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THE VIEW FROM SOUTH LAWN

The Helvidius Group has come a long way from its inception as the publisher of the *Journal of Law and Public Policy*. While the subject matter has changed, our goal has not. After two and a half decades, Helvidius continues to give undergraduates a chance to expose a wider audience to their research.

The Spring 2016 journal’s papers cover international affairs, U.S. domestic politics, current events, and history, and make up of the most diverse collections of essays published by Helvidius.

This issue’s Guest Essay, written by Columbia Professor M. Victoria Murillo, argues that voting in Latin America is heavily determined by economic conditions. She notes that most administrations have a plebiscitarian style that leads to concentration of power by leaders. Left-wing dominance during a commodity boom at the start of the twenty-first century came to a sudden end in 2015 when commodity prices fell; right-wing parties then won elections in Argentina and Venezuela and quickly made policy changes. While seemingly responsive to voters, plebiscitarian tendencies weaken the rule of law in the region’s democracies.

This issue’s Tomassi Essay, written by Pranav Jain, is a truly original piece of social science scholarship. While most papers examine recent, or even current, events, Jain’s piece delves into the life of John Sadler and the history of English common law. An associate of Oliver Cromwell, Sadler supported the Commonwealth but was critical of the violent means of its establishment. Studying Sadler provides insight into the religious influence on early modern legal culture.

For the first time, Helvidius has partnered with the Institute of Latin American Studies at Columbia to name one Institute of Latin American Studies Essay per year. In this semester’s paper, Andrea Hale examines multiculturalism in Ecuador by focusing on artists in Esmeraldas City. Hale describes a rich Afro-Ecuadorian culture and the interdependence of music, culture, and politics.

The next papers showcase the international scope of the *Journal*. Michael Davis examines the Soviet Jewry movement, which advocated for the emigration rights of Soviet Jews. Davis argues that the movement was bifurcated between the establishment, who utilized money and political influence, and grassroots organizers, who preferred demonstrations and civil disobedience. This division made the movement more effective and ultimately successful. Rachel Brown, in her paper, examines the development of the New Silk Road, an economic program undertaken by China to expedite trade with Central Asia. Brown claims that development in the Xinjiang region may exacerbate local grievances and complicate the success of the New Silk Road.

Samuel Watters’ essay examines the creation of a religiocultural identity among Turkey’s large Alevi minority. An Alevi revival movement has surfaced, creating a form of Alevi identity that challenges Turkey to reject a Sunni Muslim identity and live up to the secular principles embodied by its founder, Mustafa Kemal. Watters examines this Alevi identity through a close analysis of its symbols. In the final paper, Zihao Liu compares and contrasts China’s dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and Argentina’s occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1982. Liu argues that both regimes have used military action to divert the public’s attention from economic and political failures at home.

To bring us in line with our peers, the *Journal’s* editions have undergone a change in numbering; issues will be named for the season they are published, not the season in which they are produced. Consequently, this edition is named Spring 2016, though it follows the Spring 2015 journal.

Aside from publishing exceptionally strong undergraduate articles, this semester’s Executive Board hosted an alumni reunion in New York, and we were glad that many Helvidius alumni attended.

Lastly, I would like to thank every member of the Editorial Board for your hard work, which allowed us to publish the Spring 2016 edition of the *Journal of Politics & Society*. I have truly enjoyed working with you, and I am very proud of the high quality of the *Journal*.

Nicholas Hallock
*Editor in Chief*

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GUEST ESSAY

LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES

BREAKING THE LEFT-WING TIDE OR ELECTORAL ALTERNATION WITH A PLEBISCITARIAN FLAVOR?

M. VICTORIA MURILLO

As we entered the new millennium, a left-wing electoral wave swept over Latin America. The 1998 election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela was followed by the election of left-wing presidents in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Larger countries, such as Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, which did not have left-wing administrations, were notable exceptions to this millennial rule. During the 1990s, Latin America had experienced a different political wave, with the region’s new democracies adopting neoliberal market reforms at the urging of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury (the crucial institutions forming the so-called “Washington Consensus”). By the 2000s, these policies were increasingly replaced by state intervention, an expansion of redistributive social policies, and, in many countries, a foreign policy less friendly to the United States.

Accompanying this political turn to the Left was a commodity boom, which benefited the region by increasing the prices of its natural resource exports, which provided revenues to facilitate redistributive policies. However, with the decline of commodity prices, the conditions that favored the election and often reelection of left-wing governments were altered. Last year’s elections in Venezuela and Argentina were emblematic of that change. In both countries, weak economic conditions led governments to monetize their growing fiscal deficits to keep public expenditures up—resulting in high inflation—and to establish exchange rate policies that generated further distortions in economic activity. Consequently, by the end of last year, the governments led by Hugo Chávez’s successor Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and by Cristina Kirchner in Argentina faced electoral defeats. In Venezuela, the opposition won a legislative majority and in Argentina, a center-right president was elected. Even though right-wing presidents had been elected and sometimes even replaced left-wing presidents earlier in the 2000s, the left-wing coalitions governing these two countries had been in power for seventeen and twelve years, respectively, thus making these elections particularly significant.

Do these recent elections signal a political turning point breaking with the immediate past or simply electoral alternation in a context where economic performance is a crucial determinant of the vote? In this essay, I argue that these elections show a strong pattern of economic voting in the region—less salient in Central America but highly pronounced elsewhere—and that they probably reflect the continuation of a plebiscitarian style that has long characterized both right- and left-wing administrations in many Latin American countries. Since electoral support in Latin America is often subject to economic conditions beyond presidential control, many Latin American presidents have attempted to build support quickly by concentrating executive power and providing fast responses to voters’ immediate concerns. Unfortunately, this plebiscitarian political style fails to strengthen the rule of law in these relatively young democracies.

IT’S THE ECONOMY, STUPID!

Scholars have widely studied the importance of economic performance in influencing electoral behavior in Latin America. The recent history of the region largely explains this effect. Latin America has been subjected to strong swings in both economic policy and performance in the last half century. Therefore, its citizens pay enormous attention to economic performance when making political decisions. The influence of economic voting is only tempered when issues related to public security, such as rising criminality or the emergence of guerrillas, take the central stage.

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To understand economic voting in Latin America, it is important to remember that democratization proceeded simultaneously with the economic recession triggered by the 1982 debt crisis. At that time, many major Latin American countries faced low commodity prices for their exports and high interest rates driven by the effort of the U.S. Federal Reserve to curb inflation in the United States. In response, these countries defaulted on their external debt, capital flows to the region dried up, and governments’ inability to apply counter-cyclical policies brought Latin America into its worst recession since the Great Depression. Economic malaise served as a driver for political change in the region, eroding the legitimacy of many Latin American military regimes and allowing democratization to spread from country to country. As these new democratic governments were elected under dire economic conditions, economic performance has been a vital factor explaining electoral results ever since.

The importance of economic voting is particularly dramatic given the weight of external forces on economic outcomes in the region. The prices of commodities and the cost of credit are determined outside Latin America and have had a sharp effect on economic performance since democratization. When commodity prices are high, Latin American exporters of natural resources benefit from booming economies, while the downturn of these cycles generates domestic economic malaise. When commodity prices are low, Latin American exporters of natural resources are affected and must find other sources of income.

The first wave of democratic presidents faced dire economic circumstances and extremely high levels of inflation, which brought many Latin American citizens to accept adjustment policies and market-oriented reforms that promised to bring macroeconomic stability in the 1990s. In most cases, these policies curbed inflation and facilitated access to international credit. Interestingly, in some cases, the presidents adopting these policies had been elected on left-wing or populist platforms that opposed economic adjustment, yet as they arrived to office amidst hyperinflation, severe fiscal deficits, and no access to capital markets, these presidents shifted gears and adopted neoliberal policies. These policy turnarounds weakened presidents’ responsiveness to electoral mandates by voters. However, when economic performance improved, voters rewarded even policy switchers such as Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Argentina’s Carlos Menem with reelection.

Economic conditions were also associated with the wave of elections of left-wing presidents in the new millennium. A succession of financial crises in emerging markets (Korea, Russia, Brazil) in 1997 and 1998 affected capital inflows, which, along with a decline in commodity prices, spread economic distress through Latin America. Many incumbent governments that had adopted neoliberal policies faced widespread criticism. In many subsequent elections, voter dissatisfaction brought democratic alternation toward more left-wing options in the new millennium. As commodity prices started to shoot up with the emergent demand generated by China and India in the dawn of the 2000s, the elected left-wing presidents encountered material resources to deliver left-wing policies. Hence, this time around—and in contrast to the 1990s—when populists were elected to office, they were not forced to switch policies and implement neoliberal reforms. Instead, they could pursue redistributive policies financed by the influx of extra resources gained through higher commodity export profits.

There was variation in political style across left-wing Latin American presidents, some of which were more moderate and others more radical, especially in denouncing the United States. There was also a great deal of variation across left-wing policies regarding the degree of state intervention in markets and levels of fiscal discipline. Yet all of them expanded their social policies to reach their poorest citizens, especially those in the large informal sector that characterizes the region. Their main policy innovation was the implementation of conditional cash transfer programs, or “CCTs.” These programs provided cash transfers to low-income families under the condition that they send their children to school, have them inoculated, and provide them with routine healthcare checkups. (There was variation among countries on whether conditionality was required and whether sanctions were levied against those who failed to meet these requirements.) In addition to these relatively cheap social policies, left-wing governments oversaw an expansion of public social services, including non-contributory pensions and education. In consequence, although Latin America remained the most unequal region of the world in the first decade of the 2000s, inequality and poverty declined during this period.
Economic patterns of voting continued throughout the decade. The influx of resources in the new millennium facilitated not only the consolidation of left-wing political coalitions but also the subsequent reelection of their leaders, who had often originally emerged as political outsiders. Hugo Chávez, Daniel Ortega, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, Luiz I. “Lula” Da Silva (and his successor Dilma Rousseff), and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner were reelected immediately, whereas Tabaré Vazquez and Michelle Bachelet returned after a term out of office as their countries’ constitutions banned immediate reelection. As in earlier decades, incumbents facing good economic conditions were often reelected. As economic conditions declined, so did the luck of incumbents, and problems like corruption (which may have been ignored before) became more politically salient. For example, in Brazil, political corruption and public spending on pharaonic projects fueled mass protests and deeply eroded the popularity of President Dilma Rousseff. Perhaps more significantly, incumbent left-wing governments in Venezuela and Argentina—two countries facing substantial economic crises—faced electoral defeats in 2015.

**POPULISM AS A POLITICAL STYLE: CONTINUITIES BETWEEN LEFT- AND RIGHT-WING PRESIDENTS**

It is remarkable that, in spite of the cycles generated by commodity prices, one can observe strong similarities in political style among left- and right-wing presidents in Latin America. In particular, I want to address the definition of the term “populist” not as a particular set of economic and social policies but rather as a style of leadership. The “radical” left-wing leaders of the 2000s, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, and Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner, have been labeled as “populist” in contrast with the more moderate leadership of Chile’s Michelle Bachelet or Uruguay’s Tabaré Vazquez. However, the term “neoliberalism” had also been used to describe the political style of neoliberal leaders, such as Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru during the 1990s, given their popularity with voters and their self-definition as “men of the people.” Many leaders adopting both left- and right-wing policies in Latin America have exhibited strong but charismatic leadership—a key element of the political style of populism. Many leaders from different sides of the ideological spectrum have also shared a similar style of governance. Guillermo O’Donnell’s definition of “delegative democracy” is a crucial concept that helps account for similarities in governance between leaders whose policy trajectories suggest different ideological preferences. O’Donnell refers to a presidential style that concentrates power in the executive and neglects what he labeled “horizontal accountability”—the check and balances generated by the division of power among different political institutions. Presidents embodying O’Donnell’s conception of delegative democracy resort to issuing decrees (the Latin American equivalent of U.S. executive orders) to bypass the legislature and pay utmost attention to voters and public opinion when making decisions. In doing so, they hope to bolster their legitimacy through what he called “vertical accountability” between voters and elected officials. That is, these presidents have a plebiscitarian style of legitimacy based on the mandate given by the voters who elected them but who can only express their will in a new election every fixed number of years. Although plebiscitarianism can be detrimental to the rule of law, as explored below, it is important to note that this governing style is intimately connected with leaders’ desires to serve constituents’ interests and thereby win reelection. As such, we see the continuation of the plebiscitarian style even among leaders with vastly different political beliefs and agendas.

The cases behind O’Donnell’s theorization were Argentina under Menem and Peru under Fujimori. O’Donnell identifies delegative democracy as originally emerging during the dire economic crises of the 1990s, which many Latin American presidents characterized as “emergencies” requiring the concentration of executive power and government by decree. However, his theory can be extended to many of the “radical” left-wing presidents of the 2000s, who also relied on the concentration of executive authority to build strong governing coalitions as minority presidents, and who later sustained such concentration with the control of legislative majorities. These legislative majorities routinely delegated legislative power to the president in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez (and until now under his successor Nicolas Maduro) as well as in Argentina under Nestor Kirchner and his wife and successor,
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. In these cases, Congress delegated legislative powers to the president rather than the president impinging upon legislative authority. However, the political outcomes of the two sets of cases were similar in that regulations were decided in the executive office without logrolling and negotiating to reach a consensus including the opinion of opposing political forces. While majority presidents were able to control Congress, minority presidents ruled by decree as an alternative to pushing their initiatives through the legislature. In both cases, the outcome is “fragile” regulation: since laws can be subsequently changed in the same way as they were implemented, the law is likely to be transient and unpredictable. Given the proclivity of many Latin American leaders toward plebiscitarian politics in recent decades, we should not be surprised to observe it among recently elected leaders irrespective of their ideological stances. Indeed, the first month of the recently elected Argentine center-right president Mauricio Macri—who has only a minority of legislators in both chambers of Congress—has already seen a flurry of presidential decrees making important policy changes without public debate.

The continuity of the plebiscitarian political style seems more prevalent in some Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, where parties are weakly institutionalized. In other countries, such as Uruguay and Chile, where presidents have continuously faced organized opposition parties, their political style tends to include more consensus-building. In these countries with more institutionalized party systems, this approach to politics has a long historical trajectory extending even before re-democratization took place in the 1980s. However, to this date we do not have an explanation for variation in party system institutionalization across Latin America countries, which would allow us to explain the conditions that encourage this leadership style to emerge more frequently.

CONCLUSION: PLEBISCITARIANISM AND THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

To conclude, I want to emphasize the fact that Latin America is a developing region with the highest number of democracies in the world and that democratization has expanded more quickly there in recent decades than in any other prior historical period. However, economic volatility has made voters pay a lot of attention to economic performance. As such, recent left-wing electoral defeats in the region should be understood more as a normal electoral alternation than as a significant turning point away from the Left in Latin American politics. Since democratization swept through the region in the 1980s, elections have provided a meaningful alternation in power as well as ideologically different options in most countries of the region—even when political parties are not always characterized as programmatic.

It seems democracy is here to stay in Latin America. Not only is it working in terms of alternation in power, but socioeconomic inequality has been significantly reduced, women and indigenous groups have become increasingly represented in political institutions, and military coups have mostly become a specter of the past throughout the region. The prospects for greater democratic consolidation in Latin America have perhaps never been brighter. However, plebiscitarian presidentialism often has deleterious consequences for the rule of law and therefore democratic quality in Latin America. This is not a minor problem in a region where high socioeconomic inequality already generates incentives for the powerful to avoid compliance with the law and for the enforcement of laws to be biased by social class, gender, and/or ethnicity.

The consequences of this political style on the rule of law are meaningful even if we agree with the policies adopted by particular presidents. The concentration of executive authority to continuously change regulations and laws and the habit of ignoring the institutional constraints generated by the separation of powers dampens the quality of democracy. If citizens believe that laws are not going to last long, they will not invest in adapting their behavior to fulfill their commands. If citizens observe that rules do not apply equally to all because they are ignored by those in power, the perceived unfairness of laws will lead them to consider those laws illegitimate, further reducing their incentives for peaceful compliance. Moreover, if policy reforms are adopted without consensus, citizens will expect the next president of a different political coalition to bring a new round of reforms undoing whatever
the prior policies were set to establish. This policy volatility further damages the rule of law and makes interactions especially difficult for those who lack the power to avoid the negative effects of biased enforcement of laws, such as selectively applied sanctions for lack of compliance. Indeed, this state of affairs has a long tradition in the region as epitomized by the phrase attributed to 1930s Brazilian President Getulio Vargas: “for my friends all, for my enemies the law.”

A major pending assignment in Latin America, then, is to improve the rule of law and guarantee democracies where every citizen is equal before the law both in terms of access to justice to redress grievances and the enforcement of rights and responsibilities. The tension created by elections is that majoritarian mandates are often used to confirm plebiscitarian leadership, although minority presidents have also chosen that political style when relying on decrees and concentrating executive power to build electoral majorities. Whereas some presidents with plebiscitarian tendencies have expanded access to new rights in the new millennium, their way of practicing politics has often eroded the rule of law in their home countries. This tension created by electoral incentives is a new challenge that Latin American citizens will have to solve under either left- or right-wing administrations.

Works Cited

1. That said, there are debates in the political science literature on whether economic growth or inflation has a stronger effect on voter attitudes. A summary of the extensive literature on economic voting in Latin America can be found in M. Victoria Murillo & Giancarlo Visconti, “Economic Conditions, Income Shocks and the Vote in Latin America,” paper presented at the University of Maryland, College Park, May 21 and 22, 2015, at the conference Fat Politics, Lean Politics: Political Survival in Good and Bad Times.
I. INTRODUCTION: RE-THINKING EARLY MODERN COMMON LAW

Most histories of Early Modern English common law focus on a very specific set of individuals, namely Justices Edward Coke and Matthew Hale, Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Henry Finch, Sir John Dodgridge, and—very recently—John Selden. The focus is partly explained by the immense influence most of these individuals exercised upon the study and practice of common law during the seventeenth century. Moreover, according to J.W. Tubbs, such a focus is unavoidable because a great majority of modern lawyers left no record of their thoughts. It is my contention that Tubbs’ view is unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to reconstruct the thoughts of a vast majority of common lawyers, there is no reason to limit our studies of common law to the aforementioned group of individuals. In fact, if we are to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the place of common law in political and intellectual culture of the seventeenth century, it is necessary to move beyond the limits to which current historiography has confined itself.

As it stands, current scholarship presents two major problems. First, religion—the pivotal force that shaped nearly every aspect of life in seventeenth-century England—has received very little attention in most accounts of common law. As I will show in the next section, either religion is not mentioned at all or treated as parallel to common law. In other words, historians have generally assumed a disconnect between religion and common law during this period. Even works that have attempted to examine the intersection of religion and common law have argued that the two generally existed in harmony or even as allies in service to political motives. The possibility of tensions between religion and common law has not been considered at all. Second, most historians have failed to consider emerging alternative ways in which seventeenth-century common lawyers conceptualized the idea of reason as a foundational pillar of English common law. Focused primarily on Sir Edward Coke’s Aristotelian idea of “artificial reason,” current scholarship does not address how the changing intellectual culture of seventeenth-century England might have transformed the ways in which common lawyers thought about reason and its relation to common law. As a result, it portrays common law as rather static.

This essay addresses these shortcomings in the existing historiography by first suggesting that common law and religion did intersect in a complex way, and then challenging the idea that common law was static. Ultimately, it is important to consider religion and common law together and pay careful attention to how the idea of reason changed with time. It will accomplish this through an in-depth examination of the career and writings of a particularly little-studied figure: John Sadler, Town Clerk of London and Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge. A prominent common lawyer, Sadler commanded respect and admiration from many of his contemporaries, including Oliver Cromwell.

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ii Justice Matthew Hale, in particular, stands out for his influence on subsequent generations of lawyers. His views on marital rape were cited in court cases as recently as 1993.
who invited him to become the Chief Justice of the Province of Munster, Ireland. In spite of Cromwell’s carefully measured plea, Sadler, perhaps excited by his prospects in England, refused the offer. Nonetheless, the invitation does speak to Sadler’s stature. Munster was the largest and most settled of all the Irish provinces. The post of the Chief Justice of Munster, therefore, was one of the most important offices in the Irish administration. The fact that Cromwell offered it to the relatively young and inexperienced Sadler speaks volumes about the high regard in which Cromwell thought of Sadler.

Cromwell was not the only one who appreciated Sadler’s knowledge of the law. Appointed the Town Clerk of London in July 1649, Sadler was widely in demand for his legal expertise throughout the 1650s. In March 1650, he was appointed to the High Court of Justice, and in January 1652, he served on the famous commission for law reform chaired by Justice Matthew Hale. Apart from being a lawyer, Sadler was also a renowned scholar of Hebrew and a prominent academic. A philo-semite, he was instrumental in arranging Menasseh Ben Israel’s visit to England in 1655. When Israel died, Sadler urged Richard Cromwell to provide financial assistance to Israel’s widow. Upon the Restoration, however, Sadler lost all of his offices and spent the rest of his life in obscurity until he died in 1674.

In spite of Sadler’s importance to his contemporaries, historians have largely neglected him. Several studies of the period mention him but only in passing. Historians of philo-semitism have taken note of him as an important part of the Cromwellian machinery that brought Menasseh Ben Israel to England and organized the famous Whitehall conference. He has also been described as perhaps the first proponent of the powerful idea that the people of England are direct descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel. Scholars of political thought have discussed his contribution to the defense of the Commonwealth in the aftermath of the execution of Charles I, and historians of the Hartlib Circle have casually mentioned him as a member of the group. Likewise, Christopher Hill wrote of Sadler as one who “experienced defeat” at the Restoration in 1660 but did not examine his work in any detail. Sadler, therefore, has largely remained a marginal figure in most studies of the period.

Part of the neglect is to be explained by the fact that, unlike many of his contemporaries, Sadler did not leave behind any large collection of papers and writings. In 1666, the Fire of London ravaged his £5,000 house in Salisbury Court and very possibly destroyed most of his correspondence. Many historians have also been repulsed by the nature of his writings. Janelle Greenberg, Richard Greaves and Alan Cromartie have found his works to be “mind numbing”, “self indulgent” and “poorly organized”. It is especially difficult to interpret Sadler's tedious writings on biblical allegories and numbers. Claims that, beginning in the 1650s, Sadler grew mentally ill have hardly helped to change his image as a writer of incredibly obscure prose. While none of these criticisms is unfair, it does not follow that Sadler has little historiographical value.

In rectifying this historiographical neglect and placing Sadler within the wider common law tradition, this essay makes two key arguments. First, it argues that Sadler’s interpretation of common law and his religious beliefs were neither completely separate nor in harmony with each other; they did intersect but were at odds with each other. While common law led him to support and defend the newly established Commonwealth in 1649, his religious beliefs dictated that the means through which the Commonwealth had been established were unjustified. Even as he felt enthusiastic for the political changes around him, this enthusiasm was contained by the pacifism central to his religious beliefs. For Sadler, therefore, common law and religion worked in opposite directions. The result was a rather unusual position in which Sadler ended up supporting the ends, but not the means of the

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iii At the same time, the letter might also indicate the reluctance of the legal establishment to get involved in the Irish campaign. I thank Professor Adrian Johns for bringing this to my attention.

iv The High Court of Justice was a special court created by the Rump Parliament for the trial of King Charles I. However, the name continued to be used for a number of other courts after 1649.

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Commonwealth. Second, with regard to reason and common law, it argues that Sadler’s conception of reason was radically different from that of many other common lawyers of his time. Rather than being Aristotelian along the lines of Justice Edward Coke’s “artificial reason,” it was primarily Platonic. Bred in an intellectual tradition that detested Aristotelian Scholasticism and looked towards Platonism as an alternative, Sadler stands out as an exemplar of how the intellectual transformations of the seventeenth century affected the idea of reason as it related to common law.

To this end, I begin section 2 with a discussion of the inadequate treatment of religion in common law historiography from Sir Herbert Butterfield (1944) to Alan Cromartie (2006). In section 3, I will explore the tensions between Sadler’s religious views and ideas about common law in his Rights of the Kingdom (1649). I will first examine how he arrived at authoring this intricate defense of the Commonwealth and then highlight the centrality of common law treatises to this defense. Next, I will look at the nature of his religious beliefs, particularly his millenarian convictions, and suggest that they led him to question his commitment to the Commonwealth, thereby bringing his religion and ideas of common law into conflict with each other. In section 4, I will move away from religion and begin with a discussion of the existing historiography on reason within the common law tradition. Next, focusing primarily on Sadler’s 1640 work Masquarade Du Ciel (1640), I will highlight the Platonic nature of his idea of reason and situate it within his understanding of common law. The essay ends with a summary of the key arguments and their historiographical implications, and sketches out some directions for further research.

II. RELIGION AND COMMON LAW: A MISSING LINK IN HISTORIOGRAPHY
In 1940, as Germany waged war against England, Herbert Butterfield, then a lecturer at Cambridge, was intrigued by how often English leaders reminded their citizens of how the English could draw upon the past as a source of courage and inspiration in a time of crisis. Four years later, in The Englishman and his History (1944), he set out to better understand this powerful link between the English past and the present. Unlike the French, he wrote, the English never created a rift between the past and the present. For them, their past and their present were essentially the same. When seventeenth-century Englishmen spoke of their “historic rights,” they were not speaking of a medieval relic that they wanted to hang on to. Rather, they had made their past move with themselves. While French liberty sprang from a revolt against history and tradition, “our liberty is based on “the historic rights of the Englishmen.” This idea of historic rights, forgotten under the Tudors, was effectively revived under the Stuarts. The agents of this revival, however, were not aristocrats with claims to a long continuous tradition behind them, but “middle class citizens interested in antiquarian research.”

Thirteen years later, in his path-breaking work, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, J.G.A. Pocock built upon the work of his mentor. Acknowledging the influence of The Englishman and his History on his own work, he too set out to examine the nature of historical thought in England. Pocock’s seminal contribution, however, lay in emphasizing the intersection of common law and historical thought in the Early Modern period. In his view, during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, studying law was the most important way of studying the past. But when they spoke of law, the English referred primarily to common law—the set of unwritten rules and customs that had regulated their conduct since time immemorial. While civil and canon law were systems borrowed from abroad, common law was native to England. In Pocock’s view, the grasp of common law on English thought was such that legal, constitutional, and national history was almost always interpreted within the frame of common law.

Subsequent writings on common law, even if somewhat different in focus from Pocock’s, have largely remained within the parameters he laid out. Alan Cromartie’s work on Justice Matthew Hale, arguably the most prominent common lawyer of the 1640s and 1650s, and what Cromartie refers to as the “constitutionalist revolution” in English history, is a case in point. A remarkable omission from Pocock’s work was any substantive discussion of common law’s relationship with the religious turmoil of the time. This omission on Pocock’s part is understandable. Writing in 1957, he was obviously unaware of the central role that the ferocious
historiographical disputes of the 1970s and 1980s would accord religion in the legal and political issues of seventeenth-century England, and John Morrill’s contentious assertion that religion was the sole cause of the English Civil War was not available to Pocock. However, Cromartie’s work, despite being written in the 1990s, still presents the same problem. His biography of Hale is divided into three parts: law, religion, and natural philosophy. However, in his introduction to the book, Cromartie confidently asserts that the sections on natural philosophy and religion can be read “quite independently” from the one on law.

In one of his shorter writings, Cromartie attacks several leading historians of the English Civil War, most notably John Morrill and Conrad Russell, arguing that due to their excessive focus on religion, they had failed to realize that common law too has to be taken in account when considering the origins and the course of the parliamentary rebellion. He believes that Conrad Russell’s argument that “…religious views were an excellent predictor of behavior during the wars” does not imply that everyone who spoke about these issues had theology in mind or that “religion was a sufficient cause of their allegiance.” However, his zeal to assert its distinctiveness and novelty is misguided.

While there is nothing wrong with Cromartie’s argument per se, he sells himself short by suggesting that common law too should be considered. Rather than simply arguing that common law is as relevant a theme as religion, it appears to be more fruitful to ask how common law and religion mixed with each other to define one’s worldview or the political stance that one took. Such an approach has the benefit of helping us to go beyond the parameters drawn by Pocock and taking a more expansive view of common law’s place in seventeenth-century politics. By using Sadler as a case study, my aim is to accomplish precisely this.

This is not to suggest that religion has been completely ignored in studies of common law. In his recent book, The Constitutionalist Revolution, Cromartie argues that religion was central to common law’s dominance of English political life in the seventeenth century. The legalistic nature of the English Reformation, he argues, gave birth to the belief that, “English common law in a strict sense was omnicompetent, that is, was capable of finding answers to every social and political question including questions that concerned the powers of the church and the monarch.” For Cromartie, therefore, the relationship between common law and religion was a positive one in which religion enabled common law to acquire the dominant position that it did from the beginning of the seventeenth-century.

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Reid Barbour’s biography of John Selden, one of the most influential polymaths of the seventeenth century, suggests that, on a smaller scale, Cromartie’s interpretation is rather simplistic. Focusing on the role of common law in Selden’s vision of the “holy commonwealth,” Barbour uncovers the highly ambiguous ties between common law and religious beliefs of the time. Born in 1584, Selden began to make his mark as a lawyer and legal scholar in the 1620s. Like many of his contemporaries, he took great interest in establishing a comprehensive Holy Commonwealth. The idea was to envision a society in which “the social unity in question subsumes all of its practices, habits of thought, customs, institutions, and history under a predominantly shared sense of divine dispensation and warrants…” In most of his writings, Selden explored the role common law might play in establishing and regulating such a society.

Initially, according to Reid, Selden was convinced that, without common law, the holy commonwealth could not thrive. Selden’s studies, however, gradually led him to an ambiguous attitude towards the utility of common law for the establishment of the Holy Commonwealth. Selden’s 1616 edition of the writings of Sir John Fortescue, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in the fifteenth century, reveals a remarkable ambivalence towards common law. On one hand, Selden promoted Fortescue’s image as a legal sage, a Mosaic common lawyer. Yet, at the same time, he also critically refined this image. Gradually, Selden came to the conclusion that even if common law held power as a form of artificial reason, it would still have to “reckon with the imperfections of its own artifice.” Selden began to believe that England’s native laws, common law prominent amongst them, were not sufficient for the Holy Commonwealth. Rather, the laws of the Hebrews provided much more effective solutions
to the problems inherent in the establishment and running of the Commonwealth. To conclude, while Selden had begun with great confidence in common law as an agent of religious change, over the years, as he examined the common law tradition in greater depth, his confidence began to waver. What was earlier a firm belief gradually devolved into a proposition that Selden entertained only with great hesitation.

Barbour, of course, explores other aspects of Selden’s multifaceted life and scholarship. Nonetheless, his relatively short account of Selden’s writings on common law accomplishes two major goals. First, as has been discussed here, Barbour analyzes them in relation to Selden’s religious beliefs, thereby breaking away from the earlier historiography that kept common law and religion in isolation from each other. Second, in contrast to Cromartie, Barbour shows how common law and religion were not always allies. While Selden initially believed that common law was key to establishing the Holy Commonwealth, his faith in common law gradually weakened. Hence, in Selden’s case at least, the relationship between common law and religion was far from straightforward and positive.

In the subsequent section, I build upon Barbour’s approach to explore the connection between Sadler’s ideas about common law and his religious beliefs. In doing so, I first hope to join Cromartie and Barbour in examining the link between religion and common law to better understand common law’s position in seventeenth-century political and intellectual culture. Second, by emphasizing that Sadler’s common law and religion were at odds, I wish to suggest that the relationship between religion and common law could be both positive and negative.

III. MILLENNARIANISM AND COMMON LAW IN RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM (1649):

Born in the town of Patcham, Sussex in 1615, John Sadler was educated at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Widely considered to be the bastion of Puritan thought in the years before the outbreak of the English Civil War, Emmanuel brought him into contact with a number of theologians and clergymen, including his future brother-in-law John Harvard. Though elected a fellow in 1639, Sadler left the scholarly corridors of Cambridge for London in 1640. Once in London, he quickly cultivated a network of influential patrons and made his way into important political circles. Under the patronage of army officer and religious writer Robert Greville, Sadler wrote *Masquarade Du Ciel* (1640), a short masque that he dedicated to Charles I’s French Catholic Queen Henrietta Maria. However, with the beginning of the Civil War, as politics became increasingly divided, he emerged as a prominent parliamentarian.

In 1645, thanks to his increasingly robust political connections, Sadler, along with the writer Henry Parker, was appointed as secretary to the House of Commons. Apart from being an administrator, he also became an important part of the parliamentary propaganda machine. In June 1645, when the parliamentary forces led by Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell defeated the royalist forces and seized scandalous letters the King had sent to Queen Henrietta Maria, Sadler, along with Henry Parker and poet Thomas May, was chosen to edit the letters and later published them as *The King’s Cabinet Opened* (1645). To the editors and most of their readers, the letters stood as proof of the justness of the parliamentary cause. The letters showed the King to be an opportunist under the baleful influence of his Catholic queen. “The King,” argued the editors, “will declare nothing in favour of his parliament, so long as he can find a party to maintain him in this opposition; nor perform any thing which he hath declared so long as he can find a sufficient party to excuse him from it.” Publication of the letters had a devastating impact on the popular perception of Charles and did irreversible damage to the royalist cause.

Similarly, in 1646, when an abortive royalist counter-revolution supported by the Presbyterians was at hand (the threat was so serious that the military had to mount a takeover to stop it), Sadler immediately responded with a short tract entitled *A Word in Season.* The royalists, he argued, were
actively trying to deceive citizens who should also be cautious of the Presbyterians: “Wolves that come to us in sheepe's clothing.”28 The royalists might make any number of promises, but the English people, he suggested, owed their freedom to the parliament:

Had it not been by this Just Authority [parliament], Wee had never been freed, from the tyrannies, oppressions and cruelties of the High Commission, Star-Chamber, and Council-Board: from the burthenous Execution of Forrest Law, Court of Honor, Commissions of Waste: from the Extortions, and Exorbitances, in the Courtes of Justice, Chancery, Requests: from Shipmoney (for remission whereof, no lesse than twelve Subsidies were required) and from all those other innumerable Patents, Projects, Illegal Warrants and Imprisonments….29

By 1649, Sadler had established himself as a staunch defender of the Parliamentary cause. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, once the King was executed, he jumped to the defense of the newly established Commonwealth with Rights of the Kingdom (Rights hereafter).xi Unlike Masquerade Du Ciel (1640) and Malignancy Unmasked, there is no evidence that a patron commissioned Sadler to produce Rights. However, upon publication, it attracted the attention of some of Sadler's most prominent contemporaries; Milton and George Lawson, for example, cited him in their writings on the Commonwealth.30 In 1653, while on trial, soldier, printer, and republican thinker John Streater cited Sadler in his defense.xii Later in the century, John Locke recommended Sadler to readers who wanted to learn more about English legal history.xiii

As Sadler's most renowned work, Rights of the Kingdom has often been featured in a longstanding debate in English historiography. Following J.G.A. Pocock, Glen Burgess has argued that writers such as Sadler, despite their seemingly radical orientation, still suggest that the notion of the “ancient constitution” was inherently conservative in nature.31 Janelle Greenberg, in contrast, has argued that it is precisely writers like Sadler who represent what she calls the “radical face of the ancient constitution.”32 The debate between Burgess and Greenberg, however, has a major shortcoming. At best, the debate seems irresolvable because both use rather arbitrary standards of what it means to be radical at the time, and neither provides a justification for why their usage of the label is valid. What makes Sadler a radical for Greenberg hardly counts as evidence for Sadler's radicalism in Burgess's view. Consequently, our understanding of Sadler has been bogged down in a debate where he does not serve the ends of either of the debaters.

This section moves away from this seemingly endless debate and explores the connection between Sadler’s understanding of common law and his religious views. Sadler, as I will show, believed common law mandated the House of Commons to be the supreme authority in England. His religious views, however, allowed him to impose limitations on what the House could do. Therefore, unlike John Selden, who furnished an example of how one's religious beliefs (about the Holy Commonwealth) could be aligned with one's ideas about common law, Sadler stands out as someone whose religious views came to oppose what his faith in common law entailed.

In Rights, Sadler's main aim, he explained, was to:

…see the Kingdoms Rights, the Laws and Customs of our Ancestors, concerning King and Parliament; that we may know their Power and Privilege, their Duty and their Limits, &c. and how our Fathers did commit the power of making Laws, and judging by those Laws; and how they made us swear Allegiance to our King; what power they gave him over us; and what they did not give him over any of his subjects; and how we should behave ourselves.33

In doing so, he wanted to establish that executing the King and abolishing the House of Lords were perfectly legal and by no means extraordinary. Through an exhaustive examination of nearly 2000
years of “British, Saxon, Norman laws and histories,” he came to the conclusion that most kings in English history had come to power, not through royal succession but upon election by the Parliament and the people of England. Since the kings were elected, they were accountable to Parliament and the people. Consequently, if they failed to perform their duties, they could be punished.

Common law was central to this contention. In order to make his case, Sadler decided to see what “Antient Lawyers and Historians do record about our 26 Kings, their limitations by our Laws, their Title by Succession or Election at the common Law.” If Justice Henry de Bracton (c.1210-c.1268) and the medieval common Law treatise Fleta were to be asked about the nature of English kingship, wrote Sadler, they would unequivocally answer that, “in their times our King was Elective.” In some instances, Sadler conceded that the crown had indeed passed from a king to his biological successor. These, however, were situations where no other person in the entire kingdom was as capable as the biological successor to the throne. Regardless of the exceptions, the general trend in English history had been one of election rather than succession.

Despite the immense variety of Sadler’s sources, his analysis, as Janelle Greenberg has pointed out, rests mostly on three main sources: the Leges Edwardsis Confessoris (Laws of Edward the Confessor, written c. 1140), lawyer Andrew Horn’s The Mirrors of Justices (early fourteenth century), and Modus Tenendi Parliamentum, or Method of Holding Parliament (author unknown). All three sources were central to common law in the seventeenth century and Sadler, an eminent common lawyer himself, drew heavily on them to illustrate the nature of English kingship and role of the Parliament. The Mirrors, wrote Sadler, is clear that his Saxon ancestors always elected their kings and bound them by “Oaths and Laws.” Similarly, Laws of Edward the Confessor mentioned that the king was always elected by a council of the Kingdom. Never in English history had the Crown ever passed from one monarch to another through “blind succession.” For Sadler’s purposes, it was also important to illustrate that the people had always been represented in parliament, which had consistently played a central role in governance. Here too, he turned to these three sources. “The track of parliaments,” he wrote, “is visible enough, in all the Saxons reigning here.” As the Mirrors clearly illustrated, parliaments were so central to governing the Kingdom that King Alfred (ninth century) decided to hold them at least twice a year.

Parliament, however, was more than just an important accessory to the monarch. In Sadler’s view, without the parliament, the king was a mere figurehead. Sadler drew on Mirrors for this argument. In order to make this point, Sadler turned his reader’s attention to the popular maxim, “The King can do no wrong.” He argued the maxim made sense only if we recognized that the king “can do nothing but by Law; and what he may by Law, can do no wrong.” The king, therefore, was bound to act within the confines of the law. Only then did it make sense to argue that he can do no wrong. However, if he went against the Law, his actions were meaningless because, on his own, as the Mirrors explained, the king’s rights and dignities were akin to those of a child: “If he do against the Law, his Personal Acts, Commands or Writing do oblige no more than they were a Childs.” The implication was that, independently, the king could pass as many as laws as he wanted. However, since in legal terms he was nothing but an infant, it was only the consent or approval of the Parliament that gave the laws meaning and force.

By Parliament, however, Sadler only meant the House of Commons. The House of Lords, he argued, was rather superfluous, implying that the recent abolition of the House of Lords was not an extraordinary measure. Rather than making laws, members of the House of Lords acted simply as “Judges and the Kings Counsellors.” This was evident in the Old “Writs of Summons,” which explained that nothing could be done without the Commons. To elaborate upon this, Sadler made a distinction between Barons by tenure and Barons by patent or writ. Barons by tenure were those who wielded a great amount of power before the Barons’ War in the thirteenth century. The new Barons or Barons by Patent or Writ, while they might have had legislative rights, had been created by the Monarch to serve solely in a judicial capacity. Therefore, it was unfair

xiv The laws were not written or issued by King Edward the Confessor (1042-1066) but were composed anonymously. This explains why they appeared almost eighty years after his death.

xv According to Thomas Duffus Hardy, senior assistant keeper of the Public Record Office and editor of the Modus in the Nineteenth century, the work was authored at some point between 1294 and 1327. Thomas Duffus Hardy, Modus Tenendi Parliamentum: An Ancient Treatise on the Mode of Holding the Parliament in England (London: G.E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode, 1846), xvii.
to argue that present day Lords who had descended from the Barons by patent or writ wielded the same authority as the “old Barons by Tenure.”

For further proof, Sadler again turned to the Laws of Edward the Confessor, the Mirrors, and Modus. Laws of Edward the Confessor, he noted, obliged the king to pass the just laws made by the House of Commons. The House of Lords had no significant role in the process. Similarly, the Mirrors, he argued, mentioned that the House of Commons was older than the House of Lords. The latter had emerged from the former but carried no legislative authority, only judicial. The Modus, in his opinion, presented a remarkably similar view and suggested that, while there was a time when the Parliament had no House of Lords, it was impossible to imagine a time when there was no House of Commons. Older and more authoritative than the Lords, the House of Commons was the preeminent legislative authority in England. No one, including the king, was above it.

In order to better illustrate that the Parliament was the supreme legislative authority, Sadler turned to the militia. In doing so, he moved from the rather obscure realm of legal antiquarianism and touched upon an issue with strong contemporary resonance. The problem of whether the king could muster a militia without the Parliament’s consent had led to the rapid escalation of hostilities in 1642. By June 1642, it had become clear to Charles that the Parliamentarians were neither going to retract any of their demands nor settle for a compromise. Therefore, in case hostilities broke out, it would be best to have the provinces on his side. To this end, Charles decided to use the Commission of Array, a royal instrument that had not been used since 1557. Signed by the king and impressed with the Great Seal, one Commission of Array was drawn for each county and major city. Each document contained a list of individuals whom the king expected to take up arms in his defense. These men, known as the Commissioners of Array, were required to summon the local militia and persuade them to support the king. They were also responsible for collecting men and money and sending them to join the armies the king had begun to raise.

Parliament, of course, had been a step ahead of Charles. In March 1642, it had already passed the militia ordinance in order to muster up forces from all parts of the country. Unsurprisingly, there was little legal trouble. Unlike statutes, ordinances did not require the King’s assent and were meant to be temporary. However, when Charles took a similar step, the Parliament reacted furiously. Declaring that Charles’s orders were illegal, as he had failed to secure parliamentary consent, it sought to counter his propaganda with equally strong measures. According to a note dated July 4, 1642, in the Journal of the House of Commons, 9,000 copies of the Declaration against the Commissions of Array were printed and distributed widely.

A committed parliamentarian, Sadler had been clearly vexed by the problem of who could and could not raise a militia. He conceded that men ought to have arms to defend the king and the kingdom. However, he felt that the evidence used to make a claim for the Commission of Array stood more against than for it. Referring to a passage from the Laws of Edward the Confessor that had often been cited in support of the Commission of Array, Sadler noted that the end of the passage did speak of the command of the king. However, the arms in question had to be assessed by common consent. More importantly, the requirements should always be proportional to a man’s estate, “Free for the Defence of the Kingdom; and for the Service due to the Lords.” According to various sources of common law, this should be and always had been the case.

Going beyond the authority of Laws of Edward the Confessor, Sadler referred to a number of other texts and examples of monarchs who raised militia but only with consent of the Parliament. The Writings of William I, he argued, followed the same line as that of Laws of Edward the Confessor and proved the presence of “Common Council in his time,” which sanctioned the raising of a militia. Similarly, “These Laws of King William, with the Additions and Emendations of the Confessor’s, were afterwards confirmed by King Henry the 1st. as appeareth by his Charter.” Other monarchs, noted Sadler, had practiced what they preached. While it was true that Henry IV issued a Commission of Array, “it was again declared as the undoubted Right of this Kingdom, not to be charged with ought, for Defence of the Realm, or Safeguard of the Seas, but by their own Will and Consent in Parliament.” The keyword here is “own Will” because it bears Sadler’s other contention that Parliament’s consent alone was insufficient. The people themselves had to give their
consent. In his view:

There is no such boundless Authority, given to two or three Strangers, (or others,) to compel all Men but themselves, to provide and bear Arms, how, and when, and where it shall seem good to such commissioners: Which at one seemeth to Dissolve all Laws of Liberty.

Related to this is Sadler’s discussion of tenures. Supporters of the Commission of Array had suggested that the “Tenures of Crown” bound subjects to the defence of the kingdom. Common law, according to Sadler, presented a more complicated picture. Referring to lawyer Andrew Horn’s Mirrors of Justices, Sadler argued that even if the Mirrors suggested that “Tenures of the Crown were appointed for the Defence of the Kingdom,” this tenure had to be assessed by the aforementioned “Common Consent,” comprising both the Parliament and the people. Another source that Sadler drew his reader’s attention to was Sir Thomas Littleton’s treatise on tenures known as Littleton. Written sometime in the fifteenth century, Littleton proved to be enormously influential during the Early Modern period. None other than Justice Edward Coke published a well-known commentary on it. William Fulbecke, a playwright and legal scholar, captured the work’s influence aptly when he wrote that, “Littleton is not now the name of a lawyer, but of the law itself.” Divided into three parts, Littleton deals with the system of estates in land, title, and tenures. Sadler analyzed the second part, which focused on tenures. According to Sadler, anyone who had read Littleton could not fail to see that tenure, according to the “common law and Custom of the King,” was to be assessed not by the King but by “Common Assent in Parliament.” Therefore, even if it was true that tenure bound subjects to their King’s defense, they could not legitimately be forced to take up arms against their own will and without the consent of the Parliament. The ultimate control of the militia, consequently, rested with the people and the Parliament.

Based on only common law, it would seem that any action the Parliamentarians took against the King was justified. However, this is not the position Sadler takes in Rights. On the contrary, the work also illustrates how Sadler’s religious beliefs conflicted with the lessons of common law. The focal point is Sadler’s discussion of how his millenarian beliefs obligate him to criticize Pride’s Purge, the stepping stone towards the execution of the King and establishment of the Commonwealth. It is at this point that the opposition between common law and religion becomes sharp and clear. If Sadler’s interpretation of common law led him to the conclusion that the recent abolition of the monarchy was not anomalous, his religious views created serious doubts about the means through which the abolition had been achieved.

Though focused primarily on “Rights of the Kingdom” and the “Customs of our Ancestors,” as indicated in the full title, Rights was also meant to be, “An Occasional Discourse of great changes yet expected in the world.” The “great changes” refer to the then-prevalent belief in the Second Coming of Christ mentioned in the Book of Revelation. This belief can best be described with the label of millenarianism. To borrow Norman Cohn’s description, millenarianism, a variant of Christian eschatology, denotes the belief that after his Second Coming, Christ would establish a messianic kingdom on earth and would reign over it for a thousand years before the Last Judgment.

There is no doubt that, even before he wrote Rights, Sadler was an ardent millenarian. He was a very active member of the Hartlib Circle, the renowned group of millenarian thinkers oriented around the Polish émigré Samuel Hartlib. The historiography on the Hartlib Circle is rich and varied, the most comprehensive work is Webster Charles, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform, 1626-1660 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975).
used his political contacts to help Hartlib with his “Office of Address” and established connections with prominent thinker and Robert Boyle’s sister Katherine Jones, Viscountess Ranelagh. In his letters to Hartlib, he often expressed his millenarian aspirations. In an undated letter to Hartlib, Sadler told him: “If I deceive not myself, I dayly (sic) grow in hopes, & some assurance, that God is coming to dwell in the World to bind up the Devil, with our lusts & passions…For the whole Earth might be full of his Glory: & all his workers shall praise him; yea every Tree shall rejoice.”57 With the socio-political upheavals that preceded and accompanied the publication of Rights, Sadler’s confidence in his millenarian beliefs seems to have gained greater strength. He wrote:

I hope and believe, or know that God will come, and appear, ere long, to dwell in the World: For, the Earth shall be full of his Glory, and his Kingdom shall come, and his Will be done, on Earth, as now in Heaven. So, we were taught to ask; and it therefore shall be fully answered.58

However, unlike many other millenarians, particularly the Fifth Monarchists, Sadler did not see revolutionary violence as the way to hasten the coming of the Millennium.xix In an uprising led by the Fifth Monarchists in 1661, over forty people were killed in street fighting and numerous others wounded.59 Sadler, in contrast, believed that he did not know what force would pull Babylon down but the one that builds the new Temple or the new Jerusalem certainly would not be built by violence or violent men: “…they may perish by the Sword that use it most”.60 The way to the millennium had to be one of peace, justice, and kindness. He prayed that “all may be both Just, and Justly done. Not with Justice only, but with Pitty and great compassion, and much Mercy, for in many things we fail all.”61

It was this pacifism that led Sadler to his scathing critique of the House of Commons. The cause of his distress was the infamous Pride’s Purge. Referring to the Purge, Sadler argued that the House of Commons had failed the Commonwealth. “To speak freely”, he wrote, “although I will not Judg the Commons, yet I cannot justifie that House”62 On December 6, 1648, when Parliament’s normal guards came to Westminster, about a thousand men of the New Model Army blocked their way in Whitehall. By eight o’clock that morning, the soldiers had taken their positions in Palace Yard, Westminster Hall, the Court of Requests and on the stairs and lobby outside the House of Commons. It soon became clear to the M.P.s (Members of the Parliament) that something was amiss.63 Soon, Colonel Thomas Pride of the New Model Army came with a list of M.P.s who had been attempting to reach a compromise with the King and were opposed to trying and punishing him. Holding his hat in his band, Pride entered the House and saluted the M.P.s. Seconds later, he told them that he had orders to arrest them.

Most of the members acquiesced to the arrest and gave themselves over to Pride’s officers. Others, however, either skipped out or got word of the situation before arriving. This was soon rectified. Colonel John Birch, M.P. for Leominster, and Edward Stephens, M.P. for Tewkesbury and Gloucestershire, were “pulled out…as they looked out at the door.” Birch called out to the other M.P.s for help but was ignored.64 Similarly, lawyer and polemicist William Prynne was directly confronted by Pride himself but refused to submit. As he tried to move away, Pride, Sir Hardress Waller, and some other soldiers overpowered him and dragged him to the Court of Requests. Prynne continued to protest but was taken to join other arrested members, who were now under guard in the Queen’s Court.65 By removing the members who were still seeking a way to compromise with the King, the Purge effectively created the way for the King’s execution and abolation of the House of Lords.

Even if Sadler did not know any of these particular details, he found himself outraged by this...
show of force by the New Model Army. Speaking of the House of Commons, he wrote, “I must also condemn what was lately done to them also...by that army which hath often been acknowledged, to have both served and saved them from Ruine or Slavery.” Sadler acknowledged that his thoughts on the events were somewhat hazy, and he found it difficult to make up his mind. The distinction between “free” and “force,” he said, was very thin. What he considered to be force might mean freedom to someone else. Similarly, he was in no position to judge what counted as an act of treason or felony as there were situations when force might be deployed to avoid disaster. He said, “For it may be possible (but I hope not probable) that some Parliament-men may design or consent to such a dangerous Treason or Felony, that it may be the Duty of Officers or others to detain or secure them, till the Cause be heard in Parliament.” Nonetheless, Sadler felt it was very clear that, even though the “Law and Custom of Parliament” said that, “40 may be an House of Commons as well as 400,” he wondered to “see 40 sit alone, about the greatest Matters possible, without so much as calling the rest, or sending Writs for new Elections.” Similarly, if the King could not absent himself without the Parliament’s consent, the M.P.s too had no right to do so. According to the old “Writ of Election,” M.P.s could not depart from Parliament without Consent of the Parliament.

Like many of his contemporaries, Sadler saw God’s hand as guiding the events around him. He too interpreted the sociopolitical changes around him as another step towards the fulfillment of his millenarian beliefs and aspirations. However, as mentioned earlier, force and violence did not fit into Sadler’s worldview. When the Parliament that he had spent the entire Civil War supporting turned to such a show of force and violence, Sadler felt obligated to criticize it. Yet, in doing so, he ended up taking the rather unusual position that the ends but not the means of the Commonwealth were justified. It is not clear whether Sadler was aware of the apparent inconsistency of his position. Similarly, he never explicitly recognized the tension between his religious views and his interpretation of common law. Regardless of his recognition, the two were still at odds.

Throughout the 1640s and the 1650s, Sadler was a committed parliamentarian. During the Civil War, he staunchly defended the Parliament against repeated attacks of the royalists and those who doubted the efficacy of the Parliament. When the King was executed, Sadler quickly jumped to the defense of the newly established Commonwealth. In asserting the supremacy of the House of Commons over the monarchy and the House of Lords, he put his knowledge of common law to use and fervently argued that common law justified the new Commonwealth. However, when the House resorted to force, Sadler’s religious views overrode his belief in the supremacy of the House of Commons. If his faith in common law had allowed him to speak for the authority of the Parliament, his religious views allowed him to impose limitations on the very authority that common law helped establish. Consequently, Sadler’s religious views and his faith in common law clashed with each other.

IV. REASON: ARISTOTELIAN AND PLATONIC

In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, common lawyers often emphasized reason and custom as the keys to the supremacy of common law; both of these lent it an unmatched distinction. However, as J.G.A. Pocock discovered in his seminal study, appealing to both reason and custom presented a peculiar paradox. If law is custom, it follows that law changes constantly and adapts to the changing circumstances, but if it is reason, it is immutable. How, asked Pocock, can law be both changing and immutable at the same time? In The Politics of the Ancient Constitution (1993), Glen Burgess argued that, despite identifying the problem, Pocock failed to resolve it. Burgess wrote that Pocock focused mainly on custom and failed to adequately consider reason. In fact, upon a closer examination, Pocock’s paradox turns out to be an illusion. In Burgess’s view, common lawyers did not treat custom and reason as necessarily antithetical. Taking reason to be more important than custom, they believed that it was the customary nature of common law that made it reasonable.

The debate, however, does not end here. A number of historians have been vexed with the related problem of how common lawyers defined reason. In his biography of Sir Matthew Hale (1609-
1676), the leading legal authority of the *Interregnum*, Alan Cromartie tried his hand at the problem through a study of Sir Edward Coke. Coke’s belief that law acquired its authority through reason was hardly novel.\(^{73}\) However, what distinguished Coke from others who had made the same point (such as Circeo) was his conception of “artificial reason.” Unlike the layman’s “natural reason,” artificial reason was the skill and specialized knowledge acquired by the common lawyer through diligent study of Year Books and Reports produced by other lawyers for over three centuries.\(^{74}\) No one is born with this form of reason; rather, one develops it only through education and practice.

In *The Common Law Mind* (2000), J.W. Tubbs suggested that this understanding of Coke’s “artificial reason” is questionable. Citing the varied scholarly interpretations of the concept, he contended that Coke’s writings appear to support all of the varied readings.\(^{75}\) Nonetheless, sweeping his initial doubts aside, he presents an interpretation similar to Cromartie’s. Regardless of a person’s natural gifts, he writes, artificial reason can be developed only through education, training, and experience.\(^{76}\) However, Tubbs departs from Cromartie and others in two ways. First, he attempts to ground this understanding of reason in the wider intellectual context of the time. Second, he compares Coke with other common lawyers, most notably Sir Henry Finch (c.1558-1625) and Sir John Doddridge (1555-1628). The notion of artificial reason, according to Tubbs, is a standard product of the Aristotelian learning of the time. With its emphasis on the art of argument and derivation of further conclusions from first principles, Aristotelianism laid the foundation for a notion of reason that stood for specialized knowledge derived through the study of particular cases.\(^{77}\) In his discussion of Finch and Doddridge, Tubbs points to a number of ways in which they differed from Coke. Nonetheless, like Coke, they too were under the influence of the prevailing Aristotelianism of the time. Therefore, Tubbs concludes, seventeenth-century common lawyers thought of reason primarily in Aristotelian terms.\(^{78}\)

Not all historians, however, have argued for the prominance of Aristotelianism as sweepingly as Tubbs. Stephen A. Siegel has suggested that the Aristotelian foundations of reason as it related to common law increasingly came under attack over the course of the seventeenth-century.\(^{79}\) Siegel locates the source of this attack in what historians now refer to as the “Scientific Revolution” that swept through Europe during the period. The “Scientific Revolution”, he writes, gave birth to the “analytical-synthetical method,” which diverged from the existing Aristotelian method in a very important way. While Aristotle’s teleology had led him to create a distinction between form and matter, several seventeenth-century thinkers did not oppose matter and form. Consequently, since matter and form were essentially the same, they could be understood equally well.\(^{80}\) This led to a demand for certainty and truth that, as Hobbes argued, common law and its dependence on Coke’s “artificial reason” failed to meet. While Hobbes’s attack was against the notion of common law itself, for our current purposes, it is sufficient to highlight his critique of the idea of “artificial reason.” In Hobbes’s view, “artificial reason” acquired through diligent study and experience led not to knowledge but opinions that are, at best, probable truth. Consequently, the notion of “artificial reason” was severely inadequate for dealing with the crucial matters of justice and administration.\(^{80}\)

Unlike Siegel who focused on the “Scientific Revolution,” this section looks at Platonism as a force in seventeenth-century thought. Pointing to Sadler as a notable exception, it argues that Sadler’s understanding of reason was primarily Platonic, not Aristotelian. Emerging from a tradition that sought to break away from the Aristotelian scholasticism formally dominant in English universities, Sadler’s understanding of reason was fundamentally different from that of Coke and others. To this end, this section begins with an account of the emergence of Platonism as a strand of thought in seventeenth-century England. In particular, it highlights Sadler’s association with the Cambridge Platonists, a group of thinkers based at the University of Cambridge.

Until the seventeenth century, scholasticism, based on the corpus of Aristotle’s writings, was the dominant mode of thought in European universities.

Not so much a system of theology or philosophy as a method of teaching, it followed the Aristotelian emphasis on establishing the first principles that articulated the fundamental nature of something, principles which were to be used later to derive further results via inference. Central to this method was the idea of formal disputation that involved a constant exchange of arguments between a teacher and his students and amongst the students themselves. Beginning in the 1630s and 1640s, a number of Cambridge scholars found themselves increasingly dissatisfied with scholasticism, despite the common current at the university. To many contemporaries, the method seemed wasteful and extremely unsatisfactory. In 1632, John Milton, then a student at Christ's College, complained that Aristotelian thought was outmoded and insufficient in meeting the intellectual challenges of the day. Less a method for the pursuit of truth, the constant bickering appeared more to be a way of satisfying egos and settling scores. In his Academiarum Examen (1656), cleric and physician John Webster denounced the method as a:

...a civil war of words, a verbal contest, a combat of cunning, craftiness, violence and altercation, wherein all verbal force, by impudence, insolence, opposition, contradiction, derision, diversion, trifling, jeering, humming, hissing, brawling, quarrelng, scolding, scandalizing, and the like, are equally allowed of, and accounted just, and no regard had to the truth....

Even more vexing was scholasticism's close alignment with the reigning theology of Calvinism and, at times, doctrinaire Catholicism. With its rigid academic formulations, scholasticism proved to be a nurturing ground for the doctrines of Calvinism, which emphasized predestination and did not value human reason or freedom of the will. As a student at Eton, the philosopher Henry More felt that this made God inscrutable and contradicted his personal belief in the inherent goodness of God. Therefore, towards the beginning of the seventeenth century, there emerged increasing dissatisfaction with scholasticism and its Aristotelian foundations. When More and some of his contemporaries went to Cambridge, they fervently sought an alternative.

Aristotle's own teacher Plato, as well as his later interpreters, including Plotinus, furnished a potential alternative to the inadequacies of Aristotle and scholasticism. Their writings proved to be instrumental in articulating a worldview markedly different from Calvinism. According to Mark Goldie, the starting point was Plato's doctrine of soul, reason, and knowledge. On Earth, the soul exists in a state of alienation from the universal divine mind. Its sole purpose is the pursuit of knowledge and contemplation of the divine. However, this is possible only through the exercise of reason. But reason, unlike what the scholastics took it to be, went beyond the ability to form conclusions through deduction and inference. It was, as Platonic writers defined it, “the organ of divine sense.” Within themselves, humans carried “an intuition of archetypal truths that subsist in the divine mind.” Through this intuition, humans could choose between the good and the evil and embrace the divine. This understanding diverged from Calvinism in two ways. First, in contrast with the Calvinist disregard for reason presumably in favor of grace, the Platonic understanding affirmed reason's centrality to the contemplation of the divine. Second, through its emphasis on man's ability to choose between good and evil through his innate sense, it did away with the Calvinist belief that it was only through God that man could do good and achieve salvation. Embracing Plato's writings, therefore, provided a distinctively new understanding of the meaning and power of human reason and man's relation to God.

These ideas were best articulated in the middle decades of the seventeenth century by the Cambridge Platonists. The term “Cambridge Platonism,” however, was first used in the nineteenth-century. When speaking of the seventeenth-century, the group cannot always be distinguished from the wider movement of latitudinarianism, which called for the rejection of “narrowness and sectarian
partisanship in religion." Nonetheless, it is possible to identify the core members of the group. These were Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, both fellows of Christ's College, and Benjamin Whichcote, John Worthington, Peter Sterry, John Smith, and Nathaniel Culverwell, all fellows of Emmanuel College. Therefore, rather than being a university-wide group, Cambridge Platonism was limited to Christ's and Emmanuel.

Born in 1615, Sadler attended Emmanuel College in 1630. He earned his BA in 1634, his MA in 1638 and went on to become a fellow in 1639. Though there is no direct evidence, it is likely that Sadler came into contact with Whichcote and others during his time at Emmanuel, and several studies of the period mention him as one of the Cambridge Platonists. Yet, as Sarah Hutton has pointed out, Sadler's relationship to the group has never been explored. That aside, we are yet to ascertain if he was a Platonist at all. My aim here is to fill the gap identified by Hutton. Through a close reading of Sadler's masque Masquerade Du Ciel (1640), I hope to firmly establish that Platonism was a significant strand in his thought and came to shape his understanding of reason.

In using Sadler's masque as my case study, I do not wish to imply that the piece is exceptional by all standards. In fact, it is reasonable to suggest that most masques written by university students such as Sadler were neo-platonic. My point, as I will show, is that Sadler's masque is particularly valuable in thinking about common lawyers conceptualized reason and its relation to common law.

Dedicated to Queen Henrietta Maria, the French Catholic Queen of King Charles I, the masque presents an allegory for royal supremacy, and the just and benign nature of Kingship. Set in “the Little World or the Isle of Britain,” it tells the story of how the “late commotions” between Saturn and Mercury are settled by the “goodnesse” of monarchs Phebus and Phebe. The plot, writes Sadler, is divided into two parts: “celestiall” and “terrestriall”. The “celestiall” aims at providing the “most true and exact draught of the Site and Motions of the SUN, MOONE, VENUS, MERCURY, JUPITER and MARS; with other heavenly bodies, through the yeeres, 1639, 1640, &c (sic).” The “terrestriall”, on the other hand, represents how these motions were “shadowed upon earth”.

The quarrel between Saturn and Mercury begins with Phebus sending Mercury to the Northern Thule. However, Saturn, already present in the region, drives Mercury back. Enraged, Phebus, accompanied by Jupiter, Mars, and their Satellites, initially approaches Saturn in a “Warre-like Manner”. However, Phebe, with her “Royall Goodnesse”, intervenes asking Phebus to mediate peace which Phebus grants immediately. A discontented Mars tries to disturb the peace and “by divers assayas, Labours to break it.” Phebus strikes and holds Mars prisoner. However, once Phebus returns to his Southern residence, Venus petitions him on behalf of Mars. Good and gracious, Phebus grants her request. Undeterred by his imprisonment, Mars still plots to incense Saturn and Mercury. He succeeds and, once again, Saturn drives Mercury out of Thule. Judging the gravity of the matter, Phebe and Phebus now summon the “Grand Councell of all the Seeming Deities.” Charged with rebellion against Phebus, Mars is now forced to “forfeit all His Honours, Dignities, Priviledges &c. to His Soeveraigne PHEBUS.” Next, somewhat unexpectedly, Saturn and Mercury voluntarily “resigne up all Their Possessions, Claimes, &c. into PHEBUS Hands, acknowledging Their dependence on His Royall favour.” Yet Phebus, once again moved by his “wonted Goodnesse” reinvests them with their former privileges and several new ones knowing that “Royal Goodnesse” always makes “Loyall Subjects of all Noble Spirits.”

The part recounted so far constitutes the political realm in which Saturn and Mercury exist. Yet, writes Sadler, they are also “sometime Poeticall, sometime Platonickal, yea Chymicall sometime.” If we look to the poets, the quarrel stems from Saturn’s possession of Thule, a fact recounted in several of the “old Poets and Poeticall writers.” While the poets make a claim for Saturn’s possession of Thule, the “chymists” explain why it should belong to Mercury. Of all the planets, Mercury has the greatest latitude from “Ecliptick, which is the SUNS constant Residence.” Therefore, it seems to be a good fit for places, such as Thule with “Climes, which are most Remote and distant from the SUN.” Similarly, Mercury is cold and moist and, therefore, “fittest to reside in Cold Moyst Ilands; Such as THULE.” For Sadler, the platonic writers go a step further than the

xxiv In early modern European maps and literature, Thule represents a region far north now variously identified as Norway, Orkney, and Shetland (archipelago off the coast of Scotland).
poets and the chemists. Rather than simply telling us about the roots of the quarrel between Saturn and Mercury, the Platonists found a way to reconcile them in “Words and Shew (show),” even though “SATURN and MERCURY could in re, never agree in Heav’n or Earth.”

In making this case, Sadler displays a strong familiarity with the main doctrines of Plato and his leading interpreter Plotinus. However, before we delve further into Sadler’s thought, it is, even if somewhat crudely, worth stating Plotinus’s theory of the three hypostases, a formulation central to Sadler’s exploration of the relationship between different heavenly bodies. According to Plotinus, three principles or hypostases are fundamental to everything we experience. These are the One (Plato’s form of the good), Intellect (or Being, together with all beings or intellects) and the Soul (or, as Corrigan puts it, “all soul from which at a lower level the World soul and individual souls derive”). The three principles are largely hierarchical. From the One emanate the Intellect or Being and then comes Soul. Just like the Soul reflects the Intellect, the physical world, comprised of form and matter, is a reflection or image of the Soul. However, it is worth remembering that the Intellect and Soul here are not our intellects or souls. Rather, they represent higher principles from which our more feeble and inferior intellect and souls derive.

If not an exact representation of Plotinus’s theory, Sadler’s formulation is a relatively close approximation. Echoing Plotinus, Sadler begins with how Celius, Saturn, and Jupiter—the “Three Highest Planets in Heaven”—represent the three hypostases to the Platonists. Celius represents being, Saturn stands for knowledge, and Jupiter for activity. The three spheres exist in our own souls and, in the language of the scholastics, respectively represent essence, understanding, and will. As the sphere of being, Celius is all knowing, supreme, and infinite. “Celius must have,” Sadler writes, “in himself all Entity; (else not Infinite) all perfections; Therefore Knowledge, He must be Intelligent. And Having All within Himself, He Cannot but know all.” To express it in terms of Plotinus, Celius represents the One, which is the origin of all things. Coming next, Saturn represents the sphere of knowledge or understanding. From Saturn emerge the ideas or concepts that are then stamped upon “Severalall Lumps of Matter (as on Wax).” Sadler is careful to reiterate Plotinus’s idea of one hypostasis being a reflection of the other. Even before these ideas were stamped on matter, they were “Swallowed by SATURN Himself.” Only then did they come out again, divided and broken to “beget Forms; of which came This Fabrick, which we call the WORLD.”

Where does Jupiter stand in relation to Saturn? Jupiter, writes Sadler, is the third hypostasis representing activity or will. It functions as the medium through which Saturn made the world. Jupiter takes Saturn’s ideas and stamps them upon “rude indigested Moles of Matter.” If Saturn represents the “Ideal Cause,” according to which the world was made, Jupiter is “The Immediate Cause By whom the world was made.” In other words, Saturn provides the blueprint that Jupiter later executes to create the physical world. The link between Saturn and Jupiter is further explored through the notions of will and understanding. Even if the will follows understanding’s dictates, Saturn (understanding) and Jupiter (activity or will) are two branches of the same tree. If one thinks of “that Terrean Soule, that lump of living…Flesh, which we call our Heart,” Understanding is the “Soule’s Diastole,” and will its systole. Both will and understanding “make up but One Heart, One Soule.” In arguing thus, Sadler again follows Plotinus’s notion of all things emanating from the One and comprising an essential unity.

Last, we come to Mercury—the subject of investigation throughout the masque. Sadler repeats how Saturn provides the ideas which Jupiter stamps upon matter. But the “words, Syllables and Letters” by which Saturn’s ideas or concepts come out and are expressed, belong to Mercury. Employing the metaphor of reproduction, he notes that “MERCURY to SATURN, is Semen Ideale (Ideal seed): That Vis Prolifica (Reproductive Force), by which Ideahs (sic) coming out of SATURN, and STAMPT by JUPITER, on Matter; do there beget the Embryon of a Forme.…” In other words, Mercury acts as the force of reproduction that is impressed on the building material that Jupiter uses to shape Saturn’s ideas into physical reality. Therefore, one need not assume that Saturn and Mercury are necessarily opposed to each other. In fact, drawing upon Platonic writers, as Sadler does, it is easy to see how the two

xxv Unless noted otherwise, the italics are in the original.
are linked to each other as parts of a larger, coherent system.

Sadler’s acceptance of Platonic ideas, however, is far from uncritical. He was troubled by the sheer infinitude of things suggested by the Platonists. When discussing Jupiter, he notes how “All Nations say that Jupiter made the world. The Platonists, however, modify the assertion by suggesting that, “Twas Made by chusing Some... Ideahs out of SATURN.” The important thing for the Platonists, he emphasizes, is “Some Ideahs” because, due to their infinity, “all could not come forth.” Sadler finds this incomprehensible for two reasons. First, he asks, how is it possible that there are infinite individuals in each species, the species themselves are infinite but, at the end, there is only “One Infinite”? Second, given that the infinite species differ in terms of the “Degrees of Entity”, and the last Species must itself have infinite degrees of entity, it is inconceivable, even for the divine mind, to come to a point where something definite and worth producing can ever be picked out of this vast multiplicity.

In Rights of the Kingdom, Sadler brought these Platonic ideas to bear upon his understanding of reason. Asking what is reason, he disagreed with schoolmen or scholastics who defined reason solely as “discourse.” The word reason, he wrote, was first used with regard to the idea of proportion in mathematics, “Mother of all Analogy, and of most Learning to the Ancients.” Therefore, rational agents were those who acted in proportion. This definition comes straight from Aristotle. As Sadler notes, the “same old Philosopher” who thought that God always acts in geometrical proportion also thought reason always lies in the mean between two ends or objects, as evidenced by his argument that virtue is a “mean proportion.” However, to Sadler, this explanation seemed far from sufficient. It raised more questions than it answered. For instance, what exactly is this “proportion” that makes one rational? Does it lie between the actor and the object? How does it differentiate rational agents from “natural agents?”

To answer these questions, Sadler returned to the Platonic ideas of activity, knowledge and being, articulated earlier in Masquarade Du Ciel (1640). Rational agents, he argued, strike this “more inward Proportion” only when their activity is proportional to their being and their knowing. Reason, therefore, lies in striking the adequate balance between one’s activity, being and knowledge. Sadler offered the following logic for this proposition: God’s being, knowing and activity are infinite and, hence, proportional. God is also absolutely free. Through his knowledge, he freely comprehends. By his activity, he freely diffuses his being. This diffusion of being is such that “all the creatures seem as several Rayes, or Ideas (rightly called Species).” All creatures have some image of the Creator’s being and activity. Consequently, since creatures emanate from God, what is true of God is also true of the creatures. If such proportion constitutes reason in God, it follows that humans too should strike a balance between their being, knowing, and acting to be deemed rational.

In a text that is meant to present the “rights of the kingdom” with reference to nearly two thousand years of English history, this complicated discussion appears to be a digression. Not surprisingly, Sadler himself considers this to be the case. However, in order to justify the discussion, Sadler turns the reader’s attention back to the question of law. The long and complex discussion of reason, write Sadler, is essential because “our Law doth so adore right Reason.” In fact, what is contrary to reason is contrary to law. Equated thus, reason becomes the essence of law. Everything that the common law mandates is thereby made reasonable. For instance, a “tenant at will,” when ejected by his Lord, is protected by the common law, which requires that the tenant
have reasonable time to remove his family and goods, “with free Egress and Regress.” Similarly, a “tenant by copy” is never entirely subject to the Lord’s whim because, by common law, the Lord must have always levy a reasonable fine.” Last, common law requires that:

Houseboot, Hedgboot, Ploughboot, all Estovers (both for Tenants and Prisoners) must be reasonable, and so must all Partitions between Parceners, and upon Elegit, &c. Which are therefore not left to the Sole Pleasure of a Sheriff, or of any other, but in a sworn Enquest, as we may find in the Writ de Rationabili Partitione.116

Unsurprisingly, at some points, Sadler repeats the arguments of those with a solely Aristotelian understanding of reason and its relation to common law. For example, like Justice Coke, Sadler argues that it is mostly the lawyers and judges who have the ability to determine what is reasonable when it comes to matters of the Law. Nonetheless, he concedes that there may be cases when the Law itself “leaveth private Men (even in their own Causes) to be Judges of Reason, or what is reasonable.” One such case is that of escuage: the payment made to a lord in lieu of military service. In cases relating to escuage, a man’s own reason is sufficient to determine the outcome.117 The Law need not intervene. There could be other exceptions as well. However, in general, if we are to ask who must determine what is reasonable, the simple answer is that when a man finds himself troubled by his Lord, or his fellow tenants, he must go to the lawyers and the judges. The “Judges Breast” is a “Castle for right Reason.”118

The similarity between Coke and Sadler, however, is a minor one. It certainly does not obscure the fact (owing to his intellectual background) that Sadler had come to think of reason very differently from his predecessors. While Coke and various others followed an Aristotelian understanding of reason, Sadler leaned towards the Platonic alternative. For proponents of “artificial reason,” the strength of common law lay in the technical expertise of its practitioners acquired through the study of Year Books and Reports. Sadler, on the other hand, felt that there was more to the practice of common law. Instead of suggesting that it was the diligent study of old documents that lent common law its reasonableness, Sadler argued that it was the ability of judges and lawyers to strike a balance between their activity, being, and knowledge that made common law reasonable. For Sadler, therefore, common law stood for the exercise of a type of reason that mimicked God’s infinite and proportional being, knowing, and activity.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, at least one major recent work of scholarship has emphasized the dominance of Aristotelian thought amongst common lawyers in the seventeenth century. The effect, however, has been to portray common law as untouched by the radical intellectual transformations of the period. By looking at a figure like Sadler, this section has attempted to argue that this was not the case. As several thinkers grew dissatisfied with Aristotelian scholasticism, they made their way into Platonism. A member of the Cambridge Platonists, the most influential group of Platonic thinkers in seventeenth-century England, Sadler also took to Platonism as a way to resolve intellectual problems. One such problem was the concept of reason as it related to common law. Moving away from Justice Edward Coke’s Aristotelian concept of “artificial reason,” Sadler developed a more Platonic view of reason. In doing so, he conceptualized common law not as the use of technical knowledge gathered through diligent study but as an exercise of the Platonic variety of reason.

CONCLUSION

It is fitting to end by suggesting directions for further research. First, in thinking about common law and religion, it would be suitable to go back to Justices Edward Coke and Matthew Hale to connect their religious views with their ideas about common law. This exercise might change our interpretation of their writings and their impact on the subsequent generations of common lawyers. Second, due to the lack of substantive evidence, I have hesitated to draw a strong connection between Sadler’s religious views and his idea of reason. I have only hinted at such a connection by pointing out the role of the Divine in Sadler’s conception of reason. In pursuing this connection further, we should move away from Sadler and try to look at other common lawyers to understand the nature of this link better and construct an even more comprehensive picture of common law by linking common law, reason, and religion together.

Yet, as this essay has suggested, these avenues
can only be pursued if we appreciate two main arguments about common law in Early Modern England. First, as exemplified through Sadler, it is unwise to segregate religion and common law. Integrating the two is a much more productive approach. It allows us to appreciate common law’s relationship with the most potent factor in Early Modern life and explain why certain legal thinkers took the positions they did. Second, by ignoring the seismic intellectual changes of the period, we run the risk of portraying common law as static. By appreciating the influence of ideas such as Platonism, we can fully highlight the truly dynamic nature of Early Modern legal and intellectual culture.

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THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL REPRESENTATION
AFRO-ECUADORIAN NARRATIVES IN A PLURINATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Andrea Hale, Stanford University (2015)

ABSTRACT
In 2008, the Republic of Ecuador created a new Constitution with a particularly salient feature: Plurinationality. Given the discursive trends across Latin America toward a politics of multiculturalism, this research is an attempt to understand the significance of cultural representations in relationship to multiculturalism. More specifically, this research focuses on 'traditional' Afro-Ecuadorian artists in Esmeraldas City, Ecuador, and their positionality in relationship to broader Ecuadoran society. The first section of the article focuses on the theoretical contextualization of the research: a discussion of the emergence of plurinationalism and the underlying assumptions of racial democracy that it evokes. The second half of the article incorporates the voices of many artists, musicians, academics, and activists to form an understanding of the ways in which they are part of the construction of Afro-descendant identity in Ecuador today.

INTRODUCTION: DISCRIMINATION AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION
It was a Monday afternoon. By now, I was a regular visitor of the local Cultural Center—checking out books from the library and walking through the exhibits. It was hot out, like most days. I was sitting inside waiting to meet with the director of the library when a young black boy came to the door. He looked to be about 9 years old with a miniature wooden car in his hands. His clothes were tattered. He asked the guards if the museum was open, saying that he wanted to see what was inside. The guards gently replied: “Sorry, the museum is closed. You will have to come back another day.” The boy questioned the sign on the glass door that said the museum was in fact open, but the guards again gently replied that the museum was closed for the day and that the boy would have to come back at another time.

I sat on the marble seat in the air-conditioned lobby wondering: Did I really just see what I think I saw? I did not want to jump to any conclusions for lack of understanding, so I
confronted the guards: “Isn’t the museum open? Why didn’t you let the boy in?” They half-smiled and replied, “You know they are only here to make trouble. They go inside and make a mess.” I could not help but note the irony of the moment: the Cultural Center, open to the public, selectively closed its doors to a boy that probably belonged to one of the low-income neighborhoods of Esmeraldas, which the center was supposed to culturally represent and serve. There could not have been a more poignant and subtle example of the way in which discrimination existed in Esmeraldas.

On a separate occasion, I listened to Mercedes Vargas, a local social activist, talk about the sort of environmental racism faced by many people every day. In the outskirts of the city, there is an oil refinery, which releases black smoke into the air twenty-four hours a day. The smoke directly flows into the peripheral neighborhood of ‘Lucha de los pobres’ (‘the fight of the poor’) because “[t]hey say we are like vultures. That we are immune to all sickness. We have no political power to claim our rights, so we accept the minimum.”

Both the boy in the museum and Vargas’s account demonstrate the legacy and continuance of racism in Esmeraldas today—firstly as a form of prejudice linked to a micro-aggression and secondly as a political and structural lack of accountability to the health of those people whose lives are valued less because of racist preconceptions about the ‘immunity’ of black bodies to pollution and more broadly, pain.

Ongoing racial discrimination is the legacy of a long history of separation and exclusion of Afro-Ecuadorians in respect to the Ecuadorian state. Part of this history is of Afro-Ecuadorian social activism and cultural production. Esmeraldas is the most Northern province of Ecuador, bordering Colombia and considered the ancestral land of Afro-descendants. It continues to serve as an important center for Afro-descendant cultural production, one form of which is marimba music and its accompanying dance forms. Jacinto Fierro, an activist in the movement for collective land rights for the Afro-Ecuadorian community, recounts that the formation of organizations that began speaking about Afro-Ecuadorian land rights on a national level emerged from marimba groups.2 The organization of the dance and music groups became the basis for the formation of community identity and empowerment, through which people became conscious of their rights to land and dignity.

In contrast to an understanding of marimba as a base for organizational forms of resistance, scholar Juan García Salazar critiqued marimba performances in Esmeraldas City by arguing that these performances that are supposedly representative of the Afro-Esmeraldeñan community in fact reinforce systems of oppression because there are no narratives of resistance or effective political change within the performance.3 This critique reads marimba performance as a token expression of multiculturalism serving the interests of the audiences who look upon the spectacle. The tension between marimba as a symbol of resistance and marimba as a token of multiculturalism that reinforces racist stereotypes suggests two ways of understanding the ongoing debate about the politics of cultural representation and its implications on the lives of Afro-descendant peoples in Ecuador.

My research is placed within this debate and is an attempt to understand the politics of Afro-Ecuadorian cultural representations in the City of Esmeraldas and the people that actively construct those representations. The following paper is divided into three principle sections: first, the history of race in Ecuador and its important contributions to the creation of plurinationalism as the current political paradigm; second, a more focused look at the history of Afro-Ecuadorian intellectual history; and, finally, an analysis of Marimba as a contemporary form of Afro descendant cultural production. Altogether, the article presents a historical as well as theoretical analysis of what Afro-Ecuadorian identity is—not a set of innate characteristics, but rather actively constructed representations—and its political implications in Ecuadorian society.

METHODS & PRACTICES

The research was motivated by a very simple question with an impossible answer: What is Afro-Ecuadorian culture and how does it relate to
plurinationality? I try to understand this question by focusing on the ways in which ‘Afro-Ecuadorians’ and ‘Afro-descendants’ are addressed or left out of mainstream narratives of Ecuadorian history, as well as how these categorizations of difference relate to the lived experiences of artists that perform in marimba groups in Esmeraldas City. For two months and twenty days, I traveled across the Northern province of Esmeraldas, Ecuador, going to marimba shows, cultural events, cultural expositions, parades, and religious festivals. I also conducted informal and formal interviews with various Afro-descendant artists, social activists, and political figures. I lived in the city of Esmeraldas for a month and stayed on a small 9-hectar farm along the Cayapas River for a month. From there, I traveled to Borbón, San Lorenzo, and various smaller towns along the river, including San Miguel, Telembí, Zapallo Grande, and Pichiyacu de los Chachis. I followed up these travels with a one-week trip to Quito to get a sense of Afro-descendants’ positioning in the national imagery. I met with representatives of Afro-descendant cultural organizations and visited national museums. In my research, I chose, for the most part, to directly focus on the research that I carried out in Esmeraldas City, though all my experiences informed my analysis and writings.

The research methods varied with the changing locations and cultural contexts. In Esmeraldas City, I met a popular Afro-descendant singer named Sonia España and ended up living with her and her family in Tiguinsa, a neighborhood on the Southern outskirts of the city center. Through living with Sonia and accompanying her to different shows with the local government’s official cultural group Africa Negra (Black Africa), I was able to observe the lifestyle of artists as well as begin to understand the relationship between their personal lives and the more abstract notions of cultural production and representation. At the farm El Encanto, along the River Cayapas and all the smaller towns along the river, I learned firsthand about the lifestyle of living along the river and the differences between concepts of culture in the city and in more rural areas. While there, I conducted interviews with members of both Afro-Ecuadorian and Chachi people. Overall, my research consisted of two main methods: interviews and participant observation.

In interviews, as my research progressed throughout the summer, I had to articulate my research topic to many people and finally came upon the sentence that most precisely described my focus: How are struggles for social justice in the Afro-descendant community reflected in different modes of cultural expression? Though I identified this question as one that particularly interested me, I realized that not everyone consciously struggles for social justice or defines social justice in the same way. Furthermore, places of performance are sites in which a broad range of social processes takes place. Therefore, most of my interviews began with life histories related to dance and music. I asked almost everyone the following questions:

1. How did you become a musician/dancer?
2. Do you feel respected and valued as a professional artist?
3. Do you feel that the government has supported traditional ‘Afro-Ecuadorian’ forms of cultural expression?
4. Many people say Afro-Ecuadorian culture is disappearing. What do you think?
5. What are your goals in your career/life?

I changed or elaborated upon this basic set of questions depending on the person with whom I was speaking (e.g. if I was talking with an artist, an academic, a state bureaucrat, etc.). Depending on the person, interviews lasted from twenty minutes to an hour. Most interviews were conducted one on one, while two sets of interviews were conducted in groups; these lasted between two and three hours.

The participant observation portion of my methodology consisted of attending almost all of Africa Negra’s performances during my month in Esmeraldas City, as well as seeing other groups in the area perform. As a guest of the group Africa Negra, I was able to ride on the bus to and from shows with the dancers and musicians, getting a sense of the process of performing. In addition, I assisted at some rehearsals and the local Culture Festival, which featured a salsa band from Colombia; I also took marimba, percussion, and dance classes in the Conservatory of Esmeraldas.

The interviews as well as the participant observation allowed me to have a more nuanced understanding of the significance of marimba within peoples’ lives as well as the wide range of contexts in which both artists and audience members interact with and create meaning from marimba performance
and practice. I am indebted to all the people that have collaborated with me in the creation of this project. With their collaboration, I have been able to conduct over seventy interviews and have gained invaluable insight into the lives and perspectives of many people who identify as Afro-descendants.

This is not a comprehensive study of the world of marimba in Esmeraldas City. There are many marimba groups working in the city, from groups of college students to younger children to other professional dance ensembles. I talked to artists from many groups, but did not have the time to spend more than a month with artists in Esmeraldas City. Furthermore, the group had a particular political position and unique access to media and performance opportunities because of the group’s relationship with the government and its agreement to represent Afro-Esmeraldeñan culture. Despite the various interviews that I carried out, the main limitation of the study was time. I was unable to spend more than a month with artists in Esmeraldas City, which unfortunately made it difficult for me to get a sense of artistic life over time.

DECONSTRUCTING PLURINATIONALISM: THE LEGACY OF MESTIZAJE

Ecuador is a constitutional State of rights and justice, a social, democratic, sovereign, independent, unitary, intercultural, multinational and secular State. It is organized as a republic and is governed using a decentralized approach. Sovereignty lies with the people, whose will is the basis of all authority, and it is exercised through public bodies using direct participatory forms of government as provided for by the Constitution.

—Article 1, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008

With this new construction of the State comes what can be perceived as a necessity to erase the past. Personally, I believe it is necessary to go back and look at this past when we consider new ways of doing politics in relation to historically discriminated groups, and if we want to generate mechanisms of reparation. Unfortunately, this is not what is generally occurring.

—Alexandra Ocles

As of 2008, the Republic of Ecuador established a new constitution with two particularly salient features: Plurinationality and Sumak Kawsay (good living). Plurinationality is a model of statehood defining nationality not as a single people with a single language and culture, but instead as “a large group of persons whose existence precedes the formation of the Ecuadorian state and its members share a set of their own cultural characteristics that are unlike the rest of society.” This definition differs from the traditional understanding of a nation-state in which the state as the political organization coincides with a single or centralizing sociocultural entity. In an attempt to be more inclusive of the various nations of people living within the Ecuadorian geopolitical territory, the current Ecuadorian constitution legally recognizes cultural diversity, different forms of self-government, and territoriality. Plurinationalism has further been described as a ‘nation of nations,’ in which society and its democratic political institutions recognize the existence of culturally distinct peoples and nationalities as political subjects within the Ecuadorian State of Social Rule of Law. Today, Ecuador recognizes Afro-descendant people as a distinct cultural group, a legal structure which has political implications for issues such as land rights and distribution of government finances to support programs that protect Afro-Ecuadorian cultural integrity.

This level of political recognition did not emerge out of a unanimous consensus among different interest groups but instead out of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian movements for social justice in the face of unequal administration of rights and allocation of national resources. Plurinationalism in particular emerged as a product of the 1990s movement for land rights by both indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples, a term originally coined by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), to describe a more inclusive
democratic framework for the future of Ecuador. Furthermore, Ecuador’s Afro-descendant coastal population actively organized for constitutional recognition, which included land rights and collective rights as a ‘pueblo’ (people) or a culturally distinct group of people. It was only in 1998 that the Ecuadorian state recognized Afro-Ecuadorians and outlined “a series of collective rights for them, including the right to collective ownership of their ancestral lands, the right not to be displaced from their lands, and the rights to participate in the development of renewable resources and be consulted prior to the extraction of non-renewable resources from their lands.” Despite this important constitutional recognition of Afro-descendant peoples, the government included Afro-Ecuadorians as a sort of ‘after-thought’: “an add-on Article that followed the list of 12 indigenous collective rights in the 1998 Constitution permitted their application to Afro-Ecuadorians.”

Part of the struggle is material; Indigenous peoples and Afro Ecuadorians experience the highest rates of poverty in Ecuador across different variables (income inequality, basic needs, housing, education, etc.). The sociologist Victor Jijón quantifies Indigenous and Afro Ecuadorian poverty to show a general pattern that suggests the traditional discrimination of Indigenous and Afro Ecuadorians from mainstream Ecuadorian society. For example, of the people that participated in the 2001 Census of Population and Housing, 89.9% indigenous peoples reported unsatisfied basic needs, followed by 70.3% of the Afro Ecuadorian population. However, these material measures of quality of life are not the only factors that have contributed to the movement for constitutional recognition of Afro-Ecuadorians and various indigenous groups. Another part of the resistance has to do with addressing a history of negative representations with historical origins rooted in the first encounters of Spanish colonizers in ‘New World,’ as well as the transatlantic slave trade. Across Latin America, the legacy of colonial encounters is still observable through different facets of present-day discourses and movement such that in 2010, a United Nations Report

…identified ‘negative representation’ of Ecuadorians of African descent in the media as a persistent legacy of past discrimination, while also underscoring that the country’s 2008 Constitution, in particular the Law on Collective Rights, recognized the rights and protection of vulnerable groups including people of African descent, which was assessed as a positive attempt to combat the population’s disenfranchisement.10

The effects upon a population of people historically marginalized from the state economically, socially, and politically are mediated through modes of representation, including forms of artistic expression. These representations are central to the construction of identity and politics. However, in order to understand the multiple meanings produced through music and dance, it is necessary to analyze how racialized categories of difference formed during the early colonial period, later providing the foundation for the Ecuadorian state, and have informed Ecuador’s contemporary ’plurinational’ framework.

A HISTORY OF RACIALIZED CATEGORIES OF DIFFERENCE

Beginning in the sixteenth century with Spanish colonial presence in the Americas, Spanish categories of difference combined with colonial realities in centuries-long processes that later became termed mestizaje (miscegenation). Peter Wade’s work largely deals with the historical development of mestizaje tracing the history of race in Spain, particularly emphasizing the concept of purity of blood (limpieza de sangre): “the American colonies added an explicit racism to prejudices of birth and religion encompassed in the classic Spanish concept of ‘purity of blood,’” previously used to identify non-Christians. As Wade argues, the concept of ‘purity of blood’ was reproduced by colonial administrators in the Americas in order to understand relationships of human difference, particularly between colonizers and different groups of indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants. The result was a system of hierarchical ranking based on proximity to the broadly fixed racial categories of Spanish, Indigenous, and African.

These differences were further influenced by the priest Bartolomé de las Casas in the early sixteenth century. Also known as the ‘Protector of the Indians,’ Casas argued that ‘Indians’ have souls and should not be used for slave labor. Instead, he “recommended the massive importation of Black Africans to take over the animal tasks heretofore largely relegated to native Americans.” 12 Casas
assertions are particularly insightful into the way in which ‘Black Africans’ have been historically ranked as inhuman within a Hispanic-centric racial hierarchy and treated accordingly through systems of enslavement throughout the colonial period up until the nineteenth century.

In the nineteenth century, mestizaje (miscegenation) as a framework for thinking about human difference became central in defining what it meant to claim sovereignty in Latin America, including in Ecuador. Trends of locating human difference in race through scientific and biological explanations, the predominant discourse of mestizaje (miscegenation) reflected a sort of soft eugenics in its progression towards lightness. The projects of nation building across Latin America often proved that, “race itself could also form the basis of nation-building projects, centered on representing the nation as…racially mixed (or sometimes, rather white) and, in any case, racially democratic.”

This idyllic racial democracy would mean that all Ecuadorian citizens would have equal access to political processes and governmental services, regardless of associative racial identity categories. However, this “racially democratic” political rhetoric failed to address the effects of a history of racism and discrimination that by that time had already marginalized many communities within Ecuador and created unequal quality of life and political access across the country.

Framed by these Hispanic-centric ideologies stemming from mestizaje, Gran Colombia—a territory that encompassed much of northern South America including present day Ecuador—gained independence from the Spanish Empire on May 24, 1822. The fight for independence came at a time when Enlightenment ideas critiquing divine right were flourishing, simultaneously as ideas of nationalism spread in Europe. Benedict Anderson argues that national identities in the Americas formed as a combination of the networks created by colonial administrative units and print capitalism, a theory emphasizing the centrality of the printing press within a capitalist system. These networks created an imaginative space for politics and trade to expand. In plain terms, administrative categories and economic units became meaningful to people through public social life and commerce, activities to which indigenous and Afro-descendants were denied access. Print capitalism increased the communication of ideas, reinforcing the networks of people representative of different colonial administrative units: the connection between “this marriage with that ship, this price with that bishop” was the “very structure of the colonial administration and market system itself.”

The growing sense of connectedness brought on by print capitalism in conjunction with Enlightenment ideas, local politics, and economics contributed to the formation of an identity unique from the Spanish Empire, followed by distinct nationalist sentiments within Gran Colombia. Anderson argues that the Spanish Empire’s increasing control over the colonies contributed to the lack of communication between administrative and economic units within Latin America. This lack of communication between regions and the competition within political and economic spheres later contributed to the dissolution of Gran Colombia into different nations.

By 1830, Ecuador had claimed independence from Gran Colombia. In the new Ecuadorian nation, birth in the New World no longer meant secondary Spanish status, but instead first-class Ecuadorian citizenship, consolidated in the ideal mestizo citizen. The creation of the Ecuadorian state was very much rooted in earlier Spanish colonial identity and networks; again, it was largely at the exclusion of both Indigenous and Afro-descendent contributions to economic and political life, whether it be through the active exclusion of Indigenous and Afro-descendant people from sociopolitical participation or through the devalorization of their distinct cultural practices.

The conflation of the mestizo identity with racial democracy resulted in “monocultural mestizaje,” a term coined by Rahier. It denotes “the ideologies in which the prototypical national identity has been imagined as a mestizo identity to which would correspond a single national culture, itself the product of a particular history of cultural hybridity between, mostly, Spain and Native America, commonly at the exclusion of African contributions.” “Monocultural mestizaje” implied the invisibility of Afro-descendant peoples on a national level both materially (e.g. economic allocation of national resources) and imaginatively in the creation of mestizo as belonging to the nation and anything else as “other” and, by extension, not a priority in national politics.
THE EMERGENCE OF PLURINATIONALISM

The mestizo as the archetypal citizen has been the dominant paradigm for understanding citizenship in Ecuador until the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As a result of Indigenous and Black activist movements, as well as shifting international politics of legitimate governance, discourses of multiculturalism, interwoven with environmental justice movements, have emerged across Latin America. One result of these movements is the creation of plurinationalism, also referred to as multinationalism, in South America.

While the plurinational framework seeks to protect rights of marginalized peoples, Ecuadorian lawmakers and activists alike are confronted with the challenge of how to understand human difference from the legacy of mestizaje. Plurinationalism challenges the racial hierarchy solidified by a single archetypal citizen, providing a national image of a nation of nations. Mestizaje and multinacionalidad are thus often interpreted as two conflicting ideologies to describe the historical development of many South American countries. For example, Whitten associates mestizaje with the elite class and multinacionalidad with el pueblo (the people), but argues that both ideologies “constitute multivocalic metatropes that may serve as polarizing symbols or as condensing symbols.” Furthermore, mestizaje and “the adoption of a national image of mixedness by no means contradicted the continued existence by no means contradicted the continued existence of racism.” However, it was more difficult to talk about in terms of racial discrimination because of the logic that if the Ecuadorian citizen is a product of mestizaje, he will be equally accepting of all parts of himself that converged in the ideal citizen—including his European, Indigenous and African roots. “...[I]t was possible to eulogize mixture in the abstract spirit of national unity, while also discriminating against non-white people in everyday practice, especially if they were seen as ‘barbaric.’” Part of these everyday practices include the environmental exploitation and pollution of areas inhabited by predominantly Afro-descendants of Indigenous peoples. But, just as “monocultural mestizaje” ostensibly unified Ecuador under a certain “inclusive” framework, plurinationalism seeks to unify the country under a different framework representing a new kind of democracy that must still confront a legacy of racial hierarchy.

Therefore, though oppositional in political discourse, plurinationality and mestizaje are perhaps not too far apart in their presuppositions that different bounded races of people and culture are organized by the Ecuadorian state and awarded rights through the state. They are two racialized frameworks in conversation with one another, multinationality (or plurinationality) directly addressing the unfulfilled promise of “equality” for Ecuador. The work remains to create new modes of understanding, communication, and distribution that do not reproduce racist or exclusionary economic, political, and social institutions. One part of this work is the creation of representations of Afro-descendants in Ecuador and a study of how meaning and significance are assigned to the category of “Afro-Ecuadorian” identity.

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY & NARRATIVES OF AFRO-ECUADOR

In Ecuadorian history textbooks, representations of Afro-descendants have long been limited to either a picture of a marimba or someone dancing to the marimba with little explanation or mention of much else. However, Afro-descendants have a history of cultural production and intellectual work, offering unique and nationally significant perspectives on the development of the country and the notions of freedom that make up the founding principles of the Republic. This section presents a brief introduction to Afro-descendant history and presence in the region, followed by an analysis of the construction of historical perspectives ranging from the twentieth century to the present day.

The first historical accounts of Afro-descendant presence in Esmeraldas, Ecuador are from the mid-sixteenth century after a shipwreck, from which enslaved Africans escaped and formed a fortified community along the coast known as palenque (palisade). Peter Wade describes the palenque as particularly significant to the Chocó province of New Granada (Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador). By the sixteenth century, the region of Esmeraldas became what many scholars including Whitten and Estupiñán refer to as “a zambo republic,” zambo being the colonial designation for ‘African-Indian mixture.’

III El pueblo (the people) is a culturally significant term as well as a central component to populism, particular relevant in Ecuador which holds the record for most popular impeachments in Latin America (Zamosc 2013, 238).

22 Though Afro-descendants living within the “zambo
various forms of cultural activism. By including Afro-Ecuadorian intellectuals and artists involved in the perceptions and ideas of many other Afro-Ecuadorian history that have significantly influenced the existing hegemonic historical accounts of mestizaje.

He also critiques the way in which Ecuador’s collective memory condenses Bolívar’s and Urbina’s images with the abolition of slavery. Though they played an important role in the legislative abolition of slavery, this abolition did not necessarily reflect a reality of freedom for previous enslaved peoples: “the empires did not fall, nor did the republic end, nor did the white men die. It was a new conditioning of the man for social function. A new concept of liberty and rights, a new concept of humanity and religion that returned the negro to his condition of being human, incorporating him into a civilized role on the land,” no matter the inferiority of that role.27 To support this argument, Estupiñán analyzes the system of concertaje (sharecropping) established after the abolition of slavery in 1542, which left many Afro-descendants impoverished and taken advantage of by land owners.28

As Estupiñán offers a twentieth century retelling of Ecuadorian history, Afro-descendant artists today are also part of Estupiñán’s legacy of cultural activism, constructing and performing meaning and memory of Afro-descendant history. The historical debates presented by Estupiñán are paralleled in contemporary discussions about how Afro-Ecuadorians contribute much more to the image of Ecuador than they receive in return—particularly as many Afro-descendant communities struggle in the face of environmental exploitation and pollution from gold mining and oil production with little to no protection from the state. One marimba dancer, Mario Boboy, argues, “[t]he marimba is something autochthonous to our land…and they [government figures] say, “Ok, we have to acknowledge them,” because we [marimba artists] have given many successes to this institution…they are in debt to us. Because what they have given us is little for what we have given to them.”29 Boboy elaborates on the way that marimba has represented the provincial government both nationally and internationally, winning it much popularity. This popularity functions on two levels: one in cultural achievement and one in plurinationalist liberal ideals of representation, acceptance, and support of diversity within the Ecuadorian state.

Another common explanation for why Ecuadorian figures in his work, Estupiñán sets forth a vision of Ecuadorian history that challenges the existing hegemonic historical accounts of mestizaje.

Because what they have given us is little for what we have given to them.29 Boboy elaborates on the way that marimba has represented the provincial government both nationally and internationally, winning it much popularity. This popularity functions on two levels: one in cultural achievement and one in plurinationalist liberal ideals of representation, acceptance, and support of diversity within the Ecuadorian state.
the government is in debt to Afro-Ecuadorians is linked to tourism. Many artists expressed dismay at the government’s lack of responsibility addressing different ideas for cultural programs that artists had proposed. Boboy suggests that these projects never become realized because “the government doesn’t focus on long-term development. If you dance now, they applaud and it’s all good. But tomorrow they forget. We are tourism. We make money. It’s not the government, it is us.” He suggests that Afro-Ecuadorian cultural practices, particularly the marimba, serve as economic capital in attracting tourists and that compensation through more governmental projects that support spaces for cultural development and innovation should be funded.

Estupiñán’s writing is significant in the context of Ecuador’s plurinationality today because of the particular vision of development, civilization, and liberty that he proposes. It is not a separatist vision but a call for incorporation into the benefits of state participation, including electricity, clean drinking water, environmental justice, and other civil rights as defined by the constitution—which would be extended to include cultural rights. In my conversations with many Afro-descendant artists and activists, many had different expectations of the state’s role in contributing to their work and their livelihoods. Despite these differences, all but one out of eighty-three interviewees agreed that the government still had much to do in relationship to supporting the livelihoods and cultural production of Afro-descendant peoples.

Just as Afro-Ecuadorian people are diverse, definitions of Afro-Ecuadorian identity are inevitably contradictory given people’s varying experiences and opinions. Artistic expression, specifically “traditional” music and dance, is by no means the only way or an all-inclusive way of understanding the identity-making processes of all Afro-descendants in Ecuador or Esmeraldas. However, the image created through performance within government institutions has particular rhetorical power because of the way it figures into the political representation of Afro-Ecuadorian people and also because it serves as a legitimization of their existence and rights. While “[m]ost analysts believe that the elaboration of nationalist discourse has always been the work of self-consciously patriotic ideologues and visionaries...the transformation of such sentiments into a more formal, more forceful system of ideas is the work of particular individuals and organizations” I now consider the significance of this “cultural work” through the exploration of a long-standing symbol of Afro-descendant identity and resistance in Esmeraldas, Ecuador: the marimba.

The term marimba is used to describe a genre of music as well as an instrument featured in that genre of music. Moreover, it is considered a form of Afro-descendant cultural production both in the past and present. The section that follows is a presentation of the stories and ideas from different Afro-descendant artists about their lives and understandings of identity. I listened to the way in which people identified themselves and described their work as meaningful and often times as part of family traditions. Through these interactions, I began to observe how people actively constructed ideas and narratives through marimba performances—considered a form of “traditional” dance and music—whether through conscious choreography or spontaneous improvisation. To explore the ways in which marimba contributes to Afro-Ecuadorian identity, I propose a mosaicked analytical approach, which will include a brief history of the marimba, the current discourse of “saving culture” in which the marimba is practiced, the stories and ideas of Afro-descendant artists, and finally, a site analysis of a marimba performance. Each of these distinct analytical lenses offers different insights into the way in which Afro-Ecuadorian identity is actively constructed today, demonstrating the complexity and multiplicity of meanings and ideas negotiated in forming the categorization of “Afro-Ecuadorian.”

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARIMBA

Some of the most lasting and pervasive stereotypes about Afro-descendants in the Americas can be understood through an analysis of the role that performed expressions play in racial stereotyping in Latin America, particularly related to sexuality and morality. Iberian notions of the “other” were “deeply sexualized” and influenced by earlier Greek conceptions of the uncivilized: “Unbridled sexuality was a key feature, as it was for the ancient Greeks: ‘it is barbarians or non-Greeks who flaunt their

iv Most artists in Esmeraldas learn to play music or to dance informally like Guido Nazareno: “I started dancing at home in the garden with my family all around me” (Interview, July 21, 2014).
sexuality quite shamelessly: and so Herodotus reports that the natives of the Caucasus region copulate in the open like animals.”32 This historical association of blackness with degeneracy and sexuality was reinforced, if not centered, in religious institution and ideology: “The institutions that were pursuing witches or prosecuting religious heterodoxy were imposing a moral-sexual order and at the same time sorting people into racial categories, especially because those who fell into the categories of indigenous, black and mixed-race were commonly seen as religiously and sexually heterodox.”33 To many religious institutions and its followers, the heterodoxy of the “other” was translated onto those cultural practices of the other, including music and dance. From this context, marimba came to be regarded as “music of the devil.” Although some church institutions today, such as the Pastoral Afro, have accepted marimba as a legitimate and valuable form of cultural expression, other religious institutions and many of their Afro-descendant members consider marimba and “culture” more broadly as sinful and, to a certain extent, a waste of time.

Though marimba was considered “music of the devil,” it was not suppressed given the relative autonomy of Esmeraldas as a region until the nineteenth century. This autonomy in Esmeraldas allowed for a “distinct cultural synthesis...largely independent of the highland mestizo influences.”34 The musical and dance expressions of many Afro-descendants centered around the currulao, the marimba dance or party which took place in casas de marimba (marimba houses) at least once a week.35 In this context, Ritter suggests that the marimba was a significant part of people’s lives both as a form of cultural expression as well as a figurative symbol:

“As the dominant musical and cultural expression of freed or escaped slaves living in a quasi-autonomous state, the currulao's association with liberation was perhaps implicit more than expressly stated, but the space was nonetheless distinctly created and defined by the sound of the marimba orchestra and the boundaries of the dance floor.”35

The marimba, present in the currulao as a primarily social space, was also a significant part of other forms of Afro-descendant artistic expression from literature and poetry through which the marimba occupied a “central location, metaphorically and spatially, in their depictions of black life in the province.” 36

The increased incorporation of Esmeraldas into the national framework and market economy took place by waves of migration, the first brought on by exploration of mineral wealth in Esmeraldas and the second in the 1950s because of new roads and the first transnational oil pipeline. These migrations oftentimes brought with them environmental pollution, negatively affecting the livelihoods of previous residents. Furthermore, this incorporation was not a simple question of migration or an equal exchange of ideas. Instead, it became a suppression of Afro-descendant cultural expression and an imposition of racialized and sexualized frameworks of difference and disapproval. Ritter argues that “[u]rbanization and the search for wage labor emptied many of the upriver towns that had once been strongholds of traditional life.”37 Simultaneously, marimba practice increasingly became a target of suppression by new local officials: “Unsympathetic to local customs, new city officials began requiring permits for black residents to hold marimba dances, restricting the number of performance opportunities and eventually lowering participation due to the cost of the necessary bribe.”38 Ritter illustrates this suppression through the novel Juyungo by Adalberto Ortiz, in which a police officer announces, “[F]rom this date on, it is expressly forbidden to hold marimba dances in the central parts of the city, inasmuch as it constitutes an attack on order, morality, and the good customs of civilized people.”39 Though the novel is fiction, it reflects a societal climate hostile towards marimba confirmed by oral accounts of the banning of marimba in the provincial capital of Esmeraldas (Esmeraldas City) in the earlier twentieth century.40

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vi The artists that Ritter interviewed in 1996 and 1997 reassert the suppression of marimba, recounting that it was banned in the early part of the twentieth century. Some of my interviewees also recounted this story, while most made no mention to the history of suppression of the marimba in relationship to their work today suggesting perhaps a certain degree of removal from the past in popular collective consciousness. This is partially why many people today argue for multicultural education in which the history of Afro-descendants in Ecuador is part of all public school curriculums.
This decline in the practice of marimba is the context during which Afro-descendant artists began to form folklore groups, including two of the most well-known in Esmeraldas—Jolgorio and Cuero, Son y Pambíl. Almost all of the artists I interviewed had trained in dance and music with the latter group. Furthermore, it is from this context that we arrive at the current manner in which marimba is practiced and maintained in the city of Esmeraldas: through folklore groups, classroom instruction, and an overarching discourse of “rescate cultural” (the saving of culture).

**RESCATE CULTURAL/SAVING AFRO-ECUADORIAN CULTURE**

The phrase “rescate cultural” (saving culture) is widely used by artists and activists to talk about Afro-Ecuadorian culture today. The need to “save” a culture implies that there is either something to be saved or that something is disappearing. Additionally, in order to save culture or cultural practice, there is a tendency to create a fixed notion of what that culture or cultural practice is. Anthropologist Sally Merry suggests, “[T]o some extent the claims to cultural rights demand assertions of cultural authenticity that resonate with earlier anthropological conceptions of culture…in other words, making these claims in terms of an essentialized, homogeneous, ‘traditional’ culture.”

These claims are made through the active construction of representations; in this case, choreographies and musical compositions demonstrate “unique cultural characteristics.”

On the other hand, one interviewee queried: “How can Afro-Ecuadorian culture disappear when there are Afro-Ecuadorian people? Won’t people always have culture?” Handler asks a similar question when describing the discourse of cultural survival in Quebec as “[t]he negative vision of the struggle for survival [which] presupposes the positive vision of collective unity and maturity—for how can an entity that does not in the first place exist run the risk of disintegration?” This question is a proposition for a shifting notion of what culture means, in concordance with contemporary anthropological definitions of fluidity and transformation. Just as people transform, so does “culture,” which is reflective of their identities and ways of living in the world.

However, the focus of the movement to save culture is part of a larger social, political, and cultural movement in Esmeraldas. This movement incorporates many residents of Esmeraldas and Afro-descendant people in an effort to understand the transformations that are happening in their lives, including environmental changes that make long-used materials for making instruments hard to find. Residents further question why certain cultural practices, such as playing marimba, are disappearing or becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. In debates within and around this movement, “Afro-Ecuadorian culture” is sometimes conflated with particular facets of life, such as music and dance. It is often represented reductively by a single symbol—in many cases, the marimba. This was often expressed in terms of personal definitions of black identity:

> We are the material authors; if we weren’t here as authors perhaps the culture of Esmeraldas wouldn’t be known…lots of people think that in Ecuador there are no black people. But there are a lot of black people in Esmeraldas. Black people that make black music. 42

Bairon Angulo serves as the current artistic director of Africa Negra (Black Africa), the official marimba group of the Municipal Government of Esmeraldas. The group formed under the power of the first black Mayor of Esmeraldas, Ernesto Estupiñán Quintero. The marimba was taken as a political campaign symbol representative of Afro-Ecuadorian resilience and its importance for the region of Esmeraldas as a whole. As part of this project, Africa Negra, a group of musicians and dancers, performs traditional Afro-Ecuadorian music and dances, largely centered on the marimba. The activities of Africa Negra—its practice sessions, bus rides to different shows, and numerous performances—create spaces for both artists and audience members to reflect on identity, existence, and self-expression. This work figures into a broad obligation to “save culture.” Part of the artists’ work is in creating and maintaining a space in which people have the opportunity to learn about Afro-descendants in Ecuador and artistic practices that reflect histories and experiences that are excluded from mainstream narratives. The musician Julio Padilla explained the importance of marimba and its relationship to Esmeraldas and regional identity:

> “When we speak of national music, we are talking about the music…that most represents the country in general. The marimba is the most
Padilla presents a vision of identity split up into governmental sectors and majority representation within Esmeraldas as the representation of the region and its people. Padilla’s comment reflects a sort of logic of nationalisms as a style of cultural production that Spencer elaborates as “all of whom are concerned to uncover, create, protect, or restore the true culture of the nation.” This logic is also observable in the ways that artists describe and perform marimba as a representation of “Afro-Ecuadorian” culture. Debates about authenticity all hinge around the creation of cultural representation—a question of existence in both its physical and political discursive manifestations. Artists, as well as “cultural activists,” are concerned that marimba should articulate continuity with the past, as well as a continued distinction and affirmation in inclusion within the state.

The concerns for national recognition and respect are directly linked to the personal aspirations of artists to create brighter futures for their families. One of Angulo’s life goals is to live from Afro-Esmeraldeño music:

> Not with Latino music, no. With my black music, with the marimba which runs is in my blood. My kids have to know that this is their identity, that this is their father, that this is their mother, that this is their family. And because of this, their father provided food for them to eat… they have to know where it comes from and from thereon forward, they can choose another path, that depends on them.  

Angulo wants to create a clear connection between a sort of survival—that which food provides—with the survival of music and dance practices which he sees as central to his own identity, existence and self-expression. He continues,

> This is the mission of a group of cultural historians that have made a compromise with the art. We have gone through hunger, rain storms, a million things that you couldn't imagine. And it shouldn't be this way. Much have we cried, but we are here standing on our feet. Because we do not want this to be lost. Because this—how can I tell you—it's our identity...a people without identity is a people that is nothing, that doesn't exist.

Angulo expresses a sense of urgency to define this identity and fight for it because he equates marimba with his identity and, in turn, with his own existence and the existence of those in his community. It is in the creation of these identities that the tensions of plurinationalism and racial/ethnic identity formation discussed in the previous section come to light. Furthermore, Angulo and other artists reiterate the obligation that researchers, like myself, have in keeping Afro-Ecuadorian cultural practices such as the marimba alive.

BECOMING AN AFRO-ECUADORIAN ARTIST

The cultural representations created through the marimba are politically significant for the Afro-descendant communities today because of the current political climate that creates legislation explicitly valorizing these expressions. Despite the tendency to organize around bounded identity categories, Afro-descendant artistic expression is fluid and in constant construction; this is evidenced through the lived experiences of artists and the different intentions and meanings they cultivate from their work. One singer, Sonia España, highlights the ways in which art weaves in and out of her life, complicating the longstanding narrative of marimba and Afro-Ecuadorian music as a representation of a sort of fixed ‘authentic’ Afro-Ecuadorian identity. Similarly challenging an essentialized Afro-Ecuadorian music or dance, young artistic director Darwin Quintero aims to reinvent and reinterpret longstanding themes within the Afro-Esmeraldeño dance repertoire. Their stories and perspectives shed light on the work of creating cultural representation.

Sonia España began singing for money on a bus to make ends meet, long before she began publically performing what is considered Afro-Ecuadorian music. Today, she is one of the singers in the group Africa Negra, as well as the director of two Afro-Ecuadorian artistic performance groups, Manantial and Bonguiar. Her career as an artist largely arose from the need to provide for herself and her daughter rather than from an inclination for artistic or cultural expression. She explains, “The reality is I never thought I’d end up in this...artistic life, I never thought I would. It was just something, you know? Life’s necessities, and soon, I just found myself
singing folkloric music.47 As she began a career in “folklore,” España confronted the discursive weight of Afro-Ecuadorian culture in the broader music scene, which had both economic and symbolic implications. She began to identify as a “singer of folklore.” This became clear when España produced a CD with a popular singer Margarita Lazo, followed by events and concerts in theaters where Afro-Ecuadorian identity was a significant part of the performance.

“...I also saw that folkloric music had economy. Because popular music, I sang in the buses and I was singing in the buses, I mean, I got on the buses, sang, and people would give money [‘colaborar’], right? But it wasn’t like they would invite me to a, a show and soon a program and would say to me come, you’re going to sing music, popular music, no. I made a living like this, I mean with this, I had enough money for my house.”48

Here, “folklore” is presented as a different class of work, the “mature” performance versus the more basic “street” performance. These assumptions and valuations of different types of performance in relationship to Afro-Ecuadorian identity are not inherent but constructed. For España, “folklore,” or, in other words, what the general public and other artists define as uniquely Afro-Ecuadorian, affords her higher valuation and broader recognition as an artist. She is no longer simply another black woman on the streets of Esmeraldas struggling to support her family; instead, España transforms into an Afro-Ecuadorian artist—representative of the multiculturalist discourse which “respects” Afro-Ecuadorian culture.

However, what is this Afro-Ecuadorian performance, how is it defined, and by-whom? Finally, what is this “authentic” Afro-Ecuadorian performance that is valued such that it is deemed fit for CD collaborations followed by programs and theater shows? Perhaps this “authenticity” comes from history: Afro-Ecuadorian cultural expressions have developed partly in isolation from the more nationally mainstream music and dance forms because of the particular history of marginalization of Esmeraldas. Afro-Ecuadorian music also uses the marimba, an instrument derivative of African instruments. These unique geophysical and political parameters work their way into the family history of Darwin Quintero, director of a marimba group at one of the universities in Esmeraldas: “We are descendants of Africa but we are what we have created within Ecuador, my grandparents.” With great respect, Quintero recalled his grandfather, a great musician. He says, “dance in itself has nothing to do with politics. But when I dance, I want to save the cultural manifestations,” referring to those “manifestations” created by his ancestors which document the history of Afro-descendant presence in Esmeraldas.49

However, authenticity in both Quintero’s and España’s experience is largely constructed and more aligned with Edward Bruner’s critique of “authenticity.” According to Bruner, “authenticity” implies the existence of a true original, an authentic, and the French poststructuralists have shown that there are no originals, only endless reproductions. Everyone enters society in the middle.50 Both España and Quintero are examples of ‘enter[ing] in the middle.’51 This argument at once argues against any fixed notion of authenticity but also must lead us to question its essentializing nature.

This is a particularly relevant definition of authenticity and its conceptual imagery, given the increased migration of many Afro-Ecuadorians to cities and the exchange of different cultural practices and artistic expressions, particularly the rise in popularity of reggaetón among today’s Afro-Ecuadorian youth.52 In Bruner’s definition, authenticity is in fact a sort of myth and often functions as an imagined legitimization of cultural expressions. Bruner argues falsely imagined authenticity positions the “native performer” “in a discourse not of their making.”53 The representations of Afro-descendant culture as timeless and falsely “values” it rhetorically while depoliticizing it at the same time; this takes the culture out of its historical context and isolates it in the present market and multicultural discourse. García makes a similar critique about the state of Afro-Ecuadorian activism today, arguing that Afro history has been silenced through erasure and a lack of contextualization of cultural practices.54 However, Quintero emphasizes

vii “...I don’t believe that this government, the Ecuadorian State, or any other government for that matter, wants or knows how to confront the historic debt it has with the Afro-Ecuadorian community. I say that it does not know how because it does not know history or the perspective of the Afro community. It knows a national history where we Afros form a very small part, if at all, but supposedly we have done nothing, we have given nothing. And because they have not measured the debt as a contribution to a people that against its will had to give much work to this state and national construction, it is assumed that there is no debt, or need for reparation. The majority think that they are being included, and have an
a deep sense of belonging to Esmeraldas coupled with an agency to create cultural memory. In order to reinvent forms of Afro-descendant cultural production, Quintero suggests that the dancer should be free to interpret whatever themes are presented in the music, even if the steps do not traditionally match the music’s theme. Though many dances already represent stories, it is the creation of different interpretations of those stories and representations that can give agency to the performer to transform culture. Looking to the future, Quintero sees dance as a way to a form of self-empowerment for youth, so that they see opportunity in artistic expression.

Finally, España’s and Quintero’s experiences performing “Cuero, Son y Pambil” (Leather, Sound and Pambil—a kind of palm tree) challenges the notion of an authentic Afro-Ecuadorian culture because of the repertoire of dances and songs that they had to learn. The authentic Afro-Ecuadorian essence that España performs in her life is largely learned and largely informed by Afro-Colombian interpretations of Afro performance, (because the director of ‘Cuero, Son y Pambil’ is from Colombia) along with her own experience living as an Afro-Ecuadorian woman in Esmeraldas. The influence of Colombian artistic expression is not isolated to España or Quintero, as the vast majority of artists performing Afro-Ecuadorian music and dance in Esmeraldas City have at some point been in the same group, which is trained by the same director. This was confirmed in the majority of interviews I conducted, in which almost all of the artists said that they had either been in the group or learned from people that had been in the group. Both España’s and Quintero’s experiences begin to draw out larger themes within the world of artistic labor in Esmeraldas, such as identity formation as an Afro-descendant artist, the market value of ‘folklore’ music, and the ways that economic struggle shape artistic pursuit.

CULTURAL COMMODIFICATION: MARIMBA AND THE MARKET

All we have is in here [he points to his head], from here emerges the marimba.
—Don Hernán

The marimba, for us is our mother—for what it represents. It is a symbol, a national anthem, like a flag...For us, the marimba is life...it shouldn't have a price, right? But unfortunately, that's the way it is.

—Sonia España

Oswaldo Ruis insisted that we meet Don Hernán. He led us about three blocks up a shallow sloped hill. Borbón used to be just two parallel streets next to the river. Houses had sprung up since then, and the paved road ended at the top of the hill, where we made a right turn onto the gravel. Two blocks later, we had arrived at a concrete house at the end of the street. There, in front, stood an elderly, ghostly thin couple. They invited us in with a smile. The man walked with a cane and moved slowly into the concrete house. We sat down by the window. The house was bare, nothing on the walls and nothing in the kitchen. The trembling of his body, the trembling of his voice: “He robbed me.”

His words hung heavy in the air. He would repeat this phrase over and over again throughout our conversation as a litany of his life’s great injustice. His daughter came in and began to explain. When he was younger, he had played with the acclaimed artist, Papa Roncón. They had often traveled and performed together, but Papa Roncón never paid Don Hernán: “They used him. And now I’m the only one here to take care of my parents. But I have cancer and some days, I can barely walk.”

The economic situation of Don Hernán contrasts heavily with that of Papa Roncón, who receives a steady income after winning the Eugenio Espejo National Award in 2011. Despite Don Hernán’s contributions to the community and to Marimba as a musician, he is recognized only by community members in Borbón, having been exploited and formally unacknowledged for his contributions to Papa Roncón’s music.

The juxtaposition between the two men living less than a mile away from each other serves as a stark example of the exploitation seen within the music industry and what many interviewees referred to as “negative competition”—the economic benefit and recognition by the state of one at the expense of another.
of the other. Given the practical economic reality of artists who work to promote “Afro-Ecuadorian culture,” the purpose of the national recognition of this culture, as exemplified by the Eugenio Espejo National Award, has been put into question. The award is part of a local and national discourse that problematically promotes the “preservation of people” as “carriers” of culture or, as many people say, “guardians of tradition.” While the award is an important gesture on behalf of the state to recognize the contributions of an individual to a community, as well as a potentially important symbolic gesture to nationally legitimize Afro-Ecuadorian culture, it ultimately has very little effect on the community—except for providing an incentive for others to aspire to reach a high level of “cultural achievement,” as put by recipient of the award in 2007, Petita Palma.57

The Eugenio Espejo Award becomes a punctuated and concentrated expression of recognition by the state. Perhaps the award represents a discursive promise of an ever-deferred cultural recognition; however, this can never be a truly respectful acknowledgement of culture when continued economic marginalization and exploitation of Afro-Ecuadorians persists within the state. These awards appear to be more important symbolically for the state, which gains recognition for its performance of multiculturalism than for the actual people that make up that multicultural reality. The Eugenio Espejo award, thus, becomes an expression of the unequal distribution of state resources in “rewarding” culture on an individual level for its own benefit.

A large part of the Ecuadorian project of cultural patrimony is in an effort to transform the relationships between different ethnic and cultural groups such that the nation becomes a plurinational state, respecting the differences between all peoples, while maintaining a richness of culture. Don Hernán’s experience with the Eugenio Espejo Award incites a series of questions about the relationship between a discursive transformation in the valuation of Afro-Ecuadorian culture and the implications of that discourse on the performance and individual identities of Afro-Ecuadorian performers. Furthermore, the question of just how state discourse combines with the market economy to form identity is particularly relevant in the case of Afro-Ecuadorian performance in Esmeraldas. This was particularly salient in a conversation I had where I asked Sonia España: “How do you put a price on culture?” To which she replied:

It shouldn’t have a price, right? But unfortunately, that’s the way it is…the problem with money is…it’s chaos here in Esmeraldas. And not just here. What happens is, if we put a price, there comes along other colleagues (compañeros) that they can call…let’s say Tierra Negra, Tierra Verde, África Negra, Raices del Pacífico, etc…If they call me, and I tell them $600, the person will complain and ask me for a discount. They’ll say, ok if this is it, think about it and give me a call. They find another person and this person will charge them $400. And all of a sudden, another person will hear about this, and without being called, will find the connection and do it for $200. This is a way in which our Afro Culture is not valued, through its dances, songs, arrullos. It’s not valued economically. Because people don’t want to pay the same way they pay a salsa group.58

This was a common consensus among all the musicians that I interviewed. Another musician told me: “What [consumers] do when they want a show is they come ask us for a price. Once they get it they go around to all the other groups until they find the cheapest deal. They don’t care about quality.” Many artists reiterated this same point. The economic pressures to perform in any circumstance and on whatever terms, ends up depoliticizing and domesticating the performance of Marimba such that, for artists, working in “cultural performance” becomes primarily driven by maximizing profits by lowering the price of performances in order to make a living. This market does not directly represent or include the discourse of resistance against the racism or environmental exploitation experienced in Afro-Ecuadorian communities nor speak to the social movement of empowering black identity. Instead, it appropriates Afro-descendant identity as an exotic difference. Ironically, while performances of marimba groups are monetarily devalued, salsa groups and reggaetón artists are able to charge much higher for their performances. One example of this is during Esmeraldas’ Festival of Culture. Instead of featuring local artists, the government paid a Colombian salsa group to come and perform—

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ix There are numerous publications and books that use the very same language, including Juan García Salazar’s book, ‘Guardians of Tradition,’ containing oral traditions and histories.
travel expenses and housing included. Although the show was entertaining, many local artists argued that instead of outsourcing ‘culture,’ the government should take more action towards strengthening local cultural production, including distinct Afro-Ecuadorian forms of cultural production, such as the marimba.

Ultimately, the depoliticized use of “culture” is one of the challenges that many artists, as well as people, face in trying to make a living off of their artistic and cultural practices. This difficulty, in turn, discourages many artists from pursuing further creative possibilities in their expressions because they feel their extra effort does not make a difference—not to the audience and not to them in the form of economic compensation. Some artists do go on creating works and imagining new possibilities of expression, while many others find their time better served at another job in order to provide for their families.

The struggle for economic stability is part of a daily reality for many Afro-descendant artists and was part of the impetus for the formation of Africa Negra, whose members are paid salaries by the municipal government instead of getting paid by the show. One employee of the provincial government’s Department of Culture in Esmeraldas described the process by which most groups made a living performing marimba—an institution or organization will contact the office and fill out papers formally requesting the group to perform at an event. Customers include the government itself, oil companies, local festival organizers, schools, and individuals. Because the government subsidizes the group, Africa Negra begins charging at $70 for a contract. This fee is much smaller compared to $800-$1,000 price that all other professional groups charge. Individuals or organizations ask for a performance of the group through the government, but if a group or a person does not have the means, they can solicit a show for free. There is no accountability process for determining whether someone can afford a show or not, so many ask for free performances.

Despite their salaried positions, all artists within the group stressed the financial burden of working as an artist. Most of the members of Africa Negra had second or third jobs to support their families. When asked whether or not people felt that the government, either locally or nationally, supported Afro-Ecuadorian artists or opportunities for Afro-Ecuadorian artistic expression, the overwhelming majority of interviewees responded that, even if the government had done things in the past, there was not nearly enough support for artists or Afro-Ecuadorian cultural expression. This lack of support is reflected in the wages of artists and repeated sentiments: “Sobrevivimos del chivo” (We live from the side job), “Este trabajo es super duro” (This job is really difficult), and “Es matador” (It’s killer).

Though money and family subsistence is a critical part of the experience of many of the artists in Esmeraldas who work ‘in culture,’ paid performances are not the only spaces where music and dance are performed or created. There are many practices largely unrepresented across Esmeraldas, from personal celebrations to local festivals. Therefore, the artist has the challenge of creating representations of Afro-Ecuadorianess that are ‘authentic.’ Laurence Prescott argues that artists, like Afro-Colombian poet Jorge Artel, sought the integration and the creation of “an authentic and whole national identity,” while at the same time, “laid bare the spiritual void and perennial paradox of a nation whose citizens lived relatively free from political oppression and racial persecution but were heavily burdened by shame and fear of the ‘colored’ roots of their reputedly proud mestizo identity.”60 In other words, “at once part of the nation and yet marginalized within it, at once proud of their black heritage and yet committed to an integrated national culture,” the search to create authentic representations often leads to the reinforcement of stereotypes such as ‘innate black musicality.”61 These various debates and negotiations regarding identity become particularly contentious in politically charged setting. Following my exploration of ‘culture’ as labor, I turned to a site analysis of a dance performance that demonstrates the significance of performance as a point of contention and articulation between various different groups and interests. In this case, different groups include the state, an oil company, and local community members.

PERFORMING CULTURE: RECOGNITION AND REPRESENTATION

They practice in a garage basement. You could hear the beat of the bombo from the first floor. After walking down stairs and through a door, we found...
the group. There were musicians on one end of the room with two *bombos* (bass drums), a *marimba*, a *guasá*, two smaller drums, and two singers. The dancers, three women and four men, filled the space and moved in formation. The artistic director of the group invited my partner and me to sit and observe the rehearsal. The musicians and dancers continued on fixing positioning and cleaning up spacing. This is where they met most days of the week for practice. They all belonged to *Africa Negra* (Black Africa), the official marimba group of the municipal government of Esmeraldas in Ecuador. One performance I attended was particularly insightful in understanding the role that marimba plays in the politics of environmental racism today.

It was a Friday afternoon when approximately twelve members of *Africa Negra* shuffled into a government truck to go to a school auditorium where representatives from Oleoductos de Crudos Pesados (OCP—Heavy Crude Pipeline)$^{x}$ were holding an event for artisanal fishers with the headline: “61 families of Esmeraldas benefit…”$^{xi}$ This event commemorated the signing of an agreement of cooperation between OCP and the *Isla Piedad* (Cooperative of Fishing Production), in which OCP invested $30,000 for two fiber boats, two wood boats, maintenance kits, and a series of training workshops facilitated by Ecuador’s Ministry of Agriculture on how to use the fishing products.

To begin the event, everyone sang the National Anthem, followed by a ‘*Viva Ecuador!*’ (*Long Live Ecuador*). The MC of the event reiterated that sixty-one families would benefit directly. ‘Gifts’ included a capacitation course and fishing maintenance kits that came in little duffle bags for the sixty-one fishing families. Given its history of oil spills$^{xii}$ (e.g. OCP oil spill in 2013$^{xiii}$), OCP was still “perceived to be more amenable to community deliberation than state entities had been, and this became a key step for the province to revive an awareness of its own value and importance.”$^{62}$ The community’s effort to secure resources and investments from OCP is part of a recent history of activism and programs initiated by Mayor Estupiñán, who tried to address the fact that “local black culture, identity, and empowerment had been long been discounted, undervalued, and subverted in the country, even though Ecuadorians of African descent made up about 70 percent of the province and 5-10 percent of the national population.”$^{63}$ It was during this time under Mayor Estupiñán that the first salaried government marimba group, *Africa Negra*, was formed.

Therefore, to conclude the event, the organizers called to the stage *Africa Negra* as a representation of ‘our ancestral music.’ They presented the performance as a symbol of good will and space for the artists to share part of themselves through their art form. Perhaps just as significant as the dance was the way in which the lead singer of the group contextualized the performance, reiterating how important this investment is for the community of Esmeraldas and explicitly recalling the broader context of “all that has happened,” hinting at the history of environmental racism and discrimination, particularly for Afro-descendants. Following the introduction, the lead singer began singing about the beauty of Esmeraldas as a region and praising its rich culture in a direct juxtaposition to the risk of oil contamination, a danger which many residents of Esmeraldas continue to face. Jonathan Ritter suggests that this attention to “the songs, texts, and choreography of marimba performances themselves suggests some of the ways that Afro-Ecuadorians have insisted upon their own agency within often-compromised performance spaces and venues.”$^{64}$ In this particular situation, the lead singer reclaims the space by explicitly framing the performance in relationship to the past suffering of the Afro-descendant community. However, for the lead singer and many of the dancers and musicians, their performance is about vitality—their happiness, strength and continued thriving, particularly through cultural expressions of dance and music.

The musical introduction presented a dignified image of Esmeraldas, its people, and its significant Afro-descendant heritage. To this call, six dancers came out dressed in bright colors, primarily orange and yellow. There were three women and three men. The women wore long skirts, which they used to create shapes in space as well as to exaggerate

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$x$ The second trans-Ecuadorian pipeline, built between 2001 and 2003 (Widener 2011, 10).


$xii$ In 2009, OCP’s first break dumped approximately 14,000 gallons of oil in the Santa Rosa River effecting communities that used the river as a source of water including different indigenous communities, farmers and ranchers (Widener 2011, 265).

repeated turning sequences; their male counterparts used handkerchiefs and hats to exaggerate their movement in space. The men and women were continuously oppositional in the choreography, intermingling and separating again, often dancing in pairs and forming new spatial arrangements. The constant motion and continuous flow of skirts and handkerchief created a festive atmosphere driven by the beat of the *bombo*, a deep base drum. The artists represent their personal selves but are also part of a larger project, which, through marimba, creates a physical space for the creative expression of *negritud* defined as “the entire social, cultural, and economic project of blackness as an ethnic ideology,” which, “creates space of difference at the intersection of competing spheres of influence.”

However, in this space, the existing tension between the artist and the audiences makes the space more complicated. In a single performance, both the artist and the audience members form part of the meaning-making process that takes place in the moment. The presence of the group and its performance was a symbolic show of respect and pride for the region’s culture, a symbol of a “national,” “multicultural” richness. By extension, marimba helped create a positive image of OCP Ecuador, making it “more richly, more diversely human” despite OCPs environmental track record. In this way, the marimba performance as part of the event structure was arguably appropriated by the corporation, contextualized in such a way as to distract all audiences, even momentarily, from the continued unequal relationship between OCP Ecuador and the residents of Esmeraldas. But, again, despite a history of oil spills among other environmental problems caused by the pipeline, many people are genuinely thankful for OCP’s investment. As expressed by one leader of the cooperative: “[f]or us, it has been of utmost importance that they have realized, that they have extended their hand to us, and we have emerged from that place where we were once invisible.”

OCP is able to “greenwash” their image, simultaneously providing a marginalized community with more resources than the nation has traditionally bothered to provide for them.

This tension is visible in the theoretical distinction between performance and performativity. On one hand, performance is defined as a concept that emphasizes the agency of the individual and their challenging of societal structures, whereas performativity “challenges the notion of individuals as free-will actors to show how these individuals are enmeshed in the logics of a given society.” The artists are in a difficult position because their performance is between this paradox of performance and performativity. The performers are on one hand representing a dignified image of Afro-Ecuadorians. However, they are simultaneously confronted with the reality of structural environmental exploitation informed by the same racist framework that asserts that Afro-Ecuadorians are “like vultures.” Part of this negotiation has to confront stereotypes:

> [w]hile the very visibility of cultural performance has certainly opened political and economic possibilities for Afro-Ecuadorians, it also reinforces stereotypes of blacks, positioning them yet again in the one sphere in which they have long been accepted in the country: as musicians, dancers, and entertainers.

In this particular venue, the stereotype of the Afro-descendants as only good for music, dance, and entertainment feeds into another stereotype, which is prevalent in different environmentalist networks—that they, “are much more preoccupied with the day-to-day...The people are worried about things much more concrete...The issue of food; the issue of security,” than of the environment or anything else. Performers are particularly vulnerable to scrutiny because of the assumption that material needs are so great that making the time for dance and music (a low to no income endeavor) is an irresponsible waste of time. The real effects of these stereotypes are the historical exclusion of community groups from participation in processes that risk their health and livelihood, such as the construction of OCP or the state owned oil-refinery, because of their perceived inability to make ‘good’ decisions for themselves.

However, the artists themselves directly challenge these stereotypes—from their motivations to be professional artists to their responses to contemporary political issues at the event. In a conversation after the performance, one artist expressed frustration: “You don’t see the changes. They have left us without fish, without a means to go out and work. Esmeraldas should be the richest province. Look out how many resources there
are—mines, the oil refinery and, before, fishing. And where does the money go?” Another artist commented more directly on the pollution affecting the population of Esmeraldas: “The community is getting contaminated and no one reflects on this. They make like a screen, they organize donations as if they were gifts to people to divert their attention from the real problems of contamination.”

These comments suggest that artists are not ignorant to these problems, even as their performance is enmeshed in the center of them. The performance of marimba becomes a space not of ignorance and conformity to the actions of OCP, but instead a space where artists must negotiate broader aspirations to represent their identities with dignity and pride through performance while making a material living. Often the contexts in which dance is performed is problematic and unequal because of the ways in which broader society is problematic and unequal. But, as Edward Brunner suggests, perhaps the significance of performance is not to transform the audience so much as to transform the performers themselves. From this perspective, the audience’s interpretations of the performance at the OCP hosted event may further perpetuate stereotypes. However, the performance is simultaneously a space for artists of African descent to assert themselves and their identity. This expression has the potential to create identity consciousness, a foundational step towards a broader social justice movement.

This event is just one example of what I call the politics of Afro-Ecuadorian culture in music and dance; it explains how various artists and activists work within the constraints of the reality of a low-income and environmentally exploited environment. A study of Africa Negra’s performance must take into account the multiple discourses and contexts that compose it. This contextualization creates a rich understanding of how the performance does not produce any singular meaning (that of boosting OCP’s image or of empowering artists); instead, the performance produces multiple meanings that are part of larger social movements, including the process of defining the Afro-Ecuadorian identity. Though some may interpret marimba performance as reinforcing stereotypes of blackness, it is also part of a broader struggle against a history of negative stereotyping and unequal distribution of resources alongside other movements, such as the struggle for collective land rights. Because of this history, the performance of Afro-Ecuadorian dance and marimba is constantly at the forefront of contradictions, competing interests, and abstract tensions.

From the history of marimba to Sonia España’s experience becoming an Afro-Ecuadorian folklore singer to the performance of all the artists together at the OCP event, one begins to see that through music and dance, histories and ongoing narratives about Afro-descendant identities are constructed and maintained. The work that these artists do and the different ways they choose to express themselves through music will continue to have an impact in the way that ‘traditional Afro-Ecuadorian culture’ is imagined. This particular impact is difficult to quantify, particularly given the multiplicity of meanings at any given site of performance. Musicians, dancers, and spectators are part of the meaning making process. Afro-Ecuadorian artistic expression through the performance of dance and music is transformed based on the relationship of artists to their performance, the broader conditions in which they live, and the context in which they perform. The power to make meaning through dance and music is particularly contentious today because it is rooted in historical notions of ‘blackness’ and ‘otherness.’ The performance’s ultimate public definition is dependent on both the agency of the performer, as well as a larger web of social and political networks.

CONCLUSION

The thesis began situated between two ideas of marimba performance and representation of Afro-Ecuadorian identity: the first that marimba is a symbol of Afro-Ecuadorian resilience, especially in the land rights movement, and the latter that it is a token expression of multiculturalism. The most important message from both Fierro’s contextualization and García’s critiques are captured eloquently in the words of Grandfather (Abuelo) Zenon:

We cannot forget that our right to live in these territories is born in the historic reparation of the damage/harm that meant the dispersion of our African blood through America, dispersion that through the will of others we had to live these hundreds of years before the configuring of the States which now order/regulate us… what we are today does not depend solely on our will or
desire to be. Today we are what the laws of the State direct and dictate that we will be.75

Zenon’s statement is significant because it not only highlights Afro-Ecuadorians’ position to the state territorially but makes a significant point that ‘what we are’ is in part dependent upon ‘the State’ as well as individual Afro-descendant actors. Furthermore, Zenon’s statement strikes at the heart of the theoretical distinction between performance and performativity: the former punctuating individual agency and the latter emphasizing how performance is enmeshed in broader social and political contexts. With this distinction, it becomes apparent that marimba performances have multiple significances for many different people, from those performing to those watching.

The broad range of analytical tools presented include: the history of race and the emergence of plurinationalism, a more focused look at Afro-descendant historical presence in the region, intellectual history, and a series of analyses dedicated to understanding the contemporary construction of Afro-descendant identity in Esmeraldas around the marimba. These different analytical tools demonstrate firstly that plurinationalism does not necessarily exclude racial discrimination, and secondly, that representations of Afro-descendants in Ecuador are not only created in the realm of governmental politics but also through artistic expression. It is in the world of artistic expression that the mundane and the imaginative merge to create a marimba with multiple significances: an instrument, a genre of music, a form of work, a personal expression, a choreographed performance, or a popular representation of blackness.

In addition, the artists’ various interpretations created around the practice of marimba demonstrate the ways in which these artists’ lived experiences inform the representation of Afro-Ecuadorian identity in a plurinational framework. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the politics of culture and performances are deeply intertwined, both in the past and in the present. I hope this article serves as an introduction to the critical discussion of marimba in Esmeraldas. More broadly, I hope this work can encompass a larger debate of how to critically engage active political thoughts that exist among artists to create narratives through performance—narratives that challenge historical representations of blackness and that address the existence of racial stereotypes. Ultimately, the creation of these new narratives that confront history and imagine a future of respect from it carry forth the potential to transform individual, communal, and national ways of imagining difference and belonging.

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THE FAULT LINES OF FREEDOM
THE DIVISION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET JEWRY MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

MICHAEL A.P. DAVIS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (2015)

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This thesis is dedicated to former Secretary of State George P. Shultz and former Prisoner of Zion Natan Sharansky. Though coming from very different backgrounds and leading very different lives, these two men stood above all the infighting to secure a better life for the Jews of the former U.S.S.R. To this day, they continue to be emblems of heroism and dedication to public service.

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“I can remember
Standing, by the wall
And the guns shot above our heads
And we kissed as though nothing could fall
And the shame was on the other side
Oh we can beat them, forever and ever,
Then we could be Heroes, just for one day.”


INTRODUCTION

On the morning of December 6, 1987, 250,000 people swarmed the U.S. National Mall. Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev was to arrive the following day to meet with President Ronald Reagan for a new set of talks that marked a warming in the seemingly interminable Cold War. A future recipient of the Nobel Prize and Time’s person of the decade, Gorbachev had entranced the Western world as a great compromiser who had brought communism with a human face to the Eastern Bloc and the potential of world peace in the face of nuclear apocalypse. However, the quarter-million people on the frozen National Mall did not care about Gorbachev’s public image. They wanted him to make a commitment that the millions of Jewish people who had suffered decades of state-sponsored anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. would be granted increased religious freedom and the right to emigrate. Chants of “Let my people go!” echoed throughout the National Mall over the course of the day, a phrase that had been the clarion call for many of these people for almost thirty years.

This event, called Freedom Sunday, had substantial representation from many of the larger American Jewish organizations, whose leaders spoke alongside Soviet Jewish dissidents known as refuseniks. The protestors were accompanied by government support. Vice President George H.W. Bush spoke, as did U.S. Senator Bob Dole (R-KS), Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Jim Wright (D-TX), New York City Mayor Ed Koch, former Secretary of State Al Haig, Governor Thomas Kean of New Jersey, and Civil Rights hero, U.S. Representative John Lewis (D-GA). These people of divergent backgrounds gathered to stand for the rights of an ethnic group in a land thousands of miles away. They spoke of the suffering that Jews had endured there, their inability to leave, and the abuses inflicted upon them by security forces including the KGB for the expression of their religious and cultural identity. As a result, Gorbachev created reforms,
which enabled millions of Soviet Jews to leave the country.

These reforms, however, were a long time in the making. Between the early 1960s and 1989, the Soviet Jewry movement transformed from a small student group in New York City to a major feature of the American Jewish community. Its support base grew across the country, in the U.S. Congress, and eventually in the White House under the Reagan Administration. How did this happen? A common assumption would attribute success to the efforts of the nation’s large Jewish organizations, which often seemed to be the base of the money and power needed to execute campaigns such as Freedom Sunday, or the large marches down Fifth Avenue in New York City held in the name of Soviet Jewry over the prior two decades. But Freedom Sunday was not necessarily the brainchild of solely the Jewish establishment. A large number of grassroots Jewish activists, predominantly represented by the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ), was just as involved in organizing this event and other campaigns for Soviet Jewry. Glenn Richter, a co-founder of the SSSJ, claimed it was ultimately his cohorts that organized this particular demonstration, while the establishment footed the bill and got the credit. To the public, the movement appeared to be a seamless alliance of mainstream and grassroots forces working to achieve a similar goal; however, the relationship between the mainstream Jewish organizations and the smaller, more grassroots organizers of the Soviet Jewry movement was closer to a rivalry. Beneath the veneer of perfect unity presented at Freedom Sunday lay decades-old tensions between two factions that stemmed from differences in their respective tactics and philosophies.

I intend to show that the Soviet Jewry movement in the United States was characterized by a division between grassroots organizers and Jewish establishment organizations. The former were innovators in the early stages of the movement and preferred nonviolent demonstrations, civil disobedience, and governmental pressure towards the U.S.S.R. as a means of achieving their goal. The latter had both the money and the government connections to make a difference, but were nervous that the activities of the grassroots organizers would lead to negative repercussions from the Soviet government in the form of punishment of the U.S.S.R.’s Jewish population. The establishment instead preferred negotiations to enable the release of Soviet Jews, something that was greatly threatened by the grassroots activists’ pressure.

I have arrived at this view after carefully examining a series of primary and secondary sources. Through my research in the SSSJ Archives at Yeshiva University and the Council on Soviet Jewry (CSJ) Archives at the Center for Jewish History, I came to understand the internal life of each faction and how it individually contributed to the schism between the factions. The SSSJ Archives contain documents that articulate the SSSJ’s plans for demonstrations in the late 1960s and its negative opinions on establishment organizations. Additionally, the collection features a series of bulletins and letters between the SSSJ and larger organizations from the period 1966 to 1971 that highlight the tensions between the groups. The documents, especially the internal memoranda among establishment groups, depict a palpable fear of upsetting the Soviets through excessive aggressive activism. At the same time, letters and private notes from the grassroots organizations reveal frustration with the slow pace of the Jewish establishment’s push for emigration rights and a breakdown of communication between the factions. The Center for Jewish History provide letters from the leaders of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in the late 1970s. The letters, bulletins, and private writings of each group’s members reflect a respective skepticism of grassroots initiatives and a desire to negotiate directly with the Soviet authorities to increase the quotas of Jews allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. These letters speak to plans to meet with Soviet officials in private to negotiate increased quotas and show a growing willingness to steer the movement into a quieter direction.

I conducted an interview with SSSJ leader Glenn Richter and studied the diary of President Ronald Reagan and the memoir of his second Secretary of State George P. Shultz. These

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1 There is no official start date for the Soviet Jewry movement in America, as there arguably was for something like the American Gay Rights movement with the 1969 Stonewall Riots. Moshe Decter’s 1961 article in Foreign Affairs entitled “The Status on Jews in the U.S.S.R.” brought the plight of Soviet Jews to the attention of many Americans for the first time. Similarly, the founding of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) in 1964 and its first demonstration on May 1, 1964 may be seen as the movement’s first public protest. For these reasons, I want to suggest that the movement began in an ambiguous period between 1961 and 1964. I would consider its end date to be 1989, when Gorbachev eliminated emigration quotas.

2 As the thesis will show, Reagan became a strong ally of the Soviet Jewry movement after its goals were seriously opposed by previous Administrations.
perspectives were necessary to understand how the Reagan Administration changed the executive branch’s response to the Soviet Jewry movement and how the administration ultimately connected and corresponded its ideals. It also highlighted the variety of tactics the administration used to achieve these ends.

In addition to this primary source research, I studied secondary source materials that shed more light on the structural differences between the two factions. The secondary sources I used to study the Soviet Jewry movement from the 1960s to the 1980s included Peter Golden’s *O Powerful, Western Star*, Frederick Lazin’s *The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics*, and Gal Beckerman’s *When They Come for Us, We’ll be Gone*. Beckerman’s book is probably the most famous piece on this subject, although it is imperfect due to its consideration of the Soviet Jewry Movement as a mostly unified group with little internal division. While I accept much of his information, his perception of relative unanimity is one I try to show as too simplistic. I also used Jussi M. Hanhimaki’s *The Rise and Fall of Detente*, Walter Isaacson’s *Kissinger*, and Robert G. Kaufman’s biography of U.S. Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) to better understand the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Federal Trade Act, a 1974 amendment that served as a strong point of contention for the two factions in the Soviet Jewry movement, crystallizing the schism between the two groups.

One interesting trend I found in the historiography was the phenomenon of political action driven by ideology endemic to the grassroots activists and a number of other causes in post-war America. A number of books, including Cheryl Lynn Greenberg’s *Troubling the Waters* and Michael E. Staub’s *Torn at the Roots*, show that many alumni of the civil rights movement were present in the SSSJ and that their demonstrations had similar tactics. The Jewish establishment, which avoided demonstrations, did not share these similarities, and the historiography suggests a longstanding reluctance to radical activism that may have inspired such sentiments. In addition to the civil rights movement, this unique trend of ideology-driven politics also seemed to include U.S. Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) and President Reagan, both strong allies of the grassroots activists. Each of them had a certain kind of telos that they wanted to achieve by any means necessary, and each used the cause of Soviet Jews as a means of achieving those ends. Given the common strand of thought, this phenomenon can be seen as a connection between the humble origins of the movement overall and its final place as a central tenet of American foreign policy at the end of the Cold War.

The first section of the thesis will outline the birth of the Soviet Jewry movement and will introduce the players within each faction, as well as their driving ideologies. The second section will discuss the different factions’ reactions to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, showing how the natural rift between the two factions’ strategy grew wider. The third section will deal with the Reagan Administration’s change of policy towards the U.S.S.R. It will discuss how this change, as well as President Reagan’s respective support from both factions, stirred by his own political ideology, eventually blurred the divisions between the two factions in the final, most fruitful years of the movement.

The major players of this period are numerous, and are sometimes better represented as organizations rather than as individuals. The first of the two factions, the grassroots activists, consisted primarily of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) founded in 1964 by Jacob Birnbaum and co-lead by Glenn Richter. Its allies included Holocaust survivor and activist Elie Wiesel, Rabbi Avraham “Avi” Weiss of Riverdale, New York, and a host of other rabbis, student-activists, and advocates. In a distinct category but tied more to the grassroots movement than to the establishment were the refuseniks, a group of Soviet Jewish activists who were penalized by the Soviet authorities for attempting to emigrate. They included Natan (born Anatoly) Sharansky, his wife, Avital Sharansky, Ida Nudel, and many other allied individuals.iii

The second faction, the establishment, was slightly more amorphous. It included most of the major Jewish organizations in the United States at the time, though I will mainly focus on the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Presidents. Another more distinct

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iii Natan Sharansky was born Anatoly Sharansky in 1948 in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. He was known as such until his release from the gulag in 1986 and subsequent emigration to Israel, where he changed his first name. To avoid any confusion, I have decided to refer to him by his current appellation for all periods of time.
group within this faction was the Council on Soviet Jewry (CSJ), who went by a variety of similar names throughout the movement’s history. This group served as the coordinating arm of the establishment that had the most contact with grassroots organizers but operated under the demands of parent organizations. Since the leadership roles tended to change frequently among these groups, it is difficult to designate individual figures as major figures, yet certain individuals such as Richard Maas of the AJC, Morris Abram, and Albert Chernin of the CSJ and philanthropists Max Fisher and Jacob Stein were important actors.

Also important to observe are government officials who reacted to the movement. There were politicians such as U.S. Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) who supported pressuring the U.S.S.R. to ensure emigration rights for its Jewish citizens and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, whose policy of détente was threatened by the Soviet Jewry movement and Senator Jackson’s legislation. Later players included President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who were part of an administration that was much more active than others in helping Soviet Jews. They pressured the U.S.S.R. to allow for greater emigration rights, as well as the emancipation of the refuseniks and consequently developed positive relations with both factions of the Soviet Jewry movement.

What becomes clear throughout this essay is that, while these differences may have divided the movement, they made it more effective in certain ways. Both factions had distinct responsibilities and capabilities in their goal of achieving basic emigration rights for Soviet Jews. Therefore, while it may seem that the two factions were working against each other, it was not the adoption of a common strategy, but rather, the multiplicity of strategies that they were able to employ as a whole, which enabled their ultimate success in achieving this crucial goal for Soviet Jews. Their success was the product of a multi-faceted dynamism of both strategies engaging different aspects of Soviet and American policymaking. While the grassroots activists stimulated the American government to take aggressive action against the Soviets, the establishment tried to initiate diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets to ensure the Jews’ right to emigrate.

SECTION I: BEGINNINGS

The divergence of strategies between the grassroots activists, and the establishment was evident at the beginning of the Soviet Jewry movement. Although Jews in the U.S.S.R. had been limited in their religious rights and prohibited from emigrating since the premiership of Joseph Stalin, the efforts in Jewish community in the United States to support those emigration rights did not truly start until the 1960s. The movement’s grassroots activists were the first people to campaign in the United States on behalf of Soviet Jewry. They had a very different set of tactics than the more powerful Jewish organizations that would later play a large administrative role in advocacy for the Soviet Jewry. Despite the factions’ similar goals, the aforementioned differences were deeply rooted and prevalent in the early days of the movement. This is seen in each faction’s preferred methods of action and respective relationships with earlier campaigns for the betterment of African Americans. While the mainstream organizations kept their black counterparts at arm’s length, the progenitors of the grassroots activists were more tightly knit. This is shown in the historiography that links the grassroots activists and the civil rights movement, as well as in the primary source documents that highlight infighting between the factions.

The first leaders of the grassroots faction were student protesters from New York City in the early 1960s. The largest and most important group was the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ), whose original support base came from young students from various New York universities and Orthodox day schools, such as Ramaz, Yeshiva of Flatbush, and Manhattan Talmudic Academy. Jacob Birnbaum, a German-born scholar who had moved to London as a boy to escape Nazi tyranny, founded the SSSJ in 1964. Birnbaum worked to help Jews in the diaspora, including Holocaust survivors and those behind the Iron Curtain. He came to New York in the early 1960s where he continued his social work in the Jewish community. Upon reading a groundbreaking 1961 article by Moshe Decter in Foreign Affairs that highlighted the prohibitions against Jewish religious expression and practice as well as the use of the Yiddish language by Russian Jews, Birnbaum decided to make the alleviation of their plight his mission in life and therefore founded the SSSJ.
The first meeting of the SSSJ convened at Columbia University on April 27, 1964, after Birnbaum posted flyers at “Yeshiva, City University, Columbia, the Jewish Theological Seminary and New York University.” In the pamphlet, he called for “a grassroots movement—spearheaded by the student youth...a well-planned campaign to include some very active measures...which will be a force to be reckoned with.” Birnbaum's choice of words evidences the urgency and dynamism that he demanded from the youth of the city. Being forceful in demanding religious and emigration rights for Soviet Jews would be a key characteristic of the grassroots faction of the movement.

Within a short period of time, Birnbaum quickly rallied supporters for his cause. No more than four days after the first meeting, he was able to convene 1,000 people in front of the U.S.S.R. Mission to the United Nations, marching in rows of two and holding placards that read “I am My Brother’s Keeper” and “Let Them Pray.”

A focus on morality and determination was already present in this auspicious beginning, as made evident by these placards. “I am My Brother’s Keeper” is a reference to the story of Cain and Abel, suggesting that American Jews had a responsibility to look out for their brethren in the U.S.S.R. “Let Them Pray” is a reference to the prohibitions against religious life in the U.S.S.R., including those against the teaching of Hebrew and the maintenance of Jewish schools. The placard underscores the movement's fight for religious freedom. The significant media attention that this march at the United Nations brought was an auspicious beginning for the movement, which would be made evident in a wide array of political action, including two “Exodus” marches in 1965 in Washington, D.C., and 1969 in New York, each enlisting over 10,000 activists.

As previously noted, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s heavily influenced the SSSJ. There are superficial connections to the demonstrations for desegregation, including the single-file marching in the first SSSJ meeting and the use of “I am My Brother’s Keeper,” a phrase that white Americans used to support African Americans in the civil rights movement. In his book Silent No More, Henry L. Feingold presents evidence that strengthens this connection to the civil rights movement, noting that the tactics that the SSSJ employed included “sit-ins and lie-ins, chaining oneself to fences at the Soviet Mission...and dozens of specialized techniques to win public attention,” which were all methods of protest previously adopted by the civil rights movement.

There were also many veterans of the civil rights movement in the SSSJ, including those who were involved in more radical factions like the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In his book O Powerful Western Star!, Peter Golden expounds on this connection by examining the career of SSSJ leader Glenn Richter. He discusses how Richter volunteered “in the New York Office of SNCC” and attempted to join the Freedom Riders, a 1964 voting rights movement in the southern United States whose repression by southern whites would claim the life of his Queens College classmate, Andrew Goodman. The skills that Richter gained from working with SNCC enabled him to be effective in planning rallies. This efficacy is best demonstrated by a pamphlet from the SSSJ Archives for a successful Hanukkah march in Greenwich Village. Richter meticulously planned the march, which attracted 3,000 people. He directed the students where to march, how to avoid arrest, and reminded them to “use [their] intelligence.” In addition, there were a number of solidarity protests on the same day across the country, run by a bevy of student organizations that Richter and other SSSJ leaders helped to coordinate. The fact that mere students were in control of these large outpourings of people suggests strong coordination with little help from outside organizations, similar to the way in which SNCC and other civil rights factions operated in their campaigns.

Another tactic that bears major similarities to the civil rights movement was the shaming factor. Golden notes how Jacob Birnbaum intended to present the repression of the Soviet Jewry as a human rights crisis, exposing the USSR's “false pretensions as a model society” and galvanizing already anti-communist Americans. Like Martin Luther King Jr's determination to display the violent abuse of nonviolent protestors as a means of changing the hearts and minds of white Americans, Birnbaum sought to reveal the ugliness of the U.S.S.R. and to motivate both Jewish and non-Jewish Americans to act. This strategy would create conflict with the larger organizations later on, when the latter wanted to...
avoid pressuring or defaming the U.S.S.R.

However, the Jewish students’ relationship with the civil rights movement was not permanent, and eventually, many were isolated from its more progressive factions. A large turning point was the radicalization of the Students’ Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which had Jewish leaders, including future Members of Congress Allard K. Lowenstein and Barney Frank, during the 1964 Freedom Summer. However, the frustration with the lack of success and the rise of Black Power in the middle of the decade resulted in whites being “drummed out” from SNCC in 1965. The 1968 New York teacher’s strike worsened the situation by degenerating the already tense relations between Blacks and Jews in New York City. As Peter Golden notes in *O Powerful Western Star*, a vacuum eventually emerged for Jewish student activists that enabled them to “seek social justice on their own… turning them towards the U.S.S.R.” Effectively, with the ideological changes in the civil rights movement closing the doors for activism opportunities, many young Jews found a place with the Soviet Jewry movement.

The other major faction of the movement was the Jewish establishment, which financed efforts to raise awareness of the plight of Soviet Jews and inspire change. The most prominent group in this faction was the American Jewish Conference for Soviet Jewry (AJCSJ), which would later become the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ). As its name changed frequently, I will hereafter refer to the group as the Conference on Soviet Jewry, or simply as “the CSJ.” Founded in 1963, the CSJ was very much a top-down advocacy group with strong ties to major U.S. Jewish organizations. In fact, on nearly every piece of stationery it produced, it mentioned their support from “the Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, B’nai Brith, the United Synagogue of America, the American Jewish Conference” and a host of other big names. The leader of the organization, Albert Chernin, was an older veteran of the umbrella group, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), whose support included many organizations mentioned on the CSJ stationery.

The CSJ, as well as its sister organization, the American Jewish Committee, did not always support demonstrations pioneered by the SSSJ. Instead, they preferred quiet diplomacy and the fostering of political relations to ensure the release of Soviet Jews. If one studies the civil rights movement and its influence on the Soviet Jewry movement to the fullest extent, it becomes evident that this cautiousness was also deeply rooted in its respective relationship with the civil rights movement. The AJC was generally against segregation and the Jim Crow laws, but was reluctant to support radical efforts. Through its official magazine, *Commentary*, the AJC expressed skepticism over the “fashion” of Jewish students partaking in civil rights protests in the early 1960s and published articles stating that former Jewish desegregationist activists had only achieved “very little.”

The AJC’s reluctance to embrace the radical activism espoused by the SNCC and SSSJ was not unique, but rather part of a longstanding skepticism towards mass movements. In his book *Torn at the Roots*, Michael Staub concedes that the AJC was active in helping both Jews and the NAACP with discrimination matters, but notes that it was unwilling to aid Popular Front causes sponsored by more radical activists like Paul Robeson, for fear of red-baiting. This lack of aid resulted in the AJC being labeled “the agency of the big bourgeoisie,” a Marxian reference to staidness and aversion to anything radical. In her book *Troubling the Waters*, Cheryl Lynn Greenberg describes the organization as being vocal about “racist incidents” or maladies affecting the Jewish community. Nevertheless, they tried “to cloak” their Jewishness, to avoid additional anti-Semitism, by having non-Jewish speakers address such causes. Ultimately, they were not driven to act as brashly as the SSSJ was by their ideology-driven politics inspired by the civil rights movement. Rather, they were an advocacy group primarily focused on results that could only be achieved through careful planning. The reluctance of the AJC and the CSJ to act impulsively would underlie much of the tension between them and the grassroots activists.

In spite of this attitude, the CSJ actually had an important role to play in bringing mainstream American Jews to the side of Soviet Jewry. One example of their endeavors was their Matzoh of Hope project, in which the CSJ reached out to local synagogues during Passover to proliferate pamphlets about the plight of Jews in the U.S.S.R. The project
displays the cautious but clever activism of the CSJ, as it was able to show to American Jews the difficulty that the Soviet Jews had in celebrating the holiday. This enabled the CSJ to play at the heartstrings of American Jews while not stoking the fires of Soviet anger.

The CSJ was also extremely important in raising political support for the movement, going beyond the usual stream of Jewish New York politicians. In Frederick A. Lazin’s book, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics, he makes note of how the organization had “full-time lobbyists,” who easily solicited members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate to support their cause by playing at the anti-communist rhetoric of the time.\(^{29}\) The CSJ also enabled politicians to get more intimately involved by having congressmen “adopt” a Jewish activist in the U.S.S.R., and even got the politicians’ spouses to fundraise for them through the establishment of the Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry campaign.\(^{30}\) Their endeavors were so successful that by the 1968 Presidential Election, the matter of Soviet Jewry had become an issue on the platforms of both parties.\(^{31}\) The establishment had a place in trying to make a difference on behalf of Soviet Jews, but one that was achieved from the top down and by more traditional means of political organizing than marching in the street.

In this period of the 1960s and early 1970s, there did not seem to be a great distance between the two groups. However, the ideological and strategic fissures were unmistakably present in the correspondence between the SSSJ and the CSJ. The SSSJ Archives at Yeshiva University reveal several early conflicts between the two factions, including conflicts over credit sharing for campaigns. While the SSSJ would arrange for activists and organizers to protest, the more prominent organizations would make these events public to the national Jewish community in their newsletters. A CSJ Passover Report newsletter recovered from May 9, 1969 mentions the SSSJ only once throughout the entire article. This brief reference occurs on the second page, where it is described as having taken part in a major protest, whereas the SSSJ had in fact organized it.\(^{32}\) The SSSJ appears to have been outraged, as reflected by a pen-written notation of a certain SSSJ member frustrated that the organization only received “a mention in the dispatches.”\(^{33}\) Tremendous anger, betrayal, and jealousy are evident in these sentiments, as well as a desire from the CSJ to dissociate from a faction that played a major role in shaping the protests. The patterns of disagreement between the two groups demonstrated by these documents show that their relationship was deeply troubled from within.

On June 15, 1970, a catastrophe heightened the fundamental differences between the two factions. Out of desperation to emigrate, sixteen Soviet refuseniks bought tickets for all the seats on a small domestic flight. Under the auspices of being a wedding party, they intended to expel the pilots at a refueling stop and have a former military pilot amongst them, Mark Dymshitz, fly the plane to asylum in Israel by way of Scandinavia. The Soviet authorities at the Leningrad Airport stopped them, and all of the passengers were arrested. Dymshitz and the coordinator, Edward Kuznetsov, were sentenced to death for high treason. Beckerman writes about the outrage and protests this incited across the world, from striking “longshoreman in Genoa” to “schoolchildren in Stockholm” and all the way to New York City, where the SSSJ led a major march opposite the United Nations.\(^{34}\)

The Soviet treatment of its Jewish community, as made evident by the events surrounding the Leningrad hijacking, had finally become an international human rights issue. Although this incident cannot be cited as the single turning point, it certainly gave the SSSJ enhanced support for its activities. At the same time, the threat toward Soviet Jews had never seemed more palpable. Realizing the danger, the CSJ wanted to do everything it could to advocate for the release of these men while not inciting the anger of the Soviets. Their endeavors around this time were extremely tame in comparison to the mass marches desired by their grassroots counterparts. In one memo, they asked that the letters be “personal… non-political” and avoid “attacks on the Soviet system.”\(^{35}\) It appears they wanted to use a great deal of caution in handling this matter, and avoid causing problems for the hijacking pilots, Dymshitz, Kuznetsov and other Jews in the U.S.S.R.

Beckerman presents little evidence of a genuine split between the two groups. Rather, the image in his book of the movement is one of cautious solidarity in a time of crisis. He notes that the supporting
organizations of the CSJ, through a body called the Union of Councils, convened a meeting in 1971 calling for “quiet diplomacy” and “inoffensive forms of action” for fear of endangering Soviet Jews. The grassroots activists did not support this method. However, Beckerman does not focus on the SSSJ, but claims that the Jewish Defense League (JDL) and its leader, Rabbi Meir Kahane, manifested most of the dissent. This infamous demagogue not only condemned the mainstream Jewish groups, but also wanted violent retribution against the Soviets through bombing and attacking Soviet institutions.

Beckerman’s focus on Kahane is very problematic and somewhat reductive. Kahane’s activity in this period—in which he made a series of terrorist threats against the Soviets, instigated violence, and allegedly bombed Soviet buildings—was short-lived. Beckerman spends a chapter talking about his prominence after the Leningrad affair, but he says that Kahane’s organization soon fell out of favor among American Jews around 1971, leading Kahane himself to move to Israel. The focus on this individual detracts from issues that the SSSJ and similar, longer lasting groups had with the Jewish establishment that would eventually solidify their schism during the debate over Jackson-Vanik.

Peter Golden, on the other hand, more successfully reveals the split between the two groups. Instead of focusing exclusively on Kahane as Beckerman does, he shows the JDL’s effect on the grassroots Soviet Jewry activists. In fact, he notes how “grassroots activists...agreed with Kahane” and shows the student disappointment with the establishment-heavy Union of Councils’ decision not to act more aggressively towards the Soviets. This lack of aggression was against the goals of the SSSJ, who made it their mission to humiliate the Soviets. Golden makes note of one particular incident involving SSSJ ally Hillel Levine, who was so disgusted with the refusal to support significant action against the U.S.S.R. that he formed a sit-in of over one hundred Jewish students at a Boston meeting of the Council of Jewish Federations (CJF). His justification for going after this group was that the members were not allocating enough resources to activities related to Soviet Jewry. Here, the comparison with the civil rights movement becomes pertinent once again, in terms of tactics and motivation. The sit-in, the classic nonviolent demonstration favored by opponents of segregation, was being utilized in maintaining the shame factor against the Soviets. This episode once again shows the linkage between the grassroots activists and the civil rights movement, where it is drawn to such an extent that the Jewish establishment has taken the place of a segregated lunch counter or business.

From this, one can see that the dichotomy of strategy that emerged between the two groups during this period was instigated by the movement’s early struggles, and each faction’s reactions to the Leningrad Affair of 1970. There was clearly a strong desire from the part of the establishment to avoid endangering the Jewish population in the U.S.S.R. by any means necessary, as seen by their admonition of incendiary language. As a result, they did not want to allow the Leningrad Affair to balloon into a radicalizing incident among the activists and indirectly threaten the lives of Soviet Jews. While the grassroots activists did not necessarily support acts of terror, the allies of Richter, Birnbaum, and the SSSJ saw Leningrad as a wake-up call for greater action and pressure against the U.S.S.R.

The two factions of the Soviet Jewry movement came of age in the 1960s, and although they had the same goals of emancipating the Soviet Jews, they had very different strategies. Although their respective orientations to activism may have been more ambiguous in the mid-sixties, by the end of the decade, they were better split into two strategic camps: one supporting strong actions against the U.S.S.R. and the other preferring backroom negotiations. The two factions would reach new chasms of separation in the 1970s, as the debate over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment hardened their ideological disparity.

SECTION II: THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

In the 1970s, a piece of legislation emerged that marked a turning point for the Soviet Jewry movement in the United States. This legislation was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Federal Trade Act of 1974, which drove the United States to be less conciliatory with the Soviets and placed the goals of the Soviet Jewry movement as more important factors in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy. In spite of what might seem like a great victory for the movement as a whole, the debate over the passage of the amendment produced controversy between
the grassroots and establishment factions. The grassroots activists heartily supported Jackson-Vanik from its inception in 1971 until the Gorbachev years and earned reciprocal support from Jackson, his allies, and the refuseniks. It is unclear how much the establishment backed the bill while it was being debated in Congress, but it is certain that they opposed it in the years immediately following its passage. In many cases, they even attempted to alter the legislation and as documents from the Conference on Soviet Jewry Archives show, were willing to negotiate directly with Soviet leaders to amend quotas for Jewish emigration.

While the Leningrad Affair may have heightened the strategic divide between the two factions, the passage of this amendment solidified it on a geopolitical scale. By supporting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the grassroots activists now began to fall in line with American politicians who wanted to confront the USSR. In contrast, the Jewish establishment was more lukewarm about the bill, both during and after its passage, and preferred engaging the Soviets in a manner similar to détente. By the late 1970s, both groups were properly defined in terms of their own courses of action, and would remain that way until the Jews were allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. at the end of the following decade.

Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington introduced the bill alongside Congressman Charles Vanik of Ohio in 1972. It proposed an amendment to the Federal Trade Act that intended to help Soviet Jewry and to challenge the recent trend of working with the Soviets toward creating a thaw in the Cold War. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment sought to punish the “actions of nonmarket economy countries making them ineligible for normal trade relations, programs of credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees, or commercial agreements.”

The first qualification for these non-market economy (communist) countries to be eligible for punishment was if the state “deny[d] its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate.” Without looking at any other subtext, it appears that Jackson was referring primarily to the Iron Curtain.

When one considers Jackson’s political history and the events surrounding the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, it is evident that the actions of the bill were not purely coincidental to the goals of the Soviet Jewry movement. Jackson enjoyed good relations with the American Jewish community due to this amendment as well as his previous support for Israel. According to SSSJ leader Glenn Richter, Jackson was very much in good stead with the grassroots activists. Richter also claims that Jackson’s senior aide at the time, Richard Perle, was frequently in contact with the SSSJ and held a number of strong, similar convictions of his own on the matter. Unlike Jackson, Perle was Jewish, and according to Richter, had a great deal of sympathy for Soviet Jews. SSSJ founder Jacob Birnbaum also had warm relations with both men and was reportedly in “close contact” with Jackson and Perle as early as 1965, seven years before the amendment was proposed. The SSSJ strongly advocated for “the utilization of economic pressures on the Kremlin” and as such saw the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as very favorable. It is not entirely clear whether the SSSJ had any direct influence on the crafting of this bill, but, given this relationship, SSSJ involvement is not unlikely.

Before the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 1974, the United States was engaged in a process of détente with the U.S.S.R., during which increased trade, open communication, and military restrictions were observed. Détente was the brainchild of Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon’s National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State from 1973-1977. Before his career in Washington, Kissinger was a professor of international relations at Harvard, where he strongly defended realpolitik, a system that was decidedly “anti-ideological.” His primary foreign policy goal was to establish a state of order and balance in the world that would most benefit the United States.

Kissinger’s accommodationist directive, along with the Ostpolitik thawing of relations between East and West Germany, became popular at this time when the threat of nuclear war was very real. To establish this order, Kissinger sought more peaceful relations with the People’s Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. Steps toward improved relations include Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, as well as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviets. Kissinger also sought to normalize relations with the Soviets by being in constant contact with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and improving trade relations with the U.S.S.R., especially in the form of grain exports and the shared benefits of “scientific
exchanges."\textsuperscript{47} In spite of these changes, the Nixon administration escalated the war in Vietnam by overseeing the 1970 bombing of Cambodia and supported various anti-communist coups in South America, including the 1973 junta that overthrew Chilean President Salvador Allende.\textsuperscript{iv,48} There seemed to be no coherence of human rights or even anti-communism in Kissinger’s work, but rather a balance of power that he sought to maintain between the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the Third World. If anything, Kissinger’s policies represent the furthest deviation from any of the previously mentioned ideology-driven politics.

The historiography confirms that Jackson’s primary motivation for drafting the amendment was aiding Soviet Jewry. In his biography of Henry Kissinger, Walter Isaacson describes Jackson as being motivated to write the bill in 1972 after the Soviets passed a “prohibitively high ‘education tax’ on people emigrating, which he describes as “an exit tax primarily aimed at Jews."\textsuperscript{49} Isaacson also wrote that prior to the bill, Jackson opposed granting the U.S.S.R. “Most Favored Nation” status in trade unless “restrictions on Jewish emigration were lifted.”\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, Jussi Hanhimaki claims in The Rise and Fall of Détente that the bill was primarily in protest to this veiled “exit tax” targeted toward Jews. Beckerman supports this view by highlighting Jackson’s close relationship and empathy with the Jewish people.\textsuperscript{51} He notes that Jackson’s desire to stand up for Jewish causes came from his role in the liberation of Buchenwald concentration camp in 1945, after which he became a “strong defender of Israel and the Jews.”\textsuperscript{52} In fact, Beckerman notes that Jackson responded so personally and viscerally to this particular affront on Jewish welfare that he began working on the amendment immediately after learning about the exit tax.\textsuperscript{53}

Unlike his nemesis, Henry Kissinger, Jackson also fit in well with the overarching trend of political action based on ideology, linking him philosophically to grassroots activists more closely. His biographer, Robert G. Kaufman, describes Jackson as being an ardent supporter of “a strong civil rights bill, national health insurance,” and labor unions from his early days in Congress in the 1940s through his support for the Civil Rights Act of 1964.\textsuperscript{54} At the same time, Jackson was a hardcore anti-Communist who defended the Vietnam War and the development of new nuclear weapons to counter the Soviets. He firmly opposed SALT and any other weapon reduction plans.\textsuperscript{55} This delicate balance between progressive domestic policy and hawkish foreign policy may seem idiosyncratic to some; however, Jackson’s views can be interpreted as fulfilling a higher purpose for a better, more equitable life for all. The supposedly immoral forces of unrestrained capitalism and institutional racism as well as Soviet-style communism served as obstacles to this perceived moral aim, and he sought to undermine them. The oppression of Jews in the U.S.S.R. was one case of moral injustice that had to be countered by aggressive action, a sentiment quite similar to the ones mentioned in Jacob Birnbaum’s first SSSJ newsletter.

In theory, it makes sense for all the Jewish groups to get behind Jackson and that unanimity over Soviet Jewry prevailed to change the course of American foreign policy. This is the view upheld by Gal Beckerman, who points to the collaboration between Jewish groups at this time as evidence of unanimous support for Jackson-Vanik. He talks little of opposition in the community to the bill and notes that Jackson was able to seduce even the Conference on Soviet Jewry and “the Jewish Establishment” to support the amendment.\textsuperscript{56} Beckerman notes that Jackson was able to do so not only by the appealing substance of the bill, but also by referencing the threat of a second Holocaust in Russia to large Jewish audiences, a tactic frequently used by Meir Kahane.\textsuperscript{57} The only major threat to the amendment from within the Jewish community that Beckerman mentions is that of Max Fisher, a wealthy Republican philanthropist from Detroit, who opposed the bill as part of his dedication to Nixon. Beckerman makes Fisher look like an outsider whose views were never taken seriously by other community leaders.\textsuperscript{vi}

However, in spite of this view, concern over the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment

\textsuperscript{iv} The U.S. involvement in Allende’s ouster is a controversial subject. While the extent of the CIA or the State Department’s engagement with the junta led by Augusto Pinochet has been debated, I accept Jussi Hanhimaki’s view that it was “if not supported, at least condoned by the Nixon and Ford Administrations.”

\textsuperscript{v} The fear of a second Holocaust was a major rhetorical tool for mobilizing the Jewish community at this time, especially since the actual Holocaust was still fresh in many people’s memories.

\textsuperscript{vi} Beckerman is quite dismissive of Max Fisher throughout the eighth chapter of his book. Essentially, he makes him out to be like a Sheldon Adelson-type reactionary without the same kind of influence.
at this time was quite palpable, and the community was once again more split than Beckerman assumes. Max Fisher was not the outsider Beckerman claims; he was, in fact, quite influential in the Jewish community. Fisher was head of the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) from 1965-1967, one of the most important Jewish organizations in America, as well as the American Jewish Congress and the Council on Jewish Federations. He was also responsible for major fundraising campaigns for Israel in the United States during the Six Day War and was the leading benefactor for the very large Jewish community of Metro Detroit. All of this suggests that he would have been taken seriously and likely had a certain amount of power over major Jewish organizations.

Fisher’s largest ally at the time was Jacob Stein, another man whose great importance Beckerman overlooks. Stein served as Chairman of the Council of Presidents, an umbrella group of all the major Jewish American charities. These two men arranged a special meeting with Nixon in 1973, bringing fifteen Jewish leaders with them including the CSJ officer Charlotte Jacobson. The President demanded that they abandon their support for Jackson-Vanik in order to better broker a deal with the Soviets on emigration. Nixon, the ever-brilliant manipulator, noted that the community leaders could “protest all [they] want” but that the Kremlin would not listen. The close connection between Fisher and Nixon further illuminates the Jewish establishment’s concern of not wanting to incite Soviet Jews. Isaacson’s book reveals that Kissinger actually worked behind the scenes to increase the number of visas given to Soviet Jews to 42,000 per year. Given Kissinger’s past statements, it would be difficult to believe he did this for humanitarian reasons, but rather aimed to show the Jewish establishment that he could be more useful to them if they opposed the amendment.

The opposition to Jackson-Vanik from the Jewish establishment became more unified after President Ford signed it into law in 1974. In many circles, the newly codified amendment was popular and marked a major shift in U.S. foreign policy from accepting warmer relations with the U.S.S.R. to being more aggressive. However, as the establishment correctly predicted, Jackson-Vanik created a backlash in the U.S.S.R. that hurt the people it was trying to protect. The number of Jews permitted to leave annually decreased from nearly 50,000 to less than 10,000 by the early 1980s, and the crackdown on refuseniks and their allies in the Soviet human rights movement only increased, with major players jailed. This was evident in the arrest and imprisonment of famous refusenik Natan Sharansky, as well as the internal exile of noted scientist and reform activist Andrei Sakharov.

The grassroots activists continued supporting the efforts of Jackson-Vanik, drawing recently liberated refuseniks into their coterie. One notable figure in this camp was Avital Sharansky, the wife of Natan Sharansky, who led a series of protests in the U.S. and elsewhere on her husband’s behalf during the nine years of his incarceration. Rabbi Avi Weiss, an SSSJ ally and civil disobedience advocate, and a multitude of grassroots supporters with whom Sharansky staged rallies and hunger strikes, accompanied her. Incidentally, Avital did not receive as much support from the establishment as she did from Rabbi Weiss and his followers. The CSJ initially refused to work for her husband’s release due to his dissident nature, and the CSJ’s fear of pressuring the Soviets. Henry L. Feingold notes that they even tried to dissuade Alan Dershowitz from running a full-page plea for Sharansky’s release in the New York Times. Even though, they later launched a series of vigils in solidarity with Sharansky, the CSJ’s relationship with his wife would never be as intimate as its relationship with Rabbi Weiss and the grassroots organizers.

Another example of this connection between dissidents and activists is the 1979 Solidarity Day rally in New York City (NYC), which was organized by SSSJ, under the CSJ umbrella. The long march down Fifth Avenue featured the Leningrad pilots Kuznetzov and Dymshitz. They had both been freed from Soviet custody after their respective death sentences were commuted, and had come to New York to advocate for other dissidents such as Sharansky, Ida Nudel, and Josip Brugen. In front of several thousand people, they spoke alongside NYC Mayor Ed Koch and Senators Jackson, Jacob Javits.
and Pat Moynihan, all of whom strongly advocated in favor of the establishment of the right to emigration and the maintenance of the amendment. This Solidarity Day shows that the refuseniks were not only intimately tied with the grassroots movement, but also had strong continual support from members of the American government.

In contrast to the support of further pressure against the U.S.S.R., the Jewish establishment was growing increasingly nervous about its unintended consequences, and became more solidified in its support of more détente-like negotiations, which is, in turn, reflected in documents from the American Jewish Committee. These newsletters, taken from the AJC’s archive at the American Jewish Historical Society reveal a conscious effort to pursue a policy of supporting waivers from Jackson-Vanik for increased emigration quotas. One newsletter from 1980, written by AJC leader Richard Maass, reveals a strong discomfort with earlier support for Jackson-Vanik. Maass noted that the overall breakdown of “détente, trade and cooperation” allowed for “little that the U.S. could apply to Russians to get them to allow greater numbers of Jews to leave.”

This breakdown was clearly enabled by the passage of the amendment, as Maass seemed to be suggesting that its very forceful approach obstructed the possibility for future negotiations. Another memorandum from AJC leader David Geller said that the “restraint of trade,” a reference to Jackson-Vanik, was causing the breakdown in negotiations. Both documents displayed a type of thinking that differed from Jackson’s ideology-driven politics. Instead, they seemed similar to Kissinger’s approach, couched in political realism as opposed to the activist language of passionate ‘solidarity’ and ‘struggle.’

The AJC even went as far as meeting with the respected Soviet scientist Dr. Sergey Rogov to gain some leverage in backroom negotiations. One memorandum suggested that getting close to Rogov could enable the Soviets to “release [their] Jewish prisoners of conscience, allow the refuseniks to emigrate, and increase the general level of emigration of Jews.” Rogov, who invited AJC agent Neil Sandberg to come to Moscow to begin talks, warned that the only way to increase any progress with the negotiations would be for the Americans to show “friendship initiatives” so as to suggest the Soviets were not being pressured. Dr. Rogov’s demand substantiated some of the concerns that the American Jewish establishment had regarding demonstrations and pressure tactics under Jackson-Vanik. Moreover, in the wake of the Soviet response to the amendment, they were desperate enough to make a deal with a figure that was not as prestigious as Brezhnev or Dobrynin.

This decade was, overall, highly transformative for both American foreign policy and the Soviet Jewish movement. As the U.S. government changed the way it interacted with the Soviets, partly due to the actions of its Jewish community, it presented a point of no return for the activists. The ideological separation between the grassroots and establishment activists that grew throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s was solidified due to the consequences of this bill. Following Jackson-Vanik, the grassroots activists and their refusenik allies were more committed to putting political pressure on the U.S.S.R. than ever before.

With the end of détente and negotiations, the establishment faction would continue to negotiate to release small numbers of Soviet Jews to no avail. It would take an even greater change in government to enable them to change their strategy, a change that would finally achieve visible progress in helping the Soviet Jews. This progress would ultimately derive from the multi-faceted dynamism in American policymaking that combined attributes of both factions. The Reagan Administration, which could balance an extreme ideological anti-communism with the pragmatism of effective diplomacy, could effect such a change.

**SECTION III: REAGAN, SHULTZ, AND THE REALIGNMENT**

In the 1980s, there was a major U.S. foreign policy shift as the Reagan administration came to power. Unlike previous presidents, President Ronald Reagan supported the goals of the Soviet Jewry movement, primarily as part of a larger strategy to confront the U.S.S.R. and end communism. Both of these were part of an ideological approach to politics that differed from President Nixon’s foreign policy pragmatism and President Carter’s more universal morality-driven politics, where Reagan held the eradication of international communism above all else. He and George Shultz, Reagan’s second and longer-serving Secretary of State, continuously put...
a great deal of pressure on the U.S.S.R. to release refuseniks and eliminate immigration quotas. The functionality of the relationship between the President and the movement was evident in the close connections Reagan made with certain activists and the Jewish community’s praise for Secretary Shultz’s work.

Reagan’s ideological approach to eliminating communism and its largest standard-bearer fit in with the trend of political action that the SSSJ had been following since its inception, which led to the ideological understanding and connection between them. He also felt a personal affinity to its activists and the refusenik victims of Soviet oppression, as seen by his relations with individuals such as Avital Sharansky, which will be discussed in greater depth in this section. Similarly, President Reagan and Secretary Shultz’s later focus on negotiations as a means of achieving their ends also satisfied the previously cautious Jewish establishment. The establishment, in turn, became comfortable enough to demand more pressure to release Soviet Jews. This change, made possible in part by an administration sympathetic to the cause, resulted in an increase in activity for the Jewish establishment, and a decline of divisions between the two factions of the Soviet Jewry movement.

President Reagan’s foreign policy was radically different from that of his predecessors; his immediate predecessor, President Carter, based his foreign policy primarily on universal human rights. He claimed to be guided by “morals and principles,” as he willingly increased pressure on both the U.S.S.R. after their 1980 invasion of Afghanistan, and authoritarian right-wing governments in Latin America and elsewhere. At first glance, President Carter may seem like the poster child for ideology-driven politics, similar to those of President Reagan. However, President Carter was more focused on achieving ends in foreign policy to support universal human rights, while President Reagan, Senator Jackson, and the civil rights movement’s visions were more focused on achieving specific political ends.

For example, Carter was not as radical as Senator Jackson in opposing the U.S.S.R. and was willing to negotiate with them through a second round of SALT agreements, which he claimed was “in the interest of American security and world peace.” According to these words, President Carter was an individual much more focused on general, loftier goals, not necessarily trying to achieve direct ends like defeating Jim Crow laws or weakening the U.S.S.R. By contrast, President Reagan used his ideology-driven politics as justifications for his actions, which in terms of foreign policy were almost exclusively focused on defeating communism. In this sense, President Reagan’s goals and intentions were more directly in the service of an extreme anti-communist ideology, despite having an inspiration beyond pure pragmatism. While continuing to oppose communist regimes, President Reagan reversed the Carter administration’s positions on certain foreign actors that he believed could have been potential allies against the U.S.S.R. In doing so, he opposed sanctions on the apartheid-era government in South Africa, supported Augusto Pinochet of Chile, and aided the Contras in Nicaragua. Such things would have been against President Carter’s principles, which unlike President Reagan’s, were not wholly dedicated to the service of a specific ideology.

The justification for this split from previous U.S. policy is exhibited in a 1979 essay written by President Reagan’s future U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, in which she claimed that autocratic regimes were not as damaging as revolutionary communist regimes. She argued that the former would simply result in power changes, while the latter would “violate internal habits and values” of the countries they dominate and have caused “tens of thousands to flee.” This “Kirkpatrick Doctrine” differed from Kissinger’s détente, in the sense that it was ostensibly a foreign policy based on human rights. However, unlike Carter whose definition of human rights appeared to be more all-encompassing, President Reagan and his cabinet would ultimately determine what this meant. Hence, they supported certain political bodies that committed vicious human rights abuses.

Fortunately for the Soviet Jewry movement, their cause fit perfectly into the vision of President Reagan and his cabinet. The matter of Soviet Jews was one of protecting the religious and cultural freedom of an oppressed minority against what President Reagan saw as a hegemonic communist power. Fittingly, President Reagan appointed people, who were great admirers and associates of Senator Jackson to his staff, whose staunch anti-communism meshed...
well with his. Among these individuals were Paul Wolfowitz and Elliott Abrams, both of whom would go on to serve a series of senior positions in the State Department, in addition to Jackson’s aide, Richard Perle. President Reagan greatly appreciated these individuals, and after Senator Jackson died suddenly of an aneurysm in 1983 at the age of 71, President Reagan honored him with a posthumous Medal of Freedom and said that he was “proud to have Jackson Democrats serve in [his] administration.”

The Soviet Jewry movement was in a unique place, given that its allies now occupying important places in the executive branch when, less than a decade ago, it had been in opposition to the President.

The change of Senator Jackson’s allies to the executive branch represented a fusion in the morally driven political work that marked the grassroots faction of the Soviet Jewry movement. As mentioned in the previous section, Senator Jackson, with his fusion of liberal domestic policy and hawkish foreign policy, was a notable exemplar of ideology-driven politics in the transition period between the movement’s birth and the 1980s. The appointment of his aides to the State Department not only put supporters of the Soviet Jewry movement in powerful positions, but also enlisted people with a perspective similar to that of the grassroots activists as architects of President Reagan’s foreign policy. While Reagan was much more politically conservative than activists in civil rights movement, he shared with them, Senator Jackson, and the grassroots activists of the Soviet Jewry movement, a political perspective based on working to achieve a larger ideological goal. He was focused on defeating communism above all else, just as the SNCC members were focused on defeating Jim Crow, and just as the SSSJ members were committed to extending emigration rights to Soviet Jews.

President Reagan’s steadfast opposition to communism and the U.S.S.R. is evident in many aspects of his behavior, including his introduction of the ambitious and highly controversial Strategic Defense Initiative, colloquially known as “Star Wars.” This program intended to stop potential Soviet missiles by using a satellite system to destroy them from space, were they to be launched. Ostensibly, it was a defensive measure, but many liberal critics, such as Senator Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy (D-MA), derided Star Wars as too costly and nuclear warmongering. However, Reagan’s willingness to spend the money and risk nuclear provocation to oppose the Soviets demonstrates a dedication to his ideology above mere pragmatism. Whereas a pragmatist may have preferred a less costly or imaginative program for defense, the ever-dedicated Reagan would have been willing to risk the financial and potentially human cost in the creation of this system.

Additionally, President Reagan showed a willingness to get close to certain activists tied to the grassroots movement and act on their behalf. One example was President Reagan’s relationship with Avital Sharansky, whom he first met in 1981. She had come to the White House to talk to the President about her husband Natan, who had been “in the gulag” and whose weight, due to a combination of hunger strikes and forced starvation, was “down to 100 lbs.” President Reagan, by meeting with this woman, granted her access, in contrast to that in past administrations, such as President Nixon’s, which would only be limited to powerful fundraisers like Max Fisher as mentioned earlier in the paper. However, President Reagan’s empathy towards Sharansky’s incarceration appeared to border on righteous, visceral anger. He wrote in the diary entry for that day, “Damn those inhuman monsters... I promised I’d do everything to obtain his release and I will.”

This highly emotional and dedicated behavior shows how President Reagan’s ideology dominated his political decisions. Looking to this diary entry, it demonstrates that Reagan indeed felt for Sharansky, but the President’s writing was also in accordance with his own vision of an evil U.S.S.R. persecuting innocent minorities, which may not have been Reagan’s view in the case of similar human rights abuses committed by the apartheid-era government in South Africa.

Reagan did, in fact, act on this promise to himself and Avital Sharansky by continuously asking the Soviet leadership to release Natan. Immediately after his 1981 meeting with Avital, Reagan asked Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev to grant Avital’s husband an amnesty, in what seemed to be an ostensibly humble, private letter. However, he unmistakably threatened Brezhnev in the last line where he wrote, “I’m sure however that you understand that such actions on your part would lessen problems in future negotiations between our
It should be noted that this letter was penned during major grain negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., where Reagan had his first opportunity to move toward economic reconciliation. The U.S.S.R., which was enduring shortages due to its war in Afghanistan, could have used the U.S. demand to gain wheat exports and an easing of trade. However, President Reagan threatened to hurt the U.S.S.R. with faltering negotiations, if they did not deal with Sharansky’s persecution. He, like Senator Jackson, was willing to inflict continued and serious economic damage on the U.S.S.R., if they did not agree to his request. President Reagan’s dedication in this episode shows how far the presidency had come from the days of Secretary Kissinger. Reagan’s administration partook in the politics of action, as espoused by the grassroots activists, not just that of mediation. President Reagan’s rhetoric reflects a genuine dedication to the service of his ideology, where he was willing to upset the course of international stability for the protection of an individual and the belittling of the U.S.S.R. It seems very unwise to some, but as was the case with Star Wars, the subordination of pragmatism to ideology was a natural decision for him. In the ultimate service of destroying communism and the U.S.S.R., coexistence was of secondary priority to Reagan. Threatening the U.S.S.R. was a much more natural option for Reagan, as it enhanced the possibility of engaging the communist superstate as opposed to letting it live.

Despite this pressure, Reagan’s presidency nevertheless saw peaceful negotiations and conversation with the Soviet leaders, both about Soviet Jewry and larger matters, which greatly pleased the Jewish establishment. Such a pattern of behavior became more prevalent in his second term, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet premier. Gorbachev was more committed to reform in both domestic and foreign policy than his predecessors had been. The foreign policy reform was best seen in the period of negotiations starting with the Geneva Summit of 1985, which marked President Reagan’s first meeting with Gorbachev. During these talks, the two leaders were focused on matters, such as arms reduction and increased trade. It was very productive, and from 1985 onwards, relations between the two nations began to thaw. In addition to easing business relations between the two superpowers, President Reagan and Gorbachev signed the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a major ban on intercontinental ballistic missiles that partially assuaged fears of nuclear war.

President Reagan, assisted by his Secretary of State George Shultz, appeared to be moving back in the direction of Secretary Kissinger and détente. In spite of these changes, however, Secretary Shultz pressured the Soviets to act in the interests of their Jewish citizens. He notes in *Turmoil and Triumph*, his memoir of his State Department service that the repeatedly stated U.S. concern for Soviet Jewish emigration rights would be brought up in negotiations, whether things were “going well or poorly on other issues of concern.” Shultz recognized that the Soviets were using Soviet Jews as “pawns” for future negotiations as they had done in Secretary Kissinger’s time, and he pushed the Soviets on the matter in almost every meeting from 1982 to 1989.

Throughout this period, Shultz frequently earned the warm support of the Soviet Jewry movement. He had stellar relations with the CSJ who honored him in 1984 for his efforts and was again honored in 1988 by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, after the majority of his successes had come to pass. At this second dinner, he referred to Morris Abram, the head of the CSJ, as his “rabbi.” Secretary Shultz also performed acts of calculated solidarity with the other faction, such as a 1987 Passover Seder he led in Moscow for refusenik leaders like Ida Nudel and Iosip Brugen, who had recently been released after incarceration in the gulag throughout the previous decade. Like Reagan’s relations with Wiesel and Avital Sharansky, this was his entrée into the grassroots movement.

The praise from the Soviet Jewry movement was not without substance, as Secretary Shultz proved to be relentless in his demands to the Kremlin. When he began as Secretary of State, he first pushed to release the refuseniks, a group he saw as emblematic of the larger Soviet Jewry struggle. Eventually, the Soviets released Natan Sharansky in 1986, who after nine years of being the poster child of Jewish persecution in the U.S.S.R. was escorted to West Berlin under the auspices of a “spy-swap.” This decision came after Secretary Shultz had been working for four years for his release. The U.S.S.R. saved face by making it
seem like a prisoner trade. In Sharansky’s place, the United States handed over several Chilean scientists accused of espionage. The following year, refuseniks Josif Begun and Ida Nudel were also released due to U.S. pressure. Even after all these emancipations, Shultz pushed Gorbachev to allow the emigration of “the millions of other Soviet Jews,” during the tense Reykjavik Summit of 1987.

Nevertheless, whenever President Reagan and Secretary Shultz appeared to be making less progress than hoped for and the status of Jews within the U.S.S.R. seemed to worsen, the Soviet Jewry movement did not cease in their demands of the administration. This time, however, it was the establishment that applied most of the pressure. In 1984, the year before Gorbachev was made premier, only 1,000 Jews were allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. per year, down from the already low quota of 10,000 that existed five years prior and deemed a “profound crisis” by the Conference on Soviet Jewry.

Before the Geneva conference, there was a major protest of 250,000 people in NYC, organized by the SSSJ but sponsored by the Conference on Soviet Jewry. It is notable that even though the administration was on their side, a more mainstream group like the CSJ was willing to sponsor a mass demonstration demanding even more action. Moreover, CSJ leaders, including Morris Abram and Herbert Kronish, spoke to Secretary Shultz before the Geneva conference, calling on him to pressure his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, for the release of “all Soviet prisoners of conscience” and “exit visas” to anyone wishing to emigrate. This was a much bigger step than previous bargains, and the CSJ seemed to be adopting a more radical approach in this demand, in spite of the ongoing desperate situation.

Clearly, a transformation had taken place in the movement. The establishment was no longer content to be cautious and negotiate over the lives of a select number of Soviet Jews, but was willing to demand of Secretary Shultz emigration rights for all Soviet Jews. The CSJ’s willingness at such a dire time to organize protests and pressure the government show a shift of the establishment in regard to the role the grassroots organizers had previously played. This shift was indicative of a change in the place of Jewish groups in U.S. politics. In the past, the establishment was more moderate in its tactics as its goal was not in tandem with the White House, and Jackson-Vanik had not yet been passed. Though matters of infighting would persist, it seemed as if the major disparity of strategy between the two factions was diminishing as the Reagan era progressed, and the Soviet Jewry movement achieved a new foothold in foreign policy. As seen beforehand, this was partly due to their own activities, which laid the groundwork for a President to come in with ideas and an ideology in step with theirs.

The release of the refuseniks and other major progress made for Soviet Jews throughout the 1980s led to a legendary final major rally. This was the Freedom Sunday for Soviet Jews held at the National Mall on December 6, 1987, on the eve of a major meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan. Although the grassroots groups worked to mobilize hundreds and thousands of marchers, and the mainstream organizations put up the money and speakers, the separation between the two groups was still present. While many refuseniks and leaders of Jewish organizations spoke, no member of the SSSJ did, nor was any member invited to be on the dais. Not even SSSJ founder Jacob Birnbaum or ally Avi Weiss, who had both engaged in hunger strikes and civil disobedience for years, were given air time at this climactic rally. The grassroots activists and the Jewish establishment may have both been winning the fight, but at the end of it all, they were still fairly divided.

In 1989, Gorbachev lifted the emigration restrictions. The Jews of the U.S.S.R. were finally allowed to leave, and over the next ten years, almost two million of its two-and-a-half-million strong community settled in other countries where they could freely practice their religion without government prohibitions and express support for their homeland. The Soviet Jewry movement in the United States was not able to entirely to overcome its internal divisions. However, it undoubtedly made tremendous progress due to shared goals, and both factions working with the cooperative Reagan administration, which consequently enabled them to develop a stronger voice in addressing these policy matters.

CONCLUSION

The transformation of the Soviet Jewry
movement in the United States between the 1960s and 1980s not only represented a great victory for the two factions of the movement, but also helped bring about a major change in U.S. foreign policy. When the movement started in the early 1960s, only a select number of prominent activists and politicians came to its aid, but, as time progressed, the matter became a focal point of late-Cold War diplomacy. My thesis displays this transition, especially in sections one and two of the paper. Jackson-Vanik and the repercussions associated with its passage made the cause of Soviet Jewry a focal point of U.S. foreign policy by driving policy makers out of the stagnancy of détente and into a more interventionist approach. Such a change allowed the ideas of the grassroots activists to become more accepted by the executive branch, as they fit in greatly with the new aggression taken towards the Soviets. Yet the Reagan Administration's commitment to peaceful negotiations with the U.S.S.R. regarding Soviet Jewry reflects a certain degree of calm similar to the Jewish establishment, who as mentioned earlier, remained close with the President and the Secretary of State. Essentially, the success of this movement was based on a multi-faceted dynamism that combined the best of both Soviet Jewry movement factions.

The transformation from realpolitik pragmatism in the Kissinger years to a palpable show of executive strength against the U.S.S.R. came during the Reagan administration, as demonstrated in the third section of this paper. President Reagan maintained an ideology-driven foreign policy primarily dedicated to vanquishing communism and all of its negative consequences, including the persecution of Jews within the largest Marxist-Leninist state. It was the combination of having a common enemy and having a shared goal, which enabled genuine action to be taken on behalf of their brethren in the U.S.S.R. While President Reagan was more ideologically compatible with the ideas of the grassroots activists than the previous Cold War presidents like Nixon and Ford, under whom Kissinger served, as well as Jimmy Carter, he certainly had not abandoned mainstream Jewish organizations, who still maintained their old ties to the executive branch. It was during Reagan's presidency that the ideas of both groups had relative parity in terms of acceptance and influence on the President and his advisors, and where the disparate strengths of both factions came together for a foreign policy victory for the emigration rights of Soviet Jews.

It can be determined that both groups had something unique to contribute to the success of their movement and to elevate the state of Jews in both the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Through their constant campaigning and their civil rights movement-influenced activism, the grassroots activists stirred in hundreds of thousands of American Jews to demand a change in U.S. engagement with the Soviets. While their numbers were comparatively small, they were able to maintain a constant indefatigable energy throughout the three decades of the movement's existence, and to concentrate their energies on achieving tangible solutions. Supporting Jackson-Vanik before and after its passage enabled the movement to daringly challenge the mainstream of American foreign policy, in spite of the potentially damaging consequences in the U.S.S.R. President Reagan and Secretary Shultz's gumption in pressuring Gorbachev to remove the emigration quotas in the 1980s would not have been possible without the fundamental policy change secured in the preceding decade. By going against the more powerful forces of the Jewish community who were afraid to challenge the status quo, advocates like Jacob Birnbaum, Glenn Richter and the refuseniks were able to help create the healthy transition from détente to engagement.

Nevertheless, the Jewish establishment's role in the movement should not be discounted. Their financial support and ability to spread information about the movement's activities across the country was necessary for Jewish Americans outside the New York nexus of SSSJ activism to become more aware of the injustices committed in the U.S.S.R. The establishment's constant lobbying and network of political supporters enabled the cause of Soviet Jewry to get the attention it would not have otherwise received. Its willingness to negotiate with the Soviets in the 1970s may seem to have been the lost plan in achieving release for Soviet Jews. However, alongside political pressure, it was this strategy that Reagan and Shultz chose to help realize the movement's goals. Likewise, the same flexibility and practicality that marked this wing of the movement, as opposed to the justice-seeking rigidity of the grassroots activists, enabled them to change their strategy in the 1980s to pressure the President and the Secretary of the
State to push for all Jews to be released. From behind the scenes, it is undeniable that the establishment remained vigilant and effective in securing the release of Jews behind the Iron Curtain.

It was in fact the fusion of their efforts that made this transformation of an ethnic cause into a Cold War foreign policy position possible. The Reagan administration’s policy of aggressive negotiation in a way marks this fusion, as it combines the dedication of the activists with the flexibility of the establishment leaders. It is not clear what would have happened if there had been no factions. It is possible that the movement would have been disregarded as another Jewish bloc without the mix of strategies and alliances necessary to achieve its ends. Like so many other successful causes, the Soviet Jewry movement would not have succeeded as a monolith. What may have seemed like problematic relations at the time produced a sort of crucial synthesis of ideas needed to bring the shared goals of the campaign to fruition.

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Liu Yazhou, a general in the People’s Liberation Army once wrote that Central Asia is “the thickest piece of cake given to the modern Chinese by the heavens.” Over the past three decades, China has sought to take advantage of its strategic location next to Central Asia and its influence in the region has grown dramatically. China’s relationship with Central Asia is strongly influenced by its policies and aspirations concerning the western province of Xinjiang. The province borders three of the five Central Asian states and its largest ethnic group, the Uighurs, share a Turkic heritage and Muslim religion with many Central Asians. As the Chinese government has tried to integrate Xinjiang into the rest of the country to establish that it is more cohesively a part of China, the province has been beset by tensions between the native Uighur population and Han migrants. In 2013, the Chinese government announced the “New Silk Road,” a grand scheme to develop inter-Asian transportation and trade routes, a large portion of which run through Xinjiang and Central Asia. An article by Wu Jianmin, former president of the China Foreign Affairs University, described the project as “the most significant and far-reaching initiative that China has ever put forward.” Due to the unstable situation in Xinjiang, the New Silk Road, unlike many other instances of Chinese investment abroad, is likely to have a direct domestic impact in China.

Through the New Silk Road, the Chinese government hopes to achieve three main goals: to increase its access to energy resources in Central Asia, to open new markets for Chinese goods through the construction of infrastructure and thus offset some excess industrial and manufacturing capacity, and to promote stability in Xinjiang. The Chinese government has previously used economic development in Xinjiang and expansion of trade with Central Asia in attempts to quell ethnic unrest through improvements in living standards.

This paper argues that new efforts to bring Central Asian states into China’s sphere of influence through investment and trade can be seen as an extension of past development efforts undertaken by the Chinese government in Xinjiang. While China has successfully collaborated with Central Asian states to increase its influence and achieve its security aims, expanding its economic relations with the region poses additional challenges. While the New Silk Road has the potential to bring a number of benefits to the region, I argue that, based on the resentment generated by certain past projects and the similarities between these projects and those proposed under the new initiative, it also presents risks that run counter to the Chinese government’s goal of promoting regional and interethnic stability.

To support this argument, this paper first traces the evolution of the Chinese government’s policies in Xinjiang and Central Asia over the past twenty-five years, focusing on the connections between the two sets of policies and successful diplomatic strategies employed. The discussion then shifts to the use of economic development to address ethnic tensions in Xinjiang and how the New Silk Road grows out of this effort. An overview of the key components of China’s economic relationship with Central Asia and how the New Silk Road will affect each component is then given. Reactions to Chinese economic involvement in the region are important for understanding the prospects of the New Silk Road. Theoretical arguments demonstrate how different interest groups are expected to respond when increased trade, migration, and investment occur, with a particular emphasis on which groups may be opposed. This paper will utilize case studies of both Xinjiang and Central Asia to examine the actual effects of investment and migration. In each of the two case studies, the paper will first discuss
current reactions and then provide an analysis of how the local populations may respond to the New Silk Road. Finally, the ethical implications of regional development are discussed.

I. THE NEW SILK ROAD INITIATIVE

The New Silk Road refers to a foreign policy initiative that encompasses far more than just China’s economic relationship with Central Asia. The Chinese government now refers to the initiative “one belt, one road,” since it comprises both the “New Silk Road Economic Belt,” which covers land routes from China through Central Asia, and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” which covers sea lanes running through Southeast Asia. In September 2013, President Xi Jinping launched the Silk Road Economic Belt during a speech at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan. The following month, he announced the Maritime Silk Road in Jakarta, Indonesia (for simplicity, the references to the New Silk Road in this paper refer only to the “economic belt” portion).5

The Silk Road Economic Belt will include a network of railways, pipelines, and roads to facilitate the movement of goods and resources. A joint statement from China’s National Development Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce in 2015 outlined seven of the project’s specific objectives. These were: constructing and upgrading infrastructure, expanding market access, reducing customs and trade barriers, cooperating on natural resources, deepening financial ties, encouraging cultural and educational exchanges, and using multilateral economic forums.6 Among these objectives, cooperation on natural resources and improving regional infrastructure are particularly important in Central Asia.7 The Silk Road Economic Belt is projected to be completed by 2025 and to begin in Xi’an, the historic terminus of the Silk Road pass through the Chinese cities of Lanzhou and Urumqi, and then continue into Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.8

Many commentators cite the New Silk Road as evidence of the Xi administration’s effort to reassert China’s historic role in the region and counter the influence of the United States.9 In 2012, a professor at Peking University, Wang Jisi, advocated for a “March West” strategy in which China would move into the areas of Central and South Asia from which the United States was withdrawing as the war in Afghanistan wound down.10 From this view, one could see increased connectivity in the region through economic and infrastructural ties as a foundation for creating a pan-Asian community led by China.11 Some have gone so far as to compare the project to a reestablishment of the vassal relationships in China’s past, while others have characterized it “as a Marshall Plan with Chinese characteristics.”12 Chinese officials, however, vehemently deny any similarities between the two plans. When asked whether the New Silk Road followed the model of the Marshall Plan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi responded, “It [‘Belt and road’] is a product of inclusive cooperation, not a tool of geopolitics, and must not be viewed with the outdated Cold War mentality.”13

The New Silk Road will be financed by a combination of Chinese government entities and multilateral institutions backed by China. Beijing has approved $40 billion specifically for a Silk Road Fund to finance the project, in addition to funding that will be supplied by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and bilateral loans.14 The Silk Road Fund will receive capital from government bodies including the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the China Investment Corporation (China’s sovereign wealth fund), the China Export-Import Bank, and the China Development Bank.15 Many of these institutions have played an active part in previous Chinese foreign development projects. In addition to the funding provided directly by the Chinese government, Chinese firms, some of which are also state-owned enterprises, are also investing in the region as part of the New Silk Road.16 The project will similarly allow companies in China to draw on extensive experience with domestic infrastructure construction and apply it abroad.17 A number of commentators have also cited, “one belt, one road” as a way for China to address domestic excess capacity by providing new opportunities for firms abroad. However, the degree to which the initiative can help absorb excess capacity is unclear, and the new projects may play only a small role in increasing demand for Chinese products.18

The multilateral nature of the projects in the New Silk Road has led China to take a somewhat different approach to the initiative’s funding than in past projects. Chinese officials have said that the Silk Road Fund will be more open to the opinions and invest-
ments of outside nations and firms. The head state risk analyst of the China Export-Import Bank said that each decision made by the fund must be based on a consensus among the various parties involved. These changes are attributed to the dependency of the projects on cooperation from other governments.

China's grand aspirations for the New Silk Road have led members of the Western media to express concern about shifting power relations in the region. In particular, the involvement of China-led institutions, such as the AIIB, raises questions about how China will use its increased geopolitical influence. The New Silk Road will also have significant effects on the economies of Xinjiang and Central Asia.

II. CHINESE POLICY IN XINJIANG AND ITS EFFECT ON CENTRAL ASIA

The motivations guiding the New Silk Road strategy can best be understood through an analysis of China's policies in Xinjiang and how the Chinese government's troubled history with Xinjiang influences its relationship with Central Asia. For China, political and economic ties with Central Asia are instrumental for ensuring stability in Xinjiang, as the province borders Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Mongolia. This section will describe how China's political relations with Xinjiang and Central Asia have evolved, including the increased emphasis placed on regional trade and multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

a. Policies in Xinjiang Prior to the 1990s

Xinjiang was conquered by China in 1759 during the Qing Dynasty. During this period, China was developing a more cohesive sense of national character, and the province was managed with repressive tactics. At the time, Russia and Great Britain were competing for influence in Central Asia as part of the “Great Game,” and China wanted to assert its own interests in the region as well. Han Chinese slowly began moving to the province during the Qing Dynasty, starting a long history of using migration to promote assimilation in Xinjiang. Tensions between Han Chinese and the Uighurs grew over the subsequent two centuries. Although Xinjiang experienced three brief periods of independence during the twentieth century, the last of these ended with the unification of the country under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949.

The CCP's rule of Xinjiang differed from those of previous governments. In the three decades after 1949, the Chinese government sought to integrate Xinjiang into the rest of China using Maoist ideology and new political and economic structures. Much of the government's focus was on using improved infrastructure and communication networks to strengthen ties. The CCP also adopted harsher policies towards the Uighurs partly due to “a fear of concentrated ethnic groups.” Despite improvements in physically integrating Xinjiang with the rest of China, many residents did not feel socially or politically integrated into the state and retained their historical and cultural ties to Central Asia.

The Chinese government sought to further isolate Xinjiang from non-Chinese groups and beliefs following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. During this period, the Chinese government pursued a policy of trying to “re-orient Xinjiang 'inward' toward China proper,” rather than permitting its traditional outward orientation toward Central Asia because most of that region was now controlled by the Soviet Union. As a result, there was little formal trade across the border. Such a shift was designed in part to prevent Xinjiang from coming under the ideological sway of the Soviet Union. To achieve this, the Chinese government attempted to weaken existing cultural ties through efforts such as encouraging Han migration, reforming the Uighur script, and limiting economic and political connections with Central Asia.

b. Changes in Xinjiang and Central Asian Policies During the 1990s

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chinese government became increasingly worried about instability in Xinjiang, and its concerns were magnified by unrest that began in the province in the early 1990s. According to M. Taylor Fravel, a professor at MIT who has written extensively on China's territorial disputes, the Baren Uprising, which occurred in southern Xinjiang in April 1990, “sparked a decade of ethnic unrest and instability in Xinjiang that challenged the regime's authority in this vast frontier.” During the Baren Uprising alone, between 2,000 and 3,000 Uighurs died in skirmishes with the Chinese police. After new states were
established in Central Asia in 1991, Chinese leaders worried that the Uighurs too might now demand their own independent state.33 Indeed, as “Uighurs saw their cousins in Central Asia found sovereign states…resistance to Chinese rule exploded.”34 The unrest during this period took the form of demonstrations, terrorist activities, and fighting between insurgent groups and the government.35

Uighur political organizations in Central Asia particularly worried the Chinese government. Many of the Uighur groups that advocated for a free “Uighurstan” or “East Turkestan” during the 1990s operated out of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Officials feared that movements organized in these nations would travel across the border and take root domestically.36 Many of these groups argued for a secular democracy established through nonviolence, but some promoted a more violent ideology.37 Chinese leaders were also concerned that Islamist movements in Afghanistan and Central Asia would spread into Xinjiang.38

To gain the assistance of Central Asian governments in cracking down on Uighur separatist and Islamic movements, Chinese leaders took a concessionary approach to border disputes.39 After the Soviet Union fell, China had to settle outstanding border disputes with the new nations of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.40 Border agreements that China signed with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1998 were precipitated by violence in Xinjiang and all helped China to achieve the outcomes of strengthened security, expanded trade, and the cessation of support to Uighurs abroad.41 As a result, throughout the 1990s, China was able to place “immense but discrete pressure on the Central Asian governments, in particular Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, over their Uighur diaspora.”42 This pressure was exerted primarily through provisions that discouraged these nations from providing assistance—financial or otherwise—to Uighur political movements.

The 1990s thus represented the beginning of Central Asia’s special role as a region that was central to achieving three of China’s interests: preserving stability on its borders, quelling Uighur separatism, and ensuring access to energy resources.43 These three interests continue to underlie Chinese foreign policy in the region and to motivate the New Silk Road.

c. Economic Relations with Central Asia during the 1990s

In addition to the political tools used to strengthen relations with Central Asian nations, the Chinese government also began employ the opening of trade relations with the region as a means for achieving stability during the 1990s. The border between Xinjiang and Central Asia had been closed for trade after the Sino-Soviet split. Even when trade reopened in 1983, the level of cross-border trade was low.44 However, the leadership in Beijing believed that, “with the necessary economic development, infrastructure upgrades, and legal environment (especially reducing corruption), the region could potentially provide a critical economic partner for Xinjiang and, over the long run, a direct portal for the Western province to the outside world.”45 The Chinese government hoped that opening up to Central Asia would improve the political situation in Xinjiang, which would then establish a suitable environment for economic development to take place.46 This led to a “double-opening” in which Xinjiang was opened up to both the rest of China and to Central Asia, a process that continues today.47

Increased Chinese economic interest in Central Asia coincided with a broader shift in the expansion of Chinese foreign investment. As early as 1994, the Chinese Premier Li Peng called for the establishment of a New Silk Road that would travel from China to the Middle East through Central Asia.48 Such an initiative would open new markets and allow China greater access to energy resources.49 During the late 1990s, under the leadership of President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, the government exhorted Chinese firms to “go out” (走出去) and by extension to “go global”(走向世界).50 State-owned enterprises, particularly energy companies, quickly adopted this policy and eyed markets in Central Asia as well as other parts of the world.51

China’s economic turn outward in the 1990s coincided with the government’s development of a more Asia-focused foreign policy. During this period, the principles of trying to “establish good neighborliness, make neighbors prosperous, and make them feel secure” guided China’s relations with states on its periphery.52 China sought to engage with Central Asia multilaterally in a manner consistent with a “peaceful rise.”53
d. The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

One of the main mechanisms through which China has sought to engage in multilateral diplomacy and increase its influence in Central Asia is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO was founded in 2001 and grew out of the “Shanghai Five,” a group of states settling border disputes in the 1990s. Its members now include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia.

The Chinese government has been adept at shaping the agenda of the SCO to promote its own interests, particularly those related to domestic stability. The organization has facilitated cooperation on security issues, including efforts to combat what China deems the “three evils” of extremism, terrorism, and separatism through the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. It is also an important body for facilitating cultural and diplomatic ties, and leaders of member states meet regularly for summits. China houses the SCO’s headquarters and maintains a strong leadership role in the organization.

The SCO has been less successful, however, in promoting collaboration on economic projects despite China’s desire for the body to do so. Although the SCO announced in 2003 that it would increase its emphasis on economic issues, progress has been limited. Most of the investments supposedly made by the SCO have actually been provided by China. China has been the sole source of funding for joint economic undertakings, providing $900 million in loans to SCO nations in 2004 and $10 billion in 2010. Zhao Huasheng, a Chinese expert on Central Asia and Russia wrote: “China is undoubtedly the locomotive for economic cooperation in the SCO,” but that “it seems not all of China’s expectations [of the SCO] have been fulfilled, especially economically.”

Ultimately, China seeks to develop a free trade zone and an improved transportation network between SCO members to encourage economic integration and regional stability. The Chinese government has repeatedly stressed the importance of developing strong infrastructure connections between SCO countries. As early as 2003 at the SCO summit in Moscow, President Hu Jintao stated, “Taking into account the reality of the region, China suggests economic cooperation begin with transportation.” Some transportation and business advancements have been made, but Russian worries that this might threaten the expansion of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union have stymied progress toward a regional free trade zone. Zhao argues that given the situation, China must take intermediate steps to work towards a regional free trade zone.

The construction of the New Silk Road will facilitate some of these intermediate steps by enabling the Chinese government to promote integration through transportation and to push toward a free trade zone on its own. Recent signs of cooperation between those involved in the SCO and the Silk Road Initiative have also emerged. In March 2015, the government-affiliated news agency Xinhua reported, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will combine national development strategies with the China-proposed Silk Road Economic Belt initiative and work for deeper involvement in global affairs.” China’s pursuit of a multilateral economic strategy in the region appears to be moving forward, but many of its economic ties in Central Asia remain bilateral.

III. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN XINJIANG

Economic development is an important pillar of the Chinese government’s approach to reducing interethnic tensions in Xinjiang and complements the political activities discussed in section II. This section will explore the origins of China’s developmental approach in the province and how the Chinese government’s commitment to economic development in Xinjiang has taken on a circular pattern. Development is seen as critical to ensuring stability, but stability is also seen as a requirement for development. The importance of providing investment to Xinjiang was reaffirmed by the “Develop the West” campaign and will continue with the New Silk Road.

a. Development Policy in Xinjiang Prior to the 2000s

Beginning in the late 1970s, economic development took on a greater role in the Chinese government’s policies toward Xinjiang, consistent with the general shift toward economic reform and opening occurring in China at that time. The Chinese government began to adopt a less isolationist
approach to the province and to see Xinjiang as both a buffer area and a region with strategic and economic assets that could increase China’s stature. Xinjiang comprises one-sixth of China’s land territory and possesses a quarter of the nation’s oil and gas, as well as extensive coal reserves. Thus, it has the potential to contribute significantly to the economy. The shift toward a strategy more focused on economic development in Xinjiang included greater investment in the energy sector, attempts to centralize economic policy, the establishment of inland “ports” for trade bordering Central Asia, and more spending on infrastructure. However, even as the focus shifted toward economic development, aspects of policy from previous eras remained. These included Han migration and a strong role for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a government body focused largely on local agriculture and infrastructure.

The Chinese government has often paired economic development policies with strict crackdowns in the wake of violent outbursts in Xinjiang. In the 1990s, President Jiang Zemin explained that development was to “maintain the unity of ethnic groups, national unification and social stability.” The Chinese government attributes the instability in Xinjiang to low incomes. Thus, by raising the standard of living, it can reduce resentment toward government policies. Even though Xinjiang’s GDP growth began to rise during the 1990s, the gap between per capita incomes in Xinjiang and those in coastal cities remained substantial. For example, in the late 1990s, the per capita GDP in Xinjiang (6,229 RMB) was approximately one-third that of Beijing (18,482 RMB). New outbreaks in hostilities in the province in 1996 led to additional initiatives to boost the local economy and promote stability. These initiatives were included in the Ninth Five-Year plan (1996-2000), which discussed the importance of developing “pillar industries” in Xinjiang in petroleum, petrochemicals, and cotton.

b. The “Develop the West” Policy

Economic development initiatives in Xinjiang intensified when the Chinese government undertook the “Develop the West” campaign (西部大开发) to reduce regional disparities in standards of living. Launched in March 2000, Develop the West (also known as the Great Western Development campaign) was implemented across China. The campaign included provisions to develop Xinjiang into “an industrial and agricultural base and a trade and energy corridor for the national economy.” The “Develop the West” campaign produced significant nationwide investment, including $190 billion in 2007 and $64 billion in 2008 and 2009. While it is difficult to separate the exact amount of spending by province, since many of the infrastructure projects were inter-regional, the comparatively large and restive provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet received substantial investment. In Xinjiang specifically, much of the investment went towards the construction of telecommunications infrastructure and roads, as well as toward developing Xinjiang’s oil reserves and finding ways to connect the province to other oil exporters.

During the campaign, Chinese officials reiterated their commitment to resolving internal stability challenges in Xinjiang through development. In 2000, the head of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Li Dezhu, stated, “The strategy to promote social and economic development of western China is a fundamental way to speed up the development of minority nationalities, and a necessary choice to solve China’s nationality problems under new historical circumstances.” The various components of “Develop the West,” particularly its infrastructure projects, continued previous attempts to join Xinjiang more tightly to other parts of the country.

Beijing has continued to invest in infrastructure and development in Xinjiang. In 2010, the government issued a roadmap to spur “leapfrog development” in the province with the aim of raising per capita incomes in the province to national levels in five years. The roadmap came in the wake of protests that killed 197 people and injured 1,700. As a result of these development programs, in recent years, the province’s economy has consistently grown at a rate of 10 percent or higher, roughly 3 percent faster than the national average.

c. Xinjiang’s Role in the New Silk Road

An analysis of the domestic provisions of the New Silk Road shows that the initiative is guided by a similar logic to that which underlies the “Develop the West” campaign. The Vice-Director of the State Information Center’s World Economic
Research Bureau, Zhang Monan, explained that the domestically focused “Develop the West” policy evolved to be more international and broader in scope. Through both the Central and Southeast Asian components of the New Silk Road, $16.3 billion will be provided specifically for domestic infrastructure projects in twenty provincial regions of China. Previous road and rail construction was undertaken to deepen links between Xinjiang and the rest of the country. That pattern is now being extended with rail construction to China’s neighbors to achieve a similar aspiration of using infrastructure to improve political and economic ties.

Just as in the “Develop the West” campaign, one of the Chinese government’s domestic aims for the New Silk Road is to create more balance between the economies of the nation’s eastern and western provinces. An article in Xinhua stated that the initiative will allow “more parts of the country to enjoy the benefits of its opening-up policy,” and enable China “to integrate domestic and regional development.” Just as China’s coastal provinces improved their economies by receiving greater foreign investment and becoming hubs for trade, the Chinese government hopes that the New Silk Road will bring similar opportunities to Xinjiang and other parts of western China.

The New Silk Road will significantly impact Xinjiang’s economy. Seventy percent of trade between China and Central Asia already passes through Xinjiang, and with the New Silk Road, the value and volume of this trade will increase. Additionally, more than $300 billion has already been invested, largely by state-owned enterprises, on new projects in sectors including construction, energy, and technology. The provincial government has also begun to upgrade transportation infrastructure. Roads and railways built to conduct goods to and from Central Asia will pass through the province, and many of the oil and gas pipelines originating in Central Asia terminate in Xinjiang. The hope is that through the New Silk Road, Xinjiang’s economy will expand to include more tourism, manufacturing, and services. The New Silk Road may also increase exports from Xinjiang and other parts of western China to Central Asian markets. Finally, the provincial capital, Urumqi, aspires to become a financial center for trade between China, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

The projected development associated with the New Silk Road is already changing Xinjiang’s urban landscape. New economic centers, where companies will enjoy favorable tax regimes and other services, have been announced in the province. The city of Horgos, situated on the border between China and Kazakhstan, was already an established inland port, but has recently drawn media attention due to new investment under from the Silk Road Economic Belt. Horgos has become a departure point for goods-laden trains headed to Central Asia and Europe and boasts China’s first cross-border free trade area. Between 2013 and 2014 alone, Horgos’ revenue grew by 80 percent. In coming years, the city is predicted to expand to one hundred times its current size, while its population and number of businesses are expected to go up tenfold over the next ten years. Horgos is just one of many cities in Xinjiang expected to benefit from the New Silk Road, but since it is already at an advanced stage of development, it is often touted as an example of what the government’s economic policies and engagement with Central Asia can achieve for the province’s economy.

IV. CHINA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL ASIA

Chinese trade with and through Central Asia is an important part of the New Silk Road. This section will examine the key dimensions of China’s economic relationships with Central Asian states, including the export of manufactured goods, import of natural resources, and construction of infrastructure. Analyzing these trade dynamics elucidates what China hopes to achieve economically through the New Silk Road.

China has taken over Russia’s historic role and become the largest trading partner for most Central Asian states. Between 2000 and 2012, China’s trade with the region grew from $1.8 billion to $46 billion, according the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The number of Chinese companies operating in Central Asia has also expanded. China’s presence in Central Asian economies has become so large that an estimated 70 to 80 percent of goods sold in Kazakh markets originate in China.

a. Export of Manufactured Goods

Manufactured products are an important part of China’s trade with Central Asia. Finished goods such as textiles, electronics, and other consumer
items make up 80 to 90 percent of China's exports to Central Asia.\textsuperscript{105} Although the arrival of these products threatens local manufacturing capabilities (discussed later in the paper), it also creates new opportunities for Central Asians to engage in transportation, re-export, and other services.\textsuperscript{106} Kyrgyzstan, the only member of the World Trade Organization in Central Asia, is particularly open to the arrival of Chinese goods.\textsuperscript{107} It has become a center for the re-export of Chinese products in Central Asia, as it imports Chinese products and then exports them to other states. Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, professors at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, estimate that re-exports in Kyrgyzstan are equal in value to the nation's entire economy and provide a key means for accessing foreign currency.\textsuperscript{108}

b. Import of Natural Resources

Another critical aspect of China's trade relationship with Central Asia is its desire to access natural resources to meet its growing energy demands. China is already the biggest global consumer of energy, and its demands for both oil and natural gas are projected to grow over the next two decades.\textsuperscript{109} China currently relies on imports to meet more than half of its energy needs. While approximately 47 percent of these imports come from the Middle East, an increasing portion comes from Central Asia.\textsuperscript{110}

Central Asian nations are rich in resources that, advantageously, can also be transported to China overland rather than by sea. Kazakhstan contains 1 percent of the world's natural gas and 2 percent of the world's oil supply, and Turkmenistan contains nearly 10 percent of the world's natural gas supply.\textsuperscript{111} A number of Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested in the Central Asian energy market since 1997, including the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Sinopec, China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China International Trust and Investment Corporation, and Sinochem.\textsuperscript{112}

China has its most significant energy relationship in Central Asia with Kazakhstan. As of 2010, Chinese companies controlled 23 percent of Kazakhstan's overall oil output, the biggest stake China holds in any oil-exporting nation.\textsuperscript{113} The Sino-Kazakh pipeline opened in 2006, and by 2011, it provided China with ten million tons of oil annually.\textsuperscript{114} This comprised approximately 5 percent of China's oil needs at the time.\textsuperscript{115} This project was China's first cross-border pipeline and was jointly undertaken by the CNPC and the Kazakh firm KazMunaiGaz.\textsuperscript{116} China also uses pipelines through Kazakhstan to gain access to oil from Kazakhstan and areas near the Caspian and Black Seas.\textsuperscript{117}

Chinese firms have also invested in resources in other parts of Central Asia. The China-Central Asia pipeline was completed in 2009, and by December 2011, it was transporting 65 billion cubic meters of gas to China from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{118} The China Development Bank provided the loan for the pipeline's construction and supported the purchase of a certain amount of the pipeline's gas, the profits from which initially went toward repayment of the loan.\textsuperscript{119} China has also invested in hydropower projects in Kazakhstan and proposed projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with the objective of providing electricity to Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{120}

Consistent with China's previous economic engagement with Central Asia, the New Silk Road will focus heavily on expanding China's access to energy resources. The vice-director of China's National Energy Administration has stated that energy is “the centerpiece of the New Silk Road economic belt plan,” and Chinese state-owned enterprises are expected to increase their investment as a result.\textsuperscript{121} The Chinese government is particularly interested in the continued construction of overland pipelines in light of increasing tensions in the South and East China Seas.\textsuperscript{122}

c. Construction of Infrastructure

In addition to China's extensive investments in Central Asian energy, much of its influence in the region comes from investments in infrastructure and technology.\textsuperscript{123} Elizabeth Economy and Michael Levi of the Council on Foreign Relations argue that because Chinese leaders are able “to coordinate bids that combine subsidized infrastructure projects and access to natural resource deposits [this] creates a win-win situation for both construction companies and resource companies.”\textsuperscript{124} China will often provide low-interest rate loans or grants to countries that its firms are hoping to enter. The government's ability
to provide such assistance and to subsidize state-owned enterprises provides Chinese energy and construction firms with an edge by lowering the costs of accessing the resources or enabling Chinese companies to outbid other firms. 125

In addition to infrastructure for energy, the Chinese government has also financed a robust transportation network in Central Asia, with a particular focus on connections to Xinjiang. Between 2002 and 2011, China spent millions of dollars on building highways in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and a rail project connecting cities in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Xinjiang. 126 The New Silk Road follows this pattern with its emphasis on increasing the physical integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia and the Middle East.

With the New Silk Road, China will also expand the infrastructure networks it has already established in Central Asia and use them as a conduit for increasing trade with larger markets such as Turkey, Russia, and Iran. 127 Additionally, since China’s largest trading partner is the European Union, there is strong interest in ensuring that goods can be shipped to Europe as efficiently as possible. 128 The rail lines constructed as part of the Silk Road Economic Belt will allow a greater number of containers to travel by land instead of by sea. 129 Although trains are unlikely to entirely replace ships as a means for transporting goods—since they can hold fewer containers and are more costly—for higher value products such as electronics, shipping by train may prove worthwhile to ensure earlier arrivals. 130

V. MODELS FOR TRADE AND MIGRATION BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIA

The growth in trade and investment ties between Central Asia, Xinjiang, and other parts of China has affected local economic structures and demographics. Exploring these effects with both theoretical models and empirical evidence deepens an understanding of how China’s economic presence is perceived in the region and what reactions the New Silk Road is likely to provoke.

a. The Effects of Trade

As discussed above, there is a clear divide in the types of goods that China and Central Asian states import and export from one another. The Stolper-Samuelson model can help explain these trade patterns. This fundamental model for trade dynamics considers two states, state A and state B, both of which are endowed with labor and capital as factors of production. If in state A, labor is relatively plentiful and capital is relatively scant, and in state B, the reverse is true (labor is scant and capital plentiful), then we expect that producing labor-intensive goods will be relatively cheap in state A, but expensive in state B. Similarly, producing capital-intensive goods will be relatively cheap in state B, but expensive in state A. Thus, if the two states engage in trade, state A will export labor-intensive goods and import capital-intensive goods, and nation B will export capital-intensive goods and import labor-intensive goods. This pattern of trade will occur until wages and the marginal product of capital equalize across the two countries, and the respective prices for the two types of goods are the same on both sides of the border. 131

The Stolper-Samuelson model can be applied to analyze trade between China and Central Asia. In general, China is relatively rich in capital and labor, and relatively scarce in natural resources (oil, gas, and certain minerals). Central Asian states, in contrast, are relatively abundant in natural resources, but relatively scarce in capital and labor. This means that when trade opened between the two states, China would be expected to export capital-and labor-intensive goods to Central Asia (such as machinery or manufactured goods) and import natural resources, while the reverse would occur in Central Asian states. As demonstrated in section IV, this is precisely what occurred.

Understanding the reactions to investment in Xinjiang and Central Asia requires an analysis of the various interest groups involved and how they are affected. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem can be used to analyze how domestic constituencies are likely to react to the opening of trade. Ronald Rogowski, a professor at UCLA, created a model for the political implications of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem by examining the types of domestic conflicts likely to arise from trade. Rogowski considers how a state’s relative abundance or scarcity in different combinations of three factors of production—land, capital, and labor—can lead to rural–urban conflict or class conflict. 132

The version of Rogowski’s model that most closely parallels the situation faced by Central Asian
nations in their economic relationships with China is one in which capital and labor are scarce and land is abundant (in this case, mineral and energy resources should be substituted for land, although land deals between China and Central Asia have been proposed). The distribution of the factors of production in Xinjiang is similar, although the situation differs because the economic relationship is domestic. Rogowski argues that this scenario will lead to rural–urban conflict because capital and labor tend to be concentrated in urban areas and land in rural areas.\textsuperscript{133}

In Central Asia, however, since the abundant natural resource is not land but rather mineral and energy resources, the type of conflict that will occur differs. The most likely form of conflict is between those groups with stakes in the energy industry (often the elite in Central Asia and state-owned enterprises in Xinjiang) and those engaged in capital- and labor-intensive sectors such as manufacturing and retail. Those working in capital- and labor-intensive sectors may come to resent China’s role in the economy because Chinese imports threaten their own products and jobs. Those in the resource sector, however, will welcome Chinese investment. The effect of these class cleavages in Central Asia and Xinjiang following the implementation of new trade and development policies is discussed in section VI.

As predicted by the models above, much of the opposition to trade in Central Asia comes from lower-skilled workers engaged in manufacturing and in the selling of goods at bazaars rather than from the elite.\textsuperscript{134} This response is also consistent with the finding that low-skilled workers tend to be more protectionist.\textsuperscript{135} Additionally, factors outside of economic interests may inform opposition to Chinese trade in Central Asia. Foreign policy and antagonistic sentiments toward a particular nation based on history have been found to negatively affect a population’s attitudes towards opening trade.\textsuperscript{136} During the Soviet era, there was significant propaganda in Central Asian societies critiquing China, and some negative attitudes linger today.\textsuperscript{137} Thus, in the case of China and Central Asia, suspicions about the Chinese government’s intentions and ongoing resentment surrounding water disputes and land deals may also spill over into resistance to trade.\textsuperscript{138}

b. The Effects of Migration

Another concern surrounding increased investment in both Central Asia and Xinjiang has been an accompanying increase in migration. In Central Asia, this concern relates to migration from all parts of China, while in Xinjiang, the concern relates specifically to Han Chinese migration into the province. Early on, many of the traders that migrated through Xinjiang to Central Asia were Uighurs engaged in the shuttle trade. However, the influence of Han merchants has grown substantially and the number of Uighur traders has declined.\textsuperscript{139} There is now estimated to be a roughly even divide of Chinese migrants to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan who are either Han Chinese or ethnically Central Asian.\textsuperscript{140} Yet shared ethnicity does not necessarily make the receiving Central Asian populations more sympathetic, and some oppose the migration of Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs as well.\textsuperscript{141}

The literature on individual attitudes towards migration and globalization can help explain the sources of these concerns. Professors Jens Hainmueller and Daniel Hopkins divide the sources of opposition to migration into two major categories: those that relate to political economy and those that relate to socio-psychological factors.\textsuperscript{142} Fears of both types are apparent in Xinjiang and Central Asia.

Considering first the factors related to political economy, the labor market affects of migration should be analyzed. Extending the Stolper-Samuelson theory to migration suggests that trade and migration can act as substitutes for one another.\textsuperscript{143} A nation with a relatively abundant labor supply can either export labor-intensive goods or can send migrants abroad to a state where labor is scarce. The eventual equilibration in wages will be the same.\textsuperscript{144} The arrival of Chinese workers brought in to complete infrastructure and energy projects in the less populous nations of Central Asia has sparked resentment because they are seen as replacing local laborers. Similarly, the negative attitudes toward Han Chinese migration into Xinjiang have arisen in part from fears of labor market substitution and the sense that Han migrants fill new jobs created by economic development.\textsuperscript{145}

In other scenarios, however, migration and trade are complements.\textsuperscript{146} This appears to be the case in certain types of migration between China and Central Asia. Migration acts as a complement
to trade in instances when the Chinese migrants are traders or businessmen and accompany goods produced in China and brought to Central Asia. A similar phenomenon has played out in Chinese trade with Africa, where some of the migrants are shopkeepers who establish small shops selling goods that they have imported from China. Thus, the opposition to Chinese goods in Central Asia is at times linked to opposition to migration, since they reflect two aspects of the same phenomenon.

Outside the labor market, there are also concerns about the cultural and political effects of Chinese immigration. Hainmueller and Hopkins report that recent studies have shown “that immigration-related attitudes are driven by symbolic concerns about the nation as a whole,” which can be either cultural or economic. With migration, individuals may worry not only about their own wages and labor market outcomes, but also about the social effects of migrants. For instance, in Central Asia, concern over the social impact of Chinese traders changing the character of bazaars may compound individual fears. Misrepresentations of the Chinese migrant population in Central Asia due to “a lack of consistent data assessing the true magnitude of Chinese in-migration” have also been used by journalists and political figures to fuel xenophobia. This is consistent with the finding that opposition to migration rises in relation to misperceptions of the number of migrants in a country and their visibility.

c. Trade as a Means to Promote Cooperation

While the models above discuss ways in which disagreements over trade policy can arise, China’s investment policies, both foreign and domestic, also relate to discussions of whether trade can facilitate peaceful cooperation. Debate on this subject dates back to the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued in the first supplement of Of the Guarantee for Perpetual Peace that mutual interest as demonstrated by trade is a powerful force in uniting nations. He wrote, “The spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state.” Then, by trading and engaging in financial transactions, states ultimately develop an inclination to pursue peace and mediate emerging conflicts with one another. Following this logic, as long as trade remains a primary basis of the relationship between China and Central Asian nations, there will be little incentive for either side to engage in behaviors that would disrupt this positive financial relationship. Thus, by increasing trade ties with Central Asia, China should be able to promote a common interest in regional stability and ensure cooperation on security issues. The government’s policies indicate a belief in this approach. However, trade and investment can also give rise to new sources of friction, as demonstrated in the sections below.

VII. ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA’S ROLE IN CENTRAL ASIA

Since one aim of Chinese economic involvement in Central Asia is promoting stability, it is important to consider if and when China’s polices actually increase, not reduce, tensions. In Central Asia, the economic situation has been the primary impetus for the creation of both pro-China and anti-China groups. In this section, theories for reactions toward Chinese trade, investment, and migration are compared to empirical evidence of responses to China’s growing economic role in the region. This analysis informs an understanding not only of the effect of previous Chinese investment, but also of the aspects of the New Silk Road that might prove the most controversial.

a. General Views

Central Asian leaders have generally welcomed Chinese investment and discussed the potential for China to play a special role in each of their countries. China represents not only a significant source of investment but also an alternative to the traditional superpowers in the region, Russia and the United States. China is also an attractive investor because it rarely imposes political conditions on its loans, particularly appealing to Central Asian autocrats. Islam Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan, said, “In 22 years of bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and China, the latter has never set any political demands.”

Private economic interests underlie many of the positive attitudes Central Asian elites have toward China. Many elites have personal stakes in companies or sectors of the economy that benefit from investment from China, such as the oil sector. As predicted by the models of trade-related class cleavages, such groups are more likely to be
supportive of China’s growing influence. The Chinese government and companies have also sought to generate positive impressions through the use of soft power.\textsuperscript{158}

However, not all support among Central Asian citizens for a greater Chinese role in the region is based solely on a desire to benefit from current economic opportunities. Among younger generations, some see China as presenting a new and appealing development model and thus favor engagement as a way to mimic that model in their own nations and to help improve national financial conditions.\textsuperscript{159} Moreover, the decrease in oil prices during the winter of 2015 caused both energy revenues and remittances sent back to Central Asia from workers in Russia to decline. When these two important contributors to their economies fell, Central Asians may have begun to look more favorably on Chinese investment in the region as a way to balance against turmoil in other investor nations.\textsuperscript{160}

While many Central Asian leaders express positive views of China, these views are often motivated more by economic need than a genuine belief in China’s good intentions.\textsuperscript{161} Indeed, opposition parties in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have used anti-China sentiments as an important part of their platforms. Once in government, however, these parties often change course because “in view of the large economic, political, and demographic differential, no Central Asian regime can afford to present itself as Sinophobe.”\textsuperscript{162} During the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, many opposition leaders heavily criticized China and accused the sitting president, Askar Akayev, of being too concessionary toward China. However, when the opposition eventually came to power, they again established positive relations with the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{163}

While there is no regional consensus toward China, the sense that trade will bring economic benefits is often mixed with feelings of resentment and suspicion.\textsuperscript{164} The director of the Central Asian Studies Center at KIMEP University in Kazakhstan, Nargis Kassenova, stated, “China is too powerful, too strong, and we’re afraid of being overwhelmed.” He added, “It’s hard to turn down on [sic] what China can offer, but we resist the full embrace of Chinese power.”\textsuperscript{165} Populations in many other Asian nations, even those that have deep economic ties with China, echo these concerns. Economic dependence is likely to further increase as a result of the New Silk Road, but if nations do try to resist China’s “full embrace,” it could reduce future political and security cooperation.

The degree to which citizens of Central Asian states express anti-China sentiments varies depending on the level of media and political freedom. In general, the more open countries, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, report the highest levels of opposition to China in domestic polls.\textsuperscript{166} In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the media repeatedly refers to a “China lobby” linked to their countries’ “economic woes and policy errors of the government.”\textsuperscript{167} In the more authoritarian states of Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, however, violent anti-China incidents have not occurred.\textsuperscript{168}

b. Concern that the Economic Relationship Is Imbalanced

The populations of many Central Asian states express concern that their states’ economic relationships with China are increasingly imbalanced and overly reliant on extractive industries. This sentiment is most frequently voiced in Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{169} More than 85 percent of exports from Central Asia to China are natural resources and raw materials, while more than 85 percent of the products sold by Chinese companies are manufactured items.\textsuperscript{170} Due to the large share of Kazakh oil that Chinese energy firms own, some in Kazakhstan worry that their country will gradually become simply a “raw materials appendage” of China.\textsuperscript{171} The secretary-general of Kazakhstan’s opposition Green Party, Serikzhan Mambetalin, said, “The whole economy of Kazakhstan is based on producing crude oil, selling it for US dollars and using these dollars to buy cheap Chinese products. There is no industry in this country apart from the extractive industry.”\textsuperscript{172}

c. Attitudes toward Chinese Goods

One of the largest tensions in the Sino-Central Asian economic relationship is the effect of Chinese manufactured goods on local markets. Chinese products, which constitute between 80 and 90 percent of exports to the region, trigger resentment because they are often cheaper than those made domestically and are seen as contributing to high levels of local unemployment.\textsuperscript{173} In recent years, a large number of Chinese goods have arrived in
Central Asian bazaars and provoked discontent among local traders. The director of a Kyrgyz market research firm decried the effects of Chinese goods in local markets in an article in EurasiaNet. He explained that because Kyrgyzstan had become so dependent on Chinese imports, the economy was subject to more volatility because Chinese goods were considered to be of poor quality: “We cannot be sure of the quality of the food and household products entering our market, because traders tend to buy from the lower spectrum of Chinese goods. Much trade with China is contraband and this can impact the health of the population.”

The arrival of Chinese goods, whether contraband or legal, is likely to accelerate with the improved transportation routes of the New Silk Road.

In Kazakhstan, significant concern surrounds the effects of Chinese manufactured goods on local industrial capacities. Since its independence, Kazakhstan has had a weak manufacturing base; the costs of production in the country are estimated to be five times the costs in China. Thus, even though the opening of trade has benefited the national economy overall, individuals in certain sectors, such as textiles, have been harmed, as the Stolper-Samuelson model would predict regarding the types of goods traded between countries with different initial factors of production.

In some areas, loosely formed groups of opposition emerged in response to anxiety surrounding the Chinese presence in local markets. Consistent with the effects discussed in the Rogowski model on who opposes and supports the opening of trade, these groups have emerged largely among “working middle-class people, concerned about Chinese competition and the deterioration of the labor market.” However, restricting Chinese products from entering the Kazakh market might prove difficult. More than half of the small businesses in Kazakhstan trade with China. Konstantin Syroezhkin of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies said, “We have no alternative. If we were to eliminate Chinese products we would end up facing a severe deficit of products in the market.”

Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, opposition has also developed toward goods and traders from China. A group representing 10,000 merchants and storeowners at Kyrgyzstan’s Karasu Bazaar has repeatedly criticized Chinese competition and organized protests. More violent acts have also occurred. In one incident in 2010, a violent mob attacked Kyrgyzstan’s Guoying shopping center, which is owned by a Chinese company. Not all Kyrgyz are critical of the Chinese goods arriving in their country, however, and a Kyrgyz customs inspector told the Economist, “There is demand for them in our country, so I suppose these goods must be okay.”

The New Silk Road initiative will likely increase the number of Chinese goods arriving in Central Asia. The initiative focuses on reducing barriers to market access created by poor infrastructure, tariffs, and customs practices, but not on improving local manufacturing capabilities. Thus, many of the concerns discussed above should be expected to increase rather than to be alleviated.

d. Attitudes toward Chinese Migrants

Transportation routes affiliated with the New Silk Road will facilitate the movement not only of goods but also of people. The reactions to Chinese migration in Central Asia are an important manifestation of China’s regional image. Migration associated with Chinese infrastructure projects and trade is a global phenomenon. A particular concern in Central Asia is the perception that Chinese migrants are sent abroad to cultivate influence over local populations. Rustam Haidarov, a Tajik sociologist, said, “It is China’s strategy to resettle its people in different countries.” He added his belief that the Chinese first gain influence in economic spheres and then transfer that influence into political spheres. His statements reflect the high degree of suspicion surrounding Chinese migration in Central Asia. A report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2003 argued that while Central Asian states were worried about Chinese migration, it was difficult for them to object because they needed economic and security assistance. The phenomenon remains true today.

The presence of Chinese traders and other migrants is particularly visible in poorer Central Asian nations, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Strong opposition to Chinese migrants exists in these states since “an upsurge of Chinese laborers has escalated competition with local communities for jobs in mining, agriculture, construction, trade and transportation.” As more Chinese enterprises have been established, domestic frustrations have
grown. Between 2002 and 2010, multiple arson attacks occurred in the Chinese and Uighur areas of Kyrgyz bazaars, although it was unclear whether these fires could be fully attributed to ethnic and national tensions. In Tajikistan, the number of Chinese workers rose from 30,000 to 82,000 between 2007 and 2010. In general, these laborers work for large Chinese companies and do not interact much with the local population; however, as the number of migrants has grown, occasional spates of violence between Chinese laborers and Tajik citizens have increased. Incidents in both states reflect opposition to migration arising from fears related to labor market substitution.

The Kyrgyz government has considered restricting migration but has not done so, out of fear for China’s reaction. In April 2007, the Kyrgyz government proposed restricting the number of foreigners that could engage in wholesale and retail trade, going so far as to issue a directive to limit the number of foreign traders at Kyrgyz bazaars to 4,500 (for comparison, as early as 2003, there were 20,000 Chinese traders present). An explicit aim of the directive was to minimize competition arising from Chinese merchants. That year, however, the SCO summit was hosted by Kyrgyzstan, and the government worried about the negative impact this directive might have on relations with Beijing. It was thus never put into force. Nonetheless, some Kyrgyz would still like their government to pressure China to restrict migration. Others, however, see Chinese traders as positively contributing to the Kyrgyz economy through the re-export market, payment of rents, and provision of cheap goods to Kyrgyz consumers.

Chinese migration in Kazakhstan is less controversial than in poorer states, but it is still a point of concern. Due to the energy-focused relationship between China and Kazakhstan, most of the Chinese migrants in the country are engineers and construction workers. Kazakhstan has put in place some mechanisms to control Chinese migration and limit social unrest, including monitoring visas and mandates for the hiring of a certain number of Kazakh employees. Such laws, however, are not always enforced. Even when they are, reports indicate that local employees receive reduced wages and are assigned more challenging jobs. Protests regarding the treatment of workers at a China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation site in Kazakhstan occurred in 2007. During this time, the Chinese were criticized in local media “as exploiters of the Kazakh people.” Although Kazakhstan receives fewer migrants from China than from Central Asian states, Chinese laborers are perceived as contributing to high local unemployment. In particular, the risk of a “Yellow Peril,” has been raised in both the Kazakh parliament and press, which reflects the cultural and ethnic sources of opposition to migration.

VIII. HOW MIGHT THE NEW SILK ROAD BE RECEIVED IN CENTRAL ASIA?

a. Political Responses to Chinese Investment

The above analysis of the reaction to Chinese investment in Central Asia suggests that the Chinese government may encounter opposition to an increase in its regional economic presence unless it can show that its actions will benefit other nations, and it will not merely extract resources for use in its own economy. Inclusiveness will thus be critical to the New Silk Road’s design. Gao Huacheng, the Chinese commerce minister, sees the program as in the interest of all nations. He said, “We believe the initiatives will not only facilitate China’s growth, but also boost economies along the route as well as the world.” The Director of the Institute for Central Asian Studies at Lanzhou University, Yang Shu, however, believes that based on current plans for the New Silk Road, “It looks like China is building it and asking others to tag along.”

While in general Central Asian leaders have welcomed the New Silk Road, some domestic opposition could still arise. The president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has stated that the project is “a wonderful concept,” and “solidarity will be our strength to develop regional cooperation along the Silk Road.” Such optimistic statements, however, may belie past realities. Rafaello Pantucci, the director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute, has said that due to investment from the New Silk Road, “The Kazakh government might find they have political anger at home toward the Chinese investment…If you got huge public anger to confront, you’ve got to respond to it.”

The anti-China sentiments expressed by
citizens in Central Asian nations pose a political problem for their governments, which are forced to balance demands from China with those from domestic constituencies.\textsuperscript{202} Agreements with China can lead local populations not only to criticize the Chinese entities involved, but also to question the strength and intentions of their own governments.\textsuperscript{203} For instance, citizens have repeatedly raised the concern that Kazakhstan will eventually be forced to cede oil and land to China in order to pay off loans.\textsuperscript{204}

Rather than finding ways to make Chinese presence more palatable, the Kazakh government has sometimes conceded to domestic anger. When China sought to lease one million hectares of land from Kazakhstan in 2009, protests were so strong that the deal was canceled. Political opposition to Chinese influence in Kazakhstan also thwarted a free trade agreement between the two states.\textsuperscript{205} The political opposition toward some Chinese investment in Kazakhstan has led Laruelle and Peyrouse to argue that despite the large stake that China has in Kazakhstan’s oil sector, “Chinese control over Kazakh oil is not established.”\textsuperscript{206} Indeed, the Kazakh Minister of Oil and Gas stated in September 2013, “that China’s share of the domestic oil and natural gas production will drop from 24 percent to 7-8 percent.”\textsuperscript{207} This statement runs counter to the spirit of cooperation normally expressed by Kazakh officials toward economic deals with China. Future political opposition of this sort could hinder the proposed expansion in energy partnerships under the New Silk Road and force governments to limit new deals. Additionally, the more that working with China is considered to be a sign of governmental weakness, the less likely future cooperation may become.

b. Regional Security Implications of the New Silk Road

The New Silk Road has also been explicitly linked to China’s security interests in the region.\textsuperscript{208} It ties into China’s previous pattern of using economic incentives as a means for ensuring greater political and security cooperation. Over the past decade, China has been able to successfully use its bilateral economic relationships to encourage repression of Uighur activities by Central Asian governments and expand on previous political efforts.\textsuperscript{209} The World Uighur Congress, a collection of Uighur groups, reports that between 2001 and 2011, approximately fifty Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan were extradited to China.\textsuperscript{210} In more recent economic agreements, the parties involved have again stated their willingness to confront Uighur terrorism.\textsuperscript{211}

The deals in the New Silk Road may include additional provisions to address security and promote China’s regional agenda. Regional terrorism is a genuine concern, and the rise of the Islamic State has increased fears. In the same speech in which President Xi announced the New Silk Road initiative in Kazakhstan in 2013, he also argued that the participating nations should cooperate with one another on topics including “sovereignty, territorial integrity and security, while cracking down on the ‘evil forces’ of terrorism, extremism and separatism.”\textsuperscript{212} As Central Asian nations become even more indebted to China due to loans provided under the New Silk Road, they may have no choice but to accept new security provisions.\textsuperscript{213} However, while building relationships with Central Asian nations has generally proved an effective means for China to suppress Uighur political organizing, there is also a risk that by reinforcing Xinjiang’s position as an economic gateway to Central Asia, greater political and religious affiliations between the two regions may emerge.\textsuperscript{214}

The security interests involved in the New Silk Road initiative are further underscored by the support that it has received from members of the Chinese military. Major General Ji Mingkui of the People’s Liberation Army is one of the most prominent military officials to support the New Silk Road. He stated that it will provide an opportunity for the SCO to further collaborate on security issues as well as economic development. Colonel Bao Shixiu has also argued that with the initiative, China is “ready to share its [economic] opportunities with [its] neighbors,” but “at the same time, it needs their cooperation in addressing problems such as terrorism, cross-border crime and drug trafficking.”\textsuperscript{215} This is very similar to the rhetoric that surrounded China’s development of relations with Central Asian nations in the 1990s. The Chinese government appears to be building on past efforts to ensure the cooperation of Central Asian states on terrorism and separatism through economic development. However, Chinese leaders must also
remain attuned to how the initiative is perceived abroad if the deals are to succeed.

IX. HOW MIGHT THE NEW SILK ROAD BE RECEIVED IN XINJIANG?

Given the similarities between previous economic development campaigns in Xinjiang and certain provisions in the New Silk Road, understanding the effects of past development is necessary to analyze how people will react to the New Silk Road. This section will use the models for individual reactions to trade and migration established in section IV as well as information on reactions to previous investment in Xinjiang to consider what implications the New Silk Road will have for the province.

a. Previous Reactions to Economic Development

Despite the emphasis that the Chinese government has placed on development initiatives as a panacea for interethnic tensions and promoting social stability in Xinjiang, these initiatives have encountered obstacles. More specifically, the Uighur population has felt marginalized by the arrival of Han migrants and unequal distribution of opportunities. The government sees Han migration into Xinjiang as a method for integrating the province and “bringing investment, educated labor, and droves of loyal citizens to the troubled and resource-rich region.” When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, there were just 220,000 Han Chinese in the province and members of China’s ethnic minorities comprised a majority of the population. Migration intensified with the incentive of new employment prospects created through development. By 1990, the Han population in Xinjiang was 5.32 million (37.6 percent of the population), by 2000, it was 7.49 million (40.6 percent), and by 2010, it was 8.4 million (39 percent). Most migrants have gone to Xinjiang’s more industrialized north, particularly to the city of Urumqi, where Han Chinese now comprise more than three quarters of the population.

Han migrants are perceived as disproportionately benefiting from the economic development policies in Xinjiang. Economic integration between the province and the rest of China has led to the growth of Xinjiang’s energy sector, as would be predicted by the models in section IV since the province is relatively rich in resources. However, the accompanying benefits have not always gone to the local population. Since state-owned energy companies are not based in Xinjiang, a large portion of their profits return to other parts of China. Additionally, in Xinjiang’s oil industry, many of the managers and construction workers are Han Chinese. In other areas of the economy, Han Chinese have also displaced Uighurs. Cross-border barter trade with Central Asia was once largely organized by Uighurs, but is now led by Han merchants. Disparities in opportunity have resulted in high unemployment rates in the Uighur population, even among those who are well-educated. Han Chinese migrants are often richer than Uighur residents and occupy higher-class positions. As of 2014, just 13 percent of Uighurs worked in managerial and professional positions compared to more than 35 percent of the employed Han population. While there are clear benefits from greater investment, it is consistent with the findings of the aforementioned models that because Uighurs tend to occupy lower-skilled positions they might have more reservations about opening their province to further investment.

In recent years, acts of Uighur-led hostility have increased not just in Xinjiang, but also in other parts of China. In October 2013, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement claimed responsibility for a car attack in Tiananmen Square. In March 2013, stabbings by Uighurs occurred at a railway station in the city of Kunming. In the wake of unrest, the “stick” of increased political, social, and religious restrictions has been paired with the “carrot” of economic development policies in Xinjiang.

In this period of increased unrest, there remained a clear commitment to using economic development, including through the New Silk Road, to address tensions. A 2014 Xinhua article said that the best way of handling the current social issues was through “improving the quality of living for all ethnic groups through balanced development.” However, some also expressed skepticism about the continued use of development in Xinjiang. For example, Kendrick Kuo writes in Foreign Affairs, “Beijing’s drive to develop the region economically—in the face of an already resentful and restless minority—has failed to create stability there.” While improving standards of living in the province is a positive development, once residents achieve a certain level of economic security they may be able devote more
time to promoting and organizing around their ethnic identity. Thus, further development through the New Silk Road may not necessarily serve to improve relations in Xinjiang in the way the Chinese government might desire.  

b. Implications of the New Silk Road

Analyzing the record of economic development campaigns in Xinjiang reveals a risk that despite the hopes that the New Silk Road will improve the province's economy, it may ultimately provoke new frustrations among the Uighur population. The spokesman for the World Uighur Congress, Alim Seytoff, said,

“The Chinese investment of $40 billion that Xi revealed is really bad news for the Uighur people... Chinese investment has not brought so-called prosperity, stability or peace for the indigenous Uighur people in East Turkestan. In light of the strategic importance of East Turkestan, which is a gateway to Central and South Asia for China, we have seen more of the repression Uighurs have faced over the past decade.”

The network of trade routes that will run through Xinjiang as a result of the New Silk Road will make ensuring a stable environment in the province all the more important. The desire to maintain stability in turn could lead to increased restrictions on religious, political, and educational freedoms and fuel Uighur resentment.

The effects of Chinese investment in Xinjiang have also raised doubts about Chinese investment in Central Asia; the New Silk Road may exacerbate these doubts. Kazakhstan's first ambassador to China, Murat Auezov, said, “What is happening in Xinjiang is the building of a platform for the next leap forward into the Central Asian and Kazakh territory.” Central Asians worry that the pattern of Han migration that has occurred in Xinjiang will eventually expand into Central Asia. However, most experts do not think that the same level of migration will occur outside of Xinjiang.

X. THE ETHICS OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW SILK ROAD

The New Silk Road will not only affect the political and economic situation in Xinjiang and Central Asia, but will also raise important considerations regarding the ethics of economic development and trade. This section will give a brief overview of those considerations and how the Chinese government has addressed them.

China’s foreign investment strategies have been criticized as being “neo-colonial.” Such criticisms have largely been levied in the context of China’s involvement in Africa; however, similar critiques could be applied in Central Asia. In both regions, China’s investment is largely focused on the extraction of resources and building the infrastructure necessary to do so. An economy can be considered “neo-colonial” when it is “... geared toward the promotion of the interests of foreign capital that dominates a particular location.” As China’s role in Kazakhstan’s oil sector and Kyrgyzstan’s re-export market has grown, the economies of both Central Asian nations have become increasingly geared towards an outside power. However, neo-colonial or neo-imperial endeavors also often include the imposition of values on another nation. This is something that China explicitly avoids in its public statements and in fact part of appeal of its investment to other nations. While arguments about neo-colonialism can draw attention to some worrisome aspects of China’s policies, it is hyperbolic to suggest that with the New Silk Road China is becoming a “neo-colonial” power. China is engaging in activities beneficial to its domestic economy and international status, but these actions are not designed to subsume the existing political or cultural systems in the nations in which it trades or invests.

Additionally, countries subject to “neo-colonialism” often lack an alternative partner besides the dominant nation. This is clearly not the case in Central Asia where local governments have played Russia, China, and the United States against one another in both the political and economic spheres. Moreover, other Asian nations now appear to be increasing their focus on Central Asia. Japanese President Shinzo Abe visited five Central Asian states in October 2015 and emphasized opportunities for trade with Japan. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who also visited all five states in 2015, India has begun to expand the “Connect Central Asia” policy begun in 2012 and to pursue trade and resource agreements with Central Asia. Central Asian states clearly will not lack
Accusations of neo-colonialism have been explicitly made regarding Chinese economic development programs in Xinjiang. While there is a clear economic rationale for the government’s investment in the region, these programs have raised concerns about distributive justice and the effects of development on local customs. For instance, the “Develop the West” campaign project was billed as bringing more “civilization” to the province, but also contributed to the weakening of regional culture. One instance of this was the razing of large sections of the old city of Kashgar, located in southern Xinjiang, to make room for new buildings. Some types of “civilization” were thus privileged above others. The government’s encouragement of Chinese migration and of Han-Uighur intermarriage, and discouragement of Uighur women wearing headscarves all raise similar concerns about cultural and demographic dilution and the imposition of outside values on the region’s population.

The Chinese government has begun to recognize that some policy changes must be made to ensure that issues of justice do not undermine its development program in Xinjiang. During a visit to the province in April 2015, President Xi indicated that the focus of development would shift toward “labor-intensive industries, agriculture industrialization and other traditional local industries,” in order to promote the employment of Uighurs and ensure greater equality of opportunity. Editorialists in the Chinese state media have also expressed a greater degree of recognition that economic development alone cannot solve the challenges in Xinjiang and that even with continued development, the benefits will need to be more evenly distributed. Similar recognition of the need for inclusive development will be required to reduce ethical concerns surrounding the New Silk Road.

XI. CONCLUSION

The New Silk Road builds on ideas, including reducing conflict through economic relations that have previously guided the Chinese government’s development policies in Xinjiang and its trade and investment policies in Central Asia. The Chinese government continues to view economic engagement with Central Asia as a tool for reducing ethnic tensions and unrest in Xinjiang, promoting regional stability by strengthening the economies of surrounding nations, gaining access to overland energy resources, and opening new markets. However, resentment toward the Chinese government’s policies has also arisen. In Xinjiang, local concerns center on Han migration and the unequal distribution of the benefits from development. In Central Asia, domestic concerns center on the extractive nature of the economic relationship, the effect of Chinese goods on local industries, and the arrival of Chinese merchants and laborers. The New Silk Road will bring a further increase in the construction of infrastructure, reduction of trade barriers, and growth in China’s regional economic clout, all of which may exacerbate these grievances. Nonetheless, given the power imbalance between China and its neighboring states and the ability of the autocratic Central Asian governments to suppress domestic frustration are large, it is unlikely that any of the grievances outlined above will derail the New Silk Road policies. The implementation of these policies will likely be more effective if past reactions to trade and investment are considered and used to design more inclusive policies. The Chinese government has repeatedly articulated the belief that the project should benefit all parties. A government framing document stated that the initiative must be “jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all.” Moreover, Chinese foreign policy experts already recognize the importance of making the plan more inclusive. Shi Yinhong, a professor at Renmin University, wrote, “It’s vital to fully engage the countries on whose sovereign lands the infrastructure systems are to be built, and this includes conducting far more international consultations than has been the case up to now.” Concrete actions, however, are necessary to demonstrate consideration of these joint interests. The Chinese government should highlight the ways that the “one belt, one road” initiative can contribute to economic diversification and employment in Central Asian nations. Some analysts already see shifting patterns of Chinese investment in Central Asia away.
from the resource sector and toward tourism, farming, and other industries. Some of these sectors, particularly tourism, would provide more opportunities for domestic development. Additionally, increasing efforts to hire local workers might quell some of the unrest regarding unemployment. Otherwise, a failure to engage with regional concerns may hamper some of the grand ambitions for the New Silk Road.

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The Nation Contested: Alevi Identity as a Response to Turkish Nationalism

Samuel Watters, Princeton University (2015)

I. INTRODUCTION

A sense of anguish had replaced the exuberance typical of the heart of the Istanbul district Beşiktaş. Streets that normally bustled with lively commotion sulked beneath banners, mourning martyrs, and decrying complacency. The football matches and boisterous cheers that usually roared from nearby bars drowned under the cries of protestors calling on the Turkish state to recognize and account for massacres that have occurred throughout its history. Although the police officers surrounding this protest only observed silently, violent clashes erupted between protestors and security forces elsewhere in the city. The protests across Istanbul and the rest of Turkey on that hot July day commemorated the Sivas massacre, a 1993 incident in which thirty-seven individuals—most of whom were Alevi intellectuals and artists—perished in a hotel set on fire by a fundamentalist Sunni mob during an Alevi cultural festival.

Only a short walk from this tense protest, however, I encountered a strikingly different portrayal of relations between the Turkish state and the Alevi population. At the top of a steep hill in a nearby park stood a nondescript building, its presence revealed only by an occasional stream of people passing through its doors or a small group of children playing in its courtyard. Conversations with local residents taught me that the modest building was a cemevi, a house of worship and center of community organizing for Alevi communities. While its plain exterior and lack of minarets distinguished the cemevi from the grandiose mosques found across the city, it was its interior that would truly impress upon me the gulf separating Alevism from the Sunni Islam observed by the majority of the Turkish population and the complicated relationship between the Turkish state and the Alevi population. Alongside portraits of the religious figures İmam Ali and Hacı Bektaş Veli hung a portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. Having witnessed the fiery protests on the anniversary of the Sivas massacre, this reverence for a figure so central to the Turkish state struck me as a seeming contradiction.

Indeed, the Alevi population occupies a perplexing place in modern Turkey. An estimated twenty percent of the population, the Alevi comprise the second largest religious community in Turkey after Sunni Muslims and one of its largest minorities, alongside the Kurds. Despite the large proportion of the population that adheres to Alevism, the beliefs and practices of the Sunni majority sharply diverge from those of the Alevi population. Whereas Sunni practitioners pray separated by gender in mosques led by imams trained by the state, Alevi men and women pray alongside one another in cemevis under the leadership of the dede (literally “grandfather”), a figure determined by familial lineages of spiritual authority. Beyond these forms of worship, Alevi reverence a number of Shi'i and Sufi figures not recognized in Sunni Islam, such as Imam Ali and Hacı Bektaş Veli, and disregard many of the rituals and traditions held sacred by Sunni Muslims, such as the daily prayers and pilgrimage to Mecca. Alevi often attribute these differences to the emphasis Alevism places on the allegorical and hidden dimensions of Islam, rather than the legalistic and literal Sunni tradition. As a result of these differences, the position of Alevism within Islam has proven controversial, with some even contending that it is a separate religion.

These religious divisions have inspired political tensions. As one of the largest groups to migrate from Anatolia to the cities of western Turkey, Alevi have grown increasingly visible in the country’s public and political life in recent decades. This greater presence in Turkish society, coupled with the emergence of the Alevi revival movement in the 1980s, has exacerbated historical tensions between the Alevi population and the state that stretch back into the Ottoman period as Alevi demand official recognition and accommodation similar to those received by Sunni Islam. Due to increased pressure from the secular opposition and the European Union in addition to the Alevi revival movement itself, the Turkish state
has haltingly sought rapprochement with the Alevi population, first in 2007 with the “Alevi Opening,” a series of workshops initiated by the dominant Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (“Justice and Development Party,” hereafter referred to as the “AKP”) that aimed to address Alevi grievances, but was ultimately condemned as a failure.\textsuperscript{10} Despite such moves, discrimination by the state and resistance by the Alevi population continue.

Scholars turn to Turkish nationalism in order to better understand the contradictory behavior of the state toward its Alevi population. Although the new state, built atop the ruins of the fallen Ottoman Empire, was declared a secular republic, scholars conclude that the nation designed by that state took on an ethnic and religious identity—specifically, a Turkish and Sunni one. As such, scholar of citizenship and identity in Turkey Başak İnce notes that, although Turkish nationalism “appear[s] to be defined as political nationalism based upon citizenship…in reality an ethno-cultural nationalism based upon race is promoted,”\textsuperscript{11} while scholar of Turkish nationalism Şener Aktürk argues that the modern Turkish nation is a continuation of the Muslim millet from the Ottoman period, a legal Muslim community that imposed a Hanefi interpretation of Sunni Islam on all Muslims in the Empire.\textsuperscript{12} Recognizing Alevis as ethnic Turks but religious outsiders allows the state to portray the Alevis as, Aykan Erdemir writes, a “noble savage,” the bearer of a genuine Turkish cultural tradition who is nonetheless mired in antiquated superstition.\textsuperscript{13} Reflecting on these conflicting views of the Alevi population, Fethi Açıkel and Kazım Ateş describe Alevis as “ambivalent citizens” subject to “constant oscillation… between genuine selfness and heretical otherness… a symptom of lack of recognition, but at the same time… a symptom of lack of total exclusion.”\textsuperscript{14} But while scholars explore the attitude of the Turkish state toward the Alevi population at length, only a few examine the response of the Alevi revival movement to the nationalism that shapes identity politics and state policy in Turkey.

In this article, I seek to address this gap in the literature by analyzing the identity formation process within the Alevi revival movement as a response to Turkish nation-building policies. To do so, I address the following question: to achieve recognition by Turkish state and society, does the Alevi revival movement pursue assimilation and present Alevi identity as a facet of the Turkish and Sunni identity privileged by the state, or does it pursue resistance and challenged the state as a minority whose differences must be respected? Simply put, do Alevis respond to their am-bivalent position in the Turkish nation as insiders or outsiders?

At first glance, it appears that the Alevi revival movement does both. Many symbols and narratives employed by the movement locate Alevism within an ethnic conceptualization of Turkish identity and identify Alevi beliefs with civic values. At the same time, however, Alevis resist assimilation by emphasizing the stark differences between Alevi beliefs and practices and those of the Sunni Islam supported by the state.\textsuperscript{15} Yet these seemingly contradictory approaches do not reflect an ambivalent response. In fact, the movement asserts that Alevies are an integral component of the Turkish nation rather than a minority outside of it.\textsuperscript{16} In doing so, Alevi leaders and institutions contest the meaning of the Turkish nation itself, arguing that the religious dimension of the Turkish identity fostered by the state is an aberration from the legitimate Turkish nation liberated by Atatürk. This true nation, the movement contends, is one grounded in Turkish culture and ethnicity, and shaped by civic values and secular principles.

As symbols are fundamental to the identity formation processes of social movements, such as the Alevi revival movement, in the first chapter, I seek to analyze what a symbol is. I begin the chapter by reviewing the relevant literature to arrive at a suitable definition of symbols. With this understanding, I then examine how states use symbols to construct national or majoritarian identities and how minority groups excluded from those identities respond. This analysis leads me to three courses of action available to responding minority groups: assimilation, exit, or resistance.\textsuperscript{17} This assessment offers us frameworks to understand the processes of identity formation at the levels of the Turkish state as it constructs a national identity and the Alevi revival movement as it responds with an Alevi identity.

In the second chapter, I build on this understanding of symbols and identity in an examination of the symbols and narratives available to the Alevi revival movement by reviewing the historical development of the Alevi population. I examine three periods of time: the Ottoman period during which the heterodox sects that would later give rise to modern
Alevis is critical in understanding modern Turkey.

II. THEORIES AND SYMBOLS OF IDENTITY

Scholar of nationalism Ernest Gellner once remarked that “one of the most important traits of a modern society” is “cultural homogeneity, the capacity for context-free communication, the standardization of expression and comprehension.” The cultural homogeneity Gellner describes results from a shared symbolic discourse, a common cultural language that unifies the experiences, values, and beliefs of a people. Yet despite the prominence of symbols in literature examining identity, symbol as a term has become diluted and problematic. Reviewing this literature, Zdzislaw Mach thus observes that although “[i]t has become commonplace that…we think and express our thoughts and feelings through symbols, and that culture is a symbolic construction… the concept of symbol is not clearly defined and is understood in many different ways.” In this chapter, I develop a definition of symbols that will allow us to better understand the processes of identity formation occurring at the levels of the Turkish state and the Alevi revival movement.

a. Symbols

Two aspects comprise a symbol: an image that provides its form and a concept that defines its meaning. Whereas the image is simple and readily understood, the complex, abstract concept that it signifies proves more evasive. C. J. Jung thus considers an image “symbolic when it means more than it denotes or expresses…has a wider ‘unconscious’ aspect—an aspect that can never be precisely defined or fully explained.” Because of this distance between the image and the concept, Roland Barthes describes the image as “analogical and inadequate” for the concept, going on to write that, for example, “Christianity ‘outs’ the cross.” As such, the concepts that symbols communicate escape words due to their nuances, subtleties, and intricacies but can be conveyed or implied through imagery. Although the traditions, narratives, and values that comprise Christianity are expansive and surpass the cross in significance, the cross succinctly expresses the essential meaning and ideas of Christianity. This disparity between the simplicity of the image and the complexity of its implications defines the symbol and gives it importance.

Despite the importance of symbols in com-
munication, their meanings are not constant. Frank Hartung writes that, “the meaning [of a symbol] is derived from its [sociohistorical] context, and cannot be derived from either its physical qualities or the sensory experience that it may cause.”22 A cross on its own does not convey the concepts associated with Christianity; rather, it has been adopted as a symbol of Christianity due to its role in Christian narratives. Further, for those without access to the narratives that give the cross symbolic meaning for Christians, the cross has no religious significance. An image may gain symbolic meaning through happenstance or historical incidents, as is the case with the cross and Christianity, or a social or cultural group may deliberately seize upon a symbol and transform the meanings associated with it. For example, though Mount Fuji was originally a sacred icon particular to the religious traditions of its immediate region, it was later adopted by the Meiji state as a symbol of Japanese ethnic identity and the triumph of Japan over foreign domination.23 This fluidity of symbols is significant for identity formation as it allows social or cultural groups to develop images that communicate the content of their identities.

In addition to communicating the content of identity, symbols also delineate its boundaries. Stuart Hall explains that the process of identity formation “operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries.”24 Boundaries are necessary as, Hall continues, “identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out... Every identity has at its ‘margin’ an excess, something more,” that excess being what he refers to as the “constitutive outside,” the cultural other against which a group defines itself.25 As it symbolizes the narrative of Christianity, the cross suggests that those who do not follow that narrative are not Christian. Similarly, Mount Fuji defines the constitutive outside of Japanese identity as “foreign,” that is, those who are not ethnically Japanese. Symbols thus not only communicate what an identity is, but also what it is not.

b. States and Nations

In the contemporary world, nationalism has emerged as the predominant force by which states cultivate popular loyalty. Gellner offers one of the most enduring definitions of nationalism: “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent...a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones.”26 What results from this principle, Benedict Anderson writes, is an “imagined political community,” an understanding among a population that it is united by a shared national identity that is realized in a nation-state.27 Nationalism legitimizes the state and communicates its power as it is seen as the political and territorial manifestation of the nation. As a result of this legitimacy, it is in the interest of the state to construct a cohesive and homogenous nation.

The state thus acts as the agent of nationalism, developing the symbols that build national identity and propagating them throughout society in order to construct what Geisler calls a “shared mythic past,” a narrative that presents citizens as part of a historical community that ultimately culminates with the state.28 The symbols that compose national identity are drawn from historical or cultural sources and constructed by the state itself, as Eric Hobsbawm explains: “[e]xisting customary traditional practices...modified, ritualized and institutionalized for the new national purposes” and “entirely new symbols and devices [come] into existence as part of national movements and states, such as the national anthem...the national flag...or the personification of 'the nation' in symbol or image.”29 The variety of symbols employed by states building nations is vast, demonstrated by the following expansive list of examples offered by Anthony Smith:

- flags, anthems, parades, coinage, capital cities,
- oaths, folk costumes, museums of folklore, war memorials, ceremonies of remembrance for the national dead, passports, frontiers...national recreations, the countryside, popular heroes and heroines, fairy tales, forms of etiquette, styles of architecture, arts and crafts, modes of town planning, legal procedures, educational practices and military codes...30

These symbols crystallize identities around attributes such as religion, ethnicity, civic values, or territory, and tether these attributes to historical and cultural narratives.31 These narratives, in turn, cultivate feelings of loyalty among citizens by placing them within a shared community bound together by a grandiose past and represented by the state, thus creating the nation.
Despite the diversity of the symbols and attributes that compose national identity, there are only two fundamental varieties of nations. In his study of nationalism, Rogers Brubaker describes these types as a “state-centered and assimilationist” French model of nationalism and a “Volk-centered and differentialist” German model of nationalism. The French model, he writes, is grounded in “a political and territorial conception of nationhood,” which asserts “that the state can turn strangers into citizens, peasants—or immigrant workers—into Frenchmen” through assimilation into a set of values and norms. As such, the state develops symbols that emphasize social and political values and the state as the center of national identity rather than ascriptive characteristics such as ethnicity, seeking to create what Cécelle Laborde describes as a “superior public identity” that requires citizens to “not only to leave behind, but often transcend, their particularism.” In contrast, the German model is based on ascriptive characteristics, the particularisms that the French model seeks to escape. In German nationalist thought, Brubaker writes, “nations are conceived as historically rooted, organically developed individualities, united by a distinctive Volksgeist and by its infinitely ramifying expression in language, custom, law, culture, and the state.” One cannot assimilate into the German nation as descent determines membership. Whereas the state stands at the center of the French nation, Smith explains that the ethnic nationalism of German thought “start[s] from a pre-existent homogenous entity, a recognizable cultural unit,” and desires that a state protect and privilege that group. Accordingly, the symbols found in the German model seek to create ancient communities bound by blood and history. Whereas membership in the French civic nation is accessible to any individual who supports the values of the state, birth determines membership in the German ethnic nation.

c. Minority Groups and Movements

Of course, not all nationalist movements obtain their own states, and the borders of states rarely align with their supposed nations. One need not look further than Turkey, where the Kurdish nationalist movement contests the state for greater political autonomy, to understand that Gellner’s understanding of the nation-state as a congruence of the boundaries of the nation and that the state is more an ideal than a reality. Discrepancies between the boundaries of the nation and the state produce minority groups—those groups whose identities place them outside the national or majoritarian identity privileged by the state. Three courses of identity are available to minority groups confronted with this dilemma: assimilation, exit, and resistance.

A minority group that pursues assimilation seeks to renounce attributes that separate it from the national or majoritarian identity or emphasize its attributes that are congruent with that identity. In some cases, members of the minority group reject the minority identity in its entirety and wholeheartedly adopt the symbols and values of the national or majoritarian identity. Members of the minority group may also pursue only partial assimilation, abandoning certain aspects of the minority identity while preserving others that are significant or not in conflict with the national or majoritarian identity.

Nimmi Hutnik describes these individuals as those “who may be well acculturated or even assimilated into the surrounding culture, but who may nevertheless feel very strongly identified with their ethnic minority group in terms of their self-categorization.” Yet assimilation is not always possible. If a national or majoritarian identity is grounded in ascriptive attributes, such as ethnicity or religion, individuals without those traits cannot assimilate. Even some supposedly civic nations exclude individuals based on such attributes, one prominent example being the repression of African-American citizens in the United States.

A minority group that either refuses or is denied assimilation may choose to exit the nation-state. If mobility is not a barrier, members of the minority group may physically exit and move to a more accepting place. Physical exit is not always an option, however, as the minority group may not have sufficient resources, or the land the minority group inhabits may have cultural or historical significance. When physical exit is not an option, the minority group may pursue secession, which allows the group to exit the nation-state while retaining its territory, but requires it to legitimize its claims to statehood, convince the international community to support its claims, and wrest control of the territory from the nation-state—all difficult tasks. Instead of exiting through emigration or secession, the minority group may pursue sociocultural exit by remaining within
the boundaries of the nation-state but exiting public and political life by isolating themselves into cultural enclaves or masking their identities with dissimulative practices.

Minority groups may also pursue resistance by articulating an identity distinct from the nation or majority and demanding accommodation from the state. The nature of these demands varies with the situation of the minority group, its level of organization, and its relationship with the state. In many cases, the minority group may only pursue limited objectives, such as autonomy in sociocultural matters like the language of instruction in schools in its territory.\(^47\) In some cases, however, the minority group may demand and obtain great autonomy, seen with the devolution of political power in the United Kingdom.\(^48\) To challenge the state for accommodation, the minority group must construct an identity and build a movement around that identity capable of challenging the state. Critical for the success of this process of identity formation is the development of social and political networks. Often grounded in religious associations and cultural organizations, these networks act similarly to a state as they articulate the content of identity, propagate their own symbols, and provide the structure necessary to mobilize the minority group.\(^49\)

Resisting minority groups develop the symbols that constitute minority identity through three methods. First, the minority group may draw symbols from the attributes that separate it from the nation or majority, such as language, religion, or ethnicity.\(^50\) Second, symbols may emerge out of interactions between the minority group and the state or majority, which are often repressive or violent acts. These symbols build solidarity among members of the attacked group, direct outrage from the incident toward the state, and legitimize claims that the minority group needs accommodation to defend itself.\(^51\) Third, the minority group may contest symbols used by the state or majority, particularly symbols that denigrate the minority group, through means such as the reclamation of terms or images. These methods of symbol production cultivate feelings of solidarity among the minority group and mobilize it as a movement capable of challenging the state.

Symbols are critical for identity formation. For states building nations, symbols comprise the foundation of national identity as they forge notions of solidarity among citizens and loyalty toward the state as the representation of the people. For minority groups building movements in resistance, symbols allow the minority group to distinguish itself from the national or majoritarian identity. This chapter offers frameworks through which we can analyze the nation-building policies of the Turkish state and the identity formation process of the Alevi revival movement. In constructing a nation, the Turkish state may pursue an inclusive civic nation or an exclusive ethnic nation. In responding to that nation-building process, the Alevi revival movement may pursue assimilation, exit, or resistance. In the next chapter, I offer a review of the historical development of the Alevi population in Turkey in order to describe the potential symbols available to the Alevi revival movement and give greater context to the modern relations between the Turkish state and the Alevi population.

III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALEVISM

Before examining the historical development of Alevism, it is important to acknowledge that the term Alevi does not refer to a single, monolithic group, but rather to a multitude of groups that emerged in Anatolia in the late Seljuk and early Ottoman periods. The term Alevi encompasses groups as varied as the Kurds of Dersim, who suffered violent reprisals by the Turkish state shortly after the war of independence; the followers of the Mevlevi order, who enjoyed privileged relations with Ottoman elites; and the nomadic Turkmen tribes, who warred with the Ottoman state. Ideological and political cleavages continue to fragment the Alevi population as their institutions struggle to find a shared definition of their identity.\(^52\) Since a comprehensive analysis of these varied groups exceeds the scope of this work, I focus on the historical and cultural developments that broadly affected the groups now considered to comprise the Alevi population.

a. Islamic Heterodoxy in the Ottoman Empire

As much of the pre-Islamic traditions of the Turkic peoples persist in modern Alevi beliefs and practices, distinguishing Alevis from Sunnis, it is necessary to first examine the ancestral traditions of the Turkic peoples that migrated into Anatolia. These traditions were characterized by the belief in the immanence of divinity in all things and the veneration of nature.\(^53\) From these animistic beliefs...
emerged the “shaman,” a religious leader who performed rituals, provided medical treatment, and served as an intermediary between the living and the dead.\textsuperscript{54} As nomadic peoples who migrated along the trade routes of Asia, the Turkic peoples encountered Neoplatonism, Christianity, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism, among other religious and philosophical systems.\textsuperscript{55} This legacy remains visible in Alevism, reflected in Hülya Küçük’s observation that, “incarnation, metamorphosis, battles with dragons and some motifs from the fire cult heavily influence these religions” while “watch your hand, tongue and sperm,” one of the main moral principles of Bekâşhism, is no different from the ‘Three Seals’ in Manichaeism.\textsuperscript{56}

Fluidity and syncretism thus defined the approach of the Türkic peoples to religions they encountered, and Islam proved no exception. As the Türkic tribes that migrated into Anatolia in the medieval period converted to Islam, striking similarities emerged between the Türkic shamans and the Islamic mystics of Anatolia: they wore outfits adorned with similar religious iconography, were both associated with miracles connected to nature, and performed shamanistic rituals even in opposition to Islamic tenets.\textsuperscript{57} In addition to this continuation of pre-Islamic practices, these Islamic mystics adopted the syncretism of the Türkic traditions. The mystic poet Muhammad Jalal al-Din Balkhi (popularemly known as Rumi), for example, asserted that truth exists in all religions.\textsuperscript{58} M. Hakan Yavuz similarly describes the Islam that emerged from these developments as “nonliteral and inclusive,” one that emphasized belief over ritual and love over law.\textsuperscript{59}

With time, the syncretic traditions surrounding these wandering mystics coalesced into a number of orders (\textit{tariqats}). High levels of variation already existed among the orders, with some more closely adhering to orthodox interpretations of Sunni Islam and others more wholeheartedly embracing the pre-Islamic Türkic traditions. Nevertheless, all of the orders generally exhibited the syncretic and fluid perspective of a “nonliteral and inclusive” Islam. Certain orders remained rural, flourishing among the Türkic tribes of central Anatolia and defined by secrecy and a mistrust of centralized governance. Other orders emerged in the urban centers of the Ottoman Empire, constructing highly developed organizations and enjoying elite patronage.\textsuperscript{60} These more urban orders exercised strong influence on the state despite ideological conflict with the Sunni ulema, as Küçük explains that “mysticism [became] a main element in the thought of the Ottoman intellectual elite and was not confined to the popular beliefs of the Sufi orders.”\textsuperscript{61} The more syncretic and mystic Bektâşi order, for example, gained popularity among the elite Janissary corps as it expanded deep into the Balkans.\textsuperscript{62} The Mevlevi order enjoyed similar prestige among Ottoman bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{63} Despite a then-nominal support for the \textit{Hanefi} interpretation of Sunni Islam, the Anatolian heterodoxies enjoyed wide support among both rural populations and urban elites.

However, relations between the orders and the state would eventually sour. As the rural orders viewed the centralized state with suspicion, economic distress or political disputes often inspired rebellions in the late Seljuk and early Ottoman periods.\textsuperscript{64} With the dramatic rise of the Safavid Empire under the leadership of an order heavily influenced by Shi’i traditions to the east of Anatolia, these tensions adopted a religious character as the rural orders adopted Shi’i traditions, such as the veneration of Imam Ali.\textsuperscript{65} Ultimately, the rural orders loyal to the Safavid state came to venerate its founder Isma’il as a messianic figure.\textsuperscript{66} Alongside this religious influence, troubles due to crop failures, plague, and rising taxation by the centralizing Ottoman state compelled the Türkic tribes of the rural orders to support the Safavid Empire, and in 1511, the tribes instigated uprisings across Ottoman Anatolia.\textsuperscript{67} The response by the Ottoman state was vicious, with the state relying on the orthodox Sunni ulema to condemn the rural orders as heresy, legitimizing massacres of the Türkic tribespeople that left tens of thousands dead.\textsuperscript{68} By the end of the sixteenth century, the Türkic tribes and rural orders had retreated into the mountains of Anatolia far from the reach of the Ottoman state.\textsuperscript{69} As the Ottoman state increasingly embraced orthodox Sunni Islam after these wars, the isolation of the rural orders allowed them to develop the more systematized, distinctive, and hereditary traditions that would become modern Alevism.\textsuperscript{70}

\subsection*{b. The National Struggle and the Early Republic}

The demise of the Ottoman Empire and the proclamation of the Republic in the wake of the First World War seemed to herald a new era of relations between the Alevi population and the state.
The Turkish War of Independence, often known as the National Struggle (Milli Mücadele), crystallized under the leadership of Atatürk in response to the division of Ottoman territories by the Entente powers and the Greek invasion of Anatolia in 1919. As the nationalist government that would become the Republic emerged in Anatolia, the Ottoman government remained in Istanbul under heavy influence by the Entente powers. The National Struggle thus became not only a war to seize territory from invading powers, but also one to wrest sovereignty from a state that had for centuries legitimized itself through military force and religious authority.

While the campaign against the Greeks revealed the military prowess of the nationalists, Atatürk sought to build religious legitimacy to cement loyalty among Muslims in Anatolia and abroad as well as to delegitimize the Ottoman Caliphate. To develop this legitimacy, nationalist elites frequently affirmed their loyalty to the Caliphate. Nationalist members of the ulema issued fetvas proclaiming the weakness of the Caliphate under European control, portraying the nationalists as religious warriors fighting to save the institution of the Caliphate from infidels. At the same time, the nationalists surrounded the burgeoning nationalist parliament in Anatolia, as Küçük writes: “Debates were conducted on whether it was suitable to write verses and hadiths in newspapers or to make Friday a day of rest…Laws were made in accordance with the Shari‘a, such as the law to prevent the use of alcohol, and so on.” Although the Republic would later impose a harsh secularization, its foundations rest in religious symbols and collaboration with religious elites.

While such appeals targeted the orthodox Sunni ulema, nationalist leaders also recognized the importance of Alevi support. Atatürk advised military commanders to forge alliances with Alevi authorities in Anatolia, and he even met with the two principle leaders of the dominant branches of the Bektaşi order at their man lodge (tekke), earning their support for the remainder of the war. As a result of this effort, the Alevi population largely supported the nationalists, offering tekkes as spaces to support the smuggling of arms and serve as hospitals and mobilizing Alevis to fight in the nationalist army. Beyond the military effort, Alevi leaders supported the political project of the nationalists. For example, nine prominent Alevi leaders from various orders participated in the first meeting of the National Assembly in 1920 to demonstrate their political support. In return, Alevis hoped to witness the establishment of a state that would welcome them as equal citizens rather than condemn them as heretics.

Indeed, the republican state that emerged triumphant from the National Struggle sought to abolish the institutions that represented the relationship between religion and state in the Ottoman Empire. In November 1922, the nationalist government began to dismantle the Ottoman state by separating the Caliphate and the Sultanate and abolishing the latter. The Caliph was thus reduced to a powerless figurehead. Nonetheless, the Caliphate would meet the same fate as the Sultanate, however, with the parliament abolishing it on March 3, 1924, less than one year after the proclamation of the Republic. The institutions that symbolized the religious identity of the state—the Şeyhülislam, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriya ve Evkaf Vekaleti), the şeriat courts, and the medreses—were similarly abolished. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, hereafter referred to as the Diyanet), a new institution that represented the power of the state over religion, replaced them. Upon adopting almost direct translations of the Swiss civil code and Italian penal code in 1926, the state completed the abandonment of Islamic law for Western law. By 1937, laiklik, the aggressive secularism of Turkish thought, had become enshrined in the constitution as a central tenet of the Republic. The state no longer sought to implement religious tenets, but rather to restrain and control religion.

This aggressive secularization did not remain confined to political and legal institutions, but instead penetrated the whole of society. As Turkish laiklik drew its inspiration from anticlerical French, the state desired not only the removal of religious influences from the state, but also, as Ioannis N. Grigoriadis writes, “its eradication from the public sphere and its limitation into a very narrowly defined private sphere.” While some policies prohibited numerous Islamic symbols and practices such as the wearing of the veil in public, others imposed a Western lifestyle, such as the replacing of Islamic timekeeping with the Western calendar and international clock. Denouncing the Arabic script used in Ottoman Turkish as “incomprehensible,” Mustafa Kemal initiated language reforms that replaced the Arabic script with
the Latin alphabet and purged it of many Arabic and Persian influences, severing ties between Turkish citizens and the Ottoman past. Moving beyond social practices, the state sought to crush Islamic institutions with Law 677, which shut down the dervish lodges, prohibited Islamic titles and dress, closed tombs of Sultans and mystic orders, abolished the profession of tomb-keeping, and imprisoned or fined anyone who transgressed these laws. As such, the aggressive secularization of the state brought about a renewed repression of heterodox Islam. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi explains that after the reforms, “state trespasses on Alevi religious gatherings occurred frequently” and “Alevi dedes, easily identifiable by their long beards and untrimmed moustaches, were often arrested because of illegal religious and ‘superstitious’ activities.” Among state elites, debates emerged surrounding the closing of the lodges and orders and the prohibition of Anatolian Islamic practices—focusing on a perceived disloyalty of the orders and thus more reminiscent of the vitriolic rhetoric of the sixteenth-century Ottoman state than the nationalist government several years earlier during the National Struggle—and shaped policy toward religion. Yet for many Alevis, this period of transition was a period of hope as, after centuries of violent repression by the Ottoman state, nationalist elites reached out to the Alevi population and invited them to join the project to build a new nation founded not on Sunni Islam, but secular republicanism.

c. Developments Since 1950

The urbanization and democratization that occurred after 1950 fundamentally altered the place of the Alevi population in Turkish state and society. As mass migrations swept a significant proportion of the Alevi population into the large and wealthier cities of western Turkey, village networks and traditional institutions dissolved, leaving a weaker population in the less developed provinces of central and eastern Anatolia and a population without an organized community in the urban western provinces. As democratization in 1950 encouraged political parties to appeal to a largely Sunni Muslim population, political parties, particularly rightist parties, came to represent Sunni Islam. Left in the midst of a predominantly Sunni society in the western cities and agitated by the return of Islam to politics, Alevi overwhelmingly joined leftist organizations that promised egalitarianism and secularism. Tensions between leftists and ultranationalists grew through the 1970s, ultimately erupting into ideological warfare that bloodied Turkish cities and sectarian tensions in rural provinces between Alevis and Sunnis and Turks and Kurds. Many of these attacks directly targeted Alevis, the largest massacres occurring in Sivas in 1978, Kahramanmaraş in 1978, and Çorum in 1980. As the government proved incapable of containing the violence, the state and society came to blame Alevis for this political instability. Seeking to restore stability, the military staged a coup on September 12, 1980, ending democratic politics until 1983 and leaving a curtailing of political freedoms that is long lasting. The state no longer perceived Alevis as a bastion of Kemalist support, but rather as a grave threat.

In response to the divisions that had erupted in the years leading to the coup, the military government adopted the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis, a theory of Turkish identity developed in 1973 by the nationalist and Islamist Aydınlar Ocağı (the Hearth of Intellectuals). Mustafa Şen explains that “[t]he basic assertion…is that Turkishness and Islam are two essential components of the national culture, and Islam is the best suited religion to Turkish culture and identity… Islam is the only religion in which Turkish culture found its best and the most correct expression.” Abandoning the Kemalist repression of religion, the military government sought to foster a religious camaraderie that could transcend the polarizing divisions of the 1970s. As such, the state initiated the construction of numerous new mosques and religious schools, increased its control over the messages given in religious texts and mosques, and mandated religion courses that taught a nationalist Sunni Islam. This welcoming of religion into public life by the state enabled the emergence of political Islam, first indicated by the dramatic success of the Islamist Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) after the resumption of democratic politics.

A number of identity-based movements have emerged alongside the Islamist movement since the resumption of democratic politics in 1983, however. Among these movements are the feminist movement, Kurdish movement, and the Alevi revival movement examined here. Erman and Göker find three causes for the emergence of the Alevi revival movement: “the fall of Communism… the rise of
Sunni political Islam… and the military confrontation between the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party) and the Turkish forces.” Concerning the first, Reha Çamuroğlu writes, “socialism, which in the previous two decades had an indisputable authority as an ideological alternative for the young and middle generations of Alevis, lost its former importance.”

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis contributes heavily to the second cause as the state opened space for the rise of Islamism and imposed Sunni Islam on the Alevi population through the construction of mosques in Alevi villages, the imposition of mandatory religious courses in schools that teach Sunni Islam, and the declaration that Alevis are Sunni Muslims with differing practices, thus politicizing religious identity.

As a sizeable proportion of the Alevi population is Kurdish, the emergence of the Kurdish movement additionally contributed to politicization. Having described the historical developments that have led to the modern Alevi revival movement, I will now conclude the chapter by describing the movement itself.

The population the movement purports to represent is divided along ethnic, geographic, and socioeconomic lines. While the majority of Alevis identify as ethnic Turks and reside in central Anatolia and the cities of western Turkey, Kurds comprise twenty percent of the population and are concentrated primarily in eastern Anatolia, while a much smaller Arab population exists in southern Turkey.

The migration of many Alevi into western Turkey has introduced a new division between a rural population confronted by the disintegration of their villages and an urban population building new institutions no longer reliant on village networks or traditional dede figures. This urbanization also contributed to a growing wealth disparity as the western provinces prospered while eastern Anatolia lagged behind, resulting in the growth of an urban Alevi elite as many others suffered from poverty and downward mobility.

These divisions manifest themselves in ideological cleavages, represented by various institutions in the movement, such as the Cem Foundation (Cem Vakfı), known for its loyalty to Kemalist principles, and the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği), which preserves the leftist sentiment of the 1970s. The largest division exists between what Bayram Ali Soner and Şule Toktaş describe as the “traditionalist-religious” wing, which understands Alevism as a “pure form of Islam” and desires reconciliation with the state, and the “modernist-secularist” wing, which sees Alevism as “outside Islam… a syncretic belief system, a philosophy, a culture as well as a lifestyle constructed originally as the community interacted with various religions” and calls on the state to sever all ties with religion, although scholars recognize smaller branches as well, such as a Sufistic branch and another close to Iranian Shi’ism. Nonetheless, Soner and Toktaş note that all branches of the movement “reject Sunni-Islamic principles, interpretations and practices.”

In other words, Sunni Islam forms the constitutive outside that binds the movement together.

The leadership of the Alevi revival movement is, however, relatively homogeneous. Since the traditional village institutions disintegrated with the mass migrations of Alevis into Turkish cities and the poor languished after the collapse of the left, the urban Alevi elite in western Turkey and across Europe has built the movement, its institutions, and its identity. With traditional leaders unable to adapt to urban life, Vorhoff explains, the movement “was not realized by the traditional Alevi institutions and religious elite but by a new, Western-educated elite, via modern media and secular forms of organization; associations, foundations, concerts, staging of the traditional rites, public conferences and, last but not least, the huge mass of publications on Alevism.” Sefa Şimşek thus describes the Alevi revival movement as a “middle class movement” reliant on the “material and intellectual resources [of] the educated and better off Alevi.” This elite faces little competition as Kurdish Alevis often identify with the Kurdish nationalist movement, traditional leaders flounder, and poor Alevis support the egalitarian messages of the leadership. As a result of this poor inclusion of Kurdish, rural, and lower class elements, many accuse the Alevi revival movement of exclusivity. Erman and Göker, for example, charge that “[w]ithout acknowledging the class division, as well as the ethnic issue, Alevi politics cannot be fully democratic.” Thus, despite the diversity of the Alevi population, the image of Alevism presented by movement leaders is urban, Turkish, educated, and middle class.

With their return to public and political life, the Alevi population has suffered attacks from Sunni fundamentalists. Whereas attacks before the 1980 coup were primarily motivated by ideology, attacks since
then have been driven by religion as Sunni mobs perpetrated attacks on Alevi communities in Sivas in 1993 and Gazi in 1995.\textsuperscript{118} Further, the attacks have become more threatening due to the perceived complicity of the state. Anthropologist of Turkish Studies Martin van Bruinessen explains that in the 1993 Sivas massacre, “[t]he involvement of local police and civil authorities in the violence was also significant, as was the inability of the central government to neutralize them.”\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, sociologist and researcher of Turkish and Kurdish issues Jongerden finds that in the 1995 Gazi massacre in İstanbul, “police deliberately escalated a violent incident into a massacre” by antagonizing and firing on Alevi protestors after a shooting at a coffee shop popular with Alevi.\textsuperscript{120} Examining language the police used, van Bruinessen asserts that, “many of the police were acting out of aggressive hatred towards the Alevis.”\textsuperscript{121} The period since democratization has thus left the Alevi population with both a return to narratives of repression, but also the resources and levels of organization to address that repression as a movement. With this understanding of the history surrounding Alevism, the next chapter examines the Turkish nationalism that confronts the Alevi population.

IV. TURKISH NATIONALISM AND SOCIETY

Prior to the Ottoman Empire’s final century, the state made no effort to construct a national identity. Instead, the millet system divided the population into communities delineated by faith that governed themselves in accordance with their own religious laws.\textsuperscript{122} With the reforms of the Tanzimat era (1839–1876), however, the Ottoman state sought to introduce a civic nationalism by proclaiming legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, abolishing the millet system, and replacing religious identities institutionalized by the millet system with Ottomanism, a superior public identity.\textsuperscript{123} In response to these reforms, the reactionary Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909) supported an Islamic religious nationalism in an effort to strengthen the Caliphate and unite the Muslim populations of the Empire as nationalist movements emerged in the Christian regions of the Empire.\textsuperscript{124} With the development of the ethnic nationalism of the German model, however, an ethnic Turkish nationalism developed alongside religious nationalism, with intellectuals building ties with Turks in Central Asia in order to construct a pan-Turkish identity.\textsuperscript{125} Describing the nationalism that resulted from these civic, ethnic, and religious currents, the Ottoman ideologue Ziya Gokalp wrote: “the Turkish nation today belongs to the Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic community, and the West internationally.”\textsuperscript{126}

With the proclamation of the Republic, however, it seemed as if civic nationalism would triumph. Atatürk suggested so much during the National Struggle, declaring to the parliament: “I am neither a believer in a league of all the nations of Islam, nor even in a league of the Turkish peoples.”\textsuperscript{127} Similarly, the early Republic defined the nation as a “political and social community formed by citizens bound by the unity of language, culture and ideal”—a civic conceptualization of the nation.\textsuperscript{128} Despite these declarations of a civic nationalism, however, the ethnic and religious streams of thought present in late Ottoman nationalism persevered. This chapter describes these ethnic, religious, and civic dimensions of Turkish nationalism articulated by the state and received by the population, to better describe how Turkish nationalism articulates the state and how Alevi understand the identity presented by the state.

a. Ethnic Nationalism

Despite proclamations of a civic nationalism, Turkish nationalism quickly developed an ethnic character as the state sought to present the Turkish nation as a primordial community with ancient origins. To craft the narrative of this nation, Atatürk established the Turkish Historical Society in 1931, which developed the Turkish History Thesis, a fantastical theory that asserted that the ancient Turks heavily influenced early civilizations across the world after their own ancient civilization in Central Asia collapsed due to climatic disasters.\textsuperscript{129} With its claims that the Sumerian and Hittite civilizations of ancient Anatolia were of Turkish origin, this theory transformed the Turks from a people that settled in Anatolia only in the medieval period to a people with a long history in Anatolia that stretched into time immemorial.\textsuperscript{130} The Sun Language Theory, developed by the Turkish Language Society after its foundation in 1932, offered a twin narrative, arguing that all languages descended from the language of the ancient Turks, making modern Turkish, Hugh Poulton writes, “the most aristocratic, powerful,
lively and ancient of languages.”131 This reimagining
of the Turks as an ancient race with Anatolia as their
adopted homeland built a nation united by territory,
history, and descent—an ethnic nation—despite the
falseness of the claims.

As discussed in the first chapter, the ethnic na-
tion employs symbols that focus on this grand past
and emphasize ascriptive characteristics. As such,
the banks founded by the young republic bore names
such as Sümerbank (Sumerian Bank) and Etibank
(Hittite Bank) after the supposedly Turkish empires
of ancient Anatolia.132 Similarly, the presidential seal
adopted in 1922 and still in use today features sixteen
stars that represent the “sixteen great Turkish em-
pires” that preceded the Republic of Turkey, present-
ing the modern republic as the culmination of a long
history.133 The language reforms mentioned in the
previous chapter sought to purge the “foreign” influ-
ences from the Turkish language by replacing Arabic
and Persian words and grammatical structures with
Turkic equivalents, imbuing the language with an
ethnic dimension in an effort to distinguish Turks
from the Arabs, Persians, and Kurds.134 Such theories
and symbols were propagated throughout Turkish so-
ciety through academic conferences and institutions
in which scholars sought historical evidence that
would support the Turkish History Thesis, school
and university curricula that taught these theories
to Turkish youth, and museums that propagated the
claimed linkages between modern Turks and the
ancient Sumerian and the Hittite empires.135

As ascriptive nationalisms, such as ethnic na-
tionalism, cannot accommodate assimilation by out-
side groups, the ethnic stream of Turkish nationalism
has proven hostile toward ethnic minority groups in
the country. Resettlement laws in the early years of
the Republic divided Anatolia into zones determined
by ethnic composition in order to organize the re-
settlement of Turks into the Kurdish east and non-
Turks into the ethnically Turkish west.136 Alongside
resettlement, the state used military service, “People’s
Houses,” which disseminated Turkish values and his-
tory, and schools to assimilate ethnic minorities into
a Turkish ethnic identity and transfer them to Turk-
ish areas.137 Repressive language policies now domi-
nate these ethnic nation-building policies. Article 42
of the Turkish constitution, for example, forbids the
Teaching of languages other than Turkish as a mother
language.138 Other policies—such as the ban on
Kurdish in speech, cultural performances, political
organizations, and other settings introduced after the
1980 coup, and only lifted in 1991—expressly pro-
hibited minority languages.139 In order to belong as
a member of the Turkish nation, one would have to
adopt an ethnic identity defined by a shared history
and common language.

This ethnic nationalism, however, does include
Alevi in the Turkish nation. As nationalists sought
to construct an ethnic nation, they viewed the Alevi
population as representations of a genuine Turkish
ness untouched by Arab and Persian influences.140
In their efforts to reform the Turkish language, the
nationalist elites thus adopted Alevi poetry and
music, bringing Alevi poetry and songs into the body
of Turkish national folklore.141 Nationalist elites
similarly viewed Alevism as a reflection of ancestral
Turkish beliefs and practices. To secular nationalists,
Açikel and Ateş write, “the Alevi version of Islam was
the least Arabized and the least cosmopolitan and
one that kept intact successfully the ancient demo-
cratic traditions of the Turks.”142 To a state search-
ing for ties to an ancestral past, the Alevi population
descended from the nomadic Turkic tribes offered
those connections. Although the significance of
ethnicity has waned, this stream of nationalism offers
one pathway by which the Alevi population could
belong in the Turkish nation.

Although the more extreme elements of ethnic
nationalism have been gradually abandoned since
the death of Atatürk in 1938 and democratization in
1950, ethnic conceptions of Turkish identity continue
to shape Turkish nationalism. Even with the end of
fanciful depictions of Turks as founders of world
Civilization in the 1940s, F. Keyman and Tuba Kanc
explain that, “the focus on the ethnic origins of na-
tional identity in the mythical motherland of central
Asia persist[s]” in textbooks, and “the geographi-
cal territory of the state continue[s] to be imagined
as ethnically Turkish since time immemorial.”143
Even as repressive policies of linguistic assimilation
have been replaced by gradual reforms, such as 2013
reforms permitting political parties to campaign
in languages other than Turkish and lifting restric-
tions on the letters q, w, and x, the state continues to
discriminate against non-Turkish languages.144 A law
that allows private courses in Kurdish, for example,
stipulates that those courses may only be taught by
native Turkish speakers for a maximum of eighteen
hours each week for only ten weeks, while a policy allowing the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation to broadcast in Kurdish restricts such broadcasts to two hours each week.\textsuperscript{145} Although state rhetoric and policy are now moving toward a greater openness toward ethnic minority groups, continued appeals to ethnic identity and setbacks confronting reforms indicate that ethnicity remains a central component of the nationalism constructed by the state.

\textbf{b. Religious Nationalism}

Alongside ethnic nationalism, a similarly ascriptive religious nationalism has historically guided Turkish nation-building policies as a product of the particularly aggressive interpretation of French laïcité adopted by the Turkish state. As scholar of Alevism Markus Dressler explains, Turkish secularism seeks to not only expunge religion from public and political life, but also demonstrates an “interest in controlling the content and boundaries of religion.”\textsuperscript{146} To accomplish this objective, as described in the previous chapter, the young republic both abolished the centuries-old religious institutions of the Ottoman state and reached into society in order to institute reforms proscribing religious practices and forbidding traditional Islamic institutions. In the place of these Ottoman institutions, the state established the Diyanet, a large bureaucracy that seeks to develop an Islam supportive of Turkish nationalism and secularism, an Islam that Candas Pinar describes as “anti-clerical, Sunni (not Sufi or Alevi), Turkish (not Arab), progressive (not backward), and rational (not superstitious).”\textsuperscript{147} As such, David Shankland explains that sermons in Turkish mosques, written by Diyanet officials and delivered by state-trained imams, emphasize “the importance of belief to the individual, the importance of respecting the secular basis of the law of the land and the role of the mosque in fostering a collective spirit in the community.”\textsuperscript{148} For these policies to succeed, however, citizens must adhere to the Sunni Islam espoused by the Diyanet, worship in its mosques, and follow its values. As a result, Sunni Islam has become critical to Turkish nation-building.

Much as the ascriptive ethnic nationalism developed by the Turkish state is hostile toward ethnic minority groups, religious nation-building policies are exclusive of religious minority groups. Population exchanges between Greece and Turkey after the National Struggle, for example, transferred approximately 500,000 Muslims from Greece to Turkey and 1,500,000 Christians from Turkey to Greece, revealing religion as the determiner of Turkish identity and reducing the non-Muslim population in Turkey.\textsuperscript{149} Other policies similarly affirmed this relationship between Islam and Turkish identity, such as the rejection of the Gagauz Turks (ethnically Turkish Christians) and the acceptance of non-Turkish Muslims from Europe.\textsuperscript{150} Non-Muslim citizens at the time suffered intimidation campaigns, harsh taxes, and discrimination in the state and military,\textsuperscript{151} despite requirements in the Treaty of Lausanne that the Turkish state protect its religious minorities.\textsuperscript{152} Although recent reforms pursued by the state are improving the situation for non-Muslims, religious homogenization persists as the state interferes with non-Muslim religious institutions, prohibits the training of non-Muslim clergy, and allows discriminatory attacks to continue.\textsuperscript{153}

Unlike ethnic Turkish nationalism’s accommodation of Alevis, however, religious nation-building policies harshly reject Alevi identity. The Diyanet distinguishes its interpretation of Islam from Anatolian traditions through the construction of symbols of what it defines as legitimate Islam. The most visible symbol has been the mosque, which the Diyanet defines as the house of worship for Muslims regardless of sect.\textsuperscript{154} Turkish politicians show a similar regard for the mosque, illustrated by comments from AKP parliamentarians that “[n]either the cem houses nor mevlevihane are alternatives to the mosque.”\textsuperscript{155} Açikel and Ateş explain that the state’s stance toward Alevism is “similar to those discourses which perceived the Kurds as ethnic mountain Turks…the religious nationalists implied that the Alevi were in fact ‘mountain Muslims’ who had lost touch with the genuine orthodox Sunni tradition.”\textsuperscript{156} This approach has resulted in what Karin Vorhoff describes as “quite paternalistic attitudes, when [Sunni officials and writers] explain what Alevi as humble Anatolian countrymen, cut off from Islamic civilization and learning, got wrong in their understanding of Islam.”\textsuperscript{157} As such, Janina Karolewski states, “[t]he Alevi tradition is not accepted…but the Alevi themselves are considered to be Muslims who would be accepted as such if they only observed the obligations of Sunni Islam.”\textsuperscript{158} Without doing so, Alevism is seen as a heretical deviation, yet one that can be corrected by acceptance of the Islam of the Diyanet.\textsuperscript{159}
With the democratization of Turkish politics in 1950 and the subsequent adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis after the 1980 military coup, religion has come to define the content of Turkish nationalism. Prior to this period, religion determined the boundaries of membership in the Turkish nation but not its content. As described earlier, however, the democratization of Turkish politics in 1950 required political parties to respond to a conservative Muslim population, thus reintroducing Islam into public and political life. The strength of this religious influence rose with the adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which has been followed by a more aggressive religious homogenization through the increased construction of mosques, growth of the Diyanet, and mandating of religion courses in primary and secondary schools. Islam is no longer an implicit component of Turkish nationalism, but rather a central means by which the state defines identity.

c. Civic Nationalism

Despite these processes of homogenization, the state defines the nation in civic terms. Article 66 of the constitution defines Turkish citizenship as follows: “Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” Further, the Turkish Citizenship Law states that citizenship may be acquired by fulfilling certain criteria, none of which concern ethnicity or religion. Neither the constitution nor the Turkish Citizenship Law refers to ethnic or religious identity in determining citizenship. Indeed, Article 10 of the constitution declares that “[e]veryone is equal before the law without distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such grounds.” State rhetoric also describes Turkish identity in civic terms. In 1931, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, hereafter referred to as the CHP) Secretary Recep Peker defined membership in the nation as follows:

We consider as ours all those of our citizens… who belong politically and socially to the Turkish nation and among whom ideas and feelings such as Kurdistan, Circassianism, and even Lazism and Pomakism have been implanted… We want to state just as sincerely our opinion regarding our Jewish or Christian compatriots. Our party considers these compatriots as absolutely Turkish insofar as they belong to our community of language and ideal.

Much like the civic nation that admits any individual who accepts the values of the state, this understanding of nationalism in the early Republic seemingly admits anyone regardless of their ethnic or religious identity so long as they accept the language and values of the Turkish nation. Decades after these early proclamations, Turkish politicians still express the same sentiment today. From the earliest years of the Republic to its most recent, notions of civic nationalism shape the official language of membership and belonging in the Turkish nation.

Similarly, many national symbols cultivated by the Turkish state emphasize the state as the center of identity. The Turkish flag represents the historical narrative of the establishment of the state—the field of red symbolizes the blood spilled by Turkish soldiers fighting against the invading forces in the First World War and National Struggle, during which the blood supposedly ran so deep on battlefields that it could reflect the moon and stars. Much like the national anthems of civic nation-states such as the United States and France, the Turkish national anthem describes the warfare that led to the creation of the state and focuses on the flag as a symbol of the country rather than describing an ancestral community. The national holidays of the country also focus on the history of the state as they commemorate military victories, the establishment of the Republic, and the death of its founder. These symbols seem to depict a civic national identity.

As the analysis of Turkish nationalism in this chapter demonstrates, however, taken together, Turkish nation-building policies do not construct a civic nationalism. The same state that proclaims it does not privilege one ethnic group over another continues to reject ethnic difference through repressive language policies and religious difference through assimilative religious policies. The same national iconography that contains the civic nationalist flag also contains the presidential seal that refers to an ethnic legacy of Turkish empires. The same textbooks that present Turkish students with the civic nationalist anthem also define the nation as, İnce writes, “a unity of language, religion, race, history, and culture.” Civic nationalism, while present in state rhetoric, is absent from policy as ethnic and religious nationalism guides Turkish nation-building.

The nationalism received by the population is
not only ethnic and religious. Undoubtedly, the population perceives these two components of Turkish nationalism. As evidenced, minorities have certainly been made to understand that they fall outside the Turkish nation. Similarly, the population responds to the civic nationalism found in state rhetoric but not policy, evidenced by protests against mandatory religion courses that utilize phrases such as, “[d]emocratic struggle against sectarian education.”

A model of Turkish nationalism is thus not simply a model of ethnic and religious nationalism, but rather one that includes ethnic, religious, and civic nationalism. As the identity built by the Alevi revival movement is constructed in response to Turkish nationalism, it is crucial to recognize this difference between the Turkish nationalism constructed by policy and that received by the population. With this distinction, in the fourth chapter I utilize the theories described in the first chapter to assess identity formation within the Alevi revival movement, drawing from the potential symbols examined in the second chapter in relation to the Turkish nationalism described in this chapter.

V. RESISTANCE, ASSIMILATION, AND CONTESTATION

Having examined the historical and cultural development of the Alevi population and the nation-building policies confronting it, I now turn to the Alevi population and analyze the patterns of identity formation occurring within it. In this chapter, I address the question posed at the beginning of this work: Does the Alevi revival movement respond to the mixed messages of Turkish nationalism as an insider or outsider of the nation? To answer this question, I survey a broad range of symbols circulated prominently throughout the movement in the iconography and narratives of institutions, the demands and slogans of Alevi political actors, and the literature and art of Alevi intellectuals. I assess these varied symbols found across the movement using the framework of minority identity formation introduced in the first chapter, determining whether the Alevi movement demonstrates assimilation, exit, or resistance. Throughout the period between the retreat of the Turkic tribes into the mountains of Anatolia in the sixteenth century and the mass migration of Alevis to the urban centers of western Turkey in the mid-twentieth century, Alevis largely pursued exit.

But now, with Alevi actors and institutions growing increasingly visible in public and political life, it has become evident that exit has largely been abandoned. As such, I analyze the symbols and narratives used by the movement for signs of assimilation and resistance.

a. Resistance

The Alevi revival movement is fundamentally political as it challenges the state. Although the reemergence of Alevi practices during the 1980s and 1990s first represented an effort to construct cultural communities by urban Alevis bereft of traditional village ties and suffering discrimination by the Sunni majority of western Turkey, this growing awareness of Alevi identity developed into a political movement in response to the perceived threat posed by the dramatic rise of Islamism. Reflecting the politicization of Alevis in response to Islamism, the Alevi manifesto that proclaimed the movement with its publication in the newspaper Cumhuriyet in 1990 accused the Turkish state of privileging Sunni Islam and demanded that it cease the construction of mosques in Alevi villages, remove required religion courses from schools, and promote a greater understanding of Alevi traditions in media and education, among other demands.

As the state has not substantively addressed these Alevi demands with reforms, demands for accommodation rather than cultural awareness or community building continue to define the objectives of the movement, as indicated by this collection of demands presented by researcher Fazilet Ahu Özmen:

Alevism must be accepted as an association of belief and must be secured against discrimination in all areas by the laws.
Compulsory religion classes must be abolished (the fact that the lessons are only Sunni Islam-oriented in this country poses a problem for the Alevis.
Cem houses must be recognized as official places of worship.
The religion section of the identification cards must be removed.
Actual equality must be obtained by the laws and law enforcement.
‘Religion and ethnics’ classes must be excluded from compulsory classes and must be established as elective courses.
Building of mosques in Alevi settlements must be put to an end. Tekkes must be taken from the Ministry of Tourism and must be assigned to the management of Alevi foundations. The presidency of Religious Affairs must be closed down or must integrated [sic] the Division of Religious Affairs of Alevism.

The Sivas Madımak Hotel must be made into a museum.

As described in the first chapter, the development of a movement based on minority identity in order to demand accommodation by the state reflects patterns of resistance.

As the movement challenges the state and Sunni majority for accommodation, it has sought to emphasize characteristics of Alevi identity that distinguish it from the Sunni Muslim identity it asserts that the state privileges. As such, Alevi institutions adopt symbols representative of Shi'i Islam or the heterodox Anatolian mystic traditions separate from, and historically persecuted by, the Turkish state and Sunni majority. Similarly, the Alevi movement emphasizes traditions found in Shi'i Islam but not Sunni Islam, such as the mourning of the twelve imams or the battle of Kerbala, rituals popular in Anatolian Islam but not orthodox Sunni Islam (such as the semah dance). Figures 1 and 2, banners from websites for the Cem Foundation’s cemevi in Beşiktaş and the Şahkulu Sultan Dervish Lodge (Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı) respectively, indicate this cultivation of symbols that draw boundaries between Alevism and Sunni Islam, with both featuring the Shi'i figure Imam Ali and the medieval Anatolian mystic Hacı Bektaş Veli and the Cem Foundation banner including images of the semah dance.

Similarly, a poem written by a dede involved in the movement during its early years defines Alevi identity through references exclusively to those aspects of Alevism that diverge from Sunni Islam:

We (Biz) congregate together (cem eyleriz)
We perform the ritual dances (semah yürüürüz)
And play the ritual music (Saz çalarız).
We sing songs, hymns and incantations (Türkü, deyış, nefes söyleriz).
We drink wine (Dem içeriz)
We mourn for the twelve imams (On iki imam yası),
We keep the Muharrem (Muharrem orucu),
And Hzır fasts (Hzır orucu tutarız).
We perform the yearly sacrifice (Yıl kurbant),
The votive sacrifice (Adak kurbant),
The social sacrifice (Musahiv kurbant),
The sacrifice of atonement (Düşkün kurbant keseriz).
We recognise no kadı (Biz kadı bilmeziz).
Do not ask our sect (Sorma sofu bize mezhebimizi).
We recognise no sects (Biz mezhep bilmeyiz); we say, “we have our path” (Yolumuz vardır, deriz).\textsuperscript{173}

The institutions and individuals within the movement thus employ symbols to construct the content of Alevi identity—its rituals, traditions, and icons—while drawing sharp boundaries between it and its constitutive outside, its foreign other. For the movement, that other is Sunni Islam.

Some symbols employed by the movement to distinguish Alevism from Sunni Islam have become politicized themselves. On the one hand, the cemevi and the dede are central institutions of Alevi identity and community formation. As the rituals and traditions of Alevism typically took place in private homes in Anatolian villages, the establishment of the cemevi in cities resulted from the need for new spaces to practice Alevi faith.\textsuperscript{174} As such, the cemevi serves as a location for both religious rituals and the articulation of Alevi identity with publications, discussions, performances, and celebrations concerning Alevism, often open to Alevis and non-Alevis alike.\textsuperscript{175} The Alevi revival movement similarly reimagines the role of the dede, discarding its social and legal functions not suited to urban life and instead focusing on its roles in officiating rituals and serving as a symbol of social solidarity.\textsuperscript{176} But while these two components of Alevi traditions transformed out of need, they also serve as symbols of resistance. As the Turkish state considers the mosque and the imam symbols of proper Islam, the development of the cemevi and dede as symbols of Alevism challenge the Sunni religious dimension of Turkish nationalism.

As the state institution responsible for implementing policies of religious homogenization, the Diyanet has also been challenged as a symbol of identity. As demonstrated in the demands of the movement, a desire to transform the Diyanet is common across all branches. Alevi institutions typically either accept the Diyanet as a legitimate institution and seek the incorporation of Alevis or reject it and demand its abolishment.\textsuperscript{177} The Cem Foundation has even responded to the Diyanet by constructing its own symbol of institutionalized religion, the Directorate of Religious Services of Alevi Islam (Alevi İslam Din Hizmetleri Başkanlığı), an act Dressler states “challenges the monopoly of [the Diyanet] and is a reaction to the state’s refusal to formally acknowledge Alevis and provide them with a share of [Diyanet’s] competence and budget.”\textsuperscript{178} This rejection of the Diyanet in its current form alongside efforts to appropriate it for Alevi needs reflect the adoption and

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Figure 3. Above. An advertisement for a fund in honor of Berkin Elvan (“Berkin Elvan Bursu,” Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associates USA, September 12, 2014, http://www.pirsultanusa.com/)}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure4.png}
\caption{Figure 4. Right. A banner of Elvan with the phrase “Berkin Elvan is immortal” at June 2014 İstanbul protest for the Sivas massacre}
\end{figure}
transformation by the resisting minority group of symbols employed by the state or majority.

Alongside these symbols that distinguish Alevism from the Sunni majoritarian identity, the movement has developed symbols of repression by the state and majority. As explained in the first chapter, symbols representing repressive acts by the state or majority strengthen a social movement by building solidarity, legitimizing demands for protection, and preserving the feelings of outrage associated with the instance of repression, thus creating a more powerful and united movement. The massacres perpetrated against Alevi communities by nationalists, and Islamists have become some of the most prominent symbols of repression, with the 1993 Sivas massacre being the most frequently mentioned. Reflecting the power of the Sivas massacre as a symbol of repression, protests occur across the country on its anniversary (as mentioned at the beginning), while Alevi institutions and leaders have long called for the Madimak Hotel attacked in the incident to be preserved as a museum in its memory. Alevis killed in these massacres and other attacks have also become prominent symbols, due to what Randall Collins describes as their representation of the “the moral power of the movement…the feeling that the movement will ultimately win out.”

During protests commemorating the Sivas massacre, for example, the names of those who died are often read and protestors often carry photos of them. The Gezi protests of 2013, while not tied directly to Alevi issues or demands, have similarly produced martyrs adopted by the movement. During a 2013 protest commemorating the Sivas massacre, for example, Alevi chanted the name of Ethem SarsılıkHz, an Alevi killed in Gezi Park protests in Ankara, along with slogans denouncing the AKP. These symbols illustrate to both the movement and those outside it that the state and majority have proven hostile to the Alevi population, and, as a result, the Alevi population must have greater protections to defend its practice and identity.

Berkin Elvan has emerged as among the most potent of these symbols. Reflecting the importance of these symbols in continued mobilization, Elvan’s death nearly a year after the Gezi Park protests instigated widespread protests denouncing the AKP and police, featuring slogans that demonstrate the power of his memory such as “Berkin Elvan is immortal.” As shown in Figure 3, Alevi institutions have adopted Elvan as a symbol of oppression and solidarity. Calling Elvan “our brother Berkin” and providing the narrative of his death, the advertisement for a fund in his honor sponsored by the American branch of the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association proclaims: “May children not be murdered; may our children who are our future go to school and smile with hope at the future!” Berkin Elvan thus does not represent a single incident, but rather the threat faced by all Alevi that suffer from persecution. Actors within the movement combine the symbol of Elvan with images of the massacres described earlier, demonstrated by the black banner featuring an image of Berkin Elvan and the phrase “Berkin Elvan is immortal” hung at a protest commemorating the June 2014 Sivas massacre shown in Figure 4. By combining images of Alevi killed during the Gezi Park protests with commemorations of past massacres, the Alevi revival movement anchors its identity in an ongoing narrative of oppression.

Such narratives of oppression are not limited to the years since the Alevi revival movement emerged, but rather reach far into history. The movement traces the origins of the Alevi population to the Turkic tribes that rose against Seljuk and Ottoman rule and faced persecution, as described in the second chapter. These narratives, Vorhoff writes, depict a

{society divided into two categories of people: on the one side there are the humble nomads, the modest farmers, the workers, the urban poor, the weak and underprivileged. They all appear as innocent, just, good, righteous and at the same time as ready to suffer for their ideal—a democratic society based on equality, justice, freedom, and solidarity… these men and the common people are the ones who are discriminated against, suppressed, exploited and murdered by an unscrupulous caste of despotic, cruel rulers and rich, treacherous merchants… every past era has produced its heroes and villains, each representing the opposing principles of Good and Evil. In such a confrontation, the oppressed appear most often as a non-Arab people, particularly Turks; the oppressors are Arabs, or ‘degenerate’, ‘decadent’ Turks such as the Seljuks or the Ottomans. }
To the Alevi revival movement, Alevi identity is thus grounded in the history of a people who suffered persecution by oppressive states that governed Anatolia throughout their history and continuing into the present. Such historical narratives of oppression under the Sunni majorities of the Ottoman Empire and modern Republic describe an ethnically unique Alevi people descended from the Turkic tribes, distinguish the Alevi population as the oppressed beneath the oppressive Sunni majority, and also incorporate Alevi preoccupations with class that linger from the leftist past of the Alevi population.\textsuperscript{187} Alevi institutions develop religious narratives of persecution alongside these historical narratives by placing the Alevi population into Shi’i narratives of oppression by Sunni states. This religious persecution is often compared to present conditions, as demonstrated by this excerpt from an Alevi poem written about the Sivas massacre:

The incident set the world in a state of turmoil,
Wasn’t there a military regiment in Sivas?
People were burned and there was dancing,
Why are you chasing [us], you bloody Yezyid?\textsuperscript{188}

As Figures 1 and 2 indicate, the central figure of Shi’ism, Imam Ali, is also one of the most revered figures in Alevism, figuring heavily into Alevi imagery as depictions of him adorn cemevis as well as the private homes of Alevis.\textsuperscript{189} The movement interprets him as a symbol of resistance against injustice.\textsuperscript{190} With these narratives, Alevis in the movement thus claim, Göner explains that, “Alevism [is] the cultural echo of resistance to all kinds of inequality and injustice.”\textsuperscript{191} Ethnic narratives of the oppression of the Turkic people and these religious narratives of the oppression offer the movement narratives of resistance against oppression by Sunni states and societies. This focus on resistance as a central component of Alevi history and identity is found in other prominent symbols as well. The Anatolian mystic-poet Hacı Bektaş Veli, widely venerated by the movement, is described as a symbol of the triumph of good over evil, a symbol of hope and perseverance for a long-oppressed people.\textsuperscript{192} As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, Imam Ali, a symbol of resistance against injustice, and Hacı Bektaş Veli, this symbol of the triumph of good, are central to Alevi identity. Indeed, Kehl-Bodrogi writes, “[e]ntering the living room of a house inhabited by Alevis, colour prints of Ali and Hacı Bektaş will inevitably leap to the eye.”\textsuperscript{193} Similarly, Pir Sultan Abdal, whose legacy is celebrated in the names of multiple Alevi institutions and an annual cultural festival in Sivas, is revered for not only his mystical poetry, but also his manner of death—execution by the Ottoman state during the sixteenth century for rebellious behavior.\textsuperscript{194} Many of the legends that surround Pir Sultan Abdal accordingly emphasize his rebellious rejection of the oppressive Sunni governor of Sivas and his loyalty to Shah Isma’il of the Safavid Empire, transforming him into a symbol of both Alevi ethnic identity as a member of the rebellious Turkic tribes and Alevi religious identity as a mystic-poet.\textsuperscript{195} Reflecting the themes of oppression and resistance and Shi’i imagery that feature heavily in his celebrated poetry, an excerpt from one poem follows:

Ever enduring I die from this malady
If you love Ali don’t touch my wound
I devote myself to the way of Ali
If you love Ali don’t touch my wound...

I am Pir Sultan, Haydar, we are Nesimi
Even from eternity we are given to the Shah
The twelve imams, our place of dwelling
We are martyrs and Ali our commander\textsuperscript{196}

These symbols surround narratives of oppression with a past of resistance against injustice. The prominence the Alevi revival movement gives these figures reveals the centrality of rebellion against injustice to Alevi identity. Indicative of patterns of a minority group resisting state and society in the pursuit of accommodation, the Alevi revival movement has portrayed the Alevis as a group long oppressed by Turkish states, but one with the will to challenge such injustices.

b. Assimilation

Despite these patterns of resistance, the Alevi revival movement rejects classification as a minority group. After a report by the European Union described the Alevis as a “non-Sunni Muslim minority” in 2004, the Turkish state immediately protested the claim, with both Kemalist President Necdet Sezer and Islamist Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the time asserting that the Alevi population is not a minority group but rather a part of the majority.\textsuperscript{197} That the state would oppose the classification of Alevis as a minority group should not be surprising given its denial of Alevi difference. Yet the Alevi revival move-
Some Alevi justify this claim by explaining that only non-Muslim populations may be considered minority groups in Turkey, often out of a fear that classification as a minority group would lead to greater suspicions that Alevis are not loyal to the state and, as a result, increased discrimination. Leaders in the movement have given an additional reason, however. Denouncing the classification of Alevi as a minority, İzettin Doğan, head of the Cem Foundation, proclaimed that, “Alevis are not a minority, they are part of the founding elements of this country,” a sentiment widely shared within the movement. Indeed, as the Alevi revival movement resists Turkish nation-building policies, it seems to also assimilate into that Turkish national identity.

Although narratives developed by the movement portray the Alevi population as oppressed by the Turkish state, it also describes Alevi identity as Turkish. As stated in the preceding section, the movement traces the origins of the Alevi to the Turkic tribes that migrated into Anatolia from Central Asia and employs Turkic mystic-poets and rebels as some of its most revered symbols, constructing an ancestral Turkic identity. This narrative comes as a response to the incorporation of Alevi into the ethnic Turkish nationalism discussed in the third chapter. This identification of Alevism as genuinely Turkish does not stop at ethnicity, however, as Açık and Ateş write that “[f]or secular ethno-cultural nationalism, the Alevi’s understanding of the Islamic faith represents a specifically Turkish interpretation of Islam… [as] the Alevi successfully conserved the spirit of the ancient Central Asian and Anatolian belief systems.” Both Alevi institutions that consider Alevism an interpretation of Islam and those that consider it outside Islam portray Alevism as a pure Turkish tradition in contrast with Sunni Islam, which they denounce as corrupted by Arabic and Persian influences in the Seljuk and Ottoman periods. The prominent Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultural Association (Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür Derneği), for example, describes Alevism as a tradition founded in thirteenth century Anatolia with roots in Central Asian, Anatolian, and Near Eastern traditions, such as “Greek philosophy, Hittite and Mesopotamian religions, ancient Turkic shamanism, ancient Iranian Mazdakism, Manichaeism, [and] Zoroastrianism,” a tradition with the same roots as the Turkish identity cultivated by the state. The movement thus locates Alevi identity within the Anatolian and Turkic identity promulgated by the state.

The most widespread symbol of this identity cultivated by the movement is Hacı Bektaş Veli, the celebrated medieval mystic-poet. As explained, his image is a central symbol within the movement, found in Alevi websites, publications, institutions, festivals, and even homes. Elise Massicard explains that he is so highly revered for a number of reasons:

Hacı Bektaş is a central figure of Alevism, since it is through him that Anatolian Alevism can be most clearly distinguished from Syrian Alawism or from the Twelver Shi’ism in Iran; he also permits the making of a direct link between Alevism and Bektashism, which are quite different sociological realities. Moreover, he is also respected by Sunnis, which is important in relation to outside society… he is also quite a consensual figure among Alevis, because most of the other figures of Alevism have a more precise significance: Pir Sultan Abdal is distinguished by a more left-wing connotation since the 1960s…

Although there exist many competing narratives of his life as little is known for sure, the movement has broadly adopted Hacı Bektaş Veli as a symbol of the Turkish and Anatolian heritage of Alevi identity. In addition to representing the triumph of good over evil, the Alevi revival movement celebrates Hacı Bektaş Veli for supposedly defending the Turkish language from being submerged beneath and extinguished by Arabic and Persian as he chose to write and deliver religious messages in Turkish. Further, although Hacı Bektaş Veli came to Anatolia in the thirteenth century, Atasevren explains that Alevi institutions and leaders understand his “love message” to be “specifically Anatolian,” meaning that “Anatolian Turks are more related to the Hittites than the Central Asian Turks, which suits the Kemalistic idea of a clearly delineated nation with a rich cultural heritage specific for this geographic area.” Hacı Bektaş Veli thus links the Central Asian and Anatolian legacies of this ethnic Turkish-Alevi identity in one symbol.

Alongside ethnic narratives of identity, the Alevi revival movement also presents Alevism as central to the civic narratives of Turkish nation-building policies. As described in the second chapter, the Alevi population broadly supported the nationalist movement that would establish the Republic, hoping
that the new state would bring an end to centuries of repression. Although the reforms introduced by the republican state repressed Alevism, they also initially repressed public demonstrations of Sunni identity, suggesting an equality of treatment under the new state.\textsuperscript{208} With the incorporation of Alevis into political life after centuries of exclusion and the destruction of institutions that repressed Alevism, the period of the National Struggle represents liberation from Ottoman oppression and unity as a nation. Excerpts from a poem by an Alevi intellectual from the early 1980s titled “The Epos of the Liberation” (“\textit{Kurtuluş Destantı}”) thus follow:

\begin{quote}
We were invincible, we became one and complete,
We were undividable, we were together with Atatürk,
Not as captives, if we had died we would have been free,
The brave men said [this is] the time and place, and they became heroes.

...\end{quote}

Our Atatürk said: “Let slavery end”!
“Let the enemy go [back] the way he came,”
“Let freedom go [back] the way he came,”
The hearths burned, his word became the principle.\textsuperscript{209}

As reflected by this poem, the discourse surrounding the National Struggle within Alevi narratives is one of liberation and national unity under the figure of Atatürk. The National Struggle represents a moment in which the population—both Alevi and Sunni—united as it rose against the collapsing Ottoman state and invading foreign forces. Ataseven explains that Alevi institutions thus assert that “the Turkish nation owes its existence largely to the Alevis” due to their role in the nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{210} Indicating this view and the importance of the National Struggle to understandings of Alevi identity, Alevi institutions often include descriptions of the National Struggle in their websites and publications.\textsuperscript{211} As an integral component of the war that established the Republic, the Alevi revival movement contends, they are an integral component of the Turkish nation and not a minority group.

Owing to his role in the National Struggle and the establishment of the secular republic, Atatürk has become one of the most prominent symbols of the movement. As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrated earlier, his image is found on the banners of Alevi websites. As seen in Figure 5, his image is even found in cemevis alongside religious figures, such as Hacı Bektaş Veli and Imam Ali. Illustrating the extreme importance his image holds within these religious settings, the heads of the Hacı Bektaş Foundation, the Hubyar Sultan Alevi Cultural Association, and even the leftist, anti-state Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association balked at a suggestion that portraits of Atatürk be removed from cemevis.\textsuperscript{212} This extraordinary reverence for Atatürk comes from his symbolic role as the liberator of the Alevi population. Indeed, Kehlbodrogi explains that Atatürk “stands for the end of a period which began in the time of Shah Isma’il, when Alevism became a community nearly hermetically sealed to the outside…the reign of Yezid seemed to be over” with “the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the disestablishment of the Islamic ulema” he brought.\textsuperscript{213} There is in fact an almost religious personage attached to Atatürk. One Bektaşi poem written during the National Struggle, which uses the word \textit{nefes} (“hymn,” used for religious poetry) in the title, goes:

\begin{quote}
He saved this oppressed nation from all the chains of slavery,
This is the hero of God who conducts holy conquests in a way that moves the heart
This leader is the revered crown of the world of Islam,
\end{quote}
Such religious themes surround the memory of Atatürk in modern Alevi poetry as well, with poems referring to him as the “hero of the last days”, the Mahdi, or the “lion of God;” invocations of “[t]he law of Atatürk” and his sword in opposition to Islamism; and demonstrations of yearning reverence for him in poetry written using mystic styles and themes.²¹⁵

Some Alevi consider Atatürk to have been an Alevi himself, although many others do not support such theories. For the Alevi revival movement, Atatürk has thus become a central symbol as the liberator of the Alevi. By invoking his image as a symbol of liberation in the National Struggle, the Alevi revival movement locates the historical narratives surrounding Alevi identity in the heart of the civic narratives of Turkish identity.

Alongside portrayals of Alevi narratives of identity as congruent with ethnic and civic nationalist narratives, the Alevi revival movement emphasizes Alevi beliefs and practices that reflect the modernist principles of Kemalism. Secular nationalists have long upheld Alevism as an example of liberal Islam, or the “authentic values of the Turks were no different from Western values.”²¹⁷ Embracing this positive reception by early nationalists, Alevi institutions present Alevi beliefs as similar to the principles promoted by the state. In her analysis of modern interpretations of Alevi values, Vorhoff offers one particularly compelling example of this practice:

The central ethical norm of Alevism that demands ‘el’ine, diline, beline sahip ol’ (be master of your hands, your tongue and your loins) refers… not merely to the banning of theft, envy, lying, telling of the secret teachings of Alevism, slander, adultery and intercourse with Sunnis, but also to the obligation to defend the fatherland (el), to preserve the (Turkish) mother tongue (dil) and to keep one’s own blood brothers (bel).²¹⁸

Alongside such nationalistic values, the Alevi revival movement promotes understandings of Alevism as a tradition that represents progressivism. As Göner explains, since the rise of the Alevi revival movement, many Alevis have come to consider Alevism a “universal religion…which defines itself in terms of universal values, such as equality, democracy, justice, human rights, freedom, cooperation, women’s rights, and environmentalism.”²¹⁹ By characterizing Alevi beliefs as representative of modern values, the Alevi revival movement locates Alevism within the stream of civic nationalism present in state rhetoric.

This new focus on the modernity of Alevi beliefs and practices has even led to a redefinition of central Alevi symbols. Although Haci Bektaş Veli is celebrated as a symbol of ancestral Turkish values and traditions, Vorhoff writes, many within the movement claim that his message of love “include[s] elements of every people, culture and faith that has ever flourished in Anatolia,” thus presenting him as “a man devoid of any racial marking, who was a master of synthesis… melding [these peoples, cultures, and faiths] into a deeply humanitarian, peace-loving and egalitarian faith and ethic.”²²⁰ The institution of the dede has additionally come under attack by elements in the Alevi revival movement due to its emphasis on lineages of descent, an institution many deem incompatible with the modern and inclusive ideology they seek to develop.²²¹ Responding to these accusations, the Cem Foundation now offers courses that allow one to become a dede, redefining a position based on lineage into one anyone can attain.²²² This opening of the institution of the dede signals a transition from ethnic, ascriptive conceptualizations of the dede—and by extension Alevism—to an understanding of the dede that embraces republican and civic values of inclusiveness. This new interpretation of Haci Bektaş Veli and criticism of dedes reflects the abandonment of attributes of the minority group incompatible with national or majoritarian identities as well as an emphasis on attributes of minority congruent with that identity, in this case a civic Turkish identity.

Although women are not readily visible within the leadership of the movement, Alevis identify the place of women in Alevism as symbolic of progressivism and adherence to civic values in a conservative Sunni society. Unlike Sunni Islam, Alevism does not demand the separation of men and women during worship, nor does it mandate the headscarf; further,
as the Alevi population practices monogamy rather than polygamy and had lower rates of divorce, the movement claims that it treats women in a modern manner in comparison to the comparatively conservative Sunni Islam that dominates majoritarian understandings of Turkish identity.223 In an interview, for example, Alevi activist Reha Çamuroğlu explained that, “if a male Bektashi224 beats his wife you would be surprised. Because such a thing is not... possible in Bektashism.”225 Asserting the historical acceptance of women within Alevism as well as distinguishing Alevi identity from Sunni identity, an Alevi institution based in Australia declares that, “[f]or over 2000 years women have been regarded as divine within the Alevi/Bektashi order” and attributes the suppressed position of women in Turkish culture to the “Arabic harem culture” that it claims corrupted the Ottoman Empire.226 Within Turkey, Alevi institutions demonstrate an open support for women, illustrated by Cem Foundation’s dedication of an entire section on its website to issues and events concerning women.227 Through this emphasis on beliefs and practices considered more modern, the Alevi revival movement seeks to locate itself within the civic values supported by the secular and republican foundations of the Turkish state as it rejects religious Turkish nationalism.

Reflecting the emphatic assertions that the Alevi population does not constitute a minority group, much of the symbolic discourse surrounding Alevi identity indicates assimilation into the Turkish identity constructed by the state. In response to the embrace of Alevism by Turkish secular nationalists as a Turkish Islam untouched by Arab or Persian influences, the movement emphasizes the Turkic and Anatolian roots of Alevism. Symbols such as Hacı Bektash Veli and discourses on elements of Alevism, such as its syncretic aspects thus describe an ethnic narrative of Alevi identity grounded in Anatolia and Central Asia and a religious narrative depicting a faith loyal to Turkish values. Understanding these Turkish values to be the modern, republican values of civic Turkish nationalism, the Alevi revival movement assimilates into a civic Turkish identity as it identifies those attributes of Alevism that are congruent with this civic identity. These processes of civic assimilation have also led the movement to renounce or redefine certain symbols. This understanding of Alevism as central to Turkish nationalism has led to an Alevi interpretation of the National Struggle that describes the Alevis as integral actors. As the Alevi revival movement locates Alevism within ethnic and civic streams of Turkish national identity, the process of identity formation occurring in the movement reflects patterns of assimilation.

c. Contestation

At first glance, these findings leave us without a satisfying response to the question posed at the beginning of this work: Does the Alevi revival movement respond to the mixed message of Turkish nationalism as an insiders or an outsider of the Turkish nation? The analysis of Alevi identity offered here reveals an apparent coexistence of resistance and assimilation present across all branches of the movement. On the one hand, institutions within the movement reject the Sunni identity constructed by the Turkish state. They emphasize those elements of Alevi beliefs, practices, and history that distinguish it from Sunni Islam with some even locating Alevism outside Islam entirely, reflecting a process of boundary formation indicative of a resisting minority group. On the other hand, however, the movement seems to assimilate into Turkish nationalism through the construction of symbols that present Alevi identity as congruent with ethnic and civic Turkish nationalism. Looking at this seeming contradiction, one might ask: Is the Alevi revival movement pursuing both resistance and assimilation? If so, how does this dualistic strategy contribute to its goals of recognition and accommodation?

Perhaps the Alevi revival movement is pursuing neither. Reflecting on the analysis of apparent resistance and assimilation within the Alevi revival movement undertaken in this work, I contend that the movement is neither resisting against the national identity constructed by the Turkish state nor assimilating into it. Both processes require the minority group to recognize that it exists outside the national or majoritarian identity of the nation-state, that it is instead part of its constitutive outside. In many ways, the Alevi population is a minority group, as it is significantly smaller than the Sunni majority and, much like a minority group building a social movement, seeks to construct an identity distinct from that majority. Yet Alevi institutions couch their narratives and demands in a majoritarian rhetoric that emphasizes Alevi belonging within ethnic and civic concep-
ualizations of the Turkish nation while rejecting the religious Sunni dimension of Turkish nationalism. A careful reading of the symbolic discourse surrounding Alevi identity reveals that, instead of resisting or assimilating, the Alevi revival movement contests the meaning of the Turkish nation, arguing that the Alevis represent the genuine Turkish nation built by Atatürk and the state is the deviant that has veered away from this true Turkish nation and receded back into the oppression of the Ottoman period. I will now analyze together the symbolic narratives of resistance and assimilation described above to elucidate this process of contestation.

As described in the analysis of patterns of resistance in the Alevi revival movement presented earlier in this chapter, the discourse surrounding Alevi identity is depicted in a dualistic framework between the oppressed and the oppressor. As Vorhoff explains, the narrative of Alevi history described by the movement “evokes a kind of Manichaean world view… the oppressed appear most often as a non-Arab people, particularly Turks; the oppressors are Arabs, or ‘degenerate,’ ‘decadent’ Turks such as the Seljuks or Ottomans… [that] no longer counted as Turkish because they uncritically adopted Arabic and Persian culture and despised ‘Turkishness in every respect.’”

To the ideologues of the Alevi revival movement, the Islam of this historical oppressive elite is therefore not the Islam of the Turks; as the preceding analyses indicate, the movement asserts that Alevism is the interpretation of Islam that genuinely represents Turkish values. Instead, the movement contends that the Sunni Islam of these elites is a corruption introduced by the Umayyad Empire. As one dede states: “The Umayyad family introduced political controversies to the religion and they corrupted the Prophet’s path… Sunni Islam is the Arabic and Umayyad understanding of Islam.”

To defend this claim, Alevi ideologues argue that Sunni practices such as daily prayers were introduced for social control rather than by the Prophet Muhammad and that the Koran is incomplete as many references to Imam Ali have been purged, among other assertions. On the other side of this historical divide exist the Turkish people, represented by the Turcoman tribes with an ethnic legacy in Central Asia and a religious legacy stretching to Imam Ali. As described, the Alevi revival movement constructs this identity through narratives that identify the oppressed Alevis as the once-oppressed Turcoman tribes and symbols of Turcoman resistance such as Pir Sultan Abdal. According to these narratives, a bleak reality dominated for much of the history of this constructed Alevi people.

The Alevi revival movement states that the balance between the oppressor and the oppressed only shifted with the emergence of Atatürk as the liberator of this Turkish people. Indeed, as the poems provided earlier in this chapter demonstrate, Mustafa Kemal is not simply the founder of a new state, but rather a liberator of the Turkish people from not only invading foreign forces but also centuries of oppression. As such, the vice president of an Alevi foundation comments: “The Alevis have only come out victorious once. We won one time with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk… Atatürk saved us from the sultanate, religious bigotry, and economic and political oppression.”

The symbolic discourse surrounding Alevi narrative thus locates the Alevi people in the Turkish nation-state established following the National Struggle and takes Mustafa Kemal as the sacred symbol of the liberation of that nation.

As described in the third chapter, Turkish nationalism during the early republic was ethnic, territorial, and ferociously secular. The Turkish nation-building policies and the fantastical theories of the Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory underpinning them portrayed the Turkish nation as one with origins in an ancestral Turkic people that left their original homeland in Central Asia to establish a new one in Anatolia. This early nationalism married these ethnic beliefs with civic nationalism by asserting that ancestral Turkish values are the beliefs in republicanism and modernism that guide the Turkish state. As demonstrated in the analysis of patterns of assimilation within the Alevi revival movement, it is the ethnic and civic dimensions of Turkish nationalism that the movement embraces. Although the movement today considers this period to represent the liberation of the Turkish people and thus locates itself within this nationalist discourse, incidents that occurred under Atatürk such as the Dersim operation, during which the Turkish military massacred an estimated ten percent of the population of the province to pacify rebelling Alevi Kurds, and the closing of the dervish lodges with Law 677, which continues to prohibit state recognition of cemevis and dedes, make obvious that the Kemalist nation-building project was not as friendly to the Alevi people as the
movement suggests. For this reason, leftist elements in the movement have become critical of this period of time and argue that the oppression of the Alevis returned while Atatürk was still alive. Nonetheless, such perspectives are marginalized, reflected by a broad denial that Atatürk was involved in incidents such as the Dersim operation while Alevis accept religious repression so long as all religious expression is proscribed. The movement thus locates the genuine Turkish nation within the nationalism of the early republic.

Because the genuine Turkish nation is taken by the Alevi revival movement to be an aggressively ethnic and staunchly secular interpretation of Turkish nationalism, the movement identifies the reemergence of Islam as a political force that occurred with democratization as the point at which the oppressive forces of the past engulfed the Turkish nation once again. Reflecting on the ascent of Islamism, one Alevi poet laments, “The Arabs drag the country into darkness… [Atatürk's] country is buried in darkness.” Indeed, Köse explains that the most prominent view of the movement asserts that, “the Turks' understanding of Islam was Sunni-fied, politicised and contaminated during the Seljukid period, Ottoman times and the multi-party period of Republican Turkey, starting from the early 1950s and continuing after the 1980 military coup.”

As such, Alevis claim that Islamists are the heirs of the oppressive Ottoman, Seljuk, and ultimately Umayyad traditions. Reflecting this interpretation in a comment on the debate on the headscarf, one Alevi institution asks: “Is it not so ironic that today’s incumbent AKP government in power are [sic] taking Turkish stature back to the dark days of fourteen centuries?” Condemning AKP efforts to build relations with the Alevi population through the Alevi opening, the chairman of another Alevi institution similarly declares: “It is an AKP project that portends new steps towards Sharia-type rule,” the Islamic law abolished by Mustafa Kemal. For the Alevi revival movement, Islamism symbolizes the return to Ottoman oppression.

In its rhetoric and discourse surrounding identity, the Alevi revival movement thus responds to Turkish nationalism by locating Alevi identity as constructed through symbols and historical narratives produced by the movement within what it considers to be the Turkish nation. The Turkish state since the democratization of Turkish politics in 1950 is thus attacked as an illegitimate representation of this nation, a state that does not represent its people but rather the forces that have historically oppressed them.

To meet this objective, the Alevi revival movement emphasizes aspects of Alevi identity congruent with the ethnic and civic streams of Turkish nationalism that dominated the early discourses of the Republic while rejecting religious aspects introduced with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, reflecting a pattern of contestation that rejects this religious nationalism as the resurgence of Ottoman forces. Its political demands
attack institutions and practices that affiliate the state with religion. As Figure 6 shows, the symbols surrounding political demands thus reflect notions of belonging in the Turkish nation through the Turkish flag and rejection of the Sunni identity increasingly adopted by the state through symbols of a distinct Alevi religious identity understood to be an ethnically Turkish identity. Although we may conclude that the Alevi revival movement is a movement of resistance that seeks accommodation like a minority group, unlike a minority group, the identity it constructs in response to the national or majoritarian identity is not one of separation, but rather one of belonging in a redefined nation.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Alevi revival movement thus offers a case study of the relationship a minority group may forge with the nation-state in which it resides. In many ways, the Alevi revival movement is a resisting minority group. With most estimates considering the Alevi population to compose between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the Turkish population, the Alevi are by no means an insignificant component of the Turkish population. Similarly, a long history of exclusion by Anatolian states that identify with Sunni Islam—the Republic included—and a population hostile to Alevism indicates that the majoritarian community of the country considers the Alevi population to be a rejected minority group. Indeed, even as the Turkish state claims that the Alevi population is a component of the majority, it only permits Alevi to enter the majoritarian community if they renounce aspects of their religious identity that separate them from official interpretations of Sunni Islam. The Alevi revival movement itself behaves like a resisting minority group, constructing an identity around those attributes that distinguish Alevi identity from the majority. Yet with assimilationist imagery and rhetoric also featuring in Alevi conceptualizations of identity, it is not so clear how the Alevi revival movement understands Alevism relative to the majority, to the Turkish nation. This work thus asks: does the Alevi revival movement assimilate or resist?

To address this question, I first examined the role of symbols in the formation of identity within states building nations and minority groups building social movements. This analysis resulted in a model that describes three potential courses of response to minority groups confronted by national or majoritarian identities. As I described, the minority group may assimilate into that identity by either renouncing those attributes that distinguish it from the majority or identifying attributes of the minority identity with the majority. A minority group that does not or cannot pursue assimilation may exit the nation-state, abandoning the national or majoritarian community through either physical migration, secession, or a sociocultural exit in which the minority group isolates itself from the majoritarian community. Lastly, the minority group may pursue resistance, forming a collective identity and challenging the state for accommodation. Although the Alevi population pursued exit for much of its history since the massacres of the sixteenth century, with the formation of a social movement active in public and political life, it can no longer do so. But does this social movement pursue assimilation or resistance?

The effort to address this question took me through the historical development of the Alevi population in Turkey as well as the evolving Turkish nationalism that shapes the relationship between the state and this religious community. This first analysis of the history surrounding the Alevi population produced numerous potential symbols of identity that told both a history of brutal repression by the former Ottoman Empire and modern Republic as well as a history of cultural and philosophical development built on a foundation of syncretism and mysticism that makes itself known through a rich body of poetry and traditions. This second analysis developed a model of Turkish nationalism as it acts on the Turkish population and is received by that population. This nationalism is one grounded in first an ancestral, sometimes fantastical, Turkish nation stretching far back into time and united by the shared language, descent, and civic values attached to that primordial identity. As the Turkish state democratized, however, it came to respond to the character of its predominantly conservative Sunni population. By building an identity defined by Sunni Islam, the state has condemned assimilative practices associated with its ethnic nationalism. With this shift, the Alevi population saw itself change from a perceived member of the ethnic nation as the descendants of the Turkic tribes to a part of the constitutive outside of that nation as a heterodox sect. Although such religious practices have always been present in Turkish nationalism, as
explained in the second and third chapters, under the early Republic, religion defined the boundaries of membership in the nation whereas ethnic attributes defined identity. In other words, before 1950 and the later adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the 1980s, to be a member of the Turkish meant to be a Muslim, but to be Turkish itself meant to be part of an ethnic group reaching to the Turkic peoples of Central Asia.

With this transformation of conceptualizations of Turkish nationalism came the rise of the Alevi revival movement to protest these perceived changes. Indeed, one scholar of the movement comments, “What pushed [the Alevi population] into this situation is a fear that Sunni Islam may come to power.” But does the Alevi revival movement respond to this changing nationalist discourse? Examined with the model of minority group response, the symbols and narratives the Alevi revival movement draws from its history, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions to construct an Alevi identity seem to suggest that the movement pursues both assimilation and resistance. Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes apparent that the Alevi revival movement utilizes these processes of identity formation not to situate itself outside national identity and demand accommodation, but rather to situate itself within the Turkish nation and condemn the Turkish state as having succumbed to the historical forces that once oppressed this Turkish people with the reentry of Islam into Turkish public and political life. As a result, the Alevi revival movement identifies its identity with the ethnic identity of early Turkish nationalism while at the same time harshly condemning and resisting the Sunni religious identity that the state has constructed the boundaries of. Moreover, it demonstrates the malleability of not only symbols and identities within a given state, but also the malleability of the nation supposedly uniting that state. As such, this work may hopefully provide a foundation for future research into the identity formation process and politics of the increasingly important Alevi revival movement as well as an understanding of the contestation of symbols and identities surrounding minority groups and other sociocultural communities in similarly troublesome situations.

Works Cited

3. Imam Ali is the son-in-law of the Muhammad and fourth Caliph, a highly revered figure in Shi’i Islam, while Haci Bektas Veli is an Anatolian mystic who lived during the thirteenth century; neither figure is significant in Sunni Islam. The deep reverence for Mustafa Kemal demonstrated above alongside these two figures is common within Alevi communities (Kristztina Kehl-Bodrog, “Atatürk and the Alevis: A Holy Alliance?” in Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, ed., Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview (Koninklijke Brill: Leiden, 2003), p. 53.
4. Because the census conducted by the Turkish state does not account for religion, there are no official statistics regarding the Alevi population. Most estimates place the Alevi population between fifteen and


24. Ibid., p. 5.


27. Michael E. Geisler, introduction to National Symbols, Fragmented Identities, p. xvi.


32. Ibid., pp. 4–8.


34. Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 216–217.


38. Zdzisław Mach, Symbols, Conflict, and Identity, p. 221.


40. Ibid., p. 159.

41. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, p. 123.

42. Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 221–222.


44. Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 220–221.


48. Zdzisław Mach, Symbols, Conflict, and Identity, p. 214; partially assimilationist minority groups may also cultivate such symbols, but they do not use them to produce social movements challenging the state.


55. Irène Mélékoff, ”From God of Heaven to King of Men: Popular Islam


184. See Figure 3.


187. Taha Köse, ”Ideological or religious?” pp. 583–587.


190. Massicard lists socialist and Kemalist imaginings of Hacı Bektaş Veli as only two examples (Ibid., p. 133).

191. Karin Vorhoff, ”Past in the Future,”


194. ”Yenilemek birlik çıkmış vurmuş başça tal, Bölmüne bakıldık ATA ile bir idki/Tutuk dayaşılı bölüğü dah hır idli/Erler merya dedi merdan olması”…Atümze de ki ”Kölelik bizini!” Dağman naslı geldi, yel–eçe gitsin”/Sonen ocaklanda gözgürük tütünsi/Yandı ocak sócak erkan olmasına” (Atayal, quoted in Markus Dressler, ”Turkish Alevi Poetry in the Twentieth Century,” pp. 141–142, 143–144).


China’s assertiveness in its maritime disputes, especially in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with Japan, has prompted many to wonder if China is bidding for regional hegemony. However, China has engaged in far more serious military provocations before. One example is the shelling of the KMT-controlled Jinmen Islands with no apparent geopolitical objectives in 1958. In fact, Mao Zedong used the shelling for domestic purposes—to create a warlike atmosphere to launch his Great Leap Forward movement. For the purpose of comparison, it is useful to examine another conflict that was waged for domestic purposes: The Falklands War of 1982. The Galtieri junta initiated the conflict to divert the Argentine people’s attention away from economic and political strife and towards the recovery of their sacred territory unjustly occupied by British imperialists. The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has diversionary effects for China as well. By instilling nationalism, which includes strong anti-Japanese elements, to replace Communism as the unifying ideology after Tiananmen, the government is trying to divert the public’s attention from its legitimacy crisis. By having a closer look at the three cases, this paper intends to seek what the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has in common with the shelling of Jinmen and the Falklands War, and what one can learn from the comparison.
widely believed by academics that the authoritarian Argentine junta led by President Leopoldo Galtieri invaded the Falklands to counter its serious domestic legitimacy crisis. In fact, one scholar has observed that, “most accounts of Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands attribute the junta’s decision” to “a desire to restore public support for the government.”

Coming into power after a military coup in 1976, the junta faced precarious economic and political conditions. Its orthodox monetarist policies resulted in a massive bank collapse in March 1980, and the “dirty war” against social oppositions had severely alienated the junta from society. The “dirty war” was so “dirty” that the junta was afraid of “Nuremburg-style investigations and trials” after democratization took place. As a result, the regime heated up the Falklands dispute to divert the public’s grievances because the islands held patriotic appeal to all segments of Argentinian society. But according to some scholars, the territorial dispute was aimed at not just the Argentinian public but the internal divisions of the regime as well. Having defeated the leftist insurgents and oppressed oppositions, the military lacked a sense of mission and fractions within the regime appeared due to disagreements on economic and social policies and competition of bureaucratic interests. Galtieri therefore initiated the invasion of the Falklands to serve the dual purposes of increasing domestic popularity and uniting the regime behind him.

China’s domestic situation today is reminiscent of Argentina’s in many ways. Despite the robust economy, China has its own social instabilities and potential for political crisis. Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which constitutes the highest political authority in China, possesses far more social and military might than the Galtieri junta, it is experiencing a legitimacy crisis. With China’s opening and reform in the 1980s, communist belief has drastically faded away and with it, an ideology capable of uniting the entire nation. The arrival of investment from abroad has also brought Western liberal political ideas that have challenged the CCP’s orthodox position as the only legitimate leader of China. The call for political liberalization in China reached its peak at the 1989 Tiananmen protest. Only by resorting to military measures did the CCP avoid the fate of their counterparts in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. It is probably unlikely today that, in the age of instantaneous Chinese social media and the high degree of internationalization, another Tiananmen Square could take place. However, grievances against government corruption, environmental pollution, enormous income inequality, and social injustice all have the potential to evolve into what the government refers to as a “mass event”—de facto demonstrations or civil disobedience. The CCP clearly recognized that its ruling status cannot be taken for granted when it said in a 2009 report “the advanced nature and ruling status of CCP cannot last forever by themselves…what we own today does not mean we will own them forever.”

To fill the ideological vacancy, the state “launched an extensive patriotic education campaign in the 1990s to ensure loyalty in a population that was otherwise subjected to many domestic discontent.” Nationalism took the place of communism. One of the core components of Chinese nationalism is the humiliation suffered by China, which includes the loss of territory, at the hands of the West and Japan in contemporary history. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issue fits in perfectly as an ideal target to divert domestic grievances, especially because of Japan’s notorious reputation in China as an extant military threat. Just like the Falklands, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute—and hatred toward Japan—appeals to all sections of Chinese society. The dispute satisfies the three factors that scholar Amy Oakes considers as major influences on diversionary conflicts—motivation (the existence of social unrest), domestic constraints (the regime is unable to perform political liberalization or extreme oppression), and opportunity (the regime is able to find a popular target).

Of course, many differences exist between the Falklands War and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. Whereas the Argentinian junta started the war, Beijing is determined, as least for now, to avoid a war with Japan and possibly with the United States. A military defeat would not only derail China’s economic growth, which to a considerable degree relies on healthy economic relationship with Asian economies such as Japan’s, but could also instigate a political crisis. In this sense, China’s practice today is similar to many practices during Mao’s era, when foreign-targeted actions were often limited but nevertheless aroused immense domestic revolutionary fervor. Another distinction is that, while Galtieri and his colleagues enjoyed the surge of nationalism, there
are signs that the Chinese government has growing concerns about it getting out of control. A strongly nationalistic public may lead the state to lose control of the direction of nationalism. China expert Susan Shirk claims that nationalism “has boxed the CCP and its leaders into a corner,” and a recent study by the International Crisis Group concludes that Chinese nationalism is restricting the room for diplomatic mitigation.\(^\text{10}\)

By discussing the shelling of Jinmen in Mao’s era, the Falklands War, and the current Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, this paper intends to find historical resemblance between the former two and the latter. Some questions to be addressed in this paper are: Does the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute inherit characteristics from both Mao’s era and the Falklands War? If so, what is unique about the current dispute and, most importantly, will China start a diversionary war with Japan over the islands? Shirk claims that when the CCP’s “political survival” is at risk, China will go to war regardless of consequences in order to prevent domestic humiliation (loss of legitimacy).\(^\text{11}\) It will be devastating to the world if two crucial economic powerhouses go to war over uninhabited rocks, so what measures should China and the international community, respectively, take then to minimize the possibility that China goes to war for legitimacy reasons?

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

To analyze Mao’s actions during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Thomas Christensen first establishes the conceptual structure of “two-level foreign policy analysis” in his book, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*. This structure focuses on how domestic political concerns can drive a nation’s foreign policy. In explaining why the relations between the United States and the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) remained hostile before Nixon’s rapprochement in the early 1970s, Christensen argues that something more than the realists’ balance of power theory was at work: the Cold War was “similar before and after 1972,” so why did the bipolarity and the common Soviet threat “not push leaders in similar directions in the 1950s?”\(^\text{12}\) To solve this conundrum, Christensen comes up with his two-level approach by analyzing the domestic political conditions in both the United States and PRC. He concludes that by using vitriolic anti-communist rhetoric and shelling the Jinmen Islands, President Truman and Mao Zedong created tensions short of war to gain domestic support to implement the Marshall Plan and the Great Leap Forward (GLF), respectively.\(^\text{13}\) In his chapter on the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Christensen refutes claims that Mao, by shelling the islands, attempted expanding the PRC’s territory, testing American resolve on Taiwan, drawing Soviet support, or defending itself from American threats. Instead, Mao used the international crisis to launch his GLF, which required extraordinary sacrifices from Chinese peasants to achieve utopian industrial and agricultural goals.\(^\text{14}\)

Chen Jian reaffirms Christensen’s argument in his *Mao’s China & The Cold War*. By offering a closer scrutiny of the PRC’s domestic political movements and foreign policies during the Cold War, Chen Jian observes that Mao used tensions ranging from the Korean War and the Jinmen shelling to the Vietnam War to create momentum to sustain his domestic revolutionary programs, such as the anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 and the GLF a year later.\(^\text{15}\) Chen attributes Mao’s anxiety about China losing its revolutionary fervor—the “postrevolution anxiety”—as the main reason why he ordered the shelling of Jinmen. According to Chen, Mao could use the tension created by the shelling to exploit the Chinese people’s “victim mentality” generated by past Western colonialism to mobilize for the GLF.\(^\text{16}\)

There is a rich scholarly literature on diversionary war theory. Jack S. Levy, a political scientist, reviews the existing literature on diversionary war theory and summarizes the claims of both supporters and opponents of this theory in *The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique*. Levy observes that, while historians and sociologists found strong correlations between war and domestic support for national governments, as demonstrated by the Crimean War, political science studies failed to reveal such a strong relationship.\(^\text{17}\) Levy, disturbed by the discrepancy between the two academic fields, conducts an examination on existing literature and identifies the shortcomings of political science research on this theory. He criticizes the political science literature for lacking a “well-developed theoretical framework guiding what are basically descriptive correlational analyses” and for paying inadequate attention to “the direction of the relationship between internal and
external conflict and to the causal mechanism driving the relationship."\(^\text{18}\) While remaining supportive of diversionary war theory, Levy also acknowledges the reciprocal effect of internal and external conflict, noting how diversionary conflicts can ruin internal stability that elites were trying to preserve.\(^\text{19}\)

One piece of literature that opposes diversionary war theory deserves special attention. M. Taylor Fravel, when explaining the PRC’s past territorial concessions to its neighbors, proposes the “diversionary peace” theory, which states that authoritarian leaders “are more likely to compromise (in a territorial dispute) when confronting internal threats to regime security, including rebellions and legitimacy crisis.”\(^\text{20}\) From studies of Chinese territorial concessions in places like Tibet and Xinjiang, Fravel concludes that leaders might give up certain territorial claims in exchange for outside recognition of its domestic policies and focus its power more on domestic issues, particularly when facing unrest near its borders.\(^\text{21}\) However, Fravel himself acknowledges that “diversionary peace” theory does not apply to the Diaoyu/Senkaku case because, unlike the often-unpublicized border dispute, it has nationalistic importance to the Chinese public and due to the islands’ strategic and economic value.\(^\text{22}\) Moreover, his theory better applies to China’s ethnic-diverse regions, where Beijing needs more resources to prevent ethnic separation movements than to maritime disputes. Still, his work demonstrates that Chinese intransigence on Diaoyu/Senkaku does not stem from established practices.

Amy Oakes’ case study on the 1982 Falklands War further strengthens diversionary war theory. Oakes cautions against the linear relationship between domestic unrest and diversionary military actions, considering the unsupportive results from political science studies.\(^\text{23}\) She supplements the existing diversionary war thesis by introducing the “alternative approach” and the “state extractive capacity” concept.\(^\text{24}\) According to Oakes, a state will engage in diversionary actions when it cannot either reform the political system or repress the oppositions (running out of alternative approaches) because of low extractive capacity—the price of either reform or repression is too unbearable. According to Oates, The Falklands War was a “classic instance” of diversionary war because the junta could not meet the public’s demand to reform—to end military rule—and the severe economic crisis, together with the unprecedented scale of public opposition, crippled the junta's capability to conduct repression.\(^\text{25}\) I will argue later in this paper that it is increasingly difficult for China to adopt alternative approaches as well.

Fravel, however, has replied to Oak’s argument through his own examination of the Falklands War. He claims the reason the Galtieri junta invaded the island was “to compel British concessions at the negotiating table, not to defeat attention from the junta’s domestic woes.”\(^\text{26}\) If domestic crisis was really what triggered the invasion, Fravel questions, then why did the junta before Galtieri, who also faced social unrest, fail to initiate the diversionary conflict? Instead of diversionary motivations, he attributes the cause of war to realist explanations: the Argentinian's frustration with the lengthy but futile diplomacy, the perception of declining British resolve, and a short window of opportunity before Britain may harden its attitude.\(^\text{27}\) Fravel's argument has its merit, and indeed the lengthy but unproductive negotiations and a preemptive strike opportunity played a hand in the junta's decision. Nevertheless, he neglects some empirical evidence that supports the applicability of diversionary war theory to this case. First of all, as late as the second half of 1980, the Argentinian government was still primarily focused on its Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, and therefore, it could not afford to antagonize two powerful players at once.\(^\text{28}\) Secondly, its relationship with Britain remained vital for several important defense contracts. Thirdly, although the negotiation process was long, it was not futile: by late 1980, a possible lease-back agreement was within sight.\(^\text{29}\) Last but not least, a conflict with Britain, however uncommitted to the Falklands it might be, would be a risky move and therefore a last-ditch measure for the junta. I will explore these points in detail in the empirical analyses section on the war.

In another paper co-written with Lily I. Vakili, Levy, while affirming that the junta went to war in 1982 for diversionary reasons, attributes the cause of war to the internal division of the junta. Levy and Vakili argue that, after the anti-Montoneros (an opposition guerilla group) campaign, the junta lacked a “unifying mission,” and internal divisions along bureaucratic interests began to intensify, leading Galtieri to launch the war to unite the regime.\(^\text{30}\) However, Oakes repudiates this argument, claiming that the legitimacy crisis was so severe that even a cohesive regime would need to divert attention.\(^\text{31}\)
Historians have paid much attention to the Falklands War. Sir Lawrence Freedman’s *The Official History Of The Falklands Campaign*, and Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins’ *Battle for the Falklands* provide a detailed overview of the war. Their works reveal some noteworthy characteristics of the Falklands crisis that apply to Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. For example, nationalism, instead of the Falklands’ strategic or economic value, was at the core of the dispute. Similarly, nationalism limited room for diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, ultranationalists’ popular yet provocative actions and miscalculations by low-level military personnel can easily menace the fragile peace without sanction from higher authority. Lastly, Argentina’s economic importance for Britain did not prevent it from going to war.

The historical literature also provides empirical support for the political scientists who uphold the relevance of diversionary war theory. Both Freedman and Hastings mention the junta’s imperative for diversionary actions, and an examination of Argentina’s military decisions by historian Martin Middlebrook confirms Oakes’ claim that the desire to conduct diversionary actions does not necessarily equal war.

So far, there is no literature that directly compares the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with the Falklands. However, many works have studied Chinese nationalism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. One prominent work is *China, Fragile Superpower* by Susan L. Shirk. By examining Chinese social instability, Shirk observes that the Chinese state is increasingly exploiting nationalism, which is already embedded in many aspects of Chinese society, to divert the public’s attention and boost support for the government. Yet Shirk warns that nationalist fervor could eventually backfire in starting an unwanted international conflict and, as the subtitle of her book suggests, “Derail Its (China’s) Peaceful Rise” because “not lashing out (against Japan, Taiwan, or the U.S.) might endanger Party rule” by making the government appear weak in front of the nationalistic public. Shirk is particularly afraid this scenario might take place over the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes.

Shirk’s argument is echoed by Zhao Suisheng, whose work, *A Nation-State by Construction*, records and analyzes Chinese nationalism from its origin in the Qing Dynasty to today. Zhao identifies three brands of Chinese nationalism: nativism, anti-traditionalism, and pragmatic nationalism. He considers anti-Japanese sentiment to be controlled by the state-led pragmatic nationalism, yet shows that when the state fails to act forcefully on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, the more hawkish nativism is used to criticize the state. He makes similar observations about the diversionary effect of nationalism and the erosion of state’s monopoly on nationalism in his published essay as well.

The study “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks” by the International Crisis Group offers a history of Sino-Japanese disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and summarizes each sides’ perspectives. It also mentions how Chinese nationalism is forcing the government to be assertive. James Manicom focuses on Sino-Japanese confrontation and cooperation in the disputed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in East China Sea. His work reminds us that one should not view the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute in isolation because it lies in the background of the EEZ dispute, and that Sino-Japanese maritime cooperation is not completely impossible even when encountering hostile domestic popular opinion.

III. THE SECOND TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS

At 5:30 pm on August 23, 1958, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the coastal region of Fujian Province, under Mao’s order, fired tens of thousands of artillery shells toward the Kuomintang (KMT)-controlled Jinmen Islands, only two miles off the coastal city of Xiamen (Amoy). The massive shelling caught the KMT garrison on the islands completely off guard, destroying the entire communication network. In 85 minutes, the PLA fired a total of more than thirty thousands shells, killing more than 600 KMT soldiers on the islands. The intense shelling continued until early October, accompanied by a naval blockade of the islands and sporadic aerial combats between the PLA air force and KMT air force in Chinese airspace.

The shelling, later known as the second Taiwan Strait Crisis, immediately raised tensions in the Asia-Pacific and could have triggered a nuclear war. President Eisenhower was afraid that the massive artillery operation was a prelude to an invasion of not only Jinmen and other offshore islands, but also the Pescadores (islets in the middle of the Taiwan Strait) and even Taiwan. As a result, he reinforced the Seventh Fleet by transferring vessels from the Sixth
Fleet, which was dealing with the crisis in Lebanon and Iraq. According to general Ye Fei, at the time commissar of the Fuzhou military district and hand-picked by Mao as the commander of the shelling operation, the U.S. naval presence in the Taiwan Strait included “seven aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, and forty destroyers.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff even discussed the possibilities of using tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese airfields in the coastal areas. Given that the Soviet Union had signed a defense treaty with China, the shelling indeed could easily have expanded the conflict way beyond the tiny offshore islands.

The military confrontation gradually subsided in October after Mao issued several statements announcing a four-week ceasefire. Although the shelling continued afterward, it took on a more symbolic meaning: the PLA only opened fire on odd days but not on even days, and the shells were intentionally fired on clear beaches. The KMT garrison followed likewise. In Mao’s words, the pattern was meant to let Chiang’s soldiers “get out to do some exercises and get some sunshine,” so that they can “stay there for long.”

Why did Mao suddenly decide to bombard the islands, raising the tensions in the West Pacific, only to conduct a unilateral ceasefire later and allow KMT forces to stay? An obvious geopolitical explanation would be that Mao wanted to destroy KMT’s offshore bases that were frequently used to conduct harassments and sabotages against the Mainland and could serve as bases for Chiang Kai Sheik’s “counter attack on Mainland.” KMT forces often conducted small-scale “surveillance and harassment” operations against the PRC’s maritime transportation around Fujian Province, and the KMT air force used the Mainland’s airspace for “surveillance, training, and airdropping anti-communist pamphlets.” By shell- ing the Jinmen Islands (including transferring fighter jets into Fujian Province to secure the airspace), Mao indeed could hope to destroy the KMT forces’ ability to further harass the Mainland.

Nevertheless, Mao’s motive was definitely not limited to geopolitical considerations. If he intended to permanently get rid of KMT bases near the Mainland’s coast, why not just take the islands after the intense shelling? After all, according to general Ye Fei, one month into the shelling, the supply lines to the islands were cut off, defense fortifications were destroyed, and the KMT garrison endured severe shortages of food and ammunition. The PLA could “easily take the islands if we launch a landing opera-
tion.” Instead of exploiting the perfect military opportunity, Mao, under the name of PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, issued a public statement on People’s Daily on十月6, announcing that: “temporarily from seven days on from October the 6th, we will stop the shelling, you can freely transport supplies with no American escort.” A week later, Mao issued another announcement: ”The shelling of Jinmen will stop for another two weeks after today, to observe enemy’s movement, and to let the compa-

In fact, Mao chose the worst time possible for an amphibious invasion to start the shelling. Late autumn was the typhoon season for Fujian, and the abominable sea condition made the PLA Navy’s at-
tack boats, which had light tonnage, hard to maneu-

Given that the PLA Navy didn’t have heavier vessels, unfriendly sea conditions basically rendered the Navy useless beyond minor scuffles. General Ye also mentions that heavy rain badly damaged transport routs and made disease prevalent among soldiers in his memoir. This evidence suggests that Mao did not plan to take the islands from the begin-

Mao was also very cautious when considering how to deal with the Americans in the operation. Two days before the shelling, when listening to Ye Fei’s report, Mao asked him if it would be possible to avoid hitting the American advisors on Jinmen Islands. Throughout the campaign, Ye Fei followed strict guidelines preventing the PLA air force’s air-

In late August, when American vessels began to provide escort to KMT supply ships, Mao ordered his troops to only fire upon KMT vessels but not the Ameri-

Why would Mao, who started this serious provocation, eagerly try to avoid confrontations
with the Americans? The only answer would be that he wanted to maintain the conflict on a very limited scale. In other words, his purpose was not to defeat any foreign adversaries.

Historians have attributed other reasons to Mao’s actions. One of them is that Mao was trying to support the anti-colonial struggle in the Middle East by diverting U.S. forces into the West Pacific. Eisenhower did transfer ships from the Sixth Fleet to the Seventh Fleet, but by late July, the tension had started to calm down. Another explanation is that Mao wanted to know how committed the U.S. was to Chiang, and he tested their relationship by shelling the offshore islands. To some extent, this statement is accurate. Mao paid close attention to the interactions between Chiang and his American allies. He was especially pleased to see that Chiang and the Americans disagreed on whether they should abandon the islands. For the Americans, the islands had little strategic value, and Eisenhower was clear that the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan did not cover the islands, urging Chiang to retreat. To Chiang, however, the islands provided him the legitimacy that his government still represented China, and he openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the Americans. By expanding the KMT-U.S. animosity, Mao wished to “ally with Chiang against the U.S.” to prevent Taiwan from gaining independence.

The major reason why Mao decided to shell the islands, however, was to create a warlike, revolutionary domestic atmosphere to facilitate the launch of the Great Leap Forward. Mao had reason to feel isolated on the world stage in 1958. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, the PRC-U.S. relationship did not show sign of improvement. Also, PRC-Soviet relations began to deteriorate as well. Mao had a very negative attitude toward Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence” concept with Western nations, believing that communist revolutions should never lose their momentum. He also regarded China as the legitimate world leader of revolutions. In mid-1958, when the Soviets proposed to establish a Sino-USSR submarine fleet and build a long-wave radio station on China’s east coast, Mao refused angrily and held sharp talks with the Soviet ambassador. When Khrushchev visited China from late July to early August, to try to calm things down, Mao did not inform Khrushchev about the incipient shelling. These cracks between the two socialist countries paved the way for the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, and reinforced Mao’s fear that the Soviets may one day collude with the U.S. against China. Therefore, Mao launched the GLF to significantly bolster the PRC’s national power to deter any potential foreign aggression.

Domestically, Mao had just finished the Anti-Rightist campaign in 1957 and felt that the time was right to start a new wave of revolution that could push China’s “socialist revolution and reconstruction to a higher level.” The GLF aimed to transform China, then a still impoverished nation, to a world superpower. It set the unrealistic industrial goal of surpassing Britain and the United States in major industrial output within 15-20 years, and this was most vividly demonstrated by the mass steel production campaign, during which each household donated nearly every metal product it owned to make steel in many backyard furnaces. Food production was also given absurd goals, like “ten thousand jin [a Chinese weight unit; one jin equals to 0.5 kilogram] of rice per acre.” Just to show how unrealistic the agricultural goals were, one famous mural in a commune depicted a pig as huge as an elephant, huge enough to feed an entire commune.

Other crucial aspects of the socialist transformation included rural communization and building the militia to increase productivity. Rural communes required Chinese peasants to give up what remained of their small plot of private land and household property to join the “people’s commune” to work and eat together. Christensen characterizes this as “the ultimate sacrifice for the greatest percentage of Chinese citizens.” More excruciating for them was that the GLF focused on heavy industry, state capital accumulation, and atomic weapons, items that would not directly benefit the peasants in the short term. Building the militia required further sacrifices by introducing military structure and discipline into the communes, leading to even less reward for the peasants’ tremendous amount of work. Although raising food production was also a goal, collectivization led the state to take most of the crops. Given that merely five years had passed since the Korean War, it would take unimaginable willingness for the peasants to sacrifice their personal welfare to build China into a superpower.

Consequently, Mao needed to persuade his people that it was worthwhile and necessary to en-

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dure such huge sacrifices. He achieved this by raising the tension in West Pacific. Mao clearly understood that, by shelling the islands, he would further deteriorate Sino-U.S. relations and increase the possibility of a direct military conflict. Mao used the state of affairs that he had created to convince the people that their country was in real danger of war with the imperialists and that they needed to make extra contributions to defend it. As Christensen argues, Mao was not actually preparing China for war, but was creating a “siege mentality necessary to extract massive sacrifices from the Chinese public.”\textsuperscript{72} Chen Jian corroborates Christensen’s argument in his similar remark: “he (Mao) found that the tension emerging in the Taiwan Strait provided him with much needed means to legitimize the unprecedented mass mobilization in China.”\textsuperscript{73} Chinese historians agree to this conclusion as well, with military historian Xu Yan observing: “it is consistent with Mao’s thought to use struggles against the enemy to stir people’s revolutionary fervor to mobilize every positive factors for revolution and construction.”\textsuperscript{74} Finally, Mao himself belied his intention in a letter to Peng on July 27, 1958. In the letter, he claimed “it would be best if the enemy attacks Zhang Zhou, Shan Tou, Fu Zhou, and Hang Zhou,” all important southeastern cities, so that “politics can be in charge.”\textsuperscript{75} Apparently, manufacturing warlike atmosphere was Mao’s primary goal.

The shelling also aligned perfectly with building militias. During or close to the period of the shelling, Mao issued several directives to strengthen building militias. In September, Mao told journalists from Xinhua Press, the state press agency of China, that we must “establish militia units on a massive level.”\textsuperscript{76} In another speech in December, Mao said: “If the imperialists dare to invade us, then we will achieve the goal of every man a soldier…”\textsuperscript{77}

What happened in China after the shelling is further evidence that Mao used the crisis for domestic purposes. China put its focus on socialist construction while only conducting symbolic and sporadic shelling of Jinmen. The naval blockade was lifted as well. Moreover, the decrease in military personnel and defense budget to the lowest in 1958-1959 since 1949 demonstrates that Mao focused on domestic construction first.\textsuperscript{78} Could one categorize Mao’s shelling of Jinmen as a diversionary action? Under the traditional definition of diversionary war, it would be difficult to do so, most notably because Mao did not face any threats to his rule at all in 1958. Even though Mao was constantly afraid that his country lacked revolutionary momentum, he was not concerned that someone might take his post (it was not until 1970 when he and Lin Biao became rivals) or that the Chinese public will no longer view him as the Chinese revolution’s great leader. There were no political opponents capable of voicing dissent after the Anti-Rightists Campaign, and Mao enjoyed absolute authority within the CCP. This was well demonstrated at the 1959 Lushan Conference, when Mao publicly denounced the revered Peng Dehuai in front of other CCP leaders because Peng had written Mao a letter urging him to seriously consider the negative consequences of the GLF. Bandied as a “careerist,” Peng lost his post as Defense Minister and other leaders concurred with Mao’s decision.\textsuperscript{79}

In conclusion, Mao decided to shell the Jinmen Islands and considerably raised the tension in West Pacific largely out of domestic concerns. He needed a limited military confrontation to create a warlike domestic atmosphere necessary to extract sacrifice from the people to implement the GLF while also taking care to not let the conflict escalate into war. The shelling operation was not designed to create dramatic international event to rally up popular support for a crumbling regime, so in this sense, it was not a diversionary action. Yet it did have a diversionary effect by making the people less focused on the hardship they would endure. Mao’s action was much more provocative than China’s assertiveness today, yet contrary to many realist explanations, the shelling was mainly a ploy for domestic political purposes.\textsuperscript{80} The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis reminds people that China has precedent of being provocative, and that provocative actions do not always imply a bid for geopolitical domination.

IV. THE FALKLANDS WAR

The Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands on April 2, 1982, completely took Britain by surprise. More than a thousand Argentine Marines easily took over what they considered to be their historical territory, while the Governor of the Falklands, Rex Hunt, only had 75 Royal Marines whose major duty was to provide symbolic British military presence and to deal with minor Argentine intrusions.\textsuperscript{81} Why, all of a sudden, did the Argentine junta, led by Leopoldo
Galtieri, launch the invasion? Evidence suggests that the junta did so for diversionary purposes—to ameliorate its domestic legitimacy crisis by conducting a military operation that would be supported by the entire Argentine society.

But could it be that the junta initiated the invasion, as Fravel suggests, for strategic or diplomatic purposes? Historical evidence does not demonstrate either of them to be the primary reason for the conflict. The Falklands were of minor strategic importance to both Britain and Argentina. During the Cold War, Britain's central security focus was in line with NATO—to counter a potential Soviet intrusion into Europe. The Royal Navy's concentration was in European waters, instead of the Falklands some 8,000 nautical miles away from Britain. The only British naval presence in the South Atlantic was "Endurance," an ice patrol ship with very limited armament that spent around five months during the Antarctic Summer in the waters of the Falklands and its dependency islands. Even "Endurance" was constantly a target for naval budget cuts, and finally, in June 1981, Thatcher's conservative government decided to put it out of service in 1982. The insignificant status of the Falklands was also highlighted by Britain's military contingency plan of 1976 in light of a possible Argentine invasion. Because of the distance, the Navy could not afford the cost of a constant presence, and a deterrence force comprised of a frigate or a nuclear submarine was not only expensive, but also may have been viewed by Argentina as a provocation. By contrast, Argentina enjoyed military initiatives. It had ample options to harm the islands, such as a blockade, termination of supplies, and air service. Therefore, the only viable option if a conflict took place was for the Navy to recapture the islands, but it would take weeks to assemble a task force and arrive at the Falklands. In addition, the amphibious strength required (including an aircraft carrier) was considered too much to be applied to the remote colony. The contingency review in 1981 only reaffirmed the difficulties. In short, due to the Falkland Island's distance and strategic unimportance, the British contingency plan was no plan at all.

The Falklands occupied little attention in British civil affairs as well. The prospect for long-term development was bleak, and the economy of the islands heavily depended on wool production that was constantly affected by the fluctuating international wool price. Geographically, the islands were "distant and inhospitable," and ironically, they relied on Argentina for many essential services and markets. To address the "growing concern about the decline of the Falkland Islands' economy and the Islands' loss of population (which was about 2000)," the British government in 1976 asked Lord Shackleton to conduct an economic survey. Much to the government's irritation, Shackleton's report claimed that the islands' economy could be self-sufficient provided there was enough investment. However, it also acknowledged that crucial pillars of the economy, such as tourism, were dependent "to a large extent on the establishment of commercial air links" with neighboring countries.

In January 1981, the new British Nationality Bill only gave Falklands residents whose parents or grandparents were not born in the United Kingdom citizenship of the British Dependent Territories, despite strong objection from the islands. Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), when negotiating with Argentine Foreign Minister Cavándoli in April 1980, claimed that the only territorial claim he cared about was that "to Bordeaux because of the wine!"

The Falkland Islands were of secondary importance to Argentina at best. Throughout its negotiations with Britain, Argentina was also concerned with the Beagle Channel Dispute with Chile. In fact, Argentina nearly went to war with Chile over the dispute, and only the intervention and eventual arbitration of the Vatican prevented the conflict. Argentina was actually more occupied with the Beagle Channel Dispute than with the Falklands as late as November 1980. It was not until the Vatican ruled the Channel dispute in favor of Chile that the Falkland issue "rush to the fore." Even during the Falklands War, the junta kept many of its best-trained troops along the Chilean border. Obviously, the Beagle Channel had more strategic importance than the Falklands. There were indications that the Falklands had potential oil reserves, but Argentina viewed the oil potential "small and very long term," and turned down British requests for joint development. Thus, from a geopolitical perspective, the Falklands were insignificant, casting doubt on the applicability of the realist model. Moreover, if the Falklands were strategically important to Argentina, then why did the consecutive juntas not occupy them before 1982?

Fravel argues the invasion was the product of
Argentina's growing dissatisfaction with its futile diplomatic efforts with the British. The negotiations first started in December 1965, following a UN General Assembly Resolution pressuring the two countries to peacefully solve the dispute. Yet in the seventeen years preceding the war, there was no agreement on the sovereignty issue, the core objective of Argentina. Fravel thinks the war "reflects the culmination of Argentine frustration from 1981 that continued to grow in 1982." It is beyond dispute that the slow progress in negotiations made the junta impatient and therefore more likely to start a conflict. An examination of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina, however, suggests that the lack of progress was not the trigger of the war.

First of all, the relationship between Britain and Argentina remained cordial throughout the entire negotiation process. Argentina was much more important economically to Britain than were the Falkland Islands: "trade with the Falklands was worth a few percent of that with Argentina." Freeland records British economic interest in Argentina as including at least £240 million, as well as investment worth £60 million. Meanwhile, the British government was unwilling to provide the funds necessary for extending the airfield at Stanley, the capital of the Falklands, at the cost of 3 to 5 million pounds. It even ridiculed the idea of the extension, a central recommendation from the Shackleton report, as "an expensive fantasy."

Ironically, Argentina was also a prominent client for British defense sales. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Britain strengthened Argentina's Navy and Air Force by selling the latter minesweepers, Canberra bombers, two Type 42 destroyers, Lynx helicopters, and secret information about Sea Wolf anti-air missiles. Thatcher's conservative government was even less restrictive on arms sales, proposing to sell either the aircraft carrier Invincible or Hermes plus Sea Harriers (backbones of the British taskforce during the war) and even a Vulcan nuclear bomber. If Argentina or Britain became more hostile toward each other during the lengthy diplomatic process, these arms sales would not have been proposed or taken place.

Secondly, the negotiations were not completely futile. In 1971, a communications agreement was signed to increase interactions between the Falklands and Argentina, so that the stubborn islanders would see the benefits of a closer relationship with Argentina. In November 1980, Britain and then Argentine dictator Jorge Videla agreed to negotiate on the basis of a lease-back, which would allow Britain to “lease” the islands before transferring sovereignty to Argentina. Ultimately, the uncompromising position of the islanders proved to be the only reason that this new initiative failed. In February 1982, the talk in New York, although failing to reach substantial agreement, resulted in a communiqué that stated: “The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit.” The Galtieri junta, however, was not pleased with it and replaced it with a unilateral hawkish statement.

One can observe that the consecutive Argentina governments, although not satisfied with the negotiations, did not regard them as worthless or obnoxious, and it was not until Galtieri's regime that Argentina suddenly took a harder stance. The nature of the sudden hawkishness of Argentina in 1982 thus cannot be explained by the mounting frustration, as Fravel argues, but rather by Argentina's worsening economic and political situation in 1982.

It is beyond dispute that the Galtieri junta faced extremely difficult economic and political conditions in 1982. The junta's orthodox liberal economic policies only aggravated the already plummeting economy. In Fravel's account, the peso "dropped by more than 600 percent against the dollar, national debt increased by 30 percent to 35 billion dollars, and inflation grew from double to triple digits." Oakes observes that the Argentine government was “on the verge of insolvency” due to its debt that made up 60 percent of its GDP. Oakes even states that Galtieri's new Minister of Economy, Roberto Alemán, was more devoted to orthodox liberal measures than his predecessors, as demonstrated by the freeze of government wages. Similarly, Hastings and Jenkins describe Alemán's orthodox economic package introduced in January 1982 as one of “devastating severity” and “bold to the point of recklessness,” turning economic conditions from bad to worse.

Tightly connected with the economic downturn was the increasingly challenging legitimacy crisis. Fravel is correct that both the economic and political crises were present before the Galtieri regime, but, as Oakes argues, in 1982, the junta's legitimacy was questioned unlike before. In fact, the junta faced a more difficult situation than just two years before when its annihilation of political opponents was ruthlessly effective. The failure of economic reforms encouraged the business circle and the media
to openly criticize the government for the first time, while the Catholic Church, which used to be accommodating to the juntas, distanced itself from the regime.109 Dissident political parties also formed a united opposition—the Multipartidaria and mothers of the victims of the Dirty War were also gathering in squares to demand explanation for their disappeared children, drawing international attention.110 Thus, the Galtieri junta faced more severe crises than its predecessors. The economic crisis reduced the government’s affordability to conduct a long-term suppression operation while the political crisis induced more opponents to demand democratic reform. According to Oakes, the junta enjoyed little extractive capacity, making a diversionary action an extremely attractive solution.

The Falkland Islands were considered to be the historical territory of Argentina, and retaking them was a move that would appeal to every section of Argentine society, even to the junta’s opposition. One central feature of diversionary actions for leaders facing legitimacy crisis is to “initiate or escalate a foreign crisis to demonstrate their competence to be reelected.”111 Galtieri did not face an upcoming election in 1982, yet he envisioned that the junta would one day become the pro-military party in civilian rule.112 If Galtieri could successfully take the Falklands from the British imperialists and settle a historic injustice, then logically, his pro-military party would have a greater chance to win in a democratic election. Furthermore, by demonstrating competency in defending national interests and honor, Galtieri could restore public confidence in the military government and earn more time for the realization of his harsh economic policy. As Hastings and Jenkins have noticed, the recovery of the Falklands would “at least unite the nation for a time…serve as a vindication of military rule and cleanse the reputation of the armed forces after the horrors of the dirty war. It would also elevate the junta to an authority which was certainly required to enforce Alemann’s economic package.”113

The junta, of course, realized that a war with Britain was extremely risky. Having an ongoing dispute with Chile, Argentina risked fighting a two-front war if Britain and Chile were to collude. The Navy, the most hawkish branch of service in the Argentine military, clearly acknowledged that if Britain were to dispatch a nuclear submarine to the Falklands, then its invasion plan would be scuttled.114 A failure in recovering the Falklands would certainly mean the end of the junta’s rule. Nevertheless, the junta launched the invasion to perform what Oakes described as a “diversionary spectacle.”115 The announced withdrawal of Endurance, the Nationality Bill, the inaccurate assumption that the U.S. would at least remain neutral in the conflict, and Britain’s focus and eventual concession on Rhodesia all convinced the junta that Britain would not seek to recapture the remote islands once they were occupied by Argentina. As a consequence, the Falklands was not only an ideal target but also an easy one. Indeed, as Fravel suggests, the junta hoped that the invasion would force Britain to concede the Falklands’ sovereignty to Argentina in the ensuing negotiations.116 Argentina was so confident that Britain would not retaliate that the vice-admiral in charge of the invasion was not even instructed to prepare for the islands’ defense.117 The junta did not want a war with Britain, but instead tried to create a fait accompli in order to gain British concessions. As such, it could create a spectacle to demonstrate to the people that it is competent in defending national interests.

One characteristic of the Falklands dispute deserves special attention—the role of nationalism in both Argentina and Britain. To Argentina, the Falkland Islands were considered sacred territory unjustly occupied by British colonialists, leaving Argentina as a humiliated victim of imperialism. Moreover, as Freedman described, “Some day, somehow, the nation would have to be completed,” and such an objective is not a matter of “legal title” but a matter of “national identity.”118 Juan Peron, the military dictator who ruled Argentina for nearly three decades after WWII, further promoted nationalism in Argentina. Schools were instructed to teach “the Malvinas are Argentine,” and the slogan was even made into music.119 Not surprisingly, every sector of Argentine society firmly believed in the national cause, making the Falklands an ideal target for diversion. Yet nationalism, expressed in the popular press, also compelled the junta to be assertive in its negotiations because appearing uncommitted in the public’s eye would damage the junta’s legitimacy.

For Britain, the Falklands were initially of only minor importance. As demonstrated above, consecutive British governments attached low priority to the Falklands, which holds neither strategic nor economic importance. Thus, there was a “political imbalance”
regarding the Falklands between Britain and Argentina. However, the islanders’ obstinate position of refusing any negotiations on sovereignty and their mobilization of British media and Parliament proved extremely effective in blocking the governments’ concessions to Argentina. Afraid of backdoor deals, the islanders wrote open letters to the Parliament and the press to criticize the “selling-out” of the British government. They also established the Falklands Islands Emergency Committee to lobby members of Parliament against any pressure that might be put on the islanders, especially on the issue of sovereignty.

In the South Georgia crisis that immediately preceded the war, the British government was under tremendous pressure from the press to remove the Argentine personnel on the South Georgia Island, a dependency island of the Falklands. Domestic pressure in Britain, although less fervent than Argentine nationalism, prevented Britain from reaching an agreement with Argentina on the issue of sovereignty.

Another important feature of the dispute was how ultra-nationalists, through spontaneous actions, could endanger the fragile peace. Unexpected incidents caused by provocative actions by front-line actors, unknown by the junta, easily escalated tension around the region. A vivid example was “Operation Condor.” In September 1966, twenty young Argentine ultra-nationalists hijacked an Argentine commercial flight and landed in Stanley, “arresting” two British officials who approached them. Though they were quickly arrested by the Royal Marines and were sent back to Argentina, they were viewed as national heroes back home. The Argentine Foreign Minister, however, was appalled by the possibility that this incident could derail the ongoing negotiation. In February 1976, an Argentine destroyer fired warning shots at a British Research Ship Shackleton, causing Britain to divert a frigate to the region and further hurting Argentine-British relations. One can easily observe that private activists and hotheaded low-level officers could hijack the diplomatic process and force both governments into a more forceful stance. It is entirely conceivable that China and Japan today face similar risks in their maritime dispute, as will be examined below.

V. CHINESE NATIONALISM AND DOMESTIC CONCERNS

The pro-democracy protest at the Tiananmen Square from May to June 1989 was a turning point in contemporary Chinese history. As historian Jonathan Spence notes, the 1989 protest, which called for the end of rampant economic corruption and later for the resignation of Deng Xiaoping and Premier Li Peng, reached “a scale unprecedented in the history of the PRC.” The CCP only maintained its ruling status thanks to PLA units loyal to Deng and his fellow hardliners who were willing to perform the not-so-honorable task of “cleaning” the Square. The Tiananmen Square incident definitely could be the worst legitimacy crisis the CCP has ever faced, and back in the early 1990s, many observers in the world logically predicted that the days of the CCP could be numbered. Nearly two decades later, however, as Chinese scholar Wang Zheng notes, the PRC has “a very patriotic and supporting populace that many governments would be envious to have.” It is indeed puzzling how the Chinese government, once pushed to the verge of collapse, regained its legitimacy in a period that witnessed the rapid decline of Communist ideology and growing social tensions.

When China embarked on its “Reform and Opening” period in the 1980s, Deng came up with the notion of “let some people become rich first” and then let them bring economic opportunities to the rest of the Chinese population. Deng’s version of Reagan’s “trickle down” policy, however, did not bring “the others” to wealth as it promised to. Instead, income inequality emerged as a prime social conflict, and nepotism and grafts became prevalent in government officials, often colluding with businessmen who were very much willing to pay bribes. Granted, Chinese economic power skyrocketed following the reform, and the majority of the Chinese people, even those who did not become rich first, were better off. However, with economic achievement came the eventual demise of Communist ideology, once the CCP’s source of legitimacy. Mao’s utopian People’s Communes were replaced by official support of free market, and the Chinese public became curious about Western liberal political thought as well. The Tiananmen incident clearly demonstrated to the government that its mobilization capacity had greatly dwindled because Communism could no longer unite the entire population as the national ideology.

The Chinese leadership also experienced a decrease of charisma and personal authority. Deng’s handpicked successor, Jiang Zemin, lacked the revo-
utionary credentials of Mao and Deng. In fact, Shirk considers him to be a “compromise choice” after Tiananmen among different rival factions. 

Jiang and his successors—Hu Jintao and his vice-president Wen Jiabao—did not command the personal authority that Mao and Deng enjoyed. As Zhao Suisheng observes, the Chinese leadership today is more accountable to the people than before due to the public’s easy access to commercialized media to instantly get information and to express their views online. In other words, the days when “a charismatic dictator” would have “the authority to arbitrate disputes in the leadership or personally set the country’s course” are gone.

To avoid another public backlash against the state like the Tiananmen incident and to enhance his personal authority, Jiang started a nationwide patriotic education campaign to instill patriotism as the new unifying ideology to replace Communism. The patriotic education campaign in national education system started in August 1994 when the Propaganda Department in charge of the campaign issued the document “Outline on Implementing Patriotic Education.” This official document states: “Patriotic education…is the foundation of guiding people to establish the correct ideal, belief, life concept, and value, and a very important work for the entire society.” The focus of the campaign not only included Chinese history and culture, but also the accomplishments of the CCP and the socialist modernization. Although the document states that patriotism is not “parochial nationalism,” Shirk contends that the campaign “has been single-mindedly promoting nationalism.”

Similarly, Zheng Wang describes this campaign as an “ideological reeducation.”

Contemporary Chinese history features heavily in the new patriotic campaign since the “century of humiliation,” a term referring to the period from the 1840s to 1940s when China was exploited by colonialists, highlights the CCP’s glorious efforts in defending China’s honor and making China a strong power today. Japan negatively occupies a central role in this campaign because of China’s painful historical memory of Sino-Japanese relations. Since Japan defeated the Qing Dynasty in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, it has been the most vicious aggressor against China. Japan’s numerous atrocities in the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945, especially the extremely notorious Rape of Nanjing, are taught and well-known to every Chinese citizen. A large part of the CCP’s legitimacy also stems from its anti-Japanese struggle. Japanese failure to fully acknowledge its guilt in WWII and its leaders’ visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which includes WWII Class-A criminals, keep the historical memory alive. Subsequently, the strong anti-Japan sentiments of the Chinese people make Japan-related issues ideal targets to divert attention from domestic problems.

Nevertheless, the patriotic education campaign has not eradicated social dissatisfaction toward the government. Problems caused by China’s rapid economic development and the instant access to information, made possible by China’s exploding number of Internet users and commercialized media, aggravated many social issues into what the government calls “mass incidents,” de facto illegal gatherings or protests. Forced seizure of farmers’ land for construction programs, corruption of law-enforcement officials, and environmental pollutions all have triggered mass incidents. In late 2011, residents in Wukan, a fishing village in Guangdong Province, started a standoff with the local government over issues of illegal land seizure and arrest of dissidents. The conflict was so serious that the villagers eventually blocked all roads leading into the village, drawing international attention. In the end, the leaders of Guangdong province reached a deal with the villagers and agreed to the villagers’ demand that an election be held in the village to elect the council members of the village. In 2007, 2011, and 2012, protests against petrochemical plants broke out in Xiamen, Dalian, Shifang, and Ningbo, with some of them turning violent. One of the most recent mass incidents took place in Hainan Province in November 2014, with villagers smashing over ten government vehicles to protest against construction programs. According to the “social blue book” published in 2012 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the number of mass incidents in recent years has reached at least “tens of thousands.” Of these incidents, half was caused by forced land seizures, 30 percent by environmental problems and labor disputes, and another 20 percent by other reasons.

In light of growing civil dissatisfaction, the government could choose either to conduct reform in accordance with dissidents’ wishes or to repress the protests. However, neither of the two options is ideal. As Huang Yasheng has written in Foreign Af-
faits, there are more calls for democracy and “honesty, transparency, and accountability” from China’s hundreds of millions of netizens. 143 Although these wishes have not created mass pro-democracy movements like the one in 1989, they are of the same nature as the petitions of the protestors at Tiananmen, and judging from the government’s previous response, it is hard to imagine how these wishes will be addressed in a way satisfying to the dissidents today. After 1989, China “allowed maximum leeway in economic growth, both to distract the populace from making more political demands and to strengthen the nation as a whole,” and its high economic growth ameliorated many domestic criticisms of China’s authoritarian political system. 144 Yet as signs of China’s economic slow-down start to emerge, one can expect more dissatisfaction with the government. 145 Moreover, the Chinese government tends to regard pro-democracy activities as “color revolutions” instigated and used by the West for regime changes. 146 Of course, it is possible that the CCP will see the necessity of democratization in the future, but as Huang puts it, the process will be gradual and in a controlled manner, thus unlikely to placate the dissidents in the short term. 147 Like the Argentine junta, the CCP may also want to buy more time in order to let it win elections in a multi-party system. The government can also choose to repress any potential demonstrations, and so far, there has been no mass incident even close in scale to the one in 1989. Nevertheless, in the age of the Internet and globalization, another forceful government reaction like the Tiananmen incident would instantly gain attention and condemnation and pose a far more serious legitimacy challenge to the government than if it chose not to suppress it at all. The government’s compromise at Wukan has already demonstrated that mere suppression of mass incidents is no longer feasible.

The enormous difficulties with both reform and repression leave a diversionary spectacle the most viable and attractive solution for the government. Indeed, in recent years, the world has witnessed more hawkish Chinese rhetoric. More in-service PLA officers appear on TV talk shows or write opinion articles to criticize what they perceive as provocative and hostile U.S. (and it allies’) policies in Asia and argue for a more uncompromising Chinese policy. Recently, Liu Yazhou, a general of the PLA Air Force, wrote an article titled “Soul of Servicemen” in a magazine, in which he proclaims: “For those who dare to infringe [upon China], soldiers must have the bravery and the spirit to hunt them till the end to kill them.” 148 As scholar Hao Yufan notes, “the voice of the PLA has grown louder in recent years as territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea have intensified” and it “always arouses nationalistic public sentiment.” 149 Assertive rhetoric is not limited to defending China’s interests, but has already touched upon the question of global order. Pang Zhongying, a professor of international relations at Renmin University, posted an article on the website of The Global Times to predict the major role China will play in creating a new world order. He argues that, by providing “global public products” such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China is attracting more international supporters while the U.S.-led post-WWII order has been “damaged without recognition” by United State’s hegemonic practices. 150

Given the condition of Chinese nationalism examined above, it is not difficult to see why the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute remains a major contention in the Sino-Japanese relationship. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, about 400km west of Okinawa, 170km north of Taiwan, and 300km east of China. 151 Japan took the islands after the First Sino-Japanese War and currently administers the islands, while both China and Taiwan claimed sovereignty of the islands after 1972, when the United States transferred Okinawa (along with the islands) back to Japan and when oil deposits were discovered near the islands. Like how the Argentines view the Falklands, the Chinese view the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as sacred territory unjustly occupied by Japanese colonialism and militarism.

Chinese nationalist sentiments were immediately ignited once the dispute emerged in the 1970s, but interestingly, it was the Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and North America that took the lead in holding demonstrations and protests. As scholar Chien-peng Chung notes, the PRC government “was quite content to let the Chinese outside China take the lead in expressing the Chinese people’s outrage.” 152 The Chinese government did not register a formal protest before Japanese officials until September 1996, when a group of Japanese right-wing nationalists landed on the islands to repair a damaged lighthouse and when one of the Hong Kong activists drowned while trying
to swim to the islands two weeks later. But even then, the government was determined to prevent public protests or anti-Japanese demonstrations from taking place, partly because it was afraid that the turmoil might scare away valuable Japanese investment and because the government may lose control of the protests.  

A nationwide anti-Japanese protest did break out in 2005, but it was mainly caused by Japan’s controversial revision of its historical textbook, not because of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The territorial dispute did not trigger a nationwide anti-Japanese demonstration until October 2010, when a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the islands and its crew was detained. In Fall 2012, a larger protest broke out when Japanese right-wing nationalists landed on the islands, and the Japanese government “nationalized” the islands by purchasing them from their private owner, who was never identified. The 2012 protest was comprised of demonstrations in over eighty-five Chinese cities and included the smashing and looting of Japanese restaurants, vehicles, and products. In one infamous incident, a protestor smashed the skull of the owner of a Japanese car in Xi’an.  

So why did the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute not create large anti-Japan demonstrations in China until 2010? The direct causes of the demonstrations were Japanese provocations, such as the landing of right-wingers and the “nationalization.” But Japanese actions from the 1970s to 1990s were not vastly different from actions in recent years, yet the Chinese government was determined to discourage any public protest on this issue. By contrast, in Fall 2012, the government “was complicit in tolerating” the demonstrations and fanned popular anger by providing sympathetic media coverage to the protestors. This inconsistency should therefore mainly be explained by China’s domestic motivations, and the government’s desire to instigate anti-Japanese nationalism as a diversion could be a reasonable explanation.  

It is important to realize that China’s recent state-encouraged public upheaval about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute took place within the context of its assertive military actions in its maritime vicinity and was part of the government’s efforts to increase the region’s prominence. Seth Cropsey, former Deputy Undersecretary of the U.S. Navy under both Reagan and George H.W. Bush, clearly believes that Chinese actions in recent years have been more assertive than before. Cropsey cites Chinese standoffs with Japan around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, its evictions of Philippine fishing boats from the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, its announcement of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that covers the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in November 2013, and its placement of an oil rig this May in the disputed Paracel Islands with Vietnam as signs of this new, systematic assertiveness, compared to China’s isolated provocations in the past. Specifically regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, China made about 200 incursions into the airspace of the islands in 2013 that caused Japanese fighter jets to scramble about 300 times, compared to just two incursions in 2011. Taking into account the state’s heavy emphasis on contemporary China’s suffering of external bullying and Japan’s atrocities, it is self-explanatory why China’s recent assertiveness both in rhetoric and actions would win domestic support for the government. The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is not an isolated diversion, but is instead the most prominent part of a series of issues that have diversionary effects.  

Could China’s growing maritime assertiveness, especially in regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, be explained through a realist model? The answer is affirmative. Both the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands’ strategic importance and the shifting balance of power in East Asia contribute to the rising tension between China and Japan. The islands possess significant geopolitical value that neither China nor Japan can afford to overlook. Japan is afraid that if the islands are controlled by China, the latter will use it as a platform to monitor U.S. and Japanese military activities near Okinawa, while China sees the control of the islands as necessary to break the first island chain (which links South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines) to access the Pacific Ocean for its fledging blue water navy. Similarly, Dr. Arthur Herman, an East Asian specialist at the Hudson Institute, regards the islands as “potential choke points for threatening China’s maritime security” like the Malacca Strait. In the waters surrounding the islands there are also large amounts of oil and gas reserve, not a small allure given the two economic powerhouses’ gigantic demand for energy and their heavy reliance on imports. Finally, China and Japan both claim a 200-mile wide EEZ, which includes the islands. Although a successful claim on the islands will not automatically lead to the recognition of their EEZ claims, there is
no doubt it can at least strengthen their respective positions.\textsuperscript{161} Considering that both China and Japan have maritime disputes with other countries in Asia, the outcome of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute can have linkage effects beyond the East China Sea.

The changing dynamics of the balance of power in Asia has also toughened China’s actions. Whereas during Deng’s era and Jiang’s era the need for continuing Japanese investment was a major factor as to why they played down the territorial dispute in the East China Sea, most clearly expressed in Deng’s slogan “set aside dispute and pursue joint development”, today, China no longer attaches the same economic importance to Japan. China surpassed Japan in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010, and many predict it will surpass the U.S. in the not-too-distant future.\textsuperscript{162} Although Japan still remains an important market for Chinese exports, China no longer depends on Japanese investment for economic growth. While more and more countries in Asia (including Japan) find China as their most important economic partner, China’s supreme economic status in Asia provides it more leverage in dealing with neighboring countries in maritime disputes. Given the growing strength of the PLA diminishes the deterrence effects of U.S. forces in Japan as well. To summarize, the Chinese government clearly did not create the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute out of thin air, nor has it intensified its claim over the islands just for the purpose of diversion. Instead, realist explanations are capable of explaining more hawkish Chinese behaviors.

Nevertheless, one cannot downplay the role of nationalism in the dispute nor deny the fact that the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute serves a diversionary purpose. As shown in Manicom’s work, China and Japan have engaged in negotiations about the EEZ dispute and the joint development of the oil field in the East China Sea before and reached agreements. Therefore, as crucial as the energy potential is, there should be room for diplomatic negotiations and no reason for the two to treat the dispute as a zero-sum game. As for the islands’ strategic importance, it is insufficient to raise the tension to the level in recent years by itself. If the islands were of utmost geopolitical interest to China, then why didn’t the Chinese government formally protest Japanese actions until the 1990s and discourage civil demonstrations until 2010, while Chinese outside of Mainland China have conducted civil actions since the 1970s? Would it not be advantageous to the PRC government if it could show the world that its people genuinely and strongly support its claim? Similarly for Japan, if it is so afraid that the PRC-controlled islands will pose an extremely serious security threat, then why has it not installed any military facilities on the islands beside a lighthouse? Rather than just looking at the dispute through the geopolitical prism, one should also consider the role of domestic politics in deteriorating the stability of the region.

Since Japan occupies a central antagonistic role in the patriotic education campaign and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute frequently appears in the press, it is no longer possible to downplay the issue in China. Together with more hawkish rhetoric, often tolerated by the state, nationalistic sentiments rose to a high level in China, culminating in the nationwide anti-Japanese riot in 2012. Because gaining the control of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is also a goal that appeals to all sections of Chinese society, the government benefits from acting tough vis-à-vis Japan to keep this issue an ongoing spectacle. Even if the Chinese government wants to reach a compromise with Japan, the nationalistic public and the commercialized media would guarantee another legitimacy crisis for the state for capitulating to Japan.\textsuperscript{163} As the International Crisis Group states in their report, backdoor diplomacy is no longer feasible due to domestic pressures in China. Cropsey also thinks that nationalism “heated up the degree [of the dispute] a lot” more than if the dispute were just about geopolitics.\textsuperscript{164}

VI. THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU DISPUTE: COMPARISON, AND CONCLUSION

What does the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute have in common with the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Falklands War, and what can such a comparison tell us about the current dispute and the broader narration of a rising China? The comparison exposes the danger of China’s overplay of nationalism, highlights the need for a crisis-management mechanism between China and Japan, and questions the traditional wisdom of a rising China bidding for regional hegemony in Asia. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis serves as a reminder that China has a precedent of deliberately creating tensions in the region for domestic political purposes. The shelling of Jinmen was not about taking over the islands, but about helping Mao launch his radical GLF movement because the
crisis could “mobilize the people and to re-create the revolutionary fervor of the civil war and Korean War days.”165 It is interesting to observe that, in the eyes of the PRC leaders, both the Jinmen Islands and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands carry tremendous domestic political significance, since they both evoke the public’s “nationalist pride and profound victim mentality.”166 The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is viewed in China as an unsettled historical issue and an ugly legacy of Japanese colonialism, and just like the Jinmen Islands, it can arouse nationalism by reminding the Chinese people of unfinished business with its enemy.

One can find many common features shared by both the Falklands War and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. Both China and Argentina are challengers to the existing status quo, and both the Falklands and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have strong appeals to every section in their respective societies. Nationalism, instead of the islands’ geopolitical or natural resources values, is the core of the disputes that prevents Argentina and China from reaching an agreement with Britain and Japan, respectively. Both China and Argentina seized this opportunity to create diversionary spectacles, heating up nationalism sentiments domestically to draw the public’s attention away from their legitimacy crisis. However, by doing so, both governments face increasing public pressure against any backdoor negotiations or diplomatic compromises. Just as Argentine diplomats have complained to their British counterparts before the war that domestic pressure, reinforced by nationalistic media, had created tremendous difficulties for them to compromise, so did the Chinese Foreign Ministry in withstanding more and more public backlash. Shirk recalls that once a Foreign Ministry official told her that the Ministry had received mails with calcium pills in them from ordinary citizens who want them to have more “backbone” in handling foreign relations.167 The strong anti-Japanese mentality of the Chinese public, as represented by the 2012 nationwide riot, has basically made any secret negotiations impossible because a leak of such actions would create another legitimacy crisis.

Radical actions taken by zealous individuals are capable of escalating tensions in a very short period of time. As detailed before, “Operation Condor” deteriorated regional stabilities and the prospect of diplomatic solutions soon after it took place, yet its conducors were treated as heroes in Argentina. Likewise, attempted landings on the disputed islands by Chinese activists and the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain by Japanese Coast Guard in the islands’ surrounding waters sparked waves of anti-Japanese protests in China that worsened the already fragile Sino-Japanese relations.

More importantly, the Chinese government today faces a similar dilemma the Argentine junta faced before 1982—inability to either reform or repress. The Chinese government has attempted to cleanse out corrupt officials, but because of the lack of an independent judiciary system and little oversight in rural areas, the government cannot systematically address the corruption problem. Popular anger ignited by rogue law enforcement agents and officials are likely to continue in the future. Furthermore, the government will not possibly comply with the growing demand that there should be an end to the one-party system. State media has frequently defended the one-party system as absolutely necessary for China.168 It is equally hard to imagine that, in case another Tiananmen-like mass pro-democratic movement breaks out, the government will resort to the hardline response it took in 1989. This is not because the state lacks resources to suppress or does not have the authority to use its military forces for domestic suppression, but because the consequences of doing so will be much greater than they were two decades ago. In the age of the Internet, social media, and instant message software such as WeChat and QQ, events like the Tiananmen crackdown will be known by the entire nation and the world before the government issues a blackout. A violent crackdown may spark a more serious legitimacy crisis that the government is trying to avoid, and it can send a very negative message to Taiwan and other countries worrying about the rise of China, destroying China’s “peaceful rise” image that its leaders have tried hard to maintain. Diversion, therefore, becomes an increasingly attractive option for the Chinese state.

Surely, there are many differences between the Falklands War and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. British population inhabited the Falklands Islands, and therefore their wishes to stay within Great Britain figured prominently in the dispute; the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are uninhabited and “self-determination” plays no role in the dispute. China’s legitimacy crisis is considerably less severe than the one faced by
Galtieri’s junta: the economy, albeit slowing down, is still performing reasonably well, and in the near future, there is little possibility (though not impossible) that any mass incidents will be similar in scale to the Tiananmen movement. The Chinese government is, at least for now, determined to avoid a war in East and South China Sea, whereas the Galtieri junta felt little danger in occupying the Falklands. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands also possess more geopolitical and natural resources value than the Falklands do.

Still, there are some salient lessons to be learned from the three cases. First of all, a comparison between the Falklands War and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute highlights the danger of China’s overplay of nationalism. After about two decades of patriotic education campaign, anti-Japanese sentiment in China is already hard to ameliorate and can be quickly ignited by another incident between China and Japan. Just as Anglo-Argentine economic relations did not prevent the two from going to war in 1982, one should not expect that the close Sino-Japanese economic ties will stop them from fighting over the uninhabited rocks in East China Sea. Abe clearly realized the danger when he warned in January 2014 that “China and Japan were in a similar situation to Britain and Germany before 1914,” who went to war with each other in spite of close economic ties. More worrisome is the prospect that the territorial dispute can create a dominant and uniform social discourse in China. The prevalent anti-Japanese rhetoric may silence any members of society who hold doubts about the importance of the dispute over other social problems. As examined in the Falklands War section, the political pressure created by the Falklands lobbies in Britain restrained the British government from reaching a deal with Argentina. The Chinese government is also less likely to reach an agreement with Japan if it perceives the social discourse that it helped to create in the first place as genuine wishes of the people.

Another potential hazard of China’s overplaying nationalism is that a diversionary action will look more and more attractive in the eyes of the government in the future. China’s steady and rapid economic growth has kept the people generally content about the existing political system. However, if the Chinese economy slows down in the future (and there are already signs of it), latent social issues will rise to the surface, and there are bound to be more people casting doubt on the government’s legitimacy. By then, an act of assertiveness around the disputed islands will become an alluring option both to boost the public’s support and to buy time for the government to solve its domestic crisis. This scenario is all the more possible considering that it is the CCP that controls the PLA, meaning the Party could use the military as a last-ditch effort to save its ruling status. In a meeting with military personnel in November 2014, President Xi reaffirmed that the Party has “absolute leadership” over the military. Granted, this is a distant possibility, but it is still worthwhile to keep it in mind when predicting China’s economic and political situation in the future.

The second lesson is the need to establish a crisis-management mechanism among China, Japan, and the U.S. with focus on the East China Sea. As shown by the Falklands dispute and by multiple instances in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, provocative actions taken by activists can deteriorate regional stability and create political turmoil rapidly. But since it is hard to keep track of all the activists’ plans, China and Japan could enhance their communication mechanism so that they can keep the malicious influence of these incidents to a minimum. Chinese activists who are arrested by Japanese Coast Guard should be quickly repatriated back to China or Taiwan, instead of sitting for trial in Japan. In the long term, Japan should also discourage its activists from landing on the islands because such actions might trigger acts of revenge from Chinese activists. The United States must be ready to deal with potential incidents between China and Japan at any time. By getting first-hand information about the incidents, the U.S. can serve as a mediator to calm down the tension. When politically feasible, the U.S. should attempt to restrain Japanese provocative actions, such as the infamous visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Whenever Japanese officials visit the shrine, China and South Korea will express their outrage, and such visits will only worsen Japan’s image in Asia. Stopping the visits or at least making them non-official, can eliminate a major sore point in Sino-Japanese relations.

Last but not least, a study of the three cases provokes second thoughts on the traditional wisdom that a rising China equals Chinese dominance in Asia. As prominent scholar David Shambaugh notes, “a mini-industry of ‘China rise’ prognosticators has emerged over the past decade” that argues “the China
juggernaut is unstoppable...”¹⁷¹ One of the prognosticators is the structural (or offensive) realist John J. Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer holds that, “the best way for any state to ensure its survival is to be much more powerful than all the other states in the system, because the weaker states are unlikely to attack it for fear they will be soundly defeated.”¹⁷² Since it is impossible for China to become a global hegemon (because of U.S. power), China will “try to dominate the Asia-Pacific region much as the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere” at the cost of its neighboring countries and the United States, making its peaceful rise impossible.¹⁷³

However, none of China’s actions today have been as nearly provocative as the shelling of the Jinmen Island in 1958, and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis reminds people today that China has a history of intentionally creating tensions in Asia for domestic purposes. Mao Zedong explicitly announced during the crisis that the “Western Pacific belongs to the people of the Western Pacific,” establishing China’s own model of the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁷⁴ China, however, only supported this doctrine in rhetoric without any serious attempt at execution. By comparing the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with the Falklands War, it is also clear that domestic politics serve as strong incentives for China to act tough abroad. Consequently, China watchers should keep China’s domestic political dynamics in mind before concluding that China is aiming to become a hegemon. A classical realist approach, instead of structural realism, should be a better candidate in guiding future China policies. As Jonathan Kirshner claims, “classical realism also places great emphasis on politics, domestic and international, and even considers the role of things like ideas, norms, and legitimacy.”¹⁷⁴ While acknowledging China’s rising power, it is also vital to realize its weakness at home and the limits of its power so that the world can engage with China peacefully. Mearsheimer’s approach “is suspect (at best) in its logic, handcuffed by the limits of its structuralism, and, ironically, rooted in utopianism—an attempt to reshape the world as one would like to see it, rather than respecting the realities of power.”¹⁷⁵ Therefore, structural realism and the hostile policy it calls for will only create a self-fulfilling prophecy that can further destabilize East Asia. What the world, and especially the United States, should do is directly address China’s nationalism and discuss the dangers of it directly with the Chinese leadership while taking a non-confrontational approach. Otherwise, a war between China and Japan, two strong naval powers, in the geographically important East China Sea will bring many more casualties and unpredictable political crisis than the Falklands War did in 1982.

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