Regime Evolution in Trump's America: Should We Be Worried?

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The Neglected War: Intervention and Extra-State War Duration, 1816-2007

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When this year’s Executive Board assumed leadership of the Helvidius Group, we hoped that the Journal could be a space to grapple with pressing contemporary challenges as well as unexplored historical viewpoints. Our goal was to increase the variety of content we make accessible to our readers while maintaining our rigorous selection criteria. This year, we broadened the scope of our call for papers to incorporate new voices across a range of subjects, and our essays this semester reflect this diversity of thought.

In this issue's guest essay, Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace research scholar Lincoln Mitchell explores the democratic and constitutional ramifications of Donald J. Trump's presidency. He asserts that the president has threatened our democracy, unity, and national sovereignty, a claim lawmakers have echoed on the right and left.

This semester, Columbia’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute essay is “Unfounded Optimism: Workers’ Perceptions of Social Mobility in Beijing” by Janice Jia. The paper, recognized by the Institute for its notable contribution to East Asian studies, explores how migrant workers perceive their chances for social mobility upon moving from the countryside to Beijing. Jia argues that migrants are optimistic about their futures despite low levels of education due to a conviction in alternative paths to social mobility.

In “The Neglected War: Intervention and Extra-State War Duration, 1819-2007,” Thejasa Jayachandan investigates the factors that affect the duration of conflicts between state and non-state actors outside of the state’s borders. Jayachandan’s analysis, which utilizes both quantitative analysis and case studies, suggests that military, economic, and diplomatic intervention have varied effects on extra-state war duration.

Priya Ellen Misra explores why Belarus adopted a bilingual language law to accommodate its sizeable Russian-speaking population while the demographically similar Ukraine never reformed its monolingual language law. Misra attributes this difference to varying strategies of imperial rule in west Ukraine and west Belarus prior to joining the Soviet Union. She argues that such strategies impacted popular support for monolingual language legislation in the 1990s.

“Blackened Fertility: The Lasting Discourse of African American Female Reproduction after the Civil Rights Movement” by Osaremen Fortune Okolo examines the significance of the perception that black women reproduce more often than their white counterparts. She finds that the narrative of hyper-fertility has so eclipsed physician’s attention over the decades following the civil rights movement that they are unable to explain why African American women are more likely to suffer from infertility than their white contemporaries.

Rohit Ram seeks to understand which circumstances in conflict external actors can reliably identify and exploit, or manufacture, to produce a viable peace process. In “Momentum Shifts: When and How External Actors Can Pursue Peace in Conflict,” he asserts that points in time where the previously-losing side wins a series of tactical victories and the previously-winning side experiences a series of tactical losses are critical to this understanding. In these "momentum shifts," he contends, an external actor has a strong chance of successfully initiating a viable peace process.

In “Neoliberalism or Nah? Explaining Right-Wing Party Success in Contemporary Latin America: The Case of Argentina’s Propuesta Republicana (PRO),” Reed Gregory Shaw examines the effort to build an electorally viable political right in Argentina. He studies the strategies conservative parties can employ to succeed electorally despite an electorate somewhat hostile to their predecessors and programmatic objectives. Shaw uses the PRO’s victory in the 2015 national elections as a case study and writes an afterword exclusively for the Journal reflecting on Argentina’s 2017 midterm election.

Beyond publishing these insightful papers, this semester’s Editorial Board reconnected with alumni and hosted a career panel on opportunities in research and policy open to the entire Columbia community.

I would like to thank every member of the Editorial Board for your hard work, which allowed us to successfully publish Volume XVIII of the Journal of Politics & Society. From you, I have learned so much about research, editing, and leadership, and I know this publication is in good hands for years to come.

Jordan Singer
Editor in Chief
New York City
May 2018
REGIME EVOLUTION IN TRUMP’S AMERICA
SHOULD WE BE WORRIED?

LINCOLN MITCHELL

As the Trump administration moves through its second year, it continues to elicit very strong reactions from across the political spectrum. One important question all Americans should be asking ourselves is the extent to which Trump is an existential threat to our constitutional system and to our democracy. One response to this is that Trump is an unconventional, outspoken, and occasionally vulgar politician, but that otherwise this is more or less business as usual. Conservatives who hold that view can point to some accomplishments around taxes, deregulation and the Supreme Court from this Republican President, but may be disappointed with the failure of the administration to be successful with its broader legislative agenda. Progressives who share this opinion believe that winning the 2018 and 2020 elections will solve the problem of Trump, and that ultimately Trump is terrible, but America can vote itself out of this mess.

There is another way to look at the Trump presidency, from either the left or the right. That is the view that in the last year or so the administration has threatened our democracy, unity and national sovereignty in a way that is qualitatively different than any other time recent history. This view, while more widely held on the left, is certainly compatible with conservative political opinion and has been occasionally suggested by Republican Senators such as John McCain, Bob Corker, and Jeff Flake. The evidence for this position lies in a battery of issues and events including the relationship between the Kremlin and the Trump campaign during the 2016 election, efforts by the Trump family to use the office of the presidency to enrich themselves, and the ongoing attacks on the media by the President and those around him. This is the understanding of the Trump presidency that will be explored in this essay.

Some who do not want to recognize or accept the depth of the challenge to our democracy posed by recent events point to the Watergate scandal in the 1970s as evidence that our constitution always has the capacity to right itself and keep democracy on track. This idea is reassuring, but there is no guarantee that things will work out so well this time. Before we get too comfortable with the Watergate precedent, we might do well to remember events of a century or so before that when conflict and a divided country led us to the Civil War. Comparisons to Watergate get more traction in today’s politics than comparisons to the Civil War do more because of recency bias rather than due to any rigorous methodology.

It is also significant that most of those offering reassuring words because we got through Watergate are older than sixty. The Watergate rationalization should therefore also be understood in substantial part as a cri de cœur from the baby boomers who for reasons of identity and generational pride need to believe that Watergate was the worst crisis we have experienced. If we take a step back and depersonalize this, it is apparent that compared to what we see now, Watergate was, to use a political science term, a Sunday School picnic. That we survived an amateur hour break-in and a cover-up by a paranoid president during a time when the president’s party did not even control either house of Congress is not exactly reason to believe things will work out now.

This current crisis of American democracy is probably real. We see democratic norms including how the White House treats the media, the restrictions to access on information, efforts to undermine the First Amendment at the state level eroding almost every day. We also see frequent attempts to exacerbate racial and other divisions within the U.S. citizenry. There is a very real possibility that foreign intervention made the difference in the last election; and partisanship is overriding the checks and balances created by the founders and therefore preventing a full understanding of that interference. Nonetheless, some of the President’s harshest critics are wrong. Trump is not Hitler and America is becoming neither fascist nor a Nazi type regime. To assert this is an insult to the memory of the victims of Hitler as well as to the American people. It is also intellectually lazy and unhelpful.

1 Dr. Lincoln Mitchell is a political analyst, pundit, and writer, as well as an Adjunct Associate Research Scholar in the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.
THE AMERICAN REGIME TYPE NOW

The desire to look at American history to understand what we are experiencing now is natural. It is also true that there have been times in our history when divisions have been very strong, notably the Civil War era, and other periods when there were concerns about the future of democracy, but in the context of American history we have never experienced anything quite like this before. That does not mean there are no examples of similar regimes that can help explain the Trump presidency and what the future might hold for the U.S. However, if you want to understand our current political environment it is probably useful to look overseas, specifically to post-Soviet countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and even Russia. This is not to say the U.S. is now Azerbaijan, but the regime similarities are hard to miss.

Today some of the countries of what was once the Soviet Union such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are essentially democratic. Others including Georgia and Moldova are working to strengthen their democracy. Ukraine is locked in a conflict with Russia while simultaneously trying to reduce corruption and build a democratic state. The remaining states are neither democratic nor clearly moving in that direction. Rather they range from being authoritarian like Turkmenistan to those that are a bit freer like Armenia. These regimes have been described as hybrid regimes, semi-authoritarian, in the case of Russia sovereign or managed democracy, but the term sultanism probably is the most useful for understanding these regimes and increasingly our own American government.

Regardless of degrees of freedom or what the preferred term is, all of these formerly Soviet regimes share some characteristics. Understanding those characteristics helps provide insight into our own evolving American regime. Sultanistic regimes are defined by Linz and Stepan as Linz and as having:

"(A) high fusion by the ruler of the private and the public. The sultanistic polity becomes the personal domain of the sultan...(T)here is no rule of law and there is no institutionalization...(T)he essential reality in a sultanistic regime is that all individuals, groups and institutions are permanently subject to the unpredictable and despotic intervention of the sultan, and thus all pluralism is precarious."1

This description is of something more extreme and much less democratic than anything we are experiencing in the US, but the kernels of important similarities should not be overlooked. For example, Donald Trump is nothing if not unpredictable and is, with regards to his human interactions, even since assuming the presidency, despotic. Power in the Trump administration does not flow from holding formal offices, but from proximity to Trump himself. This is most visibly egregious with regards to Jared Kushner who has at times during this presidency been charged with solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stopping the opioid epidemic, and more or less everything in between. Kushner holds no formal position other than advisor and is really only there because he is the President's son-in-law. He also has probably been more involved with making major foreign policy decisions than Secretary of State Mike Pompeo or Secretary of Defense James Mattis. Stephen Miller is another Trump devotee who has outsized power in the administration due to relationship with the President. Additionally, it is apparent that Trump is building a presidency based around family, or in the language of Central Asia, clan. The Trump-Kushner clan is extremely powerful in the administration with three of Trump's children, and one son-in-law having input on decision making while further enriching themselves.

Another important aspect of sultanism is that the goals of these regimes are not to govern well or implement an ideologically driven vision, but to stay in power and enrich the sultan and his family. That is a very good description of the Trump administration. The political decisions of the White House have not been driven by attempts to pass legislation, build a national consensus, or even to build a supportive majority. Rather, it has been to keep Trump's base enraged and enthusiastic so that they can serve a praetorian guard against any political threat. This praetorian guard has already been mobilized by Trump to attack his political foes, shout down attempts to draw attention to the Russia-related election scandals and to treat any negative information about the President as fake news. Any well-known person with a Jewish surname, and even some of us who are Jewish and do not have identifiable Jewish last names, who has Tweeted something critical of the President has seen the power, rancor and bigotry of the President's most ardent supporters. This is the action of a regime concerned about holding onto power, perhaps at any cost, not one that

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1 Linz, Juan and Stepan Alfred (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
is pursuing political success in a democratic system.

The financial corruption that has surrounded the Trump administration since before the inauguration has frequently been overshadowed by political controversies or simply the latest Tweet from the President, but it should not be ignored. The Trump-Kushner clan has consistently sought to further enrich themselves and use the presidency for their own gain. Examples of this include foreign licensing deals involving the Trump children and the complex network of ties that the Trump organization continues to maintain with foreign governments and business interests.

Timothy Egan described this in the New York Times.

“The presidential sleaze involves everything from using public money to promote and enrich Trump properties to pay-to-play schemes that allow companies to buy influence at many levels. At its core is a nepotistic operation that puts family interests ahead of country...(O)ne thing Trump has accomplished in his first 100 days is ensuring that his family can use the vast reach of the federal government for private gain. By God, they see their opportunities and they took 'em.”

Because regimes in Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Russia are so focused in staying in power, limits are often put on democratic rights and freedoms. These regimes view democracy as at best something that needs to be tolerated in small doses, usually for external purposes, and more frequently something that can impede their ability to stay in power. Thus, we see these regimes harass political opponents, pass laws restricting freedom and assembly, change their constitution to skirt inconvenient election or other laws, create barriers for opposition parties and leaders and in more extreme cases arrest those leaders, and violently crackdown on other political opponents. In these countries politics is about the ebb and flow of democracy rather than policy making or substantive debates about issues.

Unfortunately, similar trends in the US are increasingly difficult to ignore. Efforts to suppress the votes of heavily Democratic constituencies, that are frequently ethnic minorities, through legal and informal means have increased in recent years. These efforts have accelerated due to President Trump’s frequent, and untrue, reference to the millions of illegal votes that he claims were cast for Hillary Clinton in 2016. Less well known are the efforts by several state GOP-controlled legislatures to limit rights of speech and assembly that are guaranteed to all Americans by the First Amendment through proposed laws regarding public demonstrations and the like. Similarly, some Republican controlled states, most notably North Carolina, have sought to pass laws limiting the powers of incoming or future Democratic state governments, thus undermining the will of the people.

“Today’s GOP legislators (in North Carolina) have unapologetically pushed their authority to the max. They’ve moved to change rules governing local elections, control of election boards and the order in which candidates appear on ballots, all in ways designed to disadvantage Democrats.

“North Carolina may be ground zero in terms of legislative assaults on other branches and institutional norms, but it’s not unique. All around the country, longstanding norms of political fair play are being tossed aside. Lawmakers are moving openly to undermine critics or opponents who threaten their power. They’ve filed dozens of bills to weaken state courts and to shield themselves from other forms of accountability, undermining ethics agencies and cordon off access to public records. Legislatures and state agencies keep putting up roadblocks against reporters, up to and including expulsion from legislative chambers.”

These issues have now become part of our political dialog and debate, meaning that democracy itself is now a major issue in our democracy. This is a key characteristic of political contestation in sultanistic and other semi-authoritarian regimes.

SOME QUESTIONS

Restoring democracy in America, in other words returning to an environment where citizens can fight bitterly, but lawfully and freely, over issues like marriage equality, marginal tax rates, foreign policy, how to address (or ignore) climate change, and the like will not be easy or fast. It is conceivable that some combination of deus ex machina in the form of impeachment hearings or the 25th Amendment will prematurely end the Trump presidency. Some believe the next election cycle or two will restore democratic normalcy in the US, but neither of these outcomes are anything close to assured. It is more likely that the we are in for a longer process here. With that in mind, there a few questions that should inform our thinking.

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about this as we move to, and beyond, the next few election cycles.

Sultanistic leaders in the former Soviet states have shared an extreme reluctance to give up power. Some, like Vladimir Putin, have manipulated term limit laws and elections to ensure their grip on power. Others like Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan have built multi-generational dynasties to ensure power stays in the family. In Central Asia, leaders have generally relied on more oppressive measures to ensure they are not forced to leave office. In Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych spent his first years in office seeking to limit civil society and press freedoms to make it easier for him to either get reelected or otherwise not have to give up power. These leaders know that if they leave office, the likely outcome is not a quiet retirement, but criminal prosecution and the possibility of having to flee the country. Moreover, these possibilities extend to their families given the nature of clan based rule in most of these countries.

It is very likely that these same thoughts have occurred to the current American president. It is apparent that if Donald Trump were to be defeated in 2020, he and his family would not simply retire to the life of wealth and comfort they know so well. It is likely that Donald Trump, his three oldest children, and his son-in-law would face ongoing legal hassles that would lead to business and financial difficulties as well. Faced with this prospect, it is very possible Trump will do whatever he can to stay in office, even if he is defeated at the polls. It is not fair to accuse somebody of stealing an election that is still more than two years away—and sultanistic leaders almost never simply steal elections. Nonetheless, it is also naive and betrays a poor understanding of the current political context to dismiss the idea altogether, particularly given some of the signs the administration, and the President himself, have already sent.

Tweets like this one, “In addition to winning the Electoral College in a landslide, I won the popular vote if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally,” in late November of 2016, and these ones two months later “I will be asking for a major investigation into VOTER FRAUD, including those registered to vote in two states, those who are illegal and…. “ even, those registered to vote who are dead (and many for a long time). Depending on results, we will strengthen up voting procedures!” are easy to attribute simply to the President’s erratic Twitter behavior and his need to bolster his political support after a very close election victory. However, when they are followed up by the creation of a commission, albeit an ultimately unsuccessful one, to look into voter fraud that is led by Kris Kobach, the Secretary of State of Kansas, who has spent his career trying to make it harder for ethnic minorities and new citizens to vote, a more sinister pattern emerges.

Experience from Moscow, Kyiv, Baku, or Bishkek suggests that Trump is laying the groundwork for telling a story after a 2020 defeat that his defeat was due to widespread election fraud. Again, this kind of prognosticating has no place in the conventional study of American politics, but to ignore these emerging patterns would be a triumph of optimism and blind faith in the American system, over a recognition of what has occurred to our political system in recent years. Maybe Trump will get reelected handily and this point will be moot, but it is very easy to imagine his Tweets as the returns start coming in on November 3rd, 2020. It is also easy to imagine how a base of Trump supporters would be mobilized to defend what they believe was Trump’s victory. It is extremely difficult to know what would happen next.

If we understand the Trump presidency in a broader comparative context, rather than an American historical one, we can begin to think about some other questions about what might come next. One of the most disturbing aspects of the involvement of Russia in our election is the strong likelihood that not only did some people around Trump know about this during the election, but that the Republican congressional leadership was also aware of this and decided that winning the presidency was more important. This makes them, in political terms, co-conspirators and raises further questions about what else they knew and what else they covered up. This is potentially disastrous for the legacy of the Republican Party, but also demands some kind of judicial process. If the U.S. transitions back to democracy, there will be demands that those that made its drift away from democracy easier should be held accountable. This falls short of the widespread human rights violations that usually accompany calls for transitional justice, but there will need to be some kind of extraordinary judicial process before the post-Trump U.S. is able to move forward.

Discussions of the intensity of partisan division in the U.S. have been so strong that there is now a
backlash as we are frequently told that the country was more divided in the late 1960s and early 1970s and during the years preceding the Civil War. The former period was more violent, but in many respects less divided. The years preceding the Civil War were a period of greater division in the US, but that should not be very comforting to most Americans. It is difficult to imagine unity, of one kind or another, not returning to the US, but the fact of the collapse of the Soviet Union should be a reminder that there is no guarantee of this. As ideological divides in the US are increasingly reinforced both by partisanship and identity, this division may very well get stronger. There is no clear cut way to hold the country together, but every election that reinforces these cleavages, every fight between ordinary citizens on Twitter, every clash between white supremacist demonstrators and their opponents makes it more difficult to reach that goal.

WHAT COMES NEXT

The US is not Russia, Azerbaijan or any other sultanistic regime, but the trends are disturbing and the similarities are beginning to emerge. This essay has sought to bring some clarity to the question of what continued democratic rollback could look like in the US. and is based on the presumption that what is occurring in Washington now is not normal and that concerns about the future of democracy are more than just partisan kvetching. Given this, the question of what will come next and whether or not the US will grow to look increasingly like a post-Soviet sultanistic regime are important.

There are, broadly speaking, three possible outcomes for the US. The first is that this essay is an overreaction and that the U.S. will quickly return to the democracy of the pre-2016 period. This outcome relies upon an electoral solution either in the form of a Democratic take over of congress that leads to impeachment, or the election, and seating, of a Democratic president in 2020. However, this is a partisan solution to a structural regime problem, something that we rarely see in non-democratic regimes. Moreover, the election of a Democratic president would cheer up progressives, but it would be very difficult for that new president to address problems of democracy following an election that was extremely partisan and bitterly fought.

One of the seeming paradoxes of many post-Soviet states is that the non-democratic government enjoy a measure of popularity. The most frequently cited example of this is Russia where Putin’s popularity is bolstered by the relative absence of critical media. An analogous situation could emerge in the US. In this second outcome, the US would consolidate as a sultanistic or other kind of non-democratic regime with enough freedom, particularly for those groups that would enjoy full citizenship and not be targets of the regime-those who are white, straight, and Christian, that many of those people would both be happy with the government and continue to believe it was a democracy. This seems like the most likely outcome as it is the path of least political resistance. In this scenario, opponents of the regime and other rights based activists would continue to try to draw attention to the problems of democratic rollback, but a larger group of citizens would be enjoying enough stability, prosperity and political freedom that these concerns would get very limited traction.

The third outcome is the most intriguing—that efforts to push back against democratic rollback will succeed, not through the existing means but through mass movement, a united front for democracy and resistance. This might occur through widespread civil disobedience, a mobilization to ensure the real winner is seated in 2020, or similar means. If this occurs, the U.S. will not go back to where it was in 2001-16 because the flaws in our system will have been exposed. The undemocratic nature of the electoral college and the Senate, regardless of the problems they were created to address over 200 years ago, will be exposed. The limits of our system of checks and balances will similarly be laid bare. A post-Trump democratic moment would reinvigorate American democracy forcing it to address both the undemocratic nature of the Constitution itself, the particular challenges to maintaining democracy in the current technological and economic environment.

This third outcome is intriguing, but it will be very difficult to achieve. In the former Soviet Union, there have been moments of real democratic breakthrough, notably in Georgia in 2003-4 and again 2012, Ukraine in 2004 and again in 2014 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005. None of these have led to strong consolidated democracies, but they all have shown that non-democratic regimes do not last forever. It is comforting to know this, but concerning to now discuss the U.S. in that context.

\( \text{\textsuperscript{7}} \) See, for example, Frye, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle L. Marquardt and Ora John Reuter “Is Putin’s Popularity Real?” Post Soviet Affairs, March 7, 2016
UNFOUNDED OPTIMISM
MIGRANT WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN BEIJING

JANICE JIA, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (2017)

ABSTRACT
Given China's growing inequality, this paper explores how migrant workers, individuals who move from the countryside to the city in search of economic opportunities, perceive their chances for social mobility. Historical inequality between the city and countryside and disadvantages in the distribution of public goods and social services make migrant workers a marginalized population in China. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork among migrant workers staffing a restaurant in Beijing, this article argues that migrants were optimistic about their futures despite their low levels of education. They saw alternative paths to social mobility, including the possibility of getting a better job or opening their own small business outside of Beijing with the knowledge and skills they gained at the restaurant.

INTRODUCTION

A few weeks into working at a Japanese teppanyaki restaurant on the outskirts of Beijing, Hair, a nineteen-year-old migrant waiter, posted a picture on his QQ blog of a Mercedes-Benz logo on a building visible through the restaurant's floor-to-ceiling windows. The caption read, “From now on, we have different ideas about the future, yours is Mercedes-Benz and mine is looking at this building (three emojis of a crying smiley face).” He was suggesting that he would never be able to work in one of those office buildings or live the lifestyle of a white-collar worker, which could have given him a chance at owning a Mercedes-Benz.

Hair stopped going to school after the first year of high school. His mother wanted him to go to vocational school and learn computer programming, but he wanted to do something bigger and better with his life. He was just not yet sure what that would be. He boldly joked that he wanted to become a CEO, walk toward life’s peak (走上人生巅峰), and marry an ideal girl (白富美). I got a different response from him, however, when, in another conversation, I asked him what he wanted to do with money. He thought for a while and simply replied that he wanted money so that he would not be “hot in the summer or cold in the winter” (夏天不热着，冬天冷不着). He optimistically believed in the possibility of becoming a CEO, but more realistically hoped to somehow improve his life.

Hair understood that his lack of a high school and advanced education set him apart from the white-collar workers in the office buildings surrounding the restaurant, but this did not stop him from seeing his future with hope. In our conversations, he brainstormed how he could make money, marry the beautiful girl, and climb the socioeconomic ladder. Hair considered going to vocational school but only as one possible option. He wanted to do something big with his life and he did not see education playing a central role. Although he knew that his chances of becoming a CEO were slim, he believed that becoming his own boss in his own small business was not out of the question. Hair simply did not think about “social mobility” as many researchers do—in terms of predictable ascriptive factors.

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From a poor country struggling with poverty, famine, and basic socioeconomic stability, China has dramatically transformed to become a major economic powerhouse. Following the founding of the People’s Republic of China by Mao Zedong’s
Chinese Communist Party in 1949, China instituted a socialist command economy. Then in 1978, after Mao’s death (1976) and the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms that opened China to the global market economy. In a Politburo meeting in 1979, Chen Yun, a political leader helping China to formulate the economic reforms, aptly summarized, “We have 900,000,000 people, over 80 percent of whom are farmers. We are very poor. There are still people begging for food. We all want to modernize, but the question is what can we achieve?” Deng’s economic reforms dramatically transformed China from a country that was unable to meet basic material needs to the second-largest economy in the world with a GDP of eleven trillion, an average growth rate of 10 percent a year, and 700,000,000 people lifted out of poverty.

However, China’s recent prosperity has led to one of the highest rates of inequality in the world. Deng’s “reform and opening” policy catalyzed inequalities since it allowed the few to get rich first, with the hope that the rich would be able to help those behind them. According to one report in a study by Peking University, the top 1 percent of households have one-third of China’s wealth while the bottom 25 percent have only 1 percent. This inequality has been instrumental in enabling China to develop at the pace with which it has. Under these unequal conditions, migrant workers, who have fueled the economic boom by providing cheap labor, have not proportionately benefited from China’s newfound wealth. A recent article in The New York Times highlights the lack of social mobility in China, calling migrant workers the “new lower class” stuck at the bottom at a time of high inequality and low social mobility.

This thesis explores how migrant workers like Hair understand their social mobility in light of the dramatic inequality in China today. The current literature on migrant workers seems to indicate that they do not have a path to social mobility. However, as seen through Hair’s perception of his own future, migrants can be optimistic about their own ability to improve their situation. In this thesis, I will explain how migrants retain optimism towards social mobility despite China’s growing inequality by reframing the conversation about migrant workers’ social mobility to include their perceptions of their situation.

Migrant Workers in China and Their Importance

Migrant workers in China are typically low-income laborers from the countryside who move to cities in search of economic opportunities. A majority have only a middle school education though some have gone to vocational school. For individuals who live in regions with few opportunities, migration is a way to increase family income and improve standards of living. Many migrants leave children and elderly parents at home in order to work long hours under physically demanding conditions in the city. Their destinations are often the major cities alongside the eastern seaboard. Besides Beijing, the Pearl River Delta in the area around Guangdong and the Yangtze River Delta, which includes Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, are other popular destinations. The jobs that migrants take are low-skill, temporary, and informal, often in service and manufacturing industries or petty commerce. They are the waitstaff in restaurants, factory workers at the assembly line, street cleaners on the side of the road, and vendors at the neighborhood vegetable market—an inescapable presence in the city.

Migrants are also legally distinct from local urbanites. Starting in 1958, the hukou system (户口), or household registration system, listed individuals’ legal place of residence and categorized them as “agricultural” or “nonagricultural,” or, in other words, rural or urban. This barred the entire population from freely moving since hukou determined access to social services like jobs, welfare, housing, education, and healthcare. Hukou’s categorization created a designation, or a status, that stayed with an individual for life unless the state gives them permission to alter it. Furthermore, no matter where an individual was born, they retained their mother’s hukou status, making it an ascribed characteristic. Hukou allowed for stricter control of the population and lessened the burdens of the socialist government’s management of the population since each individual had clear affiliations to a specific location and type of occupation. Today, due to the economic reforms there are now few sanctions on migration, but hukou remains. Thus, migrants have fewer social-service benefits than permanent legal residents do, even though the migrants also reside in the city.

The use of pinyin, or the Romanization of Chinese characters, follows conventions set by other scholars. The terms spelled out with pinyin are frequently discussed in scholarly work. Otherwise, pinyin is used to clarify connotations of certain terms.

Similar systems of community-based civil control had been used in China in the past so the hukou system was not completely new.
With China’s rapid economic development, migrant workers now make up a sizeable portion of the population. According to a 2015 report on migrant workers by the National Bureau of Statistics, there are 227,470,000 migrant workers in China, about 20 percent of the entire Chinese population. The same report states that in 2015, there were 3,520,000 more migrant workers than the previous year, but the growth rate has recently slowed. In Beijing, a city with over 20,000,000 residents, one person out of three is a migrant worker.

While the Chinese state needs migrant workers to further its economic development, migrants are not directly under the state’s purview. Migrants are often collectively referred to as the floating population (流动人口), a rather amorphous term, because, as James Scott (2010) would argue, migrants are “illegible” based on government categorizations. Since the state cannot clearly mark migrant workers with its two-category hukou system, their status can make it difficult to craft policy directed at them.

Consequently, this study focuses on migrant workers’ perspectives, particularly towards social mobility, in order to better understand the effects of the economic reforms and the direction of socioeconomic progress within China. As its rate of economic growth has recently been declining, China is also looking at migrants to help transform the nation from an export-based economy to a consumer-based economy by increasing domestic demand for goods and services. Improving the social mobility of migrants and increasing their standard of living would, in turn, grow China’s economy. Migrants’ perception of social mobility is also important as less-developed cities institute policies to entice migrant workers to spur their economies. Meanwhile, first-tier cities like Beijing cap their own populations, hoping to house fewer migrant workers and design more advanced and robust economies with high-skill talent.

**Literature Review**

The literature on migrant workers in China highlights their lack of social mobility and paints a picture of a society with rigid social stratification. Statistical research within sociology reifies growing inequality and lack of social mobility based on the urban-rural dichotomy. Sociologists support the fact that hukou has a substantial impact on social mobility—urban hukou indicates higher chances of social mobility than rural hukou. Their research provides a better understanding of how factors like family class origin (i.e. peasant, landowner) before the 1949 Communist revolution, social networks, education, and Chinese Communist Party membership combines with hukou to affect social mobility. The statistical data, however, which focus on categories created by the state and are intended to help reform policy, confine researchers to institutionally created knowledge of people, which leaves out an understanding of migrants’ sense of agency and the possibility for alternative paths.

Ethnographic literature on migrant workers, also centered on the importance of hukou, does not take changing attitudes toward obtaining urban hukou into consideration. While researchers provide intimate portrayals of the institutional and market forces that shape migrant identities and experiences, discussions fail to acknowledge paths to social mobility beyond integration. In addition to hukou, much of this ethnographic literature on migrants underscores ideas of modernity and urbanity that shape female migrant identities (though a majority of migrant workers are male), rather than demonstrating how migrants think about social mobility or what they do to improve their own situations.

Moreover, the fieldwork for this body of literature dates back to the 1990s, so it does not look into the lives of the current cohort of migrant workers. Nearly four decades have passed since the economic reforms began and the first wave of migrant workers left the countryside. The migrants in this thesis are a part of what I call the second wave of migrant workers, usually discussed as “new generation migrants” or “second generation migrants” in Chinese migrant literature. Unlike the previous wave, they often have no farming experience. Many are also children of migrant workers, so they have already spent time in both the city and the countryside. They also have higher levels of education and are less bound by economic responsibilities to their families, and are therefore more interested in self-development. Due to China’s rapid pace of development, these writers

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v Looking beyond the urban-rural dichotomy does not discount the deep divide in China, but pushes beyond this framework to follow thinking of urban theorists like Neil Brenner. He sees current ways of understanding urbanization, strictly rural and urban, as obscuring complexities of the urbanization process, such as how to understand this migrant population beyond their state-given identity as rural peasants in the city.

vi According to the state website, 66.4% of migrant workers are male.

vii I refer to them as the second wave in order to distinguish the new cohort of migrant workers from the generational differences that exist within the migrant population.
often describe an older stage of **hukou**, when **hukou** restrictions were more strictly enforced and certain key benefits of **hukou** for urbanites were still in full practice (i.e. steady job in a *danwei*, or work unit, and subsidies for housing during its privatization).

**Hukou** is especially a poor measure of social mobility for migrant workers in a city like Beijing now. Although migrants will most likely never obtain a Beijing **hukou**, it is not impossible for them to attain social mobility. For a city like Beijing, where the prerequisites for obtaining the city’s **hukou** now make it virtually impossible for migrants to obtain, my interviewees simply did not worry about **hukou**.17 Writers like Dorothy Solinger (1999) and Wu Jieh-Min (2010) equate **hukou** and the urban-rural distinction to class order, but that does not take the diversity of backgrounds, occupations, and incomes of migrant workers or their optimism toward social mobility into account.18 They also do not explore the potential for other factors to override the importance of **hukou**, such as the availability of opportunities. In other words, **hukou** might be a good predictor of advancement opportunities but does not explain what migrants allotted with poor advancement opportunities think and do.

There is an inconsistency between actual determinants of social mobility, as dictated by statistical models, and perceived social mobility. Current scholarship does not provide a concrete narrative nor explains why, despite ascribed inequalities and a decline in vertical social mobility, average citizens are less concerned by income inequality and remain optimistic about their life chances.19 The predominant narrative of decreasing social mobility and systemic disadvantages within statistical studies does not account for possible alternative narratives, which include the migrants’ personal aspirations. With data from nationwide surveys, Whyte (2010) suggests Chinese citizens are more accepting of, rather than angry at, current inequality patterns because the social order under socialism was inequitable—that is, hard work was not rewarded since all people were supposed to be equal. Additionally, he notes that the era of economic reform has brought new opportunities to get ahead and has increased living standards.20 According to Whyte (2011), the “perception that the most important factors distinguishing the rich from the poor in China today are talent, training, and hard work, rather than dishonesty, unfairness in the distribution of opportunities, or other non-merit factors” rather than injustice.21 Similarly, Yu Xie (2010) found that as long as the collective good is promoted and “privileges enjoyed by the upper class bring about desirable outcomes for their subjects and others in society,” inequality is accepted.22 These studies suggest that growing inequality in China is not leading to growing dissatisfaction, which confounds conventional understandings of social mobility.

In this thesis, I confirm the veracity of Whyte’s argument amongst the migrant workers I spoke with and build upon his work with an ethnographic lens to elaborate upon his findings with concrete ways of explaining migrants’ optimism. I argue that despite the inequality and marginalization that migrants faced, alternative paths from well-recognized routes to success provided them with hope of social mobility. Underlying these alternative paths are the migrants’ physical mobility and the abundance of economic opportunities in China today. Though alternative paths might not guarantee social mobility, migrants do not feel stuck. The abundance of economic opportunities excuses and normalizes inequality and marginalization. Nevertheless, migrants at the restaurant like Hair felt optimistic because they quickly adapted their plans and saw the potential for social mobility within continuous migration, rather than settling in Beijing.

**Methodology**

In July and August of 2016, I conducted four weeks of participant observation while working ten hours, seven days a week, alongside migrant workers at a Japanese teppanyaki restaurant on the outskirts of Beijing. I was constantly surrounded by migrant workers except for the two and a half days I had off. The restaurant was about an hour subway ride and a half-hour drive from the center of Beijing at Tiananmen Square. It was situated on the fifth floor of a block-long complex containing dozens of eateries in a district filled with shopping areas, office buildings, and residential neighborhoods. This area was quite well-known as a commercial hub in Beijing.

The high-end restaurant had thirty-seven employees with about thirty people working on any given day. It had one head manager, two lower managers in charge of the waitstaff, and three managers in charge of the cooking staff. The rest of the employees were teppanyaki grill chefs, waitstaff, and cooks in the
kitchen. Everyone who worked at the restaurant was a migrant worker from the countryside, including the managers. The restaurant had a high turnover rate and provided employees with opportunities to learn transferable skills, potential room for growth, and constant contact with customers of different backgrounds. Staff worked six days a week and had about a week’s worth of vacation days in a year. New staff did not get a day off for the first two weeks.

The restaurant had a diverse group of migrant workers from Hebei, Anhui, Sichuan, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, Yunnan, and Gansu. Nationally, the average migrant is around thirty-nine, but the restaurant had migrants as young as sixteen and as old as sixty-three.\textsuperscript{viii} The youngest migrants had started working at the restaurant after quitting school and did not have plans for the future. Migrants in their early 20s often had families or were planning for a family. They were all male and either worked as teppanyaki grill chefs or were learning to become one. Chefs had the second-highest salaries after the managers. The migrants in their late 20s and 30s, with the exception of one male chef, one female cook, and one waitress, held managerial positions and had families. The older migrants, who had teenage or adult children, worked at the restaurant to support their families and for retirement. They were tasked with cleaning the bathroom, cleaning and drying the dishes, peeling the vegetables, and frying dishes.

Due to the intimate access I had to the migrant workers every day, the variety in the types of migrant workers, and the intensive work environment within the service industry, the restaurant offered me an opportunity to study social mobility from the perspective of migrant workers. My second cousin, whom I refer to as Second Cousin throughout the thesis, was the manager of the restaurant; she allowed me to work there for four weeks.\textsuperscript{ix} As a waitress, I was with the migrants every day. I lived with Second Cousin, so after getting off of work, I would continue asking her questions about her life and the restaurant. No other potential field site would have allowed me to start interacting with migrants with such depth and intimacy in such a short period of time. Migrant workers are not only busy but also quite guarded due to their vulnerability in the city, so finding migrants able and willing to talk would have been difficult. Furthermore, scholars working on the topic of migrant workers focus on women and single generations—young domestic workers (Yan 2008), factory workers (Pun 2011), sex workers (Zheng 2009), etc.—while this restaurant had a diverse group of migrant workers of both sexes and of different generations.\textsuperscript{x} Migrants working in restaurants are more ubiquitous and noticeable within Beijing than migrants in any other industry, and yet scholarly work has not focused on restaurants as a migrant space.

At the time of my research, the restaurant was struggling to make a profit and its lack of business affected the intensity with which the management controlled the staff. When Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign began in 2012, business at the restaurants deteriorated because eating at high-end restaurants could be used as evidence for abuse of power investigations. The lack of business meant that the management was eager to cut costs, heighten efficiency, increase online and word-of-mouth advertising, and take more time to inspect its workers.\textsuperscript{x} The corruption campaign also meant there were fewer customers than in past years. So, even though my coworkers and I were busy with tasks throughout our shifts, I was often able to find time to talk with them and ask questions or listen to what they were talking about with each other.

My analysis of migrants’ lives is filtered through my experience working as they did. In no other way besides experiencing the banality and exhaustion they experienced could I have understood simple events such as why young migrants were willing to spend money every day on snacks, bubble tea, and meals when the restaurant provided all meals. I became familiar with the minutiae of their world, which I could not have gained except through inhabiting that world.

My roles changed from day to day, so I was able to work at all the service areas and even in the back kitchen. Thus, I met and interacted with all of the staff at some point. I reported to work every day by 10:00 a.m. and left around 10:30 p.m., with just two-and-a-half days of break within my time there. I wore the restaurant uniform and looked indistinguishable from the rest of the staff except for my glasses, which I was told made me look like a college student. I had the

\textsuperscript{viii} China Yearly Statistics

\textsuperscript{ix} This was not unique since most of the staff members got a job through a family connection. See Zhang (2001, 55 and 104) for more information. My second cousin also had two other relatives, unrelated to me, working at the restaurant.

\textsuperscript{x} The slim profit margin on the months when there was a profit at all meant that the migrants had to accept more of the burden of increasing profit. The restaurant began implementing many new policies like a new point system to monitor its workers as well as other forms of surveillance.
same tasks and the same hours as any other starting employee would have had.

My main responsibilities were to take prepared food to customers' tables and unprepared food to chefs' grills. After the first week, I helped other waitstaff at their designated stations on the service floor as they took orders and cleared dishes away. A new hire began a week after I had started working, and I found that we were given the same work assignments.

Between mopping the floors, carrying food to the different grill stations, and serving customers, I observed interactions, asked questions, and participated in everyday life at the restaurant. Every day, I carried a notebook and pen in my apron to jot down the day's events and conversations. This made me obviously different from the migrant workers. They knew that I was from the United States and was going to school at Harvard, so, in the beginning, they would ask why I was working at the restaurant. The people whom I had already met would also often explain for me. For example, Big Boss Man, a manager at the restaurant, told others I was there to write a paper and “to experience life” (体验生活).

Many of the migrants were interested in the United States, which helped me get to know them better. As someone born in China and raised speaking Chinese, I quickly adapted to the environment. I knew culturally what was appropriate to say and ask and what was not. I also easily picked up on their sense of humor, which got us all through the long days. And as a Harvard student from the United States, I was viewed as someone with opportunities and privileges that made me interesting to talk to. They wanted to know what people ate in the United States, how Chinese people were treated, whether I liked China or the United States better, and how they could go to the United States themselves. Many also wanted to know how certain words were said in English and asked for advice on how they could learn English. When I needed help with learning the names of the dishes on the menu, they were patient. They found the limits of my Chinese interesting and were fascinated by my English. These differences were conversation starters between the migrants and me.

I also felt, however, that the differences between us limited what they were willing to share with me. I could tell that speaking with me was the first time they were interacting with someone from the United States and someone with a college education. For example, during my first few days, I would catch Lady staring at me in disbelief. She would make comments like, “You have seen so much more of the world than I, and you’re so young.” In order to bridge the distance between myself and the migrants, I talked about my family's experience as migrants from Shandong to Beijing and as immigrants in the United States to show that our experiences were related. My constant presence also made them more open and casual with me over time.

The fieldwork was also limited by the short timeframe and the scope of research. Four weeks of ethnographic research gave me an intimate understanding of how the restaurant functioned and how migrant workers live, but I was in no way privy to all of the details in the migrants' lives. Certain topics were also not discussed since migrants felt uncomfortable sharing in the work environment. My findings were also limited to what I saw and heard at the restaurant. A more comprehensive study might follow migrants as they travel home to the countryside and provide a longitudinal study of their migration. I was also unable to corroborate certain details migrants shared with me about their past. However, despite all of these limitations, I had intimate access to migrants' daily lives at the restaurant, and was therefore able to glean information on the obstacles they faced in Beijing and their perception of their situations.

Overview of the Argument

Though migrants at the restaurant faced limitations to social mobility, particularly in not being able to assimilate to Beijing and in having lower levels of education, migrants were nevertheless optimistic about their social mobility because they saw alternative paths. The root of their marginalization lies within the historical inequality between the city and countryside that the 1978 economic reforms magnified. Growing up in the countryside, the migrants faced disadvantages in distribution of public goods and social services as dictated by their hukou. Attracted to opportunities unavailable back home, they went to Beijing, where their lack of city hukou and lower levels of education, limited their social mobility. However, migrants remained optimistic about their social mobility despite obvious signs of stratification because they hoped to find a better job or open their own small business outside of Beijing with the knowledge and skills they gained at the restaurant.
CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL INEQUALITY AND MARGINALIZATION AND THEIR CONTINUATION

A History of Urban-Rural Inequality Shaped by the State

Though cities have had a unique role as administrative and trading centers throughout Chinese history, the distinction between the city and the countryside as understood today dates to the influx of foreign influence in China's port cities in the nineteenth century. In response to the military defeats and the influx of new ideas from Western countries, intellectuals blamed China's weaknesses on “backward” peasants and the countryside. These sentiments strengthened over time, leading to the May Fourth Movement (1919), a sociopolitical movement sparked by student protest of the outcomes of the Treaty of Versailles after the First World War. The students called for a break from Chinese tradition, which they believed to be the root of China's “backwardness.” Around that time, terms like feudal (封建), superstition (迷信), and peasant (农民) were added to China's vocabulary, borrowed from Meiji-era Japan and linked to Western conceptions of the countryside. Humiliation, coupled with foreign influence, forced Chinese intellectuals to compare China's development with that of the West, which brought a stigma to the countryside.

In contrast, after the establishment of the People's Republic of China by the Communist Party of China in 1949, peasants gained moral status as vanguards of the communist revolution; they represented wholesome labor and equality. Propaganda from the Mao era espoused the hard work, honesty, purity, and frugality of the countryside. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Mao attacked bureaucrats, capitalists, intelligentsia, and degenerative urban life and wanted to bridge the gap he saw developing between the city and countryside. In the 1960s and 1970s, 17,000,000 urban youths were sent to the countryside to farm alongside peasants in the Rustication Program (上山下乡) during the Cultural Revolution, and China tried to develop industry in the “third front,” China's interior.

While promoting peasants and the countryside, state policies in the Mao era reinforced the urban-rural divide that began with the entrance of foreign influence. State distinctions between the city and countryside through hukou meant different management systems. These systems gave the state greater oversight over its people and practical ways to manage the population according to its centralized plans. Peasants in the countryside were managed by communes, collective and self-sustaining organizations, while urbanites were managed by danwei, work units. If an individual were to move from the countryside to the city without state permission, they would not have food rations or a job connected to a danwei, so survival in the city would be almost impossible.

The bifurcated systems established by hukou introduced unintentional developmental inequalities between cities and the countryside. Agricultural production in the country, set at artificially low prices, subsidized industrialization in the cities, following the Soviet model. While most peasants in the countryside lacked adequate social services and even basic food securities, urbanites were given the “iron rice bowl,” or relatively high, steady income with benefits and food rations. As Jeremy Brown argues in City Versus Countryside in Mao's China, in trying to make China a more equal and powerful nation, state policies aimed to curb urban growth and promote industrialization actually caused greater inequality. Similarly, Nara Dillon (2015) argues that as a welfare state, China actually drove inequality since benefits were limited to certain urban workers and subsidized by the rural workers between the 1940s and 1960s.

In 1978, soon after the end of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping ushered in major economic reforms that allowed cities to develop faster than the rest of the country, further increasing China's regional inequality. Regions competed “to generate growth, employment, and rising living standards, with very substantial career and material rewards awaiting those who excelled in this competition.” At a national level, the economic reforms concentrated resources to certain regions—particularly Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along the eastern seaboard. SEZs had market-friendly policies for attracting foreign direct investment. As a result, regions further inland were left behind.

As economic opportunities within the countryside dwindled, demand for cheap labor drew peasants into cities. After years of organizing agriculture through communes, the Household Responsibility program was introduced, privatizing farming by
contracting land to families based on household size.\textsuperscript{33} The resulting improvements to agricultural efficiency created surplus labor in the countryside, which was directed to cities as \textit{hukou}’s sanctions on mobility relaxed. The outcome of this migration was “asymmetrical growth and power,” which still “contributes to underdevelopment in emigration regions, perpetuates economic dependency, and strengthens structural heterogeneities via a positive feedback loop by destroying economic resources, undermining traditional ways of life, and weakening social ties.”\textsuperscript{34} Therefore, regional inequality exacerbated existing inequalities and spurred internal migration.

**Inequality in the City**

Growing benefits of having urban \textit{hukou} after the economic reforms transferred the inequality between the city and the countryside to the inequality between urbanites and migrants. In particular, the privatization of housing and availability of pensions, which were influenced by \textit{hukou} status, dramatically increased urbanites’ incomes.\textsuperscript{35} Urbanites came to own homes through heavily subsidized programs through their work unit, giving them more assets than residents in the countryside. \textit{Hukou} unequally distributed the state’s resources to favor urbanites, which left migrant workers at a disadvantage. As Wu (2010) explains, the “interlocking of \textit{hukou} with citizenship rights” created a system cultivating “differential citizenship.”\textsuperscript{36}

Moreover, migrants were not always welcomed in cities, and policies used \textit{hukou} as the basis to discourage their stay. Cities were cautious about the influx of migrants during the first decades of the economic reforms due to dramatically increased demands on urban infrastructure and resources. Migrants were seen as overburdening public services and creating fears of crime.\textsuperscript{37} Throughout the 1990s, the state supported the policy of “leaving the land but not the countryside” (离土不离乡).\textsuperscript{38} In other words, the state did not want to encourage migrant workers to take up permanent residence in cities. Administrative hurdles set migrants apart within cities—levying heavy taxes, threatening their removal, requiring extensive paperwork for temporary residency permits—which only contributed to their “sense of liminality and marginal status in urban society.”\textsuperscript{39} During the 1980s and 1990s, migrants also faced issues with the police because of their residency status, sometimes causing them to be forcibly sent back to the countryside. Restrictions now are not as extreme. Migrants still must apply for a temporary residency permit, but the rule is not always enforced, so not everyone does so.

Presently, migration and urbanization make the descriptive distinctions \textit{hukou} created—urban versus rural—moot, yet \textit{hukou} remains an important tool for controlling the population.\textsuperscript{31} A migrant worker’s \textit{de facto} place of residence is not the same as their \textit{de jure} place of residence. Migrant workers can live in cities for a greater proportion of their life than in the countryside, but their lives are still anchored to their native place. Their children can be born and live in cities all their lives and still have their legal place of residence in the countryside. However, \textit{hukou} continues to be used after the economic reforms “in order to regulate and monitor migrants in the rapidly changing post-Mao socioeconomic order.”\textsuperscript{40} This set of state-created categories thus disadvantages migrants’ socioeconomic potential since they do not receive the same benefits as urbanites.

In the city, migrants only have access to low-paying, low-skill jobs, which also caps their social mobility. These opportunities are better than the ones available at home but limit migrants’ potential. Migrants often take on dirty, dangerous, and demeaning jobs urbanites do not want to take, similar to trends seen in international migration.\textsuperscript{41} According to a report on migrant workers by the National Bureau of Statistics, migrants work primarily in manufacturing, construction, wholesale and small retail, shipping, hospitality, food, residential services (domestic workers, security guards, etc.), and repairs.\textsuperscript{42} Unlike formal workers, who are skilled and part of formal migration (\textit{正式迁移}), migrant workers take on “temporary or unstable, unskilled or low-skill jobs in the urban economy” and are part of informal migration.\textsuperscript{43}

Migrants continue to carry the cultural stigma of the countryside. Even though \textit{nongmin} (农民), or “peasant,” is no longer adequate for describing over

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Hukou} is a remnant of China’s socialist past that the state continues to use \textit{hukou} because it is a useful measure for controlling internal migration and as a system for providing basic social services. Large cities do not have the capital to provide the services it provides to their \textit{hukou} holders to everyone. Funds from the central government are allocated by \textit{hukou} and not by where a person actually resides. With the New Urbanization Plan, the state began to see urbanization as the main vehicle of economic development, and under the new reforms, \textit{hukou} helps to drive urbanization efforts. By using \textit{hukou} as a tool for urbanization and economic development, the distinctions between city and countryside are thriving. The state needs these distinctions to drive the growth of small and mid-tier cities and thus \textit{hukou} retains its original function of labor allocation.
half of China's population, the label lends itself to the Chinese term for “migrant worker”—nongmin gong (农民工), which translates literally to peasant labor. Besides the connotation of nongmin gong, terminologies for the type of work an urbanite or a migrant worker does are different. Migrant workers dagong (打工), which means “to work” and connotes manual labor and working for someone else. Shangban (上班) also means “to work,” but in the context of the formal jobs that urbanites have.

Urbanites look down upon migrants due to their attachment to the countryside and the type of work they do in the city. “[Q]uasi-ethnic divisions” have formed in the cities even though “most rural migrants are Han Chinese with the same racial origin and national citizenship as urban residents” because of native place, or hometown, affinities.44 Solinger (1999) argues that migrant workers are a crucial part of China’s growing urban economy, but they are treated as the underclass. They are “inferior citizens,” the “third kind of citizen,” and “peasants in the city” as journalists stated in the 1980s.45, xii

Migrants are also known to have low suzhi (素质), a complicated term that denotes human quality, civility, discipline, and socioeconomic differentiation, which fosters marginalizing stigma.46 “It can, and has been, used to refer to a host of attributes, including education, culture, morality, manners, psychology, physiology, and genetics.”47 Migrants in cities evoke an “image of a powerless, uneducated, and low quality group which is then juxtaposed with its antithesis, permanent urban residents, who are held up as sophisticated, modern, and reliable.”48 Their dress, speech, mannerisms, lifestyle, occupations, and social spheres differ from urbanites. It is not uncommon to hear urbanites or locals talk about migrant workers with disdain and disapproval.

Migrants in Beijing and the Government’s Response

Amongst other cities along the eastern coast, Beijing is one of the most popular destinations for migrant workers. Migrants decide to work in Beijing rather than in cities close to their hometowns or in nearby provincial capitals because of the higher wages, diversity, its symbolic importance as the nation's capital, and, most importantly, personal connections from back home. Beijing attracts migrant workers from all around the country, but particularly from Hebei, Henan, Anhui, Shandong, and Sichuan.49 Now, while smaller and less developed cities in China welcome influxes of people from the countryside, first-tier cities like Beijing look to cap population. Beijing hopes to limit its population to 23,000,000 by 2020 after decades of dramatic increases.50 To curb the population growth and to improve the city’s appearance, over the past two decades Beijing has been demolishing urban villages and single-story houses (平房), as well as limiting housing options for migrants. Migrants are often physically isolated as they live in company dorms, the basement of apartment complexes, and on the outskirts of the city. Currently, the city is working on limiting the population growth by moving “polluting industries” like factories and markets out of the city so workers in those industries will move with the factories and markets.51

While Beijing has been taking measures to limit its own growth, the country as a whole has been promoting equitable development, particularly through urbanization. With slowing economic growth and rising tensions over the effects of China’s rapid industrialization, particularly rising inequality, the Chinese government is reformulating its social and economic policies. Since the early 2000s, the central government has focused on implementing anti-poverty campaigns for more equitable growth.52 The current president, Xi Jinping, even wrote about the urban-rural gap in his 2001 PhD dissertation.53 The National New Urbanization Plan (2014-2020), released March 16, 2014, is a large part of the state’s new blueprint for the future. The plan emphasizes quality-focused, human-centered urban growth, and a transition to a domestic consumption-driven economy. It proposes improving urban efficiency, promoting sustainability, building infrastructure to connect city clusters, coordinating urban and rural development to decrease disparities, and, finally, reforming hukou, which is the main focus of the paper. By 2020, the state hopes to have 100,000,000 more people with urban hukou by encouraging small and mid-sized cities to be more inviting toward migrants and providing more pathways to urban citizenship. The plan aims to curb economic slowdown by creating new markets and potentially decreasing inequality between the city and the countryside.

Even before the introduction of the New Urbanization Plan, individuals could technically change their hukou. However, actually doing so was
difficult, if not impossible, especially in first-tier cities. With hukou reform efforts, which actually started in the 1990s, it became possible to change an individual’s hukou from rural to urban, but there were procedural complications and each locality had a different set of policies and requirements, with smaller, less developed cities having the simplest procedures. While some areas like Anhui and Gansu no longer classify hukou into rural and urban, Beijing still has strict guidelines for admitting new Beijing hukou holders. Impacts of reforms in large cities like Beijing are quite limited and often truly benefit only those with high levels of education, people with high-skill jobs.54

Furthermore, many migrants now do not want to give up their rural hukou. The countryside acts as a migrant worker’s safety net against the uncertainty of urban life. Many migrants choose to keep land “as a form of income insurance in the event of a policy shift” in cities.55 A China Daily article states, “Many rural workers who did not receive higher education and do not possess practical skills also constantly worry about stable employment and integrating in the cities as urban residents.”56 Migrant workers are marginalized from mainstream urban life and thus do not feel secure enough to give up rural hukou and entitlements to land in the countryside that can protect them from potential negative changes to their lives in the city.

Scholars studying the social mobility of Chinese migrant workers fail to consider routes for migrant workers besides assimilating to their destination city by attaining urban hukou status. Furthermore, scholars studying migrants’ perceptions of living in the city often only focus on the migrants’ desires to assimilate to the city through consumption habits without considering that migrants’ end goals might not be to continue living in their destination city. In her research on workers at a luxury hotel, Otis (2012) highlights migrants’ “aspirational urbanism,” and Zhang (2001) similarly argues that consumption is an assertion of achieved rights and of Wenzhou migrants’ “urban membership.”57

The assumption that migrants want to assimilate is inaccurate for describing the second wave of migrant workers. Current migrants have technology at their fingertips, as well as hordes of relatives and acquaintances who have worked or are working as migrants so they have a different understanding of and relationship to cities. They realize that assimilation is no longer possible in cities like Beijing where the divide between migrants and urbanites with hukou benefits continues to grow. As discussed in the introduction, this has been especially true since the privatization of housing. In a study on migrants in Fujian, Zhu and Lin (2013) find that only about a quarter of second generation migrant workers plan on settling in the destination city and six percent identify themselves as urbanites.58

Instead of conceptualizing social mobility in terms of assimilation, social mobility can be understood within the framework of continuous migration. In her study based on surveys given to migrants in Beijing’s urban villages, Cindy Fan breaks from the mold of scholars only discussing assimilation and argues that settling down in the city is not inevitable and that migrants often circulate between the city and the village, but she does not hint at any other patterns of migration.59 Rather than assimilating, migrants ultimately follow opportunities. As Tian and Xu (2015) argue, migrants “are motivated by a desire for better income, working conditions, and job skills, the high degree of job mobility reflects their resort to the ‘trial and error’ approach in the hope of finding jobs.”60 In other words, migrants are flexible and willing to change jobs and locations in search of better opportunities.

Migration is not a one-legged journey, and migrant workers found optimism in social mobility based on the continuation of the journey. In her research on Filipina brides in Japan, Leiba Faier (2009) argues that the destination of migration is part of a process of “continuing on—a segment along the routes some people travel as they endeavor to realize their dreams.”61

CHAPTER TWO: LEAVING BEIJING AS AN ALTERNATIVE PATH

Control in the Restaurant Environment

The restaurant was a space that separated migrants from the rest of the urban population spatially and temporally, its rhythm out of sync with the rest of the city. Oftentimes, since they spent all of their time there, the migrants’ only tie to Beijing was the restaurant. The restaurant had its own culture, which valued collective labor over individuality. For morning roll call, everyone, except for the managers, went through military drills, a routine which is not uncommon in
the service industry. One of the managers in charge of the chefs stood in the front of the group and wished everyone a good morning, to which everyone replied, “Good, very good!” This was followed by commands: “Attention, at ease, attention, at ease, right dress, forward dress, march in place.” Then the whole staff recited the restaurant’s slogan or its twelve key phrases, which seemed like an attempt to inscribe the ideals of service into the minds of migrants. The slogan started with the words, “New day, new beginning, I will use my whole body and heart to welcome today, because that is the biggest secret to success” (新一天，新的开始，我要用全身心的爱来迎接今天，因为这是一切成功最大的秘密). The first four key phrases were “Execute without conditions, work without excuses, look to the boss as example, be good at teamwork” (无条件执行，工作无借口，以上司位榜样，善于合作). These statements were evidently meant to train the worker to embrace working at the restaurant. They stress the need not only for a worker’s labor, but also for the worker’s attitude to align with the restaurant’s mission for profit. As Yan (2013) states, “The subsumption of labor to capital, as Marx wrote, does not end in objectification (her labor power and labor time purchased thus owned by another), but it also requires a reanimation. The trainee must find joy in her work.”

The strict control of the staff’s behavior made working at the restaurant an enveloping experience that made life beyond the restaurant seem impossible. At the end of the meetings, everyone clapped their hands three times; it took me 4 or 5 days to clap at the right time and speed. These enforced habits emphasized the militaristic nature of the migrants’ working environment. I experienced the demanding, inflexible schedule firsthand while working the same hours alongside the migrants. My daily routine:

- 7:00 a.m. wake up to type field notes from the day before
- 9:00 a.m. start getting ready for work
- 9:20 a.m. walk to the bus stop
- 9:50 a.m. arrive at the restaurant and change into the uniform
- 10:00 a.m. morning roll call, morning exercises, and reciting of the restaurant slogans
- 10:10 a.m. breakfast
- 10:30 a.m. staff meeting followed by sweeping, mopping, and other general preparations
- 11:30 a.m. customers start to order and beginning of carrying trays of dishes.
- 2:00 p.m. break during which most employees napped, talked with family, watched TV on their phones, browsed social media, went to the supermarket
- 4:00 p.m. lunch followed by the same schedule as the morning routine
- 10:00 p.m. shift ends
- 10:30 p.m. walk to bus stop
- 11:20 p.m. get back to the apartment

In her work on migrants in factories, Pun (2005) argues that “the capitalist mode of construction of temporality overrode peasant time in regulating daily life...It became an alienating relationship in which life was forced to catch up to time.” Similarly, working at the restaurant involved enduring time (熬时间)—experiencing the toll that over nine hours of standing and working do to the body.

The restaurant’s strict schedule occupied all of the migrants’ time. For the first twelve days, I spent time only at the apartment in which I was sleeping or at the restaurant. It was not until the twelfth day that I went to a nearby mall. Once, Second Cousin said, “Everyone is asleep by the time we get back from work. We enter the restaurant when the city is just starting to wake and exit when everything has long been closed.” Work took up almost all of one’s waking hours and, for some, even one’s nights. This demanding schedule was responsible for the migrants’ marginalization from the rest of the urban population.

In addition to the amount of time spent at the restaurant and the rigorous enforcement of the schedule within this time, the workers were also controlled by constant monitoring since the restaurant struggled to make a profit. The business was in trouble, so there was more pressure on the managers to improve service and squeeze out profit. The restaurant had been much more easygoing before
business turned sour. With little profit, the restaurant developed a point system that was tied to one’s salary, even though it already deducted from a worker’s salary for many of the infractions that would cause point deductions. The goal was to improve service and thus word-of-mouth advertising. This system attached ratings to each worker’s performance, which would be posted in the kitchen for everyone to see. Any small transgression, such as chit-chatting, disrupting customers’ eating, not turning off the AC, talking on the phone, getting a bad review online, not eating all of the food given to all employees, and gossiping about other people’s pay, could cause point deductions. Every additional point above the standard meant a 5-yuan ($0.73) bonus while having fewer points than the standard meant losing ten yuan ($1.40) per point. Chefs who did not meet their set target of monthly money earned were docked 200 yuan ($29) for every 10,000 yuan ($1,451) that customers did not spend, even though the chefs had limited control on the daily number of customers. The restaurant was what Otis (2011) would call a “simultaneously despotic and casual work environment” where “[d]espotism can be defined as labor control that draws on coercive tactics, such as fear, fines, and penalties,” which workers tolerate because of wages.64

The restaurant added another duty to the migrants’ workloads by requiring that the chefs and waiters ask thirty customers each month for feedback on Dazhong Dianping (大众点评), a restaurant-rating app similar to Yelp. Not getting enough reviews or getting a bad review on Dazhong Dianping also meant getting points deducted. The waiters and chefs were constantly aware of whether they had asked for enough reviews and often made sure to ask multiple times in one day so they did not have to ask customers on the next day. Migrants like Bangs, a teenage waitress, and Chun, a twenty-eight-year-old waitress, were worried about not getting enough reviews. Monkey, who did not get any reviews during the first few days, was called out during meetings in the afternoon, while Hair, who got many reviews, was praised.

Management continually stressed the importance of manipulating the customers’ orders and serving smaller portions so they did not waste food. Since the restaurant was buffet-style, customers would want to try more dishes than they could eat, so it would be up to the waiter to determine the portion size, which sometimes meant giving less than what the customer asked for or waiting to make sure they finished what they had already ordered. Thus, waiters had to juggle both the customers’ demands and the restaurant’s goal of conserving supplies for profit’s sake.

The migrants were aware of the amount of control the restaurant had over their lives but did not accept it as a workplace norm. Protégé, a young migrant who started a week after I did, often spoke about how he regretted deciding to work at the restaurant. He wanted a job that allowed him to take breaks and smoke cigarettes when he wanted. Protégé desired more freedom—to talk when he wanted, to stand the way he wanted, and not to pay fines. Other migrants also discussed being tired of meetings and all the different rules.

In addition to the point system, the restaurant monitored the migrants through surveillance cameras and inspectors from the central administrative team, who stopped by a few times a week. Cameras throughout the restaurant transmitted footage to a screen in the back office and an electronic advertising panel at the entrance of the restaurant. Once, when I was squatting to rest toward the end of a late-night shift, Shy, a young migrant who worked as a waiter, warned me to stand somewhere else so that the cameras would not record me. In another instance, Auntie, a fifty-nine-year-old cook, wanted me to have a piece of the leftover sushi and Lady told me to stand in a certain way so the camera in the kitchen could not see my face. Migrants knew that they were constantly being watched. According to Big Boss Man, one of the managers, surveillance footage is collected by central administrators every two to three days. Inspectors from the central office also frequently stopped by the restaurant to watch the staff and inspect supplies. They even weighed all of the supplies in the refrigerator once a month to see that profits were not lost.

The restaurant also controlled the personal lives of the migrants, overstepping the boundary between work and personal life. For example, the restaurant provided workers with every meal they ate. This meal was not what was served to customers. Cooks took turns making separate meals made out of cheaper supplies and sometimes leftovers from a dish, like the tail of salmon that still had a little meat on it. Every staff member took a tray and got their own food. I did not get in trouble because no one had told me that I had to eat all of the food on my tray, but the penalty for not following the rule was a 200-yuan deduction,
or over two days’ salary. The restaurant also controlled what migrants did in the dormitory. The dorms were inspected once during the four weeks I was at the restaurant. If the inspectors found the spaces to be unkempt, then the workers would be fined. Other incidents included the managers telling the waitstaff to drink more water, to not keep their cell phones next to them while they slept in case they were electrocuted when drool dripped on it, to fold their blankets in the dorm, to not leave undergarments laying about, to respond to WeChat messages, and to not eat cold food because of health purposes. The managers also instructed the migrants on how to behave. Big Boss Man said that his meetings were meant to teach the migrants how to conduct themselves and how to work (做人做事).xvi

With little time and energy after the workday, the migrants’ social ties in the city, in terms of friends and romantic interests, were limited mostly to the restaurant. When migrants had a day off, they often chose to spend it in the dorm sleeping, relaxing, and catching up on chores like hand-washing their laundry; as a result, they remained cloistered by the restaurant. Some of the migrants had family or friends in Beijing, but they rarely visited each other since days off were few and far between and hard to coordinate to fit everyone’s schedule. Migrants rarely interacted with anyone besides coworkers and customers. Trainee, a twenty-four-year-old cook, said he had not met anyone outside of work during his stay in Beijing, even though he had been working there for four months. The same was true for migrants who had spent more time in Beijing, like Short, the twenty-one-year-old chef who had worked with this chain of restaurants for about four years. He mentioned that all of his friends in Beijing who did not work in the restaurant were former employees of the restaurant. He had met his girlfriend of two years while working at another location of this restaurant chain. New Chef, a twenty-five-year-old chef, originally met his wife while at school back home in Gansu, but they did not connect until they were both working at the same restaurant. They married and already have a three-year-old child. There were three additional couples at the restaurant, highlighting the limited scope of their social network and the importance of propinquity.

Aside from romantic relationships, the migrants, except for the older individuals who wanted to save more money, routinely spent their time outside of work together, so their relationships in the workplace carried over into their personal lives. The youngest migrants often ate late-night barbecue together after work. Hair even had his nineteenth birthday celebration at another restaurant nearby where all the attendants worked at the restaurant. Twelve people attended; even two of the waitstaff supervisors, Boss Lady and Little Boss Man, went to celebrate. Socializing with superiors outside of the work setting was not outside the norm. Monkey told me about his experience of going to the Great Wall of China for the first time a couple months ago with Little Boss Man, his superior, and a former colleague. Besides serving customers, there were no opportunities for the migrants to socialize with urbanites or even migrants working at other restaurants or industries except for relatives. The relationships they made, the people they could depend on outside of relatives, and their acquaintances were limited to coworkers. Although they were physically in the city, their social network did not extend to the city.

The lack of social ties prevented the migrants from pursuing other jobs and knowing their way around the city. Betty, the eighteen-year-old hostess at the restaurant, wanted to work at a bakery instead of at the restaurant. She had been working at the restaurant for over a year and had yet to find a job in a bakery or go to vocational school to learn to make cakes. Betty stated that she was not familiar with Beijing (人生地不熟) and her cousin, Boss Lady, the head of the waitstaff, had not helped her find another situation. Every time Betty asked, Boss Lady just said “We will see” (再看). Betty’s close friend, Cake, a young migrant worker who served customers their dessert and sushi, also hesitated to leave the restaurant because of her lack of social ties to individuals in the industry. She was comfortable at the restaurant and feared being cheated or lied to in a new city or a new workplace. As another example, once I told Guns, a twenty-three-year-old chef, that I could not live in China because I did not know basics like how to go online and look for an apartment, and Guns quickly jumped in and said he did not know either. If he wanted to rent a place to live, he would ask Muscles, a fellow chef, or other coworkers. Overall, migrants at the restaurant

xvi The discipline in the restaurant is quite a common experience for migrants. For example, Zhang (2001) notes “strict labor discipline” within family factories amongst Wenzhou entrepreneurial migrants towards their workers (129). Otis (2011) and He (2009) also discuss the control and management of female workers’ bodies in hotels. This type of experience dictates what happens day-to-day in migrants’ lives so it is important to understand.
were highly dependent on their network within the restaurant to manage both professional and non-professional aspects of their lives.

The migrants’ tight, repetitive schedule and cloistered social ties made small disputes inevitable. They often referred to a phrase popularized online to explain their experiences in the city, “There are a lot of skills and tricks that are needed in the city. I want to go back to the countryside” (要回农村). Little Boss Man, manager of the waiters, explained how life is more complicated in cities in terms of relationships (关系), feelings (人心), and money (金钱). According to Monkey, a young waiter, the phrase means that it would be better to back home where life is less complicated. Life at home is more relaxed (轻松). Many of the migrants I spoke with felt that there was a complexity to interactions and relationships in the city, related to competition, constant contact, and antagonizing personalities that did not exist back home.

Migrants worked at the restaurant solely to earn money. Second Cousin said she would never want her daughter to work in the restaurant, which drove the preoccupation she had with her daughter’s education and extracurricular activities. She said working at the restaurant was hard-earned money (辛苦钱), and not a job parents let their children do without feeling pain and regret (心疼). She said that the restaurant had found it harder to hire young workers harder over the years since families hesitated to send their only child to do the type of hard work done at a restaurant. Even for someone as reasonably successful as Second Cousin, whose income was similar to working class urbanites, her life was still lived as if in the shadows of others in the city. Second Cousin was working hard so that her daughter would never have to go through what she went through and what the younger migrants at the restaurant were going through. The children of migrant workers were less willing to work in menial service positions and their parents were less willing to allow them.

**Alternative Path Outside of Beijing**

Migrants at the restaurant knew the challenges they faced but remained optimistic about their social mobility. Many had no plans to stay in Beijing in the long run and saw possibilities of being successful elsewhere in China. I call this continuous migration: the idea that a migrant’s current location might not be their final destination. Continuous migration goes against the assumption that assimilation is necessary for social mobility. While scholars presume that migrant workers will want to assimilate to their destination city, this is not necessarily the case in Beijing, where the city actively tries to decrease its population of migrant workers to mitigate congestion and other urban resource problems. There are now opportunities beyond Beijing and other top-tier cities as the state continues to push development efforts beyond the east coast in second-tier and third-tier cities. Instead of staying in the restaurant and in the city, migrants forged alternative plans elsewhere, whether it be near their hometowns or in less-developed cities where they had connections. So, even though migrants were in highly controlled work environments and lacked social ties to the city, they viewed their time at the restaurant as temporary and constantly looked for the next good opportunity.

While Hair understood he was different from white-collar workers, he thought of alternative ways to reach the level of success he admired. Many of the migrants spoke about their futures in terms of planning “a way out” (出路), which meant looking for a better opportunity. When asked about their next steps, they were usually unsure. They frequently responded with “Depends on the situation,” (看情况) and “Plans cannot catch up to change” (计划赶不上变化).

Just as the migrants moved to Beijing for better economic opportunities, they will likely one day leave the restaurant and Beijing for the same purpose. Migrants at the restaurant made more money working there in Beijing than working at home. Trainee, a cook, said he would only be able to make around 1,800 yuan working at a restaurant back in Gansu whereas he earned about 2,500 yuan in Beijing. Little Boss Man said he could only make 2,000 yuan back home, but in Beijing he can make 3,000 or 4,000 yuan. He also cited more opportunities, more ideas to learn, and a greater diversity of people. There were many migrants who said they had never been to Beijing before starting to work at the restaurant so they were curious and excited to see the city. Hair wanted to work in Beijing because he wanted to make something of himself through hardship (闯一闯). For others, like Monkey and Shy, going to Beijing was not part of a defined plan. Their relatives made the contact for them to start working at the restaurant and they just followed the plan. With
a high turnover of employees, the restaurant was a liminal space that allowed migrants to bide their time to figure out, or get to, their next step. When asked whether he would work at the restaurant long-term, Lele, a twenty-one-year-old chef, laughed. For most of them, talking about future plans outside the restaurant industry was not uncommon. One day, Lady was telling Hair that he should be a policeman or join the military, but Hair jokingly said he would run away if he were a soldier. They brainstormed potential jobs for Hair, because working at the restaurant was not a job he expected to continue. Many others also talked about how they would leave within a year. The restaurant provided a space for these migrants to earn money, live without their family, and maybe learn some new skills, but was not where they saw themselves in life.

Even those who considered staying in the restaurant industry knew their time at the restaurant would only be temporary. As Hair and Shy, another waiter, reasoned, the highest position for a chef or a waiter was to be a manager, but there would be plenty of competition and they would likely have to wait until they were in their thirties. Hair in particular said he did not want to waste away waiting for promotions. Furthermore, when they reach such an age, restaurants would likely not want to hire them since establishments tend to prefer younger staff working on the service floor. Old Chef, a thirty-four-year-old chef, was quite conscious of his age and of the fact that restaurants would not want to hire him in the future.

The restaurant was by no means the final stop for migrants and, for a majority of the migrants, neither was Beijing. They had no hukou, no houses, and no families in Beijing. Their lack of social benefits and social ties to the city coupled with Beijing’s high cost of family living made the migrants look toward their hometown or other cities to develop. They simply could not afford to have their families with them as they worked. Second Cousin explained that the former head chef quit his job because it was a dead end. At most he would be able to make 5,000 yuan ($724) a month, which was not enough to live comfortably in Beijing. In another instance, Second Cousin said, as if it was a sign of failure, that all of the migrants working at the restaurant would end up going home. Since she was part of the first wave of migrants, she and still aimed to live comfortably in Beijing. But for the second wave of migrants, this was just the natural course. She cited that in the city, they would be able to afford only basements or one-story, poorly constructed houses (平房). For most of the other migrants, they saw their futures outside of Beijing.

Many of the migrants wanted to start their own small businesses, seeing it as a sign of success, but two migrants in their thirties explained that even that had its hardships in Beijing. Second Cousin wanted to stop working in the restaurant industry, but many of her friends told her not to throw away a good job with steady pay. Starting a business in Beijing required too high of an investment, potentially hundreds of thousands of yuan, and not enough return. Some of her friends had opened clothing stalls and were exhausted and frustrated by their daily routines and the unsteadiness of business. Boss Lady, the manager of the service floor, echoed the sentiment that any endeavor for migrants was difficult. She had friends who sold vegetables. Her friends woke up at 6 a.m. to go to the wholesale market and spent the rest of the day at their stalls since people bought groceries at different times. At the end of the day, Boss Lady said she was thankful that at least she got seven to eight hours of sleep a night since any job is hard. Gaining social mobility in Beijing was difficult even for migrant workers working for themselves.

Furthermore, migrants were strongly rooted to their native place or hometown (老家), so staying in Beijing was not the life they imagined for themselves. Over and over, migrants said they did not want to stay in Beijing because they had no friends or family here. New, a twenty-four-year-old chef, had been working at the restaurant since he dropped out of high school. He did not want to stay in Beijing long term and hoped to go back home one day. He said it would be difficult if he settled here, as if he lost his job or became sick, there would be no one here to take care of him. New’s support network was back home in Gansu, not in Beijing. Protégé made a similar comment when he had a high fever. While waiting for a dish, he muttered how no one was there to take care of him even though he was sick. With their families and friends not in Beijing, migrants only view working at the restaurant and in the city as part of a transitory stage in their lives.

Coming back from breaks in the countryside, it was evident that the migrants were obviously happier back home, suggesting their lack of attachment to Beijing and willingness to migrate elsewhere. Going back home was time-consuming and costly, so trips
were few and far between. Workers came back from their hometowns looking absolutely radiant, happy, healthy, and refreshed. When Glasses, a waitress with teenage children, came back from her break, she was tanned and had dyed her hair. The migrants talked about how they lost weight while they were working at the restaurant and were able to gain it back at home. In any discussion of hometown, the migrants I spoke with were filled with pride and happiness. For example, Guns talked about his love of hunting and the taste of wild boar from his hometown, and Hair waxed eloquently about the beauty of the country fields in his village. Migrants did not develop similar sentiments toward Beijing because the capital city was not home.

When migrants at the restaurant talked about their hometown, they expressed a yearning to be with the family members whom they could not afford to bring with them to Beijing. On Hair’s birthday, he showed me a picture of a tableful of food cooked by his mother. He said, “Look at all this good food my mom cooked and I can't be there.” His family was celebrating his birthday without him. The former head chef who visited the restaurant a few times said, “Everyone wants to be home. If a restaurant this big was back home, I would be living at home.” While talking about her children, Lady rhetorically asked, “Who doesn’t want to stay home and take care of the kids? But working in the fields does not make enough money.” Her mother was taking care of her children while she worked. She would prefer to take care of them herself but she had to make money and could not afford to have her children with her. Boss Lady, who went back to Yunnan to visit her children every two to three months, said she worked hard to make life better for her children. She thought that even if she did not succeed, at least she would know she had worked hard. When she went home, her niece clung onto her, but her own daughter was shy around her. Boss Lady said she could look after her child all day long, but at night her daughter wanted to be with her grandmother and not her. Her laugh ringed of sadness over the estrangement.

Working in Beijing is a transactional experience for the migrants, providing them with new experiences and, more importantly, a higher salary that helped them to reach specific goals in the near future. Many of the young male migrants were preoccupied with earning enough money for marriage in a few years. Following social norms, they were expected to have a house, along with money for renovations, a car, and funds to sustain a new family. Four of the male migrants discussed the importance of saving for marriage. Short, the twenty-one-year-old who had been in a long-term relationship with one of his former coworkers, said he was working at the restaurant “for marriage.” Whenever they talked about buying a house for their marriage, it was always back home or in the nearest small city. For the older migrants, too, working in Beijing was a transactional experience. They were there to accrue money for themselves and their family, while ultimately planning to return home. Auntie said her children were all grown and no longer depended on her, but she did not want to be a burden and had to financially help take care of her parents, who were looked after by her brothers’ families, so she was working at the restaurant to save money. Shrimp Dashu, who had worked in construction for decades, where he earned twice as much as he did in the restaurant, was helping his daughter pay for her master’s degree in Biology. She needed about 20,000 to 30,000 yuan each year. He had stopped working in construction because he could no longer handle the heavy labor of construction work.

Second Cousin was part of the first wave of migrant workers so she still wanted to stay in Beijing, but even she planned to do this by making money in Guilin, a much smaller and less developed city because of the limitations she faced in Beijing. She made around 10,000 yuan ($1,700) a month and could make a few thousand more with bonuses, depending on how well business at the restaurant was going, but usually at least 2,000 or 3,000 yuan. Considering that the average monthly salary of urban employees in Beijing’s public sector was around 8,500 yuan ($1,373), according to a report issued in 2015, she was making a decent living.65 Even though she was the most successful of the migrant workers at this restaurant—she was the only employee of the restaurant who could afford to have her child with her in Beijing while everyone else left their children back home in the countryside—she still could not afford to live in Beijing permanently without continuing her grueling lifestyle forever.

Most of her costs came from supporting her daughter and letting her have the same opportunities that children of middle-class urbanites had, even though Second Cousin did not have the same lifestyle that they had. In addition to spending 150 yuan
per class for her daughter’s weekly piano, robotics, art, math, and dance classes (about 3,000 yuan per month), she also had to pay rent for a three-bedroom apartment she shared with five other renters (2,800 yuan per month) and mortgage for an apartment she had bought two hours outside of Beijing in Gu An, where her husband’s family resides (1,600 yuan per month). She said most of her month’s salary was spent. Even though she was better off than anyone else working at the restaurant, she was not making a comfortable living for what she needed and wanted to improve her situation.

While Second Cousin felt limited in Beijing, she saw a move to Guilin as an alternative path. With the restaurant’s owner putting pressure on the restaurant to turn a profit, Second Cousin thought it was time for her to move on. She planned to start a business in Guilin, a developing tourist city known for its mountains and calm waters. Compared to Beijing, investments were low and returns were high. Second Cousin said there would be no taxes for the first three years and no rent for the first five years. With excitement, she talked about how, by 2020, Taiwan would return to China, and the city would build mansions for rich Taiwanese; by 2030, Guilin would be an international vacation destination. She claimed that Guilin has glowing prospects and would take the place of vacation spots like Hong Kong, citing the building of casinos and the presence of a red light district. It would be hard for her to find another job in Beijing that offered her an equally high salary. Even though she wanted to settle in Beijing, she saw Guilin as a nice place to live and a potential site to earn enough money to comfortably return to Beijing. Guilin was inviting toward migrants in ways Beijing was not.

Migrants’ alternative paths represent alternative settling patterns. This is in line with the state’s New Urbanization Plan, which encourages migrants to seek opportunities in less-developed cities. As they learn more about development in those cities, they will be less inclined to stay in Beijing. A few weeks after I finished conducting my fieldwork, Second Cousin quit her job and began running a hotel in Guilin with family and friends. Trainee hoped to eventually go back home, where there are no teppanyaki grills, and start one there. Small Chef also saw himself moving back to Yunnan to work and then start his own business. Even white-collar workers who migrated to Beijing are deciding to leave because they cannot afford housing and do not have Beijing hukou, without which schooling for their children would be a problem. The spread of development as promoted by the state in the New Urbanization Plan makes first-tier cities like Beijing lose their appeal for workers. While potential migrants like the ones working at the restaurant will continue coming to Beijing for the social networks and the higher wages that the city offers, many will eventually leave because of all the limitations.

In her research on Filipina brides in Japan, Leiba Faier (2009) argues that the destination of migration is part of a process of “continuing on—a segment along the routes some people travel as they endeavor to realize their dreams.” The migrants saw their time at the restaurant in Beijing as just one segment in their path to achieving social mobility. Though the optimism of the migrants at the restaurant seemed unfounded given their daily experiences, they saw alternative paths toward social mobility in finding better opportunities elsewhere.

The growth of smaller cities is crucial for maintaining migrants’ optimism toward social mobility. In less developed areas, migrants can not only take advantage of the lower costs of living and for starting a business, which is no longer practically available in Beijing, but also face fewer barriers due to inequality. Though the growth of these less-developed cities is currently insufficient to prevent migration into Beijing, it might be sufficient one day. Without the gradual spread of economic development to the rest of the country—without the existence of alternative paths—migrants working at the restaurant would not be as optimistic since they would be stuck eking out a liminal existence in Beijing.

CHAPTER THREE: WORKING AS AN ALTERNATIVE PATH – SOCIAL MOBILITY WITHOUT EDUCATION

Failures of Education

Historically, education has been the traditional meritocratic path for social mobility in China and its influence is still prominent. As Andrew Kipnis (2011) writes, educational aspiration is a social phenomenon with wide-ranging repercussions in China. The societal drive for education comes from its cultural prestige and ability to grant political legitimacy through civil service examinations, dating back to the
Han dynasty over 2000 years ago. In imperial China, the civil service exam was the “path to elite status.” Though very few from non-elite backgrounds succeeded, “the civil service exam system still produced just enough cases of upward mobility to prevent class boundaries from completely solidifying, defuse tensions between different factions of the elite, and promote a cultural model that promised upward mobility to those who invested heavily in education.”

During the Cultural Revolution in the Mao era, education was disrupted when schools were shut down and students were sent to the countryside to learn from peasants, but its importance was brought back during the post-1978 reform era, when scientific and administrative knowledge was needed to advance development. As Fong (2004) explains, “A combination of the pre-revolutionary valorization of education, the empowerment of women, the socioeconomic democratization of the Communist revolution, and the meritocratic ideologies of the capitalist world system produced a much more powerful and widespread cultural model that promised upward mobility for all youth, regardless of their gender or socioeconomic backgrounds.” After the implementation of economic reforms, education became the path for social mobility. Attaining higher and higher levels of education became the norm as job qualifications grew more demanding. The one-child policy added fuel to the fire since parents invested more on their only child. In addition, in the face of rampant corruption since the economic reforms, “Exams are often seen as the only method that can produce social hierarchies that the public will accept as legitimate.” Education has been the principal factor in obtaining socioeconomic success in Chinese society for all groups.

However, for the second wave of migrants, whose parents were also migrants, growing up in both the city and the countryside meant facing educational inequality such as a lack of funding in countryside schools, administrative hurdles, and marginalization. All the young adults working at the restaurant, ages 16 to 24, either did not attend high school or did not finish. The highest level of education at the restaurant was a high school diploma. Their level of education is similar to figures in a 2015 National Bureau of Statistics report, which states that 59.5 percent of migrants have only middle school education. Knight, Sicular, and Yue (2013) note the stagnancy of education levels from one generation to the next.

This stems from the fact that superior education systems are concentrated in wealthy cities along the eastern coast and migrants have unequal access to education within those cities. For example, Beijing No. 4 High School and The High School Affiliated with Renmin University are known as the most prestigious high schools in the country. Parents in Beijing would do anything to get their children into one of Beijing’s top schools. And amongst high school students, it is well known that students in Beijing have an easier time getting into college because colleges prioritize their acceptance with lower cut-off scores.

Hukou also plays a role in educational inequality. For migrants who were able to get at least part of their education in the city, hukou can still limit migrants’ educational attainment by limiting access to schools. In Beijing, children of migrants are only allowed to attend elementary school and middle school. Hukou can also affect a child’s educational path by determining where a student can take the college entrance exam (高考), which is seen as a life-defining moment for children since the score from this test alone determines the college they attend and, in turn, their future career. The location a student list on their hukou is the designated location for taking the exam. Since the information tested in exams varies from region to region and each region has its own curriculum for preparing students, many parents send their children to the countryside for school so that they are not set back when taking the exam. Furthermore, students with rural hukou who go to school in the city can be spatially and socially segregated within the school. Social inequality makes education an un-meritocratic path for migrant workers and their children.

Wu and Treiman (2004) argue that transferring hukou from rural to urban is central for upward social mobility and education is one of the main factors that can lead to hukou conversion, and, thus, social mobility. However, in order to have higher chances of academic success, a student should have urban hukou, achieving social mobility statistically near impossible for those with rural hukou. Since migrants are given fewer resources and opportunities, the validity of meritocracy in a Chinese education system is questionable.

The general educational system in China also lends itself to marginalizing students with the fewest resources and opportunities as they progress through
their academic careers. Given China’s high literacy rate and the institution of nine years of mandatory education, educational inequality is at its lowest point in history. However, educational inequality remains a problem as achieving higher levels of education becomes more important. In China, elementary school is six years, middle school is three years, and high school is three years. Schools in China have academic rankings, so test scores determine students’ qualifications for the type of school. Excluding international schools, the best schools are public and are designated as “key” schools (重点学校). These schools have the best reputations and the most resources. Getting into one of the key schools is crucial for getting into a good school for the next stage of the education process.

At the other end of the quality spectrum, vocational schools offer terminal degrees at the high school level and the associate level for skills training. The existence of academic and vocational tracks in high school and college perpetuates educational inequality since many migrants are on the vocational track, which limits their future educational and job opportunities, compounding the impacts of educational inequality in the younger years. For high school, students enter either an academic senior high school (高中) or a vocational training school (中专, 职高, 技校), which is determined by their test scores in the high school entrance exam (中考). Whereas the academic path offers a more prestigious high school degree and intensive preparation for the college entrance exam, the vocational track prepares students for jobs in the service industry; students who go on the vocational track do not take the college entrance exam. With tests at every level, educational inequality has a dramatic effect on career outcomes.

Students with lower scores are filtered out at an early stage and do not qualify for white-collar job opportunities. As Woronov (2011) emphasizes, “Without the hope of a university education, in the future they will be locked out of growing urban middle-class, white-collar occupations. Their futures will always be limited as workers who have attained only a vocational school credential.” Tang (2016) found that socioeconomic status and cultural background have the largest impact on the earliest stages of education whereas the quality of the school determines educational opportunity in the later years. In other words, students with low socioeconomic backgrounds, like children of migrants, face educational inequality at the start of their education. This educational inequality perpetuates with key schools and with a track system where students who do not perform as well leave the academic track early on and enter the vocational track. For all but the most high-achieving students, vocational school is the only educational option for migrants, which limits their future social mobility.

Furthermore, attending these vocational training programs has much lower returns. With jobs requiring higher levels of education and more technical skillsets, parents send their children to vocational schools in a last ditch effort to prepare them for higher-paying and less labor-intensive jobs. However, the utility of the education, the quality of the vocational school, and success of job placement are less guaranteed. In her research on vocational schools in Nanjing, Woronov (2012) notes, “Students dozed through a year of lectures on the engineering principles behind building subway tunnels and designing subway car engines. After graduating, they would be assigned jobs as ticket sellers, station cleaners, and security guards in the municipal subway system.” In other words, their lackluster education does not even align with the low-skill jobs available to them.

At a young age, the population destined to become migrant workers are also left out of mainstream paths to success as they quit school or are funneled to vocational schools where they enter a “culture of failure” outside of “normative ideals of youth” and “the national narrative of individual development.” In a society where a child’s most important duty is to study and do well in school, migrant workers’ children do not fit the mold. Vocational education acquiesces the demand for education but remains a categorically inferior form of education. Though they continue their education, students in vocational schools are nevertheless locked out of the traditional path of social mobility because their education caps their socioeconomic potential.

Bangs, a young waitress working at the restaurant, explained how migrants can be forced out of traditional education systems. Bangs’ test scores were too low to get into a public high school in her home province of Shandong. She initially went to school in Beijing since her parents were working in
the city, but she was sent back to their home village in Shandong province for fifth grade. She struggled to catch up to the different curriculum. During the last year of middle school, she said students like her had three options -- high school, trade school, or work. There were 250 students in her year in middle school and only fifty got a high enough score to get into high school. She said the high school acceptance rate is reflective of the intensive competition in her home province and her scores were simply not good enough for her to move on to high school.

For those who did go on to vocational school, those additional years of schooling did not prepare them for better opportunities than what they could have found without going to vocational school. Old Chef, a soft-spoken thirty-four-year-old who has been in Beijing working as a grille chef since 2012, went to school for three years to be a health inspector after middle school and then worked at a rabbit processing factory in Dongbei for six years. His job was to make sure nothing was wrong with the rabbit and that its weight fit the factories' criteria. He said he only worked about two days a month because he only had to work when there was a shipment of rabbits. He grew bored of the work and realized it was a dead-end job, which is why he quit and jumped at an opportunity he heard about from a relative and became a teppanyaki grill chef.

Coz was the only one at the restaurant who was still in a vocational high school, learning computer skills like Microsoft Office Suite and Photoshop. She only worked at the restaurant during summer vacation. However, she did not enjoy work at the vocational school and was seriously considering switching majors at the school or finding opportunities elsewhere. Trainee also did not enjoy his coursework at school but he chose not to waste time restarting vocational school and started working odd jobs until his cousin, Eyes, got him his current job in the restaurant. The migrants I spoke with found that jobs vocational schools prepared them for had limited growth potential, was too physically demanding, or was not enjoyable. Since all of the migrants in the restaurant who went to vocational school are now out of the industry that they trained for, they did not find education to be a problem-free answer to gaining social mobility.

For them, working at the restaurant or in another job fit better with their needs than what would have been available to them in formal education. Bangs said one of the managers of the restaurant suggested that she take part time classes at a nearby school to learn accounting. But she and her mother decided that getting a job in accounting would not be realistic since she did not even have a high school diploma. Bangs questioned the value of education in multiple conversations, once citing how everyone has to get a job one day anyways. By not seeing education as the only answer to becoming successful in life, Bangs and several other migrants at the restaurant did not see lack of education as a major setback. Muscles, a twenty-four-year-old senior chef who has worked at the restaurant for about two years, understood that he was different from his high school peers who went on to college and acknowledged he might be perceived as the one who is worse off, but Muscles framed not going to college as a choice. He said he did not continue with his education because his mother was sick and needed surgery during his senior year of high school. Going to a junior college (大专), similar to vocational schools, is the only type of school his grades would have allowed him to go to but would have cost the family 20,000 to 30,000 yuan each year. He was not doing as well in school so it made more sense to him to get a job and to start earning money. For Muscles, an office job would have been desirable, but he felt like that type of work is inferior because it would not have been built on his own efforts. He would have had to spend his family's money to attain an office job. He said he did not see himself as different from high school peers who recently graduated from college. He noted how his peers might be able to get a nine-to-five job after they graduate, but he said they bought that luxury with money. He highlighted how they have spent 100,000 yuan while he had made 100,000 yuan. In the end, he felt like his job was the same as theirs. Muscles did not see the benefits of education outweighing what he had earned over the past few years. He acknowledged the prestige of non-manual labor jobs, like those working in an office, but diminished the importance of formal education in favor of earning money without depending on his parents to support him.

However, migrants at the restaurant understood that their lower levels of education set them apart. The migrants I spoke with did not refute its importance. Whenever I talked with the waitstaff and the chefs about their schooling days, they would always talk
about how much they goofed off, got bad grades, and did not pay attention in class with a hint of shame. They knew that their behavior did not match the esteem that education has in China and agreed that education is an important factor for social mobility. Coz, a young summer worker who still attends vocational high school, knew that her lower level of education did not follow norms. Like Hair, who saw himself on a structurally different path than white-collar workers in the office buildings surrounding the restaurant, Coz felt too embarrassed to visit her aunt’s home when one of her younger cousins got into a prestigious high school in Beijing. She understood it would have been ideal for her to have performed better in school. She felt uneasy (心不踏实) for not working harder while in middle school.

Migrants often implicitly differentiated themselves from others with higher levels of education. I was the most obvious candidate since I was known as the girl from an elite American college. Migrants often discussed their lower levels of education in relation to me. Once, Eyes, a chef who has worked at the restaurant for two years, made a point of the fact that I have suzhi, explained in the first chapter as the quality of a person that can be increased with education. From his perspective, Coz did not because she mentioned vulgar acts boys in her middle school did in a passing anecdote, which actually made her cry. Eyes would also frequently sigh and tell me he has “lost at the starting line” (输在起跑线上), referring to my English abilities. He also told me he regrets not learning more in school, while pointing at the seventeen-year-olds around us at the restaurant with disappointment.

Alternative Path Outside of Schooling

The low level of educational achievement by the workers at the restaurant should signify limits to their social mobility according to Wu and Treiman (2015) and distinguish migrant workers from urbanites; however, migrants I talked with did not view lack of education as an inescapable setback, though they recognized their lack of education as a hindrance that set them apart from urbanites. The migrants’ education levels did not keep them from feeling optimistic about their social mobility because social boundaries in China seem permeable; they felt like they can forge their own path to social mobility with the knowledge and skills they gained while working.

Low levels of education did not stop migrants from being optimistic in part because with the tumultuous years of Mao’s socialist rule followed by Deng’s economic reforms, class structure changed frequently. Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the landowning class lost their status. They were later replaced by those in charge of government resources, who were then attacked through movements like the Cultural Revolution. With continuous, incited class struggle, groups in favor one day found themselves discriminated against in another. Since the economic reform, capitalist forms of class structure have found their way into China, but effects are still in formation. As a result, class is insufficient for describing the complexity of the situation in China. As Whyte (2010) points out, focus on class leaves out “a number of other important social cleavages in China that did not readily fit in any of the competing class frameworks,” citing regional inequality and ethnic cleavages as examples. Furthermore, rather than using class (阶级), categories like landowner and peasant during the Maoist era is talked about in terms of strata (阶层), which “places a marked emphasis on mobility, functional experience, and harmony among strata.”

The perceived amorphous nature of the emerging middle class in China also complicates understandings of class since it is seen as a model of success and even an attainable ideal. In her book on the emergence of the middle class in China, Zhang (2010) calls the middle strata (中产阶层), “a cultural construct that serves as an aspiration for society.” Part of the appeal of the new middle classes is precisely the projected openness and inclusiveness, which allows others to envision themselves living such a life one day. Today, China’s cultural atmosphere suggests that anyone has a shot at the Chinese dream of owning a house and a car and providing children with a better life. As Whyte (2010) notes, “Although China’s rising tide is not lifting all boats, it is lifting enough of them, and rapidly enough, to inspire confidence even among those who are not doing so well.”

The older migrants bore witness to the economic changes that fueled their optimism. Even though money at the restaurant is hard-earned (辛苦钱), the older
migrants talked about the privilege that the younger migrants have in comparison to their parents, the previous wave of migrant workers. The older migrants did not go out to eat or spend money haphazardly since they had to support their families and plan for retirement. Every dollar scrimped and saved mattered. On the other hand, the younger migrants did not have the same level of responsibilities and freely spent their salary. Dessert Ayi mentioned how the younger migrants at the restaurant have time to go out with friends while she had to work to help support her family. Another auntie chimed in, asking how could they even begin to compare the difference between the lives of the younger generation and their own. Little Boss Man also said that the younger migrants working at the restaurant are “not bitter because their families actually all have money.” He cited how they do not have to worry about their families and kept all their earnings, unlike migrants born in the 1970s and 1980s. Glasses described younger migrants in the restaurant as observing and learning from real life (体验生活) rather than working to support their family.

The young migrants’ consumption habits highlight their ability to achieve certain aspects of the middle class ideal; their ability to consume suggests that social boundaries are permeable. A short trip to the shopping complex across the street from the restaurant by Coz and Bangs led to a haul of candy, blackhead remover, hair clips, and earrings, followed by a stop at KFC to buy ice cream. Coz worked at the restaurant for two months over the summer and estimated she spent 1,000 yuan on snacks just in her first month, a little under half of her salary for that month. There were purchases everyday on odds and ends, particularly snacks and lunch, even though the restaurant provided all meals. They also often online shopped with their cell phones. One day, folding paper would come for Cake and on the next, platform shoes and a long tulle skirt would come for Betty. The boys would also often eat out and buy packs of cigarettes. Once, Betty and another boy who made desserts bought new Xiaomi-brand cell phones for 2,500 yuan, about a month’s salary, even though their old phones still worked. The month before, Bangs spent over a 1,000 yuan on a cell phone for her father. The month before that, she spent over 2,000 yuan buying a golden necklace and bracelet for the birth of her niece.

As social status and socioeconomic location continues to form and evolve in China, social boundaries, understood here as an evolving set of differences between social groups as perceived by actors, provide a much more nuanced way for understanding differences between social groups. The framework of permeable social boundaries looks at social grouping not through preconceived notions of class and social stratification but rather based on differences as the individual sees them. As opposed to class stratification, which prescribes determinants of social groupings onto people, social boundaries focus on personal understandings of the differences.

Since economic opportunities seem to grow and continue to improve living standards in China, class stratification has not solidified in the eyes of migrants. With the increases in economic opportunities and improvements in the standard of living, migrants seem to cross social boundaries, into a more consumerist middle class lifestyle.iii

The migrant workers I spoke with did not identify as “migrant worker,” further suggesting the permeability of social boundaries. One day when I was explaining why I was working at the restaurant, I said that I came to study people who moved from the countryside into the city to work. Without skipping a beat, Muscles, a twenty-four-year-old chef with a managing position, told me that I was wrong. He said, “We are young people who have come to the city in order to fulfill our dreams” (年轻人在为梦想而来城市实现梦想). Monkey added, “You are too straightforward.” Muscles was quick to emphasize his personal goals and aspirations, denouncing an impersonal scholarly take on their lives. He got offended for being lumped with the trend of rural-to-urban migration. From his perspective, he has a goal in mind and is not a helpless migrant worker. He does not define himself by the work he does or associations with the backwardness of the countryside.

In her research on the irrational optimism Malawi youths have towards education, Margaret Frye (2012) argues that “aspiration and expectations should be understood as assertions of identity that are shaped by cultural schemas and shared standards of morality.” Frye explains that the irrational optimism is based upon the ideals that education is a more virtuous path and the educational culture in Malawi shapes an imagined future. Muscles’ quick

iii Here, permeability refers to how social boundaries are not rigid and can be crossed. In the social sciences, social boundaries have been frequently used to delineate what exactly separates one group of people from another, designating boundaries between imagined communities by the actors themselves (Lamont 2000, Barth 1969).
Lady, for instance, used to work at a shoe factory where teaching the skills that are needed as they are needed. Restaurant played the role of a vocational school, skills that could promote their social mobility. The migrant workers the opportunity to learn new skills that are needed as they are needed. Lady, for instance, used to work at a shoe factory where her workday ended when she finished her assigned work so she often spent more than twelve hours a day on the factory floor. She enjoyed food and eating so she decided to learn how to cook and found herself working at the teppanyaki restaurant after her brother helped her get the job. She worked in the back kitchen where she made finishing touches rather than learning how to cook, but she hoped to become a teppanyaki chef once the management staff let her. Similarly, one of the cooks in the back kitchen and two of the waiters were learning to become teppanyaki grill chefs, which takes months to train for. The training costs 3,000 yuan, 500 yuan docked each month, which they get back if they work for the restaurant for two years. Trainee said, “Ten years from now I want to have learned a trade and depend on it to make money. Then I would not have to work for someone else.” He said it would take five years to learn a style of dishes like Sichuan, but it would only take him two to three years to figure out teppanyaki. “We don’t have Japanese restaurants [back home in Gansu] so if I make enough money in three to four years then I can open up my own shop.” Working at the restaurant is part of a strategic plan to start his own business. Even though he lacked formal education, he gained skills and had the opportunity to save the higher earnings he made in Beijing and take it back to Gansu. Working at the restaurant was part of a makeshift plan to learn some skills migrant workers could carry with them.

Migrants also did not depend on the restaurant industry as the only source of their potential social mobility. While I conducted research at the restaurant, Little Boss Man took two half-days off because he was training and testing to get his driver’s license. Learning to drive in Beijing has a hefty price tag at 4,300 yuan and his monthly salary was only around 3,500 yuan. He planned to work with Didi Dache, the Uber of China, in the future. He said that once when he was in a Didi car, the driver told him that he could make a couple hundred a day after subtracting gas and other fees. This opportunity had a relatively low start-up fee and a good wage for Little Boss Man. Even though he had this job at the restaurant, he had to plan a way out (出路). None of the migrants saw themselves working at the restaurant long-term, and many actually talked of working in other industries. Little Boss Man was highly interested in different industries and was constantly on the lookout for new opportunities. Driving for Didi Dache was the kind...

Not trapped within a migrant identity, workers at the restaurant believed they could achieve social mobility through alternative means based on a belief in the validity of meritocracy of hard work despite the educational inequality. In China today, people have the “perception that the most important factors distinguishing the rich from the poor in China today are talent, training, and hard work, rather than dishonesty, unfairness in the distribution of opportunities, or other non-merit factors.” Although migrants I met did not have high levels of education, they were optimistic about the opportunities that remain open to them.

Since migrants did not feel bound to a social group, they believed in their power to guide their own future through hard work. Little Boss Man said a person’s background and environment does determine their life but self-motivation matters too. In a small journal he kept in his locker at the restaurant, he had a quote from a mentor he met while working at a factory.

心態变则思维变
思维变则态度变
态度变则人生变

Feeling changes thus way of thinking changes
Way of thinking changes thus perspective changes
Perspective changes thus life changes

In other words, Little Boss Man thought that attitudes and mindsets have a great impact on life. He acknowledged that family background and connections matter, but he strongly believed in the power of the individual, which stems from seeing the dramatic changes to everyday life over the last couple of years. He did not feel limited by his status as a migrant worker.

Working was an alternative path that offered the migrant workers the opportunity to learn new skills that could promote their social mobility. The restaurant played the role of a vocational school, teaching the skills that are needed as they are needed. Lady, for instance, used to work at a shoe factory where...
of self-entreprise that gave migrants the autonomy they looked for when they planned to own their small businesses.

Migrants repeatedly said that taking advantage of the right opportunity at the right time was more important than education for success in the future, and they admired the stories of non-traditional paths. Little Boss Man, the head of the waitstaff, looked up to the owner of the Fuyao Glass Company, who had succeeded without an education through hard work and luck of opportunity. Little Boss Man had heard that the owner, who had just a fourth-grade education, was driving a pedicab when a customer told him to start a company to make glass for water meters. The customer assured him that orders would be guaranteed. Even though he was quite poor, the future CEO borrowed money and built a little factory, which now employs thousands of workers. Little Boss Man saw himself in this story. He also had stopped attending school at a young age. Big Boss Man, one of the managers, shared with me another story about an entrepreneur who had “made it” late in life.

These rags-to-riches stories were told to me with such optimism and conviction, illustrating why actual and perceived social boundaries seemed permeable. For these migrants, China today is a place where former low-wage workers can cross social boundaries to be amongst the ranks of successful businessmen. Even if the chances of that happening are slim and these stories of social mobility are outliers, the fact that migrants looked to these stories as inspiration highlights a sense of opportunity and optimism amongst migrant workers. This outlook supports Whyte’s hypothesis that the average Chinese citizen is hopeful with regards to social mobility because of the abundance of new economic opportunities since the reforms.

Waiting for the right opportunities to come along might make it seem like migrants’ choices are limited, but the precarity within their life empowered them to see an imagined future. For example, when asked how much longer he will work at the restaurant, Little Boss Man said, without mentioning specifics, he originally did not plan on working at the restaurant for as long as he already has, but the situation changed. He was also learning how to drive in hopes of driving for Didi, but new regulations might mean only those with Beijing hukou can drive in Beijing as a Didi driver, forcing Little Boss Man to rethink his plans once again. The uncertainty that comes with adapting to changing circumstances might seem like a limiting factor on their social mobility, but migrants I talked with audaciously hoped of having a story similar to the pedicab driver-turned-CEO’s story because the possibilities of their future seemed open-ended. Though they could not see their path for crossing the social boundary, they saw the boundary as permeable and believed there could be a path for them. This lack of a plan is different from traditional understandings of social mobility. Whereas urbanites depend solely on education for upward mobility, the migrants at the restaurant were open to alternative paths they may not have ever come across.

Migrants believed that hard work could bring social mobility because they were satisfied with even small improvements to their standard of living. Though migrants often spoke about wanting to become their own bosses, realistically they simply desired a “good job,” which did seem to be within their reach. For Hair, success is not getting too hot in the summer or too cold in the winter. So if he had a job that kept him out of the elements and away from physical labor and allowed him to support his family, then he would be satisfied. For Lele, success meant putting happiness first and quitting the job at the restaurant within the next year because he was tired of it. He said, some people “spend the first half of their life using their life to earn money and the latter half using money to buy life,” referring to how some migrants have complete disregard for their health and happiness in their youth in order to earn money and then spend a lot of money in their old age to recuperate. Lele said he is not going to do something he does not like, if he does not quit and look for a job somewhere else, he would never know what opportunities are out there. Lele said, “Some people have plans but I don’t really have any.” Lele emphasized choice rather than limitations, seemingly unfazed by social boundaries. Migrants dreamed big but were practical so working seemed like a plausible alternative path for them to achieve their version of social mobility. When I asked Eyes to give me an example of someone who is successful, he pointed at his childhood best friend, citing how he makes 200,000 yuan ($28,571) a year driving a crane that he owns. He admired how his friend has a house, wife, and child, and they are all able to live comfortably. So even though Eyes acknowledged his life could have been better with education, markers of
success for him did not include a path that required him to go back to school.

CONCLUSION

This study highlights new understandings of social mobility in post-market reform China by making sense of two conflicting trends within the topic—the former revolving around greater inequality and stagnant social mobility and the latter discussing the optimism for social mobility within the Chinese populace. In a society undergoing dramatic socioeconomic transformations, migrant workers embody both the limitations and expectations for social mobility within China today. Despite their marginalization in the city, migrant workers I spoke with were optimistic about their future. Supporting and advancing statistical studies of social mobility in China, particularly building off of Whyte’s (2010) argument that average Chinese citizens are optimistic towards social mobility, this study uses an ethnographic lens to provide insights into migrant workers’ optimism, highlighting how migrants perceive societal forces.

By focusing on assimilation and education, factors that scholars believe are critical to migrants’ chances of social mobility, I argued that migrants saw alternative paths. Migrants viewed their temporary time in the restaurant and Beijing as a stepping stone in a more complex process of migration that eventually involves migrating to wherever better opportunities are located. Limits to migrants’ social mobility were real but did not take away from their positivity regarding the availability of opportunities to them. These opportunities made them feel like their actions and frame of mind can positively impact their chances of social mobility. Whether they were experiencing a psychological rising tide or actual social mobility did not make a difference in their perceptions.

Economic progress in China, in the form of growing opportunities in second and third-tier cities and rising standards of living, was key to migrant workers’ optimism about social mobility. This highlights the continued effectiveness and significance of urban-centered growth, which China’s economic plans have always supported. Rapid economic development since the beginning of the reforms plays a major role in fueling optimism. If economic development were to slow down or halt, optimism would decrease amongst the migrant workers at the restaurant. And if their experience is generalized to the rest of the migrant population, civil unrest can potentially unfold.

The migrants’ optimism towards social mobility was not based on ignorance. Migrants understood the true nature of their socioeconomic situation and made the best of their situation. They evaluated their situation and felt like they could improve their lives. They saw no utility in viewing themselves as subjects manipulated by greater forces. Instead, they saw that they were given a chance since considering themselves as trapped would not improve their situation, whereas continuously working could lead to a brighter future.

However, migrants’ understanding of social mobility does not take away from real limitations to their social mobility due to inequality and marginalization. In discussing alternative paths, I do not discount the reality of limitations. I merely highlight how migrants perceived their situation. As Lele said, “Finding a job is easy but finding a good one is not.” Most are still unable to find work outside of the service and manufacturing industries. To gain social mobility, migrants are limited to starting their own businesses. At its foundation, migration does not solve the problem of inequality; it is a product of inequality and works only as long as there is a continuous flow of opportunities. Once China’s frontiers of economic development disappear, so will the optimism. In addition, hukou will continue to play an important role in separating the migrant population from the rest of the populace. The government has been phasing it out in certain areas but the existence of hukou in cities like Beijing continues to guarantee that inequalities will remain. Hukou system will disappear only when residing in Beijing is no longer dramatic advantage. Until then, it will continue to act as a sign of inequality and as an institutional marker that creates inequality.

My analysis is limited to perceptions of social mobility rather than actual social mobility, even though perceptions are based on actual improvements in their lives and real economic opportunities. It is unclear whether continuous migration or accumulation of skills in the workplace will allow migrants to truly obtain social mobility. Such a conclusion would require a longitudinal study in the years to come. Switching locations and professions does not signify that migrants’ chances of social mobility have increased. Second Cousin was able to quit her job and open a hotel in Guilin. Whether the
hotel succeeds and whether it will allow her to live the life she wanted and provide her daughter with better opportunities is all up in the air. This current second wave of migrant workers are much better off than their predecessors, still, they lack full economic security and social acceptance and they face limited social mobility due to their ascribed status.

Endnotes

3. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, p. 244.
Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market, p. 52.


62. Ibid., pp. 91 and 93.


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INTRODUCTION

Amongst previous security studies, causation, termination, and the success of peace negotiations have been analyzed in great detail. Squeezed in between these studies on causation and termination is the less-discussed topic of war duration. Since wars cost both financial resources, and human lives, understanding the nature and extent of the variables that influence war duration can help save these resources and lives.

An extra state war can be defined as a conflict between a state and non-state actor outside of the state's borders. A non-state actor can include any group not recognized as part of the international state system, including guerilla groups, colonies, and unrecognized nations. Colonial (decolonization) and imperial (colonization) wars are the two main subsets of extra-state conflict. The American Revolution, for example, was a colonial, extra-state war between Great Britain (the state) and the Continental Army (the non-state actor). Even though the present-day United States was a group of colonies controlled by Great Britain at the time, they were outside Great Britain's official borders. The Second Opium war between Great Britain and the Qings and the 2003 invasion of Iraq between the USA and the Al Qaeda/Iraqi Shia militias are also examples of extra-state conflicts. The amount of academic and analytical research dedicated to understanding these conflicts is severely lacking. This neglect is unfortunate since modern terrorist and guerilla organizations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia are increasing the frequency of extra-state conflicts. It is in most of the international community's interest to contain these conflicts and eventually find resolutions.

What influences extra-state war duration? In many studies, intervention becomes key to determining war duration. Military intervention involves a third party contributing soldiers to the war, becoming an actor within the conflict. Economic intervention comes from support and/or sanctions. Diplomatic intervention occurs when a third party enters the...
conflict to mediate and end the conflict. Analyzing the interventions described above, this paper argues that the various types of intervention play a crucial role in extra-state war duration.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In his book, Political Theory and International Relations, Charles Beitz offers the first widely used definition of intervention. He states that intervention has been interpreted as “all actions and policies that constitute impermissible interference in a state’s internal affairs.”\(^3\) It’s important to understand that not all interventions are unwelcome. During the Soviet Quagmire in Afghanistan, for example, the Mujahedeen welcomed Pakistan’s military equipment, training, and bases. In turn, Pakistan welcomed U.S. economic and military support.

In Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention, Anthony Lang defines military intervention as the “use of armed troops to effect a change in the political system of a sovereign state without prior permission and without declaring war.”\(^4\) Lang also touches on diplomatic intervention as a space where conflicts can be resolved.\(^5\) Inadvertently, Lang moves into the realm of war duration and conflict resolution.

Patrick Regan’s 1998 article, “Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice,” completes a working definition of intervention. Regan defines intervention as “convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces.”\(^6\) Although applicable to my study, this definition does not incorporate diplomatic intervention nor does it acknowledge the possibility of an intervention aimed at the authority structures of a non-state group. This paper will use Reagan’s definition of intervention with those two caveats added in.

While the research on extra-state war duration is negligible, analysis of interstate and intrastate war duration is plentiful. Understanding inter, and intra, state war duration will help expound the nature and mechanisms of the basic variables that affect war duration.

Research has been conducted on the role of regime types, intervention, bargaining, information, effectiveness, economics, and initiation in intervention. Researchers like Gartner and Siverson have argued that initiators of war select target actors that will probably not receive third-party help, creating a selection bias when attempting to conduct quantitative research on conflict intervention.\(^7\) Wood, Kathman, and Gent similarly state that third-party actors intervene when they expect to have the greatest impact and shift the balance of power. Moreover, the degree to which intervention influences outcome/duration is determined by the strength of the intervention.\(^8\)

Cunningham, Gleditch, and Salehyan focus their research on non-state actors in intrastate conflicts. They argue that strong rebels will engage in shorter wars because they pose enough of a military challenge to make the government amenable to concessions. Weak rebels can operate in regional peripheries and limit government victories, but are not strong enough to extract concessions, therefore leading to longer wars. Ultimately, if the insurgents can find alternative means to violence while still communicating their political message, the intrastate conflict will be shorter.\(^9\) If rebel groups have some sort of major funding, however, the war will be longer.\(^10\) Balcells and Kalyvas argue that irregular conflicts last longer than traditional conflicts because civilian victimization and guerilla tactics.\(^11\)

Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom outline catalysts for lengthening, or shortening, the duration of a civil war. Low income per capita, high inequality, and a moderate degree of ethnic division can all lengthen a war. A decline in the price of export commodities and external military intervention on behalf of the rebels shorten the war.\(^12\) Patrick Brandt argues that the larger the government’s military in a civil war, the larger the capability gap between the rebel forces and the government, shortening the war. If intervention occurs on the side of the rebels, however, the duration of the civil war will be extended, because of the equalization in the balance of power.\(^13\)

Regan’s research also found that an intervener’s use of force shortens the expected duration of a civil war. Along those lines, a forceful, early intervention shortens the conflict more than a later use of force. According to Regan, an intervention right after the conflict begins is best for reducing duration, while subsequent interventions tend to lead to longer wars. As the war progresses for quite some time, mediation is once again helpful in shortening the expected duration. However, unilateral intervention
in support of the non-state actor early in the conflict will lengthen the duration. Additionally, Regan and Aydin specify that intervention can be divided into military, economic, and diplomatic intervention, where each type functions differently. According to their research, civil war duration is decreased the most when diplomatic and economic interventions are combined.14

Bennett and Stam used empirical data from all the interstate wars between 1816 and 1985 in order to conclude that factors such as strategy, terrain, capabilities, and government type play key roles in interstate war duration. In their research, the data supported the hypothesis that wars will be shorter when more states are involved. As more states form coalitions, the benefits of victory will be distributed to the point that leaders will end up having a difficult time convincing their state to continue fighting.15 Their reasoning supports the findings of Mason, Weingarten, and Fett who state that negotiated settlement will be more likely if the value of payoffs from victory is reduced.16

There are a group of researchers, however, who argue that intervention actually lengthens a conflict. Vasquez contends that wartime alliances reduce the cost of interstate war preparations by pooling resources, therefore sustaining wars for longer periods of time.17 Accordingly, Bueno de Mesquita’s research found that war duration is linked with increases in interstate tightness. In other words, tighter alliances, and blocs, increase war duration and occurrence.18

On intrastate war, Balch-Lindsay argues that when both sides have equitable access to third-party intervention, the civil war will increase exponentially. Third-party interventions increase the chance of stalemates prolonging conflicts. Inequitable distribution of third-party intervention decreases war duration.19 Arguing against Balch-Lindsay, Gates and Lujala found that interventions on behalf of the government in a civil war will increase duration.20

Elbadawi also touches on intervention in civil wars. His research finds that because external intervention reduces the cost of a rebellion, the duration of a civil war will increase.21 Cunningham argues that when an intrastate conflict has more than two actors, war duration will increase. There will be fewer acceptable agreements, a higher likelihood of asymmetrical information, and more shifting alliances inhibiting negotiations.22 Along the same lines, Shirkey found that when third parties enter an interstate conflict later, it complicates negotiations by adding new issues to the war and increasing uncertainty about the balance of forces. More information will be needed to reaching an agreement, increasing the length of the war.23

Another group of researchers tout the value of researching the role of intervention in peace-making. Walter contends that third-party intervention is needed to guarantee a civil war settlement and ensure security for both sides.24 Regan agrees, adding that a combination of economic and diplomatic intervention is the most effective form of conflict resolution.25

Despite the plethora of research available, extending intrastate theory to extra-state wars can be problematic because of the nuances unique to extra-state warfare. In most civil wars, the state actor is pulled into a war against a non-state actor because of a direct threat to government rule. In contrast, due to the geographic distance between the state and non-state actor in extra-state wars, the state does not usually face an existential threat from the non-state actor, affording more of a choice as to whether or not to engage. Rational states enter into a conflict when they believe it will have the greatest impact, as well as the greatest chance of success.26 For most civil wars, however, the immediate security threat of non-state actors pose prevents this decision calculus. In extra-state wars, these states have the opportunity to calculate whether their goals and interests outweigh the potential costs of engagement. Extra-state wars are thus fought by states which believe they have the upper hand, and can resolve the conflict quickly.

However, intrastate and interstate theory are the only available avenues for assessing intervention and extra-state war duration. The literature suggests that the effect of intervention is highly dependent upon the type and side of the assistance, the balance of power, and the nature of the conflict. There have been no major findings, however, regarding extra-state war duration and outcome. With the importance of extra-state wars on the rise, more research needs to be conducted on the variables that affect duration and outcome. Such information will be useful for states embroiled in such conflicts. Although the relationship between intervention and war duration has been revisited countless times, there is no consensus on how intervention affects war duration. Empirical data needs to be further analyzed to understand this
relationship. This research project will fill that gap in the literature by assessing how intervention affects extra-state war duration. Factors like intervention, economics, and capabilities react differently when assessed in an interstate, versus an intrastate, setting. The same applies to extra-state conflicts. While just one factor, it offers insight into how third-party support, or lack thereof, can influence the direction of the war.

HYPOTHESES

I hypothesize that for extra-state wars, military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor will increase duration. External interventions reduce the costs of rebellions, making further conflict feasible, and complicate the bargaining process. If the non-state-side is given military support, the capability imbalance will be reduced. When both sides are more equally matched, it becomes more difficult for either side to gain the upper hand, lengthening the conflict. Furthermore, with interventions, there is an increase in the number of invested actors and therefore an increase in the number of actors who need to settle on a negotiation, lengthening the conflict due to the delay in settlement.27

Hypothesis 1: Military intervention in support of the state actor will increase the duration of the war.

I hypothesize that when an intervention takes place on the side of the state, extra-state war duration will decrease. In any conflict involving a state and a non-state actor, the state actor has more resources and a larger military. The imbalance already exists. Therefore, when a third party actor contributes military support, that imbalance will grow. In effect, the state actor has greater capabilities and renewed optimism to defeat the non-state actor.

It would seem more difficult to reach a negotiated settlement when more actors are involved, which would lengthen the conflict. However, if a state can attract enough military support to severely weaken the non-state actor, there may be no need for a “negotiated” settlement. Rather, the state actor would use its elevated military standing to defeat the non-state actor in a shorter span of time.

Hypothesis 2: Military intervention on the side of the state will decrease duration.

When both sides have equitable third-party military support, the war will likely turn towards a stalemate, lengthening the conflict. If an extra-state conflict has already transformed into a war, then the state was not strong enough to defeat the non-state actor from the start. Rather, the non-state actor was able to use its unconventional tactics and knowledge of the terrain to evade attacks and regroup. Therefore, when both sides of the conflict receive military aid, it gives them the ability to continue the conflict for a longer period of time. The pooling of resources and the increase of total military forces within a conflict contribute to the “means” of continuing a conflict. Without additional resources, we would see that both sides would eventually reach their breaking point where the costs of the war were outweighing the potential benefits. However, with equitable military support, that breaking point becomes harder to reach. Furthermore, if both sides were considering a negotiated settlement, but were offered military aid, they would aim to get their optimal settlement rather than compromising. Since neither side would want to compromise at that point, we would see a reversion back to the conflict, eventually leading to a stalemate.

Hypothesis 3: An equitable distribution of third-party, military aid will increase war duration.

I argue that diplomatic interventions reduce war duration by creating of a negotiation space. Diplomatic interventions also tend to occur when a war is destructive, or long, rendering both parties amenable to a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements without a neutral third party actor, because there are no credible guarantees to decrease instability.35 Diplomatic intervention offers both of those things.

Hypothesis 4: Diplomatic intervention by an international organization or a neutral third party will decrease duration.

Economic sanctions refer to trade embargoes, limitations, and tariffs meant to send a message and coerce a state into acting along internationally accepted lines. It is very difficult to place sanctions on a non-state group because they easily can blend into a country’s population at large. Moreover, trade relationships are almost never established between international organizations/statess and a rebel group. These sanctions are usually not targeted at rebel groups because sanctions will not directly affect them.
Therefore, this research will not test for the effect of economic sanctions on duration.

Economic support, on the other hand, was widely implemented in extra-state wars from 1816 to 2007. This form of intervention works very much in the same way as military support. Usually, when a country offers military support, economic support is included as well. However, economic support does not always directly contribute to security capabilities the way military intervention does. It can come in the form of arms deals, or measures such as loans, grants, and the lowering of tariffs. These forms of support usually apply to a state actor and help keep the state’s economy afloat. If a state can pad its budget in such a way and keep the population’s support for the war, it can most likely continue fighting. In other words, economic support on behalf of the state actor does not directly increase the capability imbalance between the state and non-state actor the same way military support does. It does, however, offer economic cushioning that allows the state to continue warring.36

Hypothesis 5: Economic support for either the state or non-state actor in the conflict will increase duration.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test the hypotheses outlined above, I use a mixed-methods research design. First I engage in quantitative analysis to test for the presence of my phenomena, correlation between military intervention and war duration. The quantitative analysis also provides an overview of trends and the possible effects interventions might have on extra-state war duration. While quantitative analysis is helpful in understanding correlation between military interventions and duration, it is unable to illuminate the validity of my proposed causal mechanisms. Moreover, due to data constraints, the regression analysis is limited to hypotheses related to military interventions, and therefore inevitably fails to address the effect of economic and diplomatic interventions on war duration.

Hence, I utilize case studies to complement the findings of my regression analysis. Case studies are not causal on their own, nor can they prove causality. However, by understanding the events and facts of a number of wars, causal mechanisms can be identified. In other words, the cases will identify some ways in which intervention had a direct or indirect effect on the length of the conflict. Moreover, by analyzing the events before and after an intervention, I will better be able to differentiate between correlation and causation. Since this research just focuses on case studies, there is a possibility of selection bias and the generalization to the greater population of extra-state wars may not be possible. However, in combination with the regression analysis, the case studies will help get closer to an understanding of the motivations behind some interventions, their mechanisms, and how those mechanisms affect extra-state war duration.37

Research Design: Case Studies

According to Gerring, there are two types of case study approaches: descriptive and causal. For the purpose of testing the previously-outlined hypotheses, and identifying causal mechanisms within the relationship between interventions and war duration, I opt for the causal case study route.

Causal case studies aim to understand how the independent variables affect the dependent variable. For the purpose of this research, the case studies will be focused on how intervention affects extra-state war duration; however, they will not be able to identify a precise or numerical effect due to the complexities and multiple variables involved in wars. Gerring argues that this is acceptable for case studies, since the ultimate goal is to discover some working relationship between the variables. Moreover, case studies provide the opportunity to focus on mechanisms and potential confounders, which is useful as a complement to the limited explanations that the regression analysis provides.38

Estimating case studies aim to test a hypothesis and focus on the independent variable. Within the estimating group, longitudinal cases—also known as interrupted time series—observe the dependent variable before and after a change occurs in the independent variable, while holding the controls constant.39

Diagnostic cases are used to confirm, reject, or refine hypotheses that have already been tested and, as such, they are very useful in identifying causal mechanisms to confirm and explain hypotheses. Within Diagnostic cases, pathway cases indicate a strong relationship between the variables and hence make it viable to identify causal mechanisms.40

To test hypothesis 3 and discover whether an
equitable distribution of military interventions will increase duration, I will use the case of the Western Sahara War. This case falls in the Diagnostic Pathway group. This is the only extra-state conflict with military interventions on behalf of both the state and the non-state actor. In other words, this case is the only opportunity to see the effect of two-sided military interventions on war duration. The war lasted almost 98 months, while the average for all extra-state wars is about 26 months, indicating a strong positive correlation between the interventions and duration. This case will be complex because of the multiple interventions, but it will also provide plenty of opportunities to assess causal mechanisms of intervention on duration. Moreover, this case can help elucidate the potential differences in how intervention affects duration depending on which side of the conflict it takes place on.

For hypothesis 4, I will analyze the Cisplatine War, which had diplomatic intervention, but no military or economic intervention. This case falls in the Estimating Longitudinal group, because it attempts to test the relationship between the independent and dependent variable without any previous quantitative analysis. Moreover, this case study will heavily focus on the independent variable (diplomatic intervention) and isolate it from other types of intervention thus providing opportunities to identify causal mechanisms.

Lastly, the Mozambique War will be used to test hypothesis 5. This war had economic intervention, but no military or diplomatic intervention. This case is also an Estimating Longitudinal case because the hypothesis has not been previously tested, and the case was chosen based on the independent variable. Again, by isolating economic intervention, this case will help us understand how economic intervention affects duration.

These three cases will not single-handedly prove their respective hypotheses. However, they will contribute to our understanding of how the different types of intervention potentially play a causal role in war duration. Hence, the case study analysis is more geared towards isolating the various causal mechanisms of intervention in order to support, or detract from, the findings of the regression analysis.

Regression Analysis: Operationalization of Variables

The Correlates of War dataset on extra-state wars ranges from 1816 to 2007. Duration is defined as how long a war lasts and hinges on the definition of war itself. A war is a conflict with at least 1,000 battle deaths per twelve-month period. For this project and based on the specificity of the Correlates of War data, duration will be defined in months. There were many instances where the war could have been measured by days, but, due to the numerous cases where only the months were available, this research will focus on months.

Military intervention will be included as a nominal-level set for how many interventions occurred. According to Correlates of War, “to be coded as a participant, a state must either commit 1,000 troops to operations in the combat zone or suffer a hundred battle-deaths in the course of such operations.”

Most cases of military interventions will either be coded zero for no intervention or one for the presence of interventions. The interventions will then be divided by which side they were on behalf of—the state or non-state actor. Moreover, in order to partially account for the wide spectrum of motivations involved with military interventions, the cases will be divided based on timing of the intervention. Military intervention will be divided into three groups: within the first year, after the first year, and after the first five years. Although the exact reasoning behind each intervention cannot be clearly delineated, a military intervention within the first six months of a conflict and an intervention after five years of a conflict might have different characteristics, whether it has to do with goals, military power, or economic prosperity. If not, these regressions will produce equal results. In addition, the interventions will be divided based on whether they were part of a coalition (like in the case of the invasion of Afghanistan) or a unilateral decision (like the French intervention in the Moroccan Rif war).

Controls will include:
1) War Type: colonial war or imperial war
2) Number of state battle deaths
3) Number of non-state battle deaths

Regression Analysis

To test my hypotheses, I conduct an Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) analysis, which will provide data on how military intervention and duration are correlated. If that analysis proves a statistically significant correlation, I can take the next step by identifying potential causal mechanisms through case studies.
regression, I conduct regressions on more specific aspects of intervention. First, I conduct a multivariate regression for military interventions on the side of the state as well as the non-state actor. These regressions will either support or take away from the overall regression analysis and also lend some data to test my first two hypotheses. The one case where military intervention took place on both sides of the conflict will be included in both the state intervention and non-state intervention groups.

Military interventions occur with different motivations and interests. Some states hope to see a conflict come to an end and choose to intervene for that reason. Other states use military intervention to continue the conflict in hopes that the involved countries will be weakened. It is very difficult to understand the motivations/interests driving a military intervention through quantitative analysis, and therefore it is difficult to assess the intended effects and mechanisms of interventions.

I will conduct another set of regressions to test how these different military intervention timings affected duration. It is important to note that these groups of intervention timing will not be compared to one another, but rather compared to the overall regression conducted at the start of this analysis to see if there are any conflicting results. It would not make sense to compare these groups to one another, because wars that attract intervention after five years and wars that attract intervention within six months are not comparable samples of the larger population of extra-state conflicts. In essence, there are too many unobserved variables that make these types of wars too different for comparison.

To finish off this robustness check, a last regression will be conducted, dividing military intervention into a coalition group and a non-coalition group. Coalitions occur when a state enters into a war with supporters already contributing to its side. In the overall regression, coalitions and non-coalitions are not distinguished as different types of intervention. This is because in the few cases of coalition conflicts, there is usually one state that leads the conflict, with the others providing military support. In the case of Afghanistan, the United States was leading the operation with British assistance. However, to check the robustness of this design choice, a regression separating coalitions and non-coalition interventions will be necessary.
As mentioned before, all of these regressions will have the same controls. These controls will be whether the war was colonial or imperial, the number of state battle deaths, the number of non-state battle deaths, initiator, outcome, region, and whether the extra-state war was transformed from another type of war.

Regression Analysis: Constraints

Interventions are not random, which creates a possibility of omitted variable bias. The type of conflict that attracts an intervention, regardless of whether that intervention was military, economic, or diplomatic, may involve another variable which truly determines the duration of the conflict. This makes it extremely difficult to isolate intervention as a causal factor explaining war duration. The Correlates of War data on extra-state wars runs from 1816 to 2007, stating only whether a military intervention occurred, and omitting economic and diplomatic interventions. In some situations, states neglect to reveal that they economically supported a party in an extra-state conflict due to fear of international repercussions. These “secret” interventions make it very difficult to categorize all military interventions and keep them separate from possible economic/military support that might have been occurring covertly.

Moreover, Correlates of War does not have data on the number of troops committed, number of weapons given, amount of aid, training etc. Even if this data was accessible, its accuracy could be debated since many states do not reveal the extent of their intervention.

Another categorization issue comes up with coalitions. Some extra-state wars are fought between a coalition of states and a non-state actor (for example, the invasion of Afghanistan consisted of a coalition of states attacking Al-Qaeda). Usually, a coalition is headed by a single state (as was the United States in the case of Afghanistan). The question then becomes whether to count such a coalition war as a non-intervention war, or count the other members of the coalition as interveners. For the purposes of this research, coalitions are considered as cases of intervention. However, the regression analysis will include the control of whether the interventions were coalitions or not.

Other published studies have similar constraints due to the nature of the topic. I understand that these constraints exist and make it difficult to isolate intervention as a causal factor in war duration. However, going forward with this research helps us understand a little more how intervention and war duration interact.

RESULTS

Before conducting the OLS regression analysis on the military interventions in extra-state wars, a survey of the descriptive statistics of these cases is necessary. As illustrated by Table 1, there were 162 extra-state wars since 1816. The duration, measured in months, averaged around twenty-six months, with the shortest war lasting four days (Allied bombardment of Algiers) and the longest war lasting nearly fourteen years (Angolan-Portuguese war). There were seventeen cases of military intervention—fifteen on behalf of the state, and three on behalf of the non-state actor. In those cases, only the Western Sahara War had both a state and non-state-side intervention.

With regard to timing, twelve of the interventions took place within the first year of the conflict, while five took place after the first year. There were no interventions that took place after five years of an ongoing conflict. Similarly, twelve of the interventions involved coalitions, while five did not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Range (min-max)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration (months)</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.167-166.733</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>33.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intervention</td>
<td>17 interventions</td>
<td>0: No intervention 1: Intervention</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State side</td>
<td>15 state-side interventions</td>
<td>0: No state side intervention 1: State side intervention</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-State side</td>
<td>3 non-state side interventions</td>
<td>0: No non-state side intervention 1: Non-state side intervention</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>17 interventions</td>
<td>0: No intervention 1: Within the first year 2: After the first year 3: After five years</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>5 coalitions</td>
<td>0: No intervention 1: Intervention without coalition 2: Intervention with coalition</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 tests the correlation between the occurrence
of military intervention and war duration. The regression reveals that extra-state wars with military intervention are, on average, twenty-four months longer than wars without military intervention. The control variables that do correlate with war duration are the type of war, whether the conflict transformed from another type of war, the number of state-side battle deaths, and the number of non-state-side battle deaths.

Model 2 tested to see whether only military interventions on behalf of the state correlated with war duration. Similar to Model 1, Model 2 shows that wars with state-side intervention are on average twenty-two months longer than wars without state-side intervention. For this model, the only statistically significant controls were the type of war and battle deaths for both sides of the conflict. Hypothesis 2 stated that war duration will decrease if there is intervention on behalf of the state, and thus was not supported by Model 2’s findings.

Model 3 focused on wars with military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor. There were only three cases with such intervention. These cases were, on average, almost fifty-four months longer than wars without non-state-side intervention. This model does support Hypothesis 3, which stated that war duration would increase with military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor.

Model 4 looks at the differences involved with military intervention timing. According to this regression, wars that had an intervention within the first year of conflict were on average seventeen months longer than wars without any military intervention. Moreover, wars that had an intervention after the first year were about thirty-four months longer than wars without interventions, and seventeen months longer than wars that had an intervention within the first year. Lastly, Model 5 looks at the duration of conflicts with coalition interventions and non-coalition interventions. Wars with a non-coalition intervention were, on average, almost fifteen months longer than wars without any intervention. Wars with coalition interventions were about twenty-nine months longer than wars without any intervention, and about fifteen months longer than wars that had a non-coalition intervention.

**Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regression: Extra-state War Duration and Intervention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration (months)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Intervention</td>
<td>24.041** (3.03)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State side</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.120* (2.57)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-State side</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53.674** (2.87)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.837** (2.96)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.616* (2.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Type (Colonial or Imperial)</td>
<td>-11.058* (-2.04)</td>
<td>-10.925* (-2.00)</td>
<td>-12.600* (-2.31)</td>
<td>-11.064* (-2.04)</td>
<td>-10.630 (-1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator (State or Non-State)</td>
<td>0.706 (0.14)</td>
<td>1.471 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.284 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.167 (-0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome of the Conflict</td>
<td>1.932 (1.13)</td>
<td>2.032 (1.18)</td>
<td>1.767 (1.03)</td>
<td>2.326 (1.38)</td>
<td>2.054 (1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformed from another type of war</td>
<td>29.310* (2.26)</td>
<td>26.316 (1.95)</td>
<td>47.591*** (3.62)</td>
<td>31.694* (2.47)</td>
<td>35.410** (2.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformed to another type of war</td>
<td>8.310 (0.74)</td>
<td>14.451 (1.26)</td>
<td>-1.649 (-0.14)</td>
<td>5.661 (0.50)</td>
<td>5.897 (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of the conflict</td>
<td>0.086 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.468 (0.39)</td>
<td>0.144 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.145 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Battle Deaths</td>
<td>.0005** (2.49)</td>
<td>.0005* (2.39)</td>
<td>.0006** (3.01)</td>
<td>.0005* (2.51)</td>
<td>.0005* (2.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state Battle Deaths</td>
<td>.00032 (2.18)</td>
<td>.0003* (2.19)</td>
<td>.0002 (1.85)</td>
<td>.0003* (2.16)</td>
<td>.00032 (2.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>19.625* (2.54)</td>
<td>19.135* (2.46)</td>
<td>20.237* (2.61)</td>
<td>19.271* (2.50)</td>
<td>19.650* (2.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* t statistics in parentheses
** p<.05, *** p<.01, **** p<.001

Figure 1 illustrates the differences in duration between intervention on behalf of the state versus the non-state actor. The data supports the hypothesis that military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor will correlate to higher duration (hypothesis 1). However, this same data does not support the hypothesis that military intervention will correlate to lower durations (hypothesis 2). Figure 1 shows that intervention correlates to higher durations more when...
the intervention was on behalf of the non-state actor, but the overall intervention-duration regression line seems closely aligned to the state-side intervention regression line. This might be attributed to the fact that a large majority of all interventions were on behalf of the state actor.

Although this graph detracts from the strength of hypothesis 2, it does support the theory forming the basis of the first two hypotheses. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were based on the idea that the non-state actor and state actor have a large capacity gap. In essence, the state actor is most probably in the advantaged situation. Hence, if a state actor receives military support, the capacity gap widens, allowing for the state to defeat the non-state actor quicker. However, if the non-state actor receives military support, the capacity gap closes, leveling the playing field and protracting the conflict.

Figure 1 shows that military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor correlates to higher durations than interventions on the state-side. In other words, an increase in military support for the non-state actor allows them to close the capacity gap enough to continue the conflict. This effect rings true for military interventions on behalf of the state as well, but not to the same degree. The case studies in the second half of this paper will help illuminate how the effects of military interventions may differ based on which side they are on behalf of.

Figure 1: Extra-state War Duration by Interventions on Behalf of the State and Non-State Actor

Overall, these regressions show a strong positive correlation between military interventions and extra-state war duration. However, the issue of omitted variable bias has not disappeared. For example, Model 3 showed that conflicts with military interventions on behalf of the non-state actor were approximately fifty-four months longer than conflicts without that type of intervention. It could be that conflicts that happen to attract military intervention on the side of the non-state actor have another characteristic which elongates the war. Although this problem still exists, the regression analysis tells us that conflicts with military intervention last much longer than conflicts without military intervention. This regression analysis has not proved that military intervention is the causal link between the varying degrees of duration. However, it gives us some insight into how extra-state conflicts can be characteristically different, and that military intervention interacts with these characteristics. This regression analysis solely focuses on the effects of military intervention on duration, due to the lack of statistical data on diplomatic and economic interventions. However, as mentioned in the literature review, military, economic, and diplomatic intervention are not mutually exclusive. In some wars, all three types of intervention are present and interact with each other to affect the duration of the conflict. For example, when a state decides to militarily intervene in a conflict, it will most likely also give economic aid to the side it is supporting.42 To understand how the various types of intervention interact with each other, and to test Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, a case study analysis will be conducted.

CASE 1: EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS


The Western Sahara War took place between mainly Morocco and the Polisario Front, who claimed self-determination, from 1975 to 1983, outside of Morocco’s internationally recognized borders. For the next eight years the conflict continued at low-level intensity until a ceasefire was signed in 1991.

This conflict involves all three types of intervention. The Polisario received economic support from Libya and Algeria. Algeria played a much larger role and even engaged in military combat in the beginning of the conflict. Mauritania entered the war with Morocco as a coalition, providing military support. Although this was a coalition, Mauritania played a minor role compared to Morocco, which is why this conflict is usually framed as taking place between Morocco and the Polisario. Moreover, the
United States, Saudi Arabia, and France provided varying levels of economic support to Morocco. In addition, France provided limited military intervention through an aerial bombing campaign. Lastly, although the conflict was no longer considered a war by 1991, a UN-sponsored ceasefire (diplomatic intervention) is what ended the conflict. However, the actual “war” ended in 1983 merely out of a decrease in operational activities and battle deaths.

Given that the Western Sahara War is characterized by military interventions on both sides, I am able to test Hypothesis 3, which states that if there is an equitable distribution of third party military interventions, war duration will increase. In addition, there are instances of economic intervention on both sides. In many conflicts, different types of interventions overlap and interact with each other. Since this conflict has a high correlation between intervention and duration, the purpose of using this case is not necessarily just to identify whether intervention increases/decreases duration. Rather, this case provides ample opportunity to identify how military or economic intervention affects duration and through which mechanisms. Hence, it falls under the Diagnostic Pathway case group.

In sum, this case is looking to understand whether and how military and economic interventions increase war duration. I hypothesize that the interventions gave both sides the means to fight, whether through weapons or economic support, prolonging the conflict. According to Weisiger, Vasquez, Bennett and Stam, without additional resources, both sides would reach their breaking point sooner where the costs of the war would outweigh the benefits. Hence, when both sides receive military aid, they feel less need to compromise and continue fighting until a stalemate.

Historical Overview
Morocco achieved independence from French and, to a lesser extent, Spanish control in 1956. The territory of Western Sahara was under Spanish control until 1975, when Spain handed control to Morocco and Mauritania. The Sahrawi people of Western Sahara developed a sense of identity and nationalism for a few decades prior to this transfer and, by 1973, created the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (the Polisario Front) in order to stake a claim for self-determination. This group called for an armed struggle to resist the Spanish and for the creation of a state separate from Morocco and Mauritania. On October 15, 1975, the UN Mission to Spanish Sahara came out in favor of Western Saharan self-determination. The International Court of Justice issued a ruling against Morocco claiming the Western Sahara. In response, Hassan II of Morocco made plans for the “Green March” on the same day as the ICJ ruling. The Green March culminated on November 6, 1975, during which about 350,000 unarmed Moroccans made their way over to the Western Sahara on foot in order to claim it for Morocco.

On November 14, 1975, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the Madrid Accords, which would divide the Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. As Spain prepared to withdraw, the Polisario began attacking Moroccan and Mauritanian forces, beginning the Western Sahara War on December 11, 1975. The Polisario Front utilized their knowledge of the terrain and guerilla tactics to throw both Moroccan and Mauritanian forces off. However, due to the war, many Sahrawis fled to neighboring Algeria.

By February of 1976, the Polisario Front created the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Soon enough, the effective guerilla tactics on supply lines and military bases forced Mauritania to withdraw and eventually recognize the SADR in 1979. Morocco responded by starting the “Berm” initiative which consisted of building large walls around Polisario-dominated regions from 1981 to 1987. The decrease in war intensity is somewhat contributed to the Berm, as well as to Morocco’s strained economy. In September of 1991, both parties agreed to a UN ceasefire which called for a referendum on the future of Western Sahara. However, that referendum is still in discussion mainly due to a disagreement on voter eligibility.

Intervention
On Behalf of the Polisario Front
Although Algeria militarily intervened on behalf of the Polisario, that intervention was preceded and succeeded by a long economic relationship with the rebel group. Rather than having a drastic effect on the duration of the war, the short-lived military intervention bolstered Algeria’s commitment to the Polisario and solidified their economic relationship. 

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1. Although multiple occurrences of intervention may complicate the causal effect between one type of intervention and duration, many conflicts have the same issue. If we are to look for external validity and apply some of the identified mechanisms to other cases, the case cannot be purely unique.
Although Algeria was the main supporter of the Polisario, it was not the first. Starting in 1973, Libya was the sole economic supporter of the Polisario. Using profits from its oil resources, Libya contributed weapons, training, and even broadcasting capabilities. However, any weapons it sent had to go through Algeria and needed Algerian permission. Therefore, the Polisario did receive limited support from Algeria, although their weapons were exclusively Libyan from 1973 to 1975. Libya continued to offer its economic support up until 1984, when it signed the Treaty of Ouja with Morocco. This treaty arose out of Gaddafi’s fears of a Balkanized Maghreb and an increase in regional issues. However, the initial Libyan aid began a relationship between Algeria and the Polisario.

At the start of the conflict, Algeria was more concerned with maintaining its détente with Morocco than it was with promoting self-determination in Western Sahara. However, the release of the UN and ICJ opinions on Western Sahara’s right to self-determination along with Morocco’s Green March shifted Algeria’s outlook. The Algerian President, Boumedienne, became horrified by the lack of self-determination, Morocco’s perpetual thirst for expansion, and the potential of using profits from the phosphate found in the Western Sahara to fund weapons research. Algeria watched as the Polisario executed small but successful guerilla attacks against the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces. Their ability to rally support amongst their people and organize effective military strategies impressed Algerian officials. The UN/ICJ rulings on self-determination, Polisario’s effectiveness, and the potential of getting access to an Atlantic trading port all contributed to Algeria’s decision to militarily and economically support the Polisario.

The Polisario rose to a new level of militancy after receiving Algerian weapons and support. With new weapons, the Polisario could wage a proper war of attrition against the Moroccans. Coupled with their pre-existing knowledge of the terrain and extensive use of guerilla tactics, the Polisario became a real threat to the Moroccan military. Moreover, Algeria accepted and supported the thousands of Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf and other camps. In fact, almost one half of the native population have lived as refugees in Algeria since 1976. It is estimated that Algeria spent $50,000 a day supporting refugees in the late 1970s alone. In addition, refugee camps such as the one in Tindouf served as training and recruitment sanctuaries for Polisario fighters. By 1979, Morocco had begun relying on air power to track and attack Polisario units. Normally, on such a small area of land, this would prove to be destructive. Even though the Polisario mostly operated at night, the Moroccan military had advanced infrared technology. However, the Polisario received SAM 7 missiles and anti-aircraft training from the Algerian military. Through effective use of the training and technology, the Polisario were able to evade many of Morocco’s air attacks. The economic and humanitarian aid to the Polisario was essentially enough to keep the rebel group afloat and effective.

Algeria’s short military intervention at the start of the conflict solidified its economic support for the Polisario. On January 27, 1976, Moroccan troops attacked armed Algerian troops in Amgala, Western Sahara—close to the Algerian border. These Algerian troops claimed they were stationed there to help with the stream of refugees coming in. The Battle of Amgala ensued for thirty-six hours with about 400 Moroccan deaths and 200 Algerian deaths. The Algerian troops retreated, but tensions remained high, and fighting resumed in February of 1976 for two days. Although Algeria did not contribute troops to the conflict after these two instances, the military intervention did highlight its motivations for involving itself in the war. In the battles of Amgala, Algeria witnessed Morocco’s refusal of Sahrawi self-determination and its lust for territorial expansion. Having been initially attacked by Moroccan troops, and after investing so much, Algeria could not end its support for the Polisario after investing so much. Moreover, Polisario success against the Moroccan troops only strengthened Algeria’s resolve to continue supporting the guerilla group.

In essence, the support of Libya and Algeria helped transform the Polisario into an almost conventional army within a couple years. Prior to both Libyan and Algerian support, the Polisario was a disorganized band of Sahrawi nationalists; in 1975, the Polisario was composed of about 800 men with very few weapons. They were confined to a small tract of land stretching from Guelta to the Algerian border, which made it easier for Moroccan aircrafts to track them. Thus, the war was not predicted to last long because of the severe capability differences between the two actors. Nonetheless, with help from Libya’s
broadcasting channels and Algeria’s radio station, the Polisario grew from 800 men in 1975 to 10,000 men in 1977, and to almost 20,000 men in 1981.65 In essence, Libyan and Algerian support helped transform the Polisario into an almost conventional army within a couple years. By the mid-1980s, the Polisario had about a hundred tanks, sixty carriers, and a hundred artillery units.66 Ultimately, Algerian and, to a lesser extent, Libyan support helped build the Polisario from a small guerilla group into an effective and successful military.

**On Behalf of Morocco**

Mauritania’s military intervention on behalf of Morocco is significant not because of the effect of the actual military intervention, but because it brought in what were soon to be two of Morocco’s most powerful allies: France and the United States. Although Mauritania’s military intervention sparked the entrance of these other two players, it was through France’s and the United States’ economic aid that Morocco was able to sustain its crumbling economy.

Mauritania is considered a military intervener on behalf of Morocco because it entered the war in a coalition with Morocco. However, being a much weaker ally, Mauritania was never considered a major belligerent in the war. In fact, it only took a part in the conflict for three years. Mauritania’s resources and military were much smaller than those of Morocco.67 In 1976, Mauritania’s army consisted of about 5,000 troops.68 In comparison, Morocco’s standing army ranged from 60,000 to 80,000 troops. In essence, Mauritania, limited by its own capabilities, was only able to commit very few human and material resources.

The Polisario’s subsidiary goal was to attack and weaken Mauritania’s government to the point that they could back out of the conflict and seek peace purely for survival. This would allow the Polisario to concentrate their forces on Morocco. From 1976 to 1977, the Polisario executed concentrated attacks on several Mauritanian cities. By 1977, Mauritanian casualties included 1,600 deaths, 900 wounded, and sixteen prisoners of war. The costs of war took up about 40% of Mauritania’s state budget in 1977, eventually rising to 60% in 1978. Apart from the financial assistance of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Ivory Coast, Mauritania mostly received aid from France.69 The Franco-Mauritanian military agreement resulted in extensive French aid to its former colony. Using their base in Dakar, Senegal, France conducted Jaguar air strikes against Sahrawi columns in Mauritania from December 1977 to July 1978.70 Moreover, France’s aid boosted Mauritania’s military from 5,000 troops in 1976 to about 17,000 troops in 1978.71 However, the economic burden coupled with the extensive drought made the government unpopular with the Mauritanian people, leading to a coup in 1978.72

Realizing Mauritania’s dwindling chances, France ended its intervention.73 Soon after, Mauritania signed a peace agreement with the Polisario on August 5, 1979.74

Although Mauritanian intervention was limited, it brought in a powerful ally for the Moroccans: the French. France continued to support Morocco throughout the conflict. Morocco received about $2 billion in weapons from France—including jets, missiles, helicopters, gunships, and intelligence-gathering technologies—only half of which was purchased.75 Other countries that provided weapons and aid included: Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Iraq, South Africa, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Brazil. However, compared to the United States and Saudi Arabia, these countries were minor contributors to Moroccan military capabilities.76

The loss of Mauritania’s troops severely burdened Morocco’s strategic and tactical potential for success. Morocco’s failure to quickly subdue the Polisario prompted the United States, (as well as Saudi Arabia and France) to support Morocco against the “socialist” Polisario. From 1976 to 1984, the United States spent $1 million a year just training Moroccan officers, pilots, and counterinsurgency (COIN) specialists. By 1982, there were about one hundred American advisors in Morocco training Moroccan troops at U.S. bases on missile countermeasures and evasion.77 In terms of training, the United States trained over 1500 troops in exchange for $17 million. The United States provided about $140-$150 million a year in loans and grants, and sold about $150 million in arms in 1980 itself.78 Moreover, Morocco received about $750 million in Foreign Military Sales and $150 million in Commercial Sales. Ultimately, about one-fourth of all Moroccan military purchases came from the United States.79

As the Moroccan economy turned for the worse in the mid-1980s due to a two year drought, budget limitations, costs of war, world recession, and inflation,
the United States found ways to keep it afloat.\textsuperscript{80} By 1983, Morocco was $11 billion in debt, but in the early 1980s, the IMF issued its largest rescue operation in the developing world, providing $1 billion in standby credit on President Reagan's request. The United States also increased its Foreign Military Sales Credits to $100 million in 1982, in the hopes that Morocco would get closer to winning the war.\textsuperscript{81} Moreover, due to the ongoing conflict, many foreign investors pulled out of Morocco's phosphate industry, but soon enough, American investors began supporting the phosphate industry mining.\textsuperscript{82} Saudi Arabia also provided a major support system for the Moroccan economy. In 1979, when Morocco's war costs exceeded 40% of its state budget, Saudi Arabia began its economic aid to ease the burden.\textsuperscript{83} Throughout the war, Saudi Arabia gave about $1 billion a year in aid to Morocco.\textsuperscript{84} Saudi Arabia's reasoning was similar to that of the United States; it saw a weakening Morocco succumbing to a guerrilla non-state actor.

The aid from the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia had a drastic effect on the size and effectiveness of the Moroccan military. In 1975, the Moroccan army consisted of 60,000 troops. However, by just 1978, the army grew to 80,000 troops; in 1979, the army consisted of 120,000 troops.\textsuperscript{85} In 1978, the military budget was $760 million.\textsuperscript{86} At the initial onset of the conflict, Morocco quickly took over all Western Saharan settlements and outposts, hoping to remove any form of cover available to the Polisario. Although there was initial success in disorganizing the Polisario, the guerrilla group quickly regrouped and strategized. Soon enough, the Polisario were using their anti-missile technology (from Algeria and Libya) to shoot down Moroccan planes. On top of that, their knowledge of the terrain made it extremely difficult for Moroccan troops to locate and disband them.\textsuperscript{87} The Moroccan military had to refocus on defense fortifications.\textsuperscript{88}

If it were not for third party aid, Morocco's switch to defense fortifications would have resulted in a collapsed economy and political system. On account of the weapons technology Morocco received, the U.S. ambassador to Morocco and the Institute for Strategic Studies both predicted that the desert terrain would allow for a rapid COIN campaign.\textsuperscript{89} However, Western Saharan terrain was actually amenable to guerrilla activities, due to good cover and areas for small bases. Even with the infrared technology given by the United States and France, the issues of poor training, particle haze, and inability to cover remote outposts, forced the Moroccans into a defensive position. By 1977, Moroccan casualties included 4,200 dead, 2,800 wounded, and ninety-six imprisoned. Taking a marginally offensive position, Moroccan began using mechanized army units and air power in 1979.\textsuperscript{90} However, air attacks produced less-than-satisfactory results, due to the Polisario's anti-aircraft technology and training. By 1981, Morocco only controlled 10% of the Western Sahara territory.

From 1982 to 1991, Morocco built a series of walls called "The Berm," which encircled about 200,000 km\textsuperscript{2} of the 260,000 km\textsuperscript{2} of the Western Sahara, forcing the Polisario to conduct concentrated attacks on the walls themselves. The Berm became extremely costly and only furthered the long war of attrition. Indeed, by building the wall, Morocco had almost accepted that the conflict would conclude with a long-awaited stalemate.

The costs of the war put a heavy burden on the Moroccan economy. By 1983, Morocco was spending $1.9 billion per year on the conflict and maintaining over 100,000 troops just in the Western Sahara territory. By 1987, Moroccan spending rose to $1 million a day in 1987.\textsuperscript{91} In 1984, Moroccan debt reached over $13 billion, leading the government to cut subsidies for basic foods, welfare, infrastructure, public investment, and to devalue its currency.\textsuperscript{92} According to the 1981 World Bank report, about 40% of the Moroccan population was living below poverty.\textsuperscript{93} Moreover, Morocco's phosphate exports declined dramatically after mine attacks by the Polisario, which made investors reluctant to offer their capital. The mining industry was only uplifted through U.S. investment.\textsuperscript{94} Soaring security expenditures, the phosphate export collapse, the increased cost of fuel imports, and rising food imports brought on widespread protests in 1981 and 1984, mostly in the form of antiwar propaganda.\textsuperscript{95} However, Morocco was only able to continue financing the conflict through gifts from Saudi Arabia and weapon loans from the United States.\textsuperscript{96} With foreign economic support, the Moroccan military was able to obtain 524 tanks, 785 carriers, and 2,000 artillery units by the 1990s.\textsuperscript{97} Ultimately, Morocco could not have sustained its conflict with the Polisario economically if it were not for its rich and invested allies.
Impact

In many cases of extra-state war, military and economic interventions overlap, making it extremely difficult to isolate the effect of each type of intervention. However, the Western Sahara War had relatively limited military intervention, when compared to the excessive instances of economic intervention. On the side of the Polisario, Algeria engaged in two small-scale skirmishes at the start of the conflict. These interventions were not even planned or intentional but rose more out of spontaneous conflict between Moroccan and Algerian troops. Morocco entered the war in a coalition with Mauritania, but Mauritania left the conflict after three years. However, even in those three years, Mauritania committed a relatively low number of troops and material resources, and its involvement was largely supported by the French. Both these interventions were limited, not extensively altering the military capabilities of either actor. The Algerian skirmishes did not enhance or limit the Polisario’s ability to wage a guerilla war against Moroccan troops.

In the Moroccan-Mauritanian case, Mauritania’s intervention forced the Polisario to initially focus their attacks on them rather than on the Moroccans. In that sense, Morocco was able to buy time from 1976 to 1979, without facing the brunt of the Polisario attacks; it did not have to expend as many resources or lose as many troops while the Polisario concentrated their efforts against Mauritania. Thus, the two-front war temporally extended Morocco’s ability to wage a longer war with the Polisario. It did not have to expend as many resources or lose as many troops while the Polisario concentrated their efforts against Mauritania.

What these military interventions have in common is that they brought in economic interventions. Algeria became more firm in its campaign against Morocco after seeing how the skirmishes in Amgala turned out and brought on French support. Moreover, when Mauritania signed the peace agreement, the United States and Saudi Arabia saw a weak Morocco in much need of military and financial aid. The seemingly endless flow of aid made it impossible for either side to achieve a military solution, eventually leading to a stalemate. In essence, the economic interventions increased the ability to wage war without shortening the duration, which can be attributed to the fact that all the state actors involved preferred an endless war to a solution where either side might come out stronger. Consequently, foreign powers continued to give more and more assistance to persuade the other side to surrender. This, in essence, led to a regional arms race between the Polisario and Morocco, prolonging the conflict. Each side was able to obtain the resources to continue the conflict. In other words, they did not face enough economic pressure to actively seek some sort of settlement.

In the Western Sahara case, military intervention inadvertently brought on economic intervention. Although the military intervention itself did not extensively alter the paradigm of the conflict, it allowed for economic interventions to raise the capabilities of both sides. With higher military capabilities, both actors felt less pressure to compromise and continued fighting in the hopes of getting a settlement that would solely benefit them.

In the Western Saharan case, military intervention led to economic support, which in turn increased the capabilities of both sides, making it seem like each side could achieve its initial goals. In other words, this case supports the hypothesis that an equitable distribution of military interventions increases war duration. The next case, the Cisplatine War, will focus on the effect of diplomatic intervention on duration.

CASE 2: DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION

The Cisplatine War, 1825-1828

The Cisplatine War took place from 1825 to 1828 and was initially between Brazil and a small guerilla group from Buenos Aires called the 33 Orientals. The conflict was over a contested territory called La Banda Oriental, which would later become Uruguay. Due to the low-intensity level of violence, this conflict on its own could not be considered a war. However, it sparked a larger militarized conflict largely between the United Provinces of the River Plate (later to become Argentina) and Brazil. The war ended in 1828 due to British mediation.

In 1825, the United Provinces of the River Plate was not an internationally recognized state and was, more accurately, a loose confederation of provinces. Therefore, the Cisplatine War falls under the extra-state categorization because it was a conflict between a system member, the Empire of Brazil, and a non-system member, The United Provinces of the River Plate.
The Cisplatine War was chosen to test Hypothesis 4, which states that diplomatic intervention by an international organization or neutral third party will decrease duration. This case falls under the Estimating Longitudinal group. There is no previous quantitative data supporting or rejecting this hypothesis, and the case focuses mostly on the independent variable of diplomatic intervention. The Cisplatine War does not have clear evidence of influential external military nor economic intervention. Therefore, the characteristics of the case will make it simpler to understand the relationship between diplomatic intervention and extra-state war duration as a function of diplomatic intervention.

According to Slantchev and Cunningham, a third party facilitates the exchange of information, in essence resulting in its role as a channel for negotiation and thus decreasing the degree of uncertainty. However, it is also important to note that the character of the third party is vital; it must be a state or organization that is legitimate and powerful in the eyes of the actors. In the Cisplatine War, the British diplomatic intervention was successful in shortening the duration of the war because both actors were economically dependent on Great Britain.

Historical Overview

The border between Portuguese Brazil and the Spanish Empire had been contentious since the 1680s. By the eighteenth century, Portugal had occupied most of the Banda Oriental, while Spain developed small towns in the region like Montevideo. In the early 1800s, Jose Gervasio Artigas led a war for the region's independence for almost a decade. In 1821, however, a referendum gave control of the land to Brazil. The United Provinces of the River Plate (UPRP) never accepted those results.

In 1825, Juan Antonio Lavalleja, one of Artigas's former lieutenants, led an expedition with 33 “Orientals” from Buenos Aires to the Banda Oriental. They waged war on April 19, 1825, joined by former lieutenant Fructoso Rivera and thousands of supporters. While the “Orientals” only had around a few thousand individuals by the end of 1826, armed with just basic guns and bayonets, an understanding of the terrain and mobilization of rural citizens allowed the insurgency group to outperform Brazil's military. The Brazilians were unable to distinguish between civilian and combatant. As a result, by 1827, the “Orientals” controlled the entire region except for Montevideo and Colonia.

On August 25, 1825, they were then able to organize the Uruguayan Assembly, which voted to denounce Brazilian rule, and opted for either independence or joining the UPRP. Buenos Aires became an unofficial base for supplying volunteers, munitions, and supplies. Wealthy families in Buenos Aires donated 16,000 pesos within the first couple of months of the rebels’ expedition.

Simultaneously, the UPRP was witnessing dramatic expansions in foreign investment and commerce, with about two million pounds in trade per year, half of which was just with Great Britain. With Brazilian militarization in the Banda Oriental, the UPRP began expanding militarily, despite maintaining its policy of neutrality. It is when Brazil made plans to blockade Buenos Aires that the UPRP reversed its policy of neutrality, welcomed the Uruguayan Assembly into the United Provinces, and went to war with Brazil. The UPRP's fortitude, juxtaposed with that of Brazil, created a military stalemate between the two powers. With prices in the UPRP skyrocketing, the blockade strangled the economy. In response, the UPRP issued about 118 privateering licenses between 1826 and 1827, allowing individual privateers to attack and loot Brazilian ships.

The UPRP understood that a military stalemate would only deplete its resources further, so in 1827, it sent MJ Garcia to Rio de Janeiro in the hopes of an armistice with an independent Banda Oriental. However, negotiations failed as Brazil was adamant about keeping the region. His failure resulted in the emergence of a new UPRP government under the decentralization-favoring Federalist Party. The UPRP under the new regime knew that the only way to defend against the Brazilian blockade was through utilizing a strong navy. It spent nearly 4.5 million pesos on rebuilding the navy, where half of that money was used just to buy ships. The central government was attempting to use the war to consolidate power. President Rivadavia spearheaded the consolidation movement but soon ran into economic barriers. The UPRP’s government income was about 1.2 million pesos a year. However, the war was costing the government 600,000 pesos a month. Most of the costs were taken on by Buenos Aires, but the government also issued excessive banknotes and decreased cash backing. Coupled with the blockade, these actions led
to high inflation rates and skyrocketing prices. Food shortages soon became commonplace.\textsuperscript{112}

Although Brazil already had a strong navy to begin with, the costs of war also took a toll on the country. With the privateering attacks severely hurting Brazilian trade, Brazilians were having a harder time paying for everyday goods, leading to increasingly negative public opinion of the war. Brazil, feeling the economic effects of the war, tried to accelerate the conflict in 1827 by tightening the blockade, as well as capturing and destroying privateer ships.\textsuperscript{113} However, these actions only exacerbated foreign grievances. Ultimately, the British negotiated a peace agreement on August 27, 1828, known as the Treaty of Montevideo.\textsuperscript{114}

At the start of the conflict, Brazil had a presence of about 6,000 troops in the Banda Oriental. Montevideo hosted 2,500 troops, Colonia had about 1,100, and the rest of the region had 1,500 dispersed troops.\textsuperscript{115} After the “Orientals” began attacking Brazilian bases and regiments, Brazil sent about ten gunboats, or schooners, along with armed ships carrying 1,200 more troops.

In comparison, the “Orientals” numbered around a few thousand individuals by the end of 1826 with only basic guns and bayonets for defense. Despite the capability gap, an understanding of the terrain and mobilization of rural citizens allowed the insurgency group to outperform Brazil’s military, leading to a military stalemate in the Banda Oriental. The “Orientals” had greater knowledge of the terrain and were able to rally the rural population, making it difficult for the Brazilians to distinguish between civilian and combatant. By 1827, the “Orientals” controlled the entire region except for Montevideo and Colonia.

For the first two years of the war, Pedro I proved inflexible on the war, arguing that the nation’s honor would not allow him to retreat from the Cisplatine province. However, with the onslaught of public protests, he began to waver in his determination for the Banda Oriental. The UPRP sent MJ Garcia in 1827 to find an end to the war, but due to miscommunication and resolve to not appear weak in front of their adversary, the peace agreement fell through.

**Intervention**

With the Treaty of Montevideo on August 27, 1828, the British asked both actors to withdraw from the Banda Oriental region and allow self-determination. The British were spurred by its economic interests and its desire to maintain an advantageous position in both nations by preserving a balance of power.\textsuperscript{116} British trade with Brazil was around 2.6 million pounds annually, while its trade with the UPRP was around one million pounds annually.\textsuperscript{117} The blockade, privateering, and consequent effects of both nations’ economies severely damaged British trade connections.

Apart from trade, the British had additional connections to the two nations. In the UPRP, there existed a British community of 3,000 individuals who settled in the region for commercial opportunities, high wages, cheap cost of living, and religious tolerance.\textsuperscript{118} In Brazil, one-third of the naval officers were British, due to the shortage of skilled Brazilians. Thereby, Great Britain had a vested interest in Brazil’s economy and social conditions.

**Impact**

The Cisplatine case was analyzed to test whether diplomatic intervention shortens war duration. This case supports that hypothesis, but the question remains in whether or not the conflict would have ended around the same time even without British intervention.

From the state of their economies, and their political turmoil, both nations wanted the war to end soon. Brazil was tightening the blockade in order to accelerate and finish off the war. If the UPRP and Brazil had to negotiate on the Band Oriental by themselves, however, a peace agreement would have taken much longer to form. Neither side wanted to give up the Banda Oriental, a territory they spent three years fighting for. They needed a neutral third party like the British to coerce them through soft power into finalizing an agreement. British mediation made it so that neither side could get that territory and ensured that neither side could break the tenants of the treaty without facing consequences from an international superpower. In terms of Slantchev’s and Cunningham’s argument, Great Britain allowed the two sides to exchange and negotiate information that they would not have been able to do so before. By doing this, the British also minimized the potential for future conflict over the region, while also creating a buffer state between the two nations. Moreover, the clauses of the agreement made it that neither nation truly won
or lost, maintaining national honor on both sides. It is through this mechanism that the Cisplatine War supports the hypothesis that diplomatic intervention shortens war duration.

CASE 3: ECONOMIC INTERVENTION

Mozambican War of Independence, 1964-1975

The Mozambican War of Independence was chosen to test Hypothesis 5; economic support for either side of the conflict will increase duration. I chose the Mozambique case in order to focus on the independent variable of economic intervention. Economic intervention can come in many forms such as arms deals, grants, loans, and even training. Essentially, economic intervention is an action that would entail funds, but not troops on the ground. There were no significant instances of military or diplomatic intervention in this war, making it simpler to isolate and concentrate on the effect of economic intervention in the Mozambican War of Independence. Although the Western Saharan War touched on the effects of economic intervention, it did not isolate it.

I argue that when actors in a conflict receive economic aid, they can continue fighting for a longer period of time, focusing on original war goals, rather than opting for compromise. Their military capability is indirectly boosted through loans, financing, and arms sales. The increased capability translates into continuing the conflict until one actor reaches their goals, or runs out of steam.

The Mozambican War of Independence took place from 1964 to 1975 between Portugal and a guerilla group known as the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) over Mozambique's independence. Out of the three cases being analyzed in this paper, this is the only example of a “colonial” war. Portugal, the colonizer state, fought a non-state actor (FRELIMO) in its colony, Mozambique. While this war did not have any significant military or diplomatic intervention, both sides attracted substantial economic intervention in support of their war efforts, which was critical in allowing for a negotiated independence for Mozambique. FRELIMO, an initially small and unequipped guerilla group, depended on foreign arms and training to successfully attack the Portuguese. Similarly, Portugal, under economic constraints, needed loans to finance this war, while maintaining economic development back home. Without fiscal support, neither side would have had the resources to organize a long-lasting campaign.

Historical Overview

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mozambique, a Portuguese colony, was not immune to the wave of nationalist and independence movements sweeping Africa and Asia. In 1962, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed under President Mondlane, as a coalition of existing nationalist groups. Mondlane hoped the coalition would be a united front, pooling resources and coordinating military efforts to lead to victory.

Already embroiled in an unexpected independence war in Angola, Portugal began militarizing in Mozambique as soon as FRELIMO formed. From 1961 to 1964, the Portuguese army expanded from 4,000 units to 35,000 units in Mozambique. They patrolled the Tanzanian border and frontier and created landing strips and mortar placements.

In September 1964, FRELIMO began guerilla raids from within Mozambique. They ambushed patrols, sabotaged communications, and then faded into the Makonde highlands to receive food and information on government maneuvers. FRELIMO's initial successes encouraged smaller raids into the southern district, diverting troops from the northern region. Soon enough, FRELIMO controlled the northern regions of Mozambique, or about one-fifth of the land.

FRELIMO was not looking for a military victory, however, but rather a war of attrition that would have been costly enough for Portugal to negotiate Mozambique's independence. While they were successful in this endeavor for the first four years, progress slowed by the late 1960s. Mondlane was killed in 1969, leading to chaos amongst the leadership of FRELIMO about which direction FRELIMO should take on an ideological spectrum. A lack of funds, uncertainty over leadership, a large Portuguese counteroffensive, and difficulties in consolidation also contributed to FRELIMO's declining success. Consequently, when FRELIMO garnered new, left-leaning leadership in the 1970s, they attracted support from China and the Soviet Union, allowing it to expand its insurgency operations.

While Portugal continued to receive support from NATO, the United States, France, and South Cape Town University Journal of Politics & Society
Africa, the economic toll resulting from its concurrent three wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau was quite large, while FRELIMO continued to spread southward as an unstoppable force. Ultimately, Portugal agreed to begin talks on independence in February 1974. However, with FRELIMO capturing cities like Murrumbala during the talks, the violence did not cease and the discussions destroyed army morale. The negotiations were finally sped up with the overthrow of Caetano and the installation of a new government. Mozambique was finally granted independence on June 25, 1975.

Intervention

On Behalf of the FRELIMO

Prior to the start of the conflict, FRELIMO was receiving support from a handful of African and Middle Eastern countries. Tanzania acted as the host country for FRELIMO, offering it refuge, financial aid, training grounds, and a channel to request outside assistance. Without Tanzania, FRELIMO would have had a much harder time forming and consolidating its members. Algeria and Egypt also provided a small number of arms to get FRELIMO started in its pursuit for independence. FRELIMO's determination to battle its colonizer triggered recent memories for Tanzania, Algeria, and Egypt. Their assistance was their method of showing support for anti-colonial movements across Africa. By June 1963, FRELIMO began preparations for its raids. FRELIMO sent recruits to Algeria and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) for guerilla training.

With the guerilla training in Algeria and their knowledge of the terrain, FRELIMO started off their raids with relative success with increasing Portuguese casualties. This catalyzed recruitment, with FRELIMO growing from only 250 men in 1964 to 2,000 by 1965, 8,000 by 1967, and 10,000 by 1969. However, Mondlane's death and the rising costs of this war caught up to FRELIMO, at which point other leaders looked elsewhere for assistance. Their new leadership promoted a sharpened socialist agenda and intensified their military campaign, eventually attracting Chinese and Soviet involvement. Prior to this, FRELIMO only received a small number of arms and training from Algeria and Egypt. This new support from China and the Soviet Union bolstered FRELIMO and gave it new life.

By the early 1970s, FRELIMO was receiving Russian and Czech weaponry, while the Chinese provided guerilla training in small arms tactics, explosive effectiveness, and arms. The Soviets provided AK 47s, 122 mm rocket launchers, and antiaircraft machine guns, while Chinese advisers instructed FRELIMO to scale down their units to six men in what was called "tactics of the ants." This small unit size allowed FRELIMO to increase the number of raids, while decreasing vulnerability to retaliation. By the early 1970s, the individual guerilla fighter was more equipped than the individual Portuguese soldier. The newly equipped FRELIMO was able to control most of the northern regions of Mozambique and eventually make their way down south to capture other major cities, which further helped recruiting. By 1974, FRELIMO was composed of over 13,000 fighters and 25,000 party activists. FRELIMO was later further supported by the Organization of African Unity, which began providing material and logistical support after witnessing FRELIMO's rise within Mozambique.

On Behalf of Portugal

By the time Portugal entered the Mozambican Independence War, it was already fighting two independence movements in Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Of the 70,000 men they put in Mozambique, only 30,000 could be used to fighting FRELIMO directly, with the remainder designated to protect infrastructure and white towns. However, unprepared for FRELIMO's guerilla raids, Portugal further suffered from the exacerbating military and economic strains. In an attempt to expand military operations in Mozambique, Portugal poured money into increasing the number of soldiers.

The military campaigns began to eat away almost half of the state's budget, an expenditure that became increasingly difficult to explain to citizens who demanded economic development. In addition, Portugal had West Germany to set up bases in Portugal in order to fill the military gap left at home. Allowing a foreign military into its borders, however, only weakened the regime's support. Moreover, FRELIMO's guerrilla-style warfare caused 4,000 Portuguese casualties within the first three years of the conflict.

As a result, Portuguese defense costs doubled between 1960 and 1970, forcing the government to impose higher taxes and increase importation of
goods. By 1973, the war was costing Portugal $70 million, which was a cost it just could not support on its own.¹⁴⁶

Portugal began receiving aid from NATO, the USA, South Africa, and certain European countries from the mid-1960s onward to address the costliness of this war.¹⁴⁷ NATO provided various measures of aid including arms, training in COIN, and financing. This aid originally could not be used within Portugal’s colonies, but NATO’s aid freed up Portugal’s military requirement in its own country, allowing it to dedicate the state’s resources towards its colonies. In addition, the USA also gave Portugal about $48 million in military aid between 1961 and 1968 on its own, with annual cash infusions of $5 million after that.¹⁴⁸ South Africa, France, and Germany also provided arms to Portugal’s army in Mozambique.¹⁴⁹ Without the arms sales, loans, and the overall economic aid Portugal received, it would have given into FRELIMO’s demands years earlier.

Impact

The economic support provided by Tanzania, Algeria, and Egypt were crucial in FRELIMO’s development and initial success. This initial success brought the attention of bigger players such as China and the Soviet Union when FRELIMO needed it the most. Without the training and weaponry provided by these two countries, FRELIMO would have fallen victim to Portugal’s COIN strategies and superior military. Therefore, the economic interventions on the side of FRELIMO allowed it to continue playing a major role in the conflict, and thereby elongated the conflict.

By 1967, Portugal was receiving generous loans, which it invested in its military in Mozambique.¹⁵⁰ In fact, Portugal became extremely dependent on these loans by 1968, with about 49 percent of its annual budget solely going to the army. As a result, internal debt rose by about 23 percent and foreign debt rose by almost 40 percent.¹⁵¹ Weakened by three wars, internal turmoil, and military ineffectiveness, Portugal would not have been able to continue the war without economic support. It would have not had the sufficient amount resources on its own to support a military of 70,000 in Mozambique without the help of NATO and other allies to help keep its budget intact (although stretched) for the many years of the war.

A fervent antiwar movement and internal discontent developed within Portugal due to war weariness, hatred of the Caetano dictatorship, and socioeconomic hardships. On top of that, Portugal was dealing with a collapsing military position by the early 1970s. It was unable to contain the guerrillas in remote regions and could not protect white civilians.¹⁵² In 1974, a coup and dire economic circumstances eventually forced Portugal to accept FRELIMO’s calls for independence. However, without foreign support, Portugal most likely would have given into FRELIMO’s demands years in advance.

Both sides of the Mozambican War of Independence showcased heavy dependence on outside economic support. This case supports the hypothesis that economic intervention, in the form of support, can increase the duration of an extrastate war. In this case, FRELIMO could not have formed nor gained its initial rise without the aid of certain African countries. It was only able to increase its military effectiveness and eventual success with economic support from China and the Soviet Union. Without any of this support, FRELIMO would have been defeated or become inconsequential within the first four years of the war. In a similar fashion, Portugal was in an unfavorable situation as well, having to deal with three different wars of independence in its African colonies at the same time. Without NATO and ally support, Portugal might have either given independence sooner or collapsed from economic overextension.

The reason economic intervention played such a pivotal role in this conflict is because it reduced the cost of fighting. This, in turn, allowed the two actors to continue fighting for a longer period of time in hopes of achieving their original goal, since compromise becomes less desirable when there is a potential for winning completely. In the Mozambican case, after FRELIMO received Chinese and Soviet assistance, the group was much more induced to hold onto the hopes of achieving independence, thereby leading to their stronger resolve to continue their resistance. Similarly, Portugal continued the conflict with the increased prospect of crushing the FRELIMO movement with greater economic support. Ultimately, the economic intervention in the Mozambican War of Independence increased the capabilities of both actors, and therefore increased the duration of the war, until one side could no longer acquire more resources to continue the fight. With military expenses taking nearly half of
Portugal’s overall budget and local infrastructure and welfare severely neglected. Portugal saw the rise of a new leadership and the eventual end to the conflict.

CONCLUSION

Although extra-state wars may not be as plentiful as interstate or intrastate wars, they have been numerous enough to warrant attention and discussion. The question driving this paper was how intervention factors in extra-state war duration. The goal of this research is twofold. On one hand, I hoped to understand whether intervention affects extra-state war duration, and if so, in what exact way. On the other hand, although this research is not exhaustive, it is meant to begin a debate on extra-state wars and bring more research and understanding on the characteristics and variables involved with this type of war.

In terms of empirical evidence, the regression analysis focused on the first two hypotheses. These hypotheses were on how military intervention affects duration. The regression analysis supported the Hypothesis 1, but did not support Hypothesis 2. Overall, the analysis supported the idea that military intervention, regardless of which side it is on, is correlated with longer war durations. However, since this regression analysis could only focus on military intervention and could only prove correlation, I also conducted three case studies. The first case, the Western Saharan War, supported the hypothesis that an equitable distribution of military interventions increases war duration. The second case, the Cisplatine War, supported the hypothesis that diplomatic intervention decreases duration. Lastly, the third case, the Mozambican War of Independence, showed that economic support increases war duration by reducing the cost of fighting. It is important to note that these cases cannot singlehandedly prove their hypotheses. Rather, they allowed me to locate potential causal mechanisms between intervention and war duration.

This research spurs new questions on extra-state war duration. Would the results of the wars change if the intensity of the military intervention were accounted for? How would a survival analysis, rather than a regression analysis affect the data? Moreover, how does a war like the Syrian Civil War fall into the typology of wars? Is it just an intrastate war or are there elements of interstate and extra-state conflict?

Ultimately, this paper supports the hypothesis that intervention does factor into extra-state war duration. Intervention can be a tool or weapon for third parties to use and has pivotal implications for the length of extra-state wars. In the world today, the battles against ISIL and the multiple branches of Al-Qaeda exemplify the importance of understanding the factors behind extra-state conflict. When embroiled in these conflicts, the USA needs to consider how and where these organizations are receiving aid from and to what extent other nations should be involved in this fight against extremism. A factor that may be contributing to the duration of the ISIL conflict is the number of actors and involved in Iraq and Syria. As supported by this research, when the number of actors increase in a conflict, the more difficult it is to find a resolution that is agreeable to all parties. However, a diplomatic agreement is nearly impossible with a group like ISIL due to separate ideological reasons. In fact, unlike the Cisplatine War case, there does not seem to a neutral third party that both ISIL and the U.S. coalition depend on enough to serve as the mediator for a peace agreement.

As we have seen, economic aid to non-state actors is a strong precursor to increased capabilities and continued fighting. In the case of ISIL, the organization draws its powers from donations and recruitment from private citizens, rather than whole nations. If the USA were successful in cutting off ISIL’s aid supply lines, it may have a better chance in ending the conflict sooner. As long as ISIL has a source of economic support, the only resolution is a complete military defeat, which seems to be the main policy driving U.S. actions today. However, this same policy may be contributing to the elongated duration of this conflict. To completely defeat ISIL, the USA and its allies would need to execute extensive counterinsurgency operations, tackle not only ISIL strongholds, but also regions of influence, and put an end to ISIL’s recruitment. All of these goals would take a significant time and troop commitment. ISIL, like other non-state groups, is elusive and can somewhat easily move its base of operations and alter its recruitment strategies, which in turn would continue the conflict.

As seen from the ISIL example above, extra-state war duration is an extremely significant topic for current global conflicts. Further research in the future will hopefully elucidate other factors, apart from intervention, that contribute to duration, and how
these factors may interact with intervention. Until then, the extra-state war remains a dynamic, yet still unfortunate neglected war.

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INTRODUCTION

“And then, what is the Russian language? I will repeat what I said to the first, second, and third presidents of Russia. When they say to me, ‘Thank you for not creating problems for the Russian language as in other (I won’t name names) countries,’ I say ‘What are you thanking me for? For our, for my Russian language…We did our share of rambling around in the Russian Empire, too…Why are we so quickly trying to forget something that we ourselves created?”¹

-Alexander Lukashenka, President of Belarus, 2009

According to President Alexander Lukashenka, the Belarusian people helped create the Russian language, while Ukraine tried to “forget” it. In the last years of the Soviet Union, Belarus and Ukraine both passed legislation to make their titular language the only official language of the land.¹

By the end of the decade, the Belarusian government reinstated Russian as an official language, whereas the Ukrainian government did not. Or, in the words of Lukashenka, Ukraine created “problems for the Russian language,” while Belarus embraced its history in the Russian Empire. Given that both countries had been under the same Soviet regime since 1944 and remained dependent on Russian energy after independence, how can one account for this variation in language policy?²

As Lukashenka suggests, the answer to this question lay in the relationship between an imperial past and contemporary understanding of ownership. I intend to argue that historical legacies of imperialism impacted popular support for monolingual language policies in the 1990s. Contrasting strategies of imperial rule in west Ukraine and west Belarus prior to joining the Soviet Union impacted their populations’ support for monolingual language legislation in the 1990s. Linguistic identities forged under imperial rule translated into political identities as voters cast their ballots in parliamentary and presidential elections based on language preference. In Ukraine and Belarus, language is not simply a means of communication, but a glimpse into the past.

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¹ “Titular” language in the post-Soviet context refers to the language spoken by the majority ethnic group in the state, usually after which the state was name; i.e. the Ukrainian language in Ukraine.

² For more on energy politics see Margarita M. Balmaceda, *The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
in turn affected electoral support for nationalist political parties with monolingual platforms. The Austro-Hungarian Empire’s strategy of indirect rule in west Ukraine led to the development of Ukrainian language, while Poland pursued a policy of cultural integration that resulted in the closure of Belarusian language institutions. These imperial policies continued to shape the residences’ language practices in the decades to follow.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first section describes the impact of imperialism on the formation of linguistic regionalism in Belarus and Ukraine. Opposing imperial language policies impacted the residents’ assimilation to Russian in the Soviet Union, leading to a stronger regional language division in Ukraine than in Belarus. The next section examines the effect of language regionalism on support for political parties with monolingual platforms. Imperial borders demarcated electoral support for a monolingual policy in west Ukraine, while the general lack of support for monolingual legislation amongst Belarusian voters was not confined to such borders in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1989, 1991, and 1994. Finally, the third section explores the influence of parties with monolingual platforms on the formation of language policy. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma required votes from the pro-titular language party to pass his new constitution in the face of Communist Party opposition in parliament, whereas the minority pro-titular language party in Belarus did not gain enough parliamentary seats to threaten the political agenda of President Alexander Lukashenka. From “imperial footprints,” to language regionalism, to voting booths, the Ukrainian public endorsed a monolingual policy while Belarusians did not.iii

Theories of Nationalism and Minority Identification

Theories of nationalism and ethnicity tend to assume homogeneity. Ernest Gellner notoriously defined nationalism as, “a political principle which asserts that political unity and national unity should be congruent.”iii In other words, nationalism is, “to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that.”iv According to Adrian Hasting, an Emeritus Professor at the University of Leeds and author of The Construction of Nationhood, a nation is “formed from one or more ethnicities,” or “a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language.”v Gellner and Hasting’s theories present challenges for one another: if Gellner’s nationalism theory calls for one political roof for every culture, and Hasting argues that multiple cultures may exist within a nation, then which culture is privileged enough to receive a roof of its own and which must coexist or assimilate?

Alan Patten, a Professor of Politics at Princeton University specializing in contemporary political philosophy, claims that the result of blurred boundaries between ethnicities and nations is the creation of a linguistic minority—a group whose language places them outside the national or majoritarian language privileged by the state.vi “Throughout history,” Patten contends, “more powerful social groups have sought to impose their language on the less powerful by requiring linguistic accommodation as a condition of economic and political opportunities and advantages.”vii From this relationship arises the classical theory of majoritarian rule: the majority seeks to establish state institutions based on their own values, traditions, and norms while minorities petition the state for greater recognition and space to preserve their own distinct cultures and languages.viii The amount of space the state chooses to allocate is subject to varying visions of unity and control.

For Jacob M. Landau and Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, Emeriti Professors of Political Science and Cultural History who have researched the social impact of language legislation in the former Soviet republics, a state’s treatment of minority languages is subject to its vision of the nation. Supporters of a bilingual language policy believe that national unity can be attained in a multiethnic or multilingual society and argue that it is “more advantageous to preserve language heterogeneity.”viii On the other hand, monolingual policy supporters consider linguistic homogeneity vital for nation-building and position assimilation to the national language as a “condition for belonging.”ix And yet, the ethnically diverse Ukraine enacted a monolingual law while the more homogenous Belarus selected a bilingual route.

Justification for Case Selection

The language policies in Ukraine and Belarus warrant a comparative study not only due to

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iii Keith Darden, an associate professor at the American University School of International Service, uses the term “imperial footprint” to describe the impact of the Ottoman Empire and Polish Commonwealth policies on voting patterns in Ukraine in the 2010’s.
their divergence, but because of the way in which they diverged. In 1989, 22.1 percent of Ukraine’s population identified as ethnic Russians compared to Belarus’s 13.2 percent. Why did a more ethnically heterogeneous state pursue a unilingual language policy, while a relatively homogenous state pursued a multilingual approach?

For example, Kazakhstan, a post-Soviet country more ethnically diverse than either Belarus or Ukraine, elected a bilingual language policy that valued national unity over linguistic homogeneity. Due to the forced relocation of ethnic minorities, including Volga Germans, Chechens, and Ingush, amongst others, from mainland Russia to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic during World War II, as well as Nikita Khrushchev’s “Virgin Lands” campaign during the 1950s and 1960s, the Kazakh SSR possessed the “lowest percentage of the population belonging to the titular group” in all of the Soviet Union during the last years of its existence. In 1989, Kazakhs and Russians each comprised 40 percent of the republic’s population and over 80 percent of Kazakhstan residents were either native Russian-speakers or fluent in the language. As Landau and Kellner-Heinkele hypothesized, President Nursultan Nazarbayev granted both the Kazakh and Russian languages official status after independence in an attempt to “moderate interethnic relations in Kazakhstan.” Why did the ethnically homogenous Belarus follow Kazakhstan’s example, whereas the more ethnically divided Ukraine did not?

This thesis argues that Landau and Kellner-Heinkele’s theory does not accurately explain the language policy trajectories of Ukraine and Belarus during the 1990s: Ukraine pursued a multilingual and multiethnic nation-building project using a monolingual policy, while Belarus positioned the Russian language as a condition for belonging under the Soviet-era fear that granting Russian official status would lower students’ incentive to learn the Russian language. Belarus and Ukraine yielded the highest number of Russian-speakers outside of the Russian Republic in the last decade of the USSR: 82.4 percent and 66.8 percent of Belarus and Ukraine’s respective populations claimed Russian as their first or second language. Yet, Ukraine’s population possessed roughly 10 percent more ethnic Russians than Belarus’s. More ethnic Belarusians preferred to speak Russian than ethnic Ukrainians. Belarus’s bilingual policy was less of a concern for multiculturalism than a reality of demographics. While the Ukrainian population was more ethnically diverse, the Belarusian population was more assimilated to the Russian language partially due to imperial legacies.

Therefore, a comparative study of Ukraine and Belarus offers insight into an unexpected variation in language policy. On the other hand, this paper is not an attempt to justify one imperial strategy over another. Rather, it is an exploration of how different forms of imperialism impacted the identities of their residents.

SECTION ONE: FROM IMPERIAL BORDERS TO LINGUISTIC BORDERS

According to the first post-World War II Soviet census in 1959, a gap between a Russian language-speaking east and titular language-speaking west had formed in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR), but not in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR). In western Ukraine, 0.9 percent of the ethnic Ukrainian population (i.e. the “titular group”) assimilated to the Russian language, compared to 7.9 percent in eastern Ukraine. In Belarus, the regional difference in assimilation was smaller: 5.3 percent of the titular group in the west and 7.3 percent in the east adopted Russian as their native language. The subsequent decade broadened the regional linguistic divide in Ukraine. Between 1959 and 1970, a gap of 46.4 percent characterized the difference in assimilation between west and east Ukraine, whereas a gap of 13.8 percent stood between west and east Belarus. Why did a linguistic divide form in Ukraine, but not in Belarus?
In western Ukraine, the formerly Austro-Hungarian territories of Galicia (containing the modern-day administrative provinces, or oblasts, of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil), Bukovina (containing Chernivtsi), and Transcarpathia (containing Zakarpattia) did not join the Soviet Union until 1944. Similarly, the former Polish territories of Brest and Grodno in west Belarus fell under Soviet rule during World War II. The shared experience of Eastern European imperialism had opposing consequences for each region’s linguistic identities. The Austro-Hungarian Empire ruled indirectly and permitted the development of the Ukrainian language, whereas in Belarus, Poland pursued a policy of cultural integration, which involved the suppression of the Belarusian language in education and the press. In contrast to the weak penetration of the Belarusian language in former Polish territories, the established language systems in west Ukraine slowed down its residents’ assimilation to Russian in the Soviet Union.

First, this section provides a brief background of the treatment of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages in the Russian Empire during the 18th and 19th centuries before comparing the differences between Austro-Hungarian and Polish imperial language policies in the following century. Next, it addresses the extent to which the experiences of linguistic assimilation in west Ukraine and west Belarus during the post-war period are comparable.

I. The Ukrainian and Belarusian Languages in the 18th-19th Century Russian Empire

Between 1772 and 1795, three states divided up the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, effectively ending Polish sovereignty for the next 120 years. According to William W. Hagen, a professor at the University of California-Davis who specializes in Polish and German history, the combination of a weak monarchy and strong nobility left the Commonwealth vulnerable to Russian, Prussian, and Habsburg Austrian territorial conquests. After three partitions of Polish territories, Russia acquired large portions of modern-day Belarus and the right-bank of Ukraine.

Within these lands, the average Belarusian and Ukrainian-speaker lived in the countryside, worked in agriculture, and was illiterate. Despite the Provincial Reform of 1775 and the Charters to the Nobility and Towns introduced by Catherine II, the Russian Empire failed to establish quick administrative and social control in the newly acquired lands. As Edward C. Thaden, a Professor of Russian History at the University of Illinois at Chicago, explores in his book *Russia’s Western Borderlands*, the lack of “sufficient human and institutional resources” forced the tsars to “rule[e] indirectly” through the local szlachta (Polish nobility). The Polish language continued to dominate local self-government, taxation, education, and legal systems within the borders of modern-day Belarus and the right-bank of Ukraine throughout the 19th century. During this time period, the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages experienced similar pressures from Tsarist policies.

In the Russian Empire, Belarusian lands consisted of five provinces: Vilna, Grodno, Vitebsk, Minsk, and Mogilev. According to the Imperial Census of 1897, 77.7 percent of the population living in western Ukraine and the historical capital of Galicia; The west Belarusian city of Grodno is located to the north of Brest, slightly above Bialystok.

vi An “oblast” is an administrative province that the Soviet Union used to federally divide the Soviet Republics; i.e. the UkSSR was divided into 25 oblasts and the BSSR possessed 6 oblasts in 1991.

vii “Right-bank” refers to the Ukrainian land west of the Dnieper River.
in these provinces identified as native Belarusian-speakers and 98 percent of Belarusian-speakers lived in the countryside or in villages with populations smaller than 2,000.\textsuperscript{x} In the nine largest cities, a majority of the population claimed Yiddish as a native language, followed by Russian and then Polish.\textsuperscript{26} Approximately 92 percent of Belarusian-speakers made their living from agriculture, forestry, hunting or fishing, and 24 percent were literate (compared to the 52.6 percent state average.)\textsuperscript{27} From 1859 to 1905, the Russian Empire declared Belarusian a dialect of Russian and forbid its use in schools and the press.\textsuperscript{28} Associating the Belarusian language with uneducated or rural lifestyles, Bernhard Kittel, a professor of political sociology at Universität Wien who researches linguistic behavior in Central and Eastern Europe, claimed that Belarusian speakers “developed some sense of inferiority” as linguistic minorities in the Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{29}

Next door, the Ukrainian language developed analogously. After the partitions of Poland, 85 percent of ethnic Ukrainians resided in the Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{30} Similar to Belarusians, 87 percent of Ukrainians gained their livelihood from farming, 2.4 percent resided in towns with populations of 20,000 or more, and 80 percent were illiterate in 1897.\textsuperscript{31} In the late 19th century, Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III signed decrees that prohibited the Ukrainian language from theatrical performances, public recitations, books, schools, and courts. Although Ukrainian theatres still performed and imported Ukrainian-language books still entered the state, no Ukrainian periodicals, elementary schools, or universities functioned in the Russian Empire during this period. As more educated, upper-class Ukrainians spoke Russian, the social prestige of the Ukrainian language declined. “The use of Ukrainian even in private was often grasped as the manifestation of a low social status,” explained George Y. Shevelov, a professor of Slavic philology at Columbia University.\textsuperscript{32} In 1903, when the question of Ukrainian elementary schools “became topical,” parents were hesitant to send their children to Ukrainian schools, fearing that “this experience would keep their children in the lower classes for good by undermining their chances to become ‘teachers, priests, physicians.’”\textsuperscript{33} Deprived of economic support and associated with social immobility, the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages shared rural, illiterate, and agricultural stigmas in the Russian Empire.

II. West Belarus: Cultural Integration

The following decade brought with it the demise of the Russian Empire and the recreation of the Republic of Poland. Formed in the aftermath of World War I, the Second Polish Republic clashed with the Soviet Union over the control of modern-day Ukraine and Belarus. On March 18, 1921, the Peace of Riga ended the Polish-Soviet War and transferred the western Belarusian regions of Brest and Grodno to Poland. On average, the linguistic demographics of Brest and Grodno resembled the six provinces of east Belarus that remained in the Soviet Union, with only 5.5 percent more Polish and Yiddish-speakers and 5.7 percent less Belarusian and Russian-speakers in its capital cities than in the capitols of its eastern compatriots.\textsuperscript{34}

Initially, Poland instituted a system of decentralized rule in Grodno and Brest. After dividing these Belarusian lands into four provinces, each with their own Polish governor, Warsaw permitted Belarusians to vote and run in national elections. The Polish government subsidized the Belarusian press, opened over 400 Belarusian-language schools and three teachers’ colleges, and supported the Belorussian National Museum, the Scientific Society, and the Teachers’ Association - all between 1921 and 1924.\textsuperscript{35} According to Nicholas P. Vakar, a Professor of Russian at Ohio State University, Poland’s decentralized approach was a result of a political comprise between the National Democrats, who argued that Poland should “integrate the various national minorities—racial, religious, and linguistic,” which then accounted for 30 percent of the total population, and the Socialists who favored local self-governance to the “long and uncertain process” of assimilation.\textsuperscript{36} In the end, Warsaw gave the Belarusian language and culture the tools to develop, while withholding the status of an autonomous region from the newly acquired territories. When Belarusian members of the Sejm (parliament) began to demand greater autonomy, the National Democrats’ approach to imperialism gained more support.

In 1924, Belarusian Sejm members claimed that Poland treated them as second-class citizens. They cited the state’s practice of favoring Poles when allocating large-landed estates in west Belarus, attacks

\textsuperscript{x} Percent of Yiddish speakers in the nine largest cities of Belarus: Vilna-40%; Minsk-51.2%; Vitsebsk-50.8%; Homel-55.4%; Babruisk-60.2%, Pinsk-73.9%.
on Orthodox churches, and the census administrators who reduced the size of the Belarusian population from approximately 3.7 million to 1 million by registering all Roman Catholics as ethnic Poles, even though many could not speak Polish. Accusing the Polish government of violating the constitution, Belarusian Sejm members called for Belarusian independence. With a history of partitions at the hands of stronger states, Poland reacted swiftly to Belarusian independence schemes: in 1924, the state either closed down or converted to Polish 300 Belarusian schools, sent 240 Belarusians teachers to Krakow, began railroad construction on Belarusian lands without compensation, imprisoned Belarusian elites suspected of revolutionary activities, raised taxes on Belarusian villages, instructed post offices to refuse telegrams written in Belarusian, and suspended fifteen Belarusian newspapers. Warsaw’s solution for Belarusian independent movements was cultural assimilation.

In response to public rallies and peak membership in the Communist Party of West Belarus (KPZB), a second wave of Polonization from 1928 to 1932 specifically targeted the Belarusian language and religion. The Polish government disbanded the Belarusian Institute of Economy and Culture, Union of Belarusian Teacher, and the Belarusian School Society, closed down 140 Orthodox churches, ordered clergy to use Polish texts, registered all three million Belarusian residents as Catholics in the 1931 census, and repealed the Act of January 1925 that protected residents’ right to education in their native language. “The Polish teacher forbids the children to talk in Belorussian,” claimed a resident of Romanovo, and “our children must go to a Polish school in the next village where all people also are Belarusian,” asserted another from Malysniki in 1938. No Belarusian publications appeared regularly by 1939. Economically, the four Belarusian provinces made up the least developed parts of Poland with only two cities containing 50,000 to 100,000 residents. Poles owned 37 percent of farmland in west Belarusian provinces, while the other 39.7 percent owned by Belarusians was divided into small plots of five to twelve acres each. Poland’s policy of cultural integration was featured in Soviet propaganda, which invited west Belarusians to emigrate to the BSSR. Vaslau Lastouski, leader of the short-lived 1918 Belarusian People’s Republic, returned to Minsk from exile in Prague and recognized the BSSR as the legitimate government of Belarus. Thereby, Polish imperial strategy negatively impacted the Belarusian language and positively influenced Belarusian leaders’ perception of the Soviet Union.

Underdeveloped and with little access to Belarusian literature or education, west Belarusians’ time under Polish jurisdiction ended in September 1939 as German and Soviet forces invaded the region. Without the language institutions that developed inwest Ukraine, west Belarusians had less experience using their mother tongue in public life before joining the Soviet Union in October 1939. Thereby, in the decades to follow, Belarusians from the west and east assimilated to the Russian language at a similar pace, whereas west Ukraine remained a stronghold for the Ukrainian language.

III. West Ukraine: Indirect Rule

In Ukraine, the linguistic experience of western Ukrainians, versusand eastern residents, differed significantly. When Emperor Joseph II’s Germanizing reforms of 1780-90 revealed a lack of state resources, and a German-speaking minority spread too thinly across the empire to regulate local politics in west Ukraine, the Habsburg Empire cooperated with local elites to instituted a policy of indirect rule in the region that relied on cooperation with local elites. Instead of ethnic Germans, property-owning Polish nobles controlled imperial administrative positions, as and a combination of Polish and German languages dominated higher education in the Ukrainian territories. When Polish autonomous movements threatened Hapsburg control over in the region, Vienna responded by uplifting Ukrainian cultural institutions.

In reaction to a Polish autonomous revolt in 1848, Franz Stadion, the governor of Galicia, instituted constitutional reforms meant to both “support Ukrainian national claims,” and rein in the rebellious Poles. Stadion liberated serfs in March 1848, conceded the Ukrainian Uniate Church and clergy an equal status to the Roman Catholic Church, and supported the formation of a Supreme Ruthenian Council to represent Ukrainian Galicians at the Slavic Congress in Prague in June. As the Habsburg Dynasty transitioned into the constitutional monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire between 1860 and 1900, Viennese rule decentralized in the western borderlands, through local parliaments, or diets, and
granting Galicia autonomous status.\textsuperscript{xi} Polish nobility still dominated political life, however, with only 30 out of 383 seats in the diet filled by Ukrainians after the first election, yet Vienna protected Ukrainian cultural rights.\textsuperscript{46}

Stadion’s reforms went hand in hand with cultural development. In 1848, Ukrainians founded the “first Ukrainian-language newspaper not only Galicia, but in all Ukrainian lands,” called the Zoria halystska, or The Galician Star.\textsuperscript{47} By 1900, Galicia and Bukovina were home to 31 Ukrainian periodicals, compared to zero such periodicals in tsarist Russia.\textsuperscript{48} Ukrainians, “could publish newspapers and books, form associations, hold public meetings, take part in elections (even if against great odds), express their grievances from the parliamentary tribune, and fight legally for the improvement of their position.”\textsuperscript{49} By the outbreak of World War I, 97 percent of Ukrainian children in Galicia and Bukovina attended Ukrainian elementary schools, while and the Supreme Ruthenian Council negotiated a new arrangement with Vienna to establish separate Polish, and Ukrainian, boards of education and diet chambers.\textsuperscript{50} Ukrainians in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia possessed the constitutional right to develop their native language, which resulted in organized press and education systems. AHowever, as Shevelov explains in more detail, however, “the actualization of the constitutional rights of Ukrainians was in nearly every instance the product of long and bitter strife with the Polish administration, which controlled the bureaucracy.”\textsuperscript{51} Polonization pressures impacted residents of both west Belarus and west Ukraine. While Ukrainians were able to petition Vienna for their rights in a federalized system, Warsaw prohibited Belarusians from developing their language lost the legal right to develop their language under Warsaw’s rule.

To the east of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Volhynia, the fourth province of west Ukraine, remained under Russian control. From 1876 to 1906, the tsarist regime banned the Ukrainian language from the public sphere. After Volhynia’s merged with Poland in 1919, Ukrainian schools and periodicals developed, so that “by the late 1930’s they [Volhynians] had become basically assimilated in outlook to the Galicians.”\textsuperscript{52} Olena Pcilke captured the different “assimilated” outlooks of west and east Ukrainians in her 1887 novel Tovarysky. Pcilke, an ethnic-Ukrainian writer born in the Russian Empire, depicted a meeting between a Russian-Ukrainian and Galician-Ukrainian: “he [the Galician] speaks Ukrainian so freely, without faltering on any topic, while she…must first think it over well and only then can she speak, as if she had first to translate it mentally from Russian…we [Ukrainians in Russia] switch immediately to Russian when we discuss serious matter.”\textsuperscript{53} For Pcilke, Ukrainian was an everyday means of communication on one side of the Dnieper, and a private affair on the other. For Belarusians on both sides of the Polish imperial border, however, the Belarusian language largely remained a private affair.


On September 17, 1939, Joseph Stalin invaded Poland from the east. In a military campaign that spanned the length of World War II, the Soviet leader incorporated the remaining territories of west Ukraine and west Belarus into the USSR. According to the first post-war Soviet census referred to in the section’s introduction, The first post-war Soviet census informs that residents of west Belarus adopted the Russian language at a faster rate than west Ukrainians, after joining the Soviet Union: Between 1959 and 1970, an assimilation gap of 13.8 divided west and east Belarus, compared to a gap of 46.4 in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{54}

The assimilation of UkSSR and BSSR residents to the Russian language from 1959 to 1970 occurred on analogous demographic landscapes. Although the UkSSR’s population of 41.9 million was roughly five times larger than the BSSR’s 8.1 million in 1959, the two republics experienced approximately the same population growth rate of 12 percent over the next decade.\textsuperscript{xii} Additionally, both republics possessed similar population distributions. In 1959, 18.6 percent of UkSSR’s population, and 26.8 percent of BSSR’s population, resided in western oblasts. These regional distributions were remained relevantly (relatively?) unscrewed by after the post-war population growth, with 18.6 percent of Ukrainian and 26.8 percent of Belarusian residents still calling western regions their home in 1970.\textsuperscript{55}

On the surface, assimilation to the Russian language in the UkSSR and BSSR seems like a standard case of urbanization: post-World War II Soviet industrialization projects stimulated the migration

\textsuperscript{xi} From 1804-1867, the Habsburg Empire was officially named the Austrian Empire.

\textsuperscript{xii} In 1970, the UkSSR’s population size was 47.1 million and the BSSR’s population was 9 million.
of agricultural workers to urban centers, resulting in an increased exposure to the Russian language. Between 1959 and 1970, the UkSSR and BSSR witnessed a respective 8.8 percent and 12.6 percent increase in their urban populations. Similar to the concentration of Ukrainian factory mills, and railroad industries in the southern Odessa and eastern Donbass regions, the largest cities of Belarus outside the capital, Vitebsk and Mogilev, lay near the Russian border with “overwhelmingly urban, industry-dependent, more 'Sovietised'” populations. By 1970, 91.8 percent and 92.5 percent of assimilated Ukrainian and Belarusian residents lived in urban centers. THowever, the movement of rural, traditionally Ukrainian or Belarusian-speaking residents to Russian-dominated cities during the post-war period, however, fails to explain the linguistic gap that formed between the west and east regions of Ukraine but not of Belarus.

Between 1959-1970, in both republics, a similar proportion of both republics’ the populations resided in western and eastern oblasts, a majority of the two republics’ ethnic Russian populations lived in eastern, urban areas, and the assimilated titular populations in both territories were overwhelmingly urban residents. Given these similarities, the demographics of the UkSSR and BSSR cannot explain the regional linguistics divides that which formed in one republic, but not the other. Instead, the roots of these contending language practices lie buried within the opposing imperial histories explored above.

V. Contrasting Imperial Experiences

Imperial strategies and linguistic development varied in Ukraine and Belarus. The Polish Empire used cultural assimilation to control Belarusian independence movements, whereas Vienna supported the Ukrainian language to control Polish autonomy. While the population of west Ukraine had greater access to cultural institutions, and the ability to politically mobilize, west Belarusians emerged from Polish rule with no Belarusian newspapers, imprisoned national leaders, and an exiled political elite who idealized the Soviet Union. In the decades following their incorporation into the USSR after War World II, both eastern and western Belarusians from the west and east assimilated to Russian at an equal rate, whereas west Ukraine remained a stronghold for the Ukrainian language. Linguistic divisions, or the lack thereof, continued to shape the landscapes of Ukrainian and Belarusian societies, after independence from the Soviet Union, as voters cast their ballots based on language preference.

SECTION TWO: FROM LANGUAGE REGIONALISM TO VOTING BOOTHS

The 1990s gave rise to two nationalist, pro-monolingual parties in Ukraine and Belarus: the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction (Rukh) and the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF). Founded in the former Austro-Hungarian territory of Galicia, Rukh garnered a majority of its support from western, Ukrainian-speaking, western voters. By the end of 1989, the nationalist party possessed 280,000 members. That same year, the BPF only claimed 50,000 members. The BPF, however, found little support for its policies in the former-Polish territories and instead relied on academics and intellectuals in Minsk, a predominantly Russian-speaking city. In 1989, the BPF was only able to claim 50,000 members. The 1989, 1991, and 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections revealed support for Rukh divided along the same lines as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whereas the scattered votes for the BPF were not confined by Polish imperial borders. Linguistic regionalism in Ukraine translated into political support for Rukh, and its monolingual stance, whereas the lack thereof (of what?) in Belarus left the BPF with an electorate that preferred to speak the Russian language.


Both Rukh and the BPF were a part of a late 1980’s/early 1990’s wider wave of popular fronts led by intellectual elites throughout the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the Soviet Republics, these movements used Gorbachev’s liberalizing reforms to organize public rallies and mobilize media resources towards gaining greater autonomy from Moscow.

Rukh, founded as a civil-political movement in 1989, and as a political party a year later, was the brainchild of the Ukraine Writers’ Union and the Ukraine Republic Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Literature. Dominated by teachers, scientists, engineers, clergymen, physicians, and cultural figures, the party was comprised of “people who are generally referred to as the intelligentsia,” as one journalist observed. A survey of 750 out of the 1,109 delegates at Rukh’s founding congress in 1990 revealed that 76
percent of representatives possessed higher education and 90 percent identified as ethnically Ukrainian. The BPF, established in 1988 as a political party and cultural movement, modeled itself after pro-democracy organizations in the Baltics. Following the example of the Lithuanian Sąjūdis party, the BPF opened its membership to “all Belarusian citizens as well as any democratic organization.” Members then flowed in from the Belarusian Writers’ Union, the Society of Belarusian Schools, and the Belarusian Language Society. Similar to the make-up of Rukh’s demographics, 70% of the BPF’s membership comprised of members of the Belarusian intelligentsia by 1989. comprised approximately 70 percent of the BPF’s membership by 1989. Initially, in both countries the nationalist option was also the intelligentsia’s option.

Influenced by Soviet nationalities policy, Rukh and the BPF attached symbolic meaning to uplifting their national languages. Soviet nationalities policy promoted Russian as the language of interethnic communication, meant to create a “single Soviet people.” As Nikita Khrushchev declared from the steps of the Belarusian State University that, “the sooner we all learn to speak Russian, the faster we will build communism.” Beginning in the late 1920s, Moscow tied access to higher education, job opportunities, government, and law to the ability to speaking Russian, thereby demoting local languages to a secondary role in Soviet society. The result, for Soviet educator and political prisoner Nadia Svitlychna, was a blurred line between “Soviet” and “Russian,” that fostered an “inferiority complex among the members of all non-Russians nations... imbuing the different nations with an artificial feeling of ‘Soviet’ patriotism, engendering the... superiority of all things Soviet.” Amongst equals, Russian was number one.

When popular fronts arose in the late 1980s, they used the demise of local languages became a to critique Moscow’s abuse of power. Theoretically, Lenin’s early nationality policies were theoretically meant to equalize nationalities, not create hierarchies. For front leaders, the revitalization of national languages was a means of “assert[ing] their right to exist.” The rise of language politics in the 1980s went hand in hand with reclaiming national identities and challenging Soviet authority.

The connection between language and national identity appeared in both the BPF and Rukh’s platforms. The BPF’s main objective was, “the revival of the national idea, including rebirth of the Belarusian language,” with a pro-western orientation and “a great deal of skepticism towards Russia.” Collecting Belarusian folklore and refurbishing historical buildings, alongside their main goal of resuscitating the national language, the BPF pursued a nation-building project based on the idealization of a unique Belarus, “in opposition to both Soviet and Russian” identities.

The need to restore national character also likewise engulfed Rukh’s 1989 platform. Seeking to, “uphold the right of the republic’s indigenous population to preserve, on their ethnic territory, their historical way of life, culture, language, and identity,” Rukh’s platform stated that, “all national groups... should have the right to open native-language schools, to create ethnic associations and societies, to have theaters and publications, and to promote their people’s spiritual values.” Delegates at Rukh’s founding congress agreed that the party’s first priorities should be the, “promot[ion] of democratization and the expansion of glasnost,” as well as “the development of the Ukrainian culture and language.”

II. Support Bases: the Austro-Hungarian West and the Belarusian-Speaking Elite

Although united in their search for a national identity that emphasized the role of language, Rukh and the BPF faced different levels of public support for their agendas. Imperial language divisions provided Rukh with a steady support base in the west. At their founding congress, 88.5 percent of delegates identified as native Ukrainian-speakers and over half of the country lived in the west. 85 percent of delegates arrived from western or central Ukraine, while less than 6 percent came from the east, despite that fact that only 23 percent of the country lived in the west. As two journalists noted at the initial congress, the “Lvov province, where the extremist wing of the movement has been firmly entrenched for a long time, had 190 delegates,” while the eastern and southern provinces of, “Kharkov, Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad [now Luhansk], and Nikolayev [now Mykolaiv] ...had only 20 each.” Consequently, “those
people from Lvov Province and their neighbors [in Galicia] created a certain atmosphere in the hall and [...] set the tone for discussion." While the journalists clearly harbored reservations regarding the “extremist” direction of western Ukraine, their description of the “mudslinging directed at the first secretaries of the Donetsk, Odessa, Chernovtsy, [and] Khmelnytsky,” eastern oblasts depicted the growing schism between eastern and western visions for the country.\textsuperscript{76}

Vicki L. Hesli, William M. Reisinger, and Arthur H. Miller, professors of political science at the University of Iowa, captured those visions in a 1995 study of identity and political preferences in Ukraine. Out of 220 issues, the most polarizing political issue between members of the Communist bloc and Rukh bloc was whether “only the Ukrainian language should be used when conducting public business.”\textsuperscript{77}

The second most important issue dividing the two blocs was whether Ukraine should enter into a federation with Russia, while the third was if Ukraine should have sole control over the Black Sea fleet in Crimea. Participants were more divided over internal language politics than Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. The authors then compared the divide between the Communist and Rukh blocs to divides between other identities: geographic location, nationality, and language most frequently used. Eastern and western Ukrainians received the same score of division score on over the issue of public language use as the Communist bloc and the Rukh bloc. Nationality (Russian versus Ukrainian) and preferred language (Russian versus Ukrainian) were substantially less divided over the language issue than east and west Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{78} In short, a Ukrainian’s geographic location was the most accurate prediction of his or her political party orientation. Political borders followed similar lines as imperial borders in Ukraine.

Such divisions played out in the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections. In Ukraine’s first election in 1994, 35 percent of the 407 seats in parliament went to the Communist party, which endorsed close ties with Russia, while 27 percent went to the Rukh-led national-democratic bloc, 22 percent went to the liberal-centrist coalition, who supported reforms and close ties to Russia, and 16 percent went to unaffiliated candidates. The national-democratic bloc gained 86 percent of its votes from western and central oblasts, whereas the Communist Party gained 84 percent of its votes from southern and eastern oblasts.\textsuperscript{79} Four years later, the Communist bloc once again “received a greater percentage of votes in more heavily Russified eastern Ukraine, and especially in Crimea, with almost 40 percent of the party vote,” and Rukh “did well in western Ukraine, especially in Lviv, where it received one-third of the party vote.”\textsuperscript{80} As one 	extit{Izvestia} journalist summarized, “The elections revealed clear-cut regional party preferences, which were previously known in a very general, abstract way: The west favored the nationalists, and the east, the Communists.”\textsuperscript{81} With language policy as the most polarizing issue dividing the Communist and Rukh blocs, the latter’s goal of strengthening the Ukrainian language appealed to the post-imperial identity of western constituents.

Unlike the regional divisions in Ukraine, Belarus did not possess an imperial footprint in the form of a Belarusian language stronghold. The BPF’s base of Belarusian-speaking intellectuals was concentrated in urban areas, yet a majority of Minsk residents remained loyal to the Communist Party, and only 1.5 percent of the capital’s residents preferred to use Belarusian in everyday communication according to a 1996 survey.\textsuperscript{82} Instead of an imperial west-versus-east language divide, Belarusian-speakers were more concentrated along urban and rural lines. After World War II destroyed 80 percent of Belarusian land, Soviet reconstruction efforts stimulated a mass migration of agricultural workers into urban areas.\textsuperscript{83} Between 1959 and 1976, the population of Minsk grew by 107 percent. Since 81.9 percent of ethnic Russians in Belarus lived in urban centers by 1970, Ioffe claimed that “urbanization also means Russification.”\textsuperscript{84} Belarusians increased their contact with the Russian language by moving to Russian-dominated cities, which influenced their likelihood to adopt Russian as their language of most frequent use. As discussed in the previous section, 92.5 percent of Belarusians who assimilated to the Russian language from 1959 to 1970 did in fact reside in urban centers. Rukh relied on western voters to gain seats in parliament, while the BPF could not rely on urban voters to do the same.

Despite the lack of a sizable Belarusian language stronghold, the BPF continued to closely associate Belarusian identity with its national tongue. BPF-founder Zianon Pazniak was a member of the archeology team that discovered 100,000 to 250,000 corpses shot by Stalin’s NKVD between 1937-41, and buried in mass graves in the Kurapaty Forest outside
of Minsk. Leading the BPF's first public rally as a Kurapaty "memorial service," for "Belorussians [to] pay tribute to their ancestors," Pazniak entered politics in what Marples and Uladimir Padhol describe as "a psychological state of fear and hatred" for Soviet authorities. The BPF leader often demonized the Communist Party, and more generally Russia as a whole, in his writings. In his article "On Russian Imperialism," Pazniak positioned Russia as "the main enemy of the Belarusian people," and called for "the complete severance of ties with Russia." 

Belarus was for the Belarusian people and language, not Russians.

According to Soviet historians Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, scholars who concentrate on post-Soviet political transitions, this technique isolated the majority of the population. "Civic self-identification, in which language use only plays a minor part, is of greater importance in Belarus than ethnic identity," claimed Eke and Kuzio, "Indeed, russification is viewed by many Belarusians and Russians as a natural progressive phenomenon, completely unconnected with the demise of culture." The BPF's connection between the Belarusian language and nation-building "alienated those citizens of Belarus who speak Russian and reject Belarusian (sometimes with disdain) but do not consider themselves any less Belarusian than those who choose their native tongue." Historian David R. Marples, a history professor at the University of Alberta specializing in modern Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian politics, made a similar claim, arguing that the BPF "misjudged the predisposition of the electorate for the native language and culture." In the Belarusian Supreme Soviet's 1989 elections to the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, the BPF won 27 out of 315 seats, compared to the Communist Party's 170 seats.

While Rukh's emphasis on the Ukrainian language and the BPF's promotion of the Belarusian language alienated more voters than it attracted amongst its linguistically homogenous populace.

III. The First Presidential Elections: Divided and Undivided

Ukraine and Belarus's first presidential elections further demonstrated the effect of imperial borders on popular support for nationalist parties. In Belarus's 1994 election, which the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) declared, "reflect[ed] the freely expressed will of the electorate," populist candidate Alexander Lukashenka won with 45 percent of the votes in the first round and 80.6 percent in the second. Vyacheslav Kebich, the incumbent Prime Minister, finished second with 17.7 percent of first round votes and 14.2 percent of second round votes, while Pazniak came in third with 13.1 percent of votes in the first round. Imperial legacies did not create regional support for the nationalist BPF's policies: Pazniak won a mere 21.2 percent and 11.7 percent of the votes in Grodno and Brest respectively. In the party's founding base of Minsk City, 21 percent of the electorates voted for the BPF candidate. Around the rest of the country, 15.3 percent of the Minsk region, 6.3 percent of the southern Homel oblast, 4.7 percent of the eastern Mahilyw oblasts, and 9.4 percent of the northern Vitsebsk oblast voted for Pazniak. To voters from both the west and east, resonated more with Lukashenka's vision for the country resonated more than the BPF's.

Both Lukashenka and Kebich favored economic ties with Russia, supported the ratification of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) charter, and emphasized the indigeneity of the Russian language in Belarus. In the words of historian Stephen R. Burant, the two right-winged candidates did "not see Russia as a threat to their people's identity." Before the election, Kebich and Russian President Boris Yeltsin were in the midst of negotiating a monetary union involving a 1-to-1 exchange rate between Belarusian and Russian currencies, the sale of oil to Belarus at domestic Russian prices, and the forgiveness of Belarusian energy debts. For Kebich, the monetary union was "not just a question of economic circumstance. We [Russia and Belarus] are linked by the closest spiritual bonds; we have a common history and similar cultures." In his mind, the two countries' pasts and futures were intertwined. By contrast, Pazniak alluded to Belarus' past relations with Russia as a reason to reject CIS membership and the monetary union. The "unification of the monetary systems of Russia and Belarus is impossible without Belarus' losing its independence and statehood," claimed the BPF leader, "It will mean the Belarusian economy's and the Belarusian state's

xiii The Supreme Soviet was made up of 360 seats, but thirteen were not filled due to low voter turnout and 45 were pre-selected from "social organizations," (i.e. army veterans).

xiv The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a confederation of former-Soviet states that coordinates trade, security, and financial relations between the member states, although some argue that its powers are largely symbolic.
capitulation to Russia's bigger more powerful capital and entrepreneurial system... In the end, we will remain on our own land, but it will no longer belong to us." Economic integration with Russia, like in Soviet times, was a threat to Belarusian independence.

“Fervently reject[ing] economic and cultural entente with Russia,” Pazniak favored free-market economics and ties to the European Union. While the role of Russian influence in Belarusian society divided the presidential candidates, it did not divide the electorate.

In the end, Lukashenka won the presidency by promising to use his former title as the chairman of the Anti-Corruption Committee in the Belarusian Parliament to negotiate a better economic agreement with Moscow and purge the government of high-level corruption. “Public opinion views him as a national hero,” one reporter exclaimed, “a Belarusian Robin Hood who will take from the rich speculator and the mafia stealing national wealth the give to the poor.” Leaning on his anti-corruption reputation, Lukashenka represented a fresh change from Kebich, who he belittled as an “inefficient authoritarian,” and “a creature of the old Soviet elite” that voted to dismantle the USSR. From east to west, Belarusians residents voted for Lukashenka.

In contrast, Ukraine's first presidential elections revealed strong support for Rukh in the former Austro-Hungarian territory of Galicia. The December 1991 election results revealed two clear front-runners: Rukh-founder Viacheslav Chornovil with 23 percent of the popular vote, and Leonid Kravchuk with 61.7 percent. Levko Lukyanenko of the Ukrainian Republican Party lagged far behind in third place with a mere 4.5 percent of the popular vote. Chornovil only received a majority of the popular vote in the former Galician oblasts, winning 75.9 percent in Lviv, 67.1 percent in Ivano-Frankivsk, and 57.5 percent in Ternopil. Imperial borders reflected political borders in Ukraine.

Both Chornovil and Kravchuk favored amicable relations with Russia while defending Ukrainian sovereignty. The Rukh leader advocated for complete military and territorial separation from its eastern neighbor, while at the same time acknowledged the benefits of an economic relationship with Russia. Rejecting Russian claims on the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea as “aggressive intentions against Ukraine by the Russian leadership," who are, “returning to Bolshevists methods to restore the empire,” Chornovil opposed the transfer of any lands or equipment to Moscow. Although the Rukh leader criticized “those forces in Russian that are trying to stifle Ukrainian independence economically,” he still valued the stability that a positive relationship with Russia could bring to his country and “always considered Boris Yeltsin to be the guarantor of good Ukrainian-Russian relations.” Rukh pressured Kiev to leave the CIS and pursue security and economic integration with Europe, claiming that “secession from the CIS was the only way of getting rid of colonial status.” At the same time, Rukh approved of treaties with Russian on the condition that they were “mutually advantageous” to all parties involved. Kravchuk mimicked Rukh's multi-vector foreign policy, while using his Communist Party background to appeal to eastern voters as well.

Kravchuk, a leading figure in the Communist Party of Ukraine, former Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, and native westerner from Volyn, marketed himself to both western and eastern identities. “Leonid Kravchuk succeeded in identifying himself with the drive for independence,” claimed King's College London's Professor of Political Science Sarah Birch in an Electoral Studies article, “but he was at the same time the choice of the conservatives in the country who saw him as representing a link with the communist past.” A month before the elections, Kravchuk supported Ukrainian sovereignty, while separating anti-Soviet sentiment from current relations with Russia, in an interview with Izvestia. “The desire to be the master in one's own land is ineradicable,” asserted Kravchuk, “when the people of one republic or another say: ‘That's it, we've had enough, we'll build a state of our own.' This is their choice, their legal right. And the politician...must honor that choice.” The Ukrainian leader acknowledged public anger over the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station explosion and Soviet exhaustion of the coal industry in the eastern Donets Basin, yet redirected public anger from Moscow to totalitarianism: “Now some people here are shouting look how Russia has treated us! But after all, the problem isn't Russia, it's the monstrous logic that guides a totalitarian regime, it's the all-devouring monster that knows neither family nor tribe.” Using a democratic platform to appeal to both western sentiment for independence and eastern desires for economic reform, Kravchuk bridged the imperial divide in political sentiments to beat his lesser-known
Rukh opponent.

Imperial borders transformed into political regionalism in Ukraine, but not in Belarus. After decades of experience with Ukrainian language schools, press, and political organizations under Austro-Hungarian rule, western Ukraine endorsed Rukh’s monolingual platform in the first presidential and parliamentary elections. Polish rule provided little support for the Belarusian language, leaving the BPF with no regional base from which to draw support for its monolingual policy. In the 1989 parliamentary and 1994 presidential elections, the BPF received few votes from formerly-Polish Grodno and Brest oblasts. This varying support for nationalist parties impacted language policy in the 1990s, as I will discuss in the following section.

SECTION THREE: IMPACT ON LANGUAGE POLICY

Imperial footprints in Ukraine generated popular support for the Ukrainian language in the west, whereas the same footprints in Belarus facilitated the rise of Russian. In the absence of a Belarusian-language stronghold, President Lukashenka portrayed the BPF’s monolingual policy as discriminatory and imposed by a fringe party. After a media campaign demonizing the BPF, Lukashenka reinstated Russian as an official language in 1995, with much public support. Next door, Leonid Kuchma also vowed to uplift the status of the Russian language during his 1994 presidential campaign. Yet throughout Kuchma’s presidency, Ukrainian remained the only official language of the country. Unlike Lukashenka, Kuchma needed parliamentary support from Rukh to counter his Communist Party opposition and pass the new constitution. As a solution, Kuchma legally supported Ukrainian as the sole official language in the 1996 Constitution, while publicly normalizing the role of Russian in Ukrainian society. The BPF never gained enough votes from the Belarusian electorate to similarly pressure Lukashenka in parliament. Without the legacy of linguistic development under Polish rule, Lukashenka ended Belarus’s monolingual policy with little public protest; in contrast, whereas the need to balance two different imperial experiences in Ukraine defined its language policy under Kuchma.

I. Belarus: A Bilingual Trajectory

One year before the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Belarusian Supreme Soviet passed legislation to uplift the Belarusian language. The January 26, 1990 “Law on Language” outlined a gradual replacement of the Russian language with Belarusian: within three years, Belarusian was to become the language of science, culture, and media; within three to five years the language of congresses, conferences, and state decrees; within five years the language of business; and finally, within a century, the language of legal matters. On June 4, the Supreme Soviet adopted the “Law on Culture” that both guaranteed cultural rights to all ethnic groups and emphasized, “the preservation, development and spread of the Belarusian culture and language,” as a policy priority. The “Law on Education,” approved four months later, also affirmed “support for the spread of the Belarusian language in education.” The Belarusian language was on the rise.

The reason for the lack of protest by the Communist Party, which controlled the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, to the monolingual law is up for debate. Alexandra Goujon, a professor of political science at the University of Bourgogne specializing in regime change and the politics of memory, claimed that, “Soviet and Belarusian leaders believed that consent on cultural issues could appease the political demands of the opposition.” In short, giving the people back their language would save the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Iryna Ulasik emphasized bottom-up agency. According to the European University Institute academic, genuine public shock at the dismal conditions of their native language, namely the revelation that “less than a quarter of all Belarusian schoolchildren study in the native language,” and “more than 95% of all literary publications were in Russian,” generated the public demand referred to by Goujon. Pazniak took all the credit for such demand, as he “frequently noted that the 30 opposition deputies were dictating the policies of the 300 others.” One journalist agreed with Pazniak’s assessment, proclaiming, “the year 1991 was a stellar year for the BPF…it briefly became virtually the ruling party in the country …Although it held only 10% of the Deputies’ seats in parliament, it managed to push through radical laws on the state symbols and language.” Whether the result of upper-level Soviet strategy, public angst, or the influence of a minority party, Belarusian was the country’s official language for the first time in almost a century. And yet, official
status did not translate into everyday reality, which may have encouraged the Community Party to grant Belarusian official status in the first place.

Despite these laws, Russian continued to dominate the political, legal, and business realms of Belarusian life. All Belarusian ministers spoke in Russian. Lukashenka himself, “does not even speak Belarusian correctly,” instead relying on a mix of Russian and Belarusian common in the countryside. According to Hanna Vasilevich, a research associate at the European Centre for Minority Issues, “the only significant change,” in the linguistic landscape of the country in the early 1990s was the re-introduction of Belarusian into schools. In the 1994/95 school year, an all-time high of 76 percent of secondary students studied in Belarusian-language schools, compared to a little less than 25 percent in the late 1980s. Ironically, the law’s solitary impact on society became its Achilles’ heel. The 76 percent of secondary students studying in Belarusian-language schools in did not match the 37 percent of the country’s population who spoke Belarusian at home. The quantity of Belarusian schools was “well above the percentage of students whose parents wanted them to attend such schools,” according to Ioffe. For such parents, the influx of Belarusian in education was perceived as a deprivation of choice.

Parties in opposition to the BPF accused them of forced Belarusization and Russophobia. The Movement of Democratic Reform (MDF) disparaged the language law as “undemocratic,” while the Movement for Democracy, Social Progress, and Justice (MDSPJ) “opposed the model of a mono-ethnic and mono-linguistic Belarusian nation,” and the United Democratic Party of Belarus (USPB) “considered the right to freely choose one’s language of education to be one of the most important civic rights which citizens of Belarus should have.” These parities united to adopt a 1993 congressional resolution that promised to “remove violence and discrimination from language policy, to adopt official bilingualism (Belarusian and Russian), [and to] legitimize the right of parents to choose the language of education of their children.” Without the development of Belarusian language education under Polish rule, the Belarusian public now interpreted the growth of such schools as “violence.”

A year into his presidency, Lukashenka vilified Belarusization. “People who speak Belarusian can do nothing else but speak Belarusian,” asserted the president, “Because in Belarusian one cannot express anything significant...There are only two great languages in the world – Russian and English.” For him, the 1990 “Law on Language” was “imposed from the top largely by the Popular Front members, without any consideration of the opinion of the people.” Emphasizing a lack of public agency while also holding the BPF accountable, Lukashenka asked, “Why on earth do we have to artificially suppress one language just in order to win approval of yet another Pazniak?” Regardless of the fact that the BPF only occupied 10 percent of the Supreme Soviet when the law was passed, Lukashenka’s accusations appealed to Russian-speaking members of society concerned about the declining number of Russian schools since independence. Compared to the BPF’s emphasis on the connection between the Belarusian nation and mother tongue, Lukashenka perceived the Russian language as no less native to the land than Belarusian. His statement, “I believe that one can be an outstanding Belarusian and a 100 percent patriot but at the same time care about the Russian language,” resonated with the majority of the country who spoke Russian at home without questioning their loyalty to Belarus.

Lukashenka’s desire “to give the choice to the people fell on receptive ears.” In 1995, the Minsk leader called for a public referendum to decide whether the Russian language should be granted the same official status as Belarusian. The purpose of a referendum, declared the President, was to develop a form of “direct democracy,” that “allowed citizens to express directly their wishes in solving major social life problems.” When discussing the country’s language situation in 2010, Lukashenka still emphasized choice and condemned the use of force:

Bilingualism is our greatest cultural asset… [it is] based on the historical choice of the people. We will never allow discrimination in this regard, there will be no violent ‘Belarusization’ at the expense of the Russian language. In Belarus, where most of the people use Russian as their native language, artificially removing it from use would be, at the very least, stupid and idiotic.

From Lukashenka’s perspective, a monolingual language policy was a form of discrimination. This populist approach to the country’s language question was a win-win for Lukashenka: the referendum promoted the illusion of a ‘power to the people’
democracy while giving the president the opportunity to attack his political rivals for failing to do the same. In the words of BPF board secretary Vintsuk Vyachorka, by portraying the BPF as “the enemy who is hindering the ‘people’s president,’” due to its opposition to the referendum, Lukashenka used the vote to distract the public from unfulfilled campaign promises, such as a deteriorating economy that resulted in an “extreme fall in the rating of the president.”

Since his former campaign enemies of Kebich and the nomenklatura (elite Soviet bureaucrats and industrial officials), “already occupied their former posts in the government of Lukashenka,” the president sought a new scapegoat and landed on an enemy “known long ago, as far back as Soviet times—it is the ‘nationalist,’ and this means the Belarusian Popular Front.”

Lukashenka’s media campaign running up to the 1995 referendum put forth a clear message: Belarusization is violent, and the BPF is the culprit.

By nicknaming Belarusian the beneefaiśkaja mova (the language spoken by members of the BPF), Lukashenka directly linked Belarusian to the nationalist party in the weeks preceding the referendum. Uladzimir Zamyatulin, the president’s chief propagandist, increased “restriction[s] on freedom of expression and [the] intimidation of journalists,” especially on “non-state newspapers.”

State-sponsored media dominated television screens, running “anti-Belarusian, pro-Russian” advertisements “with the deliberate humiliation of the Popular Front.” Days before the 1995 referendum, state channels broadcasted a documentary connecting the BPF to the collaborationist WWII government. The film emphasized the similarities between the two groups—they used the same national symbols, spoke the same language, and severed ties with Russia. According to Goujon, “in a visual and rhetorical way, Belarusian speakers were equated with internal enemies, and described as ‘fascists.’ Belarusian was presented as the language of a violent enemy.”

In addition to language, Belarus’s flag and coat of arms required amending, because “according to Lukashenka’s logic those who used White-Red-White flags are ideological followers of Nazi collaborators.”

The White-Red-White flag flew over Belarus prior to fascist occupation, originating in the 13th century Grand Duchy of Lithuania state and reintroduced in 1918 by the short-lived Belarusian People’s Republic. Yet by only focusing on its fascist links, Lukashenka’s media campaign likened speaking Belarusian to being an enemy of the state.

One month before the referendum, the Moscow state-owned station Radio Rossiî interviewed Lukashenka on the upcoming vote. The Belarusian President emphasized the minority status of the BPF and equated their opposition to a disturbance of the peace. “Some people of the BPF [Belarusian People’s Front] opposition party—they are not numerous in parliament, a couple dozen—nevertheless, they started a hunger-strike yesterday...there are threats of exploding something and subverting things...such a small bunch of people can still raise quite a row,” recounted Lukashenka. The BPF’s voices belonged neither in the media nor on the streets. Moreover, their protests were not simply against the president’s referendum, but the Belarusian people. For compared to the “couple dozen” BPF members in opposition to the vote, “approximately 85 percent of the population of the Republic of Belarus want this,” it was “accepted by the majority of our people.”

Lukashenka presented himself as standing for the majority, while the BPF represented a rowdy handful of nationalists. In Ukraine, Rukh claimed that a bilingual law language threatened national cohesion. In Belarus, Lukashenka claimed that the BPF’s support for a monolingual policy did the same. Different imperial experiences led to different relationships with the Russian language.

On May 14, 1995, the public voted in favor of all four of the referendum’s propositions: out of the 64.8 percent of registered voters who participated, 78.6 percent voted in favor of economic integration with Russia, 81.4 percent supported granting the president the right to dissolve the parliament, 87 percent sanctioned the adaptation of a new flag and coat of arms, and, finally, 86.8 percent supported instating Russian as an official state language with equal status to Belarusian.

Instead of questioning the veracity of the vote, the BPF focused on the legality of the referendum. Claiming that the president had violated the constitution, the party vowed “to initiate a nationwide referendum on confidence in the President.” Such a referendum never materialized. The people voted, and Russian was an official language of Belarus. In the parliamentary elections held on the same day, the BPF won no seats.

The BPF lacked the imperial legacy of linguistic regionalism that Rukh relied on to win representation in parliament. As I discussed in Section I, Western
Belarusian residents under Polish rule experienced pressure to assimilate to the Polish language and possessed little access to Belarusian-language education or press. After joining the Soviet Union, Belarusians in the west and east adopted Russian as their native language at a similar rate: imperial difference in Belarus did not translate into linguistic difference. Since independence from the Soviet Union, the public supported Lukashenka’s assessment of the BPF’s monolingual policy: it did not reflect the true linguistic demographics, and imperial experience, of the country.

II. Ukraine: A Monolingual Status Quo

Next door, Rukh gained enough support from voters in the formerly Austro-Hungarian territories to exert political pressure on Kuchma. The Ukrainian President responded by never fulling his promises to grant Russian official status and actually reinforcing Ukrainian as the only state language in the 1996 Constitution. Unlike the domination of the Communist Party in Belarus, the 1994 Ukrainian parliament was split between a Rukh-bloc and a Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)-bloc, that reflecting the country’s historical, imperial divisions. Using Rukh to balance his rivals in the CPU, Kuchma maintained Ukrainian’s sole legal status while publicly emphasizing the naturalness or indigenousness of Russian in society. The ambiguous relationship between protection for Russian as a minority language and the revitalization of Ukrainian as the state language allowed the president to appease both western voters and his eastern base simultaneously. Ukraine’s linguistic regionalism translated into an imprecise maintenance of its monolingual status quo in the 1990s.

The 1989 “Law on Language” declared Ukrainian the only state language of the republic, “in order to support the comprehensive development of spiritual creative forces of the Ukrainian people and guarantee its sovereign national state future.” Yet, the status of Russian remained ambiguous. Positioning “the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication [between] peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics,” in the preamble, the 1989 Law continued to protect the use of Russian throughout its text. With provision such as “The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic shall provide for the free use of the Russian language,” “the Russian language shall be the language of relations of republican and local state, party, public bodies, enterprise, institutions, and organization with Union bodies,” and “the study of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in all general education schools shall be mandatory,” the 1989 Law did not challenge the role of Russian in Ukrainian society. Additionally, the law emphasized minority language rights, “guarant[ing] the national, cultural and linguistic rights to its citizens without reservation,” especially the “free choice of the language of education.” According to Volodymyr Kulyk, a visiting professor of political science at Yale University, Russian’s vague status as the language of interethnic communication was meant to counter its dominance in society without not alienating its speakers. “The use of Russian in official institutions and in private communication between speakers of different languages was perfectly appropriate,” while “the Ukrainian language was by no means illegitimate….its existence as a separate language was unequivocally accepted, which in itself constituted a tremendous change in comparison with the Tsarist policy of treating it as a dialect of Russian and banning its use in most public domains,” attested Kulyk. Russian retained its legitimacy, while Ukrainian was acknowledged as the native language of ethnic Ukrainians. Kuchma would use this ambiguous relationship to his advantage in the years to come.

In the 1994 presidential race, Kuchma defeated Kravchuk with a campaign promise to fix the economy. Kravchuk’s remedy to the country’s $4-5.5 billion gas debt to Russia was to print more money. Reaching a rate of 4,735 percent in 1993, Ukraine “became the undisputed champion of hyperinflation in the post-communist bloc.” In the last months of Kravchuk’s presidency, the administration decreased industrial subsidies and stopped paying workers. The country looked to the industrialist from the east for answers.

Kuchma, Prime Minister from 1992-93 and director of the largest missile factory in Dnipropetrovsk, was a native Russian-speaker. The press tended to portray the election as a battle for Ukrainian statehood, casting Kravchuk as “the national-patriotic…interested primarily in building an independent Ukrainian state on an anti-Russian foundation,” and Kuchma as “an enemy of Ukrainian national independence.” Yet, as one journalist pointed out, “the former President’s [Kravchuk’s] team succeeded in planting in the voters’ minds the idea that Kuchma would mean…reunification with
Russia,” when in reality the two Leonids prioritized Ukrainian sovereignty and opposed political and military integration with Russia. Both candidates supported granting Russian official status and no candidate, not even Chornovil in the previous election, advocated cutting all economic ties with Russia. Rukh did not put forth a candidate, instead partnering with other democratic parties in support of Kravchuk, whose policies were “now associated in Ukraine with the policies of Rukh.” In the end, Kuchma won by appearing “more willing to search for an accommodation with Russia than Kravchuk,” to help the economy and appealing to eastern and southern voters with promises to revitalize industrial sectors.

In his inaugural speech, Kuchma vowed to uplift the Russian language:

When determining [the] domestic political stratify today, [we] should first understand that Ukraine is a multiethnic state. Any attempts to disregard this fact threatens a deep split in our society and the failure of the idea of Ukrainian statehood. Ukraine is mother to all of its citizens, regardless of nationality or religion, regardless of what they consider to be their native language. In the near future, I intend to propose a change to the current legislation with the aim of granting official status to the Russian language, while the Ukrainian language retains its state status.

The new president sought to end the stereotype that Russian-speakers were disloyal to the Ukrainian state. As someone who began studying the Ukrainian language just prior to the presidential elections, Kuchma himself was not fluent in the national tongue. One journalist commented that the new president must, “try to gain a decent command of the Ukrainian language in order to avoid a conflict between Kiev and Western Ukraine.” When a voter asked about his lack of fluency, Kuchma responded, “It is my problem, but it is a problem I share with a great number of Ukrainians who do not speak fluent Ukrainian.” Kuchma, like Lukashenka, saw the Russian language as a legitimate and natural part of the nation's history that a large portion of the indigenous population spoke. And yet in the 11 years of his presidency, Kuchma never reformed Ukraine's language policy.

Unlike Lukashenka, the Ukrainian president needed the Rukh-led national-democratic bloc in parliament to accomplish his political agenda. “I, as president, consider it necessary to resume the constitutional process,” declared Kuchma at his inauguration. To ratify a new constitution, the president required cooperation from the legislature. As mentioned in the previous section, the 1994 parliamentary elections left the legislative branch divided between the western Ukraine-backed Rukh bloc and eastern/southern Ukraine-backed CPU bloc. “The election results confirmed that only two parties, two political forces, were able to usher into the parliament a number of their representatives, which allows them to form factions on a strict party basis,” analyzed one journalist, “These are the Communist Party and Rukh.” Both parties relied on criticizing the others' language policy to evoke support from their regional constituency. While the CPU supported equal status for the Russian and Ukrainian languages as a means of acknowledging the multiethnic composition of the nation, Rukh argued that a bilingual policy would lead to the continued dominance of the historically privileged Russian language. The CPU then took its support for Russian a step further with nostalgia for the Soviet Union and an anti-privatization platform that ultimately “tarnished the arguments of those in favour of dual state languages, branding them as allies of the communist and ‘mortal’ enemies of the Ukrainian people.” Thus Kuchma, elected primarily from the east on a pro-Russian ticket, could not afford to renounce Rukh’s policy completely, as it would undermine its own legitimacy as the leader of an independent Ukraine. Instead, the new president publicly supported the Russian language’s legitimacy in the nation, while legally supporting Ukrainian as the sole official language.

The Donbas-based CPU combined with the Socialist Party to form the largest bloc in the new parliament. Blaming Ukraine's weak economy on the breakup of the USSR, the CPU bloc criticized Kuchma for privatizing industries and not ratifying the CIS charter. In Kuchma’s first one hundred days, the CPU blocked the president’s reforms and refused to ratify the new constitution. Using his party’s majority in parliament, the CPU bloc speaker Aleksandr Moroz “has taken measures to restrict Kuchma’s freedom of maneuver by initiating the confirmation of Vitaly Masol, the nominee of the ‘leftist’ forces, in the post of Prime Minister.” Without consent from parliament, Kuchma did not have the power to replace him. As one journalist concluded, “one of the fundamental goals of Soviet power in Ukraine is, if not to abandon
the institution of the presidency altogether, then at least to reduce the role of the head of state to purely representative functions.” Kuchma needed allies in parliament to escape this fate.

In the late 1990s, Kuchma would rely on a balancing act of regionally-based industrial oligarchs, or “business-administrative groups” (BAGs), in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kyiv to monopolize political and energy resources. But in 1994, Kuchma needed Rukh-led nationalists in parliament to pass his new constitution. “I do not rule out negotiations with Vyacheslav Chornovil,” asserted the new President, “the West is right in calling Ukraine the Central European Columbia. Without privatization and the complete restructuring of our country’s economy, Western capital will not come to us.” Rukh and Kuchma had something in common: economic reform and opposition to the CPU.

Rukh opposed granting the Russian language an official status. One week after Kuchma’s inaugural address, Chornovil and leaders from the Rukh bloc drafted a statement that depicted a bilingual policy as a veil for the continued domination of Russian:

“The president’s wish to grant official status to the Russian language cannot be regarded as anything but [a] deliberate stirring up of the passions that rage in a society infuriated by economic difficulties. It is clear to conscious people that there is no different between the terms ‘state’ and ‘official’ language…This is even at variance with the Law on Languages that was approved by the Supreme Soviet in the times of the Ukrainian SSR and it is in line with the policy of Russification that was conducted by the tsars and the Kremlin leaders. In practice, two state languages mean [the] domination of one language—Russian. Are we going to be returned to those times when neither science, nor education, nor the Army, and nor the industry used the Ukrainian language?”

Granting official status to Russian would not ensure equality between the two languages, but it would sustain the historically uneven supremacy of the Soviet tongue, according to Rukh bloc leaders.

In a nation already divided by from a presidential election that pitted the pro-Kravchuk west against the pro-Kuchma east and south, giving Russian official status would further alienate Rukh’s Galician base. “Kuchma has assumed office in a country that is divided in two, practically. Yesterday the West was the winner, today, the East,” claimed one journalist. Another newspaper article asked the grim question, “Will the prevalence of ‘leftists’ in the east and the complete rejection of them in the west split Ukraine along the Zburch River? Only time will tell.”

The Zburch River, which separates Galicia from the rest of the country, threatened to flood Kuchma’s control of the legislature. According to a Nezavisimaya Gazeta correspondent, national stability depended on Rukh’s desire to work with Kuchma, for “stability in Ukraine’s supreme echelons of power will depend on the breakdown of forces in the interface between the legislative and executive branches,” it is unclear, “how much Leonid Kuchma can change the makeup of the government in his favor without getting into a conflict with the parliament. Moreover, it is still unknown unclear how the western and central provinces, and especially the national-democratic movements and parties, whose constituencies are in those provinces, will react to the election of the new President.” Kuchma faced a CPU-majority parliament with a power-hungry Prime Minister, an antagonistic Rukh bloc, and the need to ratify a new state constitution.

The new Ukrainian leader acknowledged the divided nation in his inaugural speech: “As president of Ukraine I will do everything possible to consolidate the nation and to overcome everything that violated the Ukrainian state’s internal stability. This is the situation in Ukraine today. Therefore, one has to act quickly, but carefully.” In his language policy, “carefully” translated into endorsing Ukrainian as the sole official language in the 1996 Constitution to win the support of the Rukh bloc, while unofficially renormalizing the public use of Russian by emphasizing the multiethnic character of Ukraine. To overcome the country’s imperial legacy of linguistic regionalism and consolidate his own personal power, Kuchma embraced the ambiguity of Ukraine’s monolingual language law. Ukrainian remained the sole official language in the 1996 Constitution, while “the legal grounds for the public use of Russian remain unclear.”

On the ground in the mid-1990s, “the public use of Russian, far from being demoted to the level of a minority language, remained virtually unchanged or even increased in a number of practices,” according to Kulyk, and “Russian remaining overwhelmingly dominant in the east and south.” At the same time, the gradual Ukrainianization of secondary schools, higher education, and government agencies reassured Rukh’s goal of Ukrainian language
revitalization and quelled fear that granting Russian equal status would take away public incentive to learn the titular language. Kuchma reversed Soviet language policy: Ukrainian became the official language of the nation, while Russian retained a special status as a “more-than-minority” language. Both languages were legitimate and indigenous to Ukraine.

On June 28, 1996, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the new Constitution with a vote of 315 for and 36 against. 26 out of 27 Rukh deputies voted in favor, making for a total of 80 out of 82 in the Rukh bloc approving the draft. In the CPU bloc, 37 out of 104 voted in favor.\textsuperscript{171} The Constitution increased presidential powers, creating “a strong executive branch subordinated to the president” and gave the president the right to appoint and dismiss the prime minister unilaterally.\textsuperscript{172} Kuchma enlarged his personal authority, while Rukh got its language policy. As Article 10 affirmed, “the State language of Ukraine shall be the Ukrainian language. The State shall ensure comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory.”\textsuperscript{173} On the other hand, “the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed.”\textsuperscript{174} Some, like Judge Oleksandr Mukolaiovich Mironenko, emphasize Article 10’s comma separating “other minority languages” from “Russian” as a symbol of Russian’s unique, more-than-a-minority language status.\textsuperscript{175} In 1999, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court clarified Article 10, ruling that the Ukrainian language was the “compulsory means of communication for officials of government bodies and local self-government structures, and in all spheres of public life,” including education.\textsuperscript{176} Additionally, “local government bodies, bodies of Crimean Autonomous Republic and local self-government bodies may use Russian and other languages of national minorities along with the state language.”\textsuperscript{177} Ukrainian dominated in national government institutions and education, yet local governments could function in Russian and Ukrainian, while minorities had the right to send their children to the minority-language school of their choice under the condition that they take Ukrainian language classes.

Despite the hierarchy of the Ukrainian language in law, Kulyk still argues that in practice, Article 10 promotes “bilingualism, with no clear boundaries between the respective domains of the Ukrainian and Russian languages. Therefore, Ukrainian may be ambivalently perceived as both the language of the country and one of the two languages, hardly the most significant for social interaction.”\textsuperscript{178} Ukrainian may legally be the only state language, but in practice Russian-speakers did not have to significantly alter their linguistic practices at a local level to conform to Article 10. Kuchma used ambiguity to codify the country’s monolingual policy while avoiding the alienation of Russian-speakers.

Rukh accepted Kuchma’s ambiguous language policy. In contrast to his statement about the instability of Kuchma’s policy following the inaugural address, Chornovil presented the 1995 year as a win for national cohesion. “First and foremost, it turned out to be possible to preserve peace in society and to avoid social explosions,” claimed the Rukh leader.\textsuperscript{179} Furthermore, Chornovil portrayed the new Constitution as a symbol of the party’s support for Kuchma, stating that it has “given the president the vertical structure that he deemed necessary” in order to “sign the Constitutional Agreement,” and keep “the confrontation between the president and the Supreme Council from worsening.”\textsuperscript{180} By working with the new president, Rukh now depicted itself as a harbor of national stability. According to Kulyk, “in order to avoid being portrayed as radicals capable of causing an interethnic conflict, the ‘national-democrats’ parties largely gave up their emphasis on the language problem,” and accepted the unique role of Russian as an unofficial language of the country.\textsuperscript{181}

Indeed, during the 2002 parliamentary and 2004 presidential elections, Rukh’s “Our Ukraine” bloc did not mention language politics and ran on a centrist foreign policy platform meant to “soften their traditionally firm position along the East-West foreign policy spectrum.”\textsuperscript{182} Rukh was less concerned about the use of Russian in society than it was about the codification of Ukrainian as the only official language of the nation. As long as Ukrainian was legally shielded from Russification, minority languages deserved protection as well. Gaining enough votes from the former Austro-Hungarian western electorate to form a parliamentary bloc strong enough to influence language policy in the 1996 Constitution, Rukh ensured the maintenance of Ukraine’s monolingual legislation in the 1990s.

CONCLUSION
Impacted by different imperial experiences, the Ukrainian and Belarusian populations had different answers to Lukashenka’s 2009 question: What is the Russian language? Austro-Hungarian support for the Ukrainian language in west Ukraine stymied residents’ assimilation to Russian in the Soviet Union. After independence, imperial borders emulated electoral borders as western Ukrainians voted in support of Rukh’s monolingual platform. This popular support enabled Rukh to form a national-democratic bloc in parliament that demanded President Kuchma’s consideration to pass the 1996 Constitution. Although elected on a pro-Russian language platform, Kuchma legalized Ukrainian as the county’s sole official language in the constitution.

Next door, the BPF did not gain enough public support for its monolingual platform to impact Lukashenka’s political calculations. Poland’s strategy of cultural integration in west Belarus shut down Belarusian-language schools, community centers, and publications. After joining the Soviet Union, west Belarusians assimilated to the Russian language at a similar pace to their eastern counterparts. Without the language regionalism present in Ukraine, the BPF did not extract votes from west Belarusians with its monolingual policy. From imperial dictates, to linguistic regionalism, to political ballots, a number of historical factors ensured that the Belarusian public supported a bilingual language law in the 1990s, while the Ukrainian public did not.

This comparative essay challenges traditional nation-building theories, such as the one expounded by Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, by illustrating how multiethnic societies can use both monolingual and bilingual policies to seek national unity. How each country defines “unity” can be influenced by past imperial experiences that ingrained certain behaviors into society, be it language norms or geopolitical outlooks. By acknowledging the weight of historical events on how societies function today, we can better understand how such events can be manipulated for political ends. In light of recent territorial disputes in Ukraine, appreciating the role of imperial narratives in dividing public opinion is vital for achieving stability in the region.

A month after the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, Russia annexed the southern peninsula of Crimea in support of language rights for Russian-speakers. The February 2014 ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, due to charges of corruption and the refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union, abruptly shifted political representation from the east to the west. In Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s new government “around 60 percent of its top officials (ministers and above) come from the former Habsburg provinces. A third from Lviv itself,” claimed Associate Professor Darden in Foreign Affairs.183 Contrasting, 75 percent of Yanukovych’s government hailed from eastern and southern provinces, including 42 percent from Donetsk alone.184

Yatsenyuk’s new parliament further strained regional relations by proposing to repeal the 2012 language law, which allows regions to grant a language official minority status if 10 percent of the region’s residents speak it as their native language.185 Nine out of twelve eastern oblasts subsequently adopted Russian as an official language, including Donetsk, Lugansk, and the administrative city of Sevastopol in Crimea.186 Although ultimately overruled by acting President Aleksandr Turchinov, the repeal illustrated the new parliament’s rejection of the compatibility between the Russian language and Ukrainian nationalism popularized by Kuchma in the 1990s. Instead, it positioned Russian at odds with its vision of a pro-European Ukraine. Kuchma’s linguistic balancing act began to lean more towards the Austro-Hungarian west under the new government. One month after Yanukovych’s removal, Russian troops entered Crimea.

On March 18, 2014, Russia annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in the name of Russian-speakers. “We hoped that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and civilized state that would protect their rights. However, this is not how the situation developed,” declared Russian President Vladimir Putin after signing the annexation treaty.187 Instead, “time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced assimilation.”188 According to Putin, the western-dominated government in Kiev neglected to honor the rights of Russian-speakers. By framing his actions in terms of language rights, President Putin appealed to deeply ingrained divisions in Ukrainian society and shed light on how imperial identities can still be used to mobilize populations today. Furthermore,
the Kremlin leader used Russia's historical presence in the region to legitimize its actions: “The Russian-speaking Crimea…turned to Russia for help in defending their rights…Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been a[ ]betrayal on our past.”189 Not supporting Russian-speakers would be a betrayal of the decades of Russian imperialism in the southern peninsula.

The annexation of Crimea was also fueled by the internal support of a population disenchanted by the new political system and language policy that favored one side of the country over the other. “The state policy is dominated by the Ukrainians in the west, who think that their opinion is the only valid one,” voiced Ukrainian resident Alexander Kava in a 2014 interview with Russia Beyond.190 According to Kava, “this approach has not allowed cohesion within the country, because the inhabitants of Crimea and other regions in the south-east felt they were being treated like second-class citizens for speaking the ‘wrong’ language.”191 Kava’s apprehensions eerily resemble the concerns of journalists who covered Rukh’s 1989 founding congress, as referred to earlier. The journalists’ description of how “those people from Lvov Province and their neighbors created a certain atmosphere in the hall and… set the tone for discussion,” which included “mudslinging directed at the first secretaries of the Donetsk, Odessa, Chernovsky [and] Khmelnytsky” eastern oblasts, remains a valid account of how some Ukrainians currently perceive politics.192 While the roots of linguistic regionalism in Ukraine date back to imperial times, they still have real consequences for the fate of the country today.

Language has become a site of struggle over ownership and identity in Belarus and Ukraine. Local interactions, not majorities in parliament, ultimately decide the actualization of language policy. This paper suggests that imperialism leaves behind linguistic imprints that considerably shape those interactions. Voices of the past haunt voices of the future.

Endnotes

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23. Ibid, p. 34.
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34. Calculated from 1897 Imperial Census reprinted in Guthier, “The Belorusians,” 45.
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I wrote this thesis for the billions of black women who have walked this earth. I wrote this thesis because it is a message I was personally compelled to share. Juxtapose the depictions you will soon read with one of a Nigerian woman, fresh off a college degree earned after years as an elementary school teacher. She is the third of six children and the oldest of three sisters—one of her juniors is already a mother of five and the other gave birth to her first child as a teenager. For ten years, she and her husband have played loving aunt and uncle, and for ten years they have endured not only the heartbreak of infertility but also the taunting and insults that come with being a childless married couple in Nigeria. Eventually they flee and immigrate to Boston, Massachusetts—leaving established lives to start again, seeking solace and a child.

That woman is my mother. And though she is an African immigrant without ancestral roots in black American life, the impact of her circumstance is no less relevant. She was able to easily access fertility treatment at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, signifying the heart of this issue lies deeper than rote discrimination at the best medical institutions in the world. Though they may all be willing or even excited to provide reproductive care and assistive reproductive technologies to black women, how can they do so if these women either do not know they exist, or earnestly believe they would never need to make use of them?

And so, to my parents, forever Mommy and Daddy. Thank you for crossing an ocean in search of your miracle. This has always been for you.

ABSTRACT

Despite the freedoms obtained during the civil rights movement, black women were unable to liberate themselves from a narrative of hyper-fertility, the assumption that they reproduce more often than their white counterparts. In the years surrounding the end of the movement, the narrative of hyper-fertility became intertwined with a critical focus on black family structure and a national fear of overpopulation, leading to a new wave of sterilizations performed on black women without their consent. Ultimately, the narrative became so ingrained in this era that a fear of black, female hyper-fertility resulted in a federal welfare reform law that cemented hyper-fertility’s damaging legacy. Through the voices of black women, this thesis lays bare the impact of this legacy: hyper-fertility has so monopolized attention toward black reproduction that physicians are unable to conclusively explain why African American women are more likely to battle infertility than their white counterparts today.

**Keywords:** African American, black, fertility, hyper-fertility, infertility, reproduction, United States civil rights movement

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the historical narrative of black, female hyper-fertility to demonstrate how that narrative has influenced black women’s access to new reproductive technologies. I describe and analyze the narrative, looking closely not only at its popular characterizations within medicine and government, but also at the popular uses of its derived stereotypes and assumptions in a broader social context. The discussion, which consists of three chapters, spans near the end of the civil rights movement to present day, with a focus on the years 1965 through 1996. As I question the impact of the narrative within the United States, I argue that the sheer extent of the narrative’s influence has had an irrevocably negative impact on the lives of African American women. To be black and female in this country is to have a skewed perception of one’s own fertility that alters the entire reproductive health care experience. The hyper-fertility narrative particularly obscures a growing body of medical research that reveals black women are now more likely to be infertile than their white counterparts.

Before engaging in a discussion of the more recent effects of a narrative of hyper-fertility, I must historically define the term, as it is not a widely-accepted part of our academic lexicon. In doing so, I explore how black women’s so-called hyper-fertility and the congruent hyper-sexuality were considered prior to the mid-twentieth century. Historians have argued that both these narratives became important in shaping the African American ability to practice
reproductive autonomy during slavery, reconstruction, and the civil rights movement.

In defining hyper-fertility and throughout this thesis, I build upon the research of scholars who agree that although the Atlantic slave trade was disastrous for all African people, it primarily preyed on the existence of black women. Slavers realized that the strength of their market relied on its ability to sustain itself, which was delivered through the womb of the African—and subsequently the African American—female. Slave women were only as worthy as the children they bore; their ability to produce healthy children guaranteed an almost expense-free profit to their masters. Bodies that were typically treated with little to no regard were sent to plantation physicians for examinations if their capability for pregnancy was at all compromised. Thus, the image of a black woman as child bearer, as mother, and as supremely fertile was born.

A true comprehension of the collective narrative of hyper-fertility is crucial not only because it has existed for centuries, but also because it has affected physicians’ perspectives on black fertility, black women’s views of their own fertility, and black women’s access to reproductive technologies.

The hyper-sexuality narrative remains a uniquely pervasive aspect of black womanhood: while white antebellum femininity was synonymous with demureness, virtue, and purity, black women were vocally bartered for and examined physically while standing naked at the public auction. For that first generation of slavers, the moment of purchase may have been the first time they interacted with a black human being in the flesh; according to Collins’ 1990 Black Feminist Thought, it was through these interactions and beyond that white men created the image of a black Jezebel who welcomed sexual advances and whose promiscuity made her prolifically fertile. Hence, Collins and her contemporaries such as Deborah Gray White allow me to contend that the first, obscene slave master’s observation became a lasting imprint on the white perspective of black bodies.

My thesis stakes its claim in this space, as I believe it is imperative that we understand how these narratives—eventually found in discussions of population control and welfare reform—have been both historically and intimately debilitating for black women. The rhetoric of the post-civil rights era was so harsh, and its accompanying sterilization efforts so intense, that it infiltrated not only white psyche but also black self-perception. Among the most subversive impacts of the narrative of hyper-fertility lies within the still-lasting black response: a suspicion of and reluctance to engage with family-planning programs or even other medical providers. This hyper-vigilance can become tantamount to under-utilization, perpetuating a cycle fueled by the false narrative at its core. Indeed, the battle to erase the narrative of hyper-fertility as a pathology and the psychological effect of such a narrative on black women has lasted over two centuries, and is ultimately what has allowed black infertility—unaddressed and unchecked and unnoticed—to rise to reality.

My first chapter spans from 1965 to 1975. In it, I focus on peer-reviewed, published literature from medical and sociological journals that discuss black fertility rates as being higher than the rates of their counterparts. I connect the origin of these pieces back to the 1965 Moynihan Report on broken, female-headed black families and a national focus on overpopulation that can be traced to Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 bestseller, The Population Bomb, which urged people to stop having children so that humanity could survive. This chapter closes with my analysis of a series of major newspaper articles and an archival interview with a female physician turned population control advocate; together, they expose how medical practitioners not only forcibly sterilized many black and brown women, but also reaffirmed the narratives outlined above by neglecting their own educational training in favor of societally ingrained bias. A narrative of hyper-fertility and its mythical potential to grow the number of free black bodies certainly contributed to the white embrace of eugenics; an embrace, rooted in fear, that still affects black and brown bodies today. I follow Harriet Washington’s work particularly when I argue that the present gap between health outcomes of black and white populations within the United States is arises from a legacy of racial bias in medical practice and can only be resolved by directly accepting the existence of that bias as fact rather than opinion.

Chapter two aims to amplify the voices of black women that are often obscured in this space. My discussion rests on a qualitative analysis of primary source evidence from first-person narratives, black publications such as Essence and Ebony, and newspapers that highlighted the black experience. I collect and analyze black female reflections on
fertility, focusing on common themes to reveal what black women said about themselves rather than the commentary made about them.

In the third and final chapter I utilize political and legislative primary source data, as well as commentary on governmental decisions, to analyze how the narrative of hyper-fertility was enshrined into law between 1976 and 1996. I argue that President Ronald Reagan's utilizing the image of a black "Welfare Queen," beginning in 1976, stripped black women of their humanity by turning them into a caricature. This racist stereotype eventually paved the way for President Bill Clinton's 1996 welfare reform bill that intended to force women, predominantly black, to stop having children while on welfare or to stop receiving assistance for future offspring. A gendered racism led to impoverished black female citizens being told by their executive government that they should refrain from exercising their reproductive agency until they lifted themselves out of poverty, which could be well after their childbearing years.

Finally, in my conclusion, I center this thesis in the present as I shift from hyper-fertility to infertility. In 2017, black women are far more likely to suffer from infertility and failed in vitro fertilization than all of their counterparts, yet the medical community and society at large have only gradually become aware of an epidemic of black infertility. This transition codifies the cruelest of ironies: that a hyper-fertility narrative persists even when black women most require an honest examination of their reproductive capability.

Together, these chapters weave a new narrative of their own. In revealing the many actors, histories, and skewed perceptions of black fertility that have persisted over the last fifty years, I urge us to finally recognize and understand why this was able to occur. Only when we fully grasp the importance of this history will we be able to consider how we can work towards its rectification.

LITERATURE REVIEW: DEFINING AND REFINING HYPER-FERTILITY

In order to engage effectively in a discussion of the modern-day impact of the black hyper-fertility narrative, it is necessary to understand how women's so-called hyper-fertility and congruent hyper-sexuality were considered prior to the mid-twentieth century.

Several distinguished historians have written on the intersection of African American womanhood and black reproduction narratives. Their work collectively spans from the arrival of black bodies on North American shores to the present day, and their research functions as an essential starting point for my understanding of what the theory of a hyper-fertile black woman means in the context of social consciousness in the United States. In this thesis, I build upon these historians' work through a chronological exploration of how the black hyper-fertility narrative persisted even after the victories of the civil rights movement.

Hyper Sexuality

One such scholar, the aforementioned Deborah Gray White, published an in-depth discussion of the origins of black women's struggles in the latter half of the twentieth century. White's 1985 *Arn't I a Woman?* offers an analysis of how the hyper-fertility narrative's predecessor, the hyper-sexuality narrative, was invented and abused. Her work uses primary source evidence from books such as Harriet Jacobs' *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl*, in which the Jacobs describes in detail how the onset of her puberty coincided with her master's endless sexual advances. Rape and coercive reproduction were hallmarks of the robust plantation slave economy, and it is within the stunningly revelatory stories White analyzed that I center my most visceral understanding of how black women came to be understood as hypersexual.

Hyper Fertility: What it is and does it exist?

Reproductive politics historian Laura Briggs was the first author to approach an analysis of female "hysteria" diagnoses through the lens of critical race theory. Her 2000 article, "The Race of Hysteria," iterated that though the nervousness attributed to white women in the Reconstruction era is often described as a gendered issue, its true impact must be understood through a racial lens. In fact, Briggs' work is somewhat of a predecessor to this thesis: it argues that the narrative of hyper-fertility was born out of a fear of white extinction and minority population growth. The scholar's analysis points to hysteria, an illness assigned to white women in the 19th century, whose 'symptoms' were weakness and sterility. As a result of their hysteria, white women were blamed for contributing to a faltering white birth rate; meanwhile, their counterparts were characterized as
uncivilized people whose savage nature allowed them to remain strong and hyper-fertile. Briggs asserted that these hyper-sexual and hyper-fertile depictions of savage women originated from a late eighteenth-century Euro-American fascination with black female genitalia—the obsession manifested itself in a presumption of "broad" pelvic shape that supposedly allowed for easy childbirth or of small pelvic shape congruent with the supposed tendency to deliver inferior children with small cranial circumference.9

Briggs' consideration of an American Journal of Obstetrics 1880-1882 study on the labor and delivery of people of color within the United States centers us in the medical discourse of hyper-fertility. Her analysis reveals that medical doctors correlated the short delivery times observed in their small, statistically insignificant samples with effortless fertility and reproduction.10 In a brief yet powerful anecdote, Briggs also highlights an obstetrical researcher who neglected to report that the plantation slave women he studied actually suffered from higher rates of puerperal eclampsia than their white counterparts. Eclampsia is spurred by high blood pressure during pregnancy; therefore, his conclusion that black women did not suffer from any form of "nerves" that might result in a tedious or unsuccessful labor was unsupported by fact. Briggs' inclusion of this incident and its surrounding context allows me to argue that the narrative of hyper-fertility has been conclusively false since its inception.11

Sterilization

From hyper-fertility came a widespread public fear of overpopulation, and derived from this fear was the highly controversial practice of medical sterilization. Harriet A. Washington's 2006 Medical Apartheid is essential to understanding that practice as it offers a physiological perspective on the historical abuses of all black bodies.12 Washington's piece explains that the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century and other forced sterilizations of black women were often concealed under the guise of family planning and the birth control movement.

Dorothy Roberts, a professor of race, gender, and law, allows me to bridge these collective histories with the final sections of my narrative that are centered around the 1980s to present day.13 Roberts' 1997 book, Killing the Black Body, considered an unmatched and comprehensive history of black womanhood through the lens of reproductive liberty, traces the century following the slave era to depict a general consensus that black coitus was freely practiced. "Freely" carried a derogatory implication: that no attention was given to contraception by African Americans, and that pregnancy was considered an inevitable side effect. I follow Roberts' argument that this commonplace perception of uncontrolled black fertility, or hyper-fertility, is what allowed for government interference in black family-planning. Whether medical and state interventions—through sterilization, punitive laws, and restricted reproductive technology access—were intended to aid black women or not, Roberts' case studies illustrated that the mere existence of such practices reinforced the weight of the hyper-fertility narrative that black women both consciously and unknowingly carry.14

CHAPTER I: BLACK WOMEN & THE THREAT OF OVERPOPULATION

Rudimentary analysis of the 1960 United States census data collected during the civil rights movement suggests that the opinion of demographic experts remained that "at the lower socioeconomic levels the fertility rates of the nonwhites tended to surpass those of whites."15 Between 1965 and 1980, a national obsession with overpopulation exploded in tandem with a parallel narrative of black fertility. As Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb soared to the top of the bestseller lists in 1968, almost all major medical, scientific, and public health journals published substantial articles by expert sociologists and researchers regarding differences in fertility between black and white women, including the effects of those differences and how to counteract them. Physicians began to personally involve themselves with the reproductive choices of black women beyond routine medical care, and the nation's most circulated newspapers reported multiple instances of doctors' forcing African American patients into sterilization without consent. While it is impossible to retroactively and specifically determine motivation for a medical fixation on black reproduction, the correlation between peer-reviewed, published commentary and sterilization operations during this period at the very least suggests that the medical and larger community were gripped—often dangerously and unfairly—by a narrative of hyper-fertility, and ensconced it as a marked biological trait of the black woman.
The Black Matriarch

In March 1965, the United States Department of Labor’s Office of Policy Planning and Research released a report entitled “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.” Its second chapter opened with a sweeping statement: “At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family.” The report, which was the brainchild of then Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, served as a letter to the President Lyndon B. Johnson, urging him to act on unemployment as a way to save black males, out of work, from abandoning families due to feelings of worthlessness and alienation. While Moynihan was devising policy towards the left-leaning effort of a Great Society and believed his work was geared solely towards the goal of eventually eradicating black poverty—or at least poverty on the basis of race—he did not realize that such a conclusion also served to demonize the black, single-parent, female-headed family. A modern, mainstream feminist may decry that Moynihan enshrined unfair emphasis on patriarchy, but more troubling was his idea that a specifically black woman raising children on her own might be problematic for society. While the issues of black women having too many children were not raised by Moynihan, an unspoken assumption can be made that black women would not be in his broken family scenario if they did not so easily have children, often out of wedlock, in the first place.

Throughout his second chapter, Moynihan centers the focus of the report on three key headings: “Nearly a Quarter of Urban Negro Marriages are Dissolved,” Nearly One-Quarter of Negro Births are now Illegitimate,” and “Almost One-Fourth of Negro Families are Headed by Females.” Highlighting these statistics under the chapter heading of “The Negro Family” implies that they define black family structure. The transition from divorce, to pregnancies occurring after divorce or out of wedlock, and finally to female-headed families connotes a transition that becomes more insidious step by step; the report is essentially saying that the ultimate result of black women leading single parent households is the most dire, final problem, and that alleviating each of the steps before—primarily black males’ leaving their families or being forced out through divorce—is a solution to prevent that problem.

“The Negro Family” was written before the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In a parenthetical statement, Moynihan mentions his belief that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “does not guarantee an end to harassment in matters such as voter registration, but does make it more or less incumbent upon government to take further steps to thwart such efforts when they do occur.” Although he may have intended the statement as a throwaway fact to endear him to the plight of African Americans in the southern United States, his statement actually highlighted a glaring dissonance. Moynihan wrote on behalf of the federal government, but offered a conclusion that places the onus on black bodies themselves rather than on the executive and legislative branches he cited as being responsible for the full equality of African Americans. The dissolution of black family structure can be attributed to centuries’ worth of inequalities, but namely among them in 1965 was an economic inequality enshrined in law and impossible to budge without the right to vote for one’s own elected officials, a tenet stressed by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, and marched on in Selma and beyond.

Secondary source literature published since the report’s release confirm that it is impossible to make a sweeping determination about its lasting effects on policy aimed at alleviating African American inequality. Moynihan’s intentions were ambiguous enough to have been championed by both conservatives and liberals, who each read “The Negro Family” differently. Black self-help through renewed family values was a relief to many on the right, while job creation dedicated to African Americans was embraced by many on the left. Furthermore, though Moynihan painted the report as directly in response to the civil rights movement, he ultimately co-opted it as he reinforced the shift towards a focus on black female hyper-fertility for the next thirty years. Despite many more parenthetical notations and asides that attempted to qualify or even soften the blow of each presented point, the publication had consequential impact for African Americans. His publishing the report under a Democratic administration may have allowed both Johnson’s liberal supporters and more conservative bodies to draw vicious conclusions about what could occur when black women gave birth to black children. However, among all these differing and even opposing arguments, there is one interpretation that stands undeniably above the rest: even though
the public debate surrounding the Moynihan Report forced the White House to recant it after just eight months, the report marked a shift toward a laser focus on black family structure, black reproduction, and black fertility. Notably, the rise in the influence of the report’s rhetoric also coincided with a national “overpopulation” preoccupation.

Fertility through the lens of overpopulation

An August 1967 U.S. News and World Report article states: “‘Black Power’ advocates appear to be making headway with the argument that it is the duty of Negro slum dwellers to breed more and more children.”20 The short, one-column piece struck many of the contrasts that surrounded black reproduction, conflating, in particular, a rapidly increasing national birth rate with high black birth rates. Mrs. Ruby Evans, a black female United Planning Organization (UPO) worker, is quoted as telling a group of thirty black “girls” that “it’s part of being a woman to get babies.”21 The authors took care to specify that many in her audience had “experienced premarital pregnancy” and summarized Evans’ advice as “[opposing] efforts to reduce the high and soaring rate of births, many of them illegitimate, among the Negro poor.” The Report article allowed for a response from Evans’ superiors and cited them as iterating that Evans’ words were her own opinion and not that of the UPO. “They said the UPO would continue to furnish birth control data and devices to the poor,” the article included, offering both a glimpse into the way social welfare services approached reproduction in this time and an apparent reassurance that the UPO was indeed still contributing to population control.

While the appellation of black people living in poverty as slum-dwellers confirms a bias within the publication, the article’s conclusion still raised a question that lay at the center of the population control movement. “An official of Planned Parenthood said also that some Negroes appear to be influenced by ‘black power’ arguments that birth control drives among the poor are attempts to keep Negro numbers down,” read the last line, alluding to a widespread African-American belief in the existence of Black Genocide—a phenomenon that was widely debated in the black community but certainly was not without evidence. 22

A 1968 Pittsburgh Courier investigative article described three instances in which black bodies—including black children—were placed in fatal danger.23 First, a Sacramento millionaire was “convicted for plotting to poison Negroes in the United States on a wholesale basis by putting poison in… batches of attractively offered below-cost boxes of gelatin to be sent to ghetto slum stores.” The potential for murder there was not quite enough, as he also devised “a plot to pump cyanide through the air conditioning systems or into water at institutions which Negroes attended on a mass basis.”24 There was no arrest made in a second, successful scheme, during which forty black students in Baltimore were reported to have been coughing, choking, and even fainting in their high school cafeteria. While police made a public statement that the episode might have been a non-emergency case of “mass hysteria,” the students were simultaneously treated for gas inhalation.25 Lastly, in an insidious shift from the schoolyard to the hospital, the New York State Health Department found that medical x-ray technicians “were exposing Negroes to larger [doses] of radiation than whites.”26 Considering these incidents, it is logical to assume that the rise in rhetoric warning of an exponential increase in population was primarily driven by racist intent.

The overpopulation movement, which began in earnest in the very same year as this newspaper article’s release, often boiled down to a binary racial divide; still, the historic basis of the movement was much more complex than that. Biologist Paul Ehrlich’s answer to population control was to systematically reverse fertility rates’ outpacing of mortality rates across the world through alarmist, doomsday hypotheses.27 Ehrlich’s 1968 bestseller, The Population Bomb, was born out of a trip to Delhi, India. As he describes in his introduction:

My wife and daughter and I were returning to our hotel in an ancient taxi. The seats were hopping with fleas. The only functional gear was third. As we crawled through the city, we entered a crowded slum area... The streets seemed alive with people. People eating, people washing, people sleeping. People visiting, arguing, and screaming. People thrusting their hands through the taxi window, begging. People defecating and urinating. People clinging to buses. People herding animals. People, people, people. As we moved slowly through the mob, hand horn squawking, the dust, noise, heat, and cooking fires gave the scene a hellish aspect... since that night I’ve known the feel of overpopulation.28

The striking language and jarring depictions in
from 6 chapters and 600 members to 600 chapters and 60,000 members."30 In these public segments, Ehrlich controversially argued in favor of compulsion if people were non-compliant to ZPG, penalties against people who chose to still reproduce, and sanctions against organizations that threatened population control or were environmentally hazardous. Prizes for childless couples, taxes on children, and luxury taxes on baby products were all among the scientist’s ideas; one of his associates even explained that Ehrlich's legitimacy had become so serious that he was able to float the idea of putting a fertility-reducing chemical in the public water supply. By 1970, Ehrlich proclaimed that the end of the earth would arrive in just fifteen years if drastic measures were not taken.31 His predictions were obviously not accurate—but what was lasting was the fear and finger-pointing, stemming from his hypothesis, that directly punished people of color.

Ehrlich never specifically suggested that minorities contributed to overpopulation more significantly than whites in the United States. Still, that conclusion became an unavoidable reality of the context he set and population control efforts at the time. The impact, whether intentional or unintentional, was likely born out of his invocation of India as a launching pad for the book’s thesis. The core message of *The Population Bomb*—that population growth was rising faster than food supply and environmental capacity in an unsustainable manner—was derived from Ehrlich's experiences in and observations of what he calls “undeveloped countries.”32 He believed that these countries—Kenya, Nigeria, Turkey, Indonesia, Philippines, Brazil, Costa Rica, and El Salvador among them—doubled their population at a rate of every twenty to thirty-five years, a pace unsustainable for even basic social infrastructure needs.33 But as current observers of Ehrlich's unsubstantiated predictions observe, creating an equivalence between foreign nations and overpopulation had lasting implications. Adrienne Germain, President Emerita of International Women's Health Coalition, noted in a Retro Report documentary interview that “if you start with that problem definition, then it's almost inevitable that there will be circumstances where government and other actors will act in a way that is coercive.”34

Beginning in the 1970s, the Indian government exchanged their public service advertisements for intrauterine devices with state-mandated sterilization. Retro Report cited Indira Gandhi herself as hailing the benefits of the program, despite the fact that the procedures typically used housing, food, and other social aids as coercion, or simply occurred without a woman’s consent at all.35 Protests turned bloody in India as a revolting people clashed with police unafraid to open fire, and the civil unrest was widely reported on in the United States until the Green Revolution was ultimately introduced as a far more successful solution for India’s food scarcity.36 Still, what Retro Report missed was that this sterilization effort was also a domestic source of concern. In a *Post-Population Bomb* United States, the focus very quickly shifted to what could be done to prevent the land of liberty from a similar fate. That the developing nations where this poverty, hunger, and poor infrastructure existed were typically inhabited by brown and black bodies was likely not lost on the American populace. And perhaps the most important and problematic aspect of both India’s program and Ehrlich’s argument was the suggestion that people of color were poor of their own volition—that they had the power to pull themselves out of that poverty should they simply decide to stop having children.

Ehrlich’s contentions extended so far that they might have even penetrated the White House; one author cited a 1969 memorandum from President Richard Nixon to the United States Congress regarding population growth as a transmission Nixon “felt
to racism exerted by physiological control of white
the relationship between black and white boiled down
of traditional black family structure.
the Department of Labor for contributing to the decay
refuted Moynihan’s hypothesis and instead criticized
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era practices of slave breeding and intentional
their ancestral past—particularly the plantation
First, he explained that his contemporaries were
of racialism within the black reproductive process.
by one member of the community—
himself—but continued to deliver his detailed opinion
of the only just and fair ways for family planning and
birth control to succeed in minority communities.
Lewis paraphrased the title of Paul Ehrlich’s book
as he noted that “the family planning movement…
began in response to a problem defined as ‘population
explosion’.” It is clear that The Population Bomb was
part of a sociocultural driving shift in the waning
days of the civil rights movement and led to an influx
of medical and demographic research into fertility,
family planning, and population control.

Lewis illustrated two historical implications
of racialism within the black reproductive process.
First, he explained that his contemporaries were
just beginning to comprehend the full scope of
their ancestral past—particularly the plantation
era practices of slave breeding and intentional
miscegenation to ensure the birth of the ultimate
field hand. Lewis also shared the origins of a history
we will explore later in this narrative, by arguing that
punitive welfare legislation did not “[reduce]…births
in Black welfare families,” but instead resulted in “a
continuation from slavery of a pattern for breaking
down the mother-father-child structure of Black
family, thereby creating the widely discussed ‘female-
headed household.”

This suggestion fundamentally refuted Moynihan’s hypothesis and instead criticized
the Department of Labor for contributing to the decay
of traditional black family structure.

For Lewis and so many other historical witnesses, the relationship between black and white boiled down
to racism exerted by physiological control of white
over black throughout the twentieth century. That
control was most acutely exercised through de facto
and de jure delineation of how and when black women
could exercise their reproductive freedoms. Thus,
when population control was introduced through
white-administered birth control measures, Lewis
urged medical professionals to understand that “when
men are stripped of the ability to think and decide on
some of the most fundamental things in their lives,
then they lose the very substance that makes them
men.”

I choose to believe Lewis utilized men as a
synonym for human being, as his piece suggested
a deep understanding of a sobering reality: should
black women be told they are fertile creatures—first
as a means to ensure childbirth and later as a means
to prevent it—they cannot cease to view themselves
apart from this hyper-fertile lens superimposed
on them by another. They may find it impossible to
define or even understand the full scope their own
reproductive power. As early as 1969, Lewis articulated
the assumptions of the hyper-fertility narrative and
synthesized a full recognition of its consequences.

In a second part to the family planning series
Lewis’ address was published in, physician Joseph
D. Beasley’s remarks were billed as a depiction of
a medical educator’s point of view. Unlike Lewis,
Dr. Beasley made no mention of race as he urged
his audience to understand the necessity of family
planning. He iterated that birth control, population
control, and population policy should not be
conflated with family planning, which he viewed as “a
positive concept [that] involves giving individuals the
information, the advice, and the service necessary to
plan conception of a child under circumstances that
that will give [him] an optimal opportunity to develop
his physical, intellectual, and emotional potential as a
human being.”

Beasley forcefully encouraged his fellow
doctors to become more involved in the family
planning process, to the extent that he claimed “any
physician who fails to consider family planning in
his management of clinical situations which exhibit
specific medical needs is negligent.” He advocated
that family planning should take place in every exam
room rather than being relegated to resource centers
or designated clinics; to Beasley, a neurosurgeon’s
concerning himself with a patient’s contraceptive use
rather than just her brain tumor was not extraneous
but rather “total health care.” Despite his best efforts,
Beasley’s “build[ing] family planning into the thinking of the physician” may have unintentionally encouraged his colleagues to enforce family planning in any way they saw fit. Some physicians practiced their family planning by sterilizing black patients without consent, as I will discuss in the next section of this chapter. Still, Beasley’s address in its totality suggests that though his advice allowed for discriminatory medical malpractice to proliferate, not all medical practitioners intended malice. The primary reasons Beasley advocated for family planning echoed the Moynihan Report’s original intent: “a nation must concern itself with certain major obstacles which prevent the attainment of family health and stability necessary to foster the optimum development of the child.”

Beasley viewed unwanted, battered or malnourished children, unsupervised abortion, high-risk pregnancy, prematurity, mental disability, maternal-infant mortality, teen pregnancy, and children born out of wedlock as the crux of these obstacles. His focus on children born to unmarried women may have been coded language referring to children born to black women, especially since he ruminated on the obstacle of out-of-wedlock childbirth more than most others. Regardless, the statistics he cited, though unattributed, are presumably applicable to all races: “family planning can reduce the mortality from out of wedlock pregnancies...[because in] the United States, the mortality rate is four times higher for unwed mothers.”

Further evidence of Beasley’s unbiased perspective on reproductive health care is found in his insistence that anyone offering a family planning program engage in ten principles of success. The fourth, in which Beasley offered a directive that reflected Lewis’ advocacy, may be the most notable: “involve the community in the development of the overall plan” for family planning. Beasley iterated his desire for a full integration of family planning into a community’s social welfare agencies. “You must consider all segments of society, including the lower socio-economic white as well as the black recipients of care,” he said. “You must consult with the civil rights groups and with the religious organizations.” The stark singularity of Beasley’s family planning opinion is present in this statement; it is the first and only use of the word “black” in his message, revolving around a topic often overwhelmed by racial undertones in this era. Though the effort may have been in vain, Beasley encouraged his fellow physicians to focus on reproductive health care accessibility for black Americans through engagement on the ground, not by force or coercion.

Lewis’ and Beasley’s remarks reflect a debate in academic literature regarding population and black fertility that existed in this era. A crop of authors sprang up that tried to better explore the totality of the factors that affected black reproduction, considering whether the available data was being utilized properly and raising the effect of socioeconomic determinants on fertility trends alongside race. The research around black fertility began to take on more nuance.

Michielutte et al. wrote in Obstetrics and Gynecology that abortion rates reported amongst black women appeared to be often overstated or exaggerated in light of their own qualitative research with a cohort of almost one thousand urban black females. While the 1971 article seemingly defended the childbearing process of African Americans, it actually reinforced the notion of an extraordinarily high number of black children born out of wedlock: “these results suggest that a majority of the women in this sample did not see the necessity of marrying to legitimize a pregnancy, since their chances are just as good after the child is born.” By depicting black women as being able to “attract a husband” regardless of whether or not they have previously had children and by challenging the idea that black women terminate pregnancies regularly, the authors suggested that there is little preventing black women from childbirth, regardless of circumstance. While the argument did not amount to scientific certainty, it directly informed a sociological perspective of the black body in a medical setting—a practice the following articles engaged in as well.

In his 1973 study in Social Biology, sociologist Kent G. Mommsen wrote that “it is somewhat puzzling to discover a fairly substantial gap in the literature with regard to the determinants of black fertility.” Though part of the inspiration for my own thesis is that the gap still exists in comparison to research surrounding the determinants of white fertility, Mommsen took initiative to explore “the hypothesis that these traditional demographic fertility determinants [such as socioeconomic status (SES) and education] may have a differential impact within SES levels of the black population.”

As expected, Mommsen’s data revealed an
immense gap in the typical discussion of black fertility. After surveying 785 black doctorates, he found that "the median number of children for this sample of ever-married black professionals is 1.76, compared with 2.49 for all blacks and 2.15 for whites." Only 5 percent of female, African American PhD holders had five or more children, in comparison to 25 percent of all African American women. These figures alone are enough to argue that black reproduction and fertility are not a singular narrative, but in this post-civil rights era they were treated as one. While it might be tempting to negate the significance of this article because of the supposed rationality of its conclusion—the stereotype of a well-educated woman choosing education over a family, for example—a true understanding of the data is crucial. Mommensen's work also revealed that the fertility of black doctorates was not affected by residential region; PhD holders in the South had no more children than those in the North. Though this finding insinuated that education levels played a more significant role than cultural or societal tradition in regard to black fertility, the discourse of this period tended to ignore that the educational and economic opportunity available to African Americans was a critical if not ultimate determinant of fertility rates.

The idea that experts needed to consider the entirety of the black reproductive process before advocating for black population control was broached directly in a 1973 Science piece by Ernest B. Attah. A sociologist by training, Attah titled his article to explicitly convey its content: "Racial Aspects of Zero Population Growth." Opening with an explanation that "fertility rates predominate heavily over mortality rates, with respect to influencing possible zero growth," Attah immediately centered the determination of an over-populated nation on how many children are being birthed, rather than also considering how many residents die. He presented concrete data that revealed non-whites have more children on average than whites. These quantitative results placed the onus and consequence of an overpopulation problem squarely on the backs of black women.

While Attah's article is not explicitly racially biased, the overall tone in which minority fertility—primarily black fertility in 1970s America—was discussed is laced with alarming adjectives:

The nonwhite population has a greater momentum toward growth than does the white population.

The peak size of the nonwhite population...is proportionately greater, compared to its initial size... The combination of growth momentum and delay in fertility reduction for the [extreme] nonwhite projection...results in continued growth of the population to a final size 4.24 times the initial size. ...The populations continue to grow for at least 60 years before finally attaining their peak sizes... This paragraph cemented the image of the black body as one that reproduces more often than the white norm. Introducing the hypothetical extremes of peaks and growth momentum contributes to establishing a narrative of black women as hyper-fertile: if maximum fertility in the scenario described above can be achieved, then their bodies must be capable of doing it. Almost every exploration of Attah's population mapping and his discussion points concluded in a similar argument—regardless of control or circumstance, nonwhite birth rates would be higher because nonwhites had higher fertility. This rhetoric, coupled with the author's conclusion that "it will be necessary to limit the growth of the population," resulted in a distorted message and contributed to the hyper-fertility narrative, despite Attah's effort to offer the truth of living while black in America.

This effort was plainly stated as Attah outlined the realities of nonwhite discrimination, illustrating black populations as firmly entrenched in the minority of the United States and suggesting the existence of an underclass. Though little is known about his background and identity, as a Brown University professor Attah legitimized concern over black "genocide" by offering a solution for population control beyond contraceptive or sterilization methods. He indicated that if black citizens were more integrated into the fabric of United States modern society, they would be more likely to reduce fertility rates of their own accord. Attah presented making all social benefits available to black people as a potentially better solution for overpopulation than curbing reproduction.

Realizing that voluntary limitation might have been out of the question, Attah poses this final question: "what approaches would the society as a whole then adopt for coping with that situation?" Such a question, while intended to be provocative, ultimately may have led medical professionals and health officials to conclude that forced limitation on fertility amongst those who were "least valuable" and "most fertile" was their answer, rather than Attah's
Physicians vault sterilization into the headlines

Popular media allows us to better understand that after the civil rights era, physicians began to view hyper-fertility as a problem particular to the black community. Their solution often manifested itself in sterilization. The publications explored here almost uniformly served as a critique of these practices, as authors of major newspapers and magazines conveyed an opinion unfriendly to the idea of black and brown sterilization. The first of the articles I will discuss was published in April 1972. That date is crucial to understanding why these pieces might have reflected a tide turning against physicians who chose to sterilize or force birth control upon black women; it was in July of 1972 that the whistleblower article regarding the four-decades long Tuskegee Syphilis Study was published after a former research staff member leaked the experiment’s existence to a reporter. The study was shut down almost immediately after that front-page story broke, and the public outrage was followed by federal government action towards reparations and new laws passed to govern medical procedure and research. The difference in tone within just three years, between the 1969 U.S. News and World Report article critical of black reproductive agency and the series of following articles, entreats the consideration of a public and journalistic shift.

The first major story broke on the front page of the Boston Globe in April of 1972. “Students Charge [Boston City Hospital’s] Obstetrics Unit With ‘Excessive Surgery’” exposed what a medical school class observed to be “unnecessary surgery and substandard care” during their training. While the anecdotes the students provided to the investigatory committee covered a wide range of cases and treatments they perceived as malpractice, one specific allegation was offered as almost separate from the others and with great caution: “the medical students...expressed concern in their report over the possibility that black and Spanish-speaking women may more often be sterilized by hysterectomy, while white women are more likely to be sterilized by the less radical procedure of having their tubes tied.”

Motivations for such beliefs became more pronounced in the next year, as the Washington Post published an article about the actions of a South Carolina staff physician caring for impoverished patients at Aiken County Hospital. The hospital was cited as following a policy that resulted in sterilizations for a third of the women who delivered there while on Medicaid. Dorothy Waters, a 30-year-old black mother, spoke out against the treatment she received after delivering her fifth and final child. Dr. Charles H. Pierce refused to conduct her labor and delivery unless she agreed to a sterilization immediately following the birth of her baby; “she said that when she balked at being sterilized Pierce told her, ‘Listen here, young lady, this is my tax money paying for this baby and I’m tired of paying for illegitimate children. If you don’t want this [sterilization] find another doctor.”

Though Waters was qualified for Medicaid and had indeed separated from her husband, he had offered her money for the delivery service in an attempt to avoid sterilization. She viewed her agency to reproduce as completely legitimate, and was reported as saying, “God made me to have children and no human should change that.” Still, because Dr. Pierce made his declaration just days before Waters’ due date, she had no choice but to deliver at Aiken. As promised, she was sterilized the very next day. “There’s got to be more than tax money behind this,” Waters told the Post.

In that belief, Waters spoke for the multitude of black women who received sterilizations against their will and had to wrestle with the idea that doctors acted with racist intent, either out of a fear of black overpopulation in the United States or a desire to diminish the number of future African Americans. The Washington Post, similarly to the Boston Globe, took notable initiative in reporting their findings that hysterectomies were being performed on welfare patients without medical necessity. The United States Department of Justice’s civil rights division and the South Carolina social services director investigated Aiken, and both confirmed that the method of practice by Dr. Pierce and his colleagues was questionable, if not an immediate danger. Two years later, the New York Times dedicated a multi-page feature story to investigating why almost 700,000 hysterectomies occurred in 1975 despite the fact that about 12,000 of them resulted in death for the
By this time, hysterectomies had become the second most popular operation in the United States, behind only tonsil removal. The author, Joann Rodgers, concluded that because insured women were twice as likely to have the operation as the uninsured, monetary motivation was at play in an era in which there was a surplus of surgeons—physicians practicing in 1975 only needed to be licensed in medicine in order to perform any type of surgery.

In an attempt to relegate the criticism of excessive hysterectomy to overzealous activists, these doctors maintained that they performed the operations only to ensure malpractice-proof, curative treatments for patients riddled with cancer; they believed their choices caused no harm. However, several statistics presented by the Times called those claims into question.

First, though almost 30 percent of gynecologists in this period were not board-certified by the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG), they were reported to have performed three times as many operations as their certified counterparts, signaling a faulty knowledge base. Second, only 10 to 20 percent of hysterectomies performed in this time directly addressed at least 67,000 cases of uterine, ovarian, and invasive cervical cancers—a ratio so jarring that the ACOG launched a commission to set better guidance for its physicians. Third, the National Center of Health Statistics cited 10 percent more hysterectomies taking place in the South than in the North despite “no evidence that women in the South have more gynecological problems than women in the North.”

Though the $400 million dollars paid in gynecologists’ fees as a result of one year of these surgeries provides some explanation, we cannot ignore Rodgers’ inclusion of a racial, medical disparity in this article. After citing that many surgeons were accused of pushing hysterectomies onto black, Puerto Rican, and other non-white women who utilized free or subsidized health care, Rodgers quoted the interim director of a large New York City hospital for a candid revelation regarding these populations. According to Rodgers, the director explained that “it is an ‘unwritten policy’ to do ‘elective’ hysterectomies for sterilization on such patients (instead of the safer, simpler tubal ligation), and adds that these operations account for 10 per cent of all gynecologic surgery in New York.” These physicians’ choice to perform hysterectomies more often on black women, while white women were often asked why they were even having abortions, suggests that the doctors either believed they could find justification for the surgery in the hyper-fertility of the black body or felt little guilt regarding the potential loss of black life through surgical fatality.

Ultimately, a stark discrepancy exists between ACOG’s seeking recommendations for reformation and several ACOG members’ accusing anti-hysterectomy advocates of duplicitously using their complaints to push for a nationalized health service and more patient control. Describing the hysterectomy conversation as part of a “lunatic fringe” agenda implies that these particular physicians maintained a complete disregard for the patient opinion. This sort of disregard likely translated into the authority through which Pierce and other physicians exerted their will over black bodies. Mandatory sterilizations, devoid of empathy, may be partially attributed to the reality that almost all doctors in the United States were male at this time; in fact, this article refers to obstetric surgeons as explicitly and only male. At the very least, this feature established—if not solidified—that a national obsession with fertility was raging on without any clear, approaching end.

A Female Physician Speaks

The Schlesinger Library Family Planning Oral History Project offered a rare perspective of a female physician who also defined a role for herself within the 1970s birth control debate. Dr. Caroline “Lonny” Rulon Myers, whose nickname often led her to be mistaken for a man, was interviewed by Ellen Chesler in September 1976 about her career as a birth control champion. While practicing as an anesthesiologist at a major hospital in Chicago, she realized that her training limited her from keeping up with advancements in research and found a new calling in starting her own vasectomy clinic. By the time of her interview, she had performed 4,000 operations on her own out of her clinic’s 8,000. Myers recalled listening to Paul Ehrlich speak about The Population Bomb and deciding that “I really wanted to do something in population and have this whole idea that the attitude toward sex has to do with population.”

Ultimately, Myers—who eventually served on the board of Zero Population Growth—argued that many of those who opposed her mission were not against population control, but rather against sexual relations outside of conception. She highlighted...
major problems with Planned Parenthood and the population campaign she directly supported: “they don't get at the basic issue of sex.” In pushing back against the religious limitations applied to white sexual relations, Myers ignored the overwhelming efforts of abstinence advocates who sought to neutralize the ability of black intercourse—even among married couples—to result in black children. Similarly, the suggestion that Myers’ encouraging sterilizations to be performed on men rather than prescribing pills to women was a “maverick” revolution may have been an interpretation shrouded in a cloud of white feminism in 1976.

Myers herself admitted the racialized difference in conversations regarding birth and population control in this period. She and her interviewer, Chesler, enjoyed a camaraderie in similar demographic backgrounds, as evidenced in the way they so casually described intimate facets of black life in the United States. When Chesler asked if it concerned Myers that some of the funding she received for her work might have been donated in the name of racism and discrimination, Myers admitted to capitalizing on bigotry to further her agenda. “I would approach somebody racist, I said to myself sure, any cause has strange bedfellows.” She explained her reasoning by saying, “We have to take the votes of the racists who are having birth control just to decrease the number of blacks in the city and we would hint at that without ever saying it or writing it because I don’t believe in it but we needed a vote, you know?” Chesler answered her by confirming, “I don’t know that that’s necessarily a bad thing to achieve a good cause.”

Myers also attempted to convey her understanding of the African American fight for civil rights. However, her statement revealed that she did not understand that the freedom to reproduce was one of those rights. “I don't like to talk to black groups… When I've been pressured into doing it…especially on abortion, I would simply say that I understand this is not a primary need for you, that jobs are more important, and decent housing and good schools and education are more important…” Though here she echoed Mommsen, Attah, and all other researchers who concluded that social equality was a more pressing matter to address than fertility and controlled reproduction in black communities, Myers eventually deviated to her own message: “…but being a brood sow is not going to help you get those things at all.” The flippant manner in which she described pregnancy may have been effective for the women she typically spoke to in her personal life or through ZPG, but there was more at stake in the debate over black fertility.

She and Chesler understood that, yet still trivialized this debate. Chesler replied, “I’m sure you never got any flack from the black women in the audience,” sarcastically suggesting that black women were for birth control and their male counterparts were those against. Whether or not that was accurate, Myers’ response regarding the black nationalist opinion on reproduction was untrue and slightly incendiary. “The only thing I did was pit the women against the men though,” she said, “because there are very few women who come out with this, ‘We’ve got to have more blacks; we’ll outnumber you no matter what happens, we’ll outnumber you,’ the militant blacks who consider it.” Myers had no basis to make a gendered case against the black nationalist efforts to fight what they believed to be an attempt at black genocide, yet she did so regardless. Though in the next chapter we will indeed see that many black women were for birth control, that reality primarily serves as evidence that black women did not wildly and frequently give birth. And that reality does not mean that black women disagreed with—or could even ignore—the possibility that contraception and other sterilization techniques could be a dangerous tool leveraged against African Americans; the discussion of this very chapter directly refutes that suggestion, floated by Myers.

Despite the efficacy of the pill or other voluntary and reversible birth control choices, the number of black sterilization cases increased by 500,000 between 1970 and 1980 according to historian Dorothy Roberts. She hypothesized that doctors like Dr. C.H. Pierce (and perhaps his colleagues at Boston City Hospital) acted on the basis of one or more presuppositions. First, as the Times suggested, they would be paid more by Medicaid for performing hysterectomies, which were more expensive than the reversible tubal ligation, on poor black women. Second, and more importantly for this thesis, physicians’ social bias crept in to conflict with the Hippocratic oath to protect and heal—Roberts revealed numerous instances of doctors’ explicitly telling women they would withhold care should the patients not follow their specifications. She found that Dr. Pierce even released a press statement stating that his general policy, towards the effort of
reducing welfare rolls, was to sterilize after delivering a welfare woman’s third child; yet sixteen out of the eighteen sterilizations he performed in 1972 were on black women and the Medicaid payments he received for them were thousands of taxpayer dollars.\textsuperscript{99}

The United States Department of Social Service did not intervene on these patients’ behalf, even when they actively sought not reparations, but simple support. Perhaps that is because, as Roberts found in a 1973 book written by bioethicist Gena Corea, doctors divulged their opinion of sterilization as an unmatched method “to reduce the undesirable population growth of the poor.”\textsuperscript{100} From at least 1965 to 1975, a fear of the destruction of our nation under the weight of too many bodies allowed dormant or covert racism to expand into a fear of too many black bodies. To criticize and correct the stereotypical black woman who birthed an above average or abnormal amount of children, general opinion braided pathology into childbearing, instilling the narrative of hyper-fertility and characterizing African Americans as procreating too often. While we can argue that the desire to terminate population growth manifested itself in the renewed wave of sterilization reported in the mid to late twentieth century, we cannot extricate those actions from racism, prejudice, and discrimination. Furthermore, to truly grasp the extent of the impact of black hyper-fertility, to determine if it bears any biological validity, and to complete an understanding of the arc explored above, we must engage with the most primary of sources: black women in their own voices.

CHAPTER II: BLACK FERTILITY, BY BLACK WOMEN

For too long, Black women’s struggle against the most degrading repression has been left out of the official story of reproductive rights in America. But it is their struggle that highlights the poverty of current notions of reproductive freedom. It is also their struggle that can lead to a more radical vision of reproductive justice. As I have tried to show throughout this book, a vision of liberty that respects the reproductive integrity of Black women is a critical step toward a just society for everyone. -Dorothy Roberts, \textit{Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty}

Over the course of my research, I found that the hardest sources to encounter were those written by black women—those that magnified their own perspectives in a space larger than just a quotation. When discussing this thesis, the question I most often receive is poignant: how did black women feel about this narrative? This chapter serves as an interlude in which I aim to amplify the African American female voices that are often obscured within conversations regarding black fertility through exploring a different face of the same period as the previous chapter. By performing a qualitative analysis of primary source evidence from publications created for the black community such as \textit{Essence} and \textit{Ebony}, an anthology featuring African American female narratives, and other articles highlighting black opinion, I have found that black, female reflections on reproduction center around common themes that reveal their authentic experiences.

Men in the middle of fertility

After publishing its first issue in May 1970, \textit{Essence} magazine became the nation’s first widely circulated publication targeting African American women and striving for black female empowerment.\textsuperscript{ii} Within \textit{Essence’s} first months of existence, they featured an article that offered the perspective of a black, female freelance writer and launched the periodical into a unique position in the debate growing around black fertility.\textsuperscript{101} “Birth Control and the Black Woman,” by Kay Lindsey for the October 1970 issue, opened with an incident in which “a group of brothers in Pittsburgh closed down a family-planning center, calling it ‘black genocide,’ only to have it reopened by the women in the community which it served.”\textsuperscript{102} Considering that the closure occurred eighteen months prior to this article’s release, it likely was instigated by Dr. Charles Greenlee, chairman of the health committee for Pittsburgh’s chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). He was quoted in a 1968 \textit{Ebony} report to warn, “Our birth rate is the only thing we have. If we keep on producing, they’re going to have to either kill us or grant us full citizenship.”\textsuperscript{103}

In response to Greenlee and his fellow birth control detractors, Lindsey quoted a woman who stated an obvious yet central truth: “...they’re men,
they can't speak for women'... ‘birth control is none of their business.’ Here lies the black female versus black male tension in priorities that Lindsey based her article on; it is a tension that defined the black female experience with birth control and fertility. The juxtaposition also confirms what I have come to view as the root paradox of a hyper-fertility narrative: where white authority was threatened by black reproduction and fought back by declaring the black childbearing process unnaturally frequent, a black populace discussed increasing their rates of reproduction out of fear that threats might turn to murder. That populace, however, largely consisted of black men, whose voices often shouted over those whose freedom they argued for.

“In a free society it would seem that the decision on childbearing should be left to the woman...” Lindsey reflected as she imagined true reproductive agency. “Today, we live in a society so far from free that, like it or not, our most private decisions have political ramifications.” Despite its infringement on their own personal liberty, black women certainly understood the purpose of the crusade against black genocide; the author expressed this as she recounted the same history we have explored so far, tracing an explosion in overpopulation public discourse back to the end of the slave era. “Black fertility only became a liability to whites after slavery,” she wrote, underscoring how prolific fertility was pushed on black women in bondage before the narrative of hyper-fertility became a pathological aspect of their humanity. In urging her reader to understand the subtle supremacy asserted and maintained through this shift, Lindsey directly referred to Ehrlich and his ZPG campaign; she addressed population control’s new billing as “THE political issue” by skeptically observing its transformation into a brand new cause for “students tired of peace marches, scholars tired of the ivory tower, religious leaders tired of abstractions, and politicians tired of being held responsible by their constituency.”

Two years before this Essence article was published, the Los Angeles Times reported that a group of “Negro Doctors” were raising alarm about whether federally-financed birth control programs in the United States might be utilized for black genocide, as they had been “used to lessen the Eskimo and American Indian populations” before. This perspective from medical experts should be considered seriously, but it is also important to note that the doctors were all male. Kay Lindsey allowed us to understand that the black woman’s experience with reproduction was one in which she was singularly asked to tread and even choose between racial preservation according to those around her, or racial preservation through self-determination. She explained that, “As black women, we have the capacity to perpetuate blacks, and as human beings we have the choice to decide if, when, and under what conditions.”

The black, female manifesto

Not all black women allowed men to serve as their proxies or spokesmen. Francis Beal, New York Coordinator of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee’s (SNCC) Black Women’s Liberation Committee, wrote an impassioned narrative about the unique circumstance of existing as a black woman in the United States. In “Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female,” Beal explored what she titled as “bedroom politics” and the prevalence of sterilizations being utilized as birth control for poor, brown and black women. In particular, she focused on the frequency of the operation in Puerto Rico, where La Operación became “commoner than an appendectomy or tonsillectomy.” Just five years later, the New York Times reported that sterilizations through hysterectomies and salpingectomy were being colloquially described as just that common in the United States.

In Beal, we understand the perspective of black women determined to seek economic equality by looking beyond fertility and childbirth. She outlined the unequal pay strata that we are familiar with today; according to 1967 statistics from the Women’s Bureau of the United States Department of Labor, the wage scale for equal work reached from $6704 for white males to a low of $2861 for non-white females. She marked the black women content to “[sit] at home reading bedtime stories to their children” as not destined for survival in a national order that routinely worked against their survival. In this statement, Beal directly contradicts the idea that black female fertility is something African American women either chose not to control or biologically could not. Not only did she, as a black woman, admonish her counterparts to rise up by claiming space outside traditional roles of wife and mother, but she also painted those who choose a primary position of homemaking as loving...
and kind, not incapable and economically leeching. Though Beal primarily expressed concern regarding birth control and sterilization, another source in the same anthology her piece was published in confirms that there was indeed an active debate around each method of reproductive control. The Black Women's Liberation Group released a short, authoritative statement on birth control written by two welfare recipients, a domestic, a grandmother, and a psychotherapist.115 “Dear Brothers,” they addressed it, demanding that poor black women must be allowed the agency to practice whatever form of birth control “because of poor black men.”116 While I do not have space to fully extricate the complex relationship between black women and black men during this period, the Group offers a bleak perspective on the role of impoverished African Americans males in the household.

“Now here's how it is. Poor black men won't support their families, won't stick by their women—all they think about is street, dope and liquor, women, a piece of ass, and their cars. That's all that counts.”117 The whole statement acted as a parallel to the discourse raging in the research, medical, and predominantly white general society in 1970, as single mothers were accused of raising children that grew up to be the type of men who left them without a partner in the first place. Still, the Group took a crucial and divergent turn as they proclaimed, “Poor black women would be foolish to sit up in the house with a whole lot of children and eventually go crazy, sick, and heartbroken, no place to go, no sign of affection—nothing.”118 Where white experts, population activists, and fundamental bigots believed that black women perpetuated the systemic pathology of their race and risked infecting their surroundings by having too many children, this statement from black women themselves utterly refuted the suggestion.

They spoke of “when Whitey put out the Pill” as the day they took full control of their own destinies and no longer had to succumb to the men in their communities both sexually and economically, with children to raise on their own or into poverty.119 “Black women have always been told by black men that we were black, ugly, evil, bitches and whores—in other words, the real niggers in the society,” the statement declared.120 And while the Group may not have spoken for every black man, they certainly echoed Beal's social and economic hierarchy of white men, black men, white women, to black woman and the idea that once one body is oppressed, they often look for another below them on whom they can practice the same oppression.121 This cycle is crucial in understanding why black women have endured false conclusions resulting from the narrative of hyper-fertility; the double jeopardy of their existence made for white men viewing them as doubly unworthy, white women seeing difference in circumstance due to the ever-coloring prism of race, and black men believing they could find some semblance of control through reproductive capability.

Fear of genocide over reproductive agency

In September 1973, the Essence reader's column, P.O.V., received a submission regarding the black perspective on family planning.122 Barbara A. Williams from Wilmington, Delaware maintained an opinion unlike that of medical educator Joseph Beasley or even black advocate Toye B. Lewis as she wrote, “we must consider family planning as a kind of preventative medicine.”123 She illustrated a black woman's ability to choose when to bear children as an essential determinant of black health, medicalizing the idea in response to those who viewed unlimited black reproduction as the ultimate display of black power. In highlighting the divergence of opinion on reproductive agency in the black community, Williams said “Black women have a choice. That choice does not mean the eradication of the black race, but the full development of a Black race and culture that is morally, physically, and mentally strong.”124

Four years after the article discussed at the start of this chapter, Ebony released a feature that was also geared towards black female opinions of their own medical, societal, and economic challenges. “Stresses and Strains on Black Women” listed sterilization among health issues such as heart disease, breast cancer, hypertension, and suicide, illustrating its severe threat to the black body.125 Naomi Gray, a former Planned Parenthood employee quoted in the article, explained, “Many of us were aware via the black grapevine that black women had been forced to undergo involuntary sterilizations in the South and elsewhere.”126 Her statement was placed underneath a photo of black female surgeon Dr. Dorothy Brown of Meharry Medical Center, who is pictured explaining to a patient that fibroids—often used an excuse to sterilize—do not require
surgical removal.\textsuperscript{127} Despite whether that course of treatment is accepted today or not, Gray’s point stood firm: “It was not until recently that it was possible to document the extent to which black women have suffered involuntary sterilization and I fear that all of the figures are either not yet in or will never ever be known.”\textsuperscript{128}

Towards this new medical consideration in the black community, \textit{Psychology Today} released a summary of a study conducted by William Darity and Castellano Turner of the University of Massachusetts. The researchers surveyed 1,890 black residents of a northern city and a southern city “on their attitudes towards genocide, sterilization, and family planning.”\textsuperscript{129}

The results left a very unambiguous conclusion: 62 percent viewed birth control’s true goal to be reducing the number of the poor, 51 percent believed that as demand for cheap labor dropped, efforts to decrease the population would rise, 63 percent concluded that the rise of black militant action would also increase black population erase efforts, and 53 percent considered a rising black birth rate to be essential to the survival of the black race. Though Darity and Turner concluded that “sterilization should not be encouraged for use as a method of birth control in the black community,” they did find that upon analyzing their results by region, age, and sex it was the “-educated northern black male” that felt most threatened by black genocide.\textsuperscript{130}

The men who did not carry children in their wombs and who often did not have to worry about how to feed potential children stood most adamantly against birth control, perhaps skewing this data enough to enable Darity and Turner’s conclusion that completely ruled out the efficacy of sterilization for black birth control. While this result is ultimately beneficial, it forces us to reckon with the reality that even in the rare instances we are privy to a primary source opinion of the black community, the woman is secondary even though the narrative directly affects them.

\textit{Ebony} illuminated this discrepancy in their August 1977 special issue on black women.\textsuperscript{131} The article most relevant to this discussion was one titled “Sex and the Black Woman,” written by a husband and wife pair—Dr. Richard Tyson and nurse Joanne Tyson—who worked together at his practice and co-directed the Institute for Marriage Enrichment and Sexual Studies.\textsuperscript{132} Black leadership of such a therapy center was certainly groundbreaking at the time, and the article itself was equally unique. First, Tyson and Tyson addressed in the very opening lines that of the thousands of letters they received from their readers, many addressed questions that black women had regarding their fertility.\textsuperscript{133} That the authors included this detail was an early signal of the forthcoming focus throughout the remainder of their piece; a focus rewriting a narrative of black reproduction wholeheartedly apart from hyper-fertility. And surely enough, as the Tysons explained how they answer these written questions, they took care to elucidate their process of dispensing sound advice. “Some questions are easy to answer because they basically involve dispensing factual information,” the couple said, “which is, by the way, the same for Blacks and Whites.”\textsuperscript{134} While such a blunt aside may not have garnered as much attention within the black community, for a wider audience its inclusion suggests that African Americans were very cognizant of how the society they lived in had chosen to portray black fertility as an ‘other’ process, defined by its pathology. While the white community may not have engaged in the subjects raised in \textit{Ebony}, black citizens were certainly forced to engage with their counterparts’ carefully chosen truths.

In the second half of the article, black male-imposed dominance in the realm of black female fertility again rose to the forefront. The Tysons described black matrimony in this era as a male-centric, fertility-oriented process: “When they do look for a marriage partner, men often demand—either overtly or subtly—that the woman prove her fertility by either getting pregnant or bearing a child before marriage.”\textsuperscript{135} While this behavior is an additional piece of evidence to refute the idea that all black women display extreme fertility, it also placed a burden on black women—a reproductive burden that is ignored and obscured by bias-perpetuated noise. This twofold impression made by the marriage tendencies of African American men also extended into the period after a wedding occurred, as “the union is often a trial arrangement—with the man able to cancel the contract if a baby is not produced within a given period.”\textsuperscript{136} While this sort of agreement certainly exists within many patriarchal cultures, I cannot fathom the additional, personal burden such anxiety would place on the already socially-oppressed black female body.
Though the Tysons essentially depicted infertility as a common occurrence—common enough that black husbands were known to leave their wives should they sense the disorder was present—African American women lived in a country that would not have acknowledged that fact and in many ways operated as if it were an impossibility.

“Hundreds of letters have arrived at our offices from Black women who are desperate to get pregnant and afraid that infertility will either keep them single or break up their marriage,” stated the authors, before exposing the cruel dichotomy of black reproduction in the years following the Civil Rights era. “Sadly, some are from women who have had tubal ligations (sterilization operations)…or those who have had hysterectomies for medical reasons.”

Though Richard and Joanne Tyson themselves may not have been fully aware of the sterilization controversy brewing in the late 1970s United States, the discussion in this thesis so far tells us that these women most likely did not undergo these operations of their own volition. That hundreds of women who fully consented to a permanent form of birth control after being made aware of the irreversibility of the procedure would then write to a sex therapist advice column asking how to restore their fertility seems unlikely, if not almost ludicrous. But regardless of how those women came to be sterilized, this revelation suggested that the narrative of hyper-fertility was seemingly nonexistent in the actual black population beyond a cultural importance placed on childbearing for both outward virility and race longevity.

Still, to say nonexistent may be to speak too soon. I consider the most corruptive power of the narrative of hyper-fertility to be its infiltration of the community it falsely portrays. Though this Ebony article confirmed that black women did not subscribe to envisioning themselves as hyper-fertile, the Tysons explained that black men considered black women to be “always ready” for sexual intercourse. While the authors intended to dispel this rumor towards preventing “perfunctory lovemaking,” I must highlight that the idea of being always ready or willing to have sex—a hyper-sexuality—has often allowed societal observers to assume frequent, uncontrolled black pregnancy.

The questions the Tysons raised and the intimate details of black life that they engaged in allowed their readers a glimpse into a very honest portrayal of African American female opinion in 1977. But even their expert analysis was obscured by what they described as “myths, false premises, and mistaken beliefs” that relentlessly follow black female reproduction. The attitudes of black women writing in and visiting this somewhat revolutionary couple directly contradict the stereotypical consideration of supremely sexual black women whose hyper-fertility is manifested through promiscuous actions. This magazine article, theoretically available to all, depicted a black womanhood that reflected all the complexities and curiosities of womanhood writ large. When we speak to black women directly, and listen to genuine black voices, we learn that the veracity of societal or even official opinions regarding black life during the post-civil rights era is undoubtedly in question.

The silence imposed upon black women in the discussion regarding reproductive freedoms during this era allowed for a narrative to be written for them by white, and often biased, observers. If black women are rarely heard from—if they cannot say that they use birth control to effectively plan their child birth or that they do not ascribe to the narrative that they should be producing as many black babies as possible—then their voices are written and spoken for them. In existing against the narrative of hyper-fertility, the female African American often stood alone, even apart from her black male counterpart.

CHAPTER III: FROM A POLITICAL TOOL TO A NATIONAL LEGACY

That the black man has been denied access to the mainstream of the American job market is unquestionable. He has been systematically degraded, reviled and rejected by the white majority in his efforts to obtain even a modicum of equality. But the conditions of the black woman have been even more degrading. Under slavery, black women were used as instruments of breeding. Today, the majority of black women are still confined to the most menial and the lowest paid occupations.

As degraded and deprived as the black male worker’s family is, those families depending in whole or a large part upon the black woman’s earnings suffer even greater deprivation. The data indicate that black women, who often have the most desperate need for employment, are the most discriminated against in opportunity and income. The inequitable income differential is perhaps the most pervasive and bitter injustice experiences of all women and particularly those of minority status. But incredibly, black women
are expected to suffer their deprivations in silence.

–Dr. L. Eudora Pettigrew, “Stresses and Strains on Black Women,” Ebony, June 1974

President Ronald Reagan is often remembered as the former actor turned Great Communicator. With those legacies of performance, we must not ignore his most influential role throughout his time on the national stage between 1976-1988: Dog Whistler. History has too often overlooked that a significant number of Reagan’s campaign speeches and radio addresses invoked unsubtle race-baiting to convey specific messages to key constituent groups without the label of overt racism. Perhaps the most dangerous effect of Reaganism can be found within the former President’s interpretation of welfare dependency as a national chokehold that black women, through their childbearing and laziness, placed on the shoulders of the state. Though he ultimately did not achieve wide-ranging welfare reform, his legacy permeated into the 1990s, when a young, Southern Democrat promised to “end welfare as we know it” and signed on to legislation that would irrevocably impact the reproductive agency of black women and permanently write the narrative of hyper-fertility into our nation’s history.

Pervasive political caricature and the “Welfare Queen”

“In Chicago, they found a woman who holds the record,” the candidate began in January 1976. “She used eighty names, thirty addresses, fifteen telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans’ benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare.” Ronald Reagan, speaking at a campaign rally in 1976, then went in for the shock effect: “Her tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year.”

After his last line, the crowd erupted in what the recording translated as a loud, perhaps shocked, murmur. This sort of hook and bait became a fixture of Reagan’s “citizens’ press conference,” in which he never mentioned the perpetrator by name and rarely took questions from the press corps, playing on the citizen-oriented focus in answering only the local people. Reagan’s statistics certainly served their purpose, as every crowd who heard the story left riled up and eager to give him the chance to take the reins of the nation’s social services.

Though he did not win the Republican nomination for President in 1976, Ronald Reagan had at the very least successfully set forth a renewed national murmur on fellow citizens taking advantage of the welfare system. And in defeat, the former Governor of California utilized regular weekly radio addresses to further the rhetoric he had introduced while campaigning against President Gerald Ford, citing details from newspaper investigations into welfare fraud that he may have incited himself. “The trail extends through fourteen states,” was the declaration that opened a clip of Reagan’s October 1976 broadcast. “She has used one-hundred twenty seven names so far, posed as a mother of fourteen children at one time, seven at another, signed up twice with the same case worker in four days, and once while on welfare posed as an open heart surgeon complete with office.” A recent article that accessed the entirety of the message from Reagan’s archive added that he went on to declare this woman on welfare had “three new cars, a full-length mink coat.” Reagan is quoted as saying that “her take is estimated at a million dollars,” and attributing all of these claims to “the chief investigative reporter of the Chicago Tribune.”

Though some attribute the phrase “Welfare Queen” to Ronald Reagan, it was actually the Tribune’s George Bliss who coined this phrase and utilized it in almost every title of the articles published in his 1974 series. Bliss was the person who finally referred to one Linda Taylor by name, as the paper’s investigation had “disclosed that while receiving Illinois welfare checks she owned three 1974 automobiles—a Cadillac, a Lincoln, and Chevrolet—claimed to own four South Side buildings, and was about to leave for a vacation in Hawaii.” Bliss’ inclusion of vehicle make suggested an implicitly placed detail to convey the monetary extent of what Taylor was accused of to the average American reader. Though he never directly mentioned the same million-dollar claim made by Reagan, we must remember the value of societal descriptors that come with a cultural icon like a Cadillac. As Francis Beal described herself in “Double Jeopardy,” “America has defined the roles to which each individual should subscribe. It has defined ‘manhood’ in terms of its own interests and ‘femininity’ likewise. Therefore, an individual who has a good job, makes a lot of money and drives a Cadillac is a real ‘man,’ and conversely, an individual who is lacking in these ‘qualities’ is less of a man.” Here lies the crucial distinction. Linda Taylor was accused of essentially stealing what every true American man desired as a display of his sheer...
masculinity, yet she was a woman. And maybe even most treacherous to those who criticized her, “she is black, but able to pass herself off as Spanish, Filipino, white and black,” according to Joel Edelman, director of the Legislative Advisory Committee on Public Aid.149

Daniel Patrick Moynihan feared female-headed black households in 1965, but their prevalence had jumped from 22% in 1960 to 28% in 1970 and would rise to 43% by 1984.150 The Welfare Queen fixation reigned over the United States as the black family structure visibly changed, offering a scapegoat in the form of Moynihan reasoning. Despite the reality of a demographic shift, the rhetoric Reagan engaged in went beyond speaking directly to the disintegration of patriarchal family structure, as Moynihan had. The future president used his platform to instead strip black women of their humanity. By Ronald Reagan's second full year as President of the United States, Jet, one of the three large magazines serving the African American population, reported on the decade's census statistics to share that “the Black population in the U.S. is increasing at a greater rate than the overall population in all areas of the country except the South.”151 With almost twenty-seven million black people living in the U.S. in 1980, the population had increased by 17.3 percent to comprise 11.7 of the nation’s population.152

And though the July 1983 Jet article carefully noted that “Experts...explained that...Black fertility rates have declined over the last decade;” its authors could not exclude that “they were still higher than Whites.”153 The American demographic shift of the late twentieth century was a visible one, and one that likely played directly into Reagan's executive goals. By 1985, the negative stereotype surrounding black mothers on welfare had stretched as far north as Massachusetts. When the women’s caucus of the Massachusetts state legislature began to advocate for a ten percent increase in the cost-of-living benchmark for welfare families, they were met with unexpected opposition from their male colleagues.154 Their counterparts expressed several unfounded beliefs, including that “welfare mothers have children by different men...[and] welfare families...don’t speak English, are mostly black or other minorities, and stay on welfare for generations.”155 Though the female representatives successfully refuted these suggestions and passed the budget increase, they also reported their surprise that the public debate period had also resulted in similar commentary. Representative Marjorie A. Clapprood was quoted as saying, “there is an attitude toward people on welfare that they are shiftless...that they are parasites.”156

Reagan's Welfare Queen allusion had stretched across the coasts of the United States; ironically, the states-rights President was directly and negatively impacting the way in which commonwealth jurisdictions could carry out their own governance. Furthermore, the Women's Caucus lobby did more than reach their desired goal; towards the effort, they dispelled—at least momentarily—the stereotypical image of the black, hyper-fertile welfare mother. The blonde-haired, fair-skinned Clapprood herself told the Boston Globe that she was hurt by her colleague’s remarks on the House floor “because her mother was on welfare for a year.”157 The article then cited the Massachusetts State Welfare Commissioner's explanation that “typical profile depicted by the department of a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children...shows a white, 30-year-old single mother with two children who speaks English and stays on the rolls for two years.”158

For all of his promises to improve the economy by rolling back on welfare and the waste of the federal bureaucracy, President Reagan actually left this country in a recession that ultimately sparked a growth in families on welfare upon leaving office.159 Undeniably, a gendered racism was present in the most central principles of Ronald Reagan's two terms as president. And just as institutional racism can be traced back to the way societies and institutions were set up from the beginning of this country, Reagan's actions maintained a discrimination that specifically affected black women, perspectives of their fertility, and their reproductive agency. The political economy became irrevocably intertwined with control of the essence of black womanhood, enshrining societal influence and social commentary into the most intimate area of black female life.

Utilizing welfare to terminate black motherhood

By 1991, three years after Reagan had left the White House and his Vice-President had assumed the Oval Office, the New York Times reported on a Kansas state legislator's proposal that had gained national attention.160 Republican representative Kerry Patrick suggested that “the state pay $500 to any mother on
welfare who uses Norplant, a new, long-lasting method of birth control consisting of five matchstick-size tubes inserted into a woman’s upper arm.”\textsuperscript{161} While Patrick billed himself as an anti-abortion advocate against unplanned pregnancies that ended in termination, his reasoning also included the plan’s ability to “save the taxpayers millions of their hard earned dollars.” Though the law would only have affected Kansas residents if it had been passed, women’s advocacy groups and civil rights organizations quickly mobilized against Patrick; a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was quoted in the Times as saying the idea “crosses the line into unconstitutional coercion.”\textsuperscript{162}

The article’s author, Tamar Lewin, ended her piece by including an even more incriminating detail from the pages of a fellow print publication. “An editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer suggested that because of growing poverty among blacks, welfare mothers should be offered incentives to use Norplant,” Lewin wrote. Though Patrick likely acted under the same reasoning as the Inquirer’s editorial board, their explicit inclusion of race allowed for the newspaper’s readership and staff to condemn the editorial as racist and force an apology. This should have been the same purposeful outrage directed at Patrick. I believe that if such a denunciation of Patrick’s bill had occurred, mandatory implantation of Norplant may not have become a primary stipulation of plea deals and convictions handed to impoverished or drug-addicted black women by our nation’s courts.\textsuperscript{163}

During his 1992 campaign for president, Arkansas Governor William “Bill” Jefferson Clinton took a strong stance on welfare: “For so long Government has failed us, and one of its worst failures has been welfare,” opens a television advertisement. “I have a plan to end welfare as we know it—to break the cycle of welfare dependency...It's time to make welfare what it should be—a second chance, not a way of life.”\textsuperscript{164} Six years after Reagan’s radio address, his opposition had taken over the mantle of welfare blame; Clinton likely courted conservative southerners he knew could relate to him personally. Regardless of intent, Clinton's platform allowed the Welfare Queen speculation to tighten its grip on a nation’s anger and curiosity.

While many advocates mobilized and some media outlets published dissenting opinions, many perpetuated the imagery of a Welfare Queen. In the November 1993 issue of EXTRA, the Fairness in Accuracy and Reporting (FAIR) organization's newsletter, the group criticized Diane Sawyer and ABC’s PrimeTime Live for their misleading investigation of welfare fraud.\textsuperscript{165} According to FAIR, one of the cases introduced was about a mother who did not report her two part-time jobs and still only made $16,000 between welfare and her salary. Despite this, Sawyer “scolded” the woman during her interview, saying, “but you know people say you shouldn't have children if you can't support them.”\textsuperscript{166} The program implied that poor black women had children unnecessarily and that their financial status should prevent them from engaging in basic reproductive agency. Furthermore, though an investigator interviewed by PrimeTime explained that the majority of defrauders were non-minority, middle class citizens, the images producers chose to display during the television broadcast were of “black and inner-city Latino 'cheats.'”\textsuperscript{167}

The suggestion that a right to motherhood differed between the races was also tackled by Dorothy Roberts in 1994, prior to the release of Killing the Black Body. In an article for the Connecticut Law Journal, Roberts contended that the new pathology of the welfare system and the expectation that welfare mothers are black suggested a societal expectation that black women should be forced to work in lieu of being mothers, while the exact opposite was emphasized for white women in the idyllic image of stay-at-home motherhood.\textsuperscript{168} That African Americans on welfare were punished for their fertility instead of being celebrated for it was a centerpiece of the long-lasting legacy of the hyper-fertility stigmatization.

By June of 1995, the Washington Post released an in-depth article on the childbearing conversation surrounding the welfare debate; it was published after the House of Representatives passed a preliminary welfare reform bill with family caps—a proposed limit to the number of children welfare mothers could and the United States Senate was expected to begin debating the necessity of the caps.\textsuperscript{169} One mother quoted argued for family caps as a way to remind couples to help themselves and practice birth control while on welfare. Another mother believed that such a rule would only serve to harm the children born, a suggestion many children's rights groups corroborated. A final mother noted that regardless of whether or not the government wanted to offer additional funds for additional children, they should not try to determine whether women can become pregnant through a birth control stipulation like Norplant.\textsuperscript{170} Regardless
of public opinion, statistics revealed no significant difference in fertility rates between women enrolled in Aid to Families and Dependent Children and the national average. This reaffirmed that placing fertility at the center of the welfare reform debate was a decision made outside of basic logic.\textsuperscript{171} According to the Post, those advocating for this bill did not have available statistics on the number of women who had children while on welfare—they were proposing a radical, human-rights affecting shift on a combination of gut feeling and Republican “incentives affect behavior” contract reasoning.\textsuperscript{172}

The most racist opinions on welfare can be found through an analysis of family cap reform and its proponents, who say that the statistics do not matter because women on welfare should not have children at all. “They should have zero,” Republican Senator Lauch Faircloth is quoted as saying.\textsuperscript{173} Meanwhile, white women were never asked to sacrifice their proliferation of the white race, regardless of circumstance. The concept of welfare mothers as minority mothers allowed for a wholesale declaration on how poor black and brown women should behave. Supporters of family cap reform overlooked that African Americans were economically disadvantaged as a result of political, civil, and structural oppression; if it took a woman twenty-five years from her young adulthood to lift herself out of poverty, then Faircloth’s standard would mean she might never be able to birth her own biological children. Though the Senator would likely argue she should have found a paycheck carrying husband within a quarter century, such an attitude and the welfare reform bill itself served to perpetuate patriarchal dominance and strip women of both sexual and reproductive agency.

During the same summer the Post investigation took place, law professor Lucy A. Williams published thirty-eight pages on the United States preoccupation with “Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers.”\textsuperscript{174} Her survey data revealed how Americans considered the black, female members of their common society through the lens of the Welfare Queen in the 1990s. First and foremost, “Participants’ images of welfare mothers included...being lazy and African American.”\textsuperscript{175} Williams also cited other research findings, among them: “having many children...[and] raising [those] children with no morals.”\textsuperscript{176} The black American woman was a welfare woman—that woman was only good for sex and had far too many truant babies as a result, fracturing American exceptionalism. This was a focus group finding not in 1965, 1975, or 1985, but in 1993. Approximately twenty years had passed since the civil rights movement subsided from national focus, and the right to be seen as a full or at least functional human being still eluded African American females.

Hyper-fertility was reshaped into a particular kind of evil, as the narrative’s issue became not only that black women had a strange capacity for childbearing and had to be stopped, but also that black women were utilizing childbearing—or an extraordinary ability to bear children—to cheat the federal system and collect unearned money. It became harder for majority populations to exert overt control over African American women, so they were framed not as mothers, but instead as swine-like deviants. “What about the pigs that have kids by any man. It’s a known fact that they have kids to stay on welfare,” stated a letter that Williams received after publishing a newspaper editorial. She included more of the letter, which criticized “mothers who are making their kids act terrible in school so they can collect more money.”\textsuperscript{177} There was no sympathy for the black family in poverty, or consideration of why black children might be less likely to succeed in public schools that had been segregated only half a century earlier and had historically discriminated against them. “Some of the conditions that their kids are living in isn’t fit for a rat,” a second letter decried, not considering that decreased welfare might be congruent with pest infestation and instead choosing to superficially and incorrectly “blame this condition on mothers who are on drugs and care only about the checks, not the children.”\textsuperscript{178}

\textbf{Officially reforming (the) welfare (queen)}

In their totality, the last thirty years of the twentieth century were so fueled by a narrative of hyper-fertility that an edit to the welfare system—cited and shouted as the entity that black women and their babies took heinous advantage of—was inevitable. Late summer 1996 brought the final passage and signing of welfare reform, a fulfillment of the coded promise then-Governor Bill Clinton made on the presidential campaign trail to white voters: putting a stop to existing forms of welfare. In the year leading up to the bill’s passage, Peter Edelman, then working as Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
at the Department of Health and Human Services, abruptly resigned. As one of the President's closest advisors whose wife was also a mentor of then-First Lady Hillary Clinton, Edelman's decision was drastic. After ensuring that the President first won reelection, he eventually revealed in a 1997 Atlantic feature that "The best that can be said about this terrible legislation is that perhaps we will learn from it…I am afraid, though, that along the way we will do some serious injury to American children, who should not have had to suffer from our national backlash." The article's title? "The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done."

By turning over much of welfare's determination to the states and instituting strict enrollment term limits, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 essentially stripped the sixty-year standing guarantee of the New Deal that if you were an American child living in poverty, your government would ensure at the very minimum that you would receive enough money to be able to eat. The latest attempt to barricade white livelihood against black hyper-fertility was realized through this notorious piece of legislation, which most prominently conceived the notion of family caps even though the provision was not ultimately included in federal legislation.

Even before the law was passed, states from red Arkansas to blue Massachusetts had already started applying for and receiving approval for waivers to put limits on the number of dependent recipients of welfare any one family could maintain. And while a cap on the number of children may seem at least logical from a perspective that opposes universal social coverages, the definition of a family cap was misleading as it did not apply to families newly applying to welfare. Dorothy Roberts describes a cruel irony in the reality that welfare reform's provisions only applied to the people already receiving assistance: one mother and ten children could enter the program and expect to be covered, while one mother and one infant already enrolled would not receive additional assistance upon the birth of a second child, without any regard to circumstances of rape or multiple birth.

While it would be easy to try to extricate race and even the narrative of hyper-fertility from a law signed by a man who many referred to at the time as the first black president, Roberts deftly reveals that the evidence suggests otherwise. First, state legislators who attempted to implement these caps utilized the same language that earlier legislators did in trying to mandate sterilization for "the negro women" on welfare assistance—they just erased the siren racial rhetoric of "negro" and "sterilization." Second, though the majority of welfare recipients were not black then and still are not today, the fraction of black women who relied on government assistance in comparison to those who did not was higher than the ratio that existed within other groups.

Therefore, while Dorothy Roberts states in her analysis of this era that the reasoning and action of welfare reform affirms the American societal perception that associates public assistance with the image of a young, advantageous welfare queen who becomes pregnant just to receive a larger welfare check, this study aims to prove that it reaffirms the American societal perception of a hyper-fertile black women who can become pregnant easily enough to try to utilize her ability to receive a larger welfare check.

Fittingly, there was and is no data-driven evidence to suggest that welfare assistance resulted in higher birth rates for female recipients; the implemented family caps actually just drove families further into poverty they were already in while surviving on the inadequate additional payments that had previously followed the birth of additional children. The clandestine last legacy of 1996's welfare reform may be that it absolved the state of having to provide equal care to black women; it exists as the third wave of attempted penalization for a perceived hyper-fertility, following slavery and sterilization. This legacy forces us to confront that even as our new millennium arrived, black procreation was still cited as a primary social problem. The rhetoric surrounding hyper-fertility at the close of the twentieth century was a covert damnation of the "conniving" black woman choosing to have children that would inherit the pathological laziness, cultural poverty, and depravity attached to black mothers on welfare.

CONCLUSION: THE IRONY OF BLACK INFERTILITY

Recall Mrs. Ruby Evans from the 1967 U.S. News and World Report article. While the paper itself did not take seriously her belief that "it's part of being a woman to get babies," this statement packs power and prescient importance as we turn towards understanding how this thirty-year narrative of black hyper-fertility has
come to impact black fertility and reproductive self-perception today. What does it mean to tie one's womanhood to the ability to procreate? Though the biological capability is one of the distinguishing factors between men and women, this sort of understanding is far more consequential for black bodies. When centuries of reproductive bondage turn into a century of reproductive oppression, and when that century of reproductive oppression reaches so high and is planted so deeply that it becomes enshrined in law, it undoubtedly also entrenches itself into the black mentality. What happens when an ingrained hyper-fertility narrative obscures its mirror opposite? This may be the first time you have read that black women increasingly suffer from an inability to conceive, with infertility rates higher than any of their counterparts and the highest instances of failed in-vitro fertilization (IVF).

Notable academic research regarding minority experiences with infertility took place at the turn of the millennium. In their doctoral dissertations published in 1999 and 2002, Carol E. Bliss and Seline S. Quiroga both interviewed women of color and each included at least one African American participant. Still, apart from one of Bliss’ black interviewees who expressed her desire for an affordable, “culturally sensitive expert in infertility,” these analyses did not highlight the unique circumstance of being faced with infertility while black. In 2004, Essence jumped ahead of our societal, academic, and even medical context in publishing what may have been their first article discussing infertility within the black community. “Getting pregnant seems as natural as exhaling, especially for Black women,” the author wrote in her first sentence. “Infertility isn’t our problem; it’s White women’s mess. At least that was the myth.” Linda Villarosa continued with a frank consideration of African American rates of infertility and miscarriage, identifying the numbers as equal to those of white women except in the case of black married women who experienced more frequent instances of infertility than their counterparts. Villarosa introduced emotional issues and stress as determinants of fertility; she labeled the latter as “one of our biggest obstacles to fertility,” suggesting that the black female experience in the United States, which has often revolved around a tumultuous battle for reproductive agency, may contribute to an inability to reproduce. Villarosa’s “Baby Hunger” was advanced in the sense that it raised egg donation and IVF as procedures that have been utilized in the black community and could therefore be trusted as assisted reproductive technologies. The author also considered the exorbitant costs surrounding IVF, which for some insurances fell almost entirely within the jurisdiction of out-of-pocket medical expenses. Despite the value of this information dissemination within the black community, much of the article approached infertility as an unavoidable factor of aging. Apart from the article’s opening lines and the allusion to stress, Essence—which bills itself as black women’s lifestyle guide—was more focused on offering DIY fertility boosting tricks and encouraging a balance between career and motherhood than it was on offering an analysis of how a hyper-fertility narrative could severely impact their readers’ struggle with infertility.

Between 2006 and 2010, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that in comparison to their non-Hispanic white and Hispanic counterparts, non-Hispanic married African American women were almost twice as likely to suffer from infertility, confirming Essence’s article and indicating an increase from the one and one-half higher probability cited by Roberts in 1997. A single-site Chicago study conducted by the Fertility Centers of Illinois (FCI) from 2010 through 2012 also found that black women across socioeconomic positions and with equitable access to care had a lower clinical pregnancy rate through in vitro fertilization (IVF), with 24.4% success to white women’s 36.2%. Similarly, the spontaneous abortion rate through IVF was notably higher for black women in comparison to white women in this study, 28.9% to 14.6%.

This data has emerged only in the past five years. A decade prior, in 2004, Dr. James W. Collins released a study titled “Very Low Birthweight in African American Infants: The Role of Maternal Exposure to Interpersonal Racial Discrimination.” Numerous studies have shown that the racism that almost all people of color will endure in their lives can influence psychological and physical health. Collins made a profound finding in the field, concluding that very low birth weight in African American infants can be attributed to maternal exposure to interpersonal racism regardless of socioeconomic or educational
status. Though numerous others have noted the disparity between the number of black infants of low birth weight in comparison to white infants, Collins and his coauthors were the first to use data collected from a single, significant study to explicitly propose this correlation.

Can the higher rates of infertility and failed IVF treatments in black women also be correlated with their prolonged experiences with interpersonal racism? There are few direct causes of higher rates of black infertility beyond sexually transmitted infections—Dr. Eve C. Feinberg’s most recent data, collected in her practice as a reproductive endocrinologist, suggests that higher rates of fibroids are also a factor. How can we explain those fibroids in cases when obesity, high-blood pressure, or other biological indicators of fibroids are not present? A senior government official at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has suggested that racism absolutely does have an effect on African American fertility, but that it is difficult to measure and understand. The official confirmed that black women, regardless of socioeconomic status, are more likely to be obese and have other serious health conditions, and mentioned that these findings have been tied to the stress of their daily living. But the question then turns to how medical researchers can measure that sort of impact or even quantify it.

Though I have not conducted a study that would allow me to point to institutional racism in the manner that Collins et al. did, Collins’ work circumscribes the bitter irony of the narrative of black hyper-fertility. My thesis explains why it has been and may still be impossible for black women to view themselves as anything less than fertile people—resulting in a self-perception and family structure defined by society for an entire race. The hyper-fertility narrative had no reason to proliferate other than racism and its legacy likely contributes to the racism that the women Collins studied have experienced throughout their lives.

The irony of Collins’ work has doubled as we observe an acute shift to medical concern with infertility. In consideration of the available literature, I have concluded that 2014 was the year in which our most popular and mainstream media outlets finally began to reckon with the existence of the narrative of black hyper-fertility. “In families of color, there’s an assumption that when you want to get pregnant, you get pregnant,” Heather Lawson told the New York Times’ Tanzina Vega in April 2014. “There’s a lot of finger-pointing that women of color feel when we’ve gotten to a certain age and we haven’t had children.”

The numbers speak for themselves: whereas fifteen percent of white women have sought out medical fertility assistance, the Department of Health and Human Services and the CDC report that only eight percent of black women have. Utilization rates are unequal, and despite whether that is a result of lack of access or action, the discrepancy is tangible.

Medical experts often blame the high costs of infertility treatment as a barrier to black participation, but Dr. Camille T.C. Hammond believes that a “knowledge gap” in understanding how to find support and relevant information is the more significant obstacle. Her hypothesis is supported by the fact that even within states that do cover IVF and other infertility treatments, physicians observe that black women still comprise the group of least utilization. This lack of comprehension around reproduction and fertility is a debilitating and pervasive aspect of black culture. “Fertility is the new mental health issue for black communities,” Lawson said, medicalizing the cultural phenomenon of fertility misinformation. “It’s something that is there, but we don’t talk about it.”

An assumption might be that if black people are not discussing the issue internally, the conversations are at least happening in obstetricians’ and gynecologists’ offices across the country today. That logic was rendered moot as Dr. Nataki C. Douglas, a black, female obstetrician-gynecologist and assistant professor for reproductive endocrinology and infertility at Columbia University, explained that most physicians engage with their black patients on the level of sexually-transmitted diseases and options for birth control, particularly when those patients are of low socioeconomic status: “This discussion about reproductive options, in women who don’t have partners especially, is not coming up at the annual visit to the gynecologist.”

For all the progress that scientific medicine has made over the past fifty years, physicians still seem to be stuck in an outdated, false perspective of what it means to be a black woman. If a physician buys into the belief that her black patients are hyper-fertile as a result of hyper-sexuality, then that conclusion completely alters her method of patient care. One patient, Cariesha Tate Singleton, said to Vega that though she was diagnosed with fibroids at age seventeen, she was never told the impact they could have on her future ability to...
bear children or given a more permanent method of treatment beyond continuous birth control to alleviate symptoms and weight loss to decrease her obesity. Singleton expressed her belief in the hyper-fertility narrative, saying she believed she was fighting against the stereotype of black women as “baby-producing machines.”

It is in Lawson’s, Hammond’s, Douglas’, and Singleton’s stories that we can witness the danger of a white and black difference in reproductive health care. Even when Singleton asked for a referral to visit a reproductive endocrinologist, she was unable to secure one. Black women who have had a self-perception of their own fertility molded by various versions of biased, discriminatory, and advantageous authorities are unable to rely on even those who understand the truth of their human anatomy for knowledge.

Lawson said that each time she visited a busy fertility clinic, “Nine times out of 10, I am the only person that looks like me.” In an interview, Dr. Feinberg revealed to me that in her analysis of infertility treatment on a military base, with equal access to care regardless of race, she found an identical percentage of use between African Americans and their counterparts. But after her fellowship with the National Institutes of Health ended and her practice shifted to the inner-city of Chicago, Feinberg saw the impact of infertility treatments’ classification as a nonessential health service at work. “When you have economics in the picture like in inner city Chicago, the utilization of services was lower,” she said. “It’s cost-prohibitive. So you’re not having as many people seek care because it’s expensive. And part of the issue is really that our health system thinks of it as an elective disease and it doesn’t get the credit that it deserves as a medical disease.”

One of the physicians interviewed by Vega also explained that even if a black woman does suffer from an inexplicable fibroid that decreases her fertility, it can often be operated on—the longer that woman waits to seek treatment, however, the higher her chances of complete infertility become. Medical researchers may never be able to trace the source issue for IVF failure in African American females if these women continue to underutilize the service, either by an inability to meet unsubsidized cost or by choice in ignorance.

I wrote this thesis for those women and for the millions of others just like them. I also wrote it because I worry little has changed over the past half century. Frances Beal urged in 1970 that “if we are going to liberate ourselves as a people, it must be recognized that black women have very specific problems that have to be spoken to. We must be liberated along with the rest of the population.”

Almost half a century later, I am not entirely convinced that has happened yet. As of 2015, Ehrlich still stands by his claims, to the extent that he told the New York Times that “if need be…he would endorse ‘various forms of coercion’ like eliminating ‘tax benefits for having additional children.’ Allowing women to have as many babies as they wanted, he said, is akin to letting everyone ‘throw as much of their garbage into their neighbor’s backyard as they want.”

In illustrating his belief that overpopulation is still an imminent threat to our society, Ehrlich regurgitates the Welfare Queen rhetoric to push his own agenda, more tacitly peddling a narrative of hyper-fertility than his book did in 1968. Though Ehrlich may apply his “coercion” to all women, history has taught us who our country is more likely to consider these garbage-throwing women to be.

Additionally, true risks are still present regarding coerced sterilization. Short term memory can be dangerous as we enter an era in which reproductive control through freely used contraception has morphed into a core aspect of what many deem to be the mainstream feminist movement. There are twenty-first century advocates who respond to this trend by reminding us of the horrors of forced, black sterilization, and the fact that those horrors have not been completely expunged. In “Please Stop Telling Women to Get an IUD,” an article published just two months ago—afer a social media push towards permanent forms of contraception in the wake of the executive transition of power from President Barack Obama to President Donald Trump—author Anna Krist reminds us that black and other minority women have already suffered a history of being told, or rather required, to get an IUD. She begins the article with an earlier history that we have already explored here, a history of widespread government and public use of “racist stereotypes (e.g. ‘welfare queen’) to propagate the idea that Black women are not suitable mothers to their children and to justify the state’s attempts to stop them from having children.”

Krist’s scrutiny allows us to reach the most present iteration of our nation’s racist control of an invented hyper-fertility. “In 2013,” she explains, “inquiries into abusive corrections practices revealed that hundreds of tubal ligations
have been performed on incarcerated people under sketchy circumstances, and recently prosecutors in multiple states have been accused of using sterilization as a condition in plea bargains.”

Though Krist’s and other socially and historically conscious efforts may be focused on preventing a wholesale repetition of our past mistakes, I also believe that we must fully interpret and understand the span and impact of this black, female, hyper-fertility history in order to not only acknowledge it, but to correct it.

This work is certainly not exhaustive. It allows for a cursory interpretation of black male opinion as I believed that centering this message on black women was essential to its meaning. I also wish I could have done justice to the black nationalist movement of the late 1970s and 1980s that enveloped self-control of black fertility into the platform of black power. And I do not address the role of black women in the abortion legalization movement because that campaign often cut them out of the conversation as they were left battling their own right to conceive in the first place. In the end, I chose to exclude much of the extraneous towards the aim of leaving my reader with a simple truth: reproductive agency should be a human right, and black fertility is human fertility.

There is a medical, interpersonal, and political face of this story. It is all encompassing, and impacts every facet of African American life. It needs to be told. And for the sake of all black women still struggling to understand their own history in the present, through the lens of both sexuality and reproduction, it must be heard.

Endnotes

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135. Ibid., 104-6.
136. Ibid., 106.
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162. Ibid.
163. Roberts, Killing the Black Body, 104–49.
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217. Ibid.

Annotated Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

Archival Collection


I stumbled upon this archive while exploring the context surrounding the publication of Paul Ehrlich’s Population Bomb. One online blog noted that Dr. Lonny Myers was impacted by hearing Ehrlich speak, so I set out to find where that information had come from and who Myers was. After reading her trailblazing biography I expected to find an interview that could serve as foil to the other white male doctors I highlight elsewhere in Chapter 1; in the end, I was shocked to find the opposite result, but also grateful to utilize her opinion as a white and female physician to confirm that my argument was sound.

Interviews Conducted by the Author


The person I spoke with was a high-ranking official in the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS). The person asked that I do not disclose any personally identifiable information as we spoke candidly about why CMS does not cover in vitro fertilization (IVF) for patients on Medicaid and why black women suffer from higher rates of infertility than their counterparts. Our conversation helped to confirm my suggestion that interpersonal instances of racism may contribute to rates of infertility.

Eve C. Feinberg, Telephone, August 16, 2016.

Dr. Eve C. Feinberg is the Medical Director of Northwestern Medicine Fertility and Reproductive Medicine Highland Park. After reading her 2014 article, “Analyzing Ethnic Disparity in Fertility Treatment Success for Black & Asian Women,” I asked for an interview regarding the groundbreaking information she published regarding the disproportional instances of IVF failure in black women. We had a lengthy conversion in which we talked about her medical background and her experiences caring for and researching African Americans who struggle with infertility. Her research is ongoing, and she hopes to publish findings regarding more direct causes of higher rates of infertility in black women soon.

Published Narratives by Black Women

I singularly highlight these pieces because they are first-person narratives written by and advocating for black women and because they were published together in a widely-circulated anthology, offering the black, female perspective beyond black magazines or daily newspapers.


Published Primary Sources


A sociologist by training, Attaah titled his article to explicitly convey its content: “Racial Aspects of Zero Population Growth.” Attaah centered the determination of an over-populated nation on fertility rates, rather than mortality rates, by presenting concrete data that revealed nonwhites have more children on average than whites. Though I utilize this aspect of his work
to convey the racialism of the overpopulation conversation, I also note Attah’s belief that offering full equality to African Americans would do more to lessen birth rates than coercive family planning.


Beasley’s published remarks are the second of two articles in the “Fertility Trends and the Community” collection I cite. As the medical educator referenced in this source’s title, Beasley offers his audience a consideration of how physicians and medical schools should better integrate family planning into their scope of practice, regardless of specialty. Though he only explicitly refers to race once in this piece, his illustration of the perils that arrive with poor contraceptive use may have been a coded reference to the African-American population.


Though I could have simply used the 1980 U.S. Census data cited in this article, I chose to reference Jet’s reporting of black population growth as its target audience is the African American population—the nation’s demographic shift towards people of color was noted not only by those who might have feared it, but also by those who drove it.


This article was one of two dissertations I read that interviewed women of color struggling with infertility. Though Bliss does not focus directly on the African-American experience with infertility and interviewed only one black woman, her work marked an important shift in discourse.


This article allowed me to reference how the White House responded to the national overpopulation conversation that exploded after the publication of The Population Bomb in 1968.


This article was a core aspect of my conclusion and overall thesis argument, as it published the most recent data available from the CDC that announced to the world that non-Hispanic black women suffer from infertility at a rate 1.8 times higher than non-Hispanic white women or Hispanic women.


This Collins’ et al. publication was groundbreaking in that it tied the low birth weight of black newborns to their mothers’ experiences with interpersonal racism. This article spurred my interest in investigating the implications that a racist narrative of hyper-fertility might have on black women and their fertility.


This book formed my understanding of the “overpopulation debate.” It was a core source for my first chapter and its content either interacted or impacted almost every other source that followed it in this thesis.


Former Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary Edelman’s reflection helped me to contextualize the adverse reactions to welfare reform that were taking place even within the Clinton administration.


This is the article by Feinberg that I mentioned earlier in this bibliography. Her revelation that black women experience higher rates of failed IVF was a large part of what inspired this thesis, in which I trace what might have historically contributed to such an outcome.


This article served as a first-hand glimpse into the federal birth control programs that were mentioned in many of my other sources and that were set up to serve low-income women who were usually black.


This article was one of the first I read while writing this thesis and I eventually cited it in my first chapter as one of the many articles that analyzed the differences in birth rate between black and white residents of the United States.


The inauguration of President Trump drove a notable increase in women seeking an intrauterine device (IUD). In response to the social media posts and published articles I read that were urging women of childbearing age to seek long-lasting contraception, in case their right to access oral contraception or other less permanent methods was revoked, Krist includes the history of long-lasting or permanent birth control methods and women of color.


Lewis’ published remarks are the first of two articles in the “Fertility Trends and the Community” collection I cite. He offered our first consideration of the black perspective on the issues of overpopulation and family planning that gripped the nation in his time—albeit a black male perspective and not a black female one.


Two years after Ebony published an article called “Birth Control and the Negro Woman,” Essence published a version that was, as their mission mandates, far more attuned to the black, female perspective. This was the first citation in my second chapter—in offering a comprehensive analysis of the African American female’s perception of birth control, sterilization, and her own fertility, it grounded all the analysis of black, female sources that came after it.


I reference Malthus briefly to note that Ehrlich was not the first person to make an argument for population control, and also not the first person who made an incorrect hypothesis about overpopulation.

This article, cited in my conclusion, expanded on Feinberg's 2014 article, offering exact percentages of the spontaneous abortion rate through IVF in black women compared to white women.


This article offered data that refuted the stereotype of black women having a high number of abortions, but as a result also contributed to the stereotype of black women being hyper-fertile.


Mommsen also offered data refuting a stereotype attached to black women, but instead introduced one that helped to refute the narrative of hyper-fertility. Mommsen decided to analyze the fertility rates of black doctorates and found that they were lower than even the average white birth rate at the time. He argued for a more comprehensive analysis of the black population—one that considered all socioeconomic factors.


This article gave more information on the background of Richard and Joanne Tyson.


This article traced the rise of the percentage of number of female-headed black households from 1960 through 1984.


This article was one of two dissertations I read that interviewed women of color struggling with infertility. Though Quiroga does not focus directly on the African-American experience with infertility and interviewed only two black women, her work marked an important shift in discourse.


Roberts’ article, published three years before *Killing the Black Body*, contrasted the ways in which our society values black motherhood versus white motherhood. This discrepancy helped me in my analysis of the Welfare Queen rhetoric.


This article contributed to my analysis of *Essence*’s similarly titled "Birth Control and the Black Woman.”


*Ebony*’s inclusion of sterilization as one of the primary medical issues facing African American women helped me to understand how insidious and debilitating the practice had become.


This article was a fun and insightful read because it was written by a black, sexual therapy couple, included personal anecdotes of professional cases they handled, and confirmed that black women did not view themselves as hyper-fertile, but actually were concerned about infertility even in 1977.


In looking for whether *Essence* and *Ebony*, who each maintain a black target audience, discussed infertility, I found this article as the earliest instance. It was earlier than I expected, but did not consider the reality of black women having to confront their increased rates of infertility under the weight of a narrative of hyper-fertility, which is the core of my conclusion.


The title of Williams’ column, featured in a ‘reader’s point of view’ section, was what first caught my attention as it follows the same format as Lewis’ and Beasley’s “Fertility Trends and the Community” series and as all three discuss black family planning. Williams, however, offers the strongly worded perspective of a black. I used her opinion exemplify how desperate black women felt about being able to control their own fertility.


Williams discussed Castellano B. Tuner and William A. Darity’s research, “Fears of Genocide Among Black Americans as Related to Age, Sex, and Region.” She highlighted their findings that suggested well educated, northern black men were those who were most against sterilization due to its potential for coercions.


Williams’ article offered a variety of primary sources that I analyzed in my third chapter and itself served as a source in which I continued to analyze the impact of the Welfare Queen caricature.

**Newspapers Articles**

I focused on newspaper and magazine articles throughout this thesis because I wanted to explore true, discourse beyond what expert researchers had to offer regarding black fertility and reproduction. I am also acutely aware of the fact that black, female representation in academic discourse was only beginning to grow over the period covered by my chapters.


I wanted to ensure I was including the voices Abramovitz and Piven who are both renowned welfare advocates and spoke out vocally against the Clinton Administration’s support of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.


This article was one only editorialized newspaper piece published between 1965-1975 that I have used in my thesis—it explicitly expressed disdain for high black birth rates and the African American fear of race genocide through birth control. This article also allowed me to begin my analysis of how a fear of overpopulation intersected with a push against a supposed black hyper-fertility.


Bliss is credited with coining the term "Welfare Queen" through the series of investigative articles he published for the Tribune regarding Linda Taylor, a black woman on welfare accused of disrupting the system on a scale of thousands of dollars, identity theft, and other crimes.


This article was one of the core sources that illustrated the fervor with which the fear of a black Welfare Queen had taken over our national agenda and even popular culture. Cabreros-Sud dismantled the biased nature in which the fear of a black Welfare Queen had taken over our national agenda—specifically, her article was one of three expose-style narratives I cited in revealing that physicians were often sterilizing black women without consent or medical purpose.


This article was particularly interesting to me as resident of Massachusetts, and helped me to argue that the Welfare Queen accusation was not only taking place in the South or in Washington D.C., but across the nation.


The cases reported, each potential instances of premeditated murder against African Americans, helped me to cement the reality of the potential Black Genocide outside of being just a fear or paranoia.


This recent article followed up on the legacy of The Population Bomb, interviewing Ehrlich and other experts about their opinions on the overpopulation hypothesis today.


I referenced this article in understanding the racially driven hate crime that occurred in Philadelphia, Mississippi before Reagan chose to make a campaign speech there.


I found this article by chance and felt obligated to include the reflections of a black literary great on the overpopulation debate.


I was pleased to find a group of black doctors who not only spoke out against the potential for birth and population control methods to be misused for black genocide, but also who were given a platform to raise their concerns.


After reading about a Kansas legislator who wanted to pay women on welfare to receive Norplant, I was able to more soundly make the argument that welfare reform was never about saving money and slashing welfare rolls, but rather about reducing the fertility of mothers on welfare, often black women.


Rodgers’ article was a fascinating long form piece that critically looked at the surge in hysterectomies occurring at the time, and gave me concrete data points that refuted almost all the arguments some self-proclaimed unbiased doctors offered in favor of sterilization.


This article was one of three expose-style narratives I cited in revealing that physicians were often sterilizing black women without consent or medical purpose. It contained two powerful, humanity-bearing quotes from both the sterilized patient and the sterilizing doctor that I was compelled to include.


In incorporating the opinions of mothers on welfare, this article helped me to better understand the reaction to welfare reform from welfare recipients themselves.


This New York Times piece was one of the earliest I’d read in my thesis writing process, and was a primary part of my motivation to tell this story.


This piece was essential in my contextualizing of then-Governor Reagan’s usage of the image of a Welfare Queen in his 1976 presidential campaign.


DeGroot's article offered insight into Ronald Reagan's term as California governor, and allowed me to argue that Reagan's desire to cut back on welfare had existed long before he ran for president.


This article engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the Moynihan Report's varied legacies and ultimately determined that the report's ambiguity was what allowed it to be construed in so many ways. Geary's research was incredibly useful in grounding my own analysis of the Moynihan Report.


This book contributed to my historiography as the one of the only known and published female slave autobiographies.


I read this book for background knowledge but did not cite it in my thesis as it offered a detailed perspective into the everyday existence of plantation slave women.


This article helped me to better understand how the Welfare Queen originated from a journalist’s coining of the term, how President Ronald Reagan utilized the term, and the story of the real-life criminal—in more ways than just welfare corruption—that inspired the term Welfare Queen.


My first encounter with Roberts was in a class on sexual health and reproductive justice in the fall of my junior year—her unbelievably thorough consideration of black reproductive freedom was one of the primary reasons I was inspired to pursue this thesis. Though the entirety of her work grounded my historiography, some of her own primary sources have also influenced and been repurposed within my own analysis.


This video was incredibly helpful in my understanding how The Population Bomb was received and made impact in the era in which it was published.


This book contributed to my historiography as a modern take on the total history of medical experimentation on black bodies.


This book contributed to my historiography as the definitive history of black slave woman in the antebellum period.

This article allowed me to identify Joel Edelman, mentioned in another source, as director of the Legislative Advisory Committee on Public Aid.


This letter to the editors was written by then-President Clinton’s Secretary for Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, who sought to defend the value of welfare reform. I also chose to use this article because it directly engaged with the Abramovitz and Piven piece I sight earlier.

Governmental and Political Documents, Speeches, and Advertisements


This report was given to President Lyndon Johnson by then Assistant Secretary for the Department of Labor for Policy Planning and Research Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Moynihan hoped the White House might read it and take action with a jobs initiative or proposed legislation to alleviate black male unemployment.


This speech is now known as one of the most famous examples of a political dog whistle, as Reagan utilized it to attempt to court white, southern Democrats in a county where three civil rights workers had been brutally murdered.


This is one of the speeches in which then-Governor Reagan spoke about a Welfare Queen on the 1976 presidential campaign trial.


This is one of the speeches in which then-Governor Reagan spoke about a Welfare Queen on the 1976 presidential campaign trial. He does not speak the words “Welfare Queen” in this speech or the one above, but all other markers for her existence were present.


This advertisement was the moment in which then-Governor and presidential candidate Bill Clinton coined the phrase and promised to “end welfare as we know it,” beginning on a path that led to an eventually debilitating welfare reform.

SECONDARY SOURCES


This article was utilized as an essential part of my historiography, allowing me to connect how the narratives of hyper-sexuality and hyper-fertility were racialized and how they connected to each other.


DeGroot's article offered insight into Ronald Reagan's term as California governor, and allowed me to argue that Reagan's desire to cut back on welfare had existed long before he ran for president.


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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

One of the defining questions of global society today is whether the international community is capable of ending conflict and forging peace. Not every government or leader on earth may prioritize peace, but an increasingly connected and humane society has produced a global political culture that generally values peaceful negotiations and the ending of conflict. It is essential, then, that the practitioners of conflict resolution utilize academic...
research as a guide on how to approach their work. It is within this context that this paper seeks to make an argument about conflict resolution. It will approach the issue as an academic matter through three case studies. The paper will also provide a policy framework that diplomats and negotiators can apply when pursuing peace in conflicts around the world.

The central question of this paper is this: In a conflict, which circumstances can an external actor reliably identify and exploit, or manufacture, to produce a viable peace process?

One potentially opportune circumstance in a conflict for an external actor to either manufacture, or wait for and exploit, is a momentum shift. A momentum shift, as defined in this paper, occurs when the side that hitherto had been winning the conflict suffers a series of tactical losses, and the side that had previously been losing experiences a series of tactical victories. At this time, an external actor has a strong chance of success in beginning a viable peace process. Importantly, this moment does not last forever; the momentum shift produces a brief window of opportunity that must be exploited promptly and intelligently.

This thesis is not based on observations of existing phenomena, arguing that A naturally leads to B. Rather, it argues that A can lead to B if an external actor exploits the opportunity and applies tactics x, y and z. In other words, it is not an evaluation of some observable phenomena so much as a theory on how things could work. It is not claiming that the momentum shift is the only circumstance in which conflicts can be peacefully ended, but that this is one of the best times for a peace process to be pursued.

This paper will be organized in the following manner. The first and current chapter serves as an overview and introduction. The second is a review of existing literature on related topics, and how this paper seeks to fit into that literature. Chapter three will fully explain the ‘momentum shift’ as a theory. This will include exploring the theoretical, political, and psychological factors involved, as well as the methodology behind the research. The fourth and fifth chapters will be analyses of two case studies, each of which demonstrates the momentum shift phenomenon and its exploitation. The first case study is the Israel-Egypt conflict, focusing on the momentum shift that occurred in the Yom Kippur War and its role in beginning a peace process. The second is the Bosnian War, and the momentum shift in the summer of 1995 that helped lead to the Dayton Accords. The sixth chapter will be a short examination of the Syrian Civil War as an example of when the momentum shift was not exploited or turned into a viable peace process. The seventh chapter will seek to translate this conceptual theory into a policy recommendation. It will address how to make the decision to wait or manipulate the momentum shift; build an infrastructure for peace; recognize when the shift occurs; and exploit the shift. These and other issues will be thoroughly discussed, ultimately producing a full recommendation for how to operationalize this abstract theory into a policy that can end conflict. Finally, the eighth chapter will summarize the main arguments and offer a conclusion.

Peace as an idea eludes even the most idealistic of people. But we would be remiss as writers and academics not to be mindful of our research’s impact on real world struggles for peace. This paper will not solve all conflicts; it will likely not even solve one. But perhaps through its scope, ambition, and intent, it can push forward the conversation on how we can work to achieve this far-away, seemingly impossible goal. This paper seeks to contribute, just a little, to the human experiment of pursuing peace for all people; to prevent death and suffering around the world, and to end the conflicts that plague our world.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Conflict resolution has been studied for decades; theories and analyses are released every year that shake up the field. This section narrows that vast and complex field into three works, chosen for their influence on the scholarly conversation and their relevance to this paper.

While the substance of conflict resolution negotiations is arguably the more studied field, the timing of negotiations is just as important. This is the issue mainly addressed by the momentum shift theory. At the foundation of the scholarship on the timing of conflict resolution negotiations is I. William Zartman’s concept of ripeness.

Zartman premises his research on the notion that at certain moments, conflicts become ripe for resolution. As Zartman notes in his article “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond”, John Campbell summarized the idea best: “You have to do the right thing at the right time.”1 Ripeness has entered the popular lexicon for academics and diplomats alike, to indicate whether the circumstances of a conflict are
Having established the concept of ripeness, Zartman goes on to argue that the circumstance ripest for a conflict is one of mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). Zartman’s definition of MHS states that “when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way out.” The MHS involves two components. The first is some catastrophe or moment that proves to the combatant that, unless something is done about the conflict now, the pain from the conflict will only increase. The second component is a perception of a way out; each combatant does not necessarily require an end goal or visible solution, but they simply need to hope that the MHS can be ended.

Zartman’s work revolutionized the way that the timing of negotiations was viewed and discussed in the academic community. It influenced nearly every subsequent work on that topic, including another which is relevant to the momentum shift theory, Constantin Ruhe’s “Anticipating Mediated Talks: Predicting the Timing of Mediation with Disaggregated Conflict Dynamics.” This piece uses a quantitative analysis of low-intensity African conflicts to find a reasonable predictor of when a conflict is ready for mediation. Its main finding is that the probability of mediation is contingent upon conflict intensity. High-conflict intensity increases the chance of both sides being ready for negotiations if neither side is likely to prevail militarily. On the other hand, if at least one side of the conflict perceives itself to have a high probability of success, mediation is unlikely. The study ultimately concludes that in low-intensity conflicts mediation tends to occur most often when “conflict intensity increases, but neither conflict party sees a particularly high probability of victory.”

This paper seeks to contribute to the scholarly conversation that includes Zartman’s and Ruhe’s works, mainly by proposing a theory to explain another circumstance under which conflicts are ripe. The momentum shift theory does not seek to contradict these existing works on conflict ripeness, but to supplement them. Essential to the idea of the momentum shift theory is that there are multiple ways for a conflict to be ripe, including the MHS and Ruhe’s intensity theory. The momentum shift is yet another theory of how a conflict can become ripe for resolution by negotiation.

It is important to note that one fundamental notion underlies the works of Zartman and Ruhe and the momentum shift theory—that conflicts can and ought to be resolved peacefully. However, not all scholars agree. In his 1999 Foreign Affairs article “Give War a Chance,” Luttwak challenges that basic assumption. He asserts that “although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace.” Put simply, Luttwak believes that war ought to be left alone to run its natural course. Instead of intervening, he says, allow one side to simply defeat the other; it will cause immense destruction in the short-term but will ultimately lead to a more sustainable peace. Luttwak argues that this is preferable to the outcome of a well-intentioned but fruitless international effort to resolve a conflict. Luttwak posits that internationally brokered ceasefires only “intensify and prolong the struggle once the cease-fire ends” and postpones the inevitable and natural end to conflicts once exhaustion or the defeat of one side leads to the conflict’s resolution. He therefore argues that external actors should dissuade multilateral intervention and simply allow war to “serve its sole useful function: to bring peace.”

Luttwak’s argument that outside interventions only make conflicts worse is well-argued. However, it focuses solely on examples of failed intervention and ignores successful ones, and thereby reaches the flawed conclusion that all external actor interventions are misguided. Luttwak’s argument fails to account for Zartman’s foundational idea—that conflicts can become ripe for resolution under certain specific circumstances. This paper will argue, as will be made clear in chapter seven, that in the absence of reasonable certainty a conflict can end, and with a belief in the conflict’s ripeness for resolution, external actors are indeed better off biding their time and not intervening. But given the right window of opportunity—whether that be a mutually hurting stalemate, a momentum shift, or any other phenomenon—external actors could potentially intervene successfully. It is on this basic premise that the work of Zartman, Ruhe, and this paper’s momentum shift theory exist.

This paper will proceed to fully explain the momentum shift theory, with the intention of adding to the existing literature. The following chapter will dive into the phenomenon on a theoretical basis, and explain the qualitative methodology behind its testing.
CHAPTER III: THE MOMENTUM SHIFT – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

A. Explanation

In hypothetical Conflict X, there are two sides—Side A and Side B. Side A has been steadily winning in Conflict X over the past ten years, through a series of tactical and strategic victories, stronger morale, and/ or superior military technology. Side B has not lost Conflict X, but has yet to experience a breakthrough. It continues to suffer from a series of tactical losses and struggles with military and national morale. Psychology also plays a large part in the dynamic—Side A perceives itself as superior, and Side B perceives itself as inferior.

Over the past seventy years, international actors have often applied enormous diplomatic pressure to end conflicts while they are in this state. But such pressure is often misguided. Under these circumstances, it is in Side A’s interest to continue engaging in the conflict, since this option would afford it more favorable results than if it had to acquiesce to the demands of Side B and of the external actor. This often renders the efforts of international actors fruitless.

External actors would be better served in this case to choose between two options. They can intervene in Conflict X to change the dynamics on the ground or wait until circumstances are riper. This naturally leads to an essential question: under what circumstance could a conflict be ripe for intervention?

For years, Conflict X has seen Side A gradually degrade Side B’s military strength and morale, continuing to seize territory and exact significant casualties. Then, due to some external factor, the situation radically changes. Side B experiences a stunning series of tactical victories, upsetting the balance of power, increasing confidence in its own potential for victory, and shocking Side A and the international community. Suddenly, the wind has changed direction, pushing Side B forward and Side A backward. This is the definition of a momentum shift.

Importantly, this does not mean that Side B is suddenly certain to win the conflict. It does not even necessarily mean that its chances of success are above 50 percent. What is vital here is the perception of the conflict; if Side B suddenly regains confidence, and Side A is, for the first time, fearful of Side B, a momentum shift has occurred.

When the momentum shifts, Side A suddenly loses confidence in its own ability to simply defeat Side B on the battlefield. Even if it is still the more powerful actor of the two, seeing the winds change may incentivize Side A to engage with the external actor. Rather than continue the fight and risk losing what leverage it still has (but now may lose), Side A will see the wisdom in taking advantage of that leverage in a peace process while it still can. Negotiation is now in its interest. Simultaneously, Side B is also incentivized to engage in a peace process. Before the shift, doing so would have been tantamount to surrendering. Now, with the momentum at its back, Side B has the legitimacy and dignity necessary to negotiate and make serious demands. In short, the momentum shift has the potential to lead to peace because it psychologically prepares both sides for negotiating.

The momentum shift is a short window of opportunity. If the external actor waits too long, the conflict may spiral into a state of affairs that is no longer conducive to peace. For example, the momentum shift could reverse, and Side A could regain the upper hand. Alternatively, if Side B experiences too much success on the battlefield, its decision-makers may become convinced that they can win the war militarily, and so refuse to participate in peace talks. The external actor must avoid these scenarios by acting promptly, before Side A regains the upper hand and before Side B experiences too much success.

All of this is to say that the momentum shift is, at best, precarious. It does not guarantee success. The external actor must be quick to take advantage of it, and even then, multiple factors—military, political, social, psychological, or others—can lead to failure. Nevertheless, this paper maintains that the momentum shift represents one of the best opportunities to produce peace.

B. Methodology

The methodology of this paper lies in qualitative research. History of the conflicts, archived information, statements from the actors involved, and interviews with experts and participants in the peace processes were all included in the case studies.

The paper’s independent and dependent variables are, respectively, the momentum shift and a viable peace process.

1. Defining the Dependent Variable – A Viable Peace Process
What constitutes a viable peace process is necessarily contingent on the specific circumstances surrounding the conflict. However, for this paper, a viable peace process will be defined by two criteria.

The first is full commitment from combatants and from the external actor. The process must be more than a cosmetic gesture designed for the appearance of peacemaking to placate the international community or human rights groups. All sides must be entirely committed to the idea that the conflict must end through the talks.

The second criterion for a viable peace process is a realistic belief that even if the process fails to bring about an end to the conflict, it can still provide a foundation for future efforts. This happens through two processes. First, if the peace process has accustomed both sides to the idea of negotiating with the other, the process can be considered partially viable. Breaking the taboo behind compromising with one’s enemy is an important psychological step forward; even if talks do not lead to peace, this simple breakthrough provides a chance for future engagement. Second, the peace process is viable if it succeeds in setting positive precedents. If the peace process produces a set of understandings that both sides agree to, it can succeed in setting the foundation for the eventual resolution of the conflict.

2. Operationalization of the Independent and Dependent Variables

The independent variable, the momentum shift, will be operationalized by observing objective realities on the battlefield and perceptions of the conflict.

Battlefield factors are simply the physical representation of the momentum shift that occurs. How, in other words, has the reality of the war changed? These factors will include land divisions, comparative military strength, and the consistency of tactical victories or losses.

The second factor is perception. Physical realities on the battlefield mean little if the actors involved do not psychologically perceive that the situation has changed. In other words, the relevant actors must realize that the momentum has shifted in order for the momentum shift to be fully viable. Accounts of the reactions of key leaders and their publics, such as in quotes, speeches, or actions taken in the aftermath of the momentum shift will all be discussed.

Full commitment to the viable peace process will be measured by evaluating the key leaders’ change in attitudes as a result of the momentum shift. This will be analyzed by drawing a clear line between battlefield realities, perceptions of them, and combatants’ stated willingness to negotiate. If there is a clear cause-and-effect relationship between the momentum shift and change in attitude, we can be reasonably certain that the momentum shift was what presented a chance for peace.

The second criterion, setting a foundation for future efforts, will be measured by the accomplishments made by the peace process. Did, for example, the process yield any significant agreements? If it did not, were there at least precedents set that can be built upon later? The other way to measure this second criterion is to investigate the openness to future negotiations expressed by either side or whether the taboo on negotiating has been broken. All will be measured through public statements and archived discussions.

CHAPTER IV: THE ISRAEL-EGYPT CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The Egypt-Israel conflict was perhaps one of the most violent and intractable of the second half of the twentieth century. Entrenched in deep-seated hatreds and bitter land disputes, it may have once seemed impossible that Egypt, the most populous and powerful Arab state, would ever accept coexistence with a Jewish state on its border. Yet in 1978, Anwar al-Sadat and Menachem Begin signed the Camp David Accords, signaling an end to hostilities between their nations and taking a bold step toward peace in the Middle East.

How exactly did this occur? One of the most vital causes, without which peace very well may not have been achieved, was the momentum shift that occurred between Israel and Egypt with the Yom Kippur War of 1973. This chapter will begin with an overview of the conflict from 1948 to 1973, a period during which Israel was indisputably the more powerful state. It will then explain the moment the momentum shifted in the Yom Kippur War, and show precisely how this war changed perceptions of the conflict. Finally, it will address how the momentum shift brought about by the Yom Kippur War incentivized both nations to move toward peace, and how that process was helped along by an active external actor in the United States.
After the return of the Jewish people to their ancestral homeland, as well as increased urgency for sovereignty and security in the wake of the Holocaust, the state of Israel was declared on May 15, 1948. In response, a coalition of Arab states including Egypt, Syria, and Jordan invaded Palestine, beginning the first Arab-Israeli War. Israel was severely outnumbered, but after a loss of 6,300 soldiers and civilians—nearly 1 percent of its population at the time—it won the war, due largely to superior organization and motivation. Importantly, it held on to only a part of Jerusalem, excluding the Old City. The Arab states accepted armistice agreements in 1949. Thus began the decades-long state of tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Egypt, while acquiescing to an armistice in February of 1949, did not recognize Israel.8

The next direct Egyptian-Israeli confrontation occurred in 1956, when in response to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israel, with the support of France and the United Kingdom, attacked Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and attempted to seize the canal. While Israel was successful in capturing the Suez, they eventually fell back at the insistence of the Eisenhower administration. The confrontation resulted in a United Nations peacekeeping force that occupied Sinai Peninsula, acting as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. Though Egypt technically suffered a strategic defeat, Nasser emerged a hero, hailed as the man who faced down Israel and the Western powers after so many decades of Egyptian humiliation.9 While Egypt’s outlook changed after the Suez war, Israel’s did not. Israelis did not believe the balance of power had shifted, and so were not compelled to negotiate any change to the status quo. This war, as a result, did not create a momentum shift.10

The true game changer for the balance of power between Egypt and Israel—one that solidified the inequity in their positions before the momentum shift in 1973—was the Six-Day War. In May of 1967, Nasser mobilized forces in the Sinai and demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan began to mobilize. Upon seeing Egypt’s preparation for war, Israel decided to act.11

On the morning of June 5, Israel launched a preemptive air attack on its Arab enemies. In just a few hours, Israel destroyed 452 Arab aircrafts using just 196 of their own. The most devastating blow was felt in Egypt, whose air force was utterly decimated; 90 percent of its aircraft were destroyed while still on the ground. A similarly decisive blow was struck against the Syrian air force. As a result of the attacks, the Arab forces had no air power to back their ground operations, and Israel maintained full operational control of the skies. With support from the air and in no danger of aerial attack, Israeli forces swept into the Golan Heights in the north and the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula in the west, tripling their nation’s size. The Israelis also achieved what was perhaps their most powerful and symbolic victory in the war—the capture of East Jerusalem and the Old City, and subsequently all of the West Bank.12

The Six-Day War defined the psyche of both nations for the next six years. Israelis were ecstatic and proud, while Egypt was utterly humiliated at its failure. It was under these circumstances that the momentum shift would occur a few years later.13

The 1973 Yom Kippur War – The Momentum Shift

After the Six-Day War, Egypt armed itself for a new battle against the Israelis. It accelerated its offensive military development in 1972, receiving an enormous amount of advanced weaponry from the Soviet Union. Nasser died in 1970, replaced by Anwar al-Sadat, a leader with an eye on the end game with Israel.14 Both the United States and Israel mistakenly assumed that the Arabs would not go to war again. A misreading of intelligence convinced them that the Arabs knew they could not match Israel’s military strength and were unwilling to risk another humiliation. The Israelis were therefore stunned when Egypt and Syria attacked on October 6, 1973, the day of Yom Kippur.15

The first few days of the war saw Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal and marching virtually unopposed across the Sinai. Many Israeli soldiers were away observing Yom Kippur when the Israeli military frantically mobilized for a counterattack; before they could, Egypt had recaptured much of the Sinai, and the Syrians had come close to taking the Golan Heights. The Israeli military was taken aback not only by the surprise attack, but also by how quickly their equipment and reserve munitions were being exhausted. Israel turned to the United States for resupply, and President Richard Nixon and Secretary Henry Kissinger only relented when the Soviet Union began to resupply Egypt and Syria, further threatening...
Israel's security.\textsuperscript{16}

After receiving U.S. assistance, Israel turned the tide of the war. It succeeded in disabling parts of the Egyptian air force, managed to retake the Sinai, and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army. In November, Israel and Egypt signed a ceasefire agreement, and the fighting ended. Israel had, tactically speaking, come out on top; but the psychological effect of the war was devastating for its population. On the other hand, the war proved to be a boon for Egyptian morale.\textsuperscript{17}

This chapter will now establish how the Yom Kippur War was a momentum shift, and analyze how this shift contributed to peace.

\textbf{The External Actor - Manipulating the Shift}

It would be wholly inaccurate to claim that the United States somehow deftly manipulated the outcomes of the 1973 war. Both the United States and Israel had woefully failed in their assessment of the conflict, and so were completely taken aback when Egypt and Syria attacked. That said, once the war had begun, Secretary Kissinger acted with intelligence and a keen awareness of what we now could call the momentum shift phenomenon. Kissinger watched the war progress and strategized to end it in a way that created an opportunity for peace. Bernard Reich best summarizes the idea:

\begin{quote}
“\text{The goals of U.S. diplomacy, as stated by Kissinger in a press conference on October 12, were to end the hostilities as quickly as possible and to end them in such a way that they would contribute to the maximum extent possible to the promotion of peace in the region. To the latter end, the United States sought to avoid humiliating the Arabs while preventing the defeat of Israel.}”\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

When the Israelis desperately asked for resupply from the United States halfway through the war, President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger were hesitant because they wanted to avoid another overwhelming Israeli victory. “I believed that only a battlefield stalemate would provide the foundation on which fruitful negotiations might begin,” Nixon later wrote. Only after the Soviets began to resupply the Arabs did he and Kissinger assist the Israelis. Even then, they only provided as much as was necessary to guarantee a slight Israeli victory. Secretary Kissinger needed to convince both Israel and Egypt that a negotiated peace was in their interests. That would not happen if either overwhelmingly won the Yom Kippur War.\textsuperscript{19}

Kissinger was perhaps a more explicit follower of the idea that would become Zartman's mutually hurting stalemate theory, but the outline of the momentum shift idea is still visible behind his decision-making process. Had the United States airdropped supplies to the Israelis early in the war, he reasoned, Israel could have won more decisively, and an opportunity would have been lost. Only the Israelis' perception of insecurity would incentivize them into negotiations.\textsuperscript{20}

Kissinger's eventual resupply of the Israelis also fit into the momentum shift with regard to Arab incentives. When at the end of the war Israel surrounded the Egyptian Third Army and threatened Cairo, it was Kissinger who convinced the Israeli government to stop and accept a ceasefire. His insistence balanced two different extremes—Egypt would have to win psychologically to gain the dignity necessary to negotiate, but it could not do so with an overwhelming victory that caused it to refuse peace talks. The momentum needed to shift, but not too much.\textsuperscript{21}

None of this is to say that Secretary Kissinger was the puppet master behind the war. He and most of the U.S. and Israeli intelligence and diplomatic communities were caught entirely off guard by the attack. Still, Secretary Kissinger understood all the factors at play and acted accordingly. He supplied the Israelis enough so they won, but not overwhelmingly so, simultaneously ensuring that the Egyptians would not be too emboldened by their success. In other words, he used the Yom Kippur War as an opportunity to produce the proper conditions for a viable peace process.

\textbf{Perceiving the Shift}

For the momentum shift to be viable, it must be perceived by all combatants. To evaluate the change in Israeli and Egyptian mentalities, this section will recount, through academic sources and personal accounts, the state of their governments and societies both before and after the war. It is important to note that, in this case, the momentum shift did not manifest in physical changes through territorial gains and losses; the Israelis still tactically won. The shift instead came in confidence, sentiment, and perception.

\textbf{Israel's Perception of the Shift}

The Six-Day War gave Israel more than just new territory; it also ignited a manic euphoria unseen in the state's history. The people and the press hailed the
strength of the nation's military. “Victory coins” were minted, and the economy grew thanks to new tourism and donations. The war also had incredible religious significance. For the first time since 1948, Jews could return to the Old City and pray at the Western Wall, a holy place for Judaism. The very act of capturing all of Jerusalem, the site of so many historical and religious events, was an achievement of Biblical proportions. Israelis could not have been more elated.22

But the Israelis' confidence proved to be their undoing. Military complacency and a feeling of invulnerability began to grip the country. Israel had spent all its history as a state accustomed to existential threats; the miraculous victory of 1967 eroded this insecurity. The prevailing sense of joy and confidence led to what some might call hubris. There was, therefore, no incentive to make any sacrifices for peace.

When the Israelis stonewalled Secretary Kissinger as he broached the possibility of peace negotiations with Egypt before the Yom Kippur War, he erupted in anger, “There is serious fear that all you really want to do is evade any settlement that requires concessions on your part so that you can remain along the lines you hold at present!” Israel's lack of cooperation was indicative of their relative position of strength. There was no hurry to negotiate because they had all the leverage.23

William Quandt, who was part of the U.S. delegation at Camp David and is widely acknowledged as one of the world's leading authorities on those negotiations, also agrees that Israel was overconfident at the time. Quandt points out that Prime Minister Golda Meir was relatively unconcerned with the prospect of another Arab attack. Meir, just like the rest of the Israeli and U.S. intelligence communities, was convinced that Egypt would not dare attack again. Meir reassured her people that the Israeli Defense Forces were so strong that the Arabs knew that they could never win another war.24 Kissinger later wrote that Meir “considered Israel militarily impregnable; there was strictly speaking no need for any change.”25 Defense Minister Moshe Dayan echoed her sentiment, “Any blow they land will hurt them more than it will us.”26 This perception changed after October 1973.

Following the Yom Kippur War, Israel had control of more Arab territory than after the Six-Day War. It had suffered no civilian casualties and maintained the advantage of strategic depth. But, as Asaf Siniver writes, “Psychology, rather than territory, dictated the moods in . . . Jerusalem at the end of the war. As Henry Kissinger observed during his visit to Israel in the final days of the fighting, 'Israel was exhausted, no matter what the military maps showed.’” Despite their eventual success, Israel's (and, as it turned out, Egypt's) conception of itself stood in “almost opposing terms” to where it physically stood at the end of the fighting.27

Israel's state of depression during and after the war is demonstrated by the reactions of its leaders. Moshe Dayan, the hero of the Six-Day War who had held the utmost confidence in Israel's military, made the shockingly grim remark on the third day of fighting that the war spelled “the end of the Third Temple.”28 This reference to the destruction of the First and Second Temples, by the Babylonians and the Romans respectively, reveals the Defense Minister's panic. The two events are among the most traumatic in Jewish history, and both resulted in the expulsion of the Jews from their homeland. Azar Gat, a professor at Tel Aviv University and an expert on military history, expanded on this idea. When asked whether the 1973 momentum shift was at least in part what allowed for peace between Israel and Egypt, he replied, “Absolutely. . . . Because in Israel . . . the war was a great shock. The idea of Israel's invincibility . . . it is essential for the existence of the state. Unless Israel is able to win wars, and do it quickly and decisively, its days are numbered. And [the Yom Kippur War] was the first time since '48 . . . that the actual existence of Israel was put in question.”29

Moshe Dayan perhaps best exemplifies the radical change. Regarding the pivotal city at the southern tip of the Sinai, he famously stated before the war, “Better Sharm el-Sheikh without peace, than peace without Sharm el-Sheikh.” Yet Dayan became one of the most essential advocates for peace in later years. He worked with Menachem Begin in the last days of the Camp David negotiations, which included losing Sharm el-Sheikh, to ensure peace.30

Israel was shaken—still strong, but vulnerable. Something had shifted in the Israeli psyche—it realized that the status quo could not stand. The stark reversal in Israel's self-perception due to the Yom Kippur War made diplomacy more likely. Side A had been knocked down a few notches.

Side B, on the other hand, went up a few.
Egypt’s Perception of the Shift

Egypt’s position with respect to the Six-Day War was, in every sense, the exact opposite of Israel’s. Its air force was shattered, its army roundly defeated, and the Sinai Peninsula gone. Its leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, immediately understood the horrific consequences of the war. He resigned the presidency on June 9 in shame. Though he later retook the position—ostensibly due to public demands—his credibility had been destroyed. War Minister Shams Badran and other leaders were put on trial. Deputy Supreme Commander of the Army Abdel Hakim Amer was put on house arrest, and he later committed suicide. Perhaps the biggest toll was on Egyptian people themselves. Long accustomed to humiliation at the hands of the West, for some years they took pride in Nasser and the idea of pan-Arabism. This pride, however, had been devastated by their crushing defeat. Fouad Ajami best summarized Egypt’s deep depression after the war, “[The war] added a new wound to a deeply scarred civilization; it threw new constraints in the face of a society whose history has been a frustrating struggle to push back.…”

Around this time, a man named Anwar al-Sadat came to power. Sadat was not entirely averse to the idea of peace with Israel, as Nasser had been. He initially expressed willingness to engage in non-belligerency agreements. But soon he came to understand that circumstances were not ripe. Without a restoration of its dignity, Egypt was not ready for peace. Sadat then came to his final conclusion: only military action could break the stalemate, produce a political solution, and pull Egypt out of its depression. He wrote in his memoirs, “It was impossible for the United States or, indeed, any other power to make a move if we ourselves didn’t take military action to break the deadlock.” Herein begins one of the most interesting elements of this case study—Sadat’s deliberate attempt to bring about the momentum shift.

Beginning in 1972, Sadat took a series of steps that fit neatly into his overall strategy. By expelling Soviet advisers that year, he indicated to the United States that Egypt was willing to move further into the U.S. camp, and he incentivized the Nixon administration to put more pressure on the Israelis for peace. Sadat also began hardening his rhetoric. He publicly hinted at the possibility of war and declared that he was willing to lose a million soldiers to take back the Sinai. And, most significantly, he rebuilt the Egyptian military, obtaining advanced weaponry from the Soviet Union and spending months developing an impeccable battle plan.

The person who knew him best, his wife Jehan, best articulated his approach. She remarked, “Sadat needed one more war in order to win and enter into negotiations from a position of equality.” Note the key words “a position of equality.” Egypt could not “enter into negotiations” while in the state of inferiority and humiliation it endured before October 1973. Egypt could negotiate only when it had its dignity back—a moment reached after the Yom Kippur War.

One fact bears clarification—Egypt lost the Yom Kippur War. Despite successfully crossing the Suez Canal, Egyptian forces were eventually pushed back across the Sinai. The Third Army was completely encircled, and Israeli forces could have marched on to Cairo if they wanted to. Yet in the end, the physical results of the war mattered little. It had done what it needed to do—it had given the Egyptians their honor back.

Experts on the conflict agree. “Sadat succeeded to convince his people that this was victory in ’73,” says Ambassador Itzhak Levanon. “It was that [he broke] the stigma of the invincible army…and the psychological barrier. And now [they had] to combine it with diplomacy in order to restate the rest of Sinai.”

Though the war was a military defeat, it had accomplished its more significant objective: erasing the humiliation of 1967. While the Israelis lamented their perceived insecurity, Egyptians now stood on the world stage with their heads held high, a striking contrast to the shame experienced just six years before.

Recall from Chapter III, however, that although Side B must regain dignity for the shift to be complete, it cannot be so successful that it believes it no longer needs to negotiate. Sadat could have wondered, if the momentum really has shifted, why not try again?

One of the negotiators at Camp David, Elyakim Rubinstein—now an Israeli Supreme Court Justice—has an answer, “I think President Sadat . . . analyzed that if he couldn’t succeed [militarily] in Yom Kippur . . . which was a total surprise for the Israeli government and military . . . then he should pursue new ways. And he pursued the idea of peace—for which he should be blessed.” Professor Azar Gat agrees, “There was also the recognition that . . . [although] they were successful this time, it may be prudent for [them] not
to try [their] luck again. And this was especially strong with Sadat.”

Aside from the restoration of national honor was a secondary realization: another war was not only unnecessary, but also unwise. Though Egypt’s dignity had been restored, another war would risk erasing the progress it had made. Sadat’s original strategy therefore remained in place. He used the perceived victory of the war to pursue a peace process, because now Egypt could pursue negotiations with honor.

The momentum had shifted—and both Egypt and Israel perceived it. Now, that shift had to be translated into a viable peace process.

How the Momentum Shift Led to a Viable Peace Process

George Friedman articulated the momentum shift of this crisis perfectly after the war:

“The Israelis came away with greater respect for Egyptian military power and a decreased confidence in their own. The Egyptians came away with the recognition that however much they had improved, they were defeated in the end. The Israelis weren’t certain they would beat Egypt the next time. The Egyptians were doubtful they could ever beat Israel. For both, a negotiated settlement made sense. The mix of severely shaken confidence and morbid admittance to reality was what permitted Carter to negotiate a settlement that both sides wanted—and could sell to their respective publics.”

The momentum shift had occurred, and it began the years-long process toward peace. The first step on that path was the Sinai I agreement, on which this analysis will focus.

First, though, it is important to note that the momentum shift was not the only thing that led to Sinai I, or ultimately to peace. Multiple other factors played into the development of a viable peace process: Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, a new Israeli leader in Menachem Begin, and Sadat’s dramatic trip to Jerusalem in 1977, to name just a few. This paper does not argue that the momentum shift alone produced peace. It does, however, argue that the consequences of the 1973 shift were invaluable in convincing Israel and Egypt that negotiations were necessary and that without the momentum shift, peace would have been far less likely.

For one, there is a direct line between the psychological effects of the momentum shift and Egypt and Israel’s eventual willingness to enter into a peace process. Ambassador Itzhak Levanon spoke on this topic,

“We saw the Egyptian army talking to us in a different language…more understandable, more modest, seeking for a solution…it was positive. They were joking, they had coffee. It was suddenly a different kind of atmosphere. So the enemies of yesterday suddenly started to talk. Now people in the Israeli army went to the politicians and said, ‘We have a different Egypt.’ Sadat used [the same tactic]—going to the people and saying, ‘We have a different Israel, because they were defeated.’”

The momentum shift had provided both the incentive and the political capital for both sides to begin negotiating. And, beginning with the Kilometer 101 talks, they took advantage of that energy. Though those talks failed (as did a multilateral attempt in Geneva), they provided a foundation of trust for Sinai I to be signed in January 1974.

Moshe Dayan suggested the first draft of that agreement. The Israeli and Egyptian armies were to move back to a position fifteen miles from the canal on the east and west banks respectively, and the United Nations was to occupy a neutral zone between them. Troop numbers, artillery pieces, and tanks would also be limited. After a series of complex negotiations, the plan was accepted and implemented. It was the first serious negotiation between Egypt and Israel since 1949, and in retrospect can be regarded as the first step in the years-long viable peace process. Actors at the time recognized this as well. Section D of the agreement itself reads, “This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just, and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.”

That the first direct negotiation between Egyptian and Israeli officials in decades took place so immediately after the Yom Kippur War is only the first of many indications that the confrontation had initiated a momentum shift. Ismail Fahmy, then the Egyptian Foreign Minister, articulates one incentive that the October war had provided Sadat to concede some points for a first step toward peace, “[Sadat] had been very badly affected by the success of the Israeli counteroffensive in the last part of the war... As a result, he entered the negotiations ready to make concessions.” Sadat’s explicit political purposes for
the war—restoring Egyptian honor and creating an opening for peace—were achieved. But simultaneously, the reality of the situation sunk in. Egypt needed the United States if it wanted to get the Sinai back, so Sadat was committed to developing a strong relationship with Kissinger. Kissinger later recalled that Sadat viewed "a disengagement agreement...[as] essential to turn a new page in Arab-American relations and give momentum to the peace process with Israel."46 The momentum shift further motivated Sadat to sign onto the agreement that would be called Sinai I.

There is also a direct relationship between the October War and Sinai I for the Israelis. Side A comes out of the momentum shift understanding that their position of power was eroding, which motivated them to seek a peace process. For the Israelis, this came in both a short-term and a long-term form. The former was an economic problem. Golda Meir’s government was intent on withdrawing Israeli forces to the east bank of the Suez Canal due to the enormous cost of maintaining mobilization. Israel’s dire economic situation was in itself an indication of its lowered position. Partly due to the Six-Day War, Israel’s economy had been booming since 1967, benefitting from increased trade, tourism, and higher investment from foreign countries. The Yom Kippur War did not erase all of this progress, but its cost was significant.

Furthermore, Israel was now more dependent on the United States. Israel’s tactical victory in the war was due less to its own military prowess than to the last-minute resupply by the Nixon administration. “The war put Israel in a position where they had to depend on the United States,” says William Quandt, a National Security Council member during the Sinai I negotiations and a key mediator for the Camp David Accords, “It strengthened the hand of the pro-negotiation Israelis and of the United States, which wanted to pressure Israel into peace.”47 The failures of October 1973 reminded Israel how much it needed the United States for diplomatic and, crucially, military support. Kissinger was aware of this necessity and put it to good use. When Prime Minister Meir expressed reluctance to attend the Geneva talks, Kissinger issued what amounted to a threat, “The whole [United States] government is against you...if there is a war, my opinion is that the President will oppose you.” Meir replied, “Even if the Egyptians attack?” Kissinger responded in the affirmative. Israel attended the conference.48

Israel’s flexibility with respect to the content of its negotiations also changed. Before October 1973, Israel held all the cards and was in no hurry to concede anything to Egypt. Ambassador Itzhak Levon called Israelis “stubborn.” Kissinger was once so furious with their rigidity that he lost his temper with them, “What are your positive proposals? You don’t have to accept our position on every subject. But by the same token, you can’t totally reject all proposals without advancing some of your own! No one knows what you want.”49 By January, though, the Israelis were far more flexible.

Another element that shows the momentum shift’s effect on negotiations is the role of the external actor. Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” is now the stuff of legend. His trips around the Arab world and Israel in the months and years following the Yom Kippur War were crucial for developing trust among all actors. Kissinger articulates his central role in the beginning of the peace process in his book Years of Upheaval, “The seeds of the breakthrough of January 1974 had been sown at least three months earlier. It was the culmination of the strategy we had imposed on the October war:...to prevent the humiliation of the Arabs, especially on the Egyptian front;...to seek results step by step rather than in one comprehensive negotiation.”50

Kissinger’s manipulation of the conflict had paid off. In part due to his efforts, the circumstances for peace had been set up. He continued shrewdly by exploiting his leverage with the Israelis. He built a strong relationship with both sides, emphasizing the benefits of peace and moving forward through step-by-step victories. With just a few weeks of shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger helped achieve what was previously thought nearly impossible—a written agreement between Egypt and Israel. The United States played a strong role in bringing about Sinai I, demonstrating the importance of the external actor’s role in translating the momentum shift into a viable peace process.

Sinai I represents more than simply its contents. It was a breakthrough of monumental proportions—the first time Egypt and Israel produced a mutual agreement on paper since 1949. It set in motion Sinai II and, after some time and struggle, the Camp David negotiations. The link between the events of October 1973 and Sinai I, then, is hugely significant. The momentum shift had led to a peace process.

Conclusion

The Yom Kippur War did not produce Sinai
CHAPTER V: THE BOSNIAN WAR

Introduction

The Bosnia and Herzegovina of 2017 is not a perfect state. It remains administered by international authorities. It is one of the most corruption-prone states in Europe. And it continues to be hampered by ethnic and religious differences. Yet, the nation that just twenty years ago saw one of the worst wars of the twentieth century and the most egregious instances of ethnic cleansing since the Holocaust is now at peace.

Several factors led to the end of the Bosnian War in 1995, including the forceful negotiating personality of Richard Holbrooke and the willingness of the ethnic leaders to negotiate. But one fundamental reason for the end of this war parallels the reason for the end of the Israel-Egypt conflict. A momentum shift in late 1995 shattered the status quo of the three-years-long conflict, and produced a window of opportunity that the United States and its European allies seized. Due to a renewed Bosniak-Croat offensive and NATO airstrikes, the war was suddenly ripe for resolution. Just months later a power-sharing agreement to end the conflict was signed in Dayton, Ohio.

This chapter will explore how the momentum shift led to peace in the Bosnian War. It will begin with a brief history of the conflict, from 1992 to the summer of 1995. It will then explain how momentum shifted with the sudden and unexpected success of the Bosniaks and Croats, who had been losing for years, and the beginning of NATO airstrikes. Finally, it will demonstrate that the shifts of the summer of 1995 led to the Dayton Accords.

History

While the West celebrated the decline of the Soviet Union, the dismantling of the Communist system spelled chaos for much of Eastern Europe. The different Yugoslav republics had been experiencing resurgent nationalism since the early 1980s after the death of the Josip Broz Tito. In 1991, after the Berlin Wall had fallen and the Soviet Union was clearly on its last leg, the Yugoslav nations were ready to seize the moment. In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia.51

Amid these earth-shattering changes to the half-century-long status quo, the people of Bosnia awoke, ready to take their destinies into their own hands. Situated on the east of the Adriatic Sea, west of the center of power in Serbia, Bosnia had long been considered a backwater in Yugoslavia. For most of Bosnia’s recent history, religion and ethnicity had been largely irrelevant in this republic. But soon, growing nationalistic elements in Yugoslavia began to sow division within Bosnia’s diverse population. In 1991 the country was 44 percent Bosniak Muslim, 31 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croatian. Therein lay the roots of the 1992–1995 Bosnian War.52

Witnessing the breakup of Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serbs wanted desperately for their country to be part of a “Greater Serbia,” with their capital in Belgrade to the east. Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Milosevic, shared that vision. Bosniaks and Croats, on the other hand, who comprised the majority of the country’s population, strongly favored independence. Bosnia’s government was split among the three ethnic groups roughly and was led by Alija Izetbegovic, a Bosniak Muslim. Swept up by the growing calls for independence and a larger movement toward nationalism, Izetbegovic took action on March 3, 1992, declaring Bosnia’s independence. War began a month later as Serbian forces, armed by the Yugoslav People’s Army and supported by Milosevic, began to target Bosniak Muslims. Muslim-majority towns in the east, including Zvornik, Foča, and Višegrad, were brutally attacked. Muslims were expelled from the region, often beaten, tortured, raped, and murdered. Thus began the horrific process...
of ethnic cleansing, a term that was coined specifically to describe the Serb treatment of its enemies during this war. The central objective of the ethnic cleansing was to establish an ethnically pure Serb state free of Bosniaks and Croats.53

Bosniaks fought to defend their nation; Croats also countered Serb encroachments on their territory, sometimes fighting alongside Bosniaks. But by the end of 1993, the Serbs had control of nearly 75 percent of the country. Until the summer of 1995, the military situation remained relatively static. The Serbs had vastly superior military strength. Bosniaks and Croats, while together more numerous, did not have the backing of a strong and well-supplied external sponsor, as the Bosnian Serbs did in Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. They also suffered from an international arms embargo.54

Ethnic cleansing continued as the Serbs seized more territory. Once they had captured villages and towns in the east, the Serb army, aided by police, paramilitaries, and even civilians, began the process of systematically expelling Bosniak Muslims from the region. Homes were looted and burned down. Bosniaks were collected and beaten; men were separated from the women and children and often killed. Mosques and Muslims schools were destroyed. Soon, even concentration camps were built, where Bosniaks and sometimes Croats were forced to live in horrible conditions. A refugee crisis ensued. Bosniaks, eager to escape the systematic destruction of their people and way of life, fled to the other Yugoslav republics.55

Both through terror and military dominance, the Serbs established the upper hand early in the Bosnian War and maintained it for years. The United States and Europe, meanwhile, stood by, neither willing to expend any political or military capital to end the conflict. For three years Bosniaks and Croats suffered, subjected to horrors unseen in Europe since the Second World War. That status quo—the Serbs as Side A, the Bosniaks and Croats as Side B—remained unchanged until the summer of 1995.

July to September 1995 – The Momentum Shift

After over three years of military losses, unimaginable suffering, and horrific ethnic cleansing, the tide began to turn. Two changes produced a momentum shift—first, the Croat offensive Operation Storm and subsequent Federation victories, and then NATO bombings.

The Croats suffered less than the Bosniaks did in the war, but were still the victims of severe violence. Some were rounded up alongside Muslims and subjected to ethnic cleansing, and, like the Bosniaks, their army steadily lost territory to the Serbs.

The series of defeats ended with Operation Storm, a military offensive ordered by Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman. Though tactically more significant in the neighboring Croatian War for Independence, Operation Storm played an enormous strategic and psychological role in the Bosnian War. The offensive was designed to retake control of Serb Krajina (in modern-day Croatia) and western Bosnia. On August 4, 1995, the Croat army, aided by some Bosniaks (the two groups had entered into an alliance in late 1994) attacked a 390-mile front. Rolling through the territory in just days, the Croats and Bosniaks—comprising a united Federation—surprised the Serbs with a ferocious military advancement. The operation officially ended merely days later. The Croats had captured nearly 20 percent of the territory which it claimed was rightfully theirs, and the Bosniaks had gained a foothold in the west. For the first time in three years, Side B had achieved a major strategic victory.56

This change provided the Croats and Bosniaks renewed initiative in the war. The following weeks saw a series of smaller operations in which the Bosniaks began to retake territory in western Bosnia from the Serbs. Here, finally, was the beginning of a momentum shift. But the offensive was just one way in which the tide had turned; weeks prior to Operation Storm was an event that set the stage for another shift.

The small eastern town of Srebrenica had been declared a safe area by the United Nations Security Council in 1993, but the Serbs had refused to demilitarize there. In July of 1995 they began a push into the town and seized it only a week later. Thus began the Srebrenica Massacre. Thousands of the Bosniak Muslim residents were captured immediately. Women, children, and the elderly were forced onto buses that took them to Bosniak-held territory; in the process some were raped and killed. Starting on July 13, the men and boys who had been left behind were evacuated to mass execution sites to the north. The Bosniak Muslims were blindfolded, taken to killing fields, lined up, and shot. Some were mutilated and tortured before death. Estimates indicate that up to 8,000 were murdered.57
The Srebrenica Massacre followed the well-worn pattern of ethnic cleansing that had been occurring throughout the Bosnian War. On its own, it was yet another indication of the Serbs’ dominance over the Bosniaks. But the size and horror of this massacre had an unintended consequence; it impressed upon the world the moral imperative of intervention. It convinced the United States and Europe that they needed to put an end to the violence. The massacre, combined with the shelling that killed forty-three civilians in a Sarajevo market, motivated NATO into action.

NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force began on August 30. The sustained air campaign targeted 338 Bosnian Serb military targets. Airplanes and precision-guided missiles from U.S. aircraft carriers targeted and destroyed contingents of Serb soldiers, heavy artillery pieces, command and control facilities, military support complexes, and communication infrastructure. The Serbs’ ability to wage war was utterly crippled, as they were left unable to coordinate attacks or communicate with Belgrade. Bosnian Serbs and their sponsor, the state of Serbia itself, had been humbled by the stunning reversal in fortune. Just two months before, they had benefited from an enormous military and psychological advantage over the Bosniaks and Croats. They had held most of Bosnia’s territory and were close to completing their campaign of ethnic cleansing. But now, following the surprise success of Operation Storm and the sudden intervention by a far more powerful external actor, the Serbs had been struck down. The Bosniaks and Croats now had the support of NATO and were beginning to take back their territory. On-the-ground realities and psychological perceptions radically shifted. The momentum shift had taken place. The Croat and Bosniak successes and NATO intervention had produced a rare opportunity; all sides in the conflict were prepared for negotiations.58

Bosniaks, Croats, and the Momentum Shift

In order to attain favorable terms in a deal, the Bosniaks and Croats needed leverage in the form of territory—something they were sorely lacking before the summer of 1995. Franjo Tudjman, leader of the Croats, seemed to understand that his people would have no leverage or legitimacy without the significant military success that had been eluding them for so long. Tudjman was particularly intent on retaking the Krajina region; when advised against it by the United States, he delayed. But the advantages of attacking the Krajina were still compelling, both from a symbolic and a strategic standpoint. It would ultimately prove to be a significant factor in the momentum shift. Croats were not in as poor a position as the Bosniaks, but they were still definitively inferior compared to the Serbs’ military strength, and were therefore incapable of breaking the stalemate through military means or of demanding serious concessions of any Serbian actors.59

Izetbegovic had long been willing to combine diplomacy with force. “We will negotiate where we can and make war where we have to,” he said over the radio in late 1994. “If the enemy does not show readiness for reasonable political solutions within the next four months, the cease-fire will not be extended.”60 The problem was that Bosnia did not have the leverage to force the Serbs into a “reasonable political solution.” Recognizing this, Izetbegovic pleaded with the United States to intervene on behalf of the oppressed Bosniaks throughout the conflict. But the United States, first under George H.W. Bush and later Bill Clinton, was unwilling to commit military force for most of the war. Under these constraints, the Bosniaks suffered military defeat and ethnic cleansing, all the while willing to work toward a partition plan as part of a political solution but unable to compel any party to acquiesce to negotiation.61

Following the summer of 1995, however, the Bosniaks’ and Croats’ position drastically improved. After Operation Storm succeeded in capturing the Krajina, the Croats brutally expelled ethnic Serbs from the region, dealing a psychological blow to Serbian forces, who had been the ones terrorizing their enemies in the war for three years. The Bosniak-Croat Federation then gained momentum, taking control of more territory and boosting Bosniak and Croat morale. Quite rapidly, the facts on the ground moved closer to the 51–49 principle suggested earlier in negotiations; it seemed that 51 percent of Bosnian territory would belong to the Bosniak and Croat Federation, and 49 percent to the Serbs. NATO bombings soon began, providing a powerful psychological boost to particularly the Bosniak Muslims. Lord David Owen, the European Union co-chairman of the Conference for the Former Yugoslavia, summarized the feeling at the time: “Thereafter, day by day, the map altered.”62

In the coming months, the effect that these
victories had on the Croats and Bosniaks was visible. Having achieved most of their objectives through military action, the Croats were apparently the most relaxed at Dayton. Richard Holbrooke reported that Franjo Tudjman was “proud and haughty” at the negotiating table, eager to emphasize that all he needed now was to regain eastern Slavonia, an issue separate from the Bosnian War itself. From his strong bargaining position Tudjman held significant leverage over Milosevic and, incidentally, over Izetbegovic, who depended on the continuation of the Bosnia-Croat Federation that Tudjman could theoretically snatch away at any moment. The Croats—one half of Side B—were in a strong position thanks to the momentum shift, and were therefore able to negotiate with dignity.63

While the Bosniak Muslims too were Side B in the conflict, their place in Dayton was markedly different than that of the Croats. They were emboldened by their recent successes on the battlefield, but they proved to be far less flexible than either the Croats or even the Serbs. It appeared that Izetbegovic’s eagerness for a political solution had dissolved in the wake of his improved bargaining position. According to personal accounts, the Bosniaks were “lacking any real conviction” about what they wanted from the agreement, and were unenthusiastic about following through with it “until the very last moment.”64 It is clear from these accounts that the Bosniaks were in danger of falling into the trap outlined in Chapter III; their successes bolstered them to the point where they believed they could gain more favorable terms through continued fighting, rather than through a negotiated settlement. Here again, the external actor plays a vital role. It was up to the United States to convince the hesitant Bosniaks that a peace deal was more desirable than war.

While the Bosniaks and Croats underwent their own political, military, and psychological shift during this period, the Serbs suffered through their own.

Serbs and the Momentum Shift

Richard Holbrooke, the chief negotiator both before and during Dayton, summarized the role of the Serbs perfectly:

“For me…the success of the Croatian (and later the Bosnian-Croat Federation) offensive was a classic illustration of a fundamental fact: the shape of the diplomatic landscape will usually reflect the actual balance of forces on the ground. In concrete terms, this meant that as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but success on the battlefield.”65

For the first three years of the war, the Serbs had indeed “experienced nothing but success on the battlefield.” They committed appalling war crimes, striking fear into the hearts of Bosniaks, and to a lesser extent Croats, and producing an image of a terrifying, undefeatable enemy. Within months in 1992 they captured half the country, including many Bosniak-majority enclaves in the east. And with continued inaction from the United States and Western Europe, the Serbs had no reason to believe that they would be seriously challenged. They were, indisputably, Side A. They were militarily, strategically, and psychologically superior to Side B and had no incentive to change their behavior.

The Serbs’ strength was exemplified by Slobodan Milosevic’s unwillingness to make peace. Milosevic played a duplicitous game throughout the war. In public he often supported peace efforts and denied any territorial ambitions in Bosnia, despite providing assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. To prevent further international sanctions on Serbia, which he feared deeply, he supported the Bosnian Serbs only covertly, while publicly continuing to display a surprising, yet ultimately inauthentic, openness to peace processes. Milosevic remained unwilling to make any concessions to actually achieve peace. Yet even by that point, the Serbs’ position was showing signs of decay. Sanctions were beginning to take their toll on the Serbian economy, worrying Milosevic and slowly making him more open to compromise. Still, Milosevic was in a good position in the war; those who knew him at the time reported him relaxed and generally unconcerned with the progress of the conflict.66

This changed after Operation Storm and the ensuing Bosniak and Croat successes. Milosevic himself seemed to have changed after that point. Mihajlo Markovic, a major player in Serbia’s Socialist Party, told U.S. diplomat Louis Sell that Krajina had in fact affected Milosevic’s psychological state. Sell writes that Markovic reported “Milosevic was drinking more heavily, becoming even more reclusive, and was increasingly reliant on his wife and a narrow circle around her.” Hrvoje Sarinic, a Croat politician, noted with some satisfaction that Milosevic’s self-confident and charming nature before ‘Storm’ had degenerated into uncertainty. Milosevic told Sarinic that “the
situation [in Serbia] is very difficult and [he] will soon be unable to control it.”  

Milosevic’s attitude reflected the general mood of Serbs in the late summer and fall of 1995. There was, in the words of writer and analyst Robert Thomas, “a sense that the Serbs were undergoing a national catastrophe of apocalyptic proportions…[it] informed public discourse during the late summer of 1995.” The continuing success of the Croat-Bosniak Federation had changed everything. According to some contemporary observers, the advance threatened to push all the Serbs away from Bosnia. The shocking losses on the ground, combined with fear of an onslaught of Serb refugees, had shaken the Serbs’ and Milosevic’s confidence. Side A had been knocked down, militarily and psychologically.

This reality soon translated into a dramatic change at the negotiating table. Milosevic now badly wanted an agreement. An important step toward one occurred when the Bosnian Serbs agreed to allow Milosevic to represent them in a peace process and sign any potential deal for them. This effectively made Milosevic the only relevant Serb actor—an important factor given that he was so personally affected by the Federation’s advances on the ground. He fearfully complained to chief American negotiator Richard Holbrooke that “[NATO] planes are giving close air support to the Muslims and Croats.” This was not strictly true, as the attacks were not coordinated with Federation offenses, but the response was still a sign of Milosevic’s increased anxiety. He proceeded to make a new proposal; the Serbs would agree to a nationwide cease-fire, in return for an end to the NATO bombings. Holbrooke rejected the idea, but he and his team were “struck by the change in [Milosevic’s] tone.” Holbrooke later recounted the moment: “Clearly, the Croat-Muslim offensive in the west and the bombing were having a major effect on the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic seemed in a rush.”

The Bosnian Serbs themselves were also growing anxious. Ratko Mladic, the Serb military commander who was responsible for many of the atrocities of the conflict and was later indicted for war crimes, erupted in anger at a meeting with Milosevic and U.S. negotiators, where the Serbs had been presented with an “unacceptable” draft agreement. He decreed the agreement, saying, “The situation is explosive, worse than at any time since the war began….There is no justification for the bombing…. [It] is a criminal act.”

The offensives and the bombings were worrying the key Serbian actors. The momentum shift had done its job. In addition to bolstering Side B, the shift had struck at the confidence of Side A. The Serbs were now fearful of the Croats and Bosniaks, worried that they may actually lose the war and be pushed out of Bosnia. It was then that they realized they would have to take advantage of the leverage they already had, rather than risk the possibility of future losses.

But the momentum shift means little without an active external actor who can exploit it. Fortunately, the Bosnian War found one, in the United States and Richard Holbrooke.

The External Actor—Seizing and Expanding the Momentum Shift

At first the United States resisted getting involved in the Bosnian War. The George H.W. Bush administration, concerned with reelection and exhausted from two trying foreign policy initiatives—German reunification and Desert Storm—was less than enthusiastic about a new effort to end the war. They regarded it as primarily a European problem and hoped that it would be an opportunity for Europe to reassert control over its own affairs given the end of the Cold War. Western Europe, however, was also unwilling to take decisive action on the issue. Governor Bill Clinton made President Bush’s inaction an issue in the campaign, advocating a policy of “lift and strike”—lifting the sanctions that were mostly hurting the Croats and Bosniaks and striking the Serbs. But once he was president, his administration proved unwilling to take serious action to end the bloodshed.

It was the shock of Srebrenica that spurred the Clinton administration and the Europeans to act. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Bosnian War was an embarrassment for the West. In the end, the active external actor in this case made all the difference in ensuring that the independent variable produced the dependent, that the momentum shift created a viable (and as it turned out, successful) peace process. There were two things the United States did well in this case; it recognized the momentum shift, and it created and utilized leverage to pressure both sides into negotiating.

Richard Holbrooke’s team quickly realized the significance of the momentum shift that had occurred in Bosnia. In mid-August negotiator Joseph
Kruzel sent a message to Washington to express the realization, writing, “For the first time, I realize how much the Croatian offensive in the Krajina has profoundly changed the nature of the Balkan game and thus our diplomatic offensive.” Robert Frasure, another negotiator, was in a meeting with Holbrooke and Croatian President Tudjman on August 17 where another member of the team tried to convince Tudjman to halt the offensive—official Washington policy at the time. Frasure passed Holbrooke a note: “This is no time to get squeamish about things. This is the first time the Serb wave has been reversed. That is essential for us to get stability, so we can get out.”

Those back in Washington did not necessarily agree; they feared a Yugoslav reprisal and seemed to regard the Croatian and Bosniak successes as “simply another chapter in the dreary story of fighting and bloodshed in the region.” The revolutionary nature of the shift was almost overlooked. But the diplomatic team seized the initiative once the shift had taken place, ensuring that the chance for peace would not pass fruitlessly.

The second prudent move taken by the United States was beginning NATO bombings. Airstrikes had been conducted sporadically for the past several months but never with a well-defined political objective. Nor were they designed to assist the Bosniaks or Croats on the ground. The Srebrenica Massacre and the shelling of a market in Sarajevo proved to be the last straw for the United States and its European allies. They began a well-coordinated, overwhelming air campaign on August 30 on Bosnian Serb positions and subsequently adopted a more aggressive diplomatic stance. By expanding their role in the conflict, the United States finally obtained the leverage it needed to pressure both Side A and Side B into negotiations.

Expanding the shift itself was essential to ensure that it would be successful. The specter of the United States and NATO standing against the Bosnian Serbs was a key psychological motivation for the Serbs to compromise. The effect of American leverage was observable. Holbrooke remained calm yet tactful when Mladic angrily decried the bombing as a “criminal act.”

“I rose from my chair and looked down at Milosevic. “Mr. President…If your ‘friends’… do not wish to have a serious discussion, we will leave now.” …Milosevic paused for a moment, perhaps to gauge if this was a bluff. Perhaps he sensed that it wasn’t. NATO planes were bombing Bosnian Serb territory as we spoke. It was our moment of maximum leverage, and I was not bluffing about leaving…. Milosevic spoke sharply in Serbian to his colleagues, and they began to argue…It was over in a few minutes. Milosevic came over to us, asked us to rejoin him, and said that the Bosnian Serbs were ready to negotiate on the basis of our draft.”

It is unlikely that Milosevic would have been able to cajole Mladic to negotiate had the bombings not been taking place at that very moment. According to Holbrooke’s own analysis, the NATO attacks were having an effect; he was willing to forcefully use the United States’ moment of “maximum leverage” to force the Bosnian Serbs into cooperating. The fear that the attacks inspired in Mladic, in addition to the physical destruction that the bombings wrought, was absolutely vital for a viable peace process to follow.

Finally, the United States played a strong role in preventing Side B from turning away from the peace process in favor of continuing its military momentum. Franjo Tudjman, representing the Croats, came to Dayton as a victor, eager for a deal given the dignity and leverage he had attained. The Bosniaks, however, proved the most difficult negotiating partner. Unlike the Serbs and Croats, they were not completely committed to even having a deal; their leader Alija Izetbegovic, a naturally reserved man, was often frustrating to work with. Saadia Touval describes their psychological state: “The Muslims were emboldened by their recent military success, and hoped that if the war resumed they would win more territory and ultimately a better settlement. They were described as ‘lacking any real conviction’ about the desirability of an agreement, and as resisting it ‘until the very last moment.’”

Left to their own devices, the Bosniak Muslims may have turned away from the negotiations and continued their push across Serb territory. They may have prevailed, but the cost would have been high: more casualties, more destruction, more suffering. This is one of the main dangers of the momentum shift—that Side B, having attained dignity and leverage, bypasses the opportunity for peaceful settlement and simply continues fighting. The United States exerted their leverage over the Bosniaks to prevent this, threatening to withdraw support if they did not show more flexibility in negotiations, while also enticing them with a World Bank reconstruction
program of $5 billion and a pledge to persuade Europe and Russia to lift the United Nations arms embargo. Holbrooke's team also protected the Bosniaks from further concessions to the Serbs, aware of their precarious commitment. When the Serbs demanded more territory, Holbrooke arranged for that territory to come from the Croats rather than the Bosniaks.\textsuperscript{79}

The momentum shift will not lead to peace on its own. The external actor must use active diplomacy—and, in some cases, force—to convert the independent variable into the dependent. For the next two months Holbrooke and his team maneuvered the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks into reaching peace. Their efforts ultimately led to the signing of the Dayton Accords in November, ending the Bosnian War and providing the basis for a lasting peace. The momentum shift made all of this possible—and the United States played a pivotal, indeed indispensable, role in ensuring it.

\textbf{Conclusion}

It is not difficult to draw a direct line between the momentum shift and the combatants' willingness for peace at Dayton. The immediacy of negotiations after the momentum shift is just one indication of its importance; after three and a half years of fighting, the talks began in earnest within two months of the Federation offensives and NATO strikes. But another, more compelling reason to believe that the independent variable led to the dependent is the response of key actors. Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic had not been fully willing to engage in negotiations until the momentum shift occurred. Milosevic became committed to resolving the war only after the Federation's success and military involvement of the West. Meanwhile, Tudjman gained the dignity he needed to come to the negotiating table as a strong partner for peace. The other half of Side B, the Bosniaks, were less accommodating, and presented a danger to the peace process that the momentum shift had produced; but the United States asserted its leverage to ensure that the Bosniaks committed to the process.

On December 14, 1995, Slobodan Milosevic, Alija Izetbegovic, and Franjo Tudjman signed the Dayton Accords, bringing an end to the destructive fighting that had ripped Bosnia apart for over three years. Multiple factors led to the viable peace process, and finally the peace, that ensued. But a strong case can be made that those factors would not have been enough without a fundamental military and psychological shift on all sides of the conflict. The conflict had to be ripe for resolution; and the momentum shift made it so.

\textbf{CHAPTER VI: THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR}

\textbf{Introduction}

The previous two case studies were examples in which an external actor was able to successfully exploit a momentum shift. However, military and psychological momentum shifts are often not exploited; opportunities for peace can be overlooked. One such instance is the ongoing Syrian Civil War.

In the first half of 2015, the devastating conflict took a turn from what had been, until that point, the status quo. The rebels began gaining on President Bashar al-Assad's forces. Despite Assad's overwhelming military and psychological superiority for the previous four years of the war, a series of fortuitous circumstances and renewed morale among the rebels led to opposition forces gaining significant territory from Assad, even while other actors, principally the Islamic State, continued to wreak havoc on the country. However, this sudden momentum shift came and went without any overall strategic change in the war. No external actor was willing to exploit it. In the absence of a mediator to turn the momentum shift into a viable peace process, the rebels' advances produced nothing. In September, Russia intervened to support Assad, destroying any chance for a peaceful and viable negotiation.

Today, the continuing tragedy of the Syrian Civil War stands as an example of what happens when external actors with the means to recognize and intelligently exploit momentum shifts—or any other ripe moments for peace, for that matter—do nothing. But what exactly was the prior status quo of the war, and how did the momentum shift occur? Why did the global community do nothing? And what does this case study prove about the theory of the momentum shift?

\textbf{History}

As part of a wide wave of uprisings across the Arab world, prodemocracy protests began in Syria in March 2011 against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Government forces soon turned violent, opening fire on demonstrators. Assad's brutality only emboldened
the protesters, who demanded his resignation. When Assad showed no sign of acquiescing, the opposition took up arms. Protests transformed into battles. By 2012, civilians were out on the streets not to demonstrate, but to combat government troops on the rubble strewn streets of their former homes. Fighting reached Damascus and Aleppo by mid-2012. The Arab Spring in Syria had descended into a civil war. 80

For years, the conflict has fallen further into utter chaos. As of December 2017, 5.4 million Syrians have fled the country, and 6.1 million are internally displaced. Upwards of 450,000 have been killed. The humanitarian crisis has spread around the Middle East and even to Europe. Roughly a quarter of Lebanon’s population is now made of refugees; millions more have fled to Jordan, Egypt, and even Israel. Some refugees risk the dangerous Mediterranean, seeking European shores. Many die along the way. 81 82

Beyond its physical scope, the Syrian Civil War is highly unique because of its sheer complexity. There is no one rebel group fighting government troops. Moderate Arabs clash with Assad forces in the west, while Kurds, perhaps the only group to benefit even marginally over the course of the war, control vast areas in the north. Arguably the most complicating factor in the conflict was the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), the terror group that shocked the world in the first half of 2014 by quickly capturing the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Tikrit. IS soon held territory across wide swaths of the region and naturally became a combatant in the civil war. Though severely weakened since that time, IS continues to fight both moderate rebels, like the Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as the Assad government. 83

In six years the war has come to represent one of the most volatile conflicts for the region and the world. Shi’ite Iran deployed its elite Revolutionary Guard to join the conflict on the side of President Assad, a Shi’ite Alawite, soon after the war began, and even facilitated the entry of Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist group, to join from the south. Saudi Arabia, ever fearful of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, began to support the Sunni Arab rebels. As a result the civil war turned, in part, into a traditional Shi’ite-Sunni conflict. Meanwhile, Syria became a point of contention between the two former Cold War rivals. Russia, desiring a warm water port on the Mediterranean and supportive of its ally President Assad, helped government forces crush the rebels for four years. The United States, naturally sympathetic to pro-democracy rebels, offered political and later, reluctantly, military support. 84

For four years, the conflict raged, destroying millions of lives, destabilizing a region, and shocking the globe. The landscape of the war is staggeringly complex—Assad fighting all rebels, the Sunni fighting the Shi’ite, the Kurds and Arabs clashing and cooperating on and off, the Islamic State terrorizing all, Iran fighting a proxy war against Saudi Arabia, and the United States and Russia finding themselves on opposite sides. Because of this, the traditional push and pull of the tactical and strategic circumstances has often been too difficult to follow. But one thing has remained clear since the beginning: when it came to the central, somewhat simplistic narrative of the war—the oppressive government and violent extremists fighting heroic rebels—the former was roundly defeating the latter. Unlike in other conflicts, the revolutionaries failed to cohere around a single leader or ideology. Early in the war, decent intentions by pro-democracy protestors were overwhelmed by an influx of extremists seeking to exploit the vacuum of power. This, combined with general chaos, gave the Assad government the advantage of fighting a divided enemy. Held back by disunity and confusion, the rebels were never able to gain a significant foothold in the war. While they lost battle after battle on the field, perceptions of the war remained static. The common person was suffering and had little hope that Assad would one day fall. Aleppo and Damascus lay in ruins, towns had been leveled, families were divided or eradicated, and an entire generation of children never went to school. In this state of fear, terror, and hopelessness, Assad’s government held not only tactical but also psychological superiority. The conflict was not ripe for resolution. It was too overwhelmed by its own devastation, and no actor was prepared to commit seriously to any negotiation. Side A was decisively winning, Side B decisively losing, and there was no discernible opportunity to advance the cause of peace.

This changed in the first months of 2015.

The Momentum Shift

The diffuse nature of the fighting in Syria makes it more difficult than in Israel-Egypt and Bosnia to identify a single moment that changed the course of the war. No one leader, like Anwar al-Sadat or
Slobodan Milosevic, or one tactical event, such as the crossing of the Suez Canal or the capturing of the Krajina, defines the momentum shift. Instead, the first months of 2015 saw a sudden shift in the conflict on multiple fronts and by different actors. This shift did create an opportunity for a viable peace process—one that went unexploited.

The Islamic State lost significant ground in the first six months of 2015. Kurdish YPG forces, among the most fierce and organized fighters in the war, seized the key city of Kobani and the surrounding countryside from IS in early February. They also claimed to have taken one-hundred villages from IS in just a few weeks. The anti-IS coalition led by the United States also helped to turn the tide. From February 22 to 24, coalition airstrikes covered the Kurds as they advanced to within five kilometers of IS stronghold Tel-Hamis. A wider offensive was taking shape; the north was becoming increasingly Kurdish.85 86

The Assad regime then began to suffer. Government forces failed in their attempt to completely encircle Aleppo. During their effort, rebel forces rallied and stopped them in their tracks, and they soon were able to reverse Assad gains in the area. By April, the Institute for the Study of War declared that “the Assad regime [was] not positioned to secure an outright military victory in 2015.” The regime had lost significant manpower; infighting and instability plagued the Syrian government and military. As a result, Assad came to rely on a tenuous strategy of maintaining an “army of all corners” that involved the “establishment and defense of remote regime outposts throughout Syria in order to pin the outer bounds of a contiguous post-war Syrian state.” Increasingly pushed back by opposition forces of all varieties and dangerously reliant on support from Iran, Assad apparently hoped that this strategy would enable him to avoid a single, crushing defeat, while maintaining some control over his territory. This weak strategy serves as an indication of Assad’s desperation in these months. Even while he pursued this new approach, the rebels were gaining ground.87

The momentum shift that occurred on all sides is evident in simple numbers. The Islamic State had lost 9.4 percent of its territory from January to June; even more strikingly, Assad lost 16 percent. Meanwhile the Kurdish forces gained 9.8 percent, and the Sunni insurgents 11.1 percent.88

This momentum shift was far more complicated and ambiguous than those in Israel-Egypt and Bosnia. It occurred on multiple fronts, in a war that had far more combatants and actors than the other case studies ever did. Even so, a momentum shift had occurred, and the status quo had radically shifted. Had external actors noticed this, perhaps they could have taken advantage of it. But they did not.

Inaction of External Actors Interested in Peace

A coalition of nations led by the United States had begun to take a more active role in Syria by the close of 2014. U.S. planes struck terrorist positions and helped clear the way for many of the Kurd and Sunni offensives. Arab nations participated as well. But the intervention—if one could even call it that—was designed as an anti-IS action, in response to IS provocations such as rhetorical threats against the West and the killing of American journalists. It was a limited mission, in President Barack Obama’s words, to “degrade and ultimately destroy” IS; not to change the course of the broader Syrian Civil War.89

No actor capable of exploiting the momentum shift seemed to consider doing so on behalf of moderate rebels. To be fair, it would have been a risky proposition; the sides in this war were, and are, not clearly defined. Attempts to help moderate rebels such as the Kurds and some Arabs could inadvertently help extremists. It was that fear that prevented the United States from taking a more active role in the conflict.

This concern was not, and is not, invalid. But if there were ever a time when an external actor could have made a difference in the conflict, it was the first few months of 2015. A dialogue with the Assad government, pushed to its limits and newly fearful of its chances of winning the war, could have produced some sort of political agreement. Targeted engagement with Syria’s rebels, including the Kurds and non-IS or al-Qaeda affiliated Sunnis, could have strengthened those moderate factions politically and tactically. A more robust U.S. engagement in the war—one beyond half-hearted diplomatic initiatives and stronger than non-committal airstrikes—could have achieved something.

Full U.S. commitment to a peace process could have also convinced the key external sponsors of the Assad regime, Russia and Iran, to negotiate more seriously. There is perhaps no better proof that there was a momentum shift in early 2015 than the fact that Russia found it necessary to intervene in September.
It was their assessment of the conflict—that Assad needed more robust support—that led to their intervention, one that effectively ended the window of opportunity the shift had presented. But this did not have to play out as it did. As Ambassador Dennis Ross puts it:

“If the Obama administration had understood the concept of the momentum shift, they would have recognized the unique moment and done something about it. They could have gone to Russia and Iran and told them—’We understand your needs, and we’re willing to meet them. Here’s what we’re prepared to do. You can reject this offer, but then you’ll get sucked into a quagmire you won’t be able to extricate yourself from later. There has to be a political process now.’”

Would the Russians and Iranians have been willing to negotiate with the United States and the rebels? Would they have been inclined to pressure Assad to step down as a result of his precarious military position? These are impossible questions to answer. It is at least a defensible point, however, that if the United States had recognized the momentum shift and seized it with diplomatic and military posturing, both Russia and Iran may have been less inclined to increase their military commitment in Syria. Both understood the risk of confronting U.S. forces. If the Obama administration created and used leverage against these two actors, while recognizing their needs and preparing to meet them diplomatically, it is conceivable that Russia and Iran could have genuinely committed to a political process. Perhaps with their pressure, Assad would have been more flexible in negotiations.

But the Obama administration’s policy did not change in these few critical months. Its assessment of the conflict and decision not to initiate a peace process were influenced not by facts on the ground, but by its preconceptions and its fears. It did not believe it could achieve a ceasefire and was not willing to expend political capital to do so. In the absence of U.S. engagement, Russia intervened on behalf of Assad, ending the opportunity that the momentum shift provided. The Syria case underscores, then, more than anything else, the importance of recognizing the shift. The United States saw the opportunity in the Israel-Egypt conflict and in Bosnia, but not in Syria.

One point deserves emphasis: U.S. intervention to exploit the momentum shift would have been very unlikely to actually end the Syrian Civil War. The conflict is so complex, the devastation so complete, the actors so entrenched in their own ideologies, that negotiations would likely not have produced a final peace agreement. The thought is far too optimistic. But the dependent variable that the external actor must seek in this theory is not peace; it is a viable peace process. Recall that the criteria for a viable peace process, outlined in Chapter III, includes a full commitment from all sides and setting a foundation for future efforts. The effect of the momentum shift could have incentivized Assad and the rebels to break their psychological block against negotiating. Furthermore, the effort could have set positive precedents. Even if the peace process did not succeed, small victories could have developed an infrastructure for a more successful effort in the future.

Yet this opportunity was lost. No effort was designed to specifically exploit the tactical momentum shift that had occurred. The United States and the rest of the world continued to watch the conflict unfold, horrified and empathetic, yet ultimately uncommitted to peace. Instead of a country that was interested in a peace process, it was Russia that intervened in September 2015. Ostensibly meant to fight the Islamic State, Russian airstrikes were soon found to be targeting all rebels. Their goal was to support President Assad, not to eliminate terror groups. As a result of Russian military strength, the gains made by rebel factions in early 2015 were quickly reversed. Side B had lost its momentum. Side A was back on top.

Conclusion

The Syrian Civil War demonstrates what happens when an external actor that is interested in peace does not complement a momentum shift. The shift was not translated into a viable peace process of any kind; instead it went on for several months, propping up Assad’s and IS’s opponents tactically and even psychologically. But the rebels’ steam was short lasting: Russia soon stepped in and reversed the momentum shift. The window of opportunity closed. The world had failed to advance the cause of peace in Syria.

Today the war rages on. It continues to destabilize not only Syria but also the rest of the Middle East. It has produced a humanitarian crisis of unimaginable proportions. Men, women, and children are dying thousands at a time. The twenty-first century’s most devastating conflict shows no signs of abating. One
can only hope that another momentum shift, or any ripe circumstance, may emerge and be recognized and exploited by the proper actor.

CHAPTER VII: POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Introduction

The following framework does not presume to be the final answer to end conflicts. It is rather another step in the process of learning how to mediate conflict resolution.

The policy recommendation is split into four sections, creating a rough narrative of how the process would generally take place. The sections cover making the decision to wait or manipulate the momentum shift; building the infrastructure for peace; recognizing the momentum shift; and exploiting the shift.

1. Making the Decision—Wait, or Manipulate?

In each of the three case studies examined, the key actors approached the momentum shift in different ways. When debating how to resolve, or at least moderate, a conflict through the lens of the momentum shift, the first key question to ask is—should a state wait for the shift to occur or attempt to make it occur?

This decision will obviously be highly specific to the conflict in question. However, there are three principal issues a state should consider when the decision point arrives: ethical reasoning, internal confidence level, and the infrastructure for peace.

a. Ethical Reasoning

There are two ethical considerations the external actor must face when deciding whether to wait for or manipulate the shift: first, the morality of waiting and allowing the war to continue; and second, the morality of supporting one side over the other.

Roughly since the Iraq War, massive external military intervention in local conflicts has fallen entirely out of fashion—not without reason. It would be tempting, therefore, to wait for the momentum shift and solve the conflict diplomatically, rather than take the risk of intervening in any form. However, the external actor should consider the morality of standing aside while people are killed. Should it take the diplomatically prudent yet ultimately colder path, which is to develop its political capital behind the scenes without using it until the momentum shift arrives? Or should it attempt to intervene to save lives, running the risk of making the situation even worse because the conflict isn’t ripe? To wait for the momentum shift instead of manipulating it may be the safer path, but it could also be the crueler one.

Furthermore, manipulating the shift would, presumably, take place when, for lack of better terms, the “good guys” in the conflict are losing, and the “bad guys” are more powerful. But this is assuming that “good guys” and “bad guys” are even easily observable on the battlefield. Rarely is war so black and white. How does, for example, the external actor contend with extremist influence in the otherwise pro-democracy contingents of a rebel force fighting an oppressive government? Or if two sides are fighting over control of their country, and both have legitimate claims to the territory, which does the external actor support?

This paper cannot answer such questions. What it can do is present two general and simple rules for the issue at hand:

First, the external actor must wait if a.) it believes that its intervention would only make the situation worse, and b.) there is no strong ethical reasoning for supporting one side over the other.

And second, conversely, the external actor must consider manipulating the momentum shift if a.) it believes continuation of the conflict unabated would be worse than the outcome of an intervention, and b.) there is a strong ethical reasoning for supporting one side over the other.

b. Internal Confidence Level

As sophisticated modern military technology and intelligence-gathering capabilities are, no external actor can be completely confident in success, as the case studies show. NATO had a high level of confidence that it could force the Serbian government into negotiations. It had clear targets against the Bosnian Serb army and knew that with sufficient force, the destruction of Serb capabilities would have a high probability of advancing a peace process. It therefore took action. This was not the case, though, in Syria, where there was a reasonable fear that stepping in with military force, or even with aid, would only make the situation spiral out of control.

Determining whether an external actor is physically capable of affecting the momentum shift is, like the ethical reasoning, not a process this paper can spell out. But there are two intuitive lessons:
The external actor must wait if there is little confidence in its capacity to produce an exploitable and manageable momentum shift, and;

The external actor must consider manipulating the momentum shift if there is high confidence in its capacity to affect an exploitable and manageable momentum shift.

c. Infrastructure for Peace

Even if ethical reasoning and high confidence are present, intervention to create the momentum shift may lead to a disappointing outcome if the infrastructure for peace is not in place. The section after this one discusses the definition of the infrastructure for peace and how it can be created, so not much else will be said of it here. For now, a simple explanation is that it means the basic ingredients for a viable peace process must be in place before the momentum shift occurs, so that when it does, the external actor can hit the ground running. Therefore:

The external actor must wait if the infrastructure for peace is not developed enough for the eventual peace process to be viable, and:

The external actor must consider manipulating the momentum shift if the infrastructure for peace is developed sufficiently for the eventual peace process to be viable.

2. Creating the Infrastructure for Peace

While considering whether to intervene and when, the external actor must also play the long game, by patiently setting its chess pieces in the right places on the board, so that when the momentum shift occurs, naturally or otherwise, it is ready for the final play. In other words, the external actor must create the infrastructure for peace. There are innumerable steps in such a process, but this paper has identified three ingredients that seemed to determine success or failure in the case studies.

a. Gain Credibility

No external actor, regardless of its prudence in identifying or affecting the momentum shift, can produce a viable peace process if it does not have credibility in the eyes of the local players. To gain credibility, the external actor needs to develop leverage and trust.

A deficit in leverage was perhaps the single biggest reason why President Obama was unable to arrive at a diplomatic solution to the Syrian Civil War. Despite Secretary John Kerry’s herculean efforts to bring Assad, Russia, and Iran to the table, one could easily argue he never had a genuine chance at it. Neither Assad nor his sponsors believed that President Obama would take any serious action to force a solution. The President’s distaste for foreign interventionism was well-known. The Secretary of State therefore had no leverage when asking his rivals to negotiate—no credible threat of action. Compare this to the Bosnian War where the United States clearly had leverage; having destroyed Serbia’s war-making capacity through NATO bombings, it had demonstrated a credible threat of action, and therefore could compel the Serbs to negotiate.

The second element the external actor needs to gain credibility is trust. Secretary Kissinger went to great lengths to establish trust with both the Egyptians and the Israelis. His shuttle diplomacy between the two states was key to getting both Anwar al-Sadat and the Israeli government and military establishment to trust the United States, such that when President Carter came around to mediating the negotiations in 1978, the United States was trusted to lead.

b. Get All Sides Accustomed to the Idea of Negotiating

In a conflict, combatants may be so steeped in bias, hatred, and anger that the thought of even sitting at the same table as the enemy is repulsive. Consider, for example, the Syrian rebels’ utter refusal to consider Assad remaining in power, even if a transition process were in place.

This is precisely why getting each side accustomed to negotiating is so essential. Secretary Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy was key to softening both the stance of the Egyptians and even the Israelis, who before the Yom Kippur War had been less than enthusiastic about giving up their land to Egypt. Secretary Kissinger’s diplomacy, slowly but surely, chipped away at the hard positions of both sides. His efforts broke down the psychological barriers that Israelis and Egyptians had to being in a room with each other. Of course, more happened to get both sides willing to engage—a change in leadership in Egypt’s case, and a crisis of confidence in Israel’s—but the external actor must work to capitalize on those moments. By shuttling between Israel and Egypt and beginning the peace process with Sinai I, Secretary Kissinger created
leverage and forced both sides to accustom themselves to the idea of negotiating, which was essential for the final Camp David Accords in 1979.

c. Identify the Willing Players

If they wish to set the infrastructure for eventual peace, the external actor needs to identify who has the courage to sacrifice for peace, and embolden them rather than more fear- or bias-dominated leaders.

To do this, the external actor must constantly meet and communicate with those key players. By establishing a strong relationship with the local actors who can be crucial to a peace effort, the external actor can significantly increase the chance for that peace to occur. It also affords an opportunity for the external actor to constantly reassess and understand this particular leader’s positions and views, and therefore ascertain whether he or she will be a strong ally for peace.

Local decision-makers are ultimately the ones who determine their conflict’s outcome. The external actor therefore must influence those players to move toward peace. Without U.S. efforts to coax Milosevic, Izetbegovic and Tudjman into negotiations by showing them the benefits of peace and the futility of continued fighting, no amount of bombing or momentum shift-exploitation would have ended the Bosnian War.

3. Recognizing the Momentum Shift

Each conflict in which it may occur is uniquely complex. There are, though, two things that the external actor can do to prepare to notice the momentum shift: analyze battlefield trends, and constantly listen for the reactions of the key players.

a. Battlefield Trends

In all three case studies, a momentum shift on the battlefield was what produced an opportunity for peace. Egypt performing surprisingly well in the Yom Kippur War; the Croats and Bosniaks reclaiming territory from the Serbs; and the rebels gaining battlefield momentum in 2015 were all the signs that alerted (or, in the last case, should have alerted) external actors of the possibility for talks to become serious.

It is the responsibility of the external actor to constantly analyze the military progress of the conflict in question. Has Side B slowly begun to capture territory previously held by Side A, as in Bosnia? Has a decisive battle ended unexpectedly, as in the Yom Kippur War? Being up-to-date on all such developments is key to perceiving the shift.

b. Reactions of Key Players

Battlefield momentum shifts will mean little if the key players involved do not also recognize it or believe it exists. Ultimately the exploitability of the momentum shift relies on the psychological element of the phenomenon; the combatants must each have a reason to negotiate that did not exist before. That is why recognizing battlefield shifts is not enough; external actors must also be constantly aware of the reactions of key players.

This stage relies heavily on the infrastructure set up in point two, step three: identifying the willing players and building relationships with them. Using these relationships, the external actor must gauge the perceptions of the central decision-makers. Have these players perceived the momentum shift? Is their reaction to events enough to push them to be more amenable to peace talks? The external actor must maintain a constant dialogue with these actors to understand their perspective and answer these questions. It should also look for shifts in rhetoric. As Sadat did prior to his historic 1977 visit to Jerusalem, local players may design certain public comments to indicate a new willingness for negotiations. The external actor must notice these shifts. Did the leader of Side A, for example, just use a speech to subtly soften their stance on a key point of contention between them and their enemy? Has the leader of Side B been speaking with enhanced confidence, thereby indicating that they have the dignity necessary to negotiate?

Finally, the external actor must draw connections between these changes and the battlefield circumstances that could have produced them. Did a recent battle, overlooked by external actor intelligence but considered vital by local players, lead to a shift in rhetoric by one side or the other?

Watching for, and eventually recognizing, these subtle changes in atmosphere is absolutely necessary if the external actor wants to exploit the momentum shift. A simple rule summarizes this stage in the recognition process: If you are surprised by something the local actors says or does, there is a good chance that indicates a momentum shift.
4. Exploiting the Shift

Exploiting the shift is a multi-step process, but there are some general rules to this final step, all of them crucial for the external actor to maximize the chances for peace. They are building on the infrastructure for peace, reminding players of the benefits of peace, and maintaining and emphasizing the leverage the external actor possesses.

a. Building on the Infrastructure

Here is where the infrastructure for peace must be activated into an action plan. The established communication channels should be utilized; trust must produce results. One example of the external actor properly utilizing existing infrastructure comes from the Egypt-Israel conflict. Secretary Kissinger established trust and solid communication with Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli officials, trust that benefited the Carter team when it sought to move full speed ahead toward negotiations.

Another important requirement is the external actor showing that it is serious about peace. Without the engagement of the external actor’s principal leader and a sense that he or she is committing significant political capital for the negotiation process, local players will not be willing to participate. The Bosnian peace effort, for example, only worked when President Clinton got involved. On the flip side, one of the many reasons that U.S. efforts to end the Syrian Civil War failed was that there was a sense President Obama was not personally committed.

b. The Benefits of Peace

Another key step in bringing about peace is reminding the local players of the benefits of peace. An external actor should not frame negotiations as one side conceding to the other; it must convince the combatant that to do so benefits that combatant. This step is vital to getting the opposing sides to the negotiating table. Without convincing the combatants that peace will ultimately be more beneficial than continued fighting, any peace process that begins will be purely symbolic in nature and doomed to failure, like the ones that attempted to end the Syrian Civil War. Making the benefits of peace clear and tangible to the combatants is essential to exploiting the momentum shift.

c. Emphasize Leverage

As mentioned in the discussion on building an infrastructure for peace, the external actor’s leverage is key to negotiations. That leverage has to either be used or made visible to the combatants. The United States made its leverage clear beyond a shadow of a doubt to the Serbs in the Bosnian War; the NATO bombings were a big part of what made the momentum shift in that war lead to peace. Similarly, the United States held leverage with Israel; it knew that its ally was vulnerable and dependent on its relationship with the Americans, and American negotiators capitalized on this leverage to convince the Israelis to go all in for peace. When the moment to exploit a momentum shift comes, the external actor must make that leverage credible and visible to the combatants in a way that convinces them, with either negative or positive reinforcements, that negotiations are in their best interests.

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION

The basic idea behind the momentum shift is simple. One way for a conflict to be ripe for resolution is when there is a shift in momentum—when the hitherto-winning combatant, Side A, suddenly experiences a series of tactical losses to Side B, which achieves a series of tactical victories. The radical change in fortunes for both sides can produce a fresh window of opportunity for an external actor to intervene. Side A realizes where the wind is blowing, and rather than risk continuing the fight and losing, seeks to take advantage of the leverage it still has. Simultaneously, Side B is emboldened by its successes and now has the dignity necessary to negotiate, while still recognizing that it needs the external actor to gain favorable terms.

There are two examples of conflicts in the twentieth century that followed the momentum shift model. The first is the Egypt-Israel conflict, lasting on-and-off from 1948 to 1979. For the first twenty-five years of this period, Israel had both a strategic and psychological advantage over their Arab neighbors. Egypt, on the other hand, was clearly weaker, as demonstrated by the catastrophe of the 1967 war. However, this changed in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Egypt performed far better than the Israelis could have imagined. This shift in momentum was, in part, what led to Sinai I, and later the Camp David Accords.

The second example is the Bosnian War. For
three years, the Serbs had a decisive advantage over the Croats and Bosniak Muslims; battlefield victories and ethnic cleansing produced both a military and psychological advantage for the former side. However, this changed in 1995 with the Srebrenica Massacre and a series of unexpected Croat and Bosniak victories. With the Croats and the Bosniaks emboldened, and the Serbs humbled by their defeats, all sides began to see the necessity of ending the conflict. Thanks to the efforts of Richard Holbrooke and his team, Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, and Slobodan Milosevic finally came to the table and signed the Dayton Accords.

An unsuccessful example of exploiting the momentum shift is the Syrian Civil War. In 2015, President Bashar al-Assad was beginning to lose ground to rebel forces. However, in the absence of serious international intervention, his fortunes shifted: Russia intervened in September that year to make the situation even worse and end the momentum shift.

A policy recommendation followed, which analyzed how to make the decision whether to wait for or manipulate the momentum shift, create an infrastructure for peace, recognize the momentum shift, and exploit it.

No theory is perfect. Every idea needs to be challenged, criticized, and questioned. The momentum shift is no exception. But it is not with a spirit of utter certainty that this theory is presented. The momentum shift seeks to constitute another chapter in the ongoing global conversation on how conflict can be mediated and resolved. Its ideas are worth exploring and may even play a small part in an attempt to bring about peace in some future conflict.

The introduction to this study already stated the obvious; this study will most likely not end any conflict. But that does not matter. In the field of politics, policy, and conflict resolution, the acts of research, of thinking critically, of proposing ideas and discussing them, are inherently valuable; they add something to humanity’s efforts to end suffering. No one idea will save the world, but many ideas, together, may. That is the underlying belief behind this paper—more important than the methodology and the case studies, than the bullet points and rote historical analysis, is the simple tenacity to believe that these efforts can add something to the age-long pursuit of peace.

Endnotes
WHEN AND HOW EXTERNAL ACTORS CAN PURSUE PEACE IN CONFLICT

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NEOLIBERALISM OR NAH? EXPLAINING RIGHT-WING PARTY SUCCESS IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

THE CASE OF ARGENTINA'S PROPUESTA REPUBLICANA (PRO)

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I. INTRODUCTION

i.1 Overview

Democracy in Latin America has been fragile throughout the region's history. After a long history of democratic starts and stops during the twentieth century, and directly following a wave of often brutally repressive authoritarian regimes, most of Latin America transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. This marked the beginning of the longest-ever stretch of democratic continuity for many countries within the region. There are many explanations for the widespread adoption of democracy across Latin America, but most have one thing in common: they reflect the important role played by conservative forces of society.¹

The right is considered instrumental in the success of democratic systems in Latin America. This is not least because it has contributed to the failure of democratic regimes in the past, often by bypassing democratic institutions in its access to power through control of wealth and the military.² The conversion of the right to democracy, while tentative at first and still incomplete in some respects, begs the question of how to build a successful political right – a political and electoral movement for societal actors who were never before able to effectively navigate the rules and structure of democracy. During the latter half of the twentieth century, the right saw popular dissatisfaction with military and neopopulist administrations as an opportunity. The challenging events “persuaded the conservative elites that a significant electoral constituency was, for the first time, available to support them if they could only attract these disenchanted masses with sensible and reasonable appeals.”³

The importance of my topic is rooted in theories of democratic stability. If democratic stability is normatively desirable, which I will assume it is, then there should be some consideration as to what makes stability possible. While a democratic regime does not need to provide comprehensive political representation for every single sector of society, there are two sectors in particular that it is necessary to include: the military and business. The military “controls the legitimate use of force,” and the business sector controls the “accumulation of economic power”.⁴ Together, they make up much of the right in politics and are the coalition with the “greatest capacity in society to bring down the government.”⁵ However, Latin American countries such as Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela have right-wing parties that remain weak and struggle to win elections. Without a legitimate and at least mildly successful conservative party, these sectors of society may become sufficiently dissatisfied with democracy as to take their marbles and go home (or, rather, resort to force as a means to power), threatening democratic stability.⁶

This thesis examines an effort to build an electorally viable political right in Argentina—drawing comparative lessons for the rest of the region. How does the right appeal to poorer voters, given many conservatives’ hostility towards economic redistribution? What role do leaders play in the political discourse? Who are conservative parties’ allies? The overall question for which this thesis seeks an answer is this: with an electorate that may be somewhat hostile to their programmatic policy positions and unpopular ancestors, what strategies can conservative parties employ to succeed electorally in Latin America?

i.2 Case and Methods

I use a case study of the Republican Proposal (PRO) in Argentina, a conservative party that won that country’s national elections in 2015, as an example of
a conservative party that achieved electoral success. Though members of the PRO party would disagree (as conservative party members in Latin America are wont to do), I classify the PRO as a conservative party or party of the right (or center-right) based on a variety of factors. These factors include the sociological makeup of the party’s electoral base in municipal, provincial, and national elections, as well as the conservative profile of many of its leaders and core members.

The definition of what constitutes a conservative party is something that has caused much debate among theorists. For simplicity’s sake, this thesis uses Gibson’s (1996) sociological definition of a right party as foundational, and the PRO tends to match this definition. That is, a conservative party is one that has a core constituency of economic elites, but one that also must include votes from other sectors of society. A conservative party could be a party that “achieved electoral success by combining the programmatic representation of wealthy elites with the clientelistic mobilization of peasants and the rural poor.”

I used several data sources, including interviews and various quantitative datasets, to conduct my analyses. I traveled to Argentina in Summer 2016 to conduct field research, seven months after Mauricio Macri, the PRO’s founder, assumed the Argentine Presidency. My primary research consists of fifty in-person, semi-structured interviews with politicians, candidates, government officials, party activists and leaders, and campaign strategists. Most of my subjects were associated with the PRO either directly or through a party that was a member of the Cambiemos electoral alliance (see Appendix A for details about interview subjects). Interviewees were asked a standard set of questions regarding electoral strategies of the PRO, as well as follow up questions specifically tailored to their roles and affiliations. Interviews were primarily conducted in Spanish. In addition, some of my analysis incorporates demographic data from the 2010 Argentine census and election results from Argentina’s 2015 national election. I use them to make some claims about the sociological makeup of electoral coalitions.

1. DEVELOPING A THEORY OF RIGHT WING SUCCESS

1.1 Obstacles to Right Wing Electoral Success in Latin America

There are significant obstacles to right wing electoral success in Latin America that are deeply rooted in the history and socioeconomic makeup of the region. These obstacles combine to make the task of attracting popular support for a right or center-right very difficult, which makes the PRO’s gains during the 2015 elections all the more impressive.

First, the electoral landscape in much of Latin America is a challenge to conservative parties. The outlook is grim for conservative parties’ ability to garner support through programmatic appeals in a region with levels of inequality higher than anywhere in the world. High inequality means that while there is a large concentration of wealth at the top of the socioeconomic spectrum, much of the population in the region lives around or below the poverty line. While a programmatic appeal from a left-wing party that emphasizes redistribution has little trouble attracting a majoritarian coalition from the populous lower sectors, Gibson (1996) notes that there is a very narrow path for a programmatic, anti-redistributionist appeal from a conservative party.

Second, the right’s association with neoliberal and pro-market policies, particularly during the later decades of the twentieth century, makes it difficult for modern right-wing parties to compete in the electoral landscape explained above. During this period, Latin America faced a need for international credit that was met by international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. However, these institutions often required countries to commit to a series of policies summarized by the Washington Consensus, which included eliminations of tariffs and privatization of social safety net programs. These neoliberal policies, while implemented by parties of all ideological stripes, were associated with parties of the right because they were consistent with the stated ideology of many right-wing parties, as well as with the leaders of those parties. This is a challenge for conservative parties because analyses of presidential elections reveal that voter preferences in the region had moved to the left during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Third, because of conservative actors’ structural constraints in mass democracy discussed earlier in this chapter, the twentieth century saw many of these actors turn to the military as a tool to circumvent the electoral system. In Argentina, for example, economic
elites did not have a political party with any hopes of competing nationally, so they turned to bouts of military authoritarianism until the dismantling of the final military dictatorship in 1983.16 Because the military option was so readily available to conservative actors in the twentieth century, they had the flexibility to move between political arenas—from democratic to authoritarian and back again. This allowed them to attempt to compete in the recurring democratic regimes and, when they failed again to win elections, to use the military to install themselves in power. This ease of movement between arenas destroyed the incentives conservatives had to create party organizations, making democratic consolidation even more difficult.17

Finally, clientelist control of votes, particularly the votes of the peasantry, is crucial to the electoral performance of many conservative parties in Latin America. Conditions for the patron-client relationships have worsened in the century since the region’s oligarchic era. Until recently, conservative parties could distribute public and private resources to the lower classes in exchange for electoral support. However, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, as the “Pink Tide” swept across Latin America, leftist governments established and broadened social programs.18 These, in combination with modernization, helped lower poverty rates and often had the intended effect of weakening clientelist ties.19

1.2 Theories of (Right Wing) Electoral Success

Given this challenging outlook for right-wing parties in Latin America, the interesting theoretical question, is that of how, given these constraints, can new right-wing parties become competitive? This section discusses five explanations for different levels of electoral success of conservative parties in Latin America. Some of these theories were developed with Latin America in mind, while others are more broadly applicable. The theories examined in this section are as follows: 1) clear and differentiated appeals, 2) authoritarian inheritance, 3) segmented appeals, 4) polyclass coalition with mass base outside of core constituency, and 5) reframing the narrative of the election. This section discusses the various theories, considers them in the context of Latin America and Argentina, and accepts or rejects them. Eventually, it combines and supplements them to form a comprehensive theory.

Noam Lupu (2016) warns parties about the potential to weaken their partisan attachments to voters if they fail to offer clearly differentiated party brands.20 He outlines the risk of party brand dilution, which is when “party brands go from strong to weak, clear to ambiguous, and differentiated to indistinguishable from those of rivals.”21 This can occur when parties change their programmatic platform too substantially (party inconsistency) such that voters aren’t sure what the party stands for. It can also occur when party platforms converge (party convergence), which makes voters skeptical that there is much difference between the parties.22 Both phenomena make it difficult for voters to form or maintain partisan attachments.23 However, in Latin America, for reasons discussed before, clearly differentiating a right party brand is practically fatal. Perhaps a clearly differentiated, programmatically consistent appeal is a strategy that parties of the left would benefit from developing, but that strategy does not work for the right.

Another theory that attempts to explain the rare cases of conservative party success in Latin America is James Loxton’s theory of authoritarian inheritance. His claim is that the only successful conservative parties in Latin America have had their roots in twentieth century authoritarian regimes.24 While this contrasts with the idea that association with authoritarian regimes should hurt the conservative movement, Loxton points to a series of elements that authoritarian inheritance lends to conservative successor parties: party brand (some regimes were successful economically or were generous patrons), territorial organization, party cohesion (having been “in the trenches” together in the fight against communism), clientelist networks, and party finance (business interests were often involved in authoritarian regimes and would be disposed to fund their successor parties). Loxton’s authoritarian inheritance theory is not satisfying, however, since the Argentine military left no loyalist infrastructure or goodwill for conservative parties to inherit. Thus, this theory of authoritarian inheritance seems to have some explanatory power but is not comprehensive.

Juan Pablo Luna (2014) developed a theory of political party strategies in unequal democracies to explain how successful political parties form cross-class and cross-geography linkages to build electoral constituencies.25 This task is particularly challenging for conservative parties in Latin America because of
the electoral landscape problems described in previous sections. In an unequal society, a party’s challenges are “combining socioeconomic and territorially segmented linking strategies, avoiding strategic contradictions between different types of appeals aimed at different social constituencies, and at the same time persisting as meaningful organizations.”

Luna’s model suggests that, in countries with high socioeconomic fragmentation, parties and candidates can use different appeals to communicate with different populations. By distributing resources (symbolic, public policies, or private or club goods) through the relevant agents (candidate or party), parties can form various types of linkages between the organization and particular groups. For example, in low income districts, a conservative party’s strategy can appeal based on clientelism, while appealing to high income districts based on a programmatic, anti-redistribution appeal.

This theory, like Loxton's, has explanatory power in only some cases. The countries that Luna uses to make his case for segmented appeals had parties that were well established and deeply institutionalized. Only in this situation, where the UDI in Chile and the Frente Amplio (FA) in Uruguay benefited from sophisticated party organization, was the party machinery able to properly target the segmented appeals. In many cases, however, newer conservative parties, like the PRO in Argentina, lack this level of reach into society.

A multiclass coalition is key to the next theory of conservative party success, which is based on the constituencies that right parties need to attract to achieve broad-based electoral success. To form the multiclass coalition that Gibson (1996) identifies as necessary, right-wing parties must therefore cut vertically across class lines. Because a successful conservative party’s votes come mostly from outside of its core constituency (the upper strata of society), it must appeal based on “other sources of collective identification.”

Deemphasizing class identity and attempting to replace it with something else – nationalism, religion, etcetera – is essential for capitalist, bourgeois parties because these parties need to make claims of ideological universality in order to attract a viable electoral coalition. Gibson cites the “prime examples” of Thatcher’s Conservative and Reagan’s Republican coalitions as conservative parties that represented the interests of the upper strata of society but still drew about half of their support from the working class. Gibson’s model of conservative party success is useful in that it precisely articulates the kind of multiclass coalition that conservatives need to win elections. However, it offers little in terms of what those “vertically slicing” lines should be. Should they be security-based? Religion-based? Something else?

A final prominent explanation of right wing electoral success in Latin America is one that emphasizes a shift from campaigns framed by the traditional right/left divide to campaigns that focus on anti-incumbent attitudes. Attilio Borón (1992) cites the rise of corruption and conservatives’ promises to increase the efficiency of government as one of the main generators of conservative support in the late 1900s. Voters, he said, became more attracted to conservatism due to their growing “pessimism about what came to be regarded as major pitfalls of capitalist democracy: governmental overload, an overinflated welfare state, and the suffocation of the creative forces of the market by the interventionist state.” Evidence for this theory is clear from across the region, including in the cases of the National Action Party (PAN) in Mexico in the 2000s, the Venezuelan right, and in Argentina in 2015, where conservatives ran on platforms of institutionalism and anti-corruption against entrenched incumbents.

Murillo and Levitsky (2015) point to the conservative success in 2015 in Argentina as an example of an anti-incumbent referendum against a government that faced the end of a commodities boom and flagging economic conditions. The PRO-led Cambiemos campaign promised to clean up government and increase efficiency. This ability to move the debate from a division between right and left, which the right has a harder time winning because of inequality, to one between change and continuity also assisted the Mexican National Action Party (PAN). Kevin Middlebrook (2001) notes that the party, in its bid for national power in the 2000 presidential election, was able to defeat the long-dominant PRI by turning the election into a referendum on the PRI’s declining governability and apparent corruption; they boasted the slogan of “Cambio ya!” (“Change Now!”). This “reframing of the narrative” is key for a conservative party in Latin America, and is it crucial to an understanding of how a right-wing party might be able to expand past the economic elite for electoral support.
1.3 New Theory of Right Wing Success

Taking into account the theories of right-wing party success discussed above, the theory presented in this thesis seeks to update the literature on parties of the right by using research about the 2015 Argentine case. Because of its methodological elegance and verifiability through historical cases, the paper accepts Gibson’s requirement that right-wing parties form electoral coalitions that expand vertically across the class spectrum to include mostly voters outside of their narrow core constituency of economic elites. 36

In order to reach voters all over the country and in all circles of society, conservative parties—particularly new ones—must either build their own party organization to turn out voters, which is costly and challenging, or partner with existing parties that already have that kind of machinery. When searching for coalition partners, the challenge for conservative parties becomes their often-toxic ideology and history, and the aversion to it on the part of many Latin Americans. Potential alliance partners need assurances that the conservative party will be palatable to enough voters without tainting the brands of the alliance partners.

Successful conservative parties may employ two strategies to allay these concerns of their potential partners. First, they can soften their programmatic appeal, thereby blurring the ideological divisions. Appealing to valence issues like security and economic growth rather than discussing questions of redistribution can also help them do this. In addition to focusing on valence issues, the parties can actively reject the labels of “conservative” or “right.” Instead, they can focus on the “newness” of the party or the efficiency it could bring to government. This strategy deemphasizes the traditional neoliberal ideology of elite conservative parties, which is typically unpopular with the large proportion of poor voters in these unequal countries. This broadens their appeal to lower sectors of society typically averse to conservative economic policy and thus makes potential partner parties more apt to join a coalition.

Conservative parties can also use personalist appeals to attract robust coalitions. While the well-established and institutionalized target allies may have the advantage in terms of boots-on-the-ground activists and physical party infrastructure, they might be lacking charismatic, strong leadership that a new “outsider” party could offer their coalition. Combined, these two strategies make alliances with conservative parties palatable. The alliance then provides conservative parties with the party machinery that Loxton says is necessary. That party machinery, in turn, allows the parties to deliver segmented appeals that Luna says are crucial. The segmented appeal helps the party form a multiclass coalition that reaches outside of the conservative party’s core constituency, as Gibson says is required if the conservative party is to have any hope of competing successfully.

My theory for right-wing success, based on field research in Argentina, incorporates components from the models of Luna, Gibson, and Loxton described in the previous section. Right parties achieve electoral success in twenty-first century Latin America by masking their conservative ideology through orthogonal, segmented, and personalist appeals to voters, and by forming strategic alliances that help change the electoral dynamic from one of right/left to one of change/stagnation. In particular, the strategic mechanisms they use to achieve this are blurred party platforms, personalist appeals, and strategic alliances.

1.4 Theory Applied to the Argentine PRO

Right-wing parties can mask their conservative ideology by blurring their party platforms through segmented and orthogonal appeals. My research corroborates the idea that segmented appeals to different socioeconomic and geographic groups are used to broaden a conservative party’s electoral coalition. In the case of the PRO in Argentina, the emphasis in lower socioeconomic status areas was on the candidate’s cercania (closeness) with the people. A concerted effort that traced back to the days of former mayor of Buenos Aires and now Argentine President Mauricio Macri’s presidency of the very popular Boca Juniors soccer club sought to establish his charismatic appeal among the lower classes. 37 Macri’s mayorship and presidential campaign were marked by timbresos (going door-to-door) in poor neighborhoods. These tactics emphasized how well connected to the common man Macri is. 38 On the other hand, the party leadership has a prominent neoliberal and business-oriented bent that appeals to the core constituency of the party: the upper strata of society. 39 This dual strategy allows the PRO to appeal to poorer voters using the candidate as the relevant agent with a symbolic resource (candidate traits) and to wealthier voters with a programmatic appeal based on how the
leaders of the party view redistribution. In terms of orthogonal appeals, the PRO, during the time that it governed the City of Buenos Aires and during the 2015 national campaign, seized on issues unrelated to the debates over redistribution or class. For example, Macri focused on transportation, security, and the environment as mayor of Buenos Aires. His presidential campaign focused on the three main goals of ending poverty, uniting Argentines, and combating drug trafficking. With these focuses and a disciplined communications strategy, the PRO and Macri largely avoided taking potentially unpopular stances on issues related to economic redistribution.

The ability of conservative parties to galvanize support from a broad coalition helps reframe elections from a debate over right versus left to one of change versus continuity, which is yet another way to avoid dividing the electorate horizontally by class. In the case of the PRO, this meant forming a strategic alliance with the Radical (UCR) and other parties. The formation of the Cambiemos alliance allowed the PRO to benefit from the Radicals’ historical national infrastructure, as well as to unite the opposition to the incumbent government. This redefined the election as a referendum on the increasingly unpopular performance of then-President Cristina Kirchner.

These strategies of blurring party platforms, using heavily personalist appeals, and forming strategic alliances contributed to the PRO’s ability to overcome the obstacles faced by Latin American conservatives. However, the very same strategies could pose a threat to the long-term viability of party building. First, while the segmented appeals that the PRO uses to attract support in and outside of its core constituency were instrumental in forming a viable electoral coalition, they also run the risk of causing brand dilution, as voters cannot be sure what exactly the party stands for. Second, Samuels and Shugart (2010) point out that presidential systems typically result in a party system in which candidates matter the most, which lessens the importance of party organization. This, combined with the PRO’s intense organization around Mauricio Macri and a relatively shallow bench, could make the PRO’s survival overly dependent on one person, without sufficient institutionalization for long-term sustainability. Finally, dependence on the UCR’s structure could prove to be unsustainable if the party isn’t able to form an organization of its own. Analysis that combines 2013 and 2015 election results and 2014 rates of party affiliation illustrate this reliance in Chapter 4. The Cambiemos alliance saw a greater increase over PRO 2013 legislative election performance in provinces where the UCR had a stronger presence, indicating a reliance by the PRO on the UCR to garner votes in areas in which it does not have a strong organization. Interviews with party strategists and candidates acknowledged this challenge but did not reveal a strategy to address it.

1.6 Historical Failure of the Argentine Right and Rise of the PRO

Argentina’s history is littered with failed attempts at conservative party formation and electoral mobilizations that ended in failure and, frequently, in non-democratic conservative seizures of power. The most recent bout of conservative authoritarianism ended with the fall of the Videla dictatorship. After the restoration of democratic rule in 1983, there was renewed hope for conservative party development and electoral competitiveness, as key conservative players began to accept democracy as the only game in town. However, the period from 1983 through the economic crisis of 2001-2002 saw multiple failed attempts at conservative party-building as regional fragmentation, ideological infighting, and continued lack of a natural majoritarian coalition persisted.

The Believe and Grow Foundation (Fundación Creer y Crecer) was created by Francisco Narváez, a Peronist entrepreneur, and it became a meeting place for political and social activists during the tumultuous 2001-2003 political and economic crisis. Running the foundation was a well-established businessman named Mauricio Macri. Macri was heir to his father’s business empire and president of the successfully reformed Boca Juniors soccer club. He saw the political chaos as an opportunity to offer his management skills to the nation.

1.6.1 Origins

The group of activists, politicians, and businessmen that met at the foundation included disaffected members from the Peronist, Radical, and other political parties. They convened and planned for a new political order without the strong bipartisan divide between the UCR and the Peronist party that had defined Argentine politics for decades. Fragmentation during this time was significant, as different groups sought to form the basis for a new major party in
establishment of the City of Buenos Aires for much would go on to form the basis of the governing. Their technical pro file and youth gave the PRO license the traditional right/le ft the Radicals were more centrist. The NGO/foundation members, or “PRO Puros” orientation of the NGO/foundation members, or “PRO orientation contained within the new party. The newly founded PRO brought together individuals from across the political and industrial spectrum, with core members and leaders falling roughly into five groups (as defined by Gabriel Vommaro in Mundo PRO): Peronists, Radicals, Right/ Former UCEDE, NGO/foundation members, and business players. The first two, the former Peronists and Radicals, saw the new party as a vehicle back to power after the PRO-Peronists were displaced from the Justicialist Party (PJ) by the Kirchner brand of Peronism and the PRO-Radicals had scrambled to regain their footing after a devastating decade for their old party. The former UCEDE members and other conservatives were hopeful that Macri’s experiment and this post-crisis moment could be the opportunity for the right to finally gain a foothold in Argentine democracy. The NGO and foundation faction was full of new-to-politics professionals interested in the technical work of government and less in the historical power struggle. The core members of the new party were members of the neoliberal think tank Grupo Sophia, which was the organization headed by Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, an important Macrista who was elected Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires in 2015. Finally, Macri’s former business associates from his days running SOCMA, his father’s company, made up the last segment of the new PRO.

Each faction of the new party would have its own priorities, but the overall heterogeneity of the PRO factions underscores the variety of ideological orientations contained within the new party. The business, right, and Peronists (right-aligned Peronists disaffected by the Kirchners’ center-left Frente Para la Victoria) were conservative in ideology, while the Radicals were more centrist. The ideological orientation of the NGO/foundation members, or “PRO Puros”, may best be described as center/right on the traditional right/left political spectrum. However, their technical profile and youth gave the PRO license to claim their “pragmatism” in governing.

This group of seemingly incompatible actors would go on to form the basis of the governing establishment of the City of Buenos Aires for much of the early twenty-first century. It would eventually lay the groundwork for a successful presidential campaign.

1.6.2 Election of the 2000s

“Macri always had a presidential vision. Then it was clear that to be Chief of Government (Mayor) of Buenos Aires was an intermediate step to be president.” - Carlos Gervasoni, August 5, 2016

Whether or not the mayoralty of Buenos Aires was simply a stepping-stone for Macri’s presidential ambitions, he made an immediate attempt to capture it in the 2003 election. After rightist Peronist Carlos Menem withdrew from the presidential runoff race against victor Nestor Kirchner in May 2003, Macri ran for mayor of the City of Buenos Aires. His campaign highlighted familiar themes from past right-wing parties like the UCEDE, such as “serious economy” and renovation of the “silly and ineffective state”. At the same time, the CPC (later the PRO) emphasized integration of the lower classes. While Macri won in the first round, he narrowly lost in the runoff against Aníbal Ibarra.

Analyses of the 2003 municipal election results conclude that Macri clearly absorbed votes from previous right-wing parties like UCEDE and Action for the Republic (AR) in addition to new votes from the fragmented establishment parties, PJ and UCR. Further, the CPC’s ability to come across as not anti-populist, enhanced by Macri’s notoriety as President of Boca Juniors, was key to attracting voters from the “low” half of the political space.

Though the young party suffered a disappointing defeat in its first foray into electoral politics, it was heartened by its relatively strong performance and continued to press forward. Mauricio Macri set his sights on the National Chamber of Deputies election in 2005, forming an alliance with Ricardo Lopez Murphy’s RECREAR (Recreate for Growth) (the partnership between the two would become PRO). The election sent Macri to the Chamber of National Deputies, but he did not enjoy his time there. He became impatient with the impotence of the chamber to challenge the executive branch (which grew stronger with each Kirchner-dominated year), and he ended up skipping many sessions. In 2006, he missed 277 out of 321 total votes in Congress.

The PRO refocused on the Buenos Aires municipal government in 2007, with another Macri...
candidacy for mayor of the city. In this election, he highlighted themes similar to those in 2003. This time, however, Macri contracted the services of Ecuadorian political consultant Jaime Durán Barba, and Durán Barba’s political marketing helped the PRO shed some of its neoliberal flavor. This included increasing the prominence of appeals based on orthogonal issues, or issues that don’t fall into the class-polarized debate over economic redistribution, such as security and the environment. Further, the PRO sought to make even deeper inroads into the popular classes through a promise to urbanize all of the slums in the city and to integrate the lower classes into city life.

The strategy worked, and the PRO experienced a resounding victory in the 2007 election, capturing sixty-one percent of the vote in the runoff against the Kirchnerist candidate. The mayoralty of the City of Buenos Aires provided Macri with a strong platform from which to challenge the national government—something he had not found in the Chamber of Deputies. Macri’s municipal government focused on the orthogonal issues like security and conducted a non-stop public relations campaign to communicate their accomplishments on city projects. The PRO government did not necessarily live up to all of the promises it made during that 2007 campaign, but it was able to capitalize on short-term gains to signal governmental efficiency. Ultimately, it was able to portray the party as capable of buen gestión (good management) directed by a good manager (Mauricio Macri).

The strategy served the PRO well and carried through to the 2011 municipal elections, in which Macri was re-elected as Chief of Government of the city. This time around, as the PRO was setting itself up to launch a presidential bid in 2015, it tried to be more inclusive of other parties with the hope of forming a broader coalition. The official colors of the PRO changed from the familiar yellow to a multicolor design, emphasizing the openness of the party. Voters rewarded Macri with a margin equal to that of 2007 over his Kirchnerist rival in the first round of the election and a three point increase in his margin during the second round (the PRO vote proportion increased from 61 percent to 64 percent).

1.6.3 Attempts at Expansion

While the PRO enjoyed dominance of the City of Buenos Aires by the early 2010s, a path to national expansion was never a guarantee for the young party. Past attempts at conservative party construction had enjoyed some success at the subnational level but were never able to scale up to the national level. Much of the challenge stemmed from the large difference between the politics of the City of Buenos Aires and those of the rest of the country. Because Buenos Aires is the capital city and home to much of the country’s financial activity, it has many more resources and a larger population, making governance better-funded, but also more complicated. The City of Buenos Aires has income and education levels higher than anywhere else in the country. The difference in resources, and allocation thereof, across provinces originally helped produce the fragmentation of the conservative movement in the nineteenth century, as discussed in an earlier section.

The provinces outside of the City of Buenos Aires are less developed and poorer, so the PRO faced the challenge of appealing to an entirely different electorate when it looked to expand past the Federal Capital. In order to appeal to the popular classes—a difficult thing to do for a center-right party—the PRO first employed the strategy of recruiting popular culture figures without political associations to run under the PRO banner. This included a broad range of people from TV personalities to soccer players, all with one thing in common: they had nothing to do with the existing political establishment.

The most prominent example of this was in the race for the Santa Fe provincial governorship in 2011, when comedian Miguel del Sel ran as the PRO’s candidate. The PRO’s campaign strategy pitched del Sel as an outsider to politics and played on his popularity as a celebrity. Del Sel finished a close second, but generated enough support to fuel a successful bid for National Deputy two years later. This early performance in Santa Fe indicated to the party that there was a demand for their outsider message. Del Sel ran for governor again and garnered a similar election performance in the 2015 first round election: del Sel captured the same proportion of votes in 2011 that the Cambiemos ticket did in 2015, which also happened to be just one point higher than Cambiemos national vote proportion. With the 2011 election in Santa Fe as proof that they could compete outside of the boundaries of Buenos Aires, the PRO planted other candidates around the country on lists for the Chamber of National Deputies, winning ten
congressional seats in the 2013 legislative elections. 84  
However, scholars still saw the PRO’s full national expansion as a possibility rather than a probability, with Vommaro and Morresi (2014) concluding that, “the walk from the CBA’s mayor’s office to the Casa Rosada (the seat of the national executive) appears to be much longer for Macri than for the former president de la Rúa.” 85 In the same volume, Vommaro and Morresi trace the progress of Macri’s new party throughout elections from 2003 to 2011. They eventually conclude that the party, while strong among wealthier voters and a few sectors that had previously been out of reach for the right, still faced challenges with lower sectors of society and “might have some difficulties in becoming a national political force.” 86

1.6.4 The 2015 National Election

It was against this backdrop that the PRO decided to compete in the 2015 national election. Macri launched his presidential campaign in March 2015 and immediately got to work promoting a platform of change, promising Argentines a new direction (though it was never exactly clear to Argentines exactly what that new direction might look like in a programmatic policy sense). 87 The PRO allied with existing political parties to immediately expand its reach into areas of the country where the party did not yet exist, as described in the following chapter.

An unpopular incumbent Peronist administration gave Macri the foothold he needed to convince enough Argentines to give an alternative a chance. In an election devoid of any significant policy differences, voters largely based their candidate preferences on assessment of the incumbent Kirchner administration’s performance. 88 A modern political communications apparatus vaguely based on United States-style campaigns (the Obama campaigns, in particular) amplified Macri’s “change” message and cobbled together a winning coalition. 89

Ultimately, the PRO was successful at all stages of the 2015 election, defeating all other alliance candidates in the primary election with 24.5 percent of the total vote (PASO), gaining a surprising level of support in the first round of general election voting with 34.2 percent, and ultimately winning the run off ballotage in November 2015 by a small margin: Cambiemos won with 51.3 percent of the vote. 90

2. APPLYING THE THEORY: THE STRATEGIES OF

THE PRO IN ARGENTINA

The previous chapters have explained the historical and theoretical barriers to conservative party success in Latin America, as well as the Argentine Right’s specific experience. This chapter applies my theory of right-wing party success to the case of the PRO in Argentina, demonstrating that, through blurred party platforms, personalist appeals, and strategic alliances, the PRO was able to construct a successful electoral coalition in 2015. This chapter analyzes the main strategies employed by the party and Cambiemos and its electoral alliance during the 2015 national election campaign. Crucially, these strategies depended on each other to be successful. The campaign’s emphasis on the personalist appeal of Mauricio Macri allowed it to deemphasize its partisanship and the traditional right/left political divide, which otherwise would have limited its reach. The dilution of the “right”-ness of the party and the strength of its leader made possible the formation of a strategic alliance with other parties. These partnerships provided the territorial and institutional infrastructure that was necessary for the PRO’s national electoral expansion.

First, I’ll explain how the PRO attempted to mask its conservative ideology by choosing to emphasize social and political divides other than the right/left one. Next, I will discuss the centrality to the Cambiemos effort of the figure of Mauricio Macri. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I will demonstrate how these two strategies provided space and flexibility for the PRO to pursue its main electoral strategy of forming a strategic alliance between itself and other parties, including the Coalición Cívica (CC) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR).

2.1 Party Platform Blurring

As explained earlier, this thesis takes a sociological approach to defining the PRO as a conservative party based on the location of its core constituency on the upper end of the socioeconomic spectrum. 91 However, Argentine politicos have their own reasons for calling the party a center-right or right party. A strategist from the UCR described Macri and his party as the “washed-face Right.” He argued that while most members from Macri’s inner circle come from the wealthy elite and have liberal economic philosophies, admitting their neoliberal orientation would be political suicide in Argentina because “left is good and right is wrong.” 92 A Radical elected official
from an anti-PRO provincial coalition described why the PRO is center-right, despite its avoidance of the terminology:

"Those who refute ideology in general terms show it in their actions. And the actions of the PRO, I say, the increase in tarifas (utility rates), this clearly...labels their ideology."^93

Given the history of the Argentine Right, the PRO's hesitation to accept the label of “conservative” or “right” makes sense. Because of the right's past association with military dictatorship and neoliberalism, the classic left/right political spectrum is something to be obscured, a challenge to overcome.^94 Opponents used the label of right or neoliberal to describe the PRO and Macri during the campaign. The incumbent party's campaign launched attacks claiming that Macri would end social plans that many in the country rely on for their livelihood. In response, Macri promised that the social plans are “not a gift,” and that his administration would not defund them.^95

Both the party's origins and actions belie the PRO's claims of non- or post-partisanship. Macri's inner circle is full of big business leaders from his days in the private sector and at Boca Juniors, and his cabinet amounts to a who's who of large corporate interests in the country, replacing his predecessor's cabinet amounts to a who's who of large corporate leaders from his Peronist ties, Massa represented a moderate change, while Macri's outsider status allowed him to more effectively claim the change mantle.\(^{100}\) Another narrative key to the Cambiemos strategy was a crusade against corrupt government and a promise of buen gestión, or good management. This strategy manifested itself in a two-pronged appeal. First, Macri promised a respect of republican institutions and the rule of law, a clear contrast with the public perception of the Kirchner government as less-than-respectful of the constitutional constraints of the executive branch. Second, in addition to claiming respect for republican institutions, Macri's coalition promised to be a change to honest leadership and, in contrast to the current president, "to not steal, to not lie, and to not use the poor."^101

Next in the series of tactics to obscure the right/left class division was one framing the election in terms of populism versus anti-populism. One senior party official in the PRO said, “It's true that we don't stress the left/right cleavage, as it's not that important… in Argentina the thing is that in the last 10 or 12 years, the populism/non-populism axis was more important."^102 Drawing contrast between himself and his predecessor, the newly-elected President Macri claimed that Argentina was leaving behind “years of populism,” which included protectionism and prevented Argentina's integration with the world.
economy.103 Related to this point about leaving populism in the past was the PRO’s insistence on a “new” politics, contrasting its style and substance with the politics of the past. The PRO had:

“…a twenty-first century candidate, with twenty first century tools, talking to a twenty-first century electorate. The PRO came to interpret a very strong social cleavage that hadn’t existed in Argentina in the last one hundred years. Which was time. Argentina has old institutions, old leaders, and old parties. With traditions that had very little to do with: how does society advance?”104

Finally, the PRO was able to take advantage of sectoral identities, as Cristina Kirchner’s battle with agricultural exporters raged on. Theorists suggest that one way to “re-slice” society on axes that are not exclusively class-based is to appeal directly to people in specific sectors of the economy.105 For example, Macri capitalized on the incumbent’s antagonism towards the agricultural sector. He garnered the support of that sector, which was a powerful tactic in many parts of the interior of the country, including parts of the Province of Buenos Aires and Córdoba, Santa Fe, Mendoza, La Pampa, and Entre Ríos.106 In each of these provinces during the first round election, the Cambiemos alliance garnered a proportion of the vote that was higher than the average vote share by province nationally.107

All of these efforts to make appeals based on voter characteristics other than class succeeded in allowing the formation of a multiclass coalition that Gibson suggests is necessary for a successful conservative party effort. Slicing the electorate vertically on issues like corruption and security, rather than horizontally on class, was important.108

2.1.2 Valence Issues

Another way in which the PRO attempted to transcend the right/left divide was through an intense focus on issues that were not easily distributed on the traditional ideological spectrum. Valence issues are issues on which public opinion is largely united, “linking parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate.”109 The emphasized valence issues included a message about what the party had accomplished in the City of Buenos Aires during its control of the government there – with a valence issue of governability emphasized—and the generally broad focal themes, or ejes, of the campaign, which included an intense focus on security.

The PRO considered its accomplishments in the City of Buenos Aires, discussed in Chapter Two, as some of its strongest assets in a national campaign. The PRO’s management of the city, as well as its successful communication of said management, allowed it to appeal to voters outside of the Federal District by pointing to its successes and promising the party could bring the same level of governability to the nation.110 In fact, that was part of the motivation behind the PRO’s early decision to concentrate itself there: “we chose the City of Buenos Aires because it was one of the places in which we considered that we could change things.”111 The successes that the PRO pointed to were in issue areas that avoided right/left ideological divides as well: environment, good government, and security.112 Macri’s success in eschewing his previous image as a right-wing, neoliberal businessman was due, in large part, to his choice to surround himself with “technocrats, rather than ideologues” in his municipal administration and in the years leading up to his 2015 presidential run.113

Among my interviewees, there were a variety of opinions on some subjects, but all of them delivered the same answer about the focal themes of the campaign. The message discipline behind three themes and three axes (ejes) was clear. The unifying concepts of the communications strategy for the Cambiemos campaign were designed to be ideologically ambiguous and generally difficult to disagree with. The three themes of “positivity, closeness, and future” were filters through which all campaign communication ran, including television advertisement, digital media, and speeches by Cambiemos candidate around the country.114 Speaking with people from all levels of the coalition, from the national communications director to a local PRO city council candidate, these themes were recited, almost verbatim, by every single one.

Further, the campaign focused heavily on three ejes of “Zero Poverty, Uniting Argentines, and Ending Drug Trafficking”. An elite/conservative party that focuses its campaign on a promise to fight poverty attempts, blurring the expectation of what defines a conservative party. The concept of uniting Argentines is non-controversial, and a security appeal against drug trafficking makes the case that a new type of leadership is required to end the violence that predominately affects lower-income areas.
2.2 Personalist Appeal

“We’re going to make you candidate for congress or whatever, but you’re going to work for Mauricio Macri for president. That has to be your main goal. If you don’t see that, it’s going to be a problem.”

- PRO operative, describing relations with local candidates

Another part of the reframing of the election from a traditional left/right debate was an intense focus on the figure of Mauricio Macri as the leader of the PRO party. The heavily personalist nature of the PRO party and the 2015 Cambiemos campaign afforded the campaign the flexibility to emphasize Macri’s personal traits and highlight a contrast with the figure of the incumbent. This strategy played on the strength of Macri’s name since his presidency of the popular Boca Juniors soccer club. It helped convince parties that eventually joined the Cambiemos alliance that Macri’s leadership was a necessary component of any effective opposition to Kirchnerismo.

The PRO has “a tendency towards centralization,” and that centralization is predicated specifically on the figure of Mauricio Macri, the founder and leader of the party since its birth. Centralization around Macri is very strictly enforced, with local candidates and party affiliates expected to conduct themselves in a way that emphasized the central figure if they wanted to use the PRO brand. Whenever the figure of Mauricio Macri was used in a local campaign, for example, “the photographic production and the messages were very aligned.”

This adherence to a Macri-centric campaign gave more control to the leadership of the party, as the figure of Macri was something that they could develop as they saw fit.

The first phase of the national campaign was designed to introduce Macri to the national electorate. In order to shed the image some voters had of Macri as a wealthy, out-of-touch businessman, the paramount goal of the presentation of Mauricio Macri in the 2015 campaign was to convey an image of “closeness” and relatability. The centerpiece of this first phase of the campaign was the Mano a Mano strategy, which consisted of the visits that Macri made to the homes of voters around the country. Each week, the party sent out advertisements on social media and via its email list asking voters to invite the candidate to their homes. Macri then went to one of the homes to “take a mate” or have a coffee and chat with the voter. In the homes, he discussed voters’ stories and challenges, with a camera rolling, of course. The campaign then used the footage and personal stories to present the candidate in a more personable way for mass communication. All with the intention of breaching the border into the “low” space of Argentine politics, the effort to humanize Macri was strong, as the campaign put his family on full display and highlighted his experience with the Boca Juniors soccer club.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the use of personalist politics also extended to the PRO’s efforts to expand into the interior of the country before the 2015 election, with a primary strategy of the party being the recruitment of candidates, who had popularity separate from politics, for state and federal office. With examples including soccer players and TV personalities, the motivation behind this kind of candidate recruitment was to find ones with their own base of popularity within classes that would not have a natural affinity for a center-right party.

2.3 Strategic Alliance

The two strategies already covered in this chapter combined to transform a conservative party that faced obstacles of negative associations and unpopular ideology into a modern, lean party with an effective communications infrastructure and a charismatic leader. The final major component of the PRO’s strategy for national expansion, made possible by the blurring of its rightist profile and the personalist appeal of Mauricio Macri, was the decision to create an electoral alliance with other parties to compete in the 2015 national election. This section focuses mostly on the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and, to a lesser extent, the Civic Coalition (CC), but the alliance included many other smaller parties as well.

2.3.1 What Was the PRO Missing?

Approaching the 2015 election, it was clear that the PRO was lacking something very important for competing in a national election: a party structure throughout the country. In this case, a party structure meant the human, material, and logistical resources that a party employs to mobilize voters. A young party like the PRO could not expect to immediately have a party structure throughout the country, as the only parties in Argentina with the history and resources to have that are the Justicialist Party (PJ) and the UCR. With their large party infrastructures, they can keep...
track of voters in neighborhoods and provide them with incentives and enforcement to ensure that their votes are cast.

Party structure is also crucial for another reason. In Argentina, it is essential for a party to have a presence in the entire country during a national election in order to protect the votes in every province, as the threat of stolen ballots and stuffed ballot boxes is very real. The concept of fiscalización is essential to national electoral competition in the country: having members of your party at each mesas (precinct) to protect your voters. In provinces dominated by the UCR, a majority, if not all, of the fiscales for Cambiemos hailed from the UCR, with PRO party members filling in the gaps in areas where the Radical party was less prominent.

In the case of the PRO, while it could recruit some volunteer fiscales in time for the election, because of the party’s youth and lack of expanse past the urban centers, it needed the help of the UCR to gain the requisite coverage.

2.3.2 Why the Radicals?

While actively starting to build its own volunteer organization outside of the Federal Capital, the PRO also went in search of a coalition partner that could provide the support that it needed. It found the UCR. A party that had existed for more than 100 years, the UCR possessed the institutional support and historical legitimacy that the PRO lacked. Additionally, the UCR had the party infrastructure that allowed the PRO to strengthen its foothold in the provinces outside of Argentina’s urban centers. This partnership allowed the newly formed Cambiemos alliance (the combination of the PRO, UCR, and other parties) to implement an effective division of labor. The UCR took over the responsibility of mobilizing its voters in the provinces in which it was strong, while the PRO focused on organization building and campaigning in areas where it either a) already had a presence, b) could ally with a local conservative party, or c) could build its own organization.

For example, the province of Mendoza is a populous, Radical-dominated state in Argentina. Because of its large population, waging a competitive campaign in Mendoza is crucial to any national electoral effort. Due to the strong Radical presence in the province, however, the PRO did not need to focus much attention or many resources there, as it could count on the Radical party machine to turn out the votes that it needed. Many refer to the alliance between the PRO and the UCR as a “renting” of the Radicals’ structure at a cheap price: “you can buy them…you put them in charge of the photocopy of the university and they are happy with that.”

The UCR presence in the provinces also answered the simple need of having candidates competing for the Cambiemos ticket everywhere in the country. The Radical party provided many of the alliance’s candidates, and established a voice for the alliance at all levels of government, as the party controlled many municipal governments, including significant provincial capital cities. Additionally, Radical candidates and incumbents filled the legislative lists for Cambiemos, as the UCR was and is the party with the second largest presence in both houses of the National Congress.

The alliance was also necessary in terms of simple electoral math. At its peak, the incumbent government, that of Cristina Kirchner’s Frente Para la Victoria (FPV), only garnered a 54 percent majority in the 2011 presidential election. However, because of the intensely fractured opposition to oficialismo (the incumbent) in that year, the runner up only won 17 percent of the vote. This underscored both the challenge of cohesion faced by the opposition to the government and the weakness of the FPV: its electoral “ceiling” appeared to be about 54 percent, and that was in times of economic plenty.

The commodity boom came to an end, and the economic picture was less optimistic. With a term-limited Cristina Kirchner, a unified opposition in 2015 had a good chance of competing successfully. While weakened by the crisis of 2001–2002, the Radical party still represented the most significant piece of any conceivable opposition to the Kirchners.

2.3.3 Why Join? What Was in it for the Radicals?

“Macri did not have a national party. He rented us, let’s say. We were very happy to be rented this way because it allowed us not to disappear.” - UCR operative

The Radical party, after 15 years of embarrassing defeats in national elections since the 2001–2003 economic and political crisis, saw 2015 as a chance to reassert itself on the national stage. This chance at renewed relevance dominated the Radical party’s
deliberations in March 2015, when the party convention voted to join the PRO in the Cambiemos alliance. Ernesto Sanz, the leader of the UCR and the party’s presidential candidate in the primary election, said in a speech at the convention in Gualeguaychú: “If we don’t do what we need to do today (join the alliance with PRO), it’s probable that, come Monday, we will be irrelevant.” The convention eventually voted to join the coalition with a vote of 186 in favor versus 130 opposed.135

The Radicals understood that the political moment in 2015, after years of single party rule, was ripe for a campaign advocating change of government. However, they could not be the leader of that change because of the perception of Radicalism held by many Argentines; the UCR had been around since the early twentieth century and represented the established order, while society wanted a more dramatically new direction.137 Even the faction of the UCR that initially held fierce opposition to the alliance with the PRO because of the PRO’s conservative roots eventually joined the Cambiemos effort, viewing the PRO as a necessary evil in the fight against the Kirchner government.138

The combination of the three major parties of the Cambiemos coalition—the PRO, the Radical Civic Union, and the anti-corruption Civic Coalition (CC)—provided the alliance with three separate “legitimacies.” Had any of these “legitimacies” been absent, the alliance may not have been successful. The UCR provided the territoriality and infrastructure for waging a national campaign, the CC provided the stamp of anti-corruption and honest government, and Macri and his PRO provided strong leadership and personalist appeal.139 These three elements collectively allowed for success.

3. EVALUATING THE ELECTORAL IMPACT OF CAMBIEMOS

This section combines data from the 2010 national census, election results, and survey data to offer insights into the electoral performance of the Cambiemos alliance in the first round of the 2015 presidential election. It demonstrates the success that Cambiemos achieved through their electoral strategies described in the previous chapter. This chapter: (1) examines the vote delivery capabilities of the alliance with the UCR, (2) explains the geographic breadth of Cambiemos’ performance across the country, (3) extends Gabriel Vommaro’s 2014 analysis of the growth of the PRO in the City of Buenos Aires and revises his conclusions about the PRO’s prospects as a national electoral force, (4) illustrates the socioeconomic makeup of the Cambiemos electorate and engages with Gibson’s (1996) prescription for conservative parties of a polyclass construction, and (5) presents survey research that describes the ideological concerns of the alliance’s voters.

3.1 Vote Delivery

This section discusses the vote gain that the PRO achieved from its alliance with the UCR. An underlying assumption of this analysis is that the support levels achieved by the PRO and the UCR in the 2013 legislative elections can be understood as a baseline level of support for the two parties, and that an alliance between the two should produce a level of support equal to (or, more likely, greater than) the sum of their 2013 vote shares. For example, if a province saw a PRO performance of 13 percent and UCR performance of 24 percent in the 2013 elections, an alliance between these two parties should produce at least a 37 percent performance in the 2015 election. Further, to better understand the UCR’s role in lending support to the coalition, I develop a measure of party organizational strength. This measure is the number of party affiliates in a given province compared to the total population of the province. That data is compiled and housed by the national electoral board.140 The original data referenced in this section is provided in Appendix B and Table 3.1.

As I discuss the potential vote delivery gained from the structural advantages of the UCR, I omit the role played by other alliance members. Under this set of assumptions, I contend that a baseline expectation of the 2015 Cambiemos first round vote share should be equal to (or slightly above, given the growth of the PRO) the sum of the 2013 PRO and 2013 UCR popular vote shares in the 2013 legislative elections. This is because I assume that voters who supported the PRO and the UCR in 2013 have similar incentives to support the same parties in 2015, as the political dynamics in Argentina did not change significantly in the intervening two years. Put simply:

**Formula A:** 2015Cambiemos% ≥ 2013PRO% + 2013UCR% or 0 ≤ 2015Cambiemos% - (2013PRO% +
Nationally, this equation was validated, using results from first round national election:

\[
\begin{align*}
2015C - 2013P &\quad 2013UCR \\
0 &< 34.33\% - (7.65\% + 23.74\%) \\
0 &< 2.95\%
\end{align*}
\]

Provinces where the equation held true or where Cambiemos improved upon the 2013 performance of PRO and UCR combined were coded as “expected” or “over expected” vote share.\textsuperscript{141} Provincially, there is variation in how often this formula holds true (see Appendix B), but sixty-three percent (12 of 19) of the peripheral provinces had 2015 Cambiemos performances that I coded as “expected” or “over.” This helps demonstrate the vote delivery capacity of the UCR in the peripheral provinces where the PRO lacked organization. If the UCR had not provided significant vote delivery, Cambiemos’ vote share would not have increased over the PRO’s in 2013.

Assuming the UCR alliance did, in fact, contribute to the PRO’s ability to jump up in vote share from 2013 to 2015, the next metric that I looked at was the ratio of the 2013 UCR vote share to the difference between the 2015 Cambiemos performance and the 2013 PRO. This examines how significant the UCR’s contribution was to the overall increase in performance:

\textbf{Formula B:} \[
\begin{equation}
\frac{2013UCR\%}{(2015Cambiemos\% - 2013PRO\%)}
\end{equation}
\]

Nationally, this ratio is .89, suggesting that the alliance with the UCR could have contributed as much as 89 percent of the increase between PRO’s 2013 performance and Cambiemos’ 2015 first round performance. In the peripheral provinces, again there is variation, but the average ratio is 1.07, suggesting that the gains made from allying with the UCR are borne out in the election results.

To further demonstrate the vote delivery support that the UCR offered the PRO in 2015, I sought to understand the relationship between the strength of the UCR presence in a province and the increase in vote performance between the 2013 PRO legislative election results and the 2015 Cambiemos first round performance (the “UCR bump”). I use the number of UCR affiliates in a province, as a percentage of the total population, as the measure of UCR organizational strength. With a dependent variable of the increase between PRO 2013 and Cambiemos 2015 vote performance and an explanatory party strength variable of this ratio, I would expect to find a positive relationship between UCR strength and the increase in performance. This was demonstrated by the data, with a 95 percent confidence level.\textsuperscript{142} Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship.

Additionally, peripheral provinces that had large increases between PRO 2013 performance and Cambiemos 2015 performance also tended to have a large 2013 UCR vote share. Of the five peripheral provinces coded as having “large” jumps, four had “medium” or “large” UCR 2013 vote shares. Further, of the six peripheral provinces coded as having “small” jumps, five had “medium” or “small” UCR 2013 vote shares.

My investigation of the electoral results suggests that the alliance the PRO made with the UCR was critical to the success of the Cambiemos coalition in the 2015 national election. The simple presence of the UCR party in some provinces provided the basal support that Cambiemos needed to be competitive at the national level. The data shows that, often, the UCR alliance made up much of the difference between the PRO’s performance in 2013 and the alliance’s performance in 2015, indicating that the alliance with the UCR was foundational to the PRO’s expansion strategy in 2015.
3.2 Geographic Breadth

The Cambiemos electoral performance in the 2015 national election was significant because it spread beyond the confines of the capital city, a feat not achieved before by a conservative national party.

Table 3.2 shows the distribution of Cambiemos’ first round 2015 electoral performance in each of Argentina’s provinces, as both a share of the popular vote in that province and as a share of the party’s nationwide vote total. Most obvious about Cambiemos’ vote performance is that well over half of its vote came from three provinces: Córdoba, the Province of Buenos Aires, and the Federal District of Buenos Aires. These provinces delivered sixty-two percent of the party’s vote.

![Figure 3.1: Relationship between the strength of UCR party in a province and the increase in that province between 2013 PRO % and 2015 Cambiemos %](image)

**Table 3.1. Formulas A and B by Province**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>PRO 2013%</th>
<th>UCR 2013%</th>
<th>Cambiemos 2015%</th>
<th>Cambiemos 2015% - PRO 2013%</th>
<th>Formula A</th>
<th>Formula B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average by Province</td>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>119%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationally</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABA</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>200%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>113%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrientes</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>148%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaco</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>128%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chubut</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entre Ríos</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>145%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>228%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jujuy</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>314%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Pampa</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>239%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
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<td>47%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>162%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>134%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misiones</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>117%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuquén</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Negro</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salta</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-229%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>164%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Fe</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>521%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago del Estero</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucumán</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>144%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tierra del Fuego</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
nationwide votes, while their populations make up only fifty-three percent of the country’s population. This indicates that, while Cambiemos did expand its reach, its most significant strength lies in the urban centers (Buenos Aires and Córdoba are the most populous cities in Argentina). This is consistent with Gibson’s polyclass definition of a successful conservative party because, while it is necessary for conservative parties to appeal beyond the elites, their core constituency will remain the urban, wealthy upper strata of society.145

Argentina is made up of over 500 departments (called partidos in the Province of Buenos Aires), which are the subdivision below the country’s twenty-four provinces (twenty-three plus the Federal District of Buenos Aires). The average Cambiemos performance by department was 29.9 percent. As explained above, the breadth of the Cambiemos electoral coalition is best illustrated by the fact that it had at least a small voting presence everywhere in the country. Figure 4.2 demonstrates that Cambiemos won at least ten percent of the vote in almost all (ninety-four percent) of the departments in the country, at least twenty percent in seventy-four percent of departments, and at least thirty percent in half. This shows the reach of the Cambiemos campaign outside of the traditional borders of previously attempted national conservative parties.

Figure 3.2 also compares Cambiemos’ breadth across departments to that of the Frente Para la Victoria (FPV), which won the first round of the 2015 presidential election. This, again, speaks to the urban strength of Cambiemos, indicating that the party, while present in most departments with at least a nominal showing, may have some difficulties in the future challenging the FPV’s countrywide presence. In all but one (564 out of 565) department, the FPV won more than 10 percent of the vote, and in over half of the depart-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Cambiemos Votes</th>
<th>3-way Performance</th>
<th>Share of Total Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>1,142,493</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>990,826</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>441,436</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entre Ríos</td>
<td>287,704</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>66,529</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Santa Fe</td>
<td>704,358</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Pampa</td>
<td>69,725</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>3,031,168</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrientes</td>
<td>196,145</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>62,758</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>83,858</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaco</td>
<td>181,189</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuquén</td>
<td>103,395</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucumán</td>
<td>247,733</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>43,465</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misiones</td>
<td>144,900</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río Negro</td>
<td>88,620</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tierra del Fuego</td>
<td>19,943</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chubut</td>
<td>59,136</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>84,032</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salta</td>
<td>144,103</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jujuy</td>
<td>65,509</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>42,148</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago del Estero</td>
<td>81,437</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Total</td>
<td>8,382,610</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ments, they won over 40 percent of the vote. This is a result of the party’s consistent strength and decades-old territorial dominance of Argentina’s national elections. If the PRO hopes to remain a prominent national electoral force, it must maintain and enhance its presence throughout the country.

Figure 3.2: Percent of departments in which parties won at least X% of the vote (FPV was the incumbent Peronist coalition. PRO represents the Cambiemos vote)

3.3 Representative Districts

Gabriel Vommaro’s analysis of the PRO’s growth within the City of Buenos Aires used four communes (electoral districts of the City after 2008 reforms) that are different in terms of demographic makeup to understand electoral growth. He described the four districts he used as follows:

The communes we have chosen are socially and geographically divergent. Commune 2 is the most homogeneous wealthy district in the northern part of the CBA and the traditional electoral fortress of the right. Commune 13 is an upper middle-class area, traditionally identified with a non-Peronist vote and an important section of votes for progressive forces in the 1990s. Commune 5 is a typical middle-class, mostly non-Peronist area. Finally, commune 8, in the southern part of the city, includes the poorest CBA slums in which territorial and face-to-face politics play an important role in everyday residents’ sociability.

The conclusions that Vommaro drew from his analysis of national deputy results and City of Buenos Aires mayoral results from these districts since the 2003 election were that, “although PRO captured a heterogeneous electorate (through its ability to take sectors traditionally elusive for the right), it captured more electoral support in wealthier districts, and its vote was steady when local elections did not coincide with presidential campaigns, suggesting it might have some difficulties in becoming a national political force.”

Figure 3.3 replicates a figure composed by Vommaro, which showed election results for National Deputy (low house of Congress) and mayor in the City for each of the four communes described above. It adds election results from 2013 and 2015, including the presidential results in 2015. Though the City of Buenos Aires is far too different from the rest of the country to act as a proxy for understanding the national electorate, analysis of the change in the behavior of the distinct sectors that Vommaro identifies offers insight into how specific sectors might have responded to the PRO in 2015.

I make a number of observations about the data in Figure 3.3. First, in the 2013 national deputy elections, the PRO maintained or improved upon its performance in the last non-presidential election year (2011) in all four communes. This suggests the staying power of the PRO’s burgeoning polyclass coalition. Second, the 2013 and 2015 results in Commune 8 suggest a leveling off of PRO’s growth among the lowest sectors of society. There was little growth in the PRO’s performance in this district during the mayoral election and little change from 2013 to 2015 results in the National Deputy elections. This leveling off, though, is still rather impressive for a conservative party, as a roughly 40 percent “ceiling” on PRO’s performance in this sector is robust.

Third, in the case of all communes besides Commune 13, PRO performance in National Deputy elections was expected to drop dramatically in presidential election years (2007 and 2011). In 2015, however, a strong PRO ticket at the national level carried PRO to maintain or gain significantly among most sectors of society. Particularly among the upper and middle classes, there was continued growth of PRO vote share. Fourth, the PRO performed comparably or better in the 2015 presidential election compared to local elections, indicating the added strength of the national coalition. Finally, the PRO vote in all four communes remained flat in the 2015 mayoral election, suggesting a consolidation of the PRO electorate in the City. This is probably due to the fact that the PRO candidate in Buenos Aires was Macri’s right hand
man during his mayoral term and ran on a platform of continuity. This helps explain why his electorate was very similar to Macri’s.

Vommaro’s doubts about the PRO’s national electoral viability were rooted in his thought that it performed well in wealthy districts and that its vote share only remained steady when presidential elections did not coincide with local elections. However, this analysis demonstrates that, while the PRO still maintained a large advantage in wealthy districts, it was also able to obtain a steady vote share (or improve it) in 2015 when presidential and local elections coincided again. This analysis shows that the PRO was able to strengthen its heterogeneous coalition and prove its ability to endure for over a decade of elections in the City of Buenos Aires.

3.4 Sociological Analysis: Socioeconomic Status and PRO Performance

Categorization of Argentina’s departments into socioeconomic levels in the model of Gibson’s sociological analysis of the UCEDE’s growth in the 1990s is another way to help describe the makeup of the Cambiemos’ electorate. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 depict a side-by-side comparison of departments classified by SES and departments shaded by their Cambiemos vote performance. A cursory glance reveals a strong positive relationship between the socioeconomic level of an area and the electoral strength that Cambiemos realized in that area. In fact, a simple linear regression analysis between the Cambiemos vote performance in a department and the socioeconomic score of that department finds a strong correlation.

Figures 3.6 and 3.9 help illustrate this point more precisely, by depicting the average performance by department of the three main choices in the first-
round election. A few conclusions can be drawn from these figures. First, both leading parties captured a voting coalition with socioeconomic bases expected of a left populist party and a conservative party. This result confirms the locations of their voter bases. Second, as displayed in 3.2, Cambiemos was able to win at least ten percent in most (94 percent) departments, regardless of socioeconomic level. Figure 3.9 also identifies the urban nature of Cambiemos’ votes, as the red markers indicate that the alliance performed better in departments in the central provinces of City of Buenos Aires, Province of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba, and Mendoza. Data on the socioeconomic makeup of Cambiemos’ territorial success in the 2015 election is depicted in Figure 3.7 and 3.8. Figure 3.7 shows that, of the over eight million votes received by the Cambiemos national ticket, fifty-three percent of them came from departments classified as either “upper” or “upper middle” in terms of socioeconomic status. Additionally, only one percent of them came from lower-income departments. Comparing this to the socioeconomic makeup of the departments that delivered FPV’s first round vote, we see that only thirty-one percent of FPV votes came from those upper-middle and upper-sector departments, whereas many more came from the middle, middle-lower, and lower classifications. While this confirms that Cambiemos was the strongest among the upper sectors of society, it also reveals that the Cambiemos accomplished some cross-class appeal, as almost half (forty-seven percent) of its votes came from departments not classified as having an upper-middle or upper socioeconomic status.

Noam Lupu’s 2015 Argentine Panel Election Study survey provides another perspective from which to analyze the expansion of the PRO past the
traditional borders of right partisan performance. The survey questions that are most relevant to this research contribute to knowledge about the socioeconomic status, ideological orientation, and past voting behavior of 2015 Cambiemos voters.

Figure 3.10 depicts the responses to the household income question cross-tabbed by first round presidential vote. As expected, the majority of all three major party votes came from the lower sectors of society. This is necessary due to the socioeconomic makeup of the country as a whole. This further confirms that Cambiemos inevitably attracted a polyclass coalition in the 2015 election. The FPV candidate, Scioli, attracted a slightly higher proportion of lower class votes, but that is to be expected with a more populist, Peronist ticket.

Figure 3.10: Responses to the question: “In which of the following ranges falls the family monthly income of this household, including the income of all adults and children who work or receive retirement, pensions, or social programs?” (See footnote 216)

![Income Distribution](image)

Additionally, the survey revealed that almost a third (28 percent) of Macri voters reported having voted for Cristina Kirchner in 2011, which indicates, again, that the PRO’s appeal must have been somewhat inclusive of the demands of a range of sectors of society.

II. CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored the strategies employed by the PRO to expand past its original base of the City of Buenos Aires and capture a significant share of the national vote in the 2015 national election. First, it outlined the theoretical and practical challenges that parties of the right face in the region, identifying as paramount the issue of vast inequality. Second, it examined Argentine conservative history to demonstrate the uniqueness of the PRO’s ability to achieve its level of success in the Argentine democratic context. Third, it used interview research to explain the major strategies the PRO employed to achieve that level of success. Fourth, it measured the party’s success, thanks to these strategies, in terms of vote-mobilization and geographical reach.

ii.1 Findings and Contributions

Through my research, I found that the PRO employed a strategy that emphasized the personalistic appeal of its leader, Mauricio Macri. This enhanced the party’s ability to dilute its programmatic position, obscuring the right/left divide, and allowed it to

![Ideological Placement](image)
reach beyond the economic elite. This programmatic ambiguity and stylistic contrast with the incumbent government attracted alliances with other, preexisting parties that could deliver the territorial and institutional infrastructures necessary for the PRO's expansive electoral success.

However, my research suggests that these electoral strategies may be counterproductive to efforts to build a sustainable conservative party. The blurring of programmatic appeals could dilute the party brand, weakening partisan attachments. Further, heavily personalistic appeals and an overreliance on other parties for party infrastructure and vote delivery could undermine the PRO's incentives and ability to form its own structure to safeguard its political viability.

ii.2 Generalizability

Lessons drawn from the case of the PRO can be applied to other cases in the region. Strategies of redefining elections as choices between personalities or as competitions between change and continuity are prominent in successful Latin American right-wing parties. Vicente Fox's National Action Party (PAN) in the 2000 Mexican election, with its slogan of “Cambio ya!” (“Change now!”), is an example of this type of approach. Instead of campaigning as a party of the right, “the forceful and charismatic Fox succeeded in defining the presidential election as a referendum on the long reigning PRI” and was able to receive “strong backing from across the socioeconomic, regional, and religious spectrums.” However, in contrast with the Argentine PRO, the PAN had been an institutionalized party before Fox's campaign, lessening the risks of deinstitutionalization that are sometimes associated with personality-centric and brand-diluting campaigns. PRO could be more vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of these strategies due to the party's lack of history and structure.

Cases from the region hold more lessons from the PRO. In particular, a case that was similar to the PRO was that of novelist Mario Vargas Llosa's Liberty Movement (ML) in the election of 1990. Vargas Llosa's approach and appeal was strikingly similar to Macri's. They both attracted the support of intellectuals and technocrats, ran media-heavy campaigns, and allied with larger, more established parties; Vargas Llosa's ML led the Democratic Front (FREDEMO) during the election. The main difference between the two, however, was Vargas Llosa's ideological purity and public embrace of neoliberalism. However, unlike FREDEMO, attempts to blur its programmatic platform to broaden its appeal. Again, in this Peruvian example, we observe the double-edged nature of the strategies: the PRO's rejection of the neoliberal label to appeal broadly may also risk diluting its party brand.

We also see the effects of party brand dilution in the center-left case of the Alianza in early 2000s in Argentina. In that case, the governing FREPASO and UCR coalition campaigned on an anti-neoliberal platform but, once in office, pursued austerity measures that attacked the very education and health programs that their Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education proposed to bolster. The result was a decimated FREPASO and a devastated UCR that saw mass exodus, as its “party brand had become so meaningless and so indistinguishable...that politicians now preferred to form their own parties.” FREPASO disappeared after the election more quickly than it had risen.

The parallels between the FREPASO experience and that of the PRO are striking, not only because of the risk of brand dilution. FREPASO was also a new party with a desire to bring to an end over a decade of Peronist party political domination. To do this, it too allied with the UCR, which granted it the organizational infrastructure it needed to win the election. However, it also arguably began the deterioration of the party itself. The PRO's experience could shadow that of FREPASO.

ii.3 Limitations

There are some limitations to this research, a few of which I will discuss briefly here. The most important limitation is the timeline of my thesis and the election. With the election having occurred so recently, there is a concern that any conclusions could be premature. Two years is eons in political news cycles, but a fairly small amount of time in terms of institution-building and political economy.

Second, the sample size of my interviews was limited. I was fortunate to have access to many interesting interviewees, but they were heavily skewed towards the category of PRO strategist. I was able, then, to reach saturation on the PRO perspective, but the members of the UCR and CC who I interviewed had outsized influence on my analysis of those parties' points of view. Further, my snowball approach to interview subject recruitment could skew the data,
though I pursued as many original “nodes” of different snowball processes as possible to mitigate this concern.

ii.4 Moving Forward
Because this paper was written with the 2015 election in the recent past, there are many opportunities for future research on this case that could confirm or refine some of the claims in this thesis. The health and future of the Cambiemos coalition will become clearer over the next few years. The divisions between the parties within the coalition could fade, producing one party, as suggested by a high-level PRO politician. In this case, will this new party represent the center-right? The center-left? The center? And what if the divisions are too deep and the alliance fractures? Can the PRO survive on its own in the national political arena?

The 2017 legislative and 2019 presidential elections will be key moments to assess whether 2015 was a unique political moment or if there is a sustained level of support for the party. Finally, municipal elections in 2016 can provide some indication of whether the PRO might be able to grow its organization and party structure in the future. Winning a presidential election is an impressive feat, but perhaps a more effective measure of a party’s strength within a society is through its presence at the lowest levels of government.

The task of party building that the PRO must undertake is difficult. Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyke (2016) argue that conditions are most conducive to party building in times of conflict and that, perhaps counter-intuitively, democracy is not ideal for forming lasting partisan organizations. They attribute this to the forces that strengthen organizational cohesion during crises. Thus, the PRO is beginning on difficult terrain. Herein lies a paradox in Argentina and around the region: both need a strong political right to bolster a full and stable democracy. Yet, characteristics of democratic competition in Latin America make party building difficult, particularly for parties of the right.

Overall, this thesis is about the health of democracy and what produces it. If one accepts the normative desirability of democratic stability, then one has an interest in the existence of a reasonably successful political right. The PRO offers an example of a right political party that has achieved at least some success and may inform other projects in the region. This could bolster the position of conservatives in democratic society, thereby deepening democracy throughout the region. What the future holds for the PRO and the Latin American Right remains an open question, but it is one that is worth asking.

AFTERWORD

Election 2017: We’re all macristas now?

The conclusion of the 2016 paper briefly evaluated the prospects of PRO/Cambiemos’ ability to sustain itself as an electoral force in Argentine politics. Specifically, it identifies the 2017 legislative midterm elections as a potential evaluation point. The results of the election bode well for the young PRO party, as its coalition was the top vote-getter nation wide, improving on its performance in the open primaries in August 2017, as well as on its vote share in the first round of the 2015 general election. During the two years between 2015 and 2017, Cambiemos benefited from its ability to both govern in an unstable political environment and to build a formidable campaign machine, as well as from a fractured opposition still reeling from defeat in 2017. This afterword briefly discusses the 2017 election in the context of the main paper’s arguments, evaluating the electoral strategies of the coalition, and describes how the results of the election set the stage for the next phase of the Macri administration.

Personalism was a main component of the PRO and Cambiemos strategy in the 2015 campaign, which used the development of a strong unifying Mauricio Macri figure to craft a national coalition. The carefully constructed (particularly during his mayoral administration of the Capital city) figure of Macri outshone the leaders of the other coalition parties, helping to convince the parties that they should ally with the PRO to compete in Argentina’s personality-driven politics. 2017 saw the continuation of this strategy. Though President Mauricio Macri was not on the ballot in 2017, he continued to be the face of the national campaign. In addition to creating nationwide coattails for provincial candidates nationwide (Macri has been able to maintain his popular support since taking office), this strategy highlighted the intense fragmentation of the opposition. Using Macri as a centerpiece of the campaign helped Cambiemos make the case that it is the only political force present
The three major parties of the coalition were Corrientes, La Rioja, and Mendoza was the UCR.

the candidates in former Peronist strongholds like surprising victories for three major coalition parties.

three spots of their legislative list included each of the Cambiemos as PRO, Radical, and CC candidates all ran under the /right) divide allowed the tightening of ties within (left) coalition.

“governing for the rich,” an argument they also made was unsuccessful in its attempt to paint the Macri as specifier’s triumph.

Moving forward, Cambiemos will look to improve on the gains won in 2017 with a slightly different political calculus. One columnist sees two possible interpretations for the results of 2017. On one hand, they could see the legislative election results as confirmation of their moderate process of liberalization of the economy and continue to limit, for the most part, their reforms of opening up the country to outside investment. On the other hand, many conservatives think that the pace of reform is too slow to substantially improve the economy by the 2019 election. The initial reforms shrank the economy by 40%, and this group views the 2017 results as the electorate giving Macri the benefit of the doubt and a chance to adjust, a generosity they don’t expect after four years of rule. 2019 will be a referendum on the Macri presidency, and good economic results are a must-have.

The personalism and blurring of programmatic (left/right) divide allowed the tightening of ties within the Cambiemos coalition. The two years between 2015 and 2017 saw a political consolidation of the alliance, as PRO, Radical, and CC candidates all ran under the Cambiemos colors. In Santa Fe, for example, the top three spots of their legislative list included each of the three major coalition parties. In some of the most surprising victories for Cambiemos, the party fielded the candidates in former Peronist strongholds like Corrientes, La Rioja, and Mendoza was the UCR. The three major parties of the coalition reaffirmed their commitment to the alliance in January 2017, and the result was a highly coordinated effort throughout the election year.

As a consequence of Cambiemos’ efforts to mimic the 2015 election, they enjoyed resounding electoral success. They claimed victory in the five most populous provinces in the country, as well as in others that had not voted against the Peronists in years. Political scientist Carlos Gervasoni identifies the most important numbers from the election results:

“PRO’s approximately forty-one percent of the votes for national deputies in the whole country surpassed by five percent the sum of the PJ, Citizen Unity, and the rest with the Peronist name (Kirchnerist and non-Kirchnerist) in the all of the provinces. This forty-one percent represents, further, a notable increase with respect to Mauricio Macri’s thirty-four percent in October 2015, and a significant jump with respect to the thirty-seven percent in the PASO (primaries) of August. They have obtained twelve of twenty-four senators in play, another results that indicates the magnitude of the officialist triumph.”

The good news for Macri is that his coalition in Congress is larger that it was before the election and the opposition might be more willing to cooperate with rather than confront them after their big losses. The bad news is that his party is still a minority, and he will still need support from others to enact his agenda. The 2019 national election is the next test of Cambiemos’ political staying power, and it will be heavily influenced by three factors. First, it must
continue to successfully employ personalism and platform-blurring strategies to hold the electoral alliance together. This will be difficult, especially if the macristas, who want deeper reforms, win out. Second, the Macri government needs to have something to show for its painful reforms; economic reforms with all of the pain and none of the results is a hard sell after four years in government. Finally, it remains to be seen how the Peronists will react to their losses in 2017 and whether they can be an effective opposing party. Many potential leaders for the Peronists lost unexpectedly in 2017, and it is not clear whether there will emerge a strong enough figure to unite the opposition to Macri. The elephant in the room is Cristina Kirchner; she will be in the Senate and has called herself the leader of the opposition, but some believe that the opposition needs a new face.

The PRO is an example of the new right in Latin America, a movement that is still in its infancy. Studying its rise, successes, and failures is instructive for study of the health of democracy in the region, as conservatives find that they can wield political power through democratic means.

APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW SUBJECT SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operative</td>
<td>Republican Proposal (PRO)</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radical Civic Union (UCR)</td>
<td>Cordoba</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate/Elected</td>
<td>Misc/None</td>
<td>Rosario</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Justicialist Party (PJ)</td>
<td>La Plata</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Professional</td>
<td>Civic Coalition (CC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I used a snowball interview recruitment technique with three different entry points. First, an Argentine student at the Harvard Kennedy School connected me to a friend who is a high-level operative in the PRO. This individual connected me with many PRO-affiliated interviewees. Second, a family friend who had done business in Argentina connected me with several Radical Party and Civic Coalition party officials who put me in touch with other non-PRO affiliated individuals. Finally, academic connections at my university allowed me to interview a few professors at Argentine universities.

Most interviews were conducted and transcribed in Spanish, with key passages translated by the author.

A full table of interviews is available after Appendix C, with names listed for public figures.

APPENDIX B. UCR VOTE DELIVERY

B.1: Regression cited in Chapter 4 based on data in this table regarding UCR presence in the province and the difference between Cambiemos 2015 % and PRO 2013%:
### B.2: Provincial UCR Support Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Jump from PRO 2013 to Cambiemos 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UCR Affiliate % of Province Population</strong></td>
<td>1.799** (0.743)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.124** (0.046)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Observations** | 24 |
| **R²** | 0.210 |
| **Adjusted R²** | 0.174 |
| **Residual Std. Error** | 0.088 (df = 22) |
| **F Statistic** | 5.855** (df = 1; 22) |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

### B.3. Provincial Party Performance Coding

The coding of the performance of different parties in the provinces are based on the below table. The codes were binned into equal sizes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Cambiemos 2015 % minus 2013 PRO % (2013 UCR %)</th>
<th>Jump size</th>
<th>% UCR/jump</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>0.21 [over] 0.12 [low]</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABA</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>-0.16 [under] 0.32 [medium]</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>0.16 [over] 0.23 [medium]</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>-0.12 [under] 0.48 [high]</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Fe</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>-0.34 [under] 0.42 [high]</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>-0.05 [expected] 0.31 [medium]</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaco</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.28 [large]</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chubut</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.21 [medium]</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrientes</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.32 [large]</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entre Ríos</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.14 [small]</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.16 [small]</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jujuy</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.13 [small]</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Pampa</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.14 [small]</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.29 [large]</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misiones</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.23 [medium]</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuquén</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.28 [large]</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río Negro</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.22 [medium]</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salta</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.21 [medium]</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>-0.02 [small]</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.31 [large]</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.26 [medium]</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago del Estero</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.15 [small]</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tierra del Fuego</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.22 [medium]</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucumán</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.24 [medium]</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral Province Avg</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationally</td>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX C. SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS**
C.1 SES SCORE

The SES score used is based on Edward Gibson’s 1996 analysis of the UCEDE’s growth in the Federal Capital. The score is the average of (using department-level census data from the 2010 census): % of population with a university education, percent of population listed as “employer or partner,” and percentage of population classified as living in poverty (inverted so as to reflect % of population not living in poverty). The scores were then given a percentile rank, as well as divided into 5 categories (Upper, Middle Upper, Middle, Lower Middle, and Lower) based on SES score (equally binned).

C.2 Cambiemos Performance Regressed on SES Score

---

**Dependent variable:**

*Camibemos 2015 Department Vote Share*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SES Score</th>
<th>1.525***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SES score percentile</th>
<th>12.777***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.781)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>-34.206***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.076)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>516</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>8.854 (df = 513)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>300.979*** (df = 2; 513)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Note:** p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

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### Endnotes


3. Ibid., p. 78.
5. Ibid., p. 99.
8. J. A. M. Morelli examines the PRO’s electoral evolution in the municipal elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the 2000s, and identifies the wealthier districts as the PRO’s electoral base.
10. Ibid., p. 8.
22. Ibid., p. 27.
23. Ibid., p. 27.
26. Ibid., p. 2.
32. Ibid., p. 69.
34. PRO pointed to their good management of the city of Buenos Aires and promised voters that they could bring buen gestión to the rest of the country. The alliance with the Civic Coalition party, led by Elisa Carrió, known for her anti-corruption crusades, also bolstered this image.
40. As in Luna 2014.
43. Author’s interview with Subject 10, UCR operative/National deputy in Ministry of Interior. Buenos Aires, August 1, 2016.
44. Noam Lupu 2016.
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Author's interview with Subject 40, Maximiliano Sahonero, legislator for PRO in the City of Buenos Aires legislature. Buenos Aires, August 2, 2016.

Author's interview with Subject 42, Fernando Sanchez, Civic Coalition/ Cambiemos National Deputy. Buenos Aires, August 8, 2016.

Author's interview with Subject 45, former city councilor of Córdoba city. Córdoba, August 18, 2016.

Author's interview with Subject 46, Vice President of provincial UCR party and former mayor of a village. Rosario, August 15, 2016.

Author's interview with Subject 47, communications official in the Province of Buenos Aires. La Plata, July 28, 2016.


Author interview with Subject 49, Cambiemos 2015 volunteer coordinator for a peripheral region. Buenos Aires, August 11, 2017.

Author's interview with Subject 50, doctor of Political Science. Buenos Aires, August 12, 2016

Primary Sources – Datasets


