EDITOR’S NOTE

THE VIEW FROM SOUTH LAWN

Last year marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Journal of Politics & Society. I am proud that while the Journal has seen tremendous change over this period of time, it has maintained its position as the most acclaimed undergraduate publication in the social sciences.

Unlike prior editions that often focused on domestic issues, every essay in the Spring 2014 Journal examines an issue that is international in scope. Contemporary discussions reflect the increasingly globalized nature of the world. However, these discussions require an in-depth, rigorous understanding of the issues at hand, rather than a glance at the daily headlines. I, along with the rest of the Board, strongly believe in this mission.

In line with this theme, the Journal begins with a timely guest essay from Professor Kimberly Marten of Barnard College. While the media focuses on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Professor Marten directs attention to the role of local warlords in the current conflict. For the first time, our guest essay includes a Q&A, in which our Executive Editor asks Professor Marten about the events unfolding in Ukraine.

The writer of this year’s Peter and Katherine Tomassi Essay, Daniel Sellers, challenges a widely accepted tenet in development literature. A consensus has formed supporting Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen’s thesis that democratic governments create a level of accountability that prevents mass famine. By complicating the narrative painted by Sen, Daniel Sellers poses important questions for international development efforts going forward.

In the Weatherhead East Asian Institute Essay, Edmund Downie challenges the widely accepted theory that female participation in Chinese politics experienced a monotonic decline after the Cultural Revolution. By pointing to a modern trend towards gender equality, Downie complicates the old ‘declinist’ thesis of female participation.

In the next paper, Steven Server examines the techniques used to cultivate national pride after the Mexican Revolution. Server combines political theory with empirical research to examine the outlets through which Mexican nationalism was engendered in its population. Going across the Atlantic Ocean, Nadia Hajji evaluates Spain’s attempt to move beyond its troublesome past during the Spanish Civil War. In particular, Hajji critically reflects on the motivations for the main piece of legislation the state adopted to address the past atrocities.

The next three pieces reflect the globalized nature of our current world. Maria Balgova evaluates an increasingly popular belief that income equality and life expectancy go hand in hand. Using a statistical approach, she concludes that such a relationship cannot be substantiated. Ben Gottesdiener also uses an econometric method, but is interested in the relationship between energy interdependence, and political and economic engagement amongst states. Gottesdiener contests a large portion of the literature by arguing that increasing energy independence makes states less, not more, active in the international arena. Finally, Jasper Peet-Martel provides a critical evaluation of sport ‘mega events’ that are seen by developing countries as avenues to prosperity. Looking at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, Peet-Martel emphasizes that these events often sacrifice democratic governance and local development.

The past year of the Helvidius Group has been marked by a multitude of changes. During the last year, we transitioned to a new design that makes the Journal more accessible. Our twenty-fifth year anniversary invites reflection, and pushes us to innovate in order to maintain our premier reputation. Our distribution model has changed to reflect the increasing emphasis on digital viewership. While print subscriptions remain our focus, the Journal can now be read on our iOS Newsstand and Android applications, in addition to a number of digital platforms such as Google Scholar and EBSCO.

Finally, the Executive Board has focused on offering new online content. We believe it is important to keep up with the new trend of expanding open-access research offerings. Our website now features book reviews, conversations with professors, and summaries of interesting submissions. While the Board is proud of our three percent acceptance rate for submissions, many papers that were not selected for the Journal are incredibly innovative and worth reading. Consequently, going forward, a few exceptional submissions not chosen for the Journal will be uploaded to the website along with a summary written by a member of the Board.

These changes are only possible because of the energy and commitment showcased by the Board. We actively try to strike a balance between bringing the Journal forward with the world around us, while grounding the Journal in its mission—an unparalleled commitment to undergraduate research in the social sciences—that has and will continue to distinguish it from its peers. I hope you enjoy reading this edition, as it showcases the insight that undergraduate research can bring to the pressing issues of our time.

Robert C. Baldwin
Editor in Chief
New York City
May 2014
A midst all the talk of whether the Russian or Ukrainian government bears greater responsibility for the violence in eastern Ukraine and Odessa, we may be losing sight of a crucial dynamic that is happening on the ground. Local armed men in Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa and elsewhere have started down the slippery slope to warlordism — and Moscow may be encouraging this trend.

Warlords, as I discuss in my 2012 book of that same name, are individuals who control small slices of territory using a combination of force and patronage. They are distinct from rebels, because their goal is not really to overthrow a government. Instead they often cooperate and collude with weak, corrupt, or frightened state employees (including bureaucrats and security forces) to maintain their local control. While they may have ideologies and passions, warlords are fundamentally self-interested: What they want more than anything else is to stay in a position of power, so they can coerce and blackmail their opponents while controlling payouts to their allies and clients.

Warlords are not just machine-boss politicians, because they are backed by private militias that are willing to go to war to keep them in control. And while they are sometimes popular, and good at distributing the wealth to their communities, warlords rely on illegal activities like smuggling and informal financial links with outside players—not local taxes—for their resources. This latter point is crucial, because as Margaret Levi points out in her classic book, “Of Rule and Revenue,” taxation over the long-term works only when it is matched by accountability to the people. Otherwise tax collectors face constant rebellion (as we know from the history of the American Revolution). A warlord doesn’t have to worry about accountability — just about keeping down local challengers.

Warlords rise up any time states become too weak to control their own territories. All nations and all cultures produce people who are willing and able to use force for their own purposes; strong states prosecute those people and put them in prison. Organized criminals all over the world run “protection” rackets that feed off tacit collusion by corrupt state officials.

At the moment, we do not know much about the individuals who have seized power in eastern and southern Ukraine. There is good evidence, though, that at least some of them truly are locals and that they do not really constitute rebel forces. For example, C. J. Chivers and Noah Sneider of the New York Times have profiled a commander named Yuri, who is able to control a militia of 119 fighters in Slovyansk because of his past work as a Soviet Army unit commander in Afghanistan. Yuri and his men do not seem to have any clear goals — not of leaving Ukraine, joining Russia, or declaring their own independence. They are not united by ideology, just by their military training and by anger at Ukrainian leaders they consider illegitimate. It appears that at least some of the local population values the protection they provide, but it is not clear exactly from whom they are protecting that population. Ukrainian-appointed local police officers apparently cooperate with Yuri’s unofficial militia even as they go about their paid duties, and Yuri’s men claim to have bought at least one anti-tank grenade-launcher from corrupt Ukrainian soldiers.

Kiev has been announcing ever since April 13 that it is launching a major military operation to take back “rebel” held territory in Slovyansk and elsewhere, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has rumbled ominously about his right to intervene to protect the population in what he calls “Novorossiya.” But the longer that Kiev and Moscow practice what amounts to a military stalemate, the more opportunity local armed actors have to change the actual power balance on the ground. They can ensure that either the Russian or the Ukrainian state that eventually triumphs will have to bargain with them in the future.

Once ensconced in positions of local power, warlords and their threats of violence are hard to dislodge. States that want to regain control over their territories have to overcome the corruption that encourages their own employees to collude with the warlords. They also need fine-grained local intelligence to successfully coerce or buy off warlord support networks.

1 Kimberly Marten is the Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Political Science at Barnard College. This piece originally appeared in the Washington Post’s ”Monkey Cage” blog.
Buying off a network becomes much harder when it extends to a neighboring capital, and indeed that might be just what Moscow has in mind in this case. Putin has used local warlords in the past to gain political influence in neighboring Georgia, and continues to cooperate with the warlord Ramzan Kadyrov and his militia to control insurgents in the Russian republic of Chechnya. (I detail both of these cases in my Warlords book.) Getting local warlords to do his bidding would be a relatively cheap way for Putin to exercise indirect rule over eastern and southern Ukraine without bearing the costs of military invasion.

Yuri may not be a warlord (at least not yet). But conditions are ripe for Putin to find willing local strongmen to entice into his own informal patronage network.

A Q&A With Professor Kimberly Marten and Executive Editor Christopher Meyer

CM: What do you see as the best way to wrest eastern Ukraine from warlord control?

KM: The first question is that of order in eastern Ukraine. I think it was never there and people just didn’t realize it was never there. What tools does Ukraine actually have?

I don’t know how anybody can pull this off, and I think the best-case scenario at this point might be a lot of autonomy for the various regions so that Moscow can essentially influence what happens there. It’s such a mess, and I don’t see a good outcome at the moment. I don’t know whether there is anyone in Ukraine with enough power to control Donetsk and Luhansk.

CM: How do you predict Kiev will negotiate with warlords in the future, assuming they remain important political actors in eastern Ukraine?

KM: The thing that you need more than anything else is good intelligence. You need to know the people with whom the warlords are connected.

Actually, the one good example we have of taking down local warlords happened under [former President of Georgia] Mikhail Saakashvili. In [the autonomous Georgian region of] Adjara, Saakashvili’s university classmate was actually the son of the former prime minister of Adjara, and so he had a very personal connection. He was good friends with someone in that power structure, and knew everyone and knew who had to be paid off and how much they had to be paid, and how to make a deal with them to join the state. In Upper Khadori, what happened is that he had a personal representative who went back and forth by helicopter, and they tricked the guy who was the warlord into going in to Tbilisi for various things. When he was out of town they would fly in and have consultations with those who were left.

What you need to have is a personal connection, and it’s not just enough to do electronic eavesdropping. The problem is that Ukraine is so fragmented and without having any real trust in anyone, how are you going to find someone with the political power in Kiev to have influence in a place like Donetsk? The one sign of hope we’ve seen is the regional oligarchs coming out and supporting Kiev. But that gets back to the problem of patronage, and who would pay more, the oligarchs or Moscow.

CM: What is Russia’s long-term interest in fostering warlordism in eastern Ukraine?

KM: It’s a matter of having influence over the territory. So it’s not sowing instability, it’s actually the opposite. It’s ensuring stability for their interests…This is something that empires have done throughout history when they are practicing indirect rule. It is a way of having influence over a certain territory without putting your own men in place, and thereby maintaining plausible deniability. So Moscow has done that in Chechnya and Georgia, and it’s arguably what they are doing in Transnistria, the Russian-speaking area in Moldova.

CM: In terms of the Crimean annexation as a whole, you were on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart in March explaining how it could actually be seen as a loss for Putin. What did you mean?

KM: I guess it’s a matter of what you mean by winning and losing. Putin has gained a reputation as someone that the West can’t stop, but where he has lost is in the incredible expense he has taken on. He has increased the salaries of state employees, for example, in Crimea in order to gain the trust of the population.

But meanwhile what we are hearing is that things in Crimea are a mess… [Russia] is still going to have to negotiate with Ukraine to get water and electricity,
and we do not know what is happening there because they have kicked out all the Western reporters. Putin has really created a mess and he did not take a warlordism approach in Crimea. He just took direct control.

Putin has also lost the ability to have much of an influence on global events because he has lost a lot of international trust. We did not initially see where the Chinese were going to go, but now it looks like they are unhappy about this, because what they value is stability and Putin has disrupted that. And if he can set a precedent for saying, “It is acceptable to take a little piece of the land on the border of another country where people are not the same culture as those in the capital,” that does not set a good precedent for Chinese interests in places like Xinjiang or Tibet. China might get cheaper gas and oil out of this, though.

CM: How do you see this affecting even larger international negotiations, such as the P5 + 1 talks with Iran or the future of the G8?

KM: My understanding is that on the Iran talks, Russia has a very strong interest in not having Iran develop nuclear weapons. However, there were threats being made by Moscow that they would pull out of the talks, and there has been an expansion of Russian energy contracts with Iran over the last few weeks, so we have to see what that means. It’s possible that the Russian regime would try to strengthen the economy of Iran to the point where international sanctions would no longer have the desired effect.

It’s the banking sanctions that matter—we’re seeing that in both Iran and Russia. I do not think the Iran talks are going to be all that affected because there is mutual interest in Iran not becoming a nuclear power.

CM: Is there any argument to be made for the rest of eastern Ukraine holding a referendum on secession?

KM: The real problem with holding a referendum on secession is that it is not the provinces as a whole that want to secede, but the atmosphere is being poisoned by armed conflict. Recently, someone accidentally released from Moscow the actual results of the Crimean referendum, and it turns out between a third and a half of the people voted – so it wasn’t a 98% vote – and only a little over half of those people supported joining Russia.

So now you go to eastern Ukraine, and the proportion of the population that is ethnically Russian according to the 2001 census – which is the best information we have – is less than 40 percent. The further you get away from Crimea, you are going to have a lot less genuine support for joining Russia among the population. The other thing is that it varies by age, and people who started school in the post-Soviet Ukrainian school system tend to have more support for Ukraine as an independent country than the older generation because they never knew the Soviet Union.

A lot of the unhappiness in Ukraine is about economics. It is not about culture, it is not about language, it is about people being out of work and generally hopeless and getting angry with the government in Kiev. That’s why the IMF loan might not solve the problem. IMF loans come with conditionality, and in Ukraine that means skyrocketing prices for fuel, and everything that consumers buy, as subsidies are taken off.

The reason not to hold autonomy referendums is that they would be happening in a very violent situation where you do not have any information and a lot of people are very frightened about what is happening. So what you want is for the Russian influence to withdraw as well as the warlords, some of whom are local but are very violent and do not reflect what the population thinks. It’s like saying a gang in a local area who controls a block and is dealing drugs reflects what the population thinks. They don’t.
Development economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen argues that democracies, by virtue of mechanisms of accountability, are better able to avert famines than non-democratic regimes. Using empirical evidence from colonial and independent India, Sen argues for the existence of an anti-famine political contract, between the government and its supporters, predicated on the prevention of famine. Building on this theory, Sen later tested his argument using cases in Africa. While Sen's theory accurately predicts the outcomes, the causal mechanism he uses to explain each variation is falsifiable.

In studying the experiences of each African country that succumbed to famine in the 1980s, I find that a free press and competitive elections are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a country to avert famine. The results presented in this paper question the presence and role of other causes contributory to famine prevention efforts, as well as the possibility of anti-famine commitments within less-than-democratic polities.

ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM AFRICAN FAMINES IN THE 1980S

DANIEL SELLERS, REED COLLEGE (2013)

INTRODUCTION

Despite modern advances in the production and distribution of food, episodes of hunger and food insecurity still occur in many of the world’s least developed countries. Though “hunger is not a modern malady,” as Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (1989:3) remind us, it is recurrent in parts of the world, and no civilization is totally immune. During the twentieth century, endemic famine was all but eliminated from regions outside Africa, and even within the continent, there has been considerable variation. While certain countries have managed to avoid famine, others have succumbed repeatedly. Although many theories attempt to answer this question, perhaps the best-known explanation comes from Amartya Sen, who argues that “with a relatively free press, with periodic elections, and with active opposition parties, no government can escape severe penalty if it delays preventive measures and permits a real famine to occur. That threat keeps governments on their toes.”¹ Democracies, Sen argues, are better equipped to prevent famines than non-democratic governments, which may be less responsive to the demands of the people. However, this argument is problematic for several reasons.

First, while Sen’s argument does accurately predict the outcome of various African countries’ famine prevention efforts, in each case, the influence of their free press and competitive elections was less than clear. Additionally, in each case, the country’s political, economic, and other circumstances were different than those in India, on whose experience Sen’s argument was originally based. Sen’s theory stems from China and colonial India, both of which

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succumbed to famine, in comparison with post-independence India, which has avoided famine.

Second, despite the predictive accuracy of Sen's theory, in each African case, the reality is slightly different from what Sen claims. For example, while Sen uses Ethiopia and Sudan as examples of countries that experienced famine, and had neither competitive elections nor a free press, this does not tell the whole story. In the early stages of Ethiopia's 1983-85 famine, the dictatorial government did not suppress information about the impending crisis, with a brief exception coming during a time of national celebration—the tenth anniversary of the fall of Haile Selassie. Rather, clear predictions were published about the food shortage, but were ignored by Western governments and the UN, due to the country's domestic politics. Sudan also descended into famine under an authoritarian government, and though between 1986 and 1989 the country experienced a free press and competitive elections, these were not enough to diminish or eliminate famine conditions. In truth, the democratic government was to blame not only for failing to respond to the famine, but also for encouraging its continuation.

Table 1: Selected Cases

Table 1a: Sen's Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Famine</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Press Freedom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (pre-1985)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (post-1985)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1b: Additional Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Famine</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Press Freedom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda (pre-1984)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze herald Botswana and Zimbabwe as "positive' examples of famine prevention, claiming that democratic accountability [was] instrumental in averting famine despite severe food crises." Although Zimbabwe did manage to avoid famine following drought in 1982, around this time the province of Matabeleland was subject to government suppression of dissidents, which included the strategic withholding of relief. Additionally, even though Zimbabwe was fairly democratic in 1982, the next year marked the start of a downward trend, and by the end of the decade, the country was strongly autocratic. Throughout this time, the press was decidedly not free. Sen's fourth case, Botswana, has maintained an extended period of electoral democracy and has managed to avoid famine, though the causality is different than in the Indian case. Since independence, Botswana has been run by a single party, which has maintained its power through patronage networks, including relief programs. Throughout the decade, the country's press was largely free from government intervention.

Finally, Sen considers Kenya, which managed to avert famine following a drought in 1983. Drèze and Sen attribute the government's responsiveness to elected members of parliament in the face of a de jure one-party state, limited but significant press freedoms, and the threat of political instability. De Waal, in contrast, argues that "Kenya's success in escaping famine was largely attributable to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap Moi, who recognized a rudimentary and implicit political contract: feed the central highlands and the cities, and the government will survive." However, despite arap Moi's apparent recognition of this political pressure, his regime “avoided tackling the structural causes of poverty and vulnerability,” and committed innumerable human rights violations during and after this time. There are also reports of interference in the affairs of the press by arap Moi's regime, which further complicate the picture. In an attempt to further clarify Sen's thesis, I will also consider the experiences of Mozambique and Uganda, both examples of African countries that succumbed to famine. Mozambique, once a Portuguese colony, was ravaged by civil war from 1977 to 1992, and experienced famine twice throughout the 1980s: in 1983-84, from natural...
causes, and again in 1987 from the conflict. Throughout the civil war, the country did not hold elections, and throughout the decade, the press was not free. Uganda also experienced famine in 1980, resulting from environmental, economic, and post-conflict issues following the deposition of Idi Amin the previous year. In 1980, the country's first elections in eighteen years were held, though they resulted in the reelection of Milton Obote, who was previously deposed by Amin in 1971. Under Obote II, as his second term was known, the country's elections were not completely free or fair, though they were rated as among the most legitimate in this report and on the continent. While Uganda's press was deemed partly free in 1980, these freedoms were tenuous and fluctuated throughout the decade.

A third complication with Sen's argument stems from a much more fundamental question: for what reasons—if any—should democracy be supposed to have an advantage in fighting famine? A basic assumption of Sen's claim is that “civil and political rights—to free speech, to free association, to elect representatives of one's choice—contribute to the protection of social and economic rights—[such as] the right to food and livelihood.” Indeed, throughout history, one of the most important aspects of civil and political rights has been their use in promoting social and economic rights. However, it seems logical that citizens of a democracy would exploit their civil and political liberties to ensure their protection against famine, the reality is not so simple. Certainly, abuses of social and economic rights can and do occur in democracies, and often stem from a failure of related civil and political rights. How, then—if at all—is famine different?

Despite variation in each country’s response to the threat of famine, there is a common pattern across all countries. In each case, the dominant motivation underlying governmental attempts to prevent or ignore famine is that its primary interests—maintaining power—depend upon it. Thus, in some cases, there exists a political incentive to prevent famine. However, this incentive is by no means unique to democratic politics. Indeed, in all democratic states there exist interests and interest groups whose demands are not met, and an authoritarian government may just as easily derive some legitimacy from meeting certain demands of the populace—whether on the people’s conditions or the leader’s.

According to de Waal (2000), though, while efforts to this effect taken by autocratic or otherwise less-than-democratic governments may constitute an anti-famine program or commitment, these are mere privileges granted to the population by the grace of the ruler. Only in the context of “real” democratic institutions, it is argued, can an anti-famine contract emerge—a lasting and, crucially, enforceable solution to famine. However, while the difference between a repressive and a democratic government may be relatively easy to identify, the difference, both theoretically and practically, between a commitment and a contract is less than clear and raises further questions regarding the nature of political incentives and government responses to them.

As a result, we may extrapolate Sen's thesis to a universal form: mechanisms of accountability, such as a free press and competitive elections, promote responsive governments. Yet, the mechanisms Sen describes may be distinct from the institutional form of government or even any pre-existing institutional measures of accountability, which may exist without necessarily promoting any specific interest. It is apparent that neither the form of government nor the openness of the press significantly account for a government’s responsiveness to famine among its citizens. Instead, preventive action to famine seems more heavily influenced by the desire of those in power to preserve and perpetuate the regime, a motive more widely shared across regimes of all forms.

Having established that the presence and application of factors instrumental to anti-famine measures is independent of the form and structure of government, this thesis will attempt to reconcile Sen’s hypothesis with the experiences of African countries during the 1980s. In countries that experienced famine, what were the significant causal mechanisms? And in countries that avoided famine, how—if at all—did governmental action contribute to the effort? More importantly, why did the government choose to act?

Beyond Sen’s initial cases—Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe—I have also included Mozambique and Uganda, both of which also experienced famine in the 1980s. By reevaluating each case, I argue that a free press and
competitive elections—supposed preconditions to averting famine—are, in reality, neither necessary nor sufficient in achieving this objective. While these mechanisms of accountability are undeniably important to improving the quality of governance, they must be considered distinct from other specific issues and from the political will to act.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. I first review Sen’s thesis over time, followed by a review of literature on the topics of famine, elections, and press, and ultimately, an elaboration of my argument. In the second section, I provide further background on each case, focusing on the countries’ political regime and elections, operational freedom of the press, and food security efforts. Finally, in the conclusion, I provide implications and recommendations for future action.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Entitlements, Acquisition, and Freedom

Though Sen’s theory appears most explicitly in his 1990 speech, “Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment,” the notion that a free press and competitive elections could hold a government accountable stems from an earlier development by Sen: entitlements. Described as “the set of different alternative commodity bundles that [a] person can acquire through the use of various legal channels of acquisition open to someone in [their] position,” a person’s entitlements not only reflect the goods available to them, but also the conditions under which such exchanges are carried out. Thus, a person who owns and lives off their land, for example, will establish command over food in a very different way than a wage laborer who is paid in cash. While the former conducts an exchange with ‘nature’ (own-labor entitlement), the latter transacts with other members of society (trade-based entitlement).

It is of great importance, Sen argues, that these differences in exchange conditions are considered in matters of hunger and food policy—without them, it is impossible to understand how people can or cannot acquire enough food.

As a result, Sen advocates considering entitlements—the means by which people acquire commodities, including food—in addition to the level of food produced or available. Though this approach does not seek to provide a complete explanation of famine, Sen notes that “famine reflects widespread failure of entitlements on the part of substantial sections of the population.” Starvation may be thought of as any commodity bundle that does not include sufficient food. Thus, a person’s entitlements may reduce them to starvation due to changes in their endowment (e.g. loss of land or labor power), or their ‘exchange entitlement mapping’ (e.g. fall in wages, rise in commodity prices, or changes in employment).

A few years later, Sen dramatically expanded the concept of entitlements by removing its tangible boundaries. In Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment (1990), Sen argues that famine constitutes not only a breakdown of vulnerable groups’ entitlements, but also violations of individuals’ positive freedom to survive.

Sen argues that poverty is not necessarily a violation of negative freedom: “A person in extreme poverty is not free to do many things (e.g., feeding his family well, staying home when riots threaten his life), but the poverty and consequent failure of positive freedom may not be due to interference by others.” Rather, poverty and famine represent serious violations of a person’s positive freedom to survive. Despite the change in language, though, Sen’s policy solution remains the same: focus on vulnerable groups’ entitlements and changes thereof. Within this framework, explanations of famine would take the form of economic and political changes that alter various groups’ relative economic power.

By way of these considerations, Sen argues that the difference between India prior to independence—which experienced the Bengal famine of 1943—and India post-independence—the push for which was provoked by that particular famine—was not the formation of a famine response policy, but rather a willingness to invoke the policy when necessary.

Since independence, India’s famine prevention measures have been used judiciously. Thus, Sen concludes that the government’s accountability to its people, made paramount by the country’s democratic revolution and its resulting political contract, is the causal factor in the country’s newfound ability to avert famine. This case, then, illustrates that “one set of freedoms—to criticize, to publish, to vote—are causally linked with other types of freedoms, such

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ii Sen (1981) also identifies production-based and inheritance and transfer-based entitlement relations. While the latter is generally of limited relevance to famine theory, the former is relevant insofar as it interacts with others’ trade-based entitlement prospects.
as the freedom to escape starvation and famine mortality.\textsuperscript{13}

In colonial India, it was the reluctance of the British government to take responsibility for famine relief that helped discredit it and foment nationalist movements. Eventually, “sustained political agitation forced the government to take serious anti-famine measures, implicitly accepting a social contract.”\textsuperscript{14} The Bengal famine of 1943 represented a significant breach of this contract, and independence came four years later. Post-colonial governments have continued to honor this anti-famine contract, and continue to be held accountable by the press and competitive elections.\textsuperscript{15}

On the other hand, Sen considers China, a country that experienced no such popular democratic uprising. As a result of the country’s Great Leap Forward and the resulting social and economic reforms—which attempted to rapidly modernize the country’s economy through processes of industrialization and collectivization—a tremendous famine befell them. From 1958–61, between sixteen and thirty million people are estimated to have died, though other estimates place the toll even higher.\textsuperscript{16} At this time, “the government faced no pressure from newspapers, which were controlled, or from opposition parties, which were absent.”\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, the Chinese government itself was misled by the lack of free reporting, with its own propaganda and party officials all competing for credit in Beijing, distorting or fabricating statistics from around the country.\textsuperscript{18}

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Sen reformulated his theory to focus on five African cases: democratic Botswana and Zimbabwe and the questionably-democratic Kenya, which averted famine in the early 1980s, and authoritarian regimes in Sudan and Ethiopia, which succumbed to famine. Though Sen undoubtedly considers his theory robust enough to be applicable to the individual cases, there are important differences among the countries to consider that present a challenge to Sen’s hypothesis.

As in India, under colonialism, African governments faced little pressure to introduce anti-famine measures. Rather, it was only towards the end of the era that there arose any “sense of administrative responsibility towards colonial subjects.”\textsuperscript{19} However, before then, colonialism in the area was primarily exploitative and relied on military power. In the early twentieth century, for example, famine was brought about in British Tanganyika (later Tanzania) and German Ruanda-Urundi by colonial troops, in an attempt to suppress the populations.\textsuperscript{20}

Elsewhere in Africa, though, colonial administrations had begun to acknowledge famine as a detriment to the local population. Following famine and food insecurity in Sudan during the 1910s, the colonial government attempted to transplant the Indian Famine Code in the country, resulting in the 1920 Sudan Famine Regulations. However, Sudan was very different than Madras, the Indian state on whose policies Sudan’s were based. First, there was not enough administrative capacity in Sudan to organize a system necessary to predict and prevent famine, let alone undertake the prescribed relief efforts. Second, the populations most affected by the famines were different. Reflective of “the generic difference between (most) South Asian famines and (most) African ones,” those most at risk of famine in India were agricultural laborers and rural artisans, while in Sudan, those most at risk were largely pastoralist farmers and herders.\textsuperscript{21} Crucially, while the fortunes of the former depended on market conditions (i.e. food prices and employment), the wealth of the latter was held primarily in assets such as livestock, meaning that famine in Sudan would be harder to predict but slower to arrive, reducing the advantage of responding quickly.\textsuperscript{iii} The area’s lack of transport infrastructure and the absence of any food markets also meant that “the deference of the regulations to classical economics was inappropriate.”\textsuperscript{22} In reality, de Waal argues, the Sudanese Famine Regulations were constructed primarily to deter political threats by prioritizing subsidized food government employees and townspeople, followed by those in flood-prone riverine areas, while dwellers of more remote regions would be lucky to receive any assistance.

Though Sudan’s famine codes of the early twentieth century are notable for being somewhat inappropriate given their context, other African colonies also experienced ‘relief’ policies that provided a bare minimum of assistance. While in certain instances, the legacies of colonial
administrations did help to instill an expectation of emergency relief provision (e.g. Tanzania), this was not the norm. There is thus a clear difference between the approaches of famine-prevention regimes in India and in Africa: in the former, famine relief had become a right, while in the latter it was still seen as little more than an administrative duty. However, the situation was different in African cities due to the growth of trade unions and nationalist sentiment, where keeping the people fed became a political imperative and consequently was popularly recognized as a responsibility of the government.

Politics of famine prevention in colonial Africa was further complicated by disputes regarding land use and soil conservation, with colonial governors seeing traditional techniques as backwards and damaging to the environment. As one might expect, the policies that resulted from this view generated resentment and resistance that significantly strengthened nationalist sentiments. Policies dealing with epidemic disease control were met with similar hostility, owing both to their rudimentary nature and the authoritarian manner in which they were implemented.\(^4\)

Even as African countries achieved independence, there were no nationalist movements that utilized the prevention of famine as a party platform. Instead, other issues like racial identity and economic development tended to prove more salient, reflecting both a relative lack of rural civic mobilization and the problematic legacy of colonial anti-famine land-use policies.

In promoting macroeconomic and social welfare development, these regimes pursued technocratic policies that in some instances succeeded in averting famine. Ultimately, though, the authoritarian nature of the governments undermined their relief programs, leaving those most vulnerable unable to protect themselves. Thus, while systemic anti-famine policies were implemented in colonial Africa, they were markedly simpler than their Indian counterparts.

**Famine Prevention in Post-Colonial Africa**

Perhaps the clearest example of a minimal commitment to famine relief is Sudan. A British colony until 1956, the country descended into civil war almost immediately after gaining its independence. At this time, however, scholars note that the country exhibited structures that served to guard against localized food shortages degenerating into famine, but that their effectiveness was undermined by political instability. In 1969, Jaafar Nimeiri seized power and embraced political Islam, exacerbating the conflict between the country’s Northern (Muslim) and Southern (Christian) halves. Nimeiri’s corrupt regime destroyed its domestic accountability during this time, exploiting its strategic position in the West’s anti-communist strategy, and the state began to decay domestically.

In 1983, the specter of famine loomed in a few provinces, and, though drought struck again in 1984, the government took no action. In an attempt to persuade international financiers of his country’s stability, Nimeiri stated publicly at that time that the situation in the South—civil war, by all accounts—was “reassuring.”\(^23\) Though Nimeiri did ultimately acknowledge the gravity of the conditions, the famine helped solidify a coalition against him, resulting in a popular democratic uprising in 1985. However, the use was largely tactical, the consequence of which was that the movement failed to achieve any real political change.

Following the regime change, Sudan’s famine response effort was delegated to international relief agencies and became a depoliticized, technical issue. This shift was reflected in the creation of a technical early warning system that monitored economic, climatic, and agricultural data, in the spirit of the “neo-liberal agenda for eviscerating government responsibilities.”\(^24\) Under the democratically-elected Umma Party (1986-9), the country did possess liberal democratic institutions, but in practice they did not extend beyond Khartoum and other (Northern) urban centers. War in the South continued to rage, as did the famine. At this time, the press was unrestrained, though there was little interest in covering either situation.

Around this time, Ethiopia also failed to prevent famine, though the country’s prospects were not nearly so bright as Sudan’s after Nimeiri. Though Ethiopia was never colonized by a European power, Haile Selassie’s Solomonic empire came to an end in 1974 when he was deposed by a Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist military junta—the

\(^4\) It was not unheard of for entire communities to be forcibly relocated in the name of preventing the spread of disease, though in reality these programs would have done little more than expose relocated populations to new disease vectors and undermine existing social institutions.
Dergue (“council” in Ge’ez). Led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the country immediately became a one-party communist state. After the country’s 1973-4 food crisis, the imperial government established a Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to help prevent future crises; following the revolution, the Commission quickly became a tool of the Dergue. Land reforms enacted around this time were designed by a small number of intellectuals without the involvement of the peasant base, and were imposed from above. The Dergue also established a central grain-marketing corporation that extracted food from rural populations to sustain a few cities and the ever-expanding army: “precisely the same pattern of distribution which prevailed before the revolution.” During the 1980s, the RRC became a political tool to implement radical social reforms, and later the military used it to relocate people. The RRC was also tasked with procuring foreign aid—most of which went to fuel militias—and spreading propaganda, identifying the country’s 1983-5 famine as the result of overpopulation and drought, as opposed to war.

However, though drought and harvest failure did contribute to the famine, they cannot be considered direct causes. Even the government’s economic and agricultural policies were not as integral to the famine’s sustainment as the counter-insurgency campaigns in Tigray and Wollo: “The zone of severe famine coincided with the war zone, and the phases of the developing famine corresponded with major military actions.” After the famine was uncovered by international media in the fall of 1984, the Dergue began to use “aid as a strategic alibi,” with a newly-formed UN Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia acting as an international official mouthpiece. On the other side of the frontline, the Tigayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was much more cognizant of their reliance on the rural population, and as a result, aligned their interests. By “[linking] the political fortunes of the Tigayan peasantry in the face of famine to the political fortunes of the TPLF” the TPLF was also able to frame the government as having genocidal intentions.

Ultimately, de Waal explains, Ethiopia’s famines of the 1970s and 1980s are “replete with ironies, which are explicable only by attention to the existence or not of an anti-famine political contract.” While the failed response to the 1973 famine was elitist and institutionalized (and resulted in the fall of Haile Selassie), the response to the 1983-85 famine was, for a short time, thought of as a major policy success for the government of Ethiopia. Because discourse about fighting famine is disconnected from discourse of internal conflict, though, the TPLF has largely been unable to take credit for its actions.

Parts of Mozambique also experienced famine due to domestic conflict. Even before Mozambique’s 1975 independence from Portugal, the territory was subject to a decade of sporadic warfare. Additionally, following the formation of the new government—a one-party state based on Marxist principles—most of the country’s roughly 250,000 Portuguese returned to Europe, leaving the economy in shambles. Civil war broke out in 1977, and lasted until 1992. During times of peace, Mozambique is a fertile country that has little trouble feeding its population and producing exports. Between 1983 and 1984, though, the south-central region descended into famine, with most commonly cited statistics placing the death toll at around 100,000. A second major famine occurred in 1987, centered on the eastern Zambézia province, which was the result of conflict. The civil war was characterized by extensive human rights violations on both sides, and only ended after the accidental death of the president and the end of the Cold War.

Though political instability in Uganda arguably did not directly contribute to the country’s famine in 1980, the situation was indeed exacerbated by confusion and fragility following the fall of Idi Amin. After being deposed in 1979, Amin and his forces fled the country, and around the same time, crisis struck Karamoja, a region periodically afflicted by drought. Amin’s soldiers’ abandonment of a barracks within Karamoja further contributed to the instability, as traditional power relations were upset, and a power struggle following (possibly rigged) elections resulted in Karamoja—already a marginalized region—being caught in the crossfire. In the end, an estimated 50,000 Karimojong perished. Though the human rights record of Milton Obote’s regime was below par, the country did manage to avoid famine in Karamoja following drought in 1984, just before a coup removed Obote from the presidency. Dodge and Alnwick (1986), though, attribute this success entirely to efforts by international aid organizations.

At the other end of the spectrum lies Botswana,
whose government is noted for exhibiting an inherent sense of obligation and a keen sense of its electoral interests. Having gained independence from Britain in 1964, Botswana has consistently maintained what Freedom House judges as free and fair elections. In reality, though, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has “benefited from an uneven playing field,” winning every contest since independence by a considerable margin.\textsuperscript{v}\textsuperscript{vi} When drought struck in 1982 (and continued for six years), the government enacted various programs in an attempt to prop up rural incomes. Though the country’s use of plow and tractor subsidies was socially regressive, the country did manage to avoid famine conditions. There are some, however, who argue that the country’s success was in no small part bolstered by its economic growth throughout the decade, rather than by any political commitment to relief. The country’s constitution does not contain explicit guarantees for freedom of the press, and though the government occasionally interferes in media affairs, abuse by the BDP is “neither as frequent nor as severe as other countries in the region.”\textsuperscript{vii}

Though Drèze and Sen similarly laud Zimbabwe’s government for enacting effective entitlement programs and preventing the country’s 1982-84 drought from precipitating a major famine, this is far from a complete picture. After gaining independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU party were elected to power. Less publicized than the country’s aversion to famine, however, was the ZANU military campaign conducted within the province of Matabeleland, home to supporters of the rival ZAPU party.\textsuperscript{vi}ii This campaign—Gukurahundi—resulted in widespread famine conditions and the deaths of between 10,000 and 20,000 people.\textsuperscript{vii} Though this was obscured partly by Zimbabwe exploiting its strategic position between East and West, the Gukurahundi was also kept secret by restrictions on the content of news reports. It was not until 1987 that the campaign ended, following an agreement to unify ZANU and ZAPU (forming ZANU-PF). However, this relationship broke down some years later, and though the country has experienced “limited multi-party democracy,” in practice, Mugabe has held power throughout.

Last, but not least, Drèze and Sen consider the case of Kenya. After peacefully gaining independence from the British in 1963, Kenya became a republic, with Jomo Kenyatta as its president. Political pressure prompted Kenyatta to consolidate power in 1966 after winning re-election, and established a de facto one-party state. Upon his death in 1978, then-Vice President Daniel arap Moi took his place, and though he enjoyed support from around the country, he was too weak to consolidate power. However, in 1982, some officers of the air force attempted and failed to overthrow him, and arap Moi dismissed political opposition, establishing a de jure one-party state. In 1984, the country experienced a severe drought, in response to which an ‘inter-ministry drought response coordinating committee’ was established and given top priority. Ultimately, the country managed to avert famine, though there is evidence of widespread hunger leading to malnutrition.

While Drèze and Sen attribute the government’s responsiveness to political pressure from elected MPs, the (somewhat free) press, and the threat of political instability, de Waal argues that Kenya’s “success in escaping famine was largely attributable to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap Moi, who recognized a rudimentary and implicit political contract: feed the central highlands and (most importantly) the cities, and the government will survive.”\textsuperscript{33} However, despite recognizing this pressure, action taken by arap Moi’s regime seemed oriented primarily towards the placation of his opponents, failing to address the country’s more fundamental causes of poverty. Additionally, there are reports of numerous human rights violations during and after this time, as well as of governmental interference in press affairs that further complicate Drèze and Sen’s argument.\textsuperscript{34}

To summarize, then: while Botswana and Kenya managed to avert famine conditions, neither were fully democratic. On the other hand, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda were all autocratic, and all failed to avert famine conditions (in most cases due to war-time politics). Finally, on first glance, Zimbabwe also managed to avert famine, though in reality, the government indirectly created hunger to suppress political opposition.

However, while anecdotal evidence is largely

\textsuperscript{v} XRCOMP in Polity IV (see page 28).
\textsuperscript{vi} While ZANU was Western-aligned, ZAPU supported the USSR.
\textsuperscript{vii} Gukurahundi, meaning “the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains,” in the Chi-Shona language, was also known as the Matabeleland Massacres.
sufficient to reconcile Sen’s theory with reality, it cannot provide general (or generalizable) definitions of famine, competitive elections, or a free press—all of which may be used to further examine the hypothesis’ validity. While for each variable, a simple binary measure (e.g., free press vs. restricted press) would seem to suffice, in reality, it is the gradations in between which provide information pertinent to this endeavor, as they often reflect decisions and actions of a wide political variety.

**Conceptualizing Famine**

While most popular definitions of famine include scenes of malnutrition and starvation resulting from a general lack of food, this is somewhat of an oversimplification. Though famine conditions may obviously result in starvation and destitution, these symptoms are generally indicative of breakdowns of other social systems as well. Exactly which systems are affected and how they are affected, though, is a matter of debate. While some scholars argue that famine is the result of a decrease in relative exchange power of (vulnerable) populations, others emphasize nutrition, disease, social disruption, excess mortality, or other indicators as both reflecting and stemming from ‘famine conditions.’ Clearly, then, we are faced with a complex phenomenon, with debates ranging from umbrella definitions to the relevance of component factors.

Early ‘modern’ scholars of famine were influenced by Thomas Malthus, who focused on the gap between food supply and demand given a level of technological advancement and a fixed amount of land. In his 1798 work *An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Further Improvement of Society*, Malthus identified famine as “a shortfall in the supply of food in a given area and, simultaneously, the death by starvation of a substantial proportion of the inhabitants.” However, de Waal notes, the picture painted by this description—of society constantly existing on the verge of famine—is fallacious.

Though classical theories of famine have fallen out of favor, the question of whether famines stem from ‘natural’ or ‘artificial’ causes is still pertinent. Sen claims that the distinction can be misleading: famine, he argues, is fundamentally a social phenomenon, involving “the inability of large groups of people to establish command over food” in the face of adverse meteorological conditions. Furthermore, though a natural catastrophe may cause (or exacerbate) food insecurity, a disaster’s impact will nonetheless depend upon how a society is organized. For example, a country with an extensive irrigation network could theoretically weather a drought much better than one without such redistributive infrastructure. That said, even the existence of droughts, floods, and other calamities is not independent of social and economic policies. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, problems of famine and hunger are often seen as related to climate change, overlooking the influence of societal factors on how people produce and consume food.

To those in power, the identification of famine as primarily resulting from drought or other natural causes can dramatically reframe lines of accountability, and may significantly alter the policy or international response. Even the identification of famine as such “represents a choice and is therefore more political than technical: rather than being ‘found,’ a definition of famine must be ‘agreed upon.’” Thus, when famine is blamed on natural causes, as with the Sahelian famines of the 1970s—supposed products of cyclical “changes in heat coming from the sun”—drought and famine (and the prevention or alleviation thereof) are removed from the scope of agentive action.

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**Table 2: Estimated Mortality in Select Twentieth Century Famines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Location (epicenter)</th>
<th>Excess Mortality</th>
<th>Causal Triggers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>India (Bengal)</td>
<td>2.1m–3m</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-62</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>30m–33m</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-74</td>
<td>West Africa (Sahel)</td>
<td>101k</td>
<td>Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-75</td>
<td>Ethiopia (Wollo &amp; Tigray)</td>
<td>200k–500k</td>
<td>Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>Uganda (Karamoja)</td>
<td>30k</td>
<td>Conflict &amp; Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-85</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>100k</td>
<td>Conflict &amp; Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-85</td>
<td>Zimbabwe (Matabeleland)</td>
<td>10k–20k</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-85</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>590k–1m</td>
<td>Conflict &amp; Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur, Kordofan)</td>
<td>250k</td>
<td>Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Sudan (South)</td>
<td>250k</td>
<td>Drought</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Devereux, 2000)
A similar argument that has existed since colonial times is the tendency to place blame on pastoral society, the idea being that these societies are ‘backwards’ and conservative, and emphasize “stock accumulation as opposed to quality control, pastoral mobility and cattle raiding.” Indeed, it is not uncommon to see Africa’s endemic twentieth century famines attributed directly and solely to the victims themselves. However, these arguments are misleading because they are based on generalities and present pastoralism as ignorance, without considering external factors such as the weather and often-exploitative economic conditions. While Sen’s argument for considering entitlements follows, Okudi argues that such an approach is as “narrow in scope as it is limited to the immediate causes of famine and its consequences,” failing to expose the relationship between long- and short-term causes of famine.

Identification

Beyond identifying the cause(s) of a famine, there is still the question of what ‘famine conditions’ entail, what distinguishes famine from mere ‘episodes of food insecurity’ or ‘chronic hunger’; and, of course, how best to avert such afflictions. While ‘pop’ conceptions of famine do tend to oversimplify matters, they can provide a helpful starting point for exploring what constitutes this complex occurrence.

To some, famine is identified primarily as a health crisis, manifested by significant changes in nutrition levels or starvation. In this vein, Drèze and Sen (1989) distinguish famine, “involving acute starvation and a sharp increase in mortality,” from chronic hunger, “sustained nutritional deprivation on a persistent basis,” as distinct yet related phenomena. While the former, they note, requires speed in intervention, often resulting in the use of existing distributional mechanisms, the nature of the latter is such that slower but more impactful policies may be enacted. This distinction is also important in considering the experiences of different countries. India, for example, experiences regular hunger and endemic undernutrition, though the Bengal famine of 1943 was the result of acute starvation escalating into large-scale mortality. On the other hand, countries may become adept at dealing with persistent hunger, but fall prey to considerable transient hunger, as in China during 1958–61.

However, de Waal (2000) argues that the distinction between transient ‘famine’ and ‘chronic hunger’ is fallacious; as with most social scientific terms, the linkage between real-world phenomena and social scientific concepts can be unclear. In response, de Waal (2000) identifies five main components of theoretical famine, with real-world instances combining some, if not all, to varying degrees: hunger, impoverishment, social breakdown, mortality, and coping strategies undertaken in response. However, it is also possible, he notes, for a famine to occur without any number of these factors. Though uncommon, famine striking asset-rich societies is not unheard of, while others have occurred without social breakdown or even excess mortality.

Rather than simply conceptualizing hunger and famine as occurring on the same linear scale, famines may assume qualitatively different forms as they escalate. While this does help clarify famine conceptually, it does not make the identification of such an occurrence any less imprecise.

Quantification

A second measure for distinguishing famines from one another is severity—the degree to which each factor is present. One problem arises, however, in that it is often difficult to know the true scale of the excess mortality caused by a famine. Estimates are always approximate, and reflect the incentives of the published. For methodological reasons, then, demographers and nutritionists prefer to release ‘crude mortality rates’ expressed in deaths per thousand, though the media and public tend to desire aggregate totals, which are not completely accurate measures.

De Waal identifies three qualitative degrees of famine severity: famines involving primarily hunger and impoverishment, those with elevated mortality rates, and those seeing spectacularly high death rates alongside severe social dislocation and collapse. These measures also allow for consideration of

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viii In the case of Uganda, for example, Akol (1985) argues that the development of agricultural productivity in affected areas was impeded by a ‘persistent’ rustling of livestock, leading to distress migration, as well as detrimental traditional rituals and practices. Similarly, Almwick (1985) attributes the country’s 1980 famine to the ‘alarming’ amount of plundering and raids after the fall of Idi Amin the previous year.

ix For example, though the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944 was notable for occurring in a more developed and asset-rich country, it occurred during and was generated in no small part by the Nazi occupation.
auxiliary factors such as changes in exchange entitlement mappings (e.g., the ability to buy food) or coping strategies.

De Waal then proposes five general types of famine, based on the sector of society most affected and the primary causal elements. The first, pastoral famines, primarily affect herders, and are caused by drought, leading to a lack of pasture and water for animals and an abandonment or reduction of the pastoral lifestyle. Due to their slow onset, they are quite dispersed and may be extremely protracted. Agrarian/smallholder famines affect scattered farming populations, and result from drought-related production failures that often betray deeper social problems, such as exploitative economic relationships. These famines are usually slow-onset, and may manifest themselves as multiple localized famines surrounding an ‘epicenter’ from which waves of grain prices rise and cause migration. These famines may remain invisible outside the affected areas. Class-based/occupational famines negatively affect wage laborers and can result from rapid and drastic changes in exchange entitlements (e.g. collapse of labor, changes in grain price). These famines may become highly visible as people migrate, which in turn strains the resources of neighboring locales. Finally, wartime famines stem from conditions imposed on civilians during war, including destruction or confiscation of goods and restrictions on movement. These famines are highly dependent on the nature of the war.44

Of course, many famines are combinations of the above types. Agrarian famines, for example, are commonly associated with pastoral famines, and changes in grain prices caused by agrarian or wartime famines may cause class-based famines in adjacent areas. In Ethiopia in 1983-5, for example, “some of the highest mortality was recorded in areas which did not themselves suffer a major production failure, but which were suddenly (and to their residents, inexplicably) struck by high food prices and immigration of destitute laborers.”45

Generally, de Waal notes, ‘characteristic Asian famines’ have been class-based, rapid-onset, and high visibility, making coping strategies less helpful and state action more necessary. In contrast, African famines are generally more localized, slow-onset, and low in visibility, placing greater importance on coping strategies than public action. It is for this reason that famines in Africa often fail to achieve political significance.

Walker (1989), on the other hand, focuses on behavioral responses to food insecurity, with four distinct ‘stages’ of coping strategies. The first includes strategies for overcoming ‘normal seasonal stress.’ The second includes increasingly irreversible coping strategies as scarcity persists (e.g., selling livestock or mortgaging land). The third is “characterized by dependence on external support,”46 such as international aid, and if all else fails, the fourth stage, starvation and death, will follow.47 While the first stage is at least indicative of food insecurity, the second embodies a weakening of future security in the name of present survival.

Thus, both Walker and Howe remind us that “famines threaten livelihoods as well as lives, and that effective famine prevention requires early intervention to protect livelihoods, rather than mandating relief just to ‘save lives.'”48 Because coping strategies are highly context-dependent, though, their usefulness as generalizable famine indicators is diminished. Some authors distinguish ‘coping’ from ‘adaptive’ strategies, while some argue that such strategies may be adopted concurrently, while still others dismiss the idea of dividing famine into ‘stages’ at all. Ultimately, then, theories promoting coping strategies as a viable dimension of classifying famine do not effectively justify their (exclusive) use.

Whereas coping strategies are context-specific, Howe and Devereux argue that nutrition-based indicators may be compared universally. However, this metric also possesses definitional problems, such as what specific rate of malnutrition or mortality indicates the beginning of a famine. Additionally, nutritional indicators generally refer to children under five years of age, though children over five and adults are demonstrated to be more affected by emergencies than are younger children, in part because adults will often reduce their intake to ensure that their children have enough food. Child malnutrition, then, may serve as a ‘trailing indicator,’ failing to manifest until well after adult malnutrition has set in.

A third complication of nutrition-related metrics is the ambiguous relationship between aggregate nutrition and food crises, as “malnutrition outcomes can be the result of [factors]... such as disease, an unsanitary public health environment or
poor child-care practices.” According to the point raised, nutrition should not be considered an indication of famine independent of wider food-security information, as low rates of malnutrition may obscure advancing famine conditions such as severe degradation of livelihoods or the use of drastic coping strategies.

To provide greater operational clarity and accountability for famine prevention efforts, Howe proposes a bipartite scale to estimating famine severity. In addition to the ‘magnitude’ of a famine, which refers to the aggregate impact, the authors establish ‘intensity’ as a separate metric, reflecting the severity of the crisis at a given time and place.

**Intensity**

To estimate a measure of ‘intensity,’ the authors combine anthropometric and mortality indicators, as well as ‘food-security descriptors.’ The “anthropometric/mortality indicators provide cut-offs for each level that can be compared across situations. The food-security descriptors capture the dynamic, self-reinforcing changes in the livelihood system associated with increasing degrees of food insecurity and famine, and can be adapted to specific circumstances (for example, drought or conflict) and diverse contexts.” Additionally, the authors establish a system of weighting anthropometric/mortality versus food-security indicators depending on which is estimated to occupy a more causal role.

One issue with this scale, however, which has yet to be resolved, is the appropriate unit of analysis for determining the intensity level. The authors offer no solution, except to note that the intensity (localized) and magnitude (aggregate) measures are designed to be complementary. By creating an ordinal scale of localized food insecurity, the situation may be observed over time, and allows external stakeholders to make more informed decisions regarding aid.

**Magnitude**

A complete assessment of a crisis’ full impact, Howe and Devereux argue, can only be made in retrospect. Thus, ‘magnitude’ refers to “the scale of human suffering caused by the entire crisis, as proxied by excess mortality.” The authors also note that mortality of the ‘magnitude’ scale starts at zero, rather than one because, as has been established, malnutrition need not imply deaths. As the authors clarify, this points to one resolution to the long-standing debate as to whether famines must be characterized by excess mortality.

One the one hand, quantifying the impact of famine by excess mortality makes sense, because death is “the most tragic human consequence of famine.” Still acknowledging that ‘famine’ can occur without excess mortality enables a better characterization of famine as a complex set of processes (marked chiefly by hunger and destitution).

As mentioned earlier, the intensity and magnitude scales are designed to work in tandem, and thus interact in specific ways: “Any intensity level of 3 or above will register as a famine on the magnitude scale, even if it occurs in a very localized area, and even if no deaths are recorded (this could be a ‘Category A’ famine).” However, the opposite is not necessarily true: every incident which involves death is not necessarily a famine. Additionally, deaths can result from a food crisis condition, but the crisis may not be considered a ‘famine’ unless the intensity of the conditions in any given area matches or exceeds ‘level 3.’

Ultimately, Howe and Devereux argue that while their metric is not perfect, the establishment of a universal famine scale has great implications for accountability. During a crisis, such a scale offers a basis to pressure intervention by responsible, or accountable, actors, and after the fact, it may be invoked to assign ‘proportionate accountability.’ Proportionality, it is argued, is important to establishing accountability both in terms of the number of deaths caused, as well as intent.

However, while attempting to determine intent can increase accountability and bring perpetrators to justice, the authors warn against the realization of perverse incentives, “such that governments and humanitarian agencies devote disproportionate resources and energy to ensuring simply that threshold malnutrition and mortality rates on the famine scales are not crossed.” Additionally, on the part of a perpetrator—if such a role exists—these perverse incentives may result in efforts to mitigate (or exacerbate) famine conditions to the extent that the crisis crosses one threshold or another. Instead,
the authors advocate formulating policy solutions that address the underlying causes of famine, though the effort to do so may be prompted or catalyzed by the identification of more discrete levels.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
Democracy and Elections

While there certainly is no dearth of scholarship regarding identifying the presence, scope, and causes of famine, we turn now to the relationship between famine and politics. The events that catalyze famine may be of a natural or meteorological character; however, another line of thought identifies famine as resulting from a lack of action. The intuition for this perspective begins from the assumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Phrase Designation</th>
<th>Malnutrition &amp; Mortality Indicators</th>
<th>Food-security Descriptors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Food-security</td>
<td>CMR &lt; 0.2/10k/day &amp; Wasting &lt; 2.5%</td>
<td>Social system is cohesive; prices are stable; negligible adoption of coping strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Food-insecurity</td>
<td>CMR ≥ 0.2 by &lt; 0.5/10k/day and/or Wasting ≥ 2.3 but &lt; 10%</td>
<td>Social system remains cohesive; price instability, and seasonal shortage of key items; reversible ‘adoptive strategies’ are employed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Food crisis</td>
<td>CMR ≥ .5 but &lt; 1/10k/day and/or Wasting ≥ 10 but &lt; 20% and/or prevalence of œdema</td>
<td>Social system significantly stressed but remains largely cohesive; dramatic rise in price of food and other basic items; adaptive mechanisms start to fail; increase in irreversible coping strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Famine</td>
<td>CMR ≥ 1 but &lt; 5/10k/day and/or Wasting ≥ 20% but &lt; 40% and/or prevalence of œdema</td>
<td>Clear signs of social breakdowns appear; markets begin to close or collapse; coping strategies are exhausted and survival strategies are adopted; affected population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of the crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Severe famine</td>
<td>CMR ≥ 5 but &lt; 15/10k/day and/or Wasting ≥ 40% and/or prevalence of œdema</td>
<td>Widespread social breakdown; markets are closed or inaccessible to affected population; survival strategies are widespread; affected population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of the crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Extreme famine</td>
<td>CMR ≥ 15/10k/day</td>
<td>Complete social breakdown; widespread mortality; affected population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of the crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CMR: crude mortality rate
Wasting: proportion of child population (six months to five years) who are below eighty percent of the median weight-for-height or below −2 Z-score weight-for-height. (Howe, 2004)
that any society, with concerted effort, can prevent drought or other natural causes from escalating into famine. What circumstances, then, would alter a government’s response, or provoke a government to respond?

From Malthus (1798) comes a ‘demographic explanation’ of famine: it is the result of food supply restricting unsustainable increases in population. By this reasoning, famine is a natural phenomenon that cannot be averted. Though in retrospect we may call neglectful the government that allows famine to ‘run its course’ (e.g. Britain prior to 1880), the logic behind this argument only allows structural conditions to cause famine.

Sen (1981) gives an economic explanation of famine. He argues that famine is the result of the failure of some people’s entitlement relations to provide them access to enough food to survive. In other words, famines are allowed to occur when a government is insufficiently concerned with protecting the entitlements of its citizens (i.e., preventing a relative degradation or decline of people’s exchange entitlement mapping). A policy solution under this paradigm would take the form of entitlement protection, seeking to prevent changes in exchange conditions or in endowments.

Finally, Drèze and Sen (1989) and Sen (1999) offer reformulations of the entitlement argument, namely that competitive elections and freedom of the press are essential to preventing famine. The logic behind this argument is that competitive elections encourage politicians to appease voters and thereby protect their entitlements, while a free press acts as an additional tool for compelling governments to act.

De Waal (1990, 2000) responds to Sen, and though he believes in entitlement theory, he identifies entitlements as part of a larger picture. Famines are composed of five elements in varying proportions: hunger, impoverishment, social breakdown, mortality, and coping strategies in response to the first four. Thus, while famine prevention efforts should include entitlement protection measures, the presence and severity of each other factor should be considered as well.

Sutter (2011), on the other hand, explores ‘statehood’ as a mediator between political institutions and famine. To disaggregate state quality, the author measures two forms of legitimacy: ‘horizontal’—the ethnic fragmentation of a country—and ‘vertical’—the “proximity of the state—as a structure of political power—to the society.”

According to this conception of political famine response, institutions that promote (vertical) accountability, such as a free press and competitive elections, are made distinct from the political will necessary to utilize those mechanisms effectively.xi

Another explanation, known as selectorate theory, comes from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002). They argue that governments possess a finite amount of response capacity: “both democracies and autocracies face a trade-off between the cost of action and the cost of inaction. The government is assumed to maximize its political support to stay in power.” As a result, famine mortality may occur if governments “find that inaction is the support-maximizing strategy.”xi Key to this decision is evaluating the size of the selectorate (S)—“the set of people who have an institutional say in choosing leaders”—relative to the winning coalition (W)—“the minimal set of people whose support the incumbent needs in order to remain in power.” When W is small, leaders may focus on the particularistic transfer of goods and services, at the expense of the provision of public goods, while a large winning coalition encourages bandwagoning.

In all cases, legitimacy accompanies political authority and trust, which forms the “basis of a better ability of institutions to protect citizens,” and increases the state’s power to act.58 A second aspect of legitimacy is the “respect of social contract, reflecting how close the state is to society,” and third, state legitimacy “decreases the risk of shocks leading to famine, especially the likelihood of civil wars: trust in institutions build peace.” While Mesquita et al. do not discuss the legitimacy of the state per se, the same responsiveness may be thought of as a successful broadening of the winning coalition—the set of people whose support the incumbent needs to remain in power. Sutter proposes a few measures of state legitimacy, including public opinion, a ‘behavioral’ approach rooted in votes for and against the incumbent, and changes in politicians’ definitions of legitimacy.xv

Polity IV

xi Her examination of thirty-six countries over 1980-2005 reveals two findings: as institutional quality improves, the likelihood of famine decreases; and even accounting for climatological and political shocks, a higher aggregate state legitimacy corresponds to a lower probability of famine.
In an attempt to more rigorously examine each country’s political situation over time, I have included the use of the Polity IV dataset in my analysis. Begun as an attempt to “[code] the authority characteristics of states in the world system” the dataset’s level of analysis is a country’s ‘polity’: a ‘political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; state; body politic.” Among other reasons, the dataset is particularly useful for its placement of ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’ as collinear—captured as a country’s ‘Polity Score’—as well as its disaggregation of ‘executive recruitment.’

Table 5 contains Polity scores of relevant countries. For the scores of all African countries, see Appendix A. For each case, the score listed is the country’s average from 1980 to 1989, with the exceptions of Sudan, whose 1985 regime change warrants a distinction, and Uganda, whose score is only that under Obote II (1980-85).

The first score (POLITY) is simply the difference between a country’s democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC) scores on a scale of +10 (full democracy) to –10 (full autocracy). Democracy is a complex measure comprised of three elements: institutions of accountability, constraints on executive power, and the guarantee of civil liberties. According to these elements, the authors identify a ‘mature and internally coherent democracy’ as “one in which (a) political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial.”

On the other hand, though ‘autocracy’ has become a pejorative term in Western political discourse, the authors operationalize the concept not as simply a lack (or negative value) of democratic components. Rather, autocracies are polities with restricted political participation, executives chosen by political elites, and few constraints on executive power.

Though the authors construct a combined polity score (POLITY), they note that regimes may simultaneously exhibit elements of both autocratic and democratic authority. Rather, this variable is included as “a convenient avenue for examining general regime effects in analyses.” As with famine, though, scores near the middle of the spectrum are muddled somewhat, obscuring the combination of democratic and autocratic components. Thus, while POLITY is included in Table 5, this is mostly for the sake of readability. More detailed statistics are available in Appendix A.

As concerns this study are three statistics from the Polity dataset related to executive recruitment: “(1) the extent of institutionalization of executive transfers, XRREG; (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, XRCOMP; and (3) the openness of executive recruitment, XROPEN.”

XRREG The regulation of executive recruitment refers to the extent to which a polity possesses institutionalized mechanisms for the transferal of executive power. This has three possible values: (1) Unregulated, (2) Designational/Transitional, and (3) Regulated. ‘Unregulated’ implies “forceful seizures of power,” such as coups; ‘Designational/Transitional’ entails selection by political elites without formal competition; and ‘Regulated’ recruitment involves either hereditary succession or competitive elections.

XRCOMP The competitiveness of executive recruitment seems rather self-explanatory, with competition achieved when no contending party or candidate possesses a handicap (though incumbency
is obviously significant). This measure also has three possible values: (1) Selection, (2) Dual/Transitional, and (3) Election. ‘Selection’ refers to determination of executives by “hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both;”xvi ‘Dual/Transitional’ implies a polity with dual executives chosen by different means, or transitions between selection and election; and ‘Election,’ of course, refers to executive selection by competitive election between two or more parties.

XROPEN The ‘openness’ of executive recruitment is the extent to which all members of the politically active population have an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position of chief executive through an institutionalized process. If transfers of power are coded as Unregulated in XRREG, or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, XROPEN is coded 0. Four degrees of openness are used: (1) Closed, (2) Dual Executive–Designation, (3) Dual Executive–Election, and (4) Open.

For a translation of Polity IV executive recruitment concepts and component variables, as well as component variable scores for all African countries by year (1980-1989), see Appendix A.

### Press

Though literature reviewed thus far has pointed to various political mechanisms of accountability that mediate the relationship between the government and its citizens, this is only half the picture. Indeed, as much of the literature and multiple cases show, the presence of democratic institutions does not necessarily warrant their application towards the prevention of famine. Though institutionalized mechanisms of vertical or horizontal accountability may exist, the government may still possess a monopoly on the regulation of civilian activity, including the dissemination of information.

Thus, an equally important mechanism for generating government accountability is one that is in practice distinct from the government itself (bottom-up, so to speak). Just as a governmental separation of powers can promote a system of checks and balances, a free press can provide an important check on government action (or inaction). As Drèze and Sen note, it is important to remember that state action is by no means independent of “political ideology, public pressure, and popular protest.”xvi However, as with governmental mechanisms of accountability, the efficacy of the press is by no means guaranteed.

Indeed, though a free press can help spread information within and between countries—in the latter case attempting to evoke embarrassment or shame—a free press may only help prevent famine if “those vulnerable to famine are considered fully citizens of the country.”xvii It is not enough for the press to simply possess the freedom to report, but a ‘political trigger’ must be present as well. To return to Mesquita et al. and selectorate theory: in serving to help fight famine, the press must make clear who exactly the winning coalition includes, both to the government and to the voters.

Devereux (2000) argues that a combination of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ mobilization is essential to catalyzing positive action in pursuit of rights. While primary mobilization is undertaken in pursuit of one’s own interests (e.g., mass movements), secondary mobilization (a.k.a. activism) entails the participation of interest groups. Though primary mobilization is important, it cannot overcome famine alone, as those who mobilize could be satisfied with food handouts. Secondary mobilization, then, is necessary to identify issues and frame them politically. It is print, visual, and other forms of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>POLITY</th>
<th>XRREG</th>
<th>XRCOMP</th>
<th>XROPEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Nimeiri)</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Mahdi)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda (Obote II)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Republic et al., 2011)
broadcast media that must, in times of dearth, aid those affected in their fight against famine.\textsuperscript{xvii}

To paint a more complete picture of each country's civil and political freedoms, I have also considered Freedom House's \textit{Freedom of the Press} survey data. Unfortunately, though, in some instances there seem to be discrepancies between the numerical scores reported by Freedom House and more detailed historical accounts. Though in part this stems from an ironic lack of transparency on the part of Freedom House, it is also indicative of the complex, variable, and occasionally subjective nature of such a rating scheme.\textsuperscript{xviii} These discrepancies are interesting in their own right, and when they do arise, I have attempted to reconcile them with my own findings.

Conducted by Freedom House since 1980, the \textit{Freedom of the Press} survey measures the degree to which a country permits the free flow of news and information.\textsuperscript{xix} To assess this, Freedom House undertakes a “multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars” who examine legal, political, and economic indicators.\textsuperscript{67}

From 1980 to 1988, Freedom House disaggregates countries' scores into Print and Broadcast freedom (which I have combined to form half scores in Table 5), while from 1989 to 1992, they published consolidated statistics. For 1980-1988, then, I have provided averages, with Not Free equal to 0, Partially Free, 1, and Free, 2. For a table of Freedom House Press scores for all of Sub-Saharan Africa, see Appendix A.

Countries with half-scores include Botswana, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Throughout the decade, Botswana fared the best of any country (among those examined), exhibiting a print freedom score of 2 and a broadcast score of 1. Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, all had periods with print scores of 1 and broadcast scores of 0 (when both were not 0). No country on the continent exhibited more broadcast freedom than print freedom.\textsuperscript{xx}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Botswana & 1.5 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 1 & 2 & \\
Ethiopia & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \\
Kenya & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
Mozambique & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
Sudan & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1 & 0 & \\
Uganda & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
Zimbabwe & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Freedom House Scores of Examined Countries}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{0} Not Free; \textsuperscript{1} Partially Free; \textsuperscript{2} Free. (Freedom House, 2012)

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\section*{Theory}
Since the publication of \textit{Poverty and Famines} in 1981, Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze have argued that democracy—minimally, a regime with a free press and competitive elections—prevents famine. To support the argument, Sen first considers India and China, noting that where one experienced a democratic revolution whose leaders successfully used famine to mobilize support, the other, in its pursuit of social and economic reforms, caused the greatest famine of the twentieth century without even realizing it.\textsuperscript{68} This difference of outcomes Sen attributes to the formation of a political contract, predicated on the prevention of famine, between the revolutionary government and its supporters. This compact—an explicit acknowledgement of a persistent and fundamentally important political issue—was also catalyzed by the country's free press, which allowed the citizens to hold the government accountable, and was lent significant weight when independence followed its breach by the colonial government.

In later texts, the argument is reformulated to fit countries in Africa. While the first, Botswana, supposedly maintained free and fair elections, in reality, a single party has won every contest handily. And though the second positive case, Zimbabwe, experienced political conflict and famine in Matabeleland, this was not exposed until after the end of the Cold War, in part due to restrictions on...
the press. However, the country’s elections were, by most accounts, free and fair. Thus, while in Botswana the case could be made for the existence of an anti-famine political contract, it is imperfect. In Zimbabwe, the government may have been responsive to the needs of certain regions, though its actions in others indicate the lack of any significant anti-famine contract.

However, I argue that the history of Kenya is crucial to determining whether the causation is valid. As presented by Drèze and Sen, Kenya was a single-party state which, despite its lack of primary elections or political opposition, was responsive to the demands of the people due to elected members of parliament and a press which enjoyed limited but significant press freedoms. De Waal, though, diminishes the significance of the MPs and attributes government responsiveness to the astuteness of the President, who recognized the need for famine relief. However, in this case, the contract seems quite limited, painting a picture of the government response as mere political opportunism—though aid was distributed throughout affected areas (which were also politically significant), the government also committed various human rights violations during and after this time.

Further, while Drèze and Sen consider the country’s limited but significant press freedoms to be causal in the formation of this political contract, the reality seems more complex. While Freedom House rates the country’s press as ‘Partly Free’ throughout the decade, Wanyande (1995) presents a more detailed analysis, describing the relationship between the state and mass media in independent Kenya as “uneasy and conflictual.” Just as the state “has continually accused the press of being unpatriotic and bent on serving the interest of Western nations at the expense of the interest of Kenya,” the media accuses the government of “undermining its freedom and right to inform and educate the public on matters of public importance.” Wanyande also notes that while each side’s perception of the other intensified following the advent of multi-party politics in the early 1990s, whereas “under one party rule, the state could, with relative ease, suppress attempts by the media to expose its shortcomings.” De Waal corroborates, noting that neither parliament nor the press had significant sway on the president’s decision to respond to calls for relief.

Though Kenya’s successful response to drought was prompted by a recognition of the people’s needs, it was not necessarily the result of any action by the press, and certainly not motivated by the threat of being voted out of office—after 1982, arap Moi dismissed political opposition and established a de jure single-party state. While on the surface this seems to follow Sen’s causal theory, any argument for a political contract in Kenya under arap Moi would be dubious at best. For both Botswana and Kenya, then, famine prevention efforts and political stability were aided by their governments’ direct provision of goods and services, as opposed to any more programmatic efforts—reflecting a sizable disparity between the selectorate and the winning coalition.

In summary, while under certain circumstances famine may become an issue salient enough to warrant continual prevention efforts (i.e. the formation of an anti-famine contract), this is not always the case. Further, it seems that in a country’s mission to avert famine, a free press and competitive elections are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions to spur government action. Though such action may not, according to de Waal, constitute a strict ‘anti-famine political contract,’ the distinction between such a contract and its diminished analogs—a program or commitment—is far from clear, and, more importantly, of questionable relevance.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

This section includes specific details on the elections and press of each case, as well as their ‘outcomes’ (e.g. whether they experienced famine or not). While I have attempted to include details regarding each case throughout the article where appropriate, this section includes consolidated summaries of each country’s relevant historical episodes.

Case Selection

For this project, I have chosen to consider all African countries that experienced a famine during the 1980s. This includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Uganda. Additionally, I have included Botswana and Kenya, both of which experienced drought and a reduction of marketed food, but managed to avert the onset of famine conditions.
Though Drèze and Sen also consider the island nation of Cape Verde as a positive example of an anti-famine political contract, I have not included this country in my analysis because it did not experience famine or the threat of food insecurity during the 1980s. With that said, the country’s experience does accord with my reformulation of Sen’s theory.

Analytical Narratives

BOTSWANA

Political Regime and Elections

Botswana, Zimbabwe’s neighbor to the west, was a British colony until 1964, when the UK accepted proposals for a democratic self-government. In 1965, the country ratified its constitution, and the next year, formally declared independence. The country has held regular elections since independence, which international observers have judged free and fair.

Though the country’s press has been rated “Free” by Freedom House since 1973, Botswana does exhibit specific authoritarian tendencies. Since independence, for example, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has won every single election by a considerable margin. Though the elections have been observed as free and fair, the BDP has “benefited from an uneven playing field, in which extreme resource and media disparities undermined the opposition’s ability to compete.”

Institutions of Famine Prevention

Scholars note the country for having “the most enduring [anti-famine] system on the continent.” Throughout the 1980s, though, the country’s harvests were insufficient to meet its needs.

Though Botswana’s electoral system—characterized by high levels of professionalism and accountability—is undeniably important to the country’s improvement and self-preservation, it is arguably not the cause of the country’s ‘implicit anti-famine political contract.” Instead, de Waal argues, this contract comes from “political commitment, a sense of administrative obligation, and accountability through participatory structures and electoral politics.”

Botswana’s anti-famine system of the 1980s was conceived primarily in response to its program employed in 1979-80, which was conventional and moderately successful. During this time, child malnutrition and mortality rates rose slightly, and much food aid was distributed poorly. In response, the government commissioned an independent evaluation that recommended the establishment of a famine prevention system modeled on India’s Scarcity Manuals. This solution, however, did not consider an important difference between the two countries: “in Botswana there was no mass popular agitation, but instead a government with a sense of obligation and a shrewd sense of where its electoral interests lay.”

In the interest of bureaucratic integrity, the government commissioned, considered, and discussed publicly eleven more reports, and in January 1982, Botswana formally adopted a set of guidelines for a Drought Relief Programme (DRP). Modeled on Indian policy, the program was eventually reorganized and renamed the Department of Food Resources (DFR). Though the ‘right’ to relief was granted and not fought for (as it had been in India), the DFR was “an example of the characteristically Botswanan process of consultation and consensus-making, not of adversarial vigilance,” which helped ensure its continued success.

After 1984, though (when Quett Masire was elected), the DRP shifted its focus from ‘human relief programs’ to agricultural programs, which were more expensive and economically regressive, and favored commercial and bureaucratic elites.

Press

The country’s constitution does not contain explicit guarantees of press freedom, though it does protect freedoms of speech, assembly, and expression, which are generally respected by the government. Freedom House consistently rated the country’s press as ‘Free’ during the 1980s.

Although the Botswana Democratic Party occasionally breached civil liberties by shutting down independent radio networks, placing pressure on private media by adjusting allocated state advertising funds, and occasionally prosecuted (or deported) critics under the 1986 National Security Act, “such abuse was neither as frequent nor as severe as other countries in the region.”

Episodes of Food Scarcity

xxi As a result, Levitsky and Way categorize Botswana as a “competitive authoritarian” state (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

xxii Historically, the country’s ability to protect its food security has also been aided by its (relative) wealth, though at the same time, an absence of popular (i.e. secondary) mobilization for civil rights has helped to undermine government responsiveness.
Drought struck the country in 1982, and continued for six years. By 1984, relief-related expenditures had grown to 15 percent of total government expenditures, and around 20 percent of the rural working population was employed in a labor-based relief program. As a result, even though the drought was longer and more severe than that of 1979, malnutrition rose only slightly before falling to levels lower than before the drought. No excess mortality was reported, and between 1980 and 1984, death rates among children and infants fell by over 30 percent.

During this time, though, the DRP began to spend considerable amounts of money on an Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme (ARAP). Designed as yet another relief program, in practice, it amounted to little more than a subsidy to rural elites. The program was also notable for having been designed in secret and announced over the radio, to the surprise of both civilians and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Begun as a one-year program, the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme was ultimately extended to four years and consumed over half of the Drought Relief Programme's annual expenditures. Seventy-five percent of this was taken up by a 100 percent plowing subsidy to tractor owners—commercial contractors who plowed more land than was ever cultivated. The expansion of commercial tractor ownership proved to be socially regressive, as well: by awarding subsidies to the individual in whose name the land was registered, customary land tenure institutions (communal/mutual ownership among many relatives) were destroyed, as were the equally complex customs regarding oxen ownership and lending. This led to greater income inequality, as well as increased plot sizes and agricultural output of larger farmers and a reduction or elimination of the agricultural productivity of smallholders. There was also a high misappropriation of funds, in contrast to most other Botswanan entitlement programs.

Once again, an independent evaluation was commissioned. Though the resulting report was highly critical of ARAP, its existence alone reflects an "enduring sense of government obligation for rural welfare." The evaluation ultimately recommended the government's delinking famine prevention from agricultural programs, and focusing on lasting solutions to the economic vulnerability of the poorest.

During this time, though the Drought Relief Programme's shortcomings were overshadowed by the economic effects of the country's diamond mining industry, Botswana's GDP grew at 18 percent per year between 1985 and 1990, up from 3 percent per year earlier in the decade.

Ultimately, the strengths of the Drought Relief Programme lay not in any explicit anti-famine contract, but in the "integrity of the public administration and the BDP's astute use of patronage and local institutions to ensure popular legitimacy while still pursuing policies aimed at enhancing the power and wealth of a commercial-governmental elite." Despite admirable levels of accountability, though, the program faced weakness in its inability to catalyze mass political mobilization for the enforcement of the government's commitment to relief. Instead, the poor still relied on structures of representation in which they had little power to set the agenda, such as Village Development Councils and general elections.

While the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme exacerbated economic inequality, the Drought Relief Programme augmented state power with respect to the rural poor by recasting patronage networks as focused on state structures, rather than customary exchange networks. Thus, drought and famine relief in Botswana remained "hostage to a patrimonial style of government, albeit a relatively benevolent one." Though Botswana's relief program is often invoked as a notable example of African anti-famine systems, it is important to remember that this ability was bolstered in no small part by the country's economic growth.

ZIMBABWE
Political Regime and Elections
Prior to the country's birth in 1980, Zimbabwe was engaged in a protracted war of independence, during which the Rhodesian counter-insurgency used food as a weapon. Their techniques involved the forcible relocation of rural populations and the restriction of rural food supplies, creating widespread hunger just before independence. The plight of the guerrilla struggle was, therefore, based in part on an intimate symbiotic relationship between the front
and the people, paving the way for a strong political contract.

However, two complicating factors exist when analyzing the Zimbabwean case. First, the revolutionaries invoked traditional spirit mediums to gain legitimacy, and second, the front constantly inflated claims of popular mobilization. Even before independence, then, there were few significant channels for popular representation, with dissent subdued by party politics.

February 1980 saw the creation of a liberated Zimbabwe, with Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party winning the first election by a considerable margin. Polity reports this election as regulated, competitive, and open (ideal conditions). Elections were held again in March 1990, though independent observers reported this election as neither free nor fair.

Institutions of Famine Prevention

As a leader, Mugabe was committed to several radical agendas, though in the end, a lack of executive ability betrayed him. Health and education services were improved almost as much as was promised before independence, and some structural inequalities of agricultural marketing were removed. Additionally, following drought in 1980, the government introduced temporary taxes to finance future relief measures without resorting to foreign aid. This levy was relatively successful, and its funds were used for relief programs after the (milder) drought of 1987.

Compared to other African countries, Zimbabwe's economy is vigorous and diversified, though some social and economic inequalities persist as colonial residues. Thus, the agricultural sector is starkly divided, with the majority of fertile land cultivated by a group of commercial farmers, while peasant production is largely limited to 'communal areas.' Even within these communal areas, there exists regional variation in both agricultural potential and access to infrastructural support, with further divisions between ethnic and class groups. As a result, despite the economy's relative prosperity, large sections of the population do live in acute poverty.

Although they receive almost no attention, Drèze and Sen highlight the direct entitlement protection programs undertaken by Zimbabwe as a significant factor in preventing the country's 1982-84 drought from precipitating a major famine. Though the country's food supplies grew around this time, "a close examination of the facts reveals that the prevention of famine in 1982-4 must be attributed as much to far-reaching measures of public support in favor of affected populations as to the growth of food supplies." Despite the government's "socialist aims," the country has maintained private ownership and market incentives, and since independence the country's social services—particularly those related to health and nutrition—have experienced considerable improvement.

Press

Prior to independence, restrictive laws consistently stifled the media. For instance, during the fight for independence, the government proscribed reports about casualties, and instructed the media only to report rebel casualties and their retreats to Zambia and Mozambique. As a result of this and other instances of restraints on the media, the fight for a free press became central to the struggle for independence.

However, after independence in 1980, Mugabe's government did not follow through with its pre-independence promises regarding media reforms. In fact, the only colonial act that was immediately repealed following independence was one that prohibited reporting on debates in parliament. In January 1981, though, the government established the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust to expedite the transition of media control from the white minority to all of Zimbabwean society. At this time, the Ministry of Information also imposed restrictions on the content of news reports, despite its emphasis on a free, non-partisan, and mass-oriented media.

This restriction on reporting was one of the primary reasons Gukurahundi was met with such little international outcry. In addition to limiting the scope of information contained in reports, the government imposed curfews and denied press access to affected areas. A state of emergency was declared, which allowed the government to "detain and arrest ZAPU leaders, and deport international journalists for their reporting of human rights abuses." On a systemic level, Zimbabwe was a 'Frontline State' during the Cold War, which allowed Mugabe to couch Gukurahundi as a campaign to
quash Communist-allied ZAPU dissidents. At the same time, Drèze and Sen argue that the press was “relatively unconstrained,” and that they played a great part in keeping the government focused on the drought.\footnote{88}

In the face of government pressure, though, the media did succeed in making advances in its ability to criticize the government. Later in the 1980s, one newspaper published an article about the country’s AIDS problem, the government was criticized for being a one-party state, and a widespread corruption scandal was exposed.

**Episodes of Food Scarcity**

Soon after independence, the country began to experience a drought. This lasted three years, and peaked during the second year (1983). Though Zimbabwe generally produces a grain surplus, in the worst affected areas of the country, harvests of Zimbabwe’s principal staple, maize, completely failed during the drought. To combat this, Zimbabwe imported food in an attempt to reduce variability in the food supply. Botswana, in contrast, was less predisposed to produce a surplus, and consequently resorted to propping up rural incomes during the same drought period. Zimbabwe’s strategy worked well in most areas, with local party chairmen doling out relief to those earning less than the legal minimum wage.

Following two consecutive years of massive reductions in maize sales to the Grain Marketing Board (see Table 6), remittances from relatives became a crucial line of support for many households, and, as in Kenya, many of the households whose members resorted to wage labor in the wider economy were found to be the least susceptible to the drought. For others, though, government relief became the main or even the only source of food.

Begun in 1982, the country’s famine prevention measures were taken early and given high political and financial priority. The main entitlement protection measures included large-scale food distribution to the adult population and supplementary rations for children under five. Weiner (1988) estimates the number of people for whom the government drought relief program supplied the primary means of survival during 1982-4 at about 2.5 million—roughly 30 percent of the population. However, that said, estimates of how many households actually benefitted from government food distribution are complex and varied.\footnote{89} Despite variation in estimates of the number of beneficiaries, though, the program is to be commended for its size and logistical complexity, though there were reports of delays, uncertainties, and frauds in the distribution of food.

The programmatic distribution of food faced its own difficulties, with some accounts describing the eligible population as limited only to households without any member in regular employment. There have also been disputes over how judicious the distribution actually was; though some suggest the distribution was fair, others argue that the pattern was indiscriminate and blind to people’s actual needs. Such variation may have stemmed in part from the politicization of the program, given that at times party members became involved in the provision of relief, leading to favoritism along party lines. Additionally, the distribution of food was limited to rural areas, an unusual focus for relief programs that tend to have an urban bias.

**Matabeleland**

While these successes were well publicized,
the conflict and famine in Matabeleland managed to avoid popular consciousness. Following inflammatory remarks by a high-ranking ZANU official, the region, home to many ZAPU supporters, was brutally suppressed by the government. This suppression came to be known as Gukurahundi. xxxiii Also known as the Matabeleland Massacres, the campaign lasted from 1982 to 1985, with an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Matabele murdered and tens of thousands more tortured in internment camps by Mugabe’s infamous North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade. 90

On the other hand, Drèze and Sen describe this conflict as a product of the program’s politicization, noting that “the coverage of the drought relief programme in Matabeleland, the stronghold of political dissidents, has been described as ‘exceedingly patchy’.” 91 Leys (1986) adds that the government blamed the dissidents for disrupting relief efforts, even holding them responsible for the drought at one point. These accounts, however, seem more concerned with the ‘official’ provision of aid and the mechanisms thereof, rather than considering the situation as a whole.

The year 1984 also saw the third consecutive harvest failure, causing drought relief to become a major source of food for people in Matabeleland. In addition to killing civilians outright, the Fifth Brigade exploited Matabeleland’s food dependence, with later reports noting the use of “food as a weapon of coercion.” 92 Curfews and blockades were set up across the region, and soldiers began to control or block all food supply channels. When relief was distributed, “recipients were not allowed to take any rations away, but had to eat their meals under army supervision,” amounting to “a sentence of starvation.” 93 Only after a unity agreement between ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 that merged their parties did the conflict come to an end, though this was at the expense of competitive politics. Though the Matabeleland famine has not been systematically investigated, there is strong evidence pointing to its place as the result of a power struggle between the two parties. 94

Despite this, Sen argues that the overall effectiveness of the country’s entitlement protection programs at this time is “beyond question,” with starvation deaths having been “largely and perhaps even entirely prevented.” 95 Bratton (1987) boldly argues that “no person in Zimbabwe died as a direct result of starvation,” though most are not quite so confident.

Beyond this, the government’s health and education efforts since independence have caused “a noticeable improvement in the health status of the population of rural Zimbabwe in spite of the severe drought,” most notably manifesting as an apparent decline in infant mortality throughout the drought period. 96 A decline in child morbidity (in relation to immunizable diseases, at least) was also reported around this time, caused primarily by the government’s widespread immunization campaigns.

Overall, evidence regarding the nutritional status of the population during the drought is mixed. Many informal reports stressed rising levels of undernutrition in the early stages of the drought, although there is some evidence that this statistic declined following an expansion of the relief program in 1983. Nonetheless, over the whole drought period, there is a lack of any marked change in the nutritional status of the total Zimbabwean population, a remarkable accomplishment given the initial severity of the drought.

KENYA
Political Regime and Elections
A British colony until 1964, Kenya gained its independence through peaceful elections. Following the 1978 death of the country’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, Vice President Daniel arap Moi assumed power and was met with support throughout the country. Though he followed in the footsteps of his popular predecessor, Moi was too weak to consolidate power until 1982, following a failed coup by Air Force officers. Political opposition was dismissed, and the constitution was altered to establish a de jure single-party state. However, Drèze and Sen note that the country retained an elected parliament, arguably allowing for some degree of responsiveness.

Institutions of Famine Prevention
Kenya has experienced remarkable economic growth and stability since independence. The economy features a strong private sector and a substantial public sector based on parastatal corporations. However, the country has limited natural resources and no petroleum production.

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**Footnotes:**

xxxiii “The early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains,” in the Chi-Shona language.
Approximately 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas, mostly on the 20 percent of land that receives enough rainfall to support agriculture. Trade of food grain is managed by the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), a government-owned corporation that sets prices by buying and reselling grain (mostly maize).

Press

At the time of independence, Kenya's media was mostly foreign-owned but friendly to the new state. Kenyatta's administration generally had a policy of nonintervention, and Kenyatta himself argued that the media should be free but responsible, with the administration having “frequently made calls to newsrooms, ostensibly to have some sensitive stories killed.” However, after 1978, when arap Moi assumed power, the press became subject to near-constant attacks by the government, including the arrest and detention of some journalists and editors.

Episodes of Food Scarcity

Early in 1984, the country experienced a hundred-year drought that cut production of maize by half. Wheat and potato harvests were down 70 percent, and pastoralists reported similar rates of livestock mortality. However, disaster never struck, thanks to the government's entitlement protection efforts.

Kenya generally experiences two rainy seasons per year (once in spring and once in winter). As a result, the onset of drought in April 1984, continuous sunshine during the normal 'long rain' season, was evident without any technical early warning system. Around this time, the government launched an active response to the drought, beginning with the importation of food. The government's ability to respond in this way was greatly aided by high market prices of coffee and tea, the country's largest exports.

At the onset of the drought, the National Cereals and Produce Board possessed a stock that could last only four to six months. At the behest of the President, an 'inter-ministry drought response coordinating committee' that was tasked with assessment and response was established. They initiated commercial imports of food, negotiated with international donors for assistance, and established a task force to manage imports and distribution.

This effort was aided greatly by the government's strong analytical capabilities, as well as an emphasis placed on ability rather than bureaucratic formality: “Junior clerks who operated microprocessors found themselves with immediate access to the Director of Planning,” resulting in unprecedented levels of productivity.

Early on, the government chose to frame the drought as a serious problem, though “it would not be considered a crisis.” Normal administrative systems would be employed, with additional labor sourced from the private sector as needed; the response would be handled by Kenyans alone.

The low profile adopted by the government helped keep public concern in check, and the country managed to avoid hoarding and public security issues typically associated with crisis droughts. The use of normal administrative systems also helped keep costs low. Most importantly, however, their use “provided a conceptual frame of reference within which everyone could work. There would be no crises-motivated ad hoc programs.”

However, despite the best efforts of the National Cereals and Produce Board, the inevitability of food imports soon became clear. Once the international community learned of the country's need for food, the response was “dramatic. The government found itself in the peculiar position of welcoming aid while discouraging the general public and the donors from characterizing the situation as a crisis.” Arap Moi's uncompromising stance on Communism may have influenced the international community's response as well.

To determine how much food would be needed and when it would be needed required an estimation of aggregate need. The Ministry of Finance and Planning approached this problem from two perspectives: The first focused on aggregate nutritional requirements, while the second focused on national production shortfall as a proxy for imports needed. Ultimately, the second approached was used, “because its relative simplicity facilitated operationalization, and because it would reproduce market conditions experienced in a normal year.” In the end, more than 850,000 metric tons of grain were imported.

Developing a schedule for the imports, however, proved to be particularly difficult. From negotiations with donors and initial assessments of the NCPB's stocks, it became clear that even
with the most efficient effort of all parties involved, foreign assistance could not arrive until well after the depletion of domestic stocks. It also became evident that almost all aid would arrive in the form of food, rather than money, forcing Kenya to import grain commercially to endure the span between the exhaustion of domestic stocks and the arrival of aid.

Another important question was the variety of maize to import. As Glantz (1987) notes, “[a]lthough there is little nutritional difference, Kenyans strongly prefer to eat white maize as opposed to the yellow varieties.” Unfortunately, Kenyans are unique in this preference, and there is very little white maize grown for human consumption outside East Africa, such that the variety cost about 30 percent more. Ultimately, the decision was made to import cheaper yellow maize, as “it was felt that this premium for aesthetic preferences could not be justified.”

Beyond saving money, importing ‘inferior’ yellow maize had a secondary effect of encouraging informal rationing by those who could afford alternative food supplies. Some scholars note that this ultimately contributed to a progressive distribution of grain. Because the yellow maize was less desirable than its white counterpart, the demand could be expected to drop substantially as soon as the rains resumed and white maize became available again. However, this meant that the government had to be careful not to import too much, as it could end up with stocks of valuable but unmarketable grain.

To further emphasize that the drought was a ‘serious problem’ rather than a crisis, the government chose to distribute food primarily via established commercial channels in an attempt to reduce variability in food prices and availability. This would help decrease the likelihood of any informal food economies, as well as maintain an air of stability and confidence. Keeping food prices at normal levels, however, required a substantial subsidy of grain and its transport.

Thus, entitlement protection efforts took two forms. First, the imported food was directed to help reduce variability in the food supply, and second, direct relief was provided to the neediest households.

Initially, the government attempted to accomplish the former through employment generation, developing a food-for-work system, though that scheme was eventually phased out in favor of rural development projects with cash wages (which had been successful in India). Additionally, early in the drought response, the government realized that despite its employment generation efforts, some households would need direct relief. As a result, District Commissioners were authorized to freely distribute food wherever it was needed, mainly through local chiefs who knew the needs of their community. By most accounts, the chiefs did an effective and equitable job, though in the end, most households receiving rations were given very little food (just some 5 to 10 percent of individual daily requirements).

A number of NGOs also became involved in the response effort, with some groups establishing their own import schemes. To ease this process, the government allowed organizations to draw grain from existing stocks, which would later be replenished by the NCPB. While most NGOs focused on food-for-work programs, some also provided seeds for future harvests. Though deserving of commendation, NGOs’ efforts proved almost impossible to coordinate—because these programs were established before the drought and were expected to continue afterwards, there was great reluctance to surrender autonomy for the sake of the larger coordination effort. As a result, people and organizations struggled to obtain adequate information for planning and management during the drought.

To combat this, the Ministry of Finance and Planning moved quickly to assemble pertinent information and began disseminating weekly reports on the drought response effort.

While Drèze and Sen attribute the government’s responsiveness to the actions of elected members of parliament, de Waal argues that the country’s ultimate “success in escaping famine was largely attributable to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap Moi, who recognized a rudimentary and implicit political contract: feed the central highlands and (most importantly) the cities, and the government will survive.” However, despite the successes of arap Moi’s regime in averting famine during this time, action taken ultimately amounted to little more than securing their own base of power and represented only a slight policy change from colonial times. Thus, though hunger was averted, the Kenyan government “avoided tackling the structural causes of poverty and vulnerability in both the highlands and the lowlands.”
Ultimately, Glantz argues, the success of Kenya’s drought response effort was a product both of official institutional action and cooperation by laborers in the name of national unity and pride. Cohen and Lewis (1987) stress the role ‘political commitment’ played in the government’s response, while Drèze and Sen emphasize the threat of political instability following the government’s failure to avert famine after the drought in 1979.107 The instability argument, however, seems especially appropriate, as the affected Central and Eastern Provinces were both politically important and meteorologically and economically unstable, and also because drought conditions reached the outskirts of Nairobi. Regardless, the Kenyan case provides insights that challenge and improve conventional prescriptions for responding to food insecurity.

Implications for Famine Response Efforts

Most prescriptions for famine response efforts are based on analyses of the worst famines during which, by definition, existing structures and systems are unable to cope with the demands placed upon them. Conventional wisdom dictates the creation of institutional structures designed specifically to respond to food shortages. Focusing on these types of responses, though, tends to overlook the effective action a government can undertake independent of purpose-specific institutions. By virtue of their non-crisis nature, the rare cases when government is successful in averting famine often go unrecognized, their significance unappreciated. Their importance, however, “lies in the fact that potential famines are prevented from growing to the point of attracting international attention.”108

The Kenyan case, on the other hand, suggests that there may be two major approaches to addressing food insecurity: the “permanent structural strategy typically recommended by the international community,” and a “functional standby strategy.”109 Without establishing any purpose-specific structural apparatus, Kenya’s government was able to draw upon the managerial and operational resources of existing administrative structures. While the country did undertake some steps deemed essential for food security, these were not integral to the creation of a crisis-response capacity. Rather, strategies that helped mitigate drought and famine conditions were part of a broader national development strategy, with their success reinforcing this as a viable linkage.

UGANDA

Political Regime and Elections

Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962, with the country’s first elections held the year prior. Though initially a republic, many debates occurred within the country over how centralized the government should be, with deep divides along national, religious, and ethnic lines. In 1966, Prime Minister Milton Obote suspended the constitution, and in 1967, a new one was ratified that expanded the president’s authority and abolished the division of traditional kingdoms.

In 1971, Obote was deposed by a military coup led by Idi Amin, who declared himself president, dissolved the parliament, and amended the constitution to give himself absolute power. Under Amin’s rule, the country experienced significant economic decline, social degeneration, and widespread human rights violations, resulting in the deaths of between one and five hundred thousand Ugandans. Following a border altercation with Tanzania, the Tanzanian army, with Ugandan exiles, fought for the liberation of Uganda, and in 1979, Amin and his armies fled to Libya.

In December 1980, the country’s first elections in eighteen years were held, which resulted in Milton Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress party returning to power. Though the Commonwealth Observer Group (a collection of groups formed to monitor elections throughout the Commonwealth of Nations) declared itself satisfied with the outcome of this election, there is considerable debate as to whether they were rigged.

Polity lists the country’s elections as having ‘Transitional or Restricted Elections,’ one category below competitive elections. The country has some of the highest scores on the continent at this time.

Following a military campaign against the Uganda National Liberation Army—comprised of exiled Ugandans against Amin (as well as Obote)—Obote was deposed in 1985, by military coup. Amnesty International estimates the Obote II regime as responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 civilians across the country.

Institutions of Famine Prevention

In July 1978, when crop failures signaled a
dearth of food, Amin's government took no action. In 1980, the situation escalated, and eventually gained international attention following appeals by elders and an exposé in London's Observer newspaper. However, by the time relief supplies began to arrive in June 1980, a large number of people had already died, and the situation was quite severe. In summary, during the 1979-80 food crisis, the government did not take action to avert famine conditions.

**Press**

Though the state and local press were silent on the 1980 famine until its exposure by Western media, the government had been alerted about the situation from 1978 onwards by way of food monitoring in Karamoja, crop acreage and harvest assessments by agricultural officers, and estimates of affected populations. By October 1978, there was correspondence at various levels of government regarding the food situation in Karamoja. Between September and October 1978, the District Agricultural Officers for South, Central, and North Karamoja had sent reports to the Provincial Commissioner for Agriculture, which described the loss of crops to disease and drought, as well as cases of starvation and migration by pastoralists.

However, almost all indications of the drought and impending famine occurred under the reign of Idi Amin. Shortly after assuming power in 1978, Amin “tortured and killed journalists... [and] shut down all newspapers except the one he used as his own propaganda vehicle.” Though Obote was perhaps only slightly less dictatorial than Amin, he did allow some independent newspapers to exist, “but their editors and journalists suffered constant harassment and prolonged imprisonment.”

**Episodes of Food Scarcity**

Since pre-colonial times, the Karamoja region of Uganda has been plagued by drought and famine. Since the 1970s, though, natural, social, and political events have left the area “disaster-prone,” with the majority of the population impoverished and extremely vulnerable to food shortages.

During the 1980 famine, between 20,000 and 50,000 people were believed to have perished. Though the famine was centered in the Karamoja region, it also affected a number of other districts whose economies were agro-pastoral and agricultural. But though these areas experienced extreme food shortages between February and July 1980, the intensity of the shortage and the disparity between the majority impoverishment and minority enrichment were both most notable in Karamoja.

Immediate causal factors included shocks to the rural economy in 1979 and 1980, including unusually low rainfall in 1979 and the war that ousted Idi Amin, both of which led to low agricultural production. The country’s inflation led to the sale of agricultural produce to meet peasant demands, but these stocks were bought primarily by speculative traders, who later resold them at prices unattainable by the poor. This led to further impoverishment as many households “resorted to sale of what they never would have considered objects of commercial transactions in normal times, i.e., land, cows, etc.”

Episodic shocks also occurred in the early months of 1980, with neighboring districts receiving unusually heavy rains that washed away most planted crops. The rampant theft of cassava from the fields also exacerbated normal seasonal hunger, and was largely attributed to people displaced from Karamoja.

Within Karamoja, drought and raids were prevalent. 1978 and 1979 were years of minimal harvest, due to natural conditions as well as political instability. After the war of liberation, Idi Amin's soldiers abandoned a stocked barracks in Moroto, a district within Karamoja. The guns were picked up and traded by locals, for many of whom this marked a considerable advance in defense technology.

This in turn led to increased violence among tribes, primarily in the form of raids. Conditions worsened, and many lost their herds. By the fall of 1979, food was scarce, leaving to elevated starvation and mortality rates. The situation deteriorated further in early 1980, with the arrival of cholera from Sudan and restrictions on road travel in and out of the Karamoja.

Because the Karimojong people face a harsh environment and limited technology, pastoralism forms the basis of their society, with livestock herds comprising their principal source of food. Thus, Karimojong cows are rarely slaughtered, with food instead coming from animal products like milk supplemented by crops like sorghum and millet. The irregular rainfall of the area makes rain-fed agriculture unreliable, and it is not uncommon for seeds to be sowed up to four times per season. In
addition, the low level of productive development means that even after good harvests, “what is produced is consumed before the beginning of a new season.”114 The pastoralist Karimojong are, therefore, extremely vulnerable to environmental irregularities, raids, or epidemics.

To avoid the loss of animals and alleviate suffering during times of disaster, traditional measures such as “avoiding environmental degradation, close community solidarity through the exchange of gifts and ceremonies, keeping part of one’s herds with relatives or friends, raids approved by elders and assistance to those who are victims of a crisis” are employed.115 However, during the 1980 famine, these traditional means of assistance collapsed across the region.

Overall, three factors were significant during the 1980 famine: livestock, security, and the limited role of rain-fed agriculture in the local economy. Areas that were hit hardest were also those with little livestock, due to raids, whereas those hit least were those with military superiority and animals.

In the end, the 1980 famine in Karamoja seems to have ended not through any concerted government action, but simply with the passage of time. Since then, the region has continued to experience recurring food shortages, including following drought in 1984. However, during this time, the country’s relative political stability allowed for a more effective response. Dodge and Alnwick note that the response of the UN, UNICEF, and other international relief agencies helped keep starvation deaths to a minimum, though “drought, armed conflict and the displacement of large numbers of people” still occurred.116

MOZAMBIQUE
Political Regime and Elections

Prior to its independence, Mozambique was managed by Portugal. Ten years of sporadic warfare and a leftist military coup in Portugal in 1974 allowed the Marxist-Leninist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) to take control of the territory. Within a year of Portugal’s Carnation Revolution, almost the entire Portuguese population had left Mozambique, and in June 1975, the country formally declared independence. The rapid exodus left the country’s economy in shambles. Soon after, civil war broke out against the western-aligned Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), lasting from 1977 to 1992.

From the time of independence to the resolution of the country’s civil war, FRELIMO was the only legal political party; the country’s first elections were not held until 1994.117

Institutions of Famine Prevention

Though droughts and famines have occurred throughout Mozambique’s history, in the past, people were generally able to carry out various coping strategies. Prior to colonial rule, people grew and ate drought-resistant crops such as millet, sorghum, and cassava. The arrival of European colonizers heralded the introduction of maize to the region, which soon became the national staple. However, maize is much more dependent upon rainfall, portending an era of precarious food security for the area.

In addition, the Portuguese forced African men to “grow industrial crops like cotton, and also forced them to provide labor in the mines of South Africa.”118 Beyond further exacerbating the area’s food security, this placed additional burdens on women to grow food crops in addition to their preexisting domestic and reproductive duties. As a result of these policies, labor migration became significant, yielding dependency on food imports as people failed to use remittances from South Africa to develop agriculture. In the 1940s and 50s, famine became increasingly common, and in 1965, Portugal enacted a ‘scorched earth’ policy along the Tanzanian border in its fight against FRELIMO supporters which often led to starvation.

At independence, FRELIMO assumed power and stifled all local trading, imposing a uniform policy of villagization and collective production that severely affected crop yields. It was through these policies, though, that FRELIMO hoped to invigorate industrial agriculture at the expense of peasant farming. This disruption was costly and ineffective, and made the urban population reliant on food produced through a centralized and mechanized system of production.

The time after independence also saw an unusual number of natural disasters. In 1977, the Limpopo and Incomati rivers flooded, damaging crops and livestock; in 1978, the Zambezi river also flooded, driving 220,000 people from their homes, and in 1979, Cyclone Justine damaged agriculture in
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the north of the country. Prior to 1980, however, the government was largely able to curtail damage via a Department for the Prevention of Calamities and Natural Disasters. Through this organization, the government was able to mobilize resources to deal with the crises, including foreign aid.

Episodes of Food Scarcity

In 1980, three factors contributed to the sharp decline in food production and marketing. First were military tactics used by RENAMO fighters, which were directed towards infrastructure, and the population displacement that resulted. Second were official policies that restricted rural trade, established communal villages, and forcibly recruited urban jobless to rural labor programs in the north. The third factor was the weather, which in 1983-84 “turned the economic disaster into widespread human tragedy.”

During times of peace, Mozambique is a fertile country which has little trouble feeding its population and producing exports, agricultural and otherwise. Between 1983 and 1984, though, the south-central region of the country descended into famine, with most commonly cited statistics placing the death toll at around 100,000. A second major famine occurred in 1987, centered on the eastern Zambézia province, which was the result of conflict.

According to UNICEF, over 600,000 people perished during Mozambique’s decade-long period of intermittent famine—a toll that compares to Ethiopia’s famine of 1983-85. However, except for 1983-84, there were not scenes of mass starvation. Instead, famine meant “chronic shortages of food and all consumer goods, constant insecurity and frequently homelessness, loss of assets such as livestock, and being forced to survive on a reduced diet of leaves and roots, and perhaps wild game, until it [became] possible to reach a food distribution center or plant and harvest a crop.”

In the early 1980s, an unusually severe drought affected most of central and southern Mozambique, with the poorest families starting to suffer extreme hunger. In Tete Province, many died of complications related to the lack of available food, though the famine received no publicity. In Gaza and Inhambane provinces, where RENAMO was the most active, an estimated twenty-five percent of normally marketed crops were lost. In the following year, as RENAMO attacks began in earnest, 100,000 Mozambicans sought refuge in neighboring Zimbabwe.

International aid was slow to arrive, delayed until the crisis had already struck. In 1983, Zimbabwe (itself combatting famine) was the major food donor to Mozambique, and it was not until early 1984 that more food aid was sent. After 1984, though, Mozambique became massively dependent on foreign aid: “Food shortages became chronic and food became almost unobtainable on the official market.” Where food surpluses did exist, they were sold on the black market or bartered, and in provinces such as Gaza, the black market accounted for as much as half of food surpluses. By 1986, harvests were down to roughly ten percent of 1981 levels. At the same time, Mozambique’s urban population increased as rural food insecurity deepened.

1985 and 1986 saw no reprieve from conflict and hunger, with a major RENAMO offensive in Zambézia Province in late 1986 coinciding with the planting season. After attacks began on roads, over 500,000 were reported as ‘at risk’ from famine, and over 270,000 were displaced.

At the same time, there was a severe food shortage in the northern Niassa Province due to floods, poor harvests, and RENAMO activity, placing 400,000 people at risk of famine. Additionally, 1986 floods in the Zambezi Valley washed away a portion of Tete Province’s first harvests following three years of drought, placing around 500,000 at risk of a food shortage.

Around this time, famine spread to the south of the country, even reaching the outskirts of the capital, Maputo. In Maputo Province, 60 percent of the population faced serious food shortages in 1986, with another 22,000 displaced by RENAMO activity along the South African border. In Inhambane Province, about 38 percent of the population was described as at risk, and in Sofala Province, almost 1 million individuals were placed in danger by the war. Serious malnutrition was also reported in the Chibabwa area, where RENAMO burned maize.

Marginal recovery occurred in 1987, when agricultural production grew by seven percent, though around this time, famine struck in Zambézia, previously the country’s wealthiest and least famine-prone province. While it is undeniable that many in Zambézia suffered hunger and destitution due to the
RENAMO occupation, the Mozambican Air Force’s counter-insurgency strategy, which included large-scale population displacement, was also to blame.

Despite this, there is little evidence pointing to RENAMO or FAM creating famine as an end. Instead, “the basic military strategy of aiming to control the civilian population leads to famine as a direct and foreseeable consequence... The logic of war-created famine has not been one in which starvation is used to kill people, but one in which the threat of starvation is used to control people.”

The abuse of food aid was also instrumental in maintaining famine conditions, with both RENAMO and FAM responsible for attacks on relief convoys and storehouses, as well as corrupt government officials and merchants systematically diverting large amounts of relief food.

Though famine was not a deliberate strategy, as one FAM officer explained, people were relocated “for their safety. Otherwise the bandits (RENAMO) would make them feed them. In remote areas we then destroy their fields—so the bandits will not become fat.” Between 1986 and 1988, 466 such ‘accommodation camps’ were established, though many were more significant as “nodes of government control in a sea of insurgency” which could not be maintained without international aid. As a result, the government’s access to relief became one of its greatest assets in the war.

The only tangible evidence of government forces systematically destroying crops as a tactic of war comes from their 1987 counter-insurgency campaign in Zambézia. Assisted by units from Tanzania and special forces from Zimbabwe, the operation entailed large-scale population displacement from districts that had come under RENAMO control. The government’s scorched earth policy during these attacks directly contributed to the 1987 famine.

All of this is not to say that RENAMO did not commit similarly grave atrocities. An early South African training manual for RENAMO, which taught readers how to ambush, retreat, and spread propaganda, also “advised units to ‘live off the land’ by capturing supplies and destroying everything remaining so as to deny the enemies access to it.” RENAMO also targeted infrastructure in its campaigns, including railroads, bridges, trucks, shops, FRELIMO offices, clinics, and schools. In 1982 alone, 140 villages were torched by RENAMO, and in 1982-3, they destroyed 900 rural shops. In addition to its tangible effects, the destruction of infrastructure was also symbolic, “cleansing the area of government presence, providing an outlet for accumulated grievances of the populace, and returning the countryside to a subsistence condition.”

However, one of the most devastating aspects of RENAMO’s campaign was the obstruction and diversion of relief. Between 1984 and 1987, RENAMO destroyed and damaged relief trucks, killed drivers, and stole or destroyed over 400 tons of food and relief supplies. Over half of these attacks occurred in 1987—a year which also saw some 4,500,000 people face famine and the displacement of 1,600,000 more. The destruction continued through 1988, and in 1989, RENAMO launched attacks on a railway line, destroying over 2,000 tons of relief food.

Beyond this, however, it is difficult to generalize about RENAMO’s operations, with the treatment of populations under their control varying considerably. According to accounts of Mozambicans who experienced it, RENAMO’s administration can be categorized by geographical, logistical, and local political factors, with areas subject to ‘taxation,’ ‘control,’ or ‘destruction’ modes of control. Given the fluidity of the insurgency, though, these categorizations are tenuous at best.

‘Taxation’ areas constituted much of RENAMO’s domain, and were used “to produce and services for the organization, with RENAMO frequently only imposing on the local population light tribute demands.” In ‘control’ areas, on the other hand, RENAMO attempted to establish health clinics, schools, and government institutions.

When Zimbabwe fully entered the war in 1985, RENAMO was faced with the threat of air-based attacks. In response, larger bases were fragmented and moved to inaccessible locations. As areas came under military pressure, civilian food supplies dwindled considerably. By 1985-86, this had helped undermine RENAMO’s support among the local population.

Finally, Maputo and Gaza provinces were ‘destruction’ zones, subject to “the seemingly wanton destruction of health, educational and economic

xxiv In 1991, a senior RENAMO official confirmed the role of food in their strategy: “Food is a tool of war, we use it to make strategic gains, but so do the FRELIMO Marxists!” (Karl Maier, 1992).

xxv In most cases, though, these were nothing more than poor replicas of the system RENAMO had previously destroyed.
infrastructure, and food stores and food convoys."\textsuperscript{128}
From these areas, for example, came four reports one year of aid vehicles being destroyed, rather than first removing the cargo. Empty trucks were also targeted on occasion, further hampering the government’s relief efforts.

These displays of dominance, then, were dramatic indicators of RENAMO’s destructive capacity, signifying a “deliberate and effective weapon of war. [This conspicuous destruction] sends a very vivid message to the thousands of hungry deslocados (displaced people) waiting for food relief to arrive in their accommodation centers and is very effective in eroding morale.”\textsuperscript{129} In some instances, these displays signaled to the population a choice between RENAMO and starvation. Thus, in the end, food security all but dictated military strategy.

After the death of Samora Machel, Mozambique’s President, in a 1986 plane crash, Joaquim Chissano, his successor, implemented sweeping economic and political changes. In addition to transforming the country from Marxism to capitalism, Chissano successfully carried out peace talks with RENAMO, bringing the civil war to an end in 1992. Around this time, a new constitution was created that created a multi-party political system, a market-based economy, and free elections. By 1993, more than 1,500,000 Mozambican refugees returned from neighboring countries in one of Africa’s largest repatriation efforts.\textsuperscript{130}

**Press**

Throughout Mozambique’s civil war, there were many human rights violations. Even since the cessation of hostilities, there have been many concerns regarding infringements of the press and other civil liberties, although the country has improved in recent years. Consequently, during the 1980s, Mozambique’s press was rated as ‘Not Free’ by Freedom House.

**ETHIOPIA**

**Political Regime and Elections**

Unlike other countries in this study, Ethiopia was never colonized by a European power. In 1974, though, the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I was brought to an end when he was deposed by a Marxist-Leninist military junta known as the ‘Dergue’ (“committee” or “council” in Geez). Led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the junta established a one-party communist state after assuming power.

**Institutions of Famine Prevention**

Prior to 1974, there had been little successful protest action, and no urban food riots. Indeed, the early stages of the revolution were relatively non-violent. De Waal notes that at this time, Ethiopia was (on paper, at least) better equipped to prevent famine than ever in its history. Rather, “the shortcoming was that while the famine played a role in the revolution, the famine-vulnerable people did not.”\textsuperscript{131} After the revolution, reforms were imposed from above, making tenuous the gains of the revolution, and causing the government to struggle with its legitimacy.

During the power struggle that followed the revolution—the ‘Red Terror’—extractive policies were implemented to sustain the ever-increasing army. Around this time, a central food extraction institution was also established, though in practice the corporation simply supplied food to a few select cities—the same pattern of distribution as under the Emperor.

Overall, the Dergue’s economic policies had disastrous consequences that caused mass impoverishment and were partly to blame for the scope of the country’s 1983-85 famine. While the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), an anti-famine bureau established in the final years of the Empire, once produced comprehensive analyses of poverty and famine in Ethiopia, by the 1980s, the RRC had become compromised as a tool of the Dergue.

Tasked with collectivizing Ethiopia’s workforce and procuring foreign assistance, the RRC was very successful in securing aid, though much of the food was used to supply militias (especially in Eritrea and Tigray). Elsewhere, the RRC “pushed international agencies to set up relief programmes in surplus-producing regions, where the [government] continued to collect substantial quotas.”\textsuperscript{132} The RRC was also instrumental in spreading propaganda which framed the 1980s famine as resulting from overpopulation and drought, downplayed the role of war, and claimed that all victims were being reached by it and other aid organizations. However, despite these distorted claims, the RRC never interrupted the flow of early warning information, which could have
inhibited its ability to procure aid.

Press

During the country’s 1973-75 famine, Emperor Selassie suppressed information about the situation, and it was not until a newsreel aired on Canadian television that the international community began to respond. After the explosion of international attention, Ethiopia’s government sought to restrict foreign media and relief agencies, though this only drew more attention. The revolutionary Dergue used this attention to their advantage, culminating with the creation of a UN Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia (UNEOE). Though intended to be an authoritative source of information, the government deliberately obscured information, including their own reports.

During the Eighth Offensive, a domestic military operation launched in February 1985, the UNEOE did not mention any offenses, even those that involved direct attacks on relief operations. They consistently downplayed reports of forcible resettlement, rebutted independent research, and even appealed for aid at resettlement sites.

Thus, not only did the government’s control over media serve to veil its repressive military actions, but it was also able to influence the content of news that was released. This allowed the government of Ethiopia to exploit the international humanitarian community for aid through its own channels as well as through the UNEOE, while simultaneously engaging in continued domestic conflict.

Episodes of Food Scarcity

While many speak of ‘the Ethiopian famine’ as a homogeneous national phenomenon, this is misleading. This image, though, allowed the RRC to claim that it had been predicting the 1983-85 famine as early as 1981. In reality, many of those affected were in one section of the country, afflicted by a wholly different crisis that was precipitated by the Dergue’s war with various ethnic groups. Further doubt is cast on the RRC’s claims when one considers the unreliability of local statistics at that time. As late as early 1984, no one could truly have predicted the famine, with food production estimated as above average for 1981 and 1982 (see Table 7).

It was not until February 1983, when “destitute migrants [turned] up at feeding centers,” that signs of famine began to arise. International NGOs began appeals for aid, and the RRC quickly revised its assessment and claimed a major production shortfall, retroactively identifying drought to cover destruction wrought by government forces.

Though the country’s 1983 harvest was far from disastrous, famine occurred in the northern province of Tigray. In 1984, the short rains failed, and the RRC played up the incident as causing catastrophic famine, though it was not until the main harvest of 1984 that severe drought spread to the eastern and southern parts of the country. Though not nearly as prolonged or severe as the famine in the north, the figures were conflated in government statistics, giving the impression that the entire country was suffering from a unitary crisis.

While drought and harvest failure contributed to the famine, neither they nor the government’s economic and agricultural policies can be considered direct causes of the famine. Rather, the country’s famine was principally caused by the government’s counter-insurgency campaign in Tigray and Wollo: “The zone of severe famine coincided with the war zone, and the phases of the developing famine corresponded with major military actions.” Five elements of Ethiopia’s counter-insurgency strategy in particular helped catalyze famine: military offensives aimed at rebel strongholds in surplus-producing regions, the bombing of markets in rebel-held areas, severe restrictions on trade and movement, forced population resettlements, and the manipulation of relief programs.

Until early 1984, international donors were (justifiably) skeptical of the Ethiopian government’s appeals for relief amidst mounting evidence that diversion and abuse of aid were employed as tactics in counter-insurgency efforts. In October 1984, however, the famine was thrust into the international media spotlight. Though this mobilized some, others felt the exposure resulted from collusion between private relief agencies and television broadcasters. Western governments’ priorities at the time were simply to avoid embarrassment, such

xxvi A less partial indicator of famine is the price of grain, which was consistently high in eastern and central Tigray, with elevated prices rippling outwards following the 1984 harvest failure (see Table 8). Rainfall data from the time corroborates this theory, with localized droughts occurring in 1983 alongside above-average rainfall in other areas.

xxvii In addition, the broadcast aired during prime fundraising season for relief agencies, causing NGOs to compete for media exposure.
that “aid became a strategic alibi.”

In response, the Ethiopian Government sought to restrict media and relief agencies, drawing further attention to the situation. However, the Dergue soon began to use the relief presence to their advantage with the creation of a UN Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia (UNOEOE). The office’s purported mission was to coordinate relief efforts with the Ethiopian Government and to centralize the flow of information, though these functions were already served by other organizations. This left the UNOEOE, de Waal notes, to help maintain the appearance of competent action towards the famine without antagonizing the Dergue.

Nonetheless, the official UN view was that the agency enabled a broader and more effective response force. The Ethiopian Government intensified its actions (the creation of famine and manipulation of aid), and the UNOEOE acted as its mouthpiece, with journalists frequently turning to it as an authority on the topic. Rather than investigating abuses, though, the UNOEOE “consistently concealed disturbing evidence, including evidence produced by its own monitors.” In the same month as the establishment of the UNOEOE, for example, the Dergue launched a ‘silent offensive’ in Eritrea, so named for its lack of publicity.

The one international agency to withdraw from the country in protest was Doctors Without Borders (MSF), who departed soon before the government ordered their expulsion. MSF later published a damning report of the situation, though this only caused other organizations to discredit them on the basis of incompetency. Thus, the relationship between international humanitarian actors, the media, and the Ethiopian government greatly impeded any systematic evaluation of the famine.

Following a UNOEOE report on Tigrayan garrison towns that dramatically overstated the proportion of people receiving satisfactory rations, the US government was forced to become an accomplice in the cover-up. Days earlier, the US Congress requested that President Reagan determine whether Ethiopia had used starvation as a weapon of war, a tactic that would have provoked the US to take action. While the Presidential Determination ultimately argued that the Dergue’s policies “have no doubt caused vast unnecessary suffering including starvation,” there was no evidence of deliberate use of starvation at that time (a qualifier that allowed Mengistu’s administration to escape further scrutiny).138

The US also felt pressure domestically to continue providing humanitarian assistance: following popular aid concert events in England and America, it became a priority to be seen as giving generously. Because media and politicians were prohibited from visiting rebel-held areas, “it was necessary for US assistance to have a high media profile in government-held areas,” depoliticizing the famine and allowing the Dergue to exploit the media presence.

Among areas of Tigray held by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the greatest force against famine was the political relationship between civilians and the TPLF, who believed that the peasantry was crucial to succeed in revolution. As the TPLF began to undertake more quasi-governmental programs, it continued to involve the rural population. The TPLF had drawn support from peasants since its inception, so their political contract had become enforceable. Had the TPLF lacked the support of the locals, it would have been crushed militarily.

As the war and food crises intensified, the TPLF

Table 8: Relative Food Production in Ethiopia, 1977-84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>122</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: 1974-6 = 100 (de Waal, 1991)

xxviii Though its ineptitude was not the cause of its expulsion, it is not inconceivable that MSF was politically naive: “its field staff were unaware of the implications of reporting on what they had seen, and had they been more experienced they would have followed their colleagues in other agencies and remained silent” (de Waal, 1997).

xxix A convenient scapegoat for the famine was found in the natural environment, the tropes of which are familiar: drought, overpopulation, and unsustainable land-use practices. ‘Saving’ the environment became a popular nonpolitical way for Western (particularly American) donors to send aid to communist Ethiopia.

xxx The TPLF also established a relief administration with the face of an independent NGO, though in practice it was “virtually indistinguishable from the civil administration of the front” (de Waal, 1997).
also shifted its focus to economic and social policies over military action. These policies, including wage employment, money lending, and trading, helped to greatly reduce variability in individual purchasing power, and further promoted the idea of the TPLF as a governing force.

Ultimately, de Waal concludes, Ethiopia’s famines of the 1970s and 80s are “replete with ironies, which are explicable only by attention to the existence or not of an anti-famine political contract.” While the failed response to the 1973 famine was “highly intellectual, elitist and institutionalized,” the response to the 1983-85 famine was, for a time, thought of as a major policy success for the government of Ethiopia. At the same time, the TPLF largely did not receive recognition for its productive efforts.

SUDAN
Political Regime and Elections

Prior to its independence in 1956, Sudan was under the purview of the British, who allowed the establishment of a democratic parliament following a series of polls. At independence, de Waal notes, Sudan exhibited two structures that “stood as guarantees against localized food shortages degenerating into famine (in the North at least).” The first was a civil service with a reputation for professionalism, which tasked itself with safeguarding local food supplies, and the second was the system of ‘native administration’ of villages and sub-districts.

However, the situation was undermined by political instability in the form of multiple coup attempts, the migration of many of the country’s professionals, and the failure of Sudan’s ‘open door’ strategy for attracting foreign investment. Additionally, there was rampant corruption under the rule of Jaafar Nimeiri, who seized power in 1969. As a result, Sudan defaulted on its foreign debts, causing Nimeiri to appeal to international lending and aid organizations, and to invoke a spirit of ‘national reconciliation.’ In practice, this meant abandoning political alliances with secular professionals as well as the South, and Nimeiri’s rule “became characterized by an embrace of political Islam and deepening economic dependence.”

At this time, the country’s legal system began a process of ‘Islamization,’ with the appointment of a prominent Sudanese Muslim Brothers member to the post of Attorney General.

Over time, prominent secularists and religious leaders left the regime, and the situation in the South degenerated into civil war. In an attempt to legitimize his government’s use of political Islam, Nimeiri declared Islamic law in 1983 and proclaimed himself Imam. In so doing, however, he made the claim that he was accountable only to Allah, eliminating any remaining shred of commitment to popular welfare. By this point, Sudan was experiencing a massive influx of remittances; the country was also deeply indebted to foreign governments. As a result, the government became significantly less accountable to its internal tax base, and “instead [relied] on the apparently magical liquidity of Islamist financiers.” Meanwhile, capitalist investors began to withdraw, and Islamic banks and merchants began to invest, “exploiting their tax privileges, political connections and access to hard currency.”

Institutions of Famine Prevention

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Sudan’s renowned system of local government began to decay. Inflation devalued government salaries, and many civil servants joined the migration of professionals to the Gulf States. Corruption was widespread, and experiments in regional governance fostered factionalism, further lowering morale.

During the 1980s, Sudan became a strategic player in the Cold War, and was seen as key to the anti-communist strategy after it changed alliances from East to West. Despite the country’s massive offshore debt, Nimeiri exploited this position to receive more foreign aid, making Sudan the recipient of the most US foreign assistance in sub-Saharan Africa (over $1.4 billion throughout the decade). However, this foreign assistance, combined with multiple debt reschedulings, served only to...
prolong the country’s impending economic crisis. The management of Sudan’s debt was such that “by 1984, Nimeiri’s treasury was living from hand to mouth.” Eventually, the country defaulted on its debt to the IMF, making Nimeiri accountable primarily to financiers in Washington.

Around this time, reforms demanded by the US and IMF included the “widespread privatization of nationalized corporations and the radical slimming down of the state budget.” These were welcomed by Islamist merchants, to whom it provided greater leeway for investment. At the same time, more non-state actors began to become involved in the reconstruction of southern Sudan, following the 1972 peace agreement. Unlike before, though, foreign aid was now being channeled to foreign NGOs over whom the Sudanese Government had no control.

Press

The Library of Congress reports that since the country’s independence, Sudan’s mass media has largely served to disseminate information supporting various political parties or official government views (depending on the power structure at the time). Radio has “remained virtually a government monopoly, and television broadcasting [has] been a complete monopoly.” Freedom House corroborates, awarding Sudan scores of zero (‘Not Free’) for print and broadcast freedom until 1987, when print media gained some freedom.

In the end, the famine in the South failed to become a political scandal in Sudan. In addition to a lack of interest by political groups in the North, northern journalists rarely covered the crisis, which would have meant traveling to an active war zone and challenging security restrictions. Equally important, though, was the lack of significant interest among readers: “Apart from the English language Sudan Times (edited by a Southerner), only the Communist al Meidan showed an interest, and that was largely connected to the political implications of the militias.”

Though press freedom plainly “did not exist” under Nimeiri, the Library of Congress notes that under Mahdi, Sudan had numerous political newsletters, as well as independent newspapers and magazines. Following the coup by the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, all newspapers were banned.

Episodes of Food Scarcity

In 1983, the specter of famine loomed as drought reduced food production by seventy-five percent in north Kordofan, north Darfur, and the Red Sea Hills. Local governments attempted to distribute relief, but were restrained by tight budgets and meager stores. Rains failed again during the summer of 1984, and conditions became increasingly desperate. Apart from a (largely symbolic) declaration of emergency in Darfur, however, no action was taken by the government. There were mass migrations to towns and cities, including Khartoum, but around this time children in rural areas began to die.

Though Nimeiri felt himself accountable only to Allah, in reality he had actual or potential financiers as well, to whom “the drought and famine were an embarrassment and a distraction.” In an attempt to persuade international donors that Sudan was stable and a good recipient of aid, Sudan was forced to deny classifying the troubles in the South as war. Because the conflict was not ‘war,’ militias were mobilized instead of the army. Similarly, the government did not admit to famine, which would have shaken investors’ confidence.

In the end, Nimeiri’s strategy for averting famine was simply to deny that any problem existed. In November 1984 he said publicly, “The situation with respect to food security and health is reassuring;” it was not until January 1985 that he admitted to the reality of the situation. By this point, though, it had been a full year since drought became apparent, and an estimated 250,000 had perished.

The famine did help solidify a broad coalition against Nimeiri, led by professionals, including doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. In November 1984, the Ministry of Health broke ranks and published an honest report of the famine conditions. Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Agriculture released estimates of relief needed that contradicted those released by Nimeiri. The famine also divided the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the single political party at the time. With the defection of Sudan’s largest city, there began the formation of an urban-rural alliance that would overthrow the 146

xxxi. By early 1984, the FAO estimated the relief needed in Darfur at 39,000 metric tons. Khartoum cut the figure to 7,000 metric tons, and even less was delivered. Nothing was sent to Kordofan.
government.\footnote{Omdurman, population 526,284 in 1983.}

In April 1985, there was a popular uprising by democratic forces. While the fall of Nimeiri was a "triumph of the politicization of famine," the coalition which formed to overthrow him was fragile, and its use of famine largely tactical, such that in the end, no robust anti-famine political contract would emerge.\footnote{40}

Perhaps the most blatant example of political opportunism during the famine, though, was "the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which used its radio broadcasts to chastise the government for inaction over the famine, while the SPLA itself was helping to create famine in the south."\footnote{154} After the fall of Nimeiri, many who once mobilized against the famine lost interest, and the political agenda shifted. By this point, interest in overcoming the drought came only from those still affected by it.

Immediately after the fall of Nimeiri, Dr. Al-Jazuli Daf’allah, became interim prime minister and promptly delegated responsibility for relief to international agencies (in light of Sudan's now-bankrupt economy). In addition to helping depoliticize famine, this solidified the crisis as within the domain of relief organizations, rather than being owned by the democratic forces behind the uprising—famine prevention became an internationalized technical issue, rather than a political one. This shift was reflected in the establishment of an early warning system that monitored economic, climatic, and agricultural data, reflecting "the neo-liberal agenda for eviscerating government responsibilities."\footnote{155}

In 1986, democratic elections returned to Sudan, though they were spread over a twelve-day period and delayed in thirty-seven constituencies due to the civil war. After the elections, Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Umma Party assumed power. During this time:

Sudan enjoyed all the institutions of liberal democracy, at least in Khartoum and other urban centers. The press was uncensored and vigorous, and often highly critical of the government. Political parties, trade unions and professional associations were free to mobilize. There was no suspicion of fraud in the elections. The judiciary was independent and on several occasions overruled government decisions.\footnote{156}

It is arguable, though, that this liberalism was "much a reflection of the weakness of government as of a true spirit of tolerance; but the freedoms were genuine and were used by, among others, human rights activists."\footnote{157}

At the same time, this period saw the most severe famine in Sudan's modern history. In the South, famine was caused by the ongoing civil war. The government endorsed proxy militias to conduct raids, which were frequent, widespread, and devastating. Livestock were stolen, villages were destroyed, wells were poisoned, and people were killed indiscriminately. Militias were also implicated in the capture and enslavement of civilians. Those who managed to escape fled to garrison towns, where they were forced to sell their labor and assets cheaply, and were often prohibited from moving farther north, where there was the possibility of work or charity.

Local government officials and army commanders also prevented relief assistance from reaching displaced people, and an estimated 30,000 people died in Western Sudanese displacement camps that year. Localized famines were also created by the military, whose tactics included raiding and scorched earth.

Due to the militias’ connections to Sadiq's Umma Party, a war economy eventually developed, with a vested interest in the conflict’s continuation. Additionally, for some politicians, merchants, and officers, the violence, famine, and failure of relief represented a policy success.

Despite this, though, there is little evidence that points to a strategic plan to use the famine as a weapon of genocide. Instead, the “moral, political, and economic logic of the war as interpreted in Khartoum created a space where such near-genocidal motives and practices could flourish”\footnote{158}

The South was not only a war zone, but also an area with no legitimate political authority, which allowed state agents to act with impunity. This ‘abolition of restraint’ did not develop automatically, of course, but was the result of state and local politics: "Khartoum still had clients and allies in the South, whom it had to mollify, and who had power bases in their own right. But in Khartoum, the famine was virtually invisible."\footnote{159} At the same time, the Sadiq government was exceptionally sensitive to the demands of Northern constituents, especially those from urban areas, and established a subsidy on
wheat that was prohibitively expensive (equivalent to roughly 7 percent of government revenue). The insistence by the IMF to remove this subsidy in March 1985 helped contribute to the downfall of Nimeiri, and while Sudan’s donors insisted it should be further cut or abolished, Sadiq refused to touch it, despite other agreed-upon austerity measures. Even the mention of cutting the wheat subsidy drew crowds in the streets, such that “all government finance was hostage to this single issue,” as well as reducing the government’s accountability to a single, limited constituency.160

In the end, Sudan’s famine failed to become a political scandal as interest waned among journalists and the general public. The SPLA also proved an obstacle to the peace process, placing military victory over political mobilization. At best, the SPLA represented ‘benevolent paternalism,’ while at worst, it was violent and extractive. Tactics used by the force created food shortages in many areas by requisitioning food, labor, and livestock, and exacerbating shortages in others. Garrison towns were reduced to starvation, and relief supplies were consistently blocked, inhibiting efforts by Northern politicians to build anti-famine alliances with affected populations.

A glimmer of hope for relief came following widespread floods in August 1988, when “there was criticism from all quarters over corruption and favoritism in the distribution of relief,” but as the issue was gaining attention, the ruling coalition collapsed following a dispute regarding Sharia law.161 The 1988 peace accords between the SPLA and the Democratic Union Party (DUP), the second largest political party, made no mention of famine or famine relief, and it was only later in the year that Western donors took up the cause. By the end of 1988, pressure from Danish and American governments yielded Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a plan proposed, designed, and implemented almost exclusively by international relief agencies.

Ultimately, political liberalism was unable to substantially alter the lines of accountability established in the final years of Nimeiri’s regime. The exclusivism of the government combined with a lack of significant opposition and an emphasis on international assistance contributed to an environment hostile to any democratic institutions that would provide protection from famine. Additionally, the government was only sensitive to its urban constituents, and there was no urban-rural or North-South coalition that could promote broader accountability.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE AFRICAN CASES

I have argued that while Amartya Sen’s theory that a free press and competitive elections would allow a country to avert famine is not entirely accurate, its underlying causal mechanism is valid. However, press freedom and competitive elections are by no means the only mechanisms of accountability that could prompt a government to take action to avert famine.

By examining Sen’s cases—Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan—as well as Mozambique and Uganda (thus completing the set of all African countries that experienced famine during the 1980s, I argue that although the causality is valid, in most cases, countries’ famine prevention efforts were not motivated solely by freedom of the press or competitive elections. Moreover, the presence of either institution in a country does not guarantee the prevention or aversion of famine conditions. In some cases, the domestic press prompted a government’s response to famine, while in other instances it was the international media that exposed a crisis. Yet, in other cases, action was not taken despite a free press, reflecting either a lack of incentive to report food shortages or a lack of political imperative to act on the information. Thus, while a free press is, if anything, likely to expedite famine response efforts, it is by no means necessary or sufficient. Additionally, while representative politics are generally considered necessary to align the interests of politicians with the voting population, they are by no means sufficient.

Beyond raising questions of what factors are sufficient to prompt a response to famine, this finding challenges the necessity of a representative form of government for such an effort: in all institutional forms of government, the key political incentive—maintaining power—remains the same.

De Waal answers this by noting that despite the existence of other accountability-promoting institutions, the press and elections may be used by people to sanction elected politicians for past actions, while simultaneously projecting a (vague) image of desired political action. In this way, a contract
is formed which indicates to those in power the importance of a particular cause, such as preventing famine. In a liberal political system, various mechanisms can afford this ability, while under an authoritarian regime, the people's only recourse is protest, peaceful or armed.

However, as with famine versus chronic hunger, the threshold of an anti-famine political contract versus a commitment is less than clear, and, more importantly, of questionable relevance.

First, in reality, there is no perfect means of enforcement in representative politics, and so there can be no 'pure' manifestation of a political contract. Second, while the preconditions for a contract are the same as for a commitment, the latter seems little more than an impermanent version of the former; the two can only be distinguished in retrospect.

More significantly, though, is the scope of a contract, both in terms of the parties involved and the content of the agreement. While an anti-famine political contract includes the government, the people, and famine, in theory, variation in each may lead to 'impure' contracts and possibly famine conditions. In Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Kenya, for example, an anti-famine contract may be claimed to have existed, though only for a specific portion of the population (i.e. a greater disparity between the selectorate and the winning coalition).xxxiii,162 Additionally, while an agreement (be it a contract or some other pact) between a state and the people may entail the prevention of famine conditions, the government may be free from addressing more fundamental causes, such as structural poverty or vulnerability to food insecurity, a pattern observed in Kenya in 1984.

Ultimately, freedom of the press and the regulation, competitiveness, and openness of elections cannot be considered panaceas for the prevention of famine. While these mechanisms of accountability are undeniably important to improving the quality of governance, they must be

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**Table 10: Relief and Political Representation by Region, 1986-87**

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(Keen, 1994)

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xxxiii In terms of selectorate theory, this scenario would result from a disparity between the selectorate, “the set of people who have an institutional say in choosing leaders,” and the winning coalition, “the minimal set of people whose support the incumbent needs in order to remain in power.” (Mesquita et al., 2002)
### Table 11: Polity IV Executive Recruitment Concepts and Component Variables

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## Table 12: POLITY Scores for All African Countries

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On October 1, 1949, the day of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the People’s Daily ran an announcement from the newly established All China Democratic Women’s Foundation, calling on the women of China to welcome the newly established government. “Under the leadership of this government,” it said, “we women will achieve liberation and enjoy the right of male-female equality, and we will be able to effectively contribute our energies to participate in the building of a new China.” The statement represented the official continuation of the Chinese Communist Party’s longstanding commitment to the political platform of gender equality. Although the Party’s internal structure was thoroughly patriarchal, Party leaders advanced a comprehensive and radical agenda of women’s liberation in their writings, which drew widespread support from women in China, especially in the upper middle classes. A commitment to women’s political participation at levels well above what was featured in the Party at the time was fundamental to that agenda. Mao himself spoke in 1934 of a future in which women were liberated from the institution of marriage. But “first,” he said, “comes the possession of political freedom.”

Contemporary China has not realized the lofty goals of early Party rhetoric on women’s equality in politics. Its failure is by no means unusual. Data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union indicate that women make up just 21.3 percent of parliaments worldwide at the beginning of 2014. Higher positions of power are even more elusive. In 2010, just 11 of 192 heads of government worldwide were female. Chinese views on the role of women in politics are fairly typical internationally, roughly at the median of Inglehart and Norris’s data set of sixty-two countries that measures popular views of women’s place in politics. Many of the prejudices they identified that bear on Chinese women seeking careers in politics echo those experienced around the world. Chinese...
men, like men of most other countries, often perceive women with political ambitions to be passive, lacking in leadership ability, and dangerously seductive.

London School of Economics professor Jude Howell centers her brief survey of the history of women's political participation in post-1949 China around her concept of “state-derived feminism”:

not just the official gender ideology in post-1949 China but also the set of practical strategies used to enhance women's status and the particular institutional arrangements made to that end. … It has a monopoly on the explanation of women's oppression, on the management of social change, and on the imagination of the alternative.

Howell sees state-derived feminism as the driving force behind “the cycles of advance and retreat that have characterized women's numerical representation in politics and government since 1949.” She analyzes these ebbs and flows throughout four historical periods. Participation surged in the early 1950s, during the first years of the Mao period. A brief decline followed in the early 1960s, but participation picked up again from the late 1960s through the 1970s during the most infamous movement in post-1949 Chinese politics, the Cultural Revolution. Mao's death and the subsequent “reform era” of state overhaul under Deng Xiaoping precipitated a more extended fall in the 1980s and 1990s. Under Howell's framework, participation rises when the Party needs to mobilize women “for the purpose of socio-economic transformation, raising economic output, or for ideological and political ends”; it slumps when “the heat of political campaigns cools, and/or when economic restructuring requires adjustments in the labor force.” The strength of state-derived feminism is largely dependent upon its juxtaposition with the larger political, economic, and social needs of the state.

Howell's essay stands out in the literature on Chinese women in politics since 1949, because it combines a broad historical sweep with an unusual level of theoretical sophistication through its conception of state-derived feminism. Nevertheless, more than ten years after the essay's publication, the reform period deserves a new narrative. Howell and other earlier scholars of women's place in reform-era politics present a picture of uninterrupted decline, and some scholars today still subscribe to this view.

More contemporary scholars, however, present a more positive narrative of reform based upon trends from the past two decades, but they have yet to have yet to engage with the struggles of the early reform period documented by earlier scholars.

This essay attempts to reconcile the “declinist” thesis with the successes of the past two decades that have come into focus in the works of more recent scholars. In doing so, it seeks to show how the “monopoly” state-derived feminism held in determining female representation in Chinese politics has weakened during the reform period to bring about a more nuanced relationship between state feminism and civil society pressures. The declines of the early reform period—from the late 1970s through much of the 1990s—reflect the dominance of state feminism. The progress of the next two decades, or late reform, in part reflects state feminism's increasingly positive influence, manifested in the edifying effects of economic development and in policies promoting women for cadre selection. However, that progress also owes to the growing women's movement in Chinese civil society, whose influence on policy in the past two decades has challenged the place of the state as the sole driver of changes in women's role in Chinese politics.

The paper will unfold as follows. The first section will examine the decline in representation levels in the early reform period from their highs during the early 1970s. Many general overviews speak of this decline as a single, temporally consistent process, but I divide it into early and late reform. The former features a rapid drop during the early 1980s, followed by a subsequent period of stagnation through much of the 1990s. Early reform represented the state's determination to leave the tumultuous politics of the early 1970s behind; late reform reflected institutional developments in the Chinese bureaucracy that produced a very different environment for female political hopefuls. In both cases, state feminism suppressed female representation, because doing otherwise would not have been compatible with state ends. The second section will focus upon the interplay between state feminism and civil society feminism in lifting women's representation levels during late reform.

I will focus primarily on women's positions within relatively prestigious organs in the party-state bureaucracy: the National People's Congress (NPC),

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ii She presents her analysis in terms of three periods: the 1950s, the Cultural Revolution, and the reform era. I speak of four to include her analysis of the 1960s, which she uses to set up her discussion of the Cultural Revolution.
Central Party Committee (CPC), and Politburo at the national level, as well as assorted leadership positions at subnational levels. I will supplement this data with statistics on membership in the neighborhood and village committees. My choices here follow the general approach in the literature, though it is restricted by lack of complete access to data in other parts of the bureaucracy.

FROM REVOLUTION TO MODERNIZATION: DECLINE AND STAGNATION THROUGH THE 1990S

The declinist thesis of women’s representation in reform-era Chinese politics draws much of its salience from the struggles that women faced from 1978 through much of the 1990s (what I call "early reform"). Representation had peaked during the political tumult of a decade in Chinese politics known as the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The bulk of the reform-era decline occurred in the early 1980s, as the Chinese state sought to distance itself from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Subsequent changes in the Chinese bureaucracy further ensured that female representation remained low through much of the 1990s.

The Early 1980s Backlash Against the Cultural Revolution

The early 1980s was a time of rapid retreat for Chinese women in politics. From the Politburo to the bottom rungs of the cadre hierarchy, female representation had reached unprecedented levels during the Cultural Revolution due to exceptionally strong central support. However, this level of support fell with the Cultural Revolution, as the Chinese state under Deng Xiaoping shed its focus on social equality to concentrate on economic modernization. As a result, by the mid-1980s, the gains of the Cultural Revolution had almost completely disappeared. This disappearance revealed just how superficial and state-dependent these gains really were.

The Cultural Revolution offered an unusually favorable environment for prospective female cadres. The decade featured a succession of nationwide factional struggles as Mao sought to purge his opponents under the guise of a campaign against Chinese society’s anti-communist elements. He complemented these purges by seizing control of cadre selection to introduce a wave of proletarians into the party-state bureaucracy. Maoist analysis had always viewed female oppression primarily through the lens of class struggle, and so women with political aspirations—especially proletarian women—were appropriated as a class free of bourgeois leanings. Official policy required that each leadership group (lingdao banzi) had to have at least one female cadre in order to be approved. Female prospective cadres also benefitted here from the ascent to the Politburo of Mao’s controversial wife Jiang Qing in 1969, who used her political and personal status to become a powerful proponent for greater female representation.

As a result, female representation in elite politics (Tables 1-3) is widely considered by scholars to have reached levels unprecedented in the history of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution. Women reached the Politburo during this period

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for the first time in the country’s history, though the three who reached full member status were wives of top leaders Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and Zhou Enlai. However, two women were named alternate members who did not have such status: Wu Guxian, an uneducated textile worker anointed as a “labor heroine” by Mao himself, and Chen Muhua, a longtime revolutionary who had risen through the ranks since joining the party in 1938. Representation in the National People’s Congress rose sharply as well, peaking in 1975 at 22.6 percent in the general body and 27.1 percent among full members of the standing committee. More importantly, the proportion of women among full members of the Party Central Committee—the actual seat of decision-making power—reached its apex of 10.3 percent in 1973.

The Cultural Revolution also brought gains to female representation at lower levels of politics. Nationwide statistics are hard to come by for this period, but the proportion of female cadres reached 16-20 percent of cadres at district, county, and bureau levels in Beijing by 1972. Women also constituted 17-22 percent of cadres in Shanghai’s Party Committee and its Revolutionary Committee, which was the Cultural Revolution-era proxy for municipal government. Female representation at lower levels of the Party and the state was also strong, as women’s share among lower-level cadres in Shanghai was almost 50 percent. As for the Party itself, 13.5 percent of new recruits into rural Party branches were female between 1966 and 1975. More impressively, however, 11 percent of rural Party branches in 1973 had female secretaries or deputy secretaries, a sign that the traditional view that women can only handle women’s work was perhaps starting to erode.

In 1978, two years after Mao’s death, the Chi-

### Table 2: Female Representation in the Standing Committee of the NPC (Full Members)

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<td>138</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (2008)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (2013)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Female Representation in the Party Central Committee (Full Members)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Committee (Year Selected)</th>
<th>Number of Female Members</th>
<th>Number of Male Members</th>
<th>Share of Female Members (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th (1956)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (1969)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (1973)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (1977)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (1982)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th (1987)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th (1992)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th (1997)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th (2002)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th (2007)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th (2012)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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iii The executive body of the Communist Party, and, as such, the second-most powerful political institution in the PRC behind the Politburo Standing Committee, a subset of Politburo members that works as a sort of inner cabinet and is responsible for the state’s major legislative decisions. The Politburo has both full and alternate members; alternates are nonvoting.

iv Ostensibly the highest state legislative body of the PRC, though true legal authority lies with the Politburo, and especially the Politburo Standing Committee. The NPC historically served as a rubber stamp for laws ratified by the Politburo, but it has started to assert some degree of independence since the 1990s. It rarely rejects Politburo legislation today, but debates in the NPC have become an important forum for resolving disputes between the Party and other parts of government. The NPC also has its own Standing Committee, with around 5-7 percent of the members of the overall body. As with the Politburo, the NPC Standing Committee meets more regularly than the full NPC—several times a year, as opposed to just once—and is more powerful than the larger body.
Chinese leadership launched the Reform and Opening Up (gaijie kaifang) program. The initiative sought to center state policy around a pragmatic approach to economic development instead of the ideologically charged dogmatism that had defined Chinese politics throughout the Mao era. Five years later, the Cultural Revolution-era gains in women's representation had disappeared. Women's share in the first reform-era Party Central Committee in 1982 dropped below 1969 levels to 5.2 percent, and no women were promoted to the new Politburo.\(^v\) Female representation only shrank marginally in the following year's National People's Congress as a whole, but saw a precipitous drop in the NPC Standing Committee, falling to just 9.4 percent in 1983.

Lower levels seem to have experienced a similar clear-out. Wang Qi cites evidence from leading Chinese women's studies scholar Li Xiaojing that one to two-thirds of the cadres removed from office were female during the dismantling of the revolutionary committees in 1982-83.\(^24\) Wang Yinpeng presents official data on the share of female leaders in what Wang Qi calls “State organs and their working bodies” in 1982, and found only 9 percent at the provincial level and just 5 percent in the country's prefectures, cities, and counties.\(^25\) The female share of new cadres in rural Party branches fell from 13.5 percent in 1966-1975 to 8.6 percent in 1977-1982.\(^26\)

Wang Qi writes that the Cultural Revolution “went down in history as a golden age for women's representation in China and is still remembered as such.”\(^27\) But the rapid reversal of the 1980s exposed just how limited that golden age really was. This reversal can in part be explained by the transformations in the Chinese party-state bureaucracy in the post-Mao era. The push to recruit more technically and professionally accomplished cadres—that is, cadres with educational backgrounds far more abundant among men than women—was inseparable from the program of economic modernization that lay at the heart of Deng's vision for China.\(^28\) Still, such a drastic decline in women's representation cannot be attributed solely to a modernization program that was only in its infancy. Deng and his supporters had a positive program for overhauling the state, but they first had to excise the legacy of Cultural Revolution, a decade of turmoil so extreme that, in their eyes, it demanded a wholesale rejection. Women were easy targets for this because of traditional social prejudices and because they were one of the favored classes of Mao and his deposed supporters.\(^29\)

Comparing China in the early 1980s and post-Soviet states in the early 1990s provides a useful illustration of the role of the state in China's transition-era decline. Women experienced a drastic decline in political representation after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the female share in the national parliaments of post-Communist Europe, for instance, fell from a regional average of 30 percent to less than 10 percent in the new states.\(^30\) Admittedly, the post-Soviet decline was a product of elections as opposed to changing top-down selection mechanisms, and the Soviet bureaucracy did not seek out uneducated cadres as Mao did in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the U.S.S.R. and Cultural Revolution China both featured states that that (1) had appropriated formal female representation for their own political ends and (2) were politically abhorrent to their successors.\(^31\) As a result, when those states collapsed, female political participation sank as well.

**Stagnation Through the 1990s**

The low levels of female participation that emerged in the early 1980s remained in place well into the following decade. This was especially true at the lowest levels of government. In 1993, the female share of chief and deputy chief positions was 3.8 percent in townships and small towns, 5.9 percent in counties, 5.1 percent in cities, and 4.1 percent in prefectures.\(^32\) The average recruitment share of female cadres in rural Party branches dropped to 5.9 percent in 1983-1990.\(^33\) As late as the early 2000s, one survey of 218 villages in Zhejiang found that half of local Party branches did not have female members.\(^34\) The provinces showed almost no improvement in the female share of leadership positions between 1982 and 1990.\(^35\)

The national level showed some small gains. The number of women in the Central Committee held more or less steady between 1982 and 1992, even as the size of the body overall shrank by 10 percent, and representation in the NPC Standing Commit-

\(^v\) The body of the Party charged with selecting members for the Party's most important positions, including the General Secretary, the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and the Central Military Commission. The Central Committee has more power within the broader party-state apparatus than the NPC, but its pseudo-democratic structure still belies a top-down approach to Party leadership selection.

\(^vi\) Unfortunately, Wang does not specify what she means by “State organs and their working bodies,” and I did not have access to the almanac from which she drew her figures.
The CPFF, but they are functionally powerless.)

Not a delegates from China's various political parties as well as appointed individuals wider range of voices than most other party-state organs. It is comprised of

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12 international and domestic audiences alike—as late as 1994, China ranked here, the Chinese government can buttress its place in these rankings for

parliaments, but by preserving a relatively high level of female representation in national parliaments.

comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, who measure the share of women

vii other women's group could match. However, state

The lack of progress reflected the dearth of state support during this period for women's participation in government. The Organization Department did not issue its first regulation specifically on selecting female cadres in the reform-era period until April of 1988, and the first with actual numerical targets came only in 1990. Statistic rhetoric no longer sought to efface gender differences as it had during the Cultural Revolution, leading to renewed acceptance in public discourse of traditional views of women as passive and domestic. Meanwhile, the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF)—which cooperates with the Organizational Department to provide input on short-term and long-term plans for female recruitment—found its funding and staffing resources increasingly constricted. To be sure, the ACWF's potential as a champion has always been limited. The organization succeeded the All China Democratic Women's Foundation in the 1950s as a state-affiliated "mass organization," tasked with transmitting Party policy and ideology on gender to the masses. Party ideology since the founding of the PRC has included the doctrine that women's liberation is merely a subset of economic liberation, rather than a separate problem in need of a tailored approach. Moreover, the ACWF is a sub-ministerial organ, which limits its access to top Party decision-makers. Nonetheless, the organization could still provide politically-inclined women with a level of state access that no other women's group could match. However, state

policy in early reform left the ACWF gutted. Staffing reductions meant that some townships had just one or two ACWF staffers, while many counties in the early 1990s had just 500 RMB for ACWF activities annually after payroll expenses.

In the absence of explicit state support mechanisms, women were expected to compete with men for cadre positions solely on the basis of suzhi, or "quality." The concept of suzhi is a uniquely post-Mao Chinese concoction: an amalgam of ideas about Confucian malleability, Maoist self-cultivation, and the reform bureaucracy's predilection for technical and professional competence, all coalescing into a mainstay of official discourse. Today, educational background tends to serve as a proxy measure, and as such, its influence on cadre selection is profound. More than half of Party members in the early 2000s had at least completed high school, and almost 90 percent of local officials had college educations. This emphasis on education itself disadvantages women, given the persistent educational achievement gap in contemporary China. Moreover, gender prejudices seep into perceptions of female suzhi. In the context of cadre positions, suzhi entails excellence in fields such as logic and abstract thinking, which traditional conceptions of gender treat as women's weak spots. The concept of suzhi also blames inequalities in women's access to political power on female inadequacy rather than structural injustice, discouraging governing bodies from adopting affirmative action policies. Women's groups in China have not rebelled against this turn per se. The ACWF's efforts to bring more women into politics since the late 1980s have consisted in large part of efforts to improve women's suzhi, taking up programs offering technical training and instilling in women four qualities associated with suzhi: self-respect (zizun), self-confidence (zixi), self-reliance (zili), and self-strength (ziquiang).

The early reform changes detailed above affected women's representation through the traditional methods of cadre recruitment via state appointment. But the late 1980s saw the introduction of a new means of a cadre selection for village-level administration: elections. The NPC Standing Committee adopted elections for village government in 1987, and a nationwide survey in 1990 showed that 75 percent of villages had held their first elections, with half of these featuring more candidates than seats.
were not show elections—voters in Shandong alone ousted 10,000-20,000 cadres in 1995. In practical terms, elected village committees are not as powerful as village Party branches, and, in particular, local Party secretaries. Nonetheless, they have taken over a broad array of economic management functions that were handled by people's communes in the 1960s and 1970s. They also serve as an important channel for villagers to enter the Party, as successful candidates from outside the Party are usually recruited for membership. In this sense, their establishment served as the village-level equivalent to the post-Mao transformation in cadre selection methods at higher levels detailed above.

Many scholars claim that the introduction of competitive elections has brought about a decline in women's political participation at the village level. While these scholars give plenty of evidence that elections are gendered, they cite almost no data to show that elections make for a more gendered cadre cohort than what was experienced under the people's commune system, and it is difficult to find data on gender differentials among village-level cadres to assess their claims. But it should be noted that even early Mao-era village governance seems to have made plenty of room for women: according to Wang Fenghua, 70 percent of villages during the 1950s had female heads or deputy heads. In the early 2000s, however, just 1 percent of village committee chairs and 16 percent of members were female, for an average of two female committee members per three villages.

Regardless, the disadvantages that women face in Chinese village elections are indisputable—they are less likely to be named as candidates, and less likely to win when they run. These disadvantages in part reflect traditional views on gender among the rural Chinese. The end of the Mao-era suppression of gender and the introduction of elections has given these views full public expression. An early 2000s survey in rural Zhejiang found that 73 percent of respondents considered political participation to be “men's business.” In contrast, results from the 2005 World Values Survey (WVS) indicate that 53 percent of Chinese citizens nationwide consider men more capable political leaders than women. Moreover, the introduction of elections has disadvantaged the large proportion of rural women who marry men from other villages; such women are expected to move to their husband's village, and so they find it more difficult to accumulate the needed social capital to mount a run for office. From the same Zhejiang study cited earlier, a sample of female cadres from twenty-three villages found that just 13 percent had married into their villages, compared to 63 percent of women in the villages as a whole.

One might view the negative impacts of elections cited above as collateral damage from a progressive state policy. But as with cadre selection at higher levels, the state's treatment of women in politics has also actively harmed female villagers' chances as candidates. The 1987 Organic Law of Village Committees that established elections contained the stipulation that village committees should include “an appropriate number of women” (funü yingdang you shidang de mingè), but no explicit quotas were introduced until 2010. In the absence of stricter dictates, the clause became functionally interpreted as “no more than one” female member, out of each village committee's three to seven slots. Meanwhile, an early 1990s survey of twenty unsuccessful female candidates in Liaoning cited in Rosen highlighted how the consistent shunting of women into women's work hurt the chances of female candidates. Those who did have government experience had accumulated it primarily in “soft” jobs in fields like culture and education, and as a result, voters doubted their leadership and management abilities. Others came from backgrounds in “woman's work,” a term for jobs related to family planning; the unpopularity of these policies undercut their efforts to mobilize support. Beyond this, the funding and staffing reductions at the ACWF mentioned above weakened a resource that sought to link women with mobilization aids like lineages and higher-level officials, which are more easily available to male candidates.

After the sharp declines of the early 1980s, Chinese women's representation in politics showed little improvement through much of the 1990s. The introduction of elections in the villages and the modernization of cadre selection at higher levels, combined with the weakening of the state's active mechanisms to promote women in politics, fostered a very difficult institutional environment for women with political aspirations. Many of the challenges that such women faced in this period—the suzhi discourse, toothless state dictates, and, of course, traditional notions of women's unsuitability in politics—continue

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Note that the elections were initially established as a trial; they were adopted in full in 1998, and the new law preserved the language.
to work against female political participation today. Still, other developments over the past twenty years have brought about real, although very much incomplete, improvements. I turn to these below.

A FITFUL ADVANCE: REFORM-ERA PROGRESS IN WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION

The data on women’s representation in Chinese politics suggests substantive improvements in women’s position over the past twenty years, most strikingly at lower levels of government. These improvements in part follow from measures that, as with Mao-era feminism, realized gender equality for ulterior state purposes—improving China’s image in international eyes, or more indirectly, strengthening the educational qualifications of the Chinese labor force. But credit also goes to the growing women’s movement in Chinese civil society, which, through its influence on the AWCF, has contributed to a succession of progressive initiatives regarding the composition of the bureaucracy: affirmative action, policy plans, and even a change in cadre promotion criteria. In this sense, the developments of late reform suggest that the concept of state-derived feminism is no longer sufficient on its own to explain changes in women’s representation in Chinese politics; civil society feminism matters as well.

Women’s formal representation in Chinese politics has grown on a number of fronts over the past several decades. The share of female cadres over the entire bureaucracy has increased steadily since the start of the 1990s, from 31.2 percent in 1991 to nearly 40 percent in 2007. Women’s presence in the Party also expanded, from 15.1 percent in 1993 to 19.2 percent in 2005. Once again, improvements have been concentrated in lower levels of government and at the grassroots level. The share of women among village committee members nationwide reached 21.7 percent in 2008, and the proportion of female heads inched up from 1 percent in 2000 to 2.7 percent. Women made up 13 percent of mayors nationwide in 2006, up from 5 percent in 1989 and 10.9 percent in 2001. One metric that fell was women’s representation in the urban neighborhood committees, from 59 percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2011. But this seems to be a positive sign as well. The existence of a female skew in gender ratios in 2000 suggests that the neighborhood committees have been gendered as women’s work. Such gendering is certainly consistent with their lowly standing; neighborhood committees are the lowest administrative unit in urban China and lack the level of self-governance afforded to their counterparts in the villages.

Progress at higher levels has been less consistent, though recent years suggest a possible uptick. The proportion of women among provincial-level elites sat at 10 percent in 2004, no different from similar figures from Yinpeng Wang calculated for women among leaders of what Wang calls “state organs and leading bodies” in 1990. The share of women in the CPPCC increased from 9.2 percent in 1993 to 16.8 percent in 2003, but female representation in the NPC and CPC reached their low points post-Mao in 2003 at 20.2 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively. More recently, however, representation in the NPC rebounded to its highest level in history in 2013, and the female share of full and alternate PCC members reached its reform-era peak of 10 percent. More importantly, the Politburo admitted its first woman in the post-Mao era in 2002. Today, it has two female members for the first time since 1969, Vice-Premier Liu Yandong and Tianjin Party Secretary Sun Chunlan. Neither of them are wives of high-level cadres or “labor heroines,” as were the three Mao-era female full Politburo members. Rather, Liu Yandong and Sun Chunlan’s posts such as Vice-Chairwoman of the CPPCC and Party Secretary of China’s trade unions, respectively, have given them experience leading a host of different elements of the party-state bureaucracy.

Some of these reform-era improvements in women’s representation in Chinese politics reflect the force state feminism has championed most vigilantly since the launch of Reform and Opening Up: economic development. As Louise Edwards points out, this view is in certain ways consistent with traditional Party theory on women’s liberation, by which “it would be assumed that women’s status would be broadly improved with each increase in GDP—including in the sphere of political participation.” But if Mao-era state feminism promised liberation through development, it also mobilized women in

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60 If these figures seem high, note that most statistics cited to this point in the text refer to women in national positions or in leadership roles at sub-provincial levels, as opposed to more mundane assignments.

xi Urban neighborhood communities are the urban equivalent of the village committee, whose members have also been elected since 1990.

69 As with the instance cited above in fn. 8, Wang does not specify what she means by “state organs and their working bodies,” and I did not have access to the almanac from which she drew her figures.
the political and production processes to accelerate development itself. The reform-era vision of liberation through development is more passive, with more of an emphasis on raising GDP levels and less on the targeted mobilization of women to realize that purpose.

Edwards is skeptical of this strategy, and, in some ways, she is right to be so. Speaking broadly, development’s impact on female representation in politics is tricky to assess. It is true that villagers tend to have a more conservative outlook on gender roles than urbanites, but using the urban-rural divide as a proxy for development assumes too tight a connection between urbanization and development. More targeted analyses of development give more ambiguous results. As noted above, for instance, WVS data on Chinese attitudes towards women’s place in politics shows no significant change between 1995 and 2004, despite annual GDP growth consistently hovering around 10 percent during the period. One might object that such changes would not appear over such a small time period, but a geographical comparison between locations at different GDP levels in China is likewise ambiguous about the significance of development. A gender equality index constructed by Fubing Su in his 1999–2004 survey of provincial-level elites suggests that levels of development, as measured by per capita GDP, have only a small impact upon women’s representation in politics.74 The impact for development is much smaller, for instance, than whether the unit in question is an autonomous region, a centrally administered city, or a province, or whether the region has a high sex ratio. Meanwhile, at the grassroots level, Guo, Zheng, and Yang’s study of Zhejiang villages found that the villages with the highest share of women’s representation on their village committees tended to be ones of moderate wealth.75 Poorer villages lacked the consciousness to push against traditional gender norms, while wealthier villages were solely focused on economic development, the perceived province of men.

International comparisons are also useful in pushing back against explanations centering around economic development. Japan’s per capita GDP exceeds $45,000, and yet it ranks 122nd out of 142 countries in the latest Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) tables on women in national parliaments.76 Montgomery also observes that national parliaments in Post-Communist Europe demonstrate no clear connection between economic development and women’s share: Slovenia excels economically but has seen no change in women’s representation, whereas Bulgaria’s economic weakness does not prevent it from having one of the strongest female presences.77

Inglehart and Norris’s analysis of IPU tables against GDP per capita demonstrates a strong correlation between economic development and female representation, but consideration of individual cases as above indicate that economic development here is likely disguising other factors.78

Nonetheless, economic development has bolstered women’s place in reform-era Chinese politics in one very specific way: by shrinking gender disparities in educational achievement, a key prerequisite for cadre selection under the discourse of suzhi. The gap in male and female gross enrollment ratios at secondary schools shrank from 13 percent in 1983 to 8 percent in 1997.79 The post-1999 expansion in college enrollment has also made major dents in post-secondary education gender gaps. A study by Wei-Jun Jean Yeung calculated that the male-female odds ratio for progression from senior high school to college fell from 1.84 to 0.99.80 The Party has aged moderately for much of the reform period, but recruits still skew heavily young: 75 percent of Party recruits 1997–2002 were under 35.81 In this sense, the Party is drawing from a pool of potential cadres in which men and women are increasingly similar in terms of their educational qualifications.

These shrinking gender gaps emerge directly from the state’s efforts to accelerate development through expanded access to education. Decades of growth have increased demand for skilled labor in the Chinese economy, a challenge that the state has addressed through massive investments in education. Due to the post-1999 expansion in higher education mentioned above, annual college enrollment increased from 1 million in 1998 to 6.3 million in 2009.82 At the lower levels, the number of elementary schools in China rose consistently between 1980 and 2000, and slots in secondary schools have likewise seen steady increases.83 These initiatives have not been specifically targeted at gender disparities, but they have nonetheless allowed schools to accommodate a wider array of students—an important development, given traditional preferences for educating males.84 The state’s fixation on bolstering the Chinese economy has pressed it into this expansion.
It has also funded the expansion by improving tax revenues.85

The heightened demand for skilled labor in China has also raised payoffs for education.86 Urban China saw the marginal return of a year of education almost triple between 1992 and 2003 alone, from 4.0 percent to 11.4 percent. Education has become the primary factor determining whether rural workers can find more lucrative off-campus jobs.87 Returns for women in urban China are even higher than those for men.88 As such, parents during the reform era have an increasingly powerful incentive to obtain good schooling for girls.

Shrinking gender gaps in educational achievement constitute a “supply-side” explanation for the increases in female representation over the past twenty years—more women have attained the educational qualifications needed to become cadres. To be sure, it is not a comprehensive explanation. Analysis of 2000 Census data in Hannum and Yang suggests that Hunan is a middling province in terms of educational outcomes, but its village committee representation rates are exceptional.89 Shanxi’s educational outcomes for pre-1980 birth cohorts are equal or better to Hunan’s, but its village committee representation rate is among the lowest in the country: just 7.7 percent.90 These inconsistencies indicate the shortcomings of any analysis that links women’s progress entirely with educational attainment.

At the same time, women’s place in politics during the reform era has also benefited from “demand-side” initiatives by the state: a bevy of dictates on women’s participation in politics, following the Organizational Department’s first reform-era regulation in 1988 mentioned above. The first PRC law on women’s rights was passed in 1992, followed by the first national reform-era gender equality program in 1995, which explicitly set forward the goal of raising women’s participation in politics.91 In 2001, the Organizational Department expanded on the quotas it suggested for sub-county bodies in 1990 to propose figures for participation at higher levels: at least one woman in every government leadership group (li_ing_dao banzi) and Party standing committee, along with specific targets for participation in these at the province (10 percent), city (15 percent), and county (20 percent) levels.92 The 10th NPC in 2007 mandated that its successors be at least 22 percent female and followed up in 2010 to demand that one-third of village committee seats be reserved for women.93 More intriguingly, “an index of women’s participation” has been added as a criterion in officials’ performance evaluations.94 Subnational state organs have also taken steps of their own. In particular, several provinces have issued regulations requiring at least one woman in village committees and other governing bodies.95 Hunan, in particular, is widely acclaimed as a progressive province.96 Representation in Hunan village committees is more than 30 percent female, and 17 percent of mayors in 2003 were women, well above the 2004 national average of 10.9 percent. To be sure, most state regulations on women’s participation in the reform era have no enforcement provisions.97 Still, the state’s success in meeting many of its targets—such as those set by the National People’s Congress, or the Hunan mayoral and village committee level—suggests that these regulations have had more than a nominal impact.

State-derived feminism can explain in part the impetus for this raft of reforms. After the events at Tiananmen Square, the Chinese leadership hoped to improve its image worldwide by hosting the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, awarded to China by the UN in March of 1992.98 The event needed to be accompanied by a demonstrated commitment to women’s rights domestically in order to have the desired impact on international audiences.99 The 1992 law on women’s rights and the 1995 gender-equality program, in particular, reflect these pressures.

Still, the concept of state-derived feminism cannot account for the role of the burgeoning Chinese women’s movement in bringing about the sorts of changes. In the early years of the reform period, the collapse of the communes closed important channels for women’s engagement in public life. As a result, production became an individual rather than a collective effort, and so women were once again relegated to domestic affairs (Rosen, 1995). Since then, however, the growth of civil society has created a new space for public expression. That space has manifested itself most prominently in the late reform explosion in social organizations focused on women’s issues, especially in the cities.100 Women’s studies was unknown as a discipline in China until the ACWF held the first conference on the subject in 1983.101 Ten years later, with the Beijing Conference approaching, sixteen research centers had been set up
around the country.\textsuperscript{102} The energy around women's issues persisted well beyond the Beijing Conference; in 2000, there were 50,000 women's associations affiliated with the ACWF alone.\textsuperscript{103}

The growth in civil society women's groups has had little effect on citizen attitudes towards women in politics; calculations based on WVS data suggest that the proportion of Chinese who considered men more able in politics than women was consistently a slight majority from 1995 to 2004.\textsuperscript{104} Still, this proportion has been able to influence official policy in at least some capacity through the efforts of the ACWF, the only organization with the status to push for any serious policy change. In the late 1980s, under the influence of civil society feminism, the organization became increasingly disenchanted with its mandate to champion the Party line.\textsuperscript{105} It has since grown more willing to represent women's interests when they clash with Party interests.\textsuperscript{106} That shift has manifested itself in its efforts to improve women's representation at a host of levels: putting forward candidates for local People's Congress elections, offering training for prospective cadres, and lobbying for stronger quota provisions.\textsuperscript{107} Organizational Department regulations on female cadre participation are formulated in conjunction with the ACWF. The existence of concrete targets in 1990 and 2001, as well as many of the subnational circulars noted above, were a direct result of ACWF input. At the grassroots level, Judd's ethnography of a county in Shandong Province shows how pressure from the local ACWF branch brought about a surge in women's participation in local village committees.\textsuperscript{108}

At this point, I should briefly discuss women's political representation in China from another angle: intra-bureaucratic gender gaps. Scholars are unanimous in observing that women in the party-state bureaucracy consistently receive less prestigious assignments than men.\textsuperscript{109} One common saying among Chinese female cadres, “the three manys and the three fews,” sums up this problem nicely: “many in trivial positions, few in powerful positions; many deputies, few heads; many in culture, science, education, and health bureaus, few in economy and finance.”\textsuperscript{110} Su's survey of provincial-level leaders finds that female elites are four times more likely than male elites to be given deputy assignments.\textsuperscript{111} 170 of the 183 female village committee members in Wang and Dai’s survey of Zhejiang villages served as their committee directors for women's affairs.\textsuperscript{112}

I have glossed over intra-bureaucracy gender differentials in most of the paper because the extent to which they have been alleviated during the reform era is hard to assess. Time-series data on the ratios of deputies and heads, for instance, is difficult to come by. Many of the statistics on formal representation that I have cited in this paper concern positions in the party-state bureaucracy that are relatively prestigious at their administrative levels—mayor, Politburo member, village committee head, NPC delegate. Some of these increases in women's representation in these positions have outstripped the rate of increase of female cadres' total share, which rose by one-third; the share of female mayors, for instance, more than doubled. It seems also that more female mayors, at least, have been allowed to leave the traditional strongholds of culture, education and health (CEH). Rosen says that 70 percent of female mayors in 1989 were assigned to one of these fields or to sports, while Wang reports that the 2001 share in CEH was down to 50.2 percent.\textsuperscript{113}

But to the “three manys, three fews” listed above, we might add another one: “many cadres, few in the Party.” And for all the gains in state organs, it may be most significant that this phenomenon has changed little in the reform era. Women's share among cadres overall was twice their share among Party members in 1991; in 2004, the ratio was the same.\textsuperscript{114} Given the still-dominant role of the Party in Chinese politics, and the significance of Party membership for career advancement in the bureaucracy, the stagnation on this front should temper enthusiasm over other indications of the improving status of women within the cadre system.

\textbf{CONCLUDING REMARKS}

My essay has sought to offer a new vision of women's political representation in the People's Republic of China that reconciles existing narratives of early-reform decline and late-reform progress. The post-Mao era began with a rapid decline in women's representation, with female cadres treated as symbols of the Cultural Revolution's influence on the party-state bureaucracy. Deng's modernization push brought about a decade of stagnation, but the state's tentative reconciliation with policies aimed at gender equality starting in the 1990s has brought about modest advances since. We should no longer speak
of the monotonic decline in the reform era as Howell did in 2002, nor should we speak of its ebbs and flows as defined solely by the concept of state feminism. It remained dominant during the early reform period, but the growing women's movement in Chinese civil society, has proved a significant factor in its own right over the past twenty years by persuading the AWCF to drift from its rigid adherence to Party theory.

It must be stressed that these advances over the past two decades are very modest—a few percentage points here, a few percentage points there. They certainly do not anoint China as an international standard bearer for female representation in government. Women make up 23 percent of Chinese NPC delegates, the 55th largest share among parliaments worldwide.115 Thirteen percent of Chinese mayors are female, well above the regional average, but female mayors' shares in Serbia and New Zealand are 26 percent.116 2.7 percent of Chinese village committee heads are female; women in Cambodia, without the help of quotas, make up 7.0 percent of the chairs of equivalent rural councils.117 And just as the early CCP relegated its female members to second-class status by concentrating them in the Women's Bureau, today's party-state bureaucracy keeps women out of high politics through disproportionately low levels of Party membership.118 It will require a united front between state and civil society—and not one that kowtows to the state's needs, but one that takes the criticisms of civil society feminists as a guiding star—for China to establish a reputation as a leader in women's participation in government.

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In 1934, the Mexican thinker Samuel Ramos published a text entitled *El perfil del hombre y la cultura en México*. Ramos, like many of his contemporary intellectuals, had dedicated the last decade to exploring, probing, and challenging “Mexicanity.” In his new text, Ramos aimed to explore the rationale for the recent embrace of a quintessentially Mexican self-concept at a time when there was much for Mexicans to be insecure about. The nation had plunged in and out of a decade-long revolution that wracked the country with violence and instability. It was from the ruins of this conflagration that had consumed the ancien régime that the new Mexican state would have to rise. The 1920s and 1930s whirred with the work of national rebuilding and reconstruction; a new constitution needed to be implemented, infrastructure had to be rebuilt, and commerce needed to flow once again. Yet the work of the state was not limited to physical changes. A new political culture would also be needed to reify the victorious ideology with a rich system of myths, murals, ideologies, and, above all, performances. For it would be through performance, a great national pageant, that the “truth” could be formed in the midst of so much uncertainty.

This post-Revolutionary performance lies at the heart of this study. Specifically, the goal is to explore where culture and politics intersected during the decades immediately following the Revolution, from about 1920 to the end of the Cárdenas administration in 1940. In those twenty years, the state was hard at work composing a new national drama. This drama was for the benefit of Mexican citizens, who had been through a decade of hell, as well as for the world, which looked with expectation and trepidation at the new regime.

There exists much scholarship on the topic of post-revolutionary nationalism in Mexico that describes this process in depth. By contrast, this study aims to synthesize these voices into a resonant, more pluralistic, underdstanding of the creation of Mexican national identity in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. Indeed, average Mexicans created a cultural milieu that existed outside the bounds set by the state. State-employed muralists disputed politics and the appropriate role of state power in the new Mexican culture, while films of the Mexican Golden Age, beginning in the 1930s, reflected conservative ideologies inconsistent with more progressive, state-favored philosophies. Tourist materials and cookbooks, created for American audiences, also tempered the cultural norms favored the PRI by casting them as quaint or as kitsch, rather than as the full-fledged expression of an organizing ideology.

Some scholars suggest that Mexican culture in the wake of its bloody Mexican Revolution was completely manufactured by the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and scholar José Vasconcelos for the sole purpose of creating a Gramscian political hegemony and a cultural “common sense.” This article offers a different, more pluralistic, understanding of the creation of Mexican national identity in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. Indeed, average Mexicans created a cultural milieu that existed outside the bounds set by the state. State-employed muralists disputed politics and the appropriate role of state power in the new Mexican culture, while films of the Mexican Golden Age, beginning in the 1930s, reflected conservative ideologies inconsistent with more progressive, state-favored philosophies. Tourist materials and cookbooks, created for American audiences, also tempered the cultural norms favored the PRI by casting them as quaint or as kitsch, rather than as the full-fledged expression of an organizing ideology.

**DESEMPEÑANDO EL PAPEL REVOLUCIONARIO:**
NATIONALISM AND CULTURE IN MEXICO, 1920-1940

STEVEN SERVER, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (2014)

**ABSTRACT**

Some scholars suggest that Mexican culture in the wake of its bloody Mexican Revolution was completely manufactured by the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and scholar José Vasconcelos for the sole purpose of creating a Gramscian political hegemony and a cultural “common sense.” This article offers a different, more pluralistic, understanding of the creation of Mexican national identity in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. Indeed, average Mexicans created a cultural milieu that existed outside the bounds set by the state. State-employed muralists disputed politics and the appropriate role of state power in the new Mexican culture, while films of the Mexican Golden Age, beginning in the 1930s, reflected conservative ideologies inconsistent with more progressive, state-favored philosophies. Tourist materials and cookbooks, created for American audiences, also tempered the cultural norms favored the PRI by casting them as quaint or as kitsch, rather than as the full-fledged expression of an organizing ideology.

In 1934, the Mexican thinker Samuel Ramos published a text entitled *El perfil del hombre y la cultura en México*. Ramos, like many of his contemporary intellectuals, had dedicated the last decade to exploring, probing, and challenging “Mexicanity.” In his new text, Ramos aimed to explore the rationale for the recent embrace of a new quintessentially Mexican self-concept at a time when there was much for Mexicans to be insecure about. The nation had plunged in and out of a decade-long revolution that wracked the country with violence and instability. It was from the ruins of this conflagration that had consumed the ancien régime that the new Mexican state would have to rise. The 1920s and 1930s whirred with the work of national rebuilding and reconstruction; a new constitution needed to be implemented, infrastructure had to be rebuilt, and commerce needed to flow once again. Yet the work of the state was not limited to physical changes. A new political culture would also be needed to reify the victorious ideology with a rich system of myths, murals, ideologies, and, above all, performances. For it would be through performance, a great national pageant, that the “truth” could be formed in the midst of so much uncertainty.

This post-Revolutionary performance lies at the heart of this study. Specifically, the goal is to explore where culture and politics intersected during the decades immediately following the Revolution, from about 1920 to the end of the Cárdenas administration in 1940. In those twenty years, the state was hard at work composing a new national drama. This drama was for the benefit of Mexican citizens, who had been through a decade of hell, as well as for the world, which looked with expectation and trepidation at the new regime.

There exists much scholarship on the topic of post-revolutionary nationalism in Mexico that describes this process in depth. By contrast, this study aims to synthesize these voices into a resonant, more pluralistic, understanding of the creation of Mexican national identity in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. Indeed, average Mexicans created a cultural milieu that existed outside the bounds set by the state. State-employed muralists disputed politics and the appropriate role of state power in the new Mexican culture, while films of the Mexican Golden Age, beginning in the 1930s, reflected conservative ideologies inconsistent with more progressive, state-favored philosophies. Tourist materials and cookbooks, created for American audiences, also tempered the cultural norms favored the PRI by casting them as quaint or as kitsch, rather than as the full-fledged expression of an organizing ideology.
reelection of the traditionally dominant political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the concept of “institutional revolution” figures prominently in the minds of many. The PRI obviously has its roots in this period. Its political messaging was inherited from the Sonoran dynasty as the PNR (National Revolutionary Party), and it was more formally coalesced by Lázaro Cárdenas as the PRM (Party of the Mexican Revolution). As such, an exploration of the ways in which the Mexican state was created out of the chorus of different conceptions of state will clarify the overall arc of the past century, as well as the political fortunes and failures of the PRI.

But the present study also has a more general relevance. Politics and culture have an intimate connection, one that ought to be understood by citizens from around the world. It is through everyday experiences, such as reading a newspaper, watching a film, or even planning a vacation, that citizens are steeped in, and inculturated with, certain civil and political values. The object of this study is to awaken a critical eye that can discern propagandizing, but that can also see that individual creativity can have power beyond pure aesthetic or commercial appeal.

There is a great deal of scholarship that must be synthesized to satisfy these goals. It will be useful to offer the arc of the argument before embarking, which is shown by exploring the central theory of cultural hegemony as conceived of by Antonio Gramsci. Then, we will explore the erection of the Revolutionary Pantheon as a Gramscian exemplar. Thomas Benjamin’s recent book will support this exploration and demonstrate the extent to which it was a concerted effort by those in power. The second theoretical section, however, will challenge Gramscian cultural hegemony. Resting on classic texts, this section will problematize Gramsci’s theory and offer an alternative model. With this alternative reading, I endeavor to tear down the most staged of cultural projects. An analysis of the mural work of the “Big Three” (Diego Rivera, David Alfaro Siquiers, and José Clemente Orozco) will show the diversity of these contractors of Mexican nationalism, with assistance from the model text on cultural nationalism in Mexico in this period, The Eagle and the Virgin. The Revolutionary message will be shown to be decidedly contentious by doing a close reading of a major film of the period, Allá en el rancho grande. The final section will turn to both food and tourist materials; supported by texts from Pilcher and Berger, we will analyze cultural materials produced for U.S. audiences.

“Desempeñando el papel revolucionario,” or “Playing the Revolutionary Role,” the title of this study was carefully chosen to best convey the type of cultural exploration as detailed above. The great political drama being performed in Mexico beginning in 1920 relied on many actors, for the process of national reconstruction was not one that could be undertaken alone. It is the portrayal of national ideologies that remains today, for the interpretations that average citizens made of state ideology formed modern Mexico. Every Mexican had to play his or her role in the revolutionary drama, in order to fulfill the ideological underpinnings of a movement for which so many had perished.

**FORGING A NATION: CULTURAL HEGEMONY AND MEXICANIST IDEOLOGY**

To engage with the cultural materials of the post-Revolutionary years, we must first understand classical cultural history theory. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, wrote extensively on the use of culture as a tool for political domination and hegemony creation. Through cultural hegemony, a polity’s hegemonic bloc is able to create a new “common sense” for the population at large. The hegemonic bloc is the group that at any given time wields power and is able to exercise that power to affect political change: the elite, ruling class. It does not consist of all citizens, for many remain subaltern, subject to the will of the political bloc. This hegemonic bloc that holds power attempts to create cultural hegemony, which ideally encompasses all members of the polity. The broadness of the “common sense” of the cultural hegemony ensures the continued dominance of the elite, for it discourages challenges to the existing political culture.

Cultural hegemony is not widely integrated simply because the hegemonic bloc orchestrates it. The elite origin of ideology is not sufficient to create hegemony. As Stuart Hall writes, “Rather, the effective coupling of dominant ideas to the historical bloc which has acquired hegemonic power in a particular period is what the process of ideological...
struggle is intended to secure. It is the object of the exercise—not the playing out of an already written and concluded script. As such, the goal of the ruling class is not simply to conceive of a new “truth” for the state; it is not a fait accompli merely by virtue of its etiology. Rather, the ruling class must invest in the process of tying its brand of truth to the supposed contemporary hegemonic bloc. Once these ideas are strongly tied to the hegemonic bloc, the suggestion is that the ideological struggle fades away. These new ideas become an inextricable part of the “common sense” that the ruling class advances, and subaltern groups accept them as integral to political culture. A cultural hegemony is thus generated and sustained.

The process of formulating new truths, then, falls to those members of the ruling class best suited for the fixation of ideologies to the hegemonic bloc: intellectuals. Through their formulations of new national ideologies, particularly ones that support the work of the existing hegemonic bloc and are followed by propagandizing to ensure the lasting linkage of these ideologies to the dominant political culture, intellectuals are critical to hegemony formation. Many see themselves as independent of the state project, however, “Since these various categories of traditional intellectuals experience through an esprit de corps their uninterrupted historical continuity, and their special qualifications, they thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group.” They are critical in creating a new national ideology on behalf of elites. At the same time, due to their historical status, they frequently represent their ideological formulations to be free of the taint of mere partisanship. With this veneer of impartiality, it is made all the more likely that ideology may be associated with the contemporary hegemonic bloc. The elite-domination of the ideological struggle becomes ever stronger given that subaltern groups do not create or integrate intellectuals into their social group. When an intellectual does arise from the peasantry, he is immediately assimilated into the dominant social class. As such, elites may monopolize the ideological struggle and impose political culture.

Gramscian cultural hegemony theory, then, suggests a powerful and near-monolithic sense of nationalism. This stems from the fact that intellectuals, the key agents in the creation of hegemonic ideologies, are always associated with ruling class motivations, despite intellectuals’ supposedly inviolate impartiality. Subaltern intellectuals do not exist to advance an alternative ideology to “traditional” elite intellectuals. The ruling class dominates the ideological struggle, and through cultural media, is able to reify the Revolution. Utilizing the above theoretical discussion of cultural hegemony, we may now employ it in the specific case study at hand. The post-Revolutionary milieu we now explore is that of Mexico beginning in 1920, with its ambitious projects of nationalism.

Gramsci’s theory on intellectual participation emerges vividly in this specific case. Perhaps the intellectual figure that best captured the role of the state in creating and advancing Mexican national ideology is José Vasconcelos. Appointed as the head of the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) in 1921, Vasconcelos was an important voice in the casting of a new, state-sponsored ideological project. In 1925, he published La raza cósmica, arguably his most influential essay. In it, Vasconcelos embraced an Americanist ideology, highlighting the conception of mestizaje, or ethnic mixing, as the critical element that would redeem the Mexican nation: “We in America shall arrive, before any other part of the world, at the creation of a new race fashioned out of the treasures of all the previous ones: The final race, the cosmic race.” In general, Mexicanist ideology rested on an appropriation of old-style racial stereotypes that had been pervasive in the 19th century. While the Porfiriato, the late 19th century regime of President Porfirio Diaz, had been oriented toward “whitening,” or the Europeanization of the Mexican national culture, La raza cósmica explicitly rejected whitening in favor of mestizaje. It would be through the amalgamation of all of the races of the Old World that Mexico would emerge as the transcendent leader of the New World. There was a value to the indigenous element of Mexican culture; it was essential to creating Mexicanity.

But that is not to say that the new ideological regime was devoted to the edification of traditional indigenous values per se. Certainly, Vasconcelos underscored the importance of Mexican self-awareness of the indigenous contributions for contemporary Mexican sensibilities. That said, there were many elements of indigenous culture that needed to be redeemed, for native culture was still seen as backward, weak, and uncivilized. It was for
these reasons that subaltern Mexicans had suffered under the Porfiriato, (exploitation by *hacienda* owners, priests, and capitalists). Old-World European elements had corrupted the Mexican spirit. As such, it was the role of the post-Revolutionary state to “transform a ‘backward, degenerate, diseased’ people into healthy, scientific patriots mobilized for development” without the manipulations of Europeans or Americans.12

How would this project materialize? Vasconcelos’s ideas were indeed rather contradictory. He embraced both the inherent value of the indigenous elements of the Mexican national heritage as spiritually redemptive, and at the same time, believed that indigenous culture was inherently uncivilized and needed to be redeemed. The key was embracing that inherent contradiction and using it to the state’s advantage. The new ideology of *La raza cósmica* would appropriate the cultural lexicon of the nation’s indigenous history to preach the gospel of progress and development.

As the head of the SEP, Vasconcelos devoted himself to this goal through a variety of projects. At the forefront lay his socialist educational program, devoted to educating schoolchildren about the moral rightness of the new Revolutionary regime. To better educate the populace, Vasconcelos devoted himself to a variety of cultural projects, engaging in the processes of co-optation of the folkloric elements of Mexican culture in order to form a new national narrative. This was accomplished by the development of *Misiones Culturales*, a program launched in 1923 in which teachers assigned to rural, heavily indigenous communities would appropriate, collate, and redeploy cultural material for mass dissemination.13 This process of cultural mestizaje was also exemplified by the SEP’s approaches to hygiene projects, family education, and combat against social diseases, which presented campaigns advocating Western-style social systems expressed in visual and verbal terms that the people could understand, such as prints depicting animate skeletons and appeals to the rural familial unit. This reveals a desire to modernize the populace by utilizing a lexicon influenced by *indigenism*.14

Obviously, Vasconcelos and his cohort were drafting a new national identity. They were *forjando la patria*, forging and formulating the nation and creating a new culture. That is not to say they were doing this simply because that is what intellectuals do. The stakes were very high. The Revolution had been filled with instances where leaders lacked support from the people, and it had cost them and their supporters their lives. Based on Mexicanist ideology and ideas regarding *La raza cósmica*, intellectuals such as Vasconcelos and his peers were attempting to win that revolutionary struggle to which Gramsci refers. As intellectuals of the Revolution, of the emergent hegemonic bloc, these Mexicanists were tying a platform to the ruling class, to prevent further instability and bloodshed. In formulating a new national discourse that upheld both the value of *indigenism* and that of modernization of backward populations, these men were offering politicians the chance to tie the nation more closely together to create a hegemonic coalition. Vasconcelos was a self-described “child of the people,” urging fellow intellectuals to leave their ivory towers and join *La Revolución*.15 Just as Gramsci suggested, the adaptation of subaltern intellectual currents, such as the notion of the people” and agitation for land redistribution, gave the ruling class greater ballast, a wider scope, and appeal. Thereby, they hoped that the bloody tide of Revolution could subside after ten years of cataclysm.

Vasconcelos and his fellow Mexicanists wrote a myth to support the post-Revolutionary state. The cosmic spirit would pervade all elements of the new nation, as the harbinger for a Mexican renaissance. The state would tie every Mexican to the necessary agenda, calling on the fulfillment of the national political project, because it was inherent to Mexican blood and spirit. The Revolutionary state could be trusted, for through the redemption of the *indio* without European intervention, the road would be paved for a “Mexican rebirth into innocence and utopia” from the misery of the previous 500 years.16 Though directed by the spirit of the great Revolutionary heroes who had died to divine the path to Mexico’s cosmic destiny, all were to perform in this Revolutionary drama by virtue of their ethnic heritage. In terms of forging cultural hegemony, blood is thicker than water.

**BLOCK-PRINTING THE REVOLUTIONARY FAMILY**

Consequently, Gramscians have a fairly persuasive case for their theoretical model.
Mythologizing of the nation by intellectuals promised progress and stability, La raza could leave the bloodshed of the previous decade behind and turn its eyes toward the shining future. The new ruling clique had cemented its power; its new quest was translating raw power into hegemony. Politically, one can see its goals clearly. The most prominent articles of the Constitution of 1917 are fairly explicit in their rejection of Porfirián principles and an embrace of Revolutionary future. Article 27 supports the redistribution of lands by the state for public utility. Article 123 supports broad radical workers’ rights. Article 3 offers a more explicit sense of Gramscian strategizing at work: “The education imparted by the Federal State shall be designed to develop harmoniously all the faculties of the human being and shall foster in him at the same time a love of country and a consciousness of international solidarity, in independence and justice.” These political goals were explicitly expressed by Obregón and then by Calles, and formed the planks of the new Partido Nacional Revolucionario in 1929. From Vasconcelos’ appointment in 1921, however, it had been clear that intellectuals were critical in tying policies to the ruling class through cultural projects, as an extension of mandatory Federal education.

Defenders of Gramscian analysis certainly have several prominent cultural examples to support their theoretical framework. The best illustration of nationalist culture being utilized to support the political aims of the Mexican state is the trope of the Revolutionary Family. This theme manifested itself in prints of the era, a critical tool in Vasconcelos’s project of civic education. Through a simple image and slogan, the aims of the state could be readily diffused and digested by the people. The central aim of many prints of the era was ostensibly to integrate the new post-Revolutionary cultural hegemony, both horizontally and vertically. They sought to tie various subaltern groups together as Mexicans, and to tie them closer to the post-Revolutionary hegemonic bloc. In his book La Revolución, Thomas Benjamin shows how the new hegemonic bloc used mythology and official history to create this integrated political culture. Following the end of explicit hostilities by 1920, the new political apparatus returned to governance, under the watchful eye of the new President Obregón. As General Obregón was “Caudillo of the Revolution,” however, he did not need to lean on a myth of the Revolution to effectively tie ideology to his rule; as Benjamin states, “Obregón represented the unity of history and biography: the legitimacy of his authority and his government, therefore, was self evident.” In other words, Obregón had no need for a great ideological superstructure to make his regime hegemonic. Instead, he established a cult of personality, the modus operandi of most caudillos. Obregón’s departure from a revolutionary justification for power was, however, an aberration.

As time wore on, according to a Gramscian analysis, there was a marked shift toward seeing the power of crafting an external history to give ballast to future “Revolutionary” agendas. There was thus a marked push to unify disparate Revolutionary groups in order to heal divisions within the nation. To unify these subaltern groups, the Taller de gráfica popular (TGP) was established in 1937 as a propaganda arm of the Mexican state. In one of its introductory prints, its aims are made explicit. The group announced that it was formed from a group of painters “like you,”

In the country and in the city and they know your problems. They offer you their assistance in the form of illustrated education sheets, flyers that we will publish monthly, and they will deal with themes of immediate interest for you and for your community. This will help you form a conscientious community, and it will improve the morale in your school.

The TGP seemingly aimed for a horizontal integration of the post-Revolutionary state, fusing together of the various out-groups and social classes that did not wield power, to create a consciousness of national issues.

TGP prints underscored this organized society. A print entitled “Unidad en tus filas” (“Unity in Your Columns”) shows horizontal integration of distinct interest groups. A peasant and his wife, a student, a soldier, and a worker are clustered together, hands supportively on shoulders. Under this scene of mutual regard, the reader is exhorted to conserve and increase the power of their Gran Central Sindical, their individual labor group. In concept, then, the collective membership of these various labor groups would constitute a larger, unified social body under the state. The TGP urged readers to guard the Revolution by vigilance within their groups: “Don’t allow enemies to infiltrate.
Choose the most conscientious revolutionary elements for posts of responsibility. And help create the great communal unity against individual passions and betrayals. WE CAN HELP YOU WITH OUR GRAPHIC SUPPORT: Thus, the printmakers, and their handlers in the government, ensured that the Revolutionary family, “the people,” remained intact against counterrevolutionary forces, namely anyone who threatened the hegemonic bloc’s ability to wield power. Granted, this poster emerged during the late 1930s, when fears of fascism were rampant. Correcting for some of the alarm, the poster nevertheless captures the mechanism by which the state aimed to join disparate social groups together as “the people” to protect the Revolution from its enemies.

In addition to creating “the people,” a Gramscian state needed to tie these out-groups to the state. Building subaltern unity could be dangerous if this subaltern coalition was not loyal to the ruling class. The Cristero revolt, the primary opposition to Revolutionary anticlericalism, showed that challenges to the hegemonic bloc were costly in terms of blood, treasure, and political capital. Thus, vertical integration was vital. Within the fully integrated regime, “virile leaders joined forces to lead a glorified peasantry and working class to victory against a common enemy (that is, the old regime and imperialism).”

This is best represented by depictions of the Revolutionary Pantheon in prints. A 1935 cartoon shows Carranza, Zapata, Angeles, Calles, Obregón, and Cárdenas, astride horses, as guardians protecting an embracing peasant and worker in the foreground. No longer would Carranza and Villa be intractable ideological enemies, but rather allies in the larger struggle of national liberation; Madero and Zapata could peacefully coexist in prints and on Revolutionary calendars, as they could not in 1911. With this mythology of the Revolution, a hegemonic coalition could be coalesced. A cultural hegemony could embrace various Revolutionary cliques, like the followers of Pancho Villa or Emiliano Zapata, even if these cliques did not hold the central political power. By erasing the inherent “dissensus” of the Revolution and mythologizing its consensus, the ruling elite was better positioned to suggest that its political vision best coincided with larger Revolutionary aims.

As time went on, and fewer leaders had the Revolutionary résumés that leaders like Calles and Obregón did, it was important to lean on this Pantheon for credibility. Most important, however, was the sense that the current president had assumed a political mandate from those glorified heroes. President Lázaro Cárdenas attempted to demonstrate that he had lived up to the spirit of his predecessors, continuing their consecrated project. A 1938 print celebrates Cárdenas’s nationalization of the oil industry. Cárdenas sits signing documents, surrounded by ragged peasants. The improbability of the cartoon is emblematic of the aim of the print: to demonstrate that President Cárdenas had not shut himself up in the Palacio Nacional, but that he went throughout the “countryside, workshops, and all the places where the workers, peasants, women, and children call him.” Further, Cárdenas’s policy successes are enumerated; namely his defeat of the Maximato, his ejidal project, his support for labor, his support for education, and most importantly, the nationalization of oil companies. Through this act, Cárdenas had challenged the exploitation of the nation by foreign capitalists. He had protected the Revolutionary family from the foreign intriguing that had flourished during the Porfiriato. Cárdenas fostered a paternalist public image as a leader who would protect subaltern groups from the enemies of “the people.” As Eric Zolov writes, “The Mexican case achieved... the institutionalization of the president as patriarch... and the official party as domestic council.” A 1942 print is more explicit in its intent to tie the presidential father to the glory of the Pantheon. Under portraits of Madero, Zapata, Cárdenas, and the new president Manuel Ávila Camacho, a Mexican flag serves as a background for an illustrative Camacho quote: “Here are we all. Those of today and yesterday; the absent and the present, those that are and those that were, constituting a sacred union that no enemy attack will divide.” The quote explicitly speaks to the continuing spirit of Mexican resiliency and nationalism thirty-two years after the Revolution. Implicitly, however, the print speaks to the goal of using the President as the intermediary between the Revolutionary Pantheon and “the people,” who were expected to unite behind the regime. What was at stake was the creation of an indivisible political culture, and thus, a hegemonic bloc that could rule...

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without dissent.

Reading with Gramscian lenses, we see the arc of Mexican political and cultural institutions inherently tied to an intellectual elite. With the creation of a Revolutionary “people,” consisting of various subaltern interest groups, as well as the creation of the Revolutionary Pantheon, the politicians and intellectuals of the new hegemonic bloc were able to fix new ideas about *Mexicanity* and the role of the state. In this exploration of prints and propaganda, it is clear that Gramsci’s theoretical model of elite-mediated political culture is supported by the efforts of the state. Through its language, its policies, and above all, by its cultural patronage of *indigenism* and Revolutionary mythology, the state did all it could to ensure that the country would neither revert to the *ancien régime* nor spin out of control and plunge back into chaos.

**EVERYDAY FORMS OF POLITICAL CULTURE**

To simply accept, however, that Mexican national self-concept was orchestrated, executed, and dominated entirely by the state is simplistic and misguided. Gramsci’s theory suggests that subaltern groups, the peasantry or proletariat, and non-intellectuals, are incapable of utilizing intellectualism to graft values onto a hegemonic coalition. In other words, without intellectuals, it is impossible to create a political common sense. This interpretation is problematic in its portrayal of the majority of the population as powerless victims lacking any political agency. The remainder of this study will be devoted to showing that this victimhood is certainly not the entire picture. State “contractors,” namely those responsible for creating this cultural material, and non-state actors, those who consumed cultural materials, were both instrumental in creating national culture. To that end, there are two prominent texts that have staked out positions against traditional Gramscian historiography: *The Paradox of Revolution* and *Everyday Forms of State Formation*. Using both of these studies, a third position will be staked out. With this alternative theoretical model, we may then explore three primary forms of cultural expression (murals, films, and folkloric/tourist materials) and read them from this alternative historiographical perspective.

Joseph and Nugent criticize the inconsequential role assigned to popular participation by the so-called “revisionist” studies of the Mexican Revolution. Revisionists are those who take a quasi-Marxist line, seeing the Revolution as the cementation of a bourgeois authority over subalterns. In their challenge to this revisionist current, Joseph and Nugent aim to “bring the state back in without leaving the people out.” In other words, the goal is to understand the elite-spurred political culture, that popular culture is not “a thoroughly autonomous domain,” but also to recognize that “popular culture is contradictory since it embodies and elaborates dominant symbols and meanings, but also contests, challenges, rejects, revalues… and presents alternatives to them.” The authors in Joseph and Nugent’s volume support this analysis by exploring projects at the state level. From *ejidal* politics in Chihuahua to the local politics of Mayan villages in Chiapas, these historians show that the centralizing tendencies of Mexicanist ideologies were challenged by the demographic and geographic diversity of Mexico itself.

Kevin Middlebrook’s book offers a reading of the post-Revolutionary project that shows how the Mexican state’s corporatism created a diverse ideological patchwork. Middlebrook underscores the high stakes associated with the project of the new Mexican state: state policies, through which the elite-dominated bloc preserves its power, must respond to, harness, and co-opt the “political and programmatic imperatives posed by revolutionary mass mobilization.” Unlike the purely Gramscian reading of post-Revolutionary cultural nationalism, Middlebrook sees the post-Revolutionary hegemonic bloc as constrained by a variety of features of the Mexican nation. As in Joseph and Nugent, geography and local *caciques* feature prominently in Middlebrook’s presentation of the formation of this diverse national identity. Middlebrook sees the primary limitation to the erection of a monolithic Gramscian hegemony as stemming from the corporatist nature of the new regime. Leaning on labor unions and peasant groups, the state, by its very nature, had to sample and stitch together an ideology to please the entire Revolutionary Family.

This reading is consistent with Vasconcelos’s vision of *indigenism* as a tool for political modernization, as well as the edification of the Revolutionary family. The state would interact with its citizens as discrete groups: *campesinos, obreros,*
*indígenos*, and others. As Middlebrook suggests, “The very heterogeneity of this governing ‘revolutionary coalition’ symbolized the established regime’s commitment to the political representation of diverse elements.” 30 This is perhaps an overstatement of the regime’s desire to integrate separate interests. Certainly, the SEP was committed to the eradication of certain “backward” aspects of indigenous life. As seen by Cárdenas’s nationalization of oil, capitalists, particularly those who held sway during the Porfiriato, were also not, in concept, meant to be represented. Middlebrook’s point is nonetheless well taken: the state’s sampling from diverse sociopolitical groups allowed it to fix post-Revolutionary hegemony more easily.

These two studies support the notion that the post-Revolutionary state was unable to fully dominate the ideological struggle, simply due to the fact that it relied on too many disparate elements in order to fully control the messaging. For Joseph and Nugent, the geographic diversity of the nation meant Mexico City was unable to exert continuous control; for Middlebrook, the state’s corporate patronage of labor groups required modification of Revolutionary elite preferences. Both studies place importance on those with an explicit political agenda and political mobilization that exists outside of the watchful eyes and silver tongues of the governing bloc. But their readings neglect the sheer political power of the cultural. The remainder of this study will show that those who operated in the aesthetic and cultural realm were as responsible for ideological diversity as those involved in post-Revolutionary political mobilization per se.

CONTESTED UTOPIAS: THE MEXICOS OF THE BIG THREE

Even given their best efforts to diffuse Revolutionary propaganda, the TGP needed assistance from prominent citizens throughout the country. One early poster exhorts “teachers that work in the country” to use their services: “Help yourself with our propaganda and help us make it better. Revolutionary propaganda should rain over our whole country. Our sheets are weapons. The weapon is forged, wield it!” 31 It is interesting to note the use of the formal *usted* being used in this print. While other prints that used *tú* seem to be directly communicating with “the people”ii this one addressed those operators in the localities who understood the value of using propaganda to tie communities closer to the state. While this grammatical difference could certainly be coincidental, it does offer an interesting insight into the expected audiences of these two posters. It also speaks to the state’s acknowledgement that it was unable to create cultural hegemony without elements that existed outside of the hegemonic bloc per se. That SEP teachers were hundreds of miles from Mexico City meant they had autonomy in what they taught and how they taught it. Vasconcelos’s hegemony could not be everywhere.

This use of Revolutionary “contractors” ultimately led to a diversity of messaging about what truly constituted *lo mexicano*. Even the most centralized of cultural projects, the creation of murals, was subject to a differential interpretation of the state project. Murals are frequently held as the best example of Gramscian cultural hegemony at work, and strongly support the traditional vision of post-revolutionary nationalism as dictated by elite political actors. The “Big Three” muralists (Diego Rivera, David Alfaro Siquieros, and José Clemente Orozco) are supposed to have played their roles loyally in the reification of *La Revolución*. An examination of three of their famous murals, however, shows they had different conceptions of what truly constituted a Mexican utopia.

The murals of Diego Rivera are perhaps the most instantly recognizable of the Big Three, and the most explicit in the defense of *indigenism* and the Revolutionary family. To cement the connection between the muralist project and the new nationalist education, Rivera painted 235 individual frescoes throughout the Ministry of Education, covering over 15,000 square feet. 32 Throughout the murals of the SEP, Rivera’s murals evidently support a *Mexicanity* based on post-Revolutionary *indigenism*. In *Mechanization of the Countryside*, a goddess wrapped in Revolutionary red shoots a lightning bolt at a hacienda owner and his foremen. 33 Freed from their exploitation, an Indian woman sits with legs crossed, her lap overflowing with maize, and wheat surrounding her. Behind her is the evidence of modernization: a peasant rides a tractor and an airplane flies over a hydroelectric dam, which gives

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*ii* See endnote 21, “Unidad en tus filas,” for one example.
electricity to “the people.” Guarding this new agrarian prosperity are three familiar armed Revolutionary figures: a worker, a peasant, and a soldier. The message is plain: the Revolution has allowed for the liberation of the indigenous people from exploitation, and as such, abundance and technological progress have created a civilized and prosperous nation. This is but one of many examples of Rivera’s advocacy for post-Revolutionary nationalism on the basis of indigenism.

Unlike Rivera, however, José Clemente Orozco was critical of the course that the Revolution had taken. In Political and Ideological Exploitation, Orozco depicts emaciated creatures against a backdrop of flames. 34 The creatures rage at the “ideologues of modern social revolution” for their false leadership, demagoguery, and failed ideals. Desmond Rochfort suggests the figures resemble prominent Communists Karl Marx, Leon Trotsky, and David Alfaro Siquieros.35 To the left, three beastly caudillos wielding sledgehammers, rifles, and polemical pamphlets demonstrate how the false prophet’s ideologies get translated into Revolution. Ultimately, the caudillos expose their ability to oppress, as seen in the wretched, miserable figures to the right. States Rochfort, “For Orozco, the struggle for ideals and their betrayal by the fallibility of human beings that leads to greed, power, exploitation, and superstition dichotomized the human character, dooming it to tragic repetitions of failure.”36 Thus, the mural, rather than supporting a utopian vision of post-Revolutionary Mexico as Rivera did, warns against the demagoguery of false prophets speaking the words of national liberation, for Mexico and for all nations.

Clearly, there was no ideological love lost between David Alfaro Siquieros and Orozco, if Rochfort’s assertion is to be believed. Siquieros’s reputation as an ardent supporter of revolutionary radicalism was too much for Orozco. In Portrait of the Bourgeoisie, Siquieros attacked both fascists and capitalists alike. In the central panel, a machine spits out coins, ostensibly to support the gas-masked drones that surround it. To the left, a giant parrot creature addresses faceless Nazi legions, and has set fire to a revolutionary temple emblazoned with “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.” The armed worker, whose rifle is poised at the reactionary forces, is the only one who can stop the dystopian future. 37 Siquieros was evidently a great supporter of Revolutionary mobilization against fascism and capitalism. Nevertheless, he had a contentious relationship with Diego Rivera, the great indigenist muralist. In 1935, El Universal ran a front page story about their ideological conflict at a meeting at the Palacio de Bellas Artes: “There was almost a real fist-fight between the followers of Rivera and Siquieros.”38 Siquieros accused Rivera of advancing an art of the petite bourgeoisie, as his work depicted a reductionist nationalism based on indigenism. Rivera was a counterrevolutionary, a shill for the state. Essentially, Rivera’s support for Trotsky was a betrayal for the global revolutionary cause. For Rivera, Siquieros was a political opportunist. Having been expelled from the Mexican Communist Party, Siquieros had to prove his own unflinching Stalinist credentials. Thus, despite the ideological congruence of their work at first glance, the two artists had distinct political visions regarding the appropriate role of the state.39

The “Big Three,” then, are not a monolithic group. The moniker is applied to three very different men who all happened to paint political murals. In style, in content, in political orientation, and in utopian vision, the artists held different ideas about the appropriate role of art in the post-Revolutionary era, and indeed about the scope of the Revolution itself. Far from being an art form that advanced cultural hegemony, murals, due to their artist’s personal political and artistic differences, served as lightning rods for debate and dissent regarding the post-Revolutionary project.

CELLULOID IDEOLOGIES: HISPANICISM VERSUS INDIGENISM IN FILM

The incongruity of the utopian visions of the various muralists was also manifested on the Silver Screen. By the mid-1930s, the Cárdenas regime had taken to sponsoring film production. Cárdenas offered tax exemptions to domestic filmmakers and formed the Financiadora de Películas, which fielded grant proposals for private investment in film. As a result of these innovations, production grew from six films in 1932 to 57 films in 1938, greatly increasing Mexicans’ share of the domestic film market.40 Given these financial and organizational modifications, the Mexican film industry was poised to embark upon a Golden Age. Within this new film industry,
three prominent strands emerged: state-sponsored “educational” film, which was supported by state-intellectuals; experimental film; and commercial film, which looked to Hollywood for inspiration. With experimental film’s small audience, state-sponsored films and commercial films competed for largest market share. Those with control over the largest share of the film industry could also exercise a large degree of influence over the dissemination of Revolutionary ideas.  

Cárdenas’s government was clearly committed to fulfilling the remaining goals of the Revolution, and that goal manifested itself in politics as well as state-sponsored film. Unequivocally breaking the dominance of the Maximato, a cabal becoming perilously addicted to power, Cárdenas returned to a distilled set of Revolutionary principles. Oil companies were nationalized and ejidal redistribution, as guaranteed under Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, was undertaken to a greater extent than previously.

The ensuing political conflict over the redoubled Revolutionary efforts, was, as is consistent with cultural history theory, also manifested in film. Aurelio de los Reyes spoke to the two nationalistic tendencies, one conservative, the other liberal: “Both tendencies must have polarized with the arrival of Lazaro Cárdenas to the government, with his agrarian policies, which appear in the comedia ranchera, which leads to the Porfirian nostalgia.”  

In general, state-sponsored cinema defended Revolutionary indigenism, while commercial film advocated a return to Porfrian “order and progress” through the genre of the comedia ranchera, or rural comedy.

The SEP, now under Narciso Bassols, was intimately involved in the new national indigenist cinema. For members of the governmental hegemonic bloc, cinema offered an important opportunity to use Revolutionary ideology to integrate society horizontally: “educational film is the only plan possible to publicize the awareness of our proletariat that our economic situation allows, as its cost is lower than any other scheme of proletarian university that may be implemented, which also has the disadvantage of being slower and with worse results.”  

Film, with its ease and efficacy, would be the best medium to create a post-Revolutionary consensus. To this end, the SEP sponsored its first “talkie” in 1935, Redes, which told the story of indigenous fishermen who opposed exploitation by a local monopolist. Joanne Hershfield describes the film as an epic of class struggle, meant to teach Mexicani to Mexicans and to challenge commercial film’s aesthetics. She states, “the cinematography... romanticizes their lives by emphasizing the beauty of the landscape and the people and promoting an ‘intimate’ and mythical connection between people and nature.” With this transcendent cinematography, the raza cósmica message could be understood; the indigenous had a spiritual connection to the land, and once freed from oppressors they would be able to create a utopia. Life would hopefully imitate art.

Despite the SEP’s hopes to make these films popular, the films were unable to compete with commercial releases. For example, following his limited success with Vámonos con Pancho Villa, which aimed to glorify post-Revolutionary indigenism, Fernando de Fuentes scored a major hit with his 1936 film, Allá en el rancho grande. This film best represents commercial releases at the time, as well as the conservative nationalism described by de los Reyes. It supported an alternative, competing vision of horizontal integration. Rather than favoring the coalescence of a Revolutionary family that consisted of the various subaltern groups (like workers and peasants) tied together by their commitment to the Revolutionary project, the film advocated a paternalistic vision of social relations, where peasants were united by their loyalty to their hacienda owner. The film was thus ideologically at odds with everything the Revolution, and the post-Revolutionary state, stood for. The great heroes of the Revolutionary pantheon had mobilized against the Porfrian elites and desired to topple the hacienda system in favor of communal plots. Glorification of this archaic system was anathema.

Life on the Rancho Grande does not look as bleak as Zapata and Villa may have suggested, however. Despite the trite plot and simplistic resolution, the film’s depictions of life on the ranch are entertaining and convey a folkloric utopia: guitar playing, cock fighting, and hat dancing. Frequent songs and physical humor give the sense that on the ranch, the boss is less of a taskmaster than the benevolent facilitator of the good life. The film is a melodramatic romance. As a consequence of a
misunderstanding, José Francisco must defend his fiancée, Cruz against the advances of the hacienda owner, or hacendado, Felipe. Despite the conflict, the figure of the hacendado is consistently shown to be a good man. Rather than isolating himself from his peasants, the old hacendado greets them as they come in from the fields. It is due to his care that José Francisco is able to live at Rancho Grande, and he made a companion to Felipe, the future inheritor of the hacienda. Felipe, like his father before him, is a dutiful patriarch. He is taught that a hacendado must be the father, mother, doctor, judge, and sometime sexton for his peasants. As a result of his kindness, his peasants pray that the Virgin of Guadalupe bless him. The hacienda is a place of generosity, ease, and bucolic pleasure, not abjectness or exploitation.\textsuperscript{46}

A different philosophical paradigm undergirds and explains this fundamentally different vision of the social state in Mexico. As noted above, the official state ideology was indigenism, which held the racial mixture of the nation in high esteem and saw the state as the necessary agent of liberation and redemption for a people oppressed and exploited by Europeans and Americans. Clearly, from this point of view, any hacienda had to be a horrible legacy of colonial cruelty: how could it ever serve as the setting for a romantic comedy? \textit{Allá en el rancho grande}, however, supports a competing ideology, hispanicism. According to hispanicism, Spanish blood, culture, and Catholicism had redeemed the Indians from barbarity and backwardness. Employed by an alliance between conservative Catholic peasants and wealthy landowners in the states of Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Jalisco, hispanicism offered a powerful alternative vision to Revolutionary indigenism in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{47} In the film, the hacendados are clearly Spanish—the old boss’s lispe and use of “vosotros” indicate his European origin. José Francisco is the heroic, Hispanic charro, which, as Joanne Hershfield describes, “was a symbol of Hispanic masculinity—light-skinned, handsome, and respectful of the ‘inherent’ divisions within Mexican society... the charro’s role was to maintain the patriarchal system that kept classes, races, and genders in their places.”\textsuperscript{48} The hero, therefore, is heroic not because he opposes the current status quo, but because he defends its historically Hispanic customs and cultural traditions.

Indeed, there is a conflict in the film between José Francisco and Felipe. But the disagreement has nothing to do with exploitation. The conflict in the story is emphatically not due to malfeasance, intrigue, or exploitation on the part of the hacendado; rather than exploiting his peasants, Felipe is one of the victims of intrigue. The central villain of the film is Ángela, the woman who had taken José Francisco in at the beginning of the story. As a result of her lack of morality, her greed, and her machinations, she nearly topples the entire rancho. Ángela’s desire for money and to rid herself of Cruz led her to instigate the fight between the two men. Early in the film, the old patrón chastises Ángela for not being married to Florentino. By the film’s end, Florentino understands that he must become Ángela’s husband and he beats her aggressively. Without a husband to beat her into submission, Ángela was capable of intrigue. The film then cuts to Florentino and Ángela emerging from the Church on their wedding day, with Felipe and his new wife, and José Francisco and Cruz. Florentino now is the rightful head of the household; the rancho is redeemed, and the film ends against a Mexican sunset.\textsuperscript{49}

Commercial films were successful because people enjoyed these happy endings, colorful cinematography, and compelling characters. Unlike the austere didacticism of Soviet-inspired revolutionary cinema, the ambiance, sounds, and customs of the \textit{comedia ranchera} were familiar, and the simple depictions of social life were comfortable for the film’s audience. This film was so popular that de Fuentes remade the film in 1948. De los Reyes suggests that audience’s enthusiasm stemmed from the “public’s identification with the characters... by the idealization that they made of the [characters] (they were all ‘good’ and they knew how to dress and wear with dignity national costumes).”\textsuperscript{50} The charro was an idealized, honorable man, protecting the social state from decay. This conservative sensibility, rather than appearing merely reactionary, is consistent with modernity and progress. Rather, commercial films such as \textit{Allá en el rancho grande} may have been popular partly because they gestured to a non-statist version of progress and modernity. The charro can be seen as a redeemer of the past, creating modernity based on the salvation of an older model.

Further, the medium itself afforded audiences a chance to take part in the modern world. Eric Zolov attributes the success of rock ‘n’ roll films of
the 1950s to their embodiment of “a modern lifestyle that appealed to many adults’ sense of progress and prosperity, especially the desire to be viewed by the outside world as advanced.” Likewise, the fact that Allá en el rancho grande was a Hollywood-style commercial film led many to feel that they were taking part in American-style progress. In other words, the medium of Hollywood film signified modernity, especially when the characters were proud leaders that created stability. In content and presentation, Allá en el rancho grande was a chance for Mexicans to look with anticipation toward a brighter future.

Thus, the success of this comedia ranchera suggests that a conservative, Porfrian vision of society had not been totally erased by the Revolution. Through a reworking of the underlying principles, “order and progress” were realized. This vision opposed the wholesale alteration of social relations, which the Revolutionary state promoted. Modernity was not the exclusive property of the Revolutionary hegemonic bloc. The film industry, and indeed the state project, was subject to the whims of the market and its consumers; the very people the state desperately targeted with its Revolutionary “common sense” had an alternative vision of Mexican identity and the way toward modernity.

**SERAPE CANAPÉS: A MEXICO FOR FOREIGN CONSUMPTION**

Allá en el rancho grande was popular not only among Mexican audiences; Americans flocked to enjoy the folkloric comedia ranchera. An advertisement from Billboard magazine noted Guizar’s visit to the (ironically named) Cervantes Theatre in New York, where he met a crowd of 50,000 people. Quotes from reviewers from local papers spoke to the quality of Guizar’s singing voice and his “looks and sure-fire stage personality.” Americans even had a role in the film itself. During a cockfight, an obvious gringo places a bet on the “gallo colorado” because he is from Denver, Colorado, which causes everyone in the club to cringe. The gringo emerges again to defend the hacendado against a charge of exploitation of the peasants, and he is promptly knocked unconscious. In other words, the gringo is a joke; while he is obviously interested in quasi-imperialistic economic enrichment, he does not represent an imminent threat. Additionally, the gringo doesn’t understand the culture in the least. He shouts “Whoopee!” when his cock wins, another cringe-worthy moment.

The film speaks to the contemporary relationship between Mexico and the United States. Mexico and the United States had a contentious relationship since the Mexican-American War, in which the United States was perceived as an imperialistic power. This idea certainly had not vanished by the time of the Revolution, as the Porfiriato had seen a massive increase in the size and scope of U.S. investment and business development in the nation. Therefore, a key element of Revolutionary rhetoric was that the United States was the new Spain, exploiting the indigenous peoples of Mexico. Relations, at least in terms of commercial interactions, were at an all-time low with Cárdenas’s nationalization of oil, which included several U.S. interests. As the TGP prints above demonstrated, there was great national chest beating following that event, for Mexico had finally overpowered the United States.

At the same time, however, the Mexican elites sensed that the United States needed to be pacified in some regard, so that they would support the Mexican state economically. In 1929, President Portes Gil, undoubtedly at the behest of the jefe máximo Calles, announced the nation’s commitment to the expansion of the tourism industry in Mexico. To that end, he created the Mixed Pro-Tourism Commission and declared that Mexico would be made safe and comfortable for travelers from the United States. States Berger: “Amid broader efforts to define lo mexicano during the 1920s through education, art, archaeology, and music, tourism emerged as another opportunity for revolutionary leaders to define, negotiate, and preserve national identity.” Tourism was another area where the state could preach indigenism.

This project was not entirely in Mexican hands, however. Sociologists have indicated that tourists aim to experience something “distinct from everyday life—a process mediated through an artificial, protected environment developed for and demanded by the tourist. Ironically, tourists nevertheless set out in search of ‘the authentic.’” Thus, when the Mexican government facilitated tourism projects based on indigenism, they were actively catering to the desires of their American visitors to see Mexican
identity. They could not take this ideology to its extreme portrayal, however. Claiming that Europeans had oppressed Mexicans for centuries would not be appealing to Americans, so the more extreme aspects of post-Revolutionary indigenism had to be toned down when presenting to foreign audiences. In this manner, the official Revolutionary line became distorted.

In order to make Americans comfortable by creating that “artificial, protected environment,” Mexico had to demonstrate its cosmopolitan, European character. In a tourist guide for Americans, Touring Mexico, the traces of this conflicted ideology are fully evident. One advertisement for beer reads, “Cerveceria Moctezuma: The beer that made Milwaukee jealous.” This text is set against the lithographed backdrop of a hacienda and other European-style buildings. In the foreground are simple peasant cottages—a coexistence of the two ideals at the same time.

Milwaukee evoked home, as well as European methods of beer making, but the exotic setting of the factory allowed the tourist to feel just far enough away from home. The advertisement demonstrates the authentic and the comfortable

Indigenism does make an appearance in the booklet, for the only informational section of the brochure is about indigenous groups. The author writes, “It is recognized that much of the charm, individuality and strength of the present Mexican nation lies in the fact that her roots are buried deep in ancient and glorious Mexican civilizations.” Here one sees a line explicitly expressing Revolutionary state indigenism. The tourist pamphlet also expresses the goal of modernizing the Indians; the Tarahumaras [of Northwestern Mexico] are said to have lived in misery for centuries, but “the present Mexican government is making strong efforts to aid them economically, and to educate their children.”

There is even a subtle jab at the United States, consistent with the view that the United States was the new imperial oppressor. Elsewhere in the guide, a lithographed cartoon road map of the border crossing shows an angry Uncle Sam, his arms crossed in irritation. Various cartoons that depict Mexican industriousness appear throughout the lithographed pages: glass blowing, factories, and agricultural work. These images underscore the idea that Mexico was a land of modernity and progress.

At the same time, however, there are several quasi-racist stereotypes, including a Mexican sleeping under his sombrero and a palm tree, Mexicans fishing, and a Mexican getting into trouble at his work. The internal conflict in the booklet is best captured by one spread in particular. Next to an ad for Native Arts and Antiques, there is an ad for the Hotel Reforma stating, “250 rooms and bathrooms; charmingly appointed; air conditioned; purifying water plant; all modern conveniences.” The ad for the hotel lacks any indigenous adornment. Clearly, indigenism should not factor into conversations about lodgings or the comfort of their foreign visitors. Tourists need not be overwhelmed or challenged too greatly.

Evidently, many feared that for the tourists, indigenism would transition from a folkloric whimsy to a bald indication of backwardness. Indigenism was a “fun” element that could be experienced during the day, but it would not follow tourists into their hotel rooms or their restaurants beyond their own comfort level. The food of the era also captured this ambivalent attitude, particularly when presented for foreign audiences. Jeffery Pilcher notes, “Foreign recipes continued to dominate Mexican culinary literature throughout the 1920s and 1930s, an ironic continuation of Porfrian tastes through the revolutionary period.” One English-language cookbook contains Pilcher’s assessment, as well as Berger’s. In Mexico Through My Kitchen Window, María de Carbia dedicated her recipes to the “nice English-speaking people that have visited and liked Mexico,” and the recipes she selects capture this ambivalence toward indigenous cooking. She thus describes tortillas: “Just as in Africa, [where] the ‘tom-tom’ greets the ear of the wandering stranger, in Mexico the sound of the clapping hands of the Indian woman greets the ear of the wandering tourist, especially through the country roads and small villages.” De Carbia invokes Africa to give her readers a sense that Mexican food is indeed exotic, perpetuating the folkloric mystique. Mexico is indelibly influenced by its indigenous past.

De Carbia does not wish to suggest that all Mexicans constantly eat these Indian pancakes cooked on a piece of sheet metal, lest they be thought of as uncouth. The reader can rest assured that, “The middle and high class people eat tortillas instead of bread once in a while ‘for a change’ specially accompanying some chili dishes, but they use them
mainly for the confection of some fancy dishes as enchiladas.” 65 Just as in Touring Mexico, there is the explicit indication that the folkloric exists for those who want to immerse themselves in it “for a change,” but that it by no means is pervasive or anything more than whimsy. Based upon de Carbia’s recipe selection, it seems that Mexican food is unequivocally Spanish in character: the author includes recipes for gazpacho, veal Valencia style, and Spanish menestra. Here, there is an attempt to depict Mexico as truly Spanish, with some indigenous flourishes. Ideologically speaking, the text is much more hispanicist than indigenist, much more Porfirian than Revolutionary.

The Mexican state’s experience with the creation of a Mexico for international consumption can best be described by one recipe in de Carbia’s text, “Serape Canapé,” a dish consisting of toast, cream cheese, pimento, green pepper, or “any other food that can give color and taste to the canapé:” 66 The dish, invented for this text, captures the challenges associated with the creation of lo mexicano for foreigners. While the canapé looks like a serape, an indigenista icon, in fact it is made from white bread and cream cheese, ingredients that gringos could feel comfortable cooking with and serving to their friends. As in the films, the market dictated the appropriate ideological line to take. Clearly, some elements of indigenism made it through the censorship. But as the primary motivation for producing these materials was to get Americans to pay a visit, indigenism needed to be toned down and stripped of its Revolutionary radicalism. 67 Once ideology, it was transformed into kitsch.

INFERIORITY COMPLEX OR EXISTENTIAL ANXIETY?

To conclude, we return to Samuel Ramos’ text, El perfil del hombre y la cultura en Mexico. Ramos views Mexican culture as emanating from an inferiority complex on the part of the Mexican people. Oppressed for so long, told to modernize and Europeanize for centuries, the Mexican people have a deep-seated insecurity about the value of la raza. Writes Ramos, “One should suppose the existence of an inferiority complex in all individuals that demonstrate an exaggerated concern with the affirmation of their personality, that have vital interest in all things and situations that signify power, and that have an immoderate eagerness to excel, to be the first in everything.” 68

This reading is seemingly consistent with the ways in which the post-Revolutionary state desperately desired to create a cultural hegemony based upon indigenist nationalism. Vasconcelos’s conception of the raza cósmica, one which valued Indian roots over Hispanic customs, can be read as a “psychological” attempt to appropriate that which had historically made Mexicans insecure, to turn a perceived roadblock to modernity into an existential benefit. This ideology would create a Revolutionary Family, an indelible ethnic bond between all Mexicans. The current ruling bloc, then, could begin the work of modernizing and civilizing the people who had suffered hardship and exploitation for so long; the Revolution, and the path toward the ascendency of la raza, could begin in earnest. Education would be the key, for culture needed to change in order to create a new common sense for the Mexican people that could bring them out of the bloody terrors of Revolution and 500 years of exploitation.

To assume an inferiority complex does not give sufficient credit to the Mexicans who desperately believed that the Revolution, and its accompanying indigenism, was the true path to peace and security. That is, rather than attempting to conceal their own inferiority, Mexican cultural projects between 1920 and 1940 were a clear admission that power was indeed tenuous. Armchair psychology is not the primary goal of this paper, despite the invocation of Samuel Ramos. However, I would venture to offer the following diagnosis, based upon the evidence presented above: existential anxiety.

Those involved in the creation of the new state were extremely concerned with power for the mere reason that it was contested. The experience of the previous decade indicated that power was ephemeral; when it evaporated, a violent end came quickly. Personal self-interest, and anxiety about the lack of control over one’s world and future, was only part of it. These figures were indeed concerned about the future of Mexico. In establishing these cultural projects, they hoped to integrate society and tie it to their particular vision of ascendancy. That these cultural projects were rife with dissensus merely reinforced these anxieties: Siquieros and Rivera took pot-shots at each other over who was the better revolutionary. The people disdained Revolutionary film in favor of a
glorification of the ancien régime. A tourism industry had to appeal to the supposed exploiters by declaring Mexico’s ultimately European character.

Indeed, indigenism was a cultural trapping, rather than the way of the future. Mexico was no longer in the midst of a military upheaval, but instead, an ideological struggle. As during the Revolution, with its many factions and massive mobilization, the period of post-Revolutionary nation building saw a broad polyphony of voices emerge that represented those previously disenfranchised from developing a concept of the nation. To claim that there existed a great National Culture revealed from on high is the same type of mythmaking done by men like Vasconcelos. “How much of the truth can one man endure?” enquired Nietzsche. Sometimes, the very lack of control, and the great amount of individual free will, creates the most powerful myths about the universe’s divine destiny.

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POST-TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SPAIN:
PASSING THE HISTORIC MEMORY LAW

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INTRODUCTION
When Spanish leader Francisco Franco died in 1975 after a rule of over three decades marked by human rights abuses, Spain underwent a radical change in governance from dictatorship to democracy. During this transition, the country did not respond to the human rights abuses of the Franco regime, or, in other words, it failed to pursue transitional justice. Transitional justice is defined as “the array of legal and political mechanisms devised to hold departing authoritarian regimes accountable for their political transgressions.” This field of study began with the Nuremberg trials in the 1940s and was popularized by a worldwide wave of democratization in the 1980s that occurred from southern Europe to Latin America. Most countries engaged in transitions from authoritarian systems of government to democracy, such as Portugal and Chile, immediately pursue accountability and reparation measures for crimes committed by their fallen authoritarian regimes. Spain, however, is distinctive in its decision to ignore its past human rights violations, amid the fear that doing so would destabilize the new democracy. Nevertheless, Spain eventually faced both foreign and domestic demands to pursue what can be referred to as “post-transitional justice.” With pressure mounting in October 2007, the country achieved a monumental piece of justice legislation, the Historical Memory Law, which addressed the
human rights violations that took place under the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco. Scholars have speculated on the motivations behind this surge of renewed concern for Francoist crimes, yet the analysis of Spain’s recent accountability and reparation measures has been limited and explanations are incomplete. This article strives to contribute to this sparsely researched area of Spanish social justice. Understanding the context in which the Historical Memory Law was passed could help to illustrate why accountability for Franco-era crimes became an issue on the political agenda so many years after the collapse of the Franco regime and not earlier.

BACKGROUND

The Crimes of the Franco Regime

Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, which lasted from 1939 to 1975, began after a gruesome three-year Civil War between the Republicans, who were loyal to the established Spanish Republic, and the Nationalists, a rebel group led by General Franco. The crimes of the Franco regime can be divided into two phases: the years immediately following the war (1939–1947) and a more stable period that lasted until the regime fell in 1975. The most serious crimes occurred during the former period, but political crimes continued throughout the latter.

As part of a deliberate system of revenge, Francoist troops targeted civilians in locales of Republican support in the immediate post-war years. Around 440,000 Republicans were exiled immediately after the war, 10,000 of whom died in Nazi concentration camps. Mass trials and executions occurred regularly, with Franco showing little restraint in signing death warrants. Some 400,000 people were subjected to forced labor, torture, prison time, or internment camps. The number of these “official” victims who suffered directly from repression policies is unclear and the number of those who were terrorized, kidnapped, and murdered in secret is almost impossible to determine. Children were separated from their Republican parents and often adopted into families of Franco loyalists without ever knowing their true origin. Although many of these crimes continued well into the later years of the dictatorship, later violations by the Franco regime consisted mostly of political sentencing and torturing of government opponents.

Forgetting the Past

Despite this horrifying past, or perhaps because of it, Spain chose to forego any system of accountability after Franco’s death in 1975 and during the subsequent transition to democracy. There was an attempted coup d’état in 1981, in which the Civil Guard tried to reinstate the military government of the past thirty-five years. Although the coup failed, it demonstrated the precariousness of the new democracy. In response, victims chose to protect the country’s democratic achievements at the expense of reparation. Rather than speak openly about the Franco regime’s crimes, Spain adhered to an unspoken Pacto del Silencio or Pacto de Olvido (Pact of Silence). The first democratic Parliament after the dictatorship passed an Amnesty Law in October 1977 that pardoned all political crimes, regardless of nature or outcome, including those committed by the Franco regime against its enemies. Many scholars have argued that this path allowed for a peaceful governmental transition and helped stabilize the new democracy. In fact, despite its neglect of justice processes, Spain’s transition is regarded as a model for securing strong democratic outcomes after a dictatorship. Conversely, according to some academics, Portugal’s proactive investigations into past crimes during its transition compromised democratic stability. Per this view, these pursuits distracted the country from political reconciliation. Following this reasoning, the UN has historically supported laws granting amnesty and preventing prosecution as a means of restoring peace and solidifying democratic governments. Nevertheless, in choosing this method of transition, Spain did not fully conclude its tragic past. Moreover, a general consensus exists that this law is unconstitutional and incompatible with international human rights law.

Several obstacles perpetuated Spain’s pact of silence and hindered judicial inquiry into the Franco government’s violations. The first obstacle concerns statutes of limitations embedded in most legal systems, including Spain’s. These statutes ensure that prosecution for a crime may occur only within a reasonable period after the crime is committed. However, counterarguments hold that such statutes do not apply to Franco-era government violations, for the disappearances have not been solved, making them ongoing crimes. Another obstacle pertains
to basic due process rights for the accused; these cannot be upheld, as the deceased are unable to defend themselves. 14 Retroactive justice scholar Angela Guarino argues that fighting to bring justice to crimes whose perpetrators are likely deceased is unproductive and others assert that attaining justice for the crimes of past regimes is unnecessary and simply unrealistic. 15 However, to other scholars investigating Franco-era crimes, such as Mónica Zapico Barbeito, the purpose of retroactive justice is not only to ensure justice, but also to establish the truth about the crimes committed and to grant reparations to those affected. 16

The Historical Memory Law

While Spain evaded a transitional justice process in the early stages of the new government, the country faced increasing pressure at the turn of this century to reveal the past transgressions of the Franco regime. The Franco regime’s human rights violations were neglected for decades until around 2000 when a nongovernmental organization, the Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory (ARMH), was created to assist private initiatives in exhuming mass graves and investigating the fate of disappeared persons. 17 Subsequently, in 2006, a “fever for remembering” occurred, when the Spanish public pressed the government to acknowledge the truth behind Franco-era crimes. 18

In October 2007, Spain officially acknowledged the actions of Franco’s dictatorship as “unjust” for the first time by passing the Historical Memory Law. 19 The Law received international and domestic attention for its efforts to finally address the country’s silenced past. However, in an attempt to achieve broad appeal, the Law intentionally did not refer to any historical or collective memory, nor did it establish an account of what human rights violations took place, nor did it condemn the Franco regime for its actions. It simply recognized each citizen’s right to “personal and family memory,” or the right to investigate crimes pertaining directly to one’s family. 20 The bill created a process for victims to seek a “Declaration of Reparations and Personal Recognition,” enhanced the pensions of Republican survivors and Franco-era political prisoners, and instructed local administrative units to help locate and exhume mass graves. Further, it required removal of partisan commemorative symbols and prohibited political acts at the Valley of the Fallen, Franco’s burial site. 21

While the Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE) introduced the Historical Memory Law expecting quick, unanimous passage, the political process for the Law proved unexpectedly contentious. The country’s two main political parties, the center-left PSOE and the center-right Popular Party (Partido Popular, or PP), had both been active in the debate for retroactive justice in Spain. The PP objected to the proposal for the Law in its entirety, accusing the PSOE of attempting to destroy Spain’s democratic transition. 22 Some attribute the PP’s position to the public ties party members and their families had to Franco’s institutions. 23 Despite these opposing views and the resulting political drama, Congress eventually agreed upon a revised version of the legislation, which passed with 127 votes for and 119 against (115 of which were from the PP). 24

Breaking the Silence

The question remains as to what propelled the new push for Spanish transitional justice that materialized in the Historical Memory Law. Furthermore, there is no agreement on why the new law was passed when it was. Transitional justice literature suggests that ethical principles do not drive pursuits for accountability and reparations, but rather a combination of other elements condition the process. 25 Thus, to discover why the first reparations law in Spain passed in 2007 and not earlier, I conduct a situational examination rather than an ethical one. Furthermore, by examining trends at both the domestic and international levels, I provide an account thorough enough to explain why reparations legislation was finally passed in 2007.

It is important to recognize that the conversation for justice is not exclusively a domestic matter, as foreign governments and organizations also play a role. Carmen González Enríquez claims that active advocacy, including international advocacy, is central to guaranteeing prosecution of human rights crimes. 26 In her opinion, lobbying and political strategizing by the international community is consequential. 27 Additionally, the desire and perceived need to enter the “European family” may favor transitional justice. 28 Whether and how these international factors played a role in the Spanish
pursuit of justice is discussed in Section 1 of this thesis.

While the international factor may be important, the local community and public opinion cannot be ignored. In transitioning countries, retroactive justice is not intended to deter further crime, but rather to validate the rights of citizens and legitimize young democratic governments. Some believe that new state authorities must address these violations; otherwise they may be construed as retroactively supporting the perpetrators. Eijkman explains that public opinion on the priority of justice determines whether the prosecutions are appropriate. Internal pressure is examined in Section 2, which compares the Spanish populace of 2006, when the Historical Memory Law was introduced, to that of previous periods.

Finally, differing ideas on retribution and reparations often become attached to political parties, making politics a crucial element in transitional justice. The agendas of these parties can mobilize demands for justice, and other political factors, such as institutions, can shape the way a country confronts its difficult past. For example, the PSOE and the PP have been strategic in advocating for and against reparations, with the latter even defining justice attempts as an attack on the foundation of Spanish democracy. Such political factors behind the passage of the Historical Memory Law are explored in Section 3.

Although modest compared to the desires of the political left, the Historical Memory Law attempted to break the country’s silence and amnesia regarding past human rights violations. In this article, political debate, media reporting, and interviews surrounding the passage of the Historical Memory Law are used as evidence for the proposed motivations behind the justice concerns in Spain. In the subsequent sections, I argue that the bill came at a time of renewed interest in Francoism and the Civil War. Developments in international criminal law and victims’ rights norms encouraged initial self-reflection in the country. Further, a new generation of social and political participants that were willing to discuss past justice problems was replacing those who had lived and suffered through the Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. Finally, the politicians found reparation electorally favorable in 2006 and engaged in strategic negotiations to ensure the Law’s passage. Looking at the international, generational, and political contexts provides a comprehensive understanding of the factors that led to the Historical Memory Law.

METHODS

Parliamentary dialogues retrieved from the online journal of the Spanish Congress of Deputies were examined to assess the political debate on the Historical Memory Law. These journals were obtained from the website of the Congress of Deputies, http://www.congreso.es, which organized the journals by parliament session. The particular journals analyzed were retrieved by searching speeches in the eighth legislative session (2004–2008) under the keywords Guerra civil y la dictadura, which were contained in the title of the original bill. The search yielded three journals, from October 31, 2007, December 14, 2006, and November 11, 2006. On these dates the debate of the Law was recorded, with members of each parliamentary party speaking on particulars of the bill, offering amendments, and expressing overall support or concerns. The political parties that spoke on the bill included the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE), the Democratic Popular Party (PP), the Vasco Party, the Parliamentary Coalition of the Canaries and New Canaries, the Catalán parliamentary group known as Convergence and Union, the United Left, the Republican Left of Catalonia, and the Mixed Group comprised of nine members belonging to parties not large enough to create their own parliamentary group.

In each session, members of all parties contributed to the debate over the Historical Memory Law. Generally, in each session, only one speaker for each party spoke on behalf of the entire party, expressing all the positions, concerns, and opinions of that group. The three congressional sessions were screened for speeches, culminating in thirty-six speeches that in total comprised the various party stances in Congress at the time. The debate was analyzed for several factors. First, to evaluate politicians’ receptiveness to the Law, complaints about the bill were monitored. These complaints were recorded in areas where justice was still considered to be incomplete after the Law was passed, according to findings from the literature review. Any complaints outside this time condition were documented as “other complaints.” The recorded areas included:
– complaints about the Valley of the Fallen;
– proper documentation of the dictatorship and Civil War;
– sufficient apology or recognition of victims;
– condemnation of the Franco regime or establishment of a truth commission;
– concrete policy on the exhumation of mass graves;
– annulment of summary judgments during the Franco regime; and
– prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations.

Any comment that was disapproving toward, critical of, or opposed to the bill was considered a “complaint.” A “complaint” was not necessarily negative in tone, but also included any constructive comment that suggested changes, ways to improve the bill, or personal desires for the bill that had not yet been addressed. Additionally, to assess overall satisfaction with the bill, a parliamentary member’s overall judgment of the bill as either “sufficient,” “insufficient,” or “neutral” was recorded. Judgments recorded as “insufficient” were readily apparent in speeches that referred to the bill as “lacking,” “not enough,” “disappointing,” or “insufficient.” If explicit language was not used, then speeches that contained arguments for further reparation were marked as “insufficient” interpretations, while those that lacked such arguments and expressed optimism or satisfaction with the bill were marked “sufficient.” When an argument did not clearly fall into these categories or when there were conflicting interpretations in the same argument, it was marked as neutral.

References to the international community, such as international human rights law, Spanish involvement with the Pinochet case, or international interest groups such as Amnesty International, were documented within the congressional debate entries. These references were important in assessing what role the international community played in passing the Law and gauging how often debate referenced the international stage. Furthermore, the congressional debate was tracked for any evidence of a generational change occurring within Spain and among the congressional representatives. For example, if a member stressed a need to do justice for his or her grandparents or alluded to an inability to pass such a law previously because of the instability of Spain’s democracy, his or her comment was included in generational tracking. Finally, the congressional debate entries were tagged with the political party with which each respective speaker is affiliated. This allowed me to better see how party politics affected the shaping and passage of the Law.

Congressional debate data was supplemented with an analysis of arguments for the Historical Memory Law found in the two most circulated newspapers in Spain, El País and El Mundo. El País has a loosely liberal affiliation, while El Mundo skews slightly conservative. Using both of these sources ensured inclusion of the most relevant articles and a representative sample of arguments associated with both ideologies. Furthermore, it was possible to compare the coverage of both of these newspapers to reveal any partisan differences. Articles and opinion pieces from 1990 to 2013 were gathered in the LexisNexis database using search terms corresponding to the Historical Memory Law, human rights, and the Franco dictatorship. Duplicate articles and editorials were eliminated, as well as false positives that did not refer directly to the above search criteria. The extent of news coverage was quantified as the number of articles within certain time frames that referenced the Historical Memory Law, Franco, international human rights, and indications of generational changes, such as appeals to justice for grandparents.

The final data source consisted of interviews that were conducted in person in Madrid, Spain in the summer of 2013. These interviews were designed to obtain opinions of those familiar with the Historical Memory Law in order to elucidate what some people view as its benefits and drawbacks. Furthermore, these interviews were used to gain insight into the reason the bill was on the political agenda, public opinion on the Law, and general perspectives on the debate that may not have been acquired through analyses of journal and newspaper documents. Lastly, information gathered from these interviews was used to enhance the historical background behind the transitional justice process in Spain.

The most useful interview was with Carlos Castresana-Fernandez, a renowned Spanish prosecutor, criminal law professor, and head of the International Commission against Organized Crime in Guatemala (CICIG). He has particular expertise in Spanish justice, as a consequence of having
worked with Superior Courts of Justice of Madrid and Catalonia, as well as in the Special Prosecutor’s Offices against Corruption. Castresana-Fernandez is an expert in international human rights and has won many honors for his work in the subject area, including the National Award for Human Rights in Spain in 1997 and the Human Rights Award from the Argentina Association of Human Rights in 1999. The interview took place on August 29, 2013.

Additional interviews were conducted with Patricia Esteban, a resident of Madrid and professor of Spanish literature at the Universidad San Pablo; Juan Pulgar, a lawyer in Madrid; and Pilar Pulgar, a worker residing in Madrid who lived through the Franco dictatorship.

RESULTS
Section 1: International Context
The renewed interest in justice and accountability that occurred in Spain in the 2000s after years of observance of the pacto de olvido was situated in a unique moment on the international stage and in the evolution of international law. Post-transitional justice in Spain resulted from a variety of international factors including elevated international pressure, the establishment of international human rights laws, Spain’s involvement in foreign transitional justice, and the progression of transitional justice in other countries in the late 1990s.

Active International Pressure
Spain was not required to address its past human rights violations by the international communities it joined following the democratic transition; however, the international community did actively contribute to Spain’s “fever for remembering.” When Spain joined the Council of Europe in 1977, the Council did not impose entry requirements pertaining to Franco-era crimes. Although in 1950 this Council forged the European Convention of Human Rights, an international treaty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe, it did not attempt to apply this doctrine retroactively to Spain and force the country to offer reparations to victims of the Franco government. As a result, Spain did not face pressure to pursue transitional justice in the 1970s. The country’s subsequent entry into the European Union in 1986 similarly occurred without any precondition relating to Spain’s pursuit of accountability. Therefore, in the 1980s, the international community still did not require Spain to acknowledge Franco-era crimes or bring justice to Franco-regime victims.

More recently, the European Union has strictly imposed reparation conditions on countries before granting membership. Entry requirements for Serbia included the surrender of all war criminals to the former Yugoslavian tribunal. Conditions were also imposed on the Czech Republic and all former members of the Warsaw Pact. Spain and Portugal, however, were both accepted without such demands. Thus, a direct request by the international community never drove the Spanish pursuit of justice through the Historical Memory Law. The Law also had no direct repercussions for Spain in the international community, so Spain should have felt no pressure via the international stage to address its transitional justice concerns.

Although there were initially no specific international demands for Spain to address victims of the Franco regime, later requests by non-governmental international organizations resonated with the country, which could help explain why post-transitional justice occurred in 2007 and not earlier. Amnesty International implored Spain to do justice for the thousands of victims up until and even after the Historical Memory Law was passed. These appeals were publicized to the Spanish population through El País in articles from May and November of 2003. In the May 2003 article, the newspaper covered Amnesty International’s support of new initiatives honoring Civil War victims and exhumations of mass graves. Likewise, in 2002, the United Nations Human Rights Office recommended that Spain “investigate the disappearance at the hands of the Franco regime [of] at least two cases of Republicans shot after the Civil War.” El País featured this recommendation on November 16, 2002, which consequently sparked an immediate and unprecedented motion in Parliament on November 20 condemning Franco’s uprising in 1936 as an illegal rebellion against a legitimate government. This earlier reaction by the Spanish Parliament to the request of international organizations suggests that the pressure from such organizations contributed to the milieu in which the Historical Memory Law was passed. In sum, international pressure grew in the
early 2000s, which fostered dialogue on transitional justice issues.

Building International Norms

In addition to the pressure directly exerted on Spain by international actors, the evolution of international human rights norms has had a great influence on the trajectory of the Historical Memory Law debate. These developments began with the Nuremberg trials in 1945, when the United Nations resolved that atrocities like those of World War II should never recur. The United Nations adopted the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* three years later, though this declaration and the similar *Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance* (1992) are not legally binding. In contrast, the UN's *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* are legally binding human rights agreements, effective as of 1976. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted in 1998 and put into effect in 2002, establishing four core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Spain ratified the Rome Statute in 2000, although the Court did not have retroactive power to look into Spain's past. Finally, in 2005, drawing on the efforts of previous doctrines, the *Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law* defined and outlined thirteen necessary parameters of reparation. According to this retroactive standard, full and effective reparation requires restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. Moreover, the parameters explicitly obligate prosecution of persons allegedly responsible for human rights violations, provision of proper assistance to victims seeking access to justice, and the inapplicability of statutes of limitations. With the accumulation of all such human rights doctrines, the UN has a basis for recommendations on handling human rights violations, including the 2002 recommendation to Spain discussed previously. Finally, since Spain is part of the UN community, all such norms that have retroactive power apply to Spain for Franco violations.

This evolution of criminal law in the 2000s set the stage for Spain's renewed interest in Franco-era crimes. Almost 20 percent of debate speeches on the Historical Memory Law cited World War II as the origin of the international criminal law applicable to Spain, referring to it as the structural basis of European democratic culture and the foundation of the core European value of human rights. Speeches also acknowledged the sixtieth anniversary of the precedent's existence. Moreover, 36 percent of the debate speeches explicitly accused Spain of violating established international human rights doctrines, indicating that deputies were cognizant and respectful of the norms that the international community expected to be upheld.

In the debate over the Historical Memory Law, 71.4 percent of deputy accusations referred to the violation of some UN human rights doctrine. Most accusations cited noncompliance with *UN International Covenants of Human Rights*, followed by neglect of the Rome Statute. Other UN doctrines, such as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, were mentioned less often. Specifically, Joan Tardà i Coma of the Republican Left argued on October 31, 2007, that “[Spain] deliberately ignored UN resolution 95 on the recognition of judgments and the principles of international law arising from Nuremberg.” He referred to the mandatory subrogation requirement, whereby one person takes over the rights or remedies of another against a third party, implying that the current Congress was responsible for remedying the Franco regime's violations against Spanish citizens. Similarly, Deputy Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal complained that the bill did not adhere to the UN doctrine on war crimes and crimes against humanity. In this sense, although the United Nations did not impose demands on Spain to execute post-transitional justice, the norms the organization set came alive during the Historical Memory Law debate. Even if UN human rights norms did not directly influence reparation, they at least pressured the Spanish Congress to answer more questions about justice for crimes against humanity in 2006 than in any previous year.

The Council of Europe's human rights developments, specifically the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) also played a large role in the debate, with 28.5 percent of
the accusations and 11 percent of the entire debate referencing statements made by the organization. For example, Aitor Esteban Bravo of the Vasco Group insisted that the parameters for judging the Historical Memory Law should not be limited to the Spanish constitution, but should also include the ECHR. Arguments for the existence of a general international human rights norm appeared in 42.9 percent of the accusations and 16.7 percent of the debate. Congressional deputies referred to the need to explicitly condemn the Franco regime and combat historical relativism painting Franco as a “soft” dictator in order to abide by this norm. Overall, more than 50 percent of the bill debate referenced some international human rights development, giving voice to the international community along the route to the Historical Memory Law’s passage.

Moreover, El País consistently referred to UN human rights doctrine and the Rome Statute in articles from 2000 to 2008, thereby informing the Spanish public of the existence of such norms during this time. The dominant Spanish news source highlighting these norms for other human rights cases created an interactive space that fostered Spanish citizens’ introspection on Spain’s compliance with these standards. Expressing interest in this international doctrine on human rights, the Spanish public responded with 380 opinion pieces on human rights and UN doctrine in El País between 2000 and 2007. These findings suggest that international human rights norms informed both the political debate and the Spanish media. Perhaps most importantly, they indicate the extent to which the Spanish populace reacted to these international norms around the introduction of the Historical Memory Law in 2006. This, in turn, demonstrated the saliency of this issue in Spanish politics and pressured Spanish politicians to take action.

At the turn of the millennium, public interest in human rights concerns peaked in response to media stories of crimes against humanity and justice around the world. The increased attention to such concerns primed discussions over domestic human rights and ultimately increased attention to Franco violations. Overall, the prevalence of human rights development and international justice norms in the Congressional debates highlights that the development of international human rights helped shape the reparations discussion in Spain.

The Justice Cascade

Another key component of the international environment facing Spain in the early 2000s was the progression in transitional justice that had taken place in other countries, especially those in Latin America. Transitional justice was pursued in Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala in the late 1990s, ICC cases were brought against Uganda, Congo, Sudan, and South Africa in the early 2000s, and truth commissions were created in twenty-five countries during these two decades. These occurrences left people wondering when Spain’s victims would have their turn for justice. In an opinion piece in El País, Javier Maravall wrote:

> Argentina and Chile, in their democratic transition processes, looked to the Spanish transition as a model of peaceful and consensual change. Maybe it’s time you España look now to processes that have occurred in these two brotherly countries to clarify human rights violations that occurred during the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco (1939-1975).

From 1997 onward, El País featured several other opinion pieces contrasting reconciliation in Spain with that in other countries, particularly Argentina and Chile. Spain not only witnessed accountability measures in other countries with similar pasts, but also actively participated in these cases. In 1999, Guatemalan citizen Rigoberta Menchú used the Spanish High Court to bring a case against the Guatemalan military leadership for human rights violations against indigenous populations during its civil war. In June 2003, Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón jailed a former naval officer of the Argentine military dictatorship after he was extradited from Mexico to Spain pending trial for genocide and terrorism.

In September 2005, Spain’s Constitutional Court ruled that the “principle of universal jurisdiction prevails over the existence of national interests,” allowing the National Court to reach beyond national borders in cases of torture, terrorism, or war crimes, even when no Spanish victims were involved. Subsequently, on January 11, 2006, the Court initiated an investigation into seven former Chinese officials, including former President Jiang Zemin, who allegedly took part in genocide in Tibet.

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On July 7 of that year, six Guatemalan officials were formally charged to appear in the Spanish Court in regard to the Menchú case. This is the environment in which the Historical Memory Law was passed in 2006. Unsurprisingly, people began to demand Spain's own accountability for human rights crimes considering that Spain was playing such a central role in many cases regarding international human rights crimes.

The case of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, one of Spain's early probes into foreign human rights crimes, was pivotal in fostering pressure for Spanish vindications of Franco-era crimes. In 1998, Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón issued an international arrest warrant for General Pinochet for ninety-four counts of torture of Spanish citizens and for the 1975 assassination of Spanish politician Carmelo Soria. The charges filed by Spain for infractions that were not only in another country but on another continent highlighted the Spanish government's hypocrisy. Spanish citizens and the international community alike wondered why the country would provide justice for the victims of another dictatorship but not for its own victims. Such reflections appeared in sixteen articles in Agence News Press and a range of other international news sources, including The New York Times. The bulk of such international media occurred in 1998. Spanish citizens raised the same concerns in El País opinion pieces, with one professor saying, “…when we asked [sic] that Pinochet be held accountable, we must prove that there is no contradiction between our peculiar relation with the Franco dictatorship and the request for Pinochet's prosecution. Or there must be very good reasons for holding different criteria.”

The debate over the Historical Memory Law featured identical sentiments. For instance, Joan Tardà i Coma noted the “contradiction that Spanish state judges pursue crimes committed in Chile or Argentina a few years ago instead of in the State itself.” In fact, a third of the debate speeches looked to the legal protection of victims in other countries as precedents, with two-thirds directly referring to Spain's involvement in the Pinochet case. Although Patricia Esteban conceded that there was a difference in sensitivity between dealing with Spain's issues and with those in other countries, she too felt that Spain's involvement in foreign justice issues was “paradoxical.” Clearly, the debate over the Historical Memory Law was shaped partially by the irony of Spain condemning foreign human rights abuses while failing to address its own.

“Honeymoons” for Justice

Spain's lack of engagement in any international conflict also made the pursuit of reparations plausible in 2006. Spanish lawyer, judge, and magistrate Carlos Castresana-Fernandez refers to periods of international calm, like this period, as “honeymoons” for justice. For example, the international tranquility just after World War II nurtured the Nuremberg trial process; however, justice efforts following this early post-War II period were suspended for almost half a century until the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in an international peace that allowed for retroactive introspection worldwide. An enormous volume of justice occurred in the next decade that had been impossible during the fifty years of the Cold War, including the aforementioned Latin American cases. Still, even the late 1990s did not prove politically favorable for Spanish justice, as demonstrated in Section 3.

The honeymoon of the 1990s ended with the attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001. Although the Iraq War lasted until 2011, Spain pulled troops out of Iraq in 2004 under Zapatero, reinstating international peace for Spain. With the onset of the 2008 economic crisis, however, such international stability ended, limiting the government's ability to carry out reparations requiring heavy state involvement.

Therefore during the few crucial years between 2004 and 2008, Spain was sufficiently at ease to pursue reconciliation with its past.

As discussed in Section 3, the international peace coincided with domestic political developments to make reparation a possibility. Both of these conditions were necessary, but neither was sufficient, to usher in reparations legislation.

Ultimately, requests made by international organizations such as the United Nations and Amnesty International resonated with the country and elicited a reaction. The development of international human rights norms informed and framed the political debate of the Historical Memory Law. The justice cascade at the turn of the millennium provided the momentum needed to ignite Spanish retrospection, and the Pinochet case
focused attention on Spain's particular unresolved issues. Finally, an international peace was conducive to action on the part of the Spanish government. It was the confluence of these developments, not one in particular, that accounted for the international contribution to the “fever for remembering” and ultimately the passage of the Historical Memory Law. Still, generational turnover and political cooperation, discussed in the next sections, are what made reparation most plausible in the early 2000s as opposed to earlier years.

Section 2: Generational Turnover
During the Socialist PSOE rule from 1982 to 1996, the government shied away from significant accountability and reparation measures. In the following terms from 1996 to 2004, the majority Popular Party showed reluctance to invoke heavy reparations. During a renewed PSOE term from 2004 to 2012 under Prime Minister Rodriguez Zapatero, however, a new opportunity for reparations arose. Yet this new opportunity was more than just the result of a political changeover. With the passing time and changing governments, a simultaneous generational transition occurred. The composition of the Spanish general public moved from those who were directly affected by the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship to a more removed population: their children and grandchildren.

Political Continuity
In many respects, the descendants of the Franco era represent a continuity of their predecessors. Carlos Castresana-Fernandez noted a “natural heritage” in the Spanish lineage originating during the Franco dictatorship. The end of the Spanish dictatorship was not achieved through a defeat of the regime, as in Greece, Italy, or Portugal, but rather through negotiation. As a result, remnants of the dictatorship remain, even in the form of indifference toward the past. The social group that represented and supported the dictatorship now comprises the social mass that votes conservative, although it no longer holds the same authoritarian values. For example, Joan Tardá i Coma chastised the PP for allowing a member of the Franco regime, Manuel Fraga Iribarne—who was responsible for the police’s killing of five workers in Vitoria in 1976—to hold a distinguished position in the party. Similarly, the political opposition during the dictatorship now aligns with the leftist parties (ERC and IU) or the PSOE. As a result, the same conservative and progressive divisions from the dictatorship still exist and rotate in and out of office. Because of their ties to the Franco regime, the conservatives tend to be less interested in pursuing accountability and giving reparations to the victims of the Franco regime, preferring not to “reopen old wounds,” as university professor Patricia Esteban puts it. Likewise, the liberals, who disproportionately represent the victims of the Franco regime, are more inclined to pursue these reparations. The number of reparation measures these groups have passed while in office illustrates this difference. Although they passed a similar number of symbolic reparation measures, the PP passed only one material reparation during its 2000–2004 term, while the PSOE passed fifteen during its 2004–2008 term.

Reservations of the Elder Generation
The large distinction between the old and new generation was visible in other ways as well. In an opinion poll conducted by El Mundo in 2006, negative opinion towards Franco’s uprising that started the Civil War was greater amongst younger individuals than amongst the elderly. Moreover, the elderly were less inclined to speak on the matter at all, as a larger proportion of elderly respondents chose not to state any opinion. Thus in 2006, the elder generation was more hesitant to speak about, let alone confront, the terrors of the Franco regime. The younger generation, according to Joan Tardá i Coma of the Republican Left, was comprised of “people who had internalized so much pain and terror in the years of transition [that they] only dared to undertake timidly a tough journey to repair the memory of their parents.” Those of the previous generation who lived through the dictatorship preferred to portray the “placidity” of the dictatorship and the normality of life under it. Patricia Esteban, a professor of literature in Madrid, noted that some of the elder generation, even today, do not regard Franco as a dictator and deny that any oppression occurred, despite all investigations and evidence indicating otherwise. Although Juan Pulgar, a conservative who lived through ten years of the dictatorship, conceded that atrocities occurred,

ii Five during the PP 2000-2004 term; 6 during the PSOE 2000-2008 term
he argued that 2006 was not a proper time to deal with such matters. He resented that the government’s efforts were being directed at “ghosts of the past” instead of the economy.78

A New Pro-Justice Generation

On the other hand, there was a growing trend in Spain in the 2000s towards a favorable opinion of justice. While only twenty-six opinion pieces relating to General Francisco Franco were published in El País from 1995 to 1997, there were more than 200 pieces from 2004 to 2006.79 This suggests a growing willingness of the public to engage in debate over the dictatorship, which was also reflected in the political sphere. To begin, all political parties favored democracy in 2006 when the Historical Memory Law was introduced, while in the late 1970s, authoritarianism still pervaded the country. Deputy Esteban Bravo of the Vasco Party maintains that, as of 2006, no longer was any political party fully in favor of silence and against the pursuit of justice, “because it is not good for democracy nor for coexistence and equality for all citizens.”80 In fact, only three of thirty-six speeches during the Historical Memory Law debate regarded the Law as “unnecessary.”81 Even these reservations were strictly directed towards particulars of the Law, rather than to the idea of reparations in general. The Spanish people’s increased willingness to tackle post-transitional justice issues, which strongly contrasted the reservations of the Civil War generation, opening a door for debate over reparation and accountability that was previously barred.

How do we know, however, that Spanish politicians’ increased willingness to consider reparations legislation is the result of a new generation rather than simply the consequence of a favorable political climate? To examine this question, we may turn to both interviews and debate speeches. Patricia Esteban discussed how children in Spain did not, and still do not, learn in full about Spain’s recent history and the extent of the Franco dictatorship and its human rights violations, as these topics have been considered almost taboo.82 Thus, many children and grandchildren of Franco-regime victims became tired of being shielded and eager to seek justice for their relatives who were never able to procure it themselves. Thirty-nine percent of the debate speeches on the Historical Memory Law referenced the generation of victims’ grandchildren, whether by directly acknowledging an old versus new generation or by appealing to do justice for their grandparents. Jorge Fernández Díaz, for example, mentioned “a new generation…[that] does not share the hatreds and passions of those who participated in [the Civil War.]”83 Although several deputies, like Jordi Xuclà i Costa from Convergence and Union, recognized that, thirty years ago, the only possible path was one of selective amnesia (to usher in the peace and harmony necessary for democracy), this new generation of deputies agreed that another route was now possible. Joan Tardà i Coma effectively embodied this conviction during the debate, stating:

I’m not a person of the transition or who fought against Franco. I am one of the grandchildren, and my generation… has gone through school without studying and without knowing what was the struggle against Franco. We know from our family tradition, or the explanations of friends, colleagues, but we have not studied it. It would be impossible for this to happen in France, Germany, Portugal, and in so many countries that have shown that they have done good.84

Such comments and attitudes suggest that the new interest that Spanish politicians took in reparations and accountability for the Franco regime’s crimes cannot merely be explained in terms of international pressure and political development, but must also take intergenerational change into account. Grandchildren of Civil War victims were more adamant for reparations than their predecessors because the younger generation that dominated during Zapatero’s term was distanced from past horrors. Not only had they evaded the worst of the Civil War and dictatorship, but they also grew up in a world where the topic was considered taboo. This generation rejected the taboo imposed on them, instead showing openness towards justice and accountability that manifested in a renewed push for reparation legislation.

A Decline in Surviving Victims

The willingness of the grandchildren of the victims of the Franco regime to pursue reparation measures can in part be attributed to a desire for dignity and decent burial for familial victims. Such a desire led to the emergence of the Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory (ARMH), which drove early attempts to break the “pacto de olvido.”
The ARMH was created in 2000 after the privately led exhumation of a mass grave of thirteen civilians killed by Republican gunmen in 1936. Many came to the excavation site in Leon Priaranza del Bierzo for assistance in finding other missing persons, which motivated those working at the site to create ARMH to provide such help. Since then, the group has worked to dignify Spain’s past, do justice for those who deserved it, and deepen Spanish democracy. According to an El País survey, by July 2006, 64 percent of those questioned wanted bodies from mass graves to be exhumed, identified, and returned to their families.

Pressure to act before all the victims of the Franco regime were deceased further contributed to the new pro-justice consensus. The years 2005 and 2006 marked the thirtieth anniversary of Franco’s death and the seventieth anniversary of the beginning of the Civil War, respectively. These anniversaries served as a reminder of both the time lapse since the Franco regime and the declining number of living victims of that regime. Descendants wanted monetary or other tangible compensation for their elder relations during their last years. Even those without personal connections to Franco-regime victims acknowledged the urgency to address the issue while victims and relatives of victims were still alive. Such urgency was expressed during the debate over the Historical Memory Law, such as when Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal of the Mixed Group said he took his ninety-seven year-old grandfather multiple times to request annulment of his sentence from the Military Division of the Supreme Court under the Franco regime. Moreover, many with deceased relatives began to think, “Well, my grandfather is still buried in a clandestine grave. I want the body, I want the corpse, and I want a dignified process of re-vindication and a decent burial, not a clandestine one,” which Castresana-Fernandez confirmed was absolutely legitimate.

Clearly, the aging of the population and the desire for proper burial of victims served to foster discussion on reparation among the younger generation. The younger Spanish were therefore impelled to discuss reparation not only because of their distance from the atrocities of the Franco regime and their desire for breaking taboo, but also because of the social context in which they were embedded. The younger generation represented a constituency that, if not actively pressuring Congress to pursue retroactive justice, at least sought to hold accountable those representatives who were averse to measures of reparation. In fact, in all debate speeches, the PP complained that the PSOE was using the Historical Memory Law as a political weapon to boost its image and distort that of parties in opposition. The PSOE was operating under the assumption that the public would side with them in their pursuit of the reparation measure and against the PP who opposed the justice legislation, suggesting that the general constituency was supportive of justice for the Spanish people and disapproving of those against reparations. All this considered, it is evident that the Historical Memory Law came about in part due to the maturation of a younger Spanish generation in both the political arena and in Spanish society as a whole.

To conclude, since the transition from dictatorship to democracy was achieved through negotiation rather than overthrow, remnants of the dictatorship, including societal divisions and sources of influence, remain. These remnants contributed to the indifference towards Franco and reservations towards reparation among those who lived during the Civil War and the dictatorship. However, the sheltered children and grandchildren of this generation did not harbor the same fears and ties to the past and, therefore, were more willing to confront it. The younger generation undertook the task of dignifying the memory of familial victims through the Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory. Finally, the anniversaries of Franco’s death and the beginning of the Civil War reminded the country of the declining number of living victims as well as the waning time in which reparation and compensation would be relevant. Such generational factors certainly created a sense of urgency that was not achieved by the factors associated with the international community.

**Section 3: Political Considerations**

Although many point to the Historical Memory Law as a heroic measure of reparations, others insist that the degree of justice achieved by the Law is overstated. Supporters of the bill often referred to it as a “starting point,” acknowledging the bill’s limitations as well as its potential to...
serve as a precedent for future, more substantial, reparations. Others during the debate argued that the Law was trivial and would not satisfy anyone without remedying all persisting justice concerns. Because the Law encompassed sensitive and controversial topics, Congress struggled to reach a consensus on many areas of reparation. Interviews and the congressional debate suggest that the PSOE strategized to acquire sufficient votes by compromising aggressive reparation in the Law. If this is the case, then the accomplishment of this justice law thirty years after the dictatorship seems like less of a feat.

Political Motivations Behind the Law

The introduction of the Historical Memory Law itself was a strategic political move. The Law was not, in fact, included in the Socialist Worker’s Party manifesto for the 2004 general election, yet it eventually became a centerpiece of the PSOE’s legislative agenda once the Party came to power. It was meant to strengthen the Party’s position after a fortuitous election that swung votes in its favor, making the PSOE the majority party by only five percent. Out of a total of 394 members of Congress, 187 represented the PSOE, 170 represented the PP, and 47 were members of other parties. This illustrates the PSOE’s narrow margin of victory over the PP, which created a dually dominated Congress. The PSOE had to look for new opportunities, such as the Historical Memory Law, to garner support and retain their majority position in the next election. Esteban indeed cited the Law as an opportunistic play of the PSOE, comparing it to the issues of abortion and gay marriage used to strengthen and advertise its leftist politics as distinct from conservative ideologies. Additionally, in the bill’s congressional debate, PP deputies consistently accused the PSOE of manipulating reparation both for achieving political gain and attacking the PP’s conservative ties. For instance, Jorge Fernández Díaz claimed the purpose of the bill was “from day one, a deliberate attempt, make no mistake, to marginalize the [Popular] Party, to present this as a policy in which the opponents are factious, pro-Franco or fascists while the progressives understand the pain and suffering of the people.”

On the contrary, PP representative Manuel Atencia Roblado explained PP opposition to the Law as resistance to imposing an official historical memory and rejecting a single Law that simultaneously aimed to address an array of complex social justice issues. Several PP speakers defended the party’s continuous support of reparations, reminding Congress of the past reparation measures they had enacted. Nevertheless, the PSOE loosely painted opposition to the Law as opposition to victim reparation in order to tarnish the Popular Party’s public image.

Still, the Socialist Worker’s Party lacked an absolute majority in Congress and thus had to appeal to other congressional parties to support the bill. During the political debate of the Historical Memory Law, discussions attempted to get the maximum consensus possible. Congress debated the first draft of the bill, from September 8, 2006, on December 14, 2006, when three amendments were also presented. The United Left and the Republican Left presented the first two amendments as alternative texts for consideration and the PP presented the third amendment that simply requested withdrawal of the bill, yet Congress ultimately rejected all three of the amendments. Following this debate, 377 more amendments to the bill were presented. Thus, agreement was a strenuous process and intense negotiations occurred up until the bill’s passage. In the end, the final Law sacrificed aggressive reparations to reach an agreement and is accordingly unsatisfactory for the formal authorities, international standards, and the victims. Patricia Esteban noted that a large part of the Spanish population believes the Law is useless, and she also felt that the Law has not made a significant impact on society. Many members of Congress demanded that the bill be more aggressive on certain reparations, yet to no effect, as outlined below. Ultimately, the PSOE was forced to reconcile with the PP, which underscores the role political maneuvering played in influencing the trajectory of the Historical Memory Law.

Strategic Specifications within the Law: Annulment of Judgments

The most frequent concern in the Historical Memory Law debate regarded annulment of judgments. Out of the thirty-six entries, it was mentioned seventeen times, taking up approximately 47 percent of the debate. The Historical Memory Law declared illegitimate the military tribunals that condemned individuals based on political standings.
These thousands of judgments spanning from 1933 to 1978 include criminal sentences for political, military, religious, or ideological reasons. Congressional deputies insisted these judgments occurred without due process of law, have errors of form and substance, and should be null and void.

The main controversy was over the term “illegitimate,” which did not carry sufficient legal value. By declaring the judgments illegitimate, victims and their families were only allowed to “solicit individual reparation” before a council of five appointed senior social scientists who would examine each case independently before granting annulment or compensation—a process that could take decades. Many congressional deputies viewed the appeal process as an unfair burden on victims. They proposed amendments to make it the state’s duty to review these judgments, rather than to require 50,000 people to sue for the same nullity. These amendments failed. Others suggested an explicit condemnation of the Franco dictatorship, whereby the regime would be formally expelled from the legal system and oppressive legislation and judgments from the period would be deemed crimes against humanity and repealed.iii Such a condemnation was rejected as well. In each of her three debate speeches, Congress member Joan Herrera Torres of the United Left cited this issue as the “main stumbling block in the negotiations with the government.”98 She noted that the governing PSOE party did not want the annulment of judgments and in the original text did not even declare the judgments illegitimate. Several other congressional representatives expressed the same frustration, citing hundreds of interest organizations, including Amnesty International, which agreed that Spain should abide by UN doctrine on crimes against humanity and annul these judgments.99 Nevertheless, opponents cited “legal difficulties” in annulling the military trials and deflected appeals for across-the-board annulment by saying that certain victims carried their sentences as medals of honor, “proud to have defended democracy.”100

Thus the bill strategically addressed Franco’s repressive military judgments while avoiding a larger conflict over government obligation to review all military judgments of the time and over Franco’s legacy. The bill managed to sidestep any governmental burden, either financial or temporal, that would have been borne if the government annulled sentences after the bill’s passage. This secured the PSOE the political credit for the reparation without incurring much expense. Declaring the judgments illegitimate rather than annulling them was beneficial not only for the ruling PSOE, but also for the Popular Party, which was notably silent on the annulment issue during the debate. The Popular Party, due to its historical link to the dictatorship, had a vested interest in Franco’s legacy. By maintaining rhetorical limitations in the document, Congress did not alienate the PP nor commit the PSOE to address or compensate for the sentences for years to come. In this manner, the final Historical Memory Law included the most passable, though necessarily unsubstantial, solution to Franco’s military judgments.

Strategic Specifications within the Saw: the Valley of the Fallen

The Valley of the Fallen was another prominent point of contention with the Law. Over 30 percent of the debate speeches expressed discontent with Law’s solution for the Catholic basilica and memorial in the municipality of San Lorenzo de El Escorial, Spain. Franco conceived the area as a site to bury and honor those who died during the Civil War. The Valley of the Fallen remains controversial for two reasons. First, it was constructed in part by a workforce of prisoners of war. Secondly, it is a common burial ground for both Franco-regime victims and war victims from both sides.101 While some insisted that it would be disrespectful for the dictator to remain buried next to his victims, others argued that it would be dishonorable to disturb the monument. Uxue Barkos Berruezo of the Mixed Party fought during the debate to convert the Valley into a Civil War memorial.102 Esteban Bravo of the Vasco Group wanted to go even further, calling it “inadmissible” to have the tombs of both Franco and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, a notable politician and lawyer executed by the regime during the war, occupy the same resting place. Bravo called for Franco’s remains to be relocated. On the other hand, Jorge Fernández Díaz of the Popular Party argued that the Valley of the Fallen was “first and foremost a place where the remains of 60,000 people who died during or as a result of the civil war are” and

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iii Twenty-eight percent of debate speeches expressed a desire for explicit condemnation of the Franco regime in the bill.
firmly held that the area should remain undisturbed. The distinctly incompatible opinions on the bill’s dictation for the Valley of the Fallen resulted in an outcome that ultimately preserved the status quo. In the end, the Historical Memory Law simply prohibited demonstrations, political events, and exaltation of Franco at this burial place. Moreover, it provided that the grounds would be governed by the rules for establishments, places of worship, and public cemeteries.

These disagreements over the Valley of the Fallen complicated the debate of the Historical Memory Law and the bill ultimately fell short of transforming the site into a real symbol of reconciliation. In agreeing to offer limited reconciliation through the Valley of the Fallen, Spanish politicians kept the controversy surrounding the Valley from impeding the Law’s passage. Had the Valley measures been more explicit and drastic, crucial support would likely have been put in jeopardy. Disturbing any of the tombs would have put the Popular Party’s support at stake, while not addressing the Valley at all would have angered the Vasco Group, the Mixed Party, and others. Thus to appease such differing perspectives, the Law only minimally addressed the Valley of the Fallen. Clearly, the political maneuvering needed to pass the bill limited the extent of reparations possible. The dynamics of Spanish party politics made only a simple de-politicization of the Valley a possibility.

**Strategic Specifications within the Law: Grave Exhumations**

Finally, the Law was necessarily evasive in stipulating how mass grave exhumations would be administered. The Law provided state financial support and assistance for families in tracking, identifying, and eventually exhuming Franco victims who were subjected to extrajudicial executions and placed in mass graves unknown to their families. Representatives from the Convergence and Union, Vasco, United Left, Republican Left and Mixed Group parties all attempted to secure active governmental responsibility for these identifications and exhumations during the political debate in Congress, yet in the end the Law simply allowed families to request authorization for such actions, without dictating any state duty. Carlos Castresana-Fernandez explained the difficulty of privatizing the exhumation process through the example of the famous poet Federico Garcia Lorca, who was executed by Nationalist forces. Evidence suggested Garcia Lorca was buried along with three or four other victims in a mass grave. While the families of the other victims all desired to exhume the bodies, Garcia Lorca’s family objected, thereby hindering the ability of other families to obtain proper burial for their relatives. Moreover, Castresana-Fernandez argued that with, “more than 100,000 forced disappearances, it is obviously a process that cannot be dealt with privately by the families.”

This process was not only inefficient, but was also noncompliant with international human rights standards that mandate the state to establish truth and coordinate the legal consequences of reparation. In accordance with the UN “Right to a Remedy,” it is the duty of the state “to investigate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially,” and conduct “the search for the whereabouts of the disappeared.”

Still, the Garcia Lorca story illustrates the divide among the Spanish on whether to exhume these graves or leave the dead in peace. Instead of displaying a firm stance on the issue, the Law opted for a noncommittal reparation, keeping the current government from bearing any leadership burden in the process. It offered the government’s neutral support of grave exhumations as a facilitator rather than leader. Ultimately, these provisions kept the status-quo in the exhumation process, not ordering any exhumations but rather permitting individuals to deal with the graves of their relatives as they deemed fit. Although deputies could argue for a greater governmental role, such a compromise kept the grave exhumations from being a derisive issue that could potentially block the bill’s passage, and the public financing was deemed at least “a foundation.”

In sum, while disagreements still remained among conservatives and progressives over the extent to which reparation should be given, a digression from the political sentiments of the dictatorship presented a new political atmosphere where all parties held democratic values and agreed that at least some recognition and reparation was necessary. Furthermore, the political circumstances of the 2004 election provided the stimulus for the government to present the Historical Memory Law. Thus, politics in one sense advanced the cause of Spanish social justice and yet, in another sense, hindered it. The range
of pending issues of reparation and accountability that needed to be addressed made for complicated legislation that inevitably made it politically contentious. Because there was no consensus on several sensitive matters, such as truth commissions, exhumations, and nullification of judgments, strategic provisions in the Law intended to secure the most votes caused the final product to fall far short of compliance with international standards on remedy of human rights violations.

CONCLUSION

Instead of addressing the Franco regime’s violations once Spain’s democracy stabilized, Spain continued to shun its painful history for decades. Spain’s involvement with the United Nations, the development of international human rights norms, and other international justice pursuits in the 1990s set the stage for Spanish post-transitional justice in the early 2000s. With each passing year, the Spanish population became further removed from its painful history. Thus, by the thirtieth anniversary of Franco’s death and the seventieth anniversary of the Civil War in 2005 and 2006, respectively, Spain was more ready to face the Franco violations than ever before. Finally, the opportune moment for justice came after the 2004 congressional election, when the PSOE employed the past to strengthen its electoral advantage. Therefore, the “pacto de olvido” was finally broken by the Historical Memory Law in 2006, when favorable international, social, and political conditions converged.

The three factors contributing to Spanish justice all interplayed to foster an environment conducive to reparation and accountability. International social justice cases from Latin America to Eastern Europe informed public opinion of international justice norms. Grandchildren in Spain, sheltered from the reality of Franco’s human rights violations, saw the country arrest Pinochet in London and ultimately requested the same legal protection Spain provided for victims in foreign countries. With time ticking and a diminishing number of surviving victims, Spain faced a “now-or-never” moment to bring justice to those affected. The domestic push penetrated the political sphere by encouraging politicians to pass reparation measures and creating an atmosphere of disapproval toward representatives who outright opposed such measures. Taking advantage of this public opinion, the PSOE introduced the Historical Memory Law, in part to marginalize the conservative PP. Still, because of the issue’s complexity, the Law went through a process of negotiations and compromises that ultimately reduced the degree of justice incorporated. This confluence of factors accounts for why it took until 2007 to pass significant reparation legislation such as the Historical Memory Law. However, conditions did not prove favorable enough to fully rectify transitional justice concerns, as the standards of “full and efficient reparation” defined by the UN were not all addressed. I argue that it was largely party politics that limited the scope of the Law.

All three factors (international human rights development, generational changeover, and political circumstances) were necessary for the Historical Memory Law to pass, yet none were singularly sufficient. Without international social justice developments, the Spanish public may not have been as adamant for reparations; without a public desire to grant reparations, Spanish politicians would have been less likely to support reparation measures; and without political cooperation, reparation measures could not have been officially enacted. Still, these considerations do not exclusively explain the Law’s passage. Other factors that may have played a role include domestic organizations, the media, and institutional frameworks. Further research into the existence and roles of such factors would be beneficial. Moreover, which of the three factors discussed contributed most to Spain passing the Law can be researched further. Finally, a study comparing the extent of reparation between countries pursuing justice immediately and those that pursue reparation retroactively would be useful to enhance our understanding of transitional justice.

Furthermore, the delay in Spanish justice pursuits has made subsequent attempts to secure reparations and retribution difficult. Because Spain failed to implement reparation and accountability measures during the transition, pessimism for the future of reparations is apparent in Spain. Patricia Esteban commented that, if full reparation did not occur in 2008 while some of the direct victims and relatives of the victims were still alive, then restoration of memory and justice would likely never be achieved. As time passes, it will no longer be a priority, and “a legacy
of neglect and manipulation of the memory of the Franco dictatorship will remain for future generations. Indeed, in November 2013, Spain maintained that it would not review the amnesty law for crimes committed during the war and dictatorship to a critical U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances. Though the Historical Memory Law has often been referred to as a “starting point” for bringing justice to the victims of Franco-era crimes, one must wonder if there will ever be an ending point.

Finally, scholars must note that the trajectory of Spanish transitional justice has implications beyond its own borders. The factors that caused Spain to acknowledge its past crimes some seventy years later can shed light on efforts in other countries to revisit their past justice concerns. Advocates for retroactive justice can use the Spanish precedent to better understand when international, domestic, and political conditions in a country are favorable to its own borders.

The shortcomings of Spain’s delayed transitional justice process can inform other transitional justice cases—for example, teaching countries to be proactive in guaranteeing efficient reparation rather than delaying the process. Overall, the Spanish situation can shed light on how past human rights violations can be handled and when, if ever, it is too late to right past wrongs.

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DO PEOPLE IN EQUAL SOCIETIES LIVE LONGER?
THE RELATIVE INCOME HYPOTHESIS IN LIGHT OF PANEL DATA

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ABSTRACT
This paper reexamines the hypothesis of a negative causal relationship between income inequality and life expectancy. The relative income hypothesis has attracted the attention of policymakers and may become a powerful argument in favor of government redistribution of wealth. To test this claim, this paper draws on panel data from thirty-six countries over eighteen years and employs a specific variable transformation to enable direct testing of the relative income hypothesis from aggregate data. The conclusion of this analysis is that a negative impact of income inequality on life expectancy cannot be empirically substantiated.

1. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Wilkinson and Pickett published The Spirit Level, an extended version of Wilkinson’s relative income hypothesis (1992).¹ This book used empirical research to demonstrate negative impacts of income inequality on crime, obesity, mental and physical health, educational attainment, and social capital. Wilkinson and Pickett argued that international differences in these socioeconomic indicators are best explained by looking at countries’ respective inequality levels, thereby forwarding a powerful argument for a more equal distribution of income. In 2010, the leaders of the United Kingdom’s two largest political parties, Prime Minister David Cameron and Labour leader Ed Miliband, cited The Spirit Level to support the case for reducing inequality.²

The paper primarily aims to present new evidence on the relative income hypothesis from an aggregate (macroeconomic) perspective while addressing the issue of causality and its direction, which is absent from Wilkinson and Pickett’s simple cross-sectional analyses. This is essential for understanding the potential implications of redistributive policies.

To investigate the relative income hypothesis, data from an unbalanced panel of thirty-six countries over eighteen years is used in regression analysis of life expectancy. Various methods are employed—including covariates, fixed effects, and a variable transformation—to distinguish microeconomic and macroeconomic channels. In conclusion, the data do not find evidence to support the importance of relative income on health independent of covariates. In the first half of this paper, I outline the possible causal channels between inequality and health (part 2.1) and summarize the research conducted so far (part 2.2). Part 2.3 presents a variable transformation that enables direct testing for the relative income hypothesis from aggregate data. The empirical analysis follows. The data are described in part 3.1, and panel regressions are conducted in parts 3.2 and 3.3. Part 4 discusses results, offers policy implications, and suggests topics for further research.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Overview of Main Income-Health Theories
This section outlines three different ways we can think about the relationship between health and income.

First, health depends on the level of income: the poorer a person is, the worse her health, because she lacks the necessities such as basic healthcare and quality nutrition. This is the absolute income hypothesis. This pattern is well documented, especially when looking at the entire income distribution.³

Second, the relative income hypothesis states that one’s health depends on his or her position in the income distribution of the respective reference group (i.e. the group of people to which individuals compare their fortunes). A poor individual’s health
does not suffer because she cannot afford quality nutrition and basic healthcare, but because she occupies an inferior position in her society. This health gradient persists throughout the income distribution. The causal channel is psychological—the stress of having to “keep up with the Joneses” and deterioration of social relations are responsible for poor health outcomes. Merton’s Strain Theory describes the strain of an individual's success on other, less successful individuals.\(^4\) Merton uses this to explain the inequality-crime relationship. Finally, Sapolsky documents stress being related to social status.\(^5\)

Wilkinson argues that relative poverty only becomes prominent in countries that have undergone an “epidemiological transition,” a point when the nature of mortal diseases changes from infectious to chronic and degenerative. This is usually identical to the point where the marginal returns on money with respect to health start to fall. While higher incomes can help fight pandemic diseases, chronic diseases like ischemic heart disease respond much less to advances in individual earnings. Hence, absolute income does not have a significant effect on health in developed countries. Wilkinson demonstrates that the epidemiological transition can be seen in both cross-sectional international data that includes poor and rich countries, and in a time series data analysis of rich countries.\(^6\) In the United Kingdom, for example, coronary heart disease became more common in working class than higher classes in 1970’s.\(^7\)

While the causal channel from income to health is clear, there are several complementary links that could explain the negative impact of inequality on life expectancy: the stress of economic inequality may negatively impact the immune and endocrine systems, encourage fatalist thinking, and induce people to start smoking or consuming alcohol.\(^8\) Mortality depends on work security and satisfaction and on support networks. All of these were shown to deteriorate with lower economic status.\(^9\) But the causal channel does not run exclusively through individual stress levels. Wilkinson argues that inequality breaks down social cohesion and trust within a local community.\(^10\) Diminishing social networks and peer support are known to harm individual health. In this respect, income inequality is a proxy for social exclusion, with low levels of autonomy and security as related factors. In sum, relative deprivation not only creates chronic stress but also significantly weakens the institutions that would otherwise serve to diminish it.

Wilkinson also drew attention to the fact that relative deprivation that negatively affects one’s health is anchored to the income of our social group, not to the average income of the whole world.\(^11\) This creates verifiable implication of the relative income hypothesis: a health gradient should exist within, but not between countries. Wilkinson brings evidence of precisely this relationship in the data.\(^12\) So far, we have hypothesized that individual health depends on position in the income distribution. If it is better to be higher up in the income ranking, the richest individuals in a group should be left unaffected by the shape of the income distribution. To put it simply, the rich should not suffer from relative deprivation.

However, an important extension of the relative income hypothesis is that income inequality may be a health hazard in itself.\(^13\) Some of the causal channels described above are as likely to affect the poor as the wealthy. There are psychological effects in play; in a society where wealth is important, the stress related to maintaining one’s position falls on both the rich and the poor. Social capital, social support, and the provision of public goods are all hypothesized to deplete as inequality grows. Similar arguments can be found in literature from other fields. For example, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterley argue that public spending falls with population heterogeneity; income inequality may serve as a magnifier of the differences between people.\(^14\) Knack and Keefer show a positive link between the levels of trust in a society and its GDP.\(^15\) Kahn shows how high inequality reduces life expectancy through underinvestment in social infrastructure.\(^16\) If income inequality fragments society and creates stress, envy and mistrust, high inequality will reduce the health of all members of a given society, even those at the top of the income distribution. This is the relative income hypothesis, which is present in all of the literature reviewed in this paper, and it is also the hypothesis this paper will test. Overall, the evidence in favor of this hypothesis is strong on the microeconomic level, but mixed at the aggregate level. The existing literature will be discussed in part 2.2.

It is important to note that the causation may run in the opposite direction. Poor health prevents
individuals from working, reducing their income both absolutely and relatively. After all, health is one of the inputs into the production process. Policy implications are then very different, since income redistribution is a symptom, not a cause, of population health. Although this paper does not focus on this relationship, some papers in the discussed literature attempt to correct for reverse causation in order to improve the consistency of their results.17

2.2. Survey of Literature

Because it is individuals, not countries, who experience health outcomes, microeconomic studies are a natural point of departure. The conclusion is clear: most studies find a significant and positive relationship between income inequality and mortality at the individual level. The precise definition of inequality varies—income, social status, and the degree of sub-ordinance all serve as possible benchmarks—but the causal links overwhelmingly point towards increased stress, insecurity, and loss of social support that originate in inequality, and have a negative impact on individual health and life expectancy.

Studies of aggregate data will be reviewed in the second half of this section. There is no clear consensus in this literature, although most papers seem to reject the hypothesis of a straightforward negative relationship between inequality and health. Much of the discussion centers around the precise interpretation of such a relationship: does it tell us anything about individual health-income relationship at all? This paper argues that it does not, unless specific methodology is employed.

Microeconomic Studies

The absolute income hypothesis is the fundamental relationship for the study of income and health:

\[ h_i = \alpha + \beta y_i + yz_i + \varepsilon_i \]  

where \( h_i \) represents individual health outcome (e.g., life expectancy or self-reported health status), \( y_i \) is individual income, \( z_i \) is a vector of demographic control variables, \( \alpha \) is a constant and \( \varepsilon \) represents the error term.

To get an idea of the extent of mortality differences, the 1980 USA National Longitudinal Mortality Study revealed that people with household incomes below $5,000 could expect to live ten years less than individuals with household incomes exceeding $50,000.18

Microeconomic research builds on (1) in two ways: including a growing number of controls (\( z_i \)), and circumventing the problem of endogeneity of individual income. Both of these approaches aim to identify the direction and specifics of the causal link between income and health.

Adding control variables helps to pin down the source of income-health relationship by controlling for potential confounding factors. The most ready candidates for controls were education, followed by race, gender, lifestyle factors (smoking, excessive drinking), and public health expenditure. For example, in a non-linear study, Smith and Kington showed the positive effect of income on self-reported health is only halved (and still significant) after variables such as smoking, BMI, and excessive drinking were added to the regression.19

One of the first papers on this topic was by Kitigawa and Hauser, who analyzed different microeconomic datasets on income, social status, and mortality in the U.S.20

The Matched Records Study matched death records with data from population censuses to construct a dataset of more than 340,000 individuals who died in 1960. Controlling for age, sex, and race, the study found a strong negative relationship between mortality and education. The life expectancy of the least-educated group was five years below the average life span of the most educated group. This was true for both overall mortality and mortality from cardiovascular diseases, although the results for cancer mortality did not exhibit a clear trend. Interestingly enough, this relationship was not observed among those above age sixty-five, suggesting that the positive impact of education may wear off over time.

The best predictor of mortality, however, was not education, but income. The researchers found a clear negative relationship between the two, although they pointed out that because they used a measure of household income, not wealth, the individuals with poorer health may be forced to take less lucrative jobs. Hence, reverse causation may be one of the drivers behind the observed health gradient. As a result, the authors argued that years of schooling...
serve as a better proxy for social status than income. This was supported by a multivariate regression that included both income and education as explanatory variables (again, also controlling for sex, age, and race): these two variables were both statistically significant. A different dataset was based on the population census in the Chicago metropolitan area for the years 1930–1960. The results were very similar to their previous findings. Again, the overall mortality rate in the lowest income group was approximately 60–65 percent higher than in the highest income group.

The time series feature of the data revealed an important piece of evidence in favor of the relative income hypothesis. If absolute income, and not social status, mattered for life expectancy, one would expect that after several years of income growth, the poorest and the richest groups would have the same mortality rate. But instead, in Chicago, mortality was falling at an equal rate for all income groups, which preserved relative mortality between different income levels and suggested that absolute income is not all that matters for improving life expectancy.

The problem with Kitagawa and Hauser’s study is that it failed to control for migration in and out of the areas over time, which might have been strongly linked with income and health. Furthermore, neither the Matched Records Study nor the Chicago Area Study had any controls available for health-related factors such as smoking or exercise. The results of this study demonstrate a strong link between education, income, and mortality. Kitigawa and Hauser controlled for race, sex, education and age, but the seminal contribution to health-income covariates was a paper by Smith and Kington. Their aim was to explain the racial differences in health among the older U.S. population, but they employed a wide range of variables that are illuminating for income-health research in general. Interestingly, this paper used survey data on the predominantly retired population in the U.S. The advantage is that this population’s income (pension and annuity from accumulated wealth) does not depend on their contemporary health, so the researchers did not have to worry about reverse causation.

Smith and Kington found a strong health gradient: self-reported health consistently corresponded to increased household net worth. Furthermore, adding nonlinear function of income (linearly splined terciles) into the regression function significantly lowered the unexplained fraction of racial and ethnic health disparity. This suggests that the health-income relationship is concave. Smith and Kington controlled for a set of self-reported risk behaviors, such as smoking, alcohol intake, and excess calorie intake, and concluded not only that the original health gradient was not affected, but also that economic factors explained more of the ethnic and racial health disparities than the behavioral risk factors. The link between income (and wealth) and health was strongest for the poorest individuals and became relatively weak at the top of the income distribution.

Similarly to Kitigawa and Hauser, education was a significant control that improved health beyond what it contributed to income. Smith and Kington saw this as evidence that schooling is either a good proxy for socioeconomic status or is intrinsically beneficial to health, perhaps by enabling the individual to make better health-related choices or to access health information at a lower cost. Menchik explored the direction of causation between income and health, To do so, he used three different tools. First, he employed steady household wealth as a proxy for income to exclude impacts from health on income. Second, he removed bias from unobservable individual differences by controlling for parents’ health and self-assessed health status. Third, this regression was then estimated as a panel logit model to allow for non-linearities in the income-health relationship. The resulting estimate of $\beta$, the coefficient of income in the health-income regression (1), was positive and significant at 5%. Income, he concluded, caused higher life expectancy.

An alternative approach to investigating health-income causality is to make use of natural exogenous changes in income. Wilkinson conducted a quasi-natural experiment where he analyzed the relative changes in mortality and income for different occupational classes. He argued that although there was significant self-selection into occupations at the entry, most people stay within their occupation for the rest of their lives. This creates ideal conditions for this type of experiment: once we control for the occupational choice, changes in earnings of a given occupational class are independent of individual

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characteristics—the income of an individual does not have a significant impact on the changes of earnings of her occupational class. This makes it possible to estimate the causal relationship between income and mortality.

Looking at the 1971 and 1981 British censuses, Wilkinson found that 21 percent of the variation in mortality rates by occupation can be explained by occupational unemployment and the percentage of men with the lowest earnings. Changes in earnings in the higher parts of the distribution were not statistically significant, suggesting that it is relative deprivation that reduces life expectancy. All of the studies cited so far explored primarily the effect of absolute income and touched the relative income hypothesis only indirectly. A measure of income inequality, g$_q$, was at first included as a demographic control variable. Along with measures of psychological stress, these were the beginnings of the relative income hypothesis. Silver was among the first ones to use these measures.26

While stress proved to have a significant negative effect on individual health, the results for income inequality are still mixed: Gerdtham and Johannesson fail to reject the null hypothesis that community income inequality causes individual mortality in Sweden,27 and Daly et al. find that state-level inequality is insignificant for individual mortality,28 but Wilkinson shows that life expectancy and relative poverty are very negatively correlated.29

The most persuasive evidence for the relative income hypothesis comes from the Whitehall studies. Conducted in two waves (1967 and 1985) and focusing on British Civil servants, the studies discovered that rather than observing a clustering of bad health and risk factors at the lowest social class, the data exhibit a continuous health gradient that affects all social classes, including relatively rich individuals. The powerful implication of these studies is that “inequalities in health cannot be divorced from inequalities in society.”30

The first Whitehall study was carried out on 17,530 male civil servants, collecting medical information and data on their health-related behavior. Their “employment grades” were used as a measure of their social status within their workplace. Seven years later, deaths of study participants were recorded. Forty-three percent of these deaths were attributed to coronary heart disease (CHD), a diagnosis often linked to stress.

Marmot et al. analyzed this subsample and found two clear trends.31 First, the CHD mortality rate increased with age. Second, and more surprisingly, this mortality rate displayed a steep gradient with respect to the employment grade. Controlling for age, the men from the lowest employment grade (messengers and manual workers) were 3.6 times more likely to die of CHD than the men in the highest grade (employees of the administration). The first Whitehall study also notes a strong positive link between employment grade and healthy lifestyle (proportion of active sports in leisure time, smoking). Only 29 percent of the administrators smoked, compared to 61 percent of those in the “other” grade. A multiple regression was used to assess how important grade is, controlling for lifestyle choices and recorded health status. Only 40 percent of the grade differences in CHD mortality could be explained by these behavioral factors, suggesting that social status (inequality) indeed plays a very important role.

Indeed, the participants may have been sorted into employment grades based on their good health. This was the case for Civil Service employees that were hired as “other” grade after their health problems prevented them from performing more demanding physical work in better jobs. To examine the possibility of reverse causation, Marmot et al. split the sample according to whether or not the men suffered from a list of CHD-related symptoms when hired. Although the civil servants hired with symptoms were more likely to die of CHD, the health gradient remained relatively unchanged, and was equally significant in explaining CHD mortality. This relationship proved to be stable over the seven years of follow-ups.

A different confounding factor was that the men in the “other” grade were on average five centimeters shorter than those in the highest grade. Height remained negatively correlated with CHD mortality even after including a range of controls. Furthermore, height seemed to be directly linked to socioeconomic status (WWII). The interaction between mortality, inequality and early environment is complex and was not pursued further in the paper. The authors concluded that “a man’s grade of employment was a stronger predictor of his subsequent risk of CHD death than any of the other major coronary risk
Eighteen years later, a second cohort of British Civil Servants participated in an extended follow-up to the first Whitehall study. This research collected a much greater range of data on participants’ behavior, as well as on various stress-related factors such as support networks and job satisfaction.

Although some things changed—men were much less likely to smoke compared to twenty years prior—Whitehall II confirmed the findings of its predecessor. Not only coronary heart disease, but also angina pectoris, chronic bronchitis, and other chronic and degenerative diseases were less likely in higher employment grade. The association between low employment grade and risky lifestyle choices, such as greater alcohol consumption, smoking, obesity, and less physical exercise, also persisted.

Concerning the new data on social and psychological factors, fewer civil servants from the lower employment grades reported satisfaction with their work, having a close confidante, and pursuing hobbies; they were also more likely to not own a car and to experience problems paying their rent. In general, having little control over one’s life may be another channel through which stress influences mortality.

The Whitehall studies give powerful testimony to the impact of inequality on individual life expectancy. First, the participants were all non-manual workers in stable employment and none of them were in absolute poverty. Despite that, the study revealed a strong health gradient based on position in society. Second, increased probability of cardiovascular diseases was associated with stressful jobs, and the Whitehall studies deepened our understanding of what it is exactly about stress that is detrimental to health. Until Whitehall I, it was accepted that greater stress arose from fast-paced jobs with large responsibility. This study revealed that the true problem is the discrepancy between the psychological demands of a job and the degree of control the employee can actually exert. This serves as a powerful empirical foundation for the claim that inequality is bad for individual health.

A direct link between social status and health was observed in primates, too. Archie et al. observed baboons in their natural habitat for over 20 years and found that alpha monkeys were much faster to recover from injuries than their lower-status peers. The researchers discovered that the pressure of low status was proved to be an exceptionally strong source of chronic stress, and low status also meant a baboon was less likely to receive social support, which usually serves as an “antidote” to greater levels of stress hormones.

Sapolsky argued that we can extrapolate the qualitative results from the study of baboons onto humans. When under stress, human and baboon bodies release similar hormones and experience similar emotions, and similarly to people, baboons do not face any predators in their natural habitat and thus most of their stress originates in their social group. Hence, there is a reason to believe that at least some of the findings about baboon health-status relationship are transferable to humans.

Another piece of interesting evidence of the harmful impact of relative deprivation comes from behavioral economics. Kuhn et al. analyzed data on lottery winners and their neighbors in the Netherlands in the period 2003-2006. The postcode lottery in this country randomly allocates a luxury car to the lucky lottery participants. The researchers reported a strong effect where neighbors of a lottery winner were much more likely to buy a new car than the inhabitants of a neighborhood where nobody won. The study hypothesized that neighbors that cared about how they are socially perceived bought a new car to “keep up with the Joneses.”

The rest of the microeconomic literature focuses on more conventional datasets and income inequality.

A paper by Wilkinson followed novel methodology to bring evidence of a non-linear relationship between inequality and health. Wilkinson used U.K. cross-sectional microeconomic data on self-reported health and household income, and computed “health ratios,” a measure of individual health relative to the average score of the people of the same age. He regressed these individually against the household income and found a U-shaped relationship between inequality and ill-health ratio. The wealthy individuals in the sample never experienced worse relative health than their low-income counterparts at the other end of the distribution. Although these results are for morbidity, not mortality, previous studies showed that morbidity is a very good predictor of mortality, and thus these results can be generalized.
Why did the ill-health ratio rise at the right end of the income distribution? Wilkinson pointed out that in Britain, class and income are not always good predictors of each other. For instance, fifty percent of manual laborers in the transport sector earned more than the bottom twenty-five percent of the managerial class. Despite this strong claim, Wilkinson does not address the implications of the divorce between social status and income for the methodology and interpretation of most research on life expectancy and inequality, which takes the position that income distribution is a good proxy for social status. If Wilkinson’s evidence that the inequality-health relationship is convex holds, income redistribution from the rich to the poor may improve mortality and morbidity at both ends of the income distribution.

All of the research mentioned until now focused on a single country—studies that combine international data are rare. The limiting factor in this case is the lack of data that is adequately comparable across countries.

An exception is a study by Lobmeyer and Wilkinson, which used a relatively new international microeconomic dataset, the Luxembourg Income Study. Their paper is a response to a surge in contemporaneous studies that have failed to find an empirical relationship between inequality and life expectancy and claim that it was a phenomenon of the end of the twentieth century alone.

The results for total mortality rates were weak and mixed, confirming the findings of the literature to which Lobmeyer and Wilkinson respond. Looking at premature mortality, however, delivered clear results in line with the relative income hypothesis: it was strongly and positively associated with income and income inequality.

The two mortality measures used (traditional morality and index of premature deaths) attach different weights to different age groups, namely the premature deaths measure gives greater weights to the mortality of young population. As a consequence, the discrepancy of results when using different measures points to the fact that the income-health relationship changes with age. For those under the age of sixty-five, mortality grew with inequality, and also in relative poverty for these age groups. That would explain the positive relationship between premature mortality rates and median income.

The authors conclude that the loss of the health-inequality link in recent literature is a result of demographic changes in the income distribution. It used to be the elderly population, but now it is families with young children who are most likely to find themselves with the lowest incomes. As the mortality rates in younger age groups are much lower compared to the mortality above age sixty-five, the authors argue that this shift in income distribution is likely to obscure the relationship between inequality and mortality. This assertion was supported by the four countries for which time series data was available, but it is questionable how robust evidence based on such a small sample can be.

Despite its potential, the Luxembourg Income Study is representative of only a few European countries and has not yet been fully used for income-health research. To explain international differences in life expectancy, one must examine aggregate variables.

### Macroeconomic Studies

Macroeconomic studies focus on explaining the variation in mortality rates across countries. The point of departure for this perspective on the income-health relationship lies in two papers from the 1970s.

Preston observed a positive and concave relationship between income (per capita GDP) and life expectancy. Income improves life expectancy in the initial phases of development, but as a country becomes richer, an additional unit of income buys fewer and fewer years. The income-health relationship exhibits diminishing marginal returns.

An extreme extrapolation of this concave trend is that above a certain threshold (epidemiological transition), absolute income no longer matters. The income-health relationship becomes flat when the distribution of income within a society gains prominence. Average life expectancy of a country can now be raised by taking money away from the rich, whose life expectancy will respond only mildly to changes in absolute income, and giving it to the poor, for whom absolute income still raises life expectancy considerably. This was the bottom line of the second seminal paper of this field by Rodgers: on average, combining the absolute income hypothesis with diminishing marginal returns on income implies that income equality improves health.
An important result of the Preston and Rodgers study is that on the country level, relative and absolute income hypotheses are indistinguishable: income inequality reduces life expectancy. Only after employing special methodology, such as the one used in this paper, is it possible to use macroeconomic data to learn about the individual health-income relationship.

The basic aggregate relationship estimated is:

\[ h_s = \alpha + \beta y_s + \delta B_s + \gamma z_s + \epsilon_s \]  

(2)

relationship, \( \delta \) only measures the impact of inequality on average health outcome in a country. Even for a general understanding of \( \delta \) as a simple measure of covariance between health and inequality, its value is ambiguous and depends on whether (2) includes non-linear functions of income. If it does, as in Gravelle et al. (who replicated Rodgers' paper with new data and a range of alternative functional forms, including a nonparametric 3SLS procedure to approximate the concave income-health curve), it is not surprising if \( \delta \) is insignificant, because inequality and non-linear functions of income may be capturing the same aggregation affect. Gravelle failed to find a significant link between inequality and health, which led to the conclusion that the harmful effect of income inequality on individual health is just a “statistical artifact.”

On the other hand, Kaplan et al. and Wilkinson found a large and significant effect of inequality on average life expectancy.

Overall, these results are very sensitive to different functional forms of (2), the measures of income inequality (household vs. personal, different decile ratios) and the addition of control variables \( z_s \). Thus, the literature does not reach a consensus about the value of \( \delta \).

One of the papers that reported a very large \( \delta \) in both static and dynamic settings is by Wilkinson. He worked with OECD cross-sectional data from 1986-1987, and his research provides strong evidence in favor of inequality as the determinant of differences in international life expectancy. Per capita GDP and health were weakly correlated (correlation coefficient of only 0.07), but regressing life expectancy on inequality and income resulted in adjusted \( R^2 \) of approximately 75 percent. Wilkinson concluded that income and income inequality alone can account for three quarters of the variation in life expectancy.

The second part of this paper looked at the links between changes in variables. Using a different dataset with several time periods, he regressed the annual growth rate of life expectancy on the growth rate of relative poverty. The correlation coefficient was -0.73: the countries where relative poverty diminished faster also enjoyed faster growth in life expectancy.

In Wilkinson's opinion, the high correlation coefficients estimated were sufficient evidence of causality. He argues that with correlation so strong, it is unlikely that the health-income relationship isn’t driven by a third variable. Moreover, because the data on GDP per capita and life expectancy were calculated using the whole population, including economically inactive individuals whose income does not depend on their health (such as children and pensioners), the probability that the link between health and income comes from reverse causation is small. The truth is that both of these arguments could be easily disputed by finding a significant third variable, such as strong welfare state. This would render Wilkinson's empirical findings spurious.

A more persuasive argument in favor of the relative income hypothesis comes from a different paper by Wilkinson. In this study, Wilkinson explains the concept of epidemiological transition and gives compelling reasons for drawing from aggregate data in search of evidence of the relative income hypothesis.

In the last half-century, we have witnessed improvements in life expectancy at the rate of two to 2.5 years per decade, even when the income-mortality profile was flat. Humanity clearly hasn't reached the limits of life expectancy; only the determinants of life expectancy have changed in the process called ‘epidemiological transition,’ “the shift in the main causes of death from infectious diseases to degenerative cardiovascular diseases and cancers.” Now that almost all members of society have reached a certain standard of living (such as
being able to afford white bread and sugar), the question is why the probability of dying of a stroke is not the same for the top and the bottom quintiles of income distribution. In fact, the diseases among the affluent of the past (obesity, coronary heart disease) have become more common among the poor today. Wilkinson argues that the cause is relative deprivation.

Another piece of evidence comes from comparing the historical development of the UK and Japan: while the Japanese society became much more egalitarian (at least with respect to incomes) in the period since 1970, the UK experienced an increase in income inequality. At the same time, Japan became the country with the highest life expectancy, while the UK’s position in OECD rankings slipped from tenth to seventeenth. It is possible, of course, that these trends can be explained by some third variable driving both health and inequality, such as change in attitudes and preferences. Wilkinson did not provide an answer to this.

Another problem arising from the relative income hypothesis is that given that an individual’s absolute income determines her position in the inequality ranking, how can we distinguish between the two? A different paper by Wilkinson used aggregate data to respond to this issue. He points out that while a strong health gradient is consistently found within countries, it is absent from international comparisons. The strong health gradient within countries is a reflection of social status (one’s position in the society usually does not depend on wealth in other countries) and confirms the relative income hypothesis.

The literature described so far focused on showing how and what aggregate data tells us about the effects of inequality on individual health. Little attention was given to additional explanatory variables. This is addressed in the following section.

When it comes to the addition of covariates, opinions vary. Proponents of the relative income hypothesis argue that controlling for the channels via which income inequality damages health (e.g. education) artificially reduces the significance of inequality variable. On the other hand, studies like Silver champion the use of a large set of additional explanatory variables to obtain more precise models of the income-health interaction. In particular, Silver assumed that mortality is a result of a rational choice of how much input to sacrifice for better health, and the only way to consistently estimate this model is by using various covariates.

The health demand variables were household income, education (as a proxy for the cost of health information), “taste variables” such as marital status and fertility; and cultural and historic factors, for which a region dummy was used. Silver also controlled for stress (death rates of ulcers of the stomach) and public health expenditure.

A 2SLS regression was fitted along OLS because there are several reasons why income may depend on health, some of them leading to simultaneity bias. First, disease and injury may lead to loss of work or a shift to an occupation with a lower wage. Second, state benefits for the chronically ill and disabled increase income even as health deteriorates. Third, an individual with a shorter life expectancy has less time to recoup the returns on investment into education, and will therefore invest less. Thus, fewer years of schooling lead to lower wages. Exogeneity of income is also important for unbiased estimation of the coefficients on other explanatory variables that are likely to be correlated with income, such as marital status and physicians per capita. This paper looked at average variables by area in the U.S. data in the years 1959-61. The main results were very similar for OLS and 2SLS: both income and education significantly improve life expectancy. Stress and smoking were found to be detrimental to health (ulcers are significantly and positively related to mortality), while the coefficient for public welfare expenditure was significant and negative, suggesting a reverse causality problem where public welfare grows in areas with worse population health. Overall, Silver’s results on aggregate data were in line with similar microeconomic studies, such as by Kitigawa and Hauser.

A more recent study by Daly et al., which also focused on the health-income relationship in the U.S., was unique in its simultaneous use of micro and aggregate data. Their analysis used various measures of income distribution, some of them poverty-sensitive and others affluence-sensitive. They served not only as a robustness check for their findings, but also to see how the shape of the distribution impacts on mortality.

On the state level, Daly et al. found a strong
positive relationship between mortality and inequality. The association between mortality and inequality was significantly weaker when the inequality variable measured the upper end of income distribution. The regression of changes of mortality on changes in inequality, which presented a much stronger test of the health-inequality relationship, similarly suggested that only the changes of inequality among the poorest deciles of the population matter.

Linking individual life expectancy with state-level inequality (controlling for age, race and median state income) brought rather different results: inequality had the correct sign, but was never significant. The authors admit that they could find a significant inequality-mortality relationship only after “considerable experimentation” with decomposition of the full sample. This is what led them to conclude that the data do not support any role of state-level inequality in determining individual mortality. The main message of their paper is the need to recognize the source of rising inequality: is it a growing pool of the poor, or is it that the rich are getting richer? The former seems to be more harmful to life expectancy than the latter: “Empirically, the mortality correlations are stronger for measures that stress the depth of poverty rather than the height of affluence.”

A very different conclusion, a strong negative relationship between inequality and life expectancy, was the center of The Spirit Level, an influential book by Wilkinson and Pickett that brought the relative income hypothesis into public discussion. The authors focus on the relative income hypothesis, the claim that income inequality harms society by having a negative impact on all of its members. They use a large set of aggregate data on developed countries to prove its point. As a measure of inequality, they use the ratio of incomes of the top 20% versus the bottom 20% of the population. Their data comes from the World Bank (2004).

Wilkinson and Pickett produced an impressive set of scatterplots on OECD countries that document the negative relationship between income inequality in a given country and almost any “social bad” imaginable: obesity, drug use, homicide rate, teenage pregnancies, lack of trust, and life expectancy. This was complemented by a narrative that encompassed findings from sociology, their own epidemiological research, the economics of happiness, and animal biology. The authors concluded that income inequality is strongly linked to social ills, and that this channel operates on an individual level.

The message of the book provoked a strong negative response. Most of the criticism of the book focused on demonstrating that the correlations presented by Wilkinson and Pickett were a result of data mining and country selection. This is partly true (as Saunders and Snowdon argue in an article for the Guardian): for example, the authors omit South Korea, which is very unequal but has good social outcomes, and is therefore not consistent with the conclusions of their data. Another example is the use of old forecasts of obesity rates in the U.S., which strongly overshoot the actual values. However, the main limitations of the Spirit Level lie in its methodology and theoretical foundations.

First, it is rather lax when describing its claims: the authors talk about “the society,” “almost everyone,” and “all individuals” interchangeably, although these refer to very different income-health hypotheses: “The benefits of greater equality spread right across society, improving health for everyone – not just those at the bottom. In other words, at almost any level of income, it’s better to live in a more equal place.” (emphasis mine). They fail to clearly distinguish between the impact of inequality on average variables, and when the effect pertains to individual outcomes. The interplay between concavity and inequality on aggregate level, as first described by Rodgers, is not discussed at all.

Wilkinson and Pickett present the large set of scatterplots for different socioeconomic outcomes as evidence that the negative influence of income inequality on life expectancy is not a coincidence. The consistent and significant inverse relationship between inequality and negative social outcomes is interpreted as a strong indicator of a causal link between inequality and obesity, crime, etc. This is the second main problem of this book. While the authors may be correct about these correlations, which are indeed robust across dependent variables, these correlations tell us nothing about causality. The observed pattern in the data may be a result of a third variable, such as culture or history, driving these joint results. In fact, the authors refer to research that has been done on the links between life expectancy and social capital, suggesting that the inequality-health
The relative income hypothesis in light of panel data

The third weakness is that all of their data is aggregate. This would be sufficient if the authors only claimed that inequality makes societies worse on average, but as noted above, they often use these aggregate correlations as evidence in favor of negative impact of inequality on individual outcomes. (In contrast, to avoid this pitfall, this paper employs specific decomposition technique to make inferences about the individual from the aggregate.) As Runciman noted, the book includes one chart that unambiguously supports the relative income hypothesis. It plots infant mortality rates against father’s social class for Sweden vs. England and Wales. This graph not only shows a clear health gradient (the higher the class, the lower the probability of infant death), but it also shows that infant mortality in England and Wales is higher for all classes, including the top class. Following Runciman’s argument, this is the type of evidence Wilkinson and Pickett should have focused on to prove the relative income hypothesis.

2.3. Model

This section presents the theoretical model used to investigate the relative income hypothesis in aggregate data.

To formally express the relationship between health, income and inequality, I adopt the model by Deaton, which draws on the work of Rodgers and Gravelle et al., but includes a way to test the relative income hypothesis with aggregate data.

I start by modeling the individual health-income relationship. I assume that this relationship is quadratic, and that health falls within inequality of the individual’s reference group. A quadratic health-income relationship implies that eventually, health will fall as income grows, which is not very plausible. A quadratic function was used due to its simplicity and because it serves as a good demonstration of Deaton’s variable transformation. Later, in the empirical part, a log specification is explored as well.

In keeping with the previously used notation, the health \( h \) of an individual \( i \) from a country \( s \) depends on her income \( y \) and on the inequality in her reference group \( g \):

\[
h_{is} = a + \beta y_{is} - y(y_{is} - \bar{y})^2 - \theta g_{is}
\]

I express income inequality as squared deviations from country mean. \( I_s \) stands for the population size of country \( s \). Note that the implicit assumption is that the reference group of \( i \) is her home country.

The health-income relationship described in (3) nests various specific hypotheses. If we set \( \theta = 0 \), diminishing returns of income with respect to health are removed; when \( \theta \) is zero, the model collapses to the absolute income hypothesis. Hence

\[
h_{is} = a + \beta y_{is} - y(y_{is} - \bar{y})^2 - \theta g_{is}
\]

this model enables the testing of various assumptions as nested hypotheses under the umbrella expression (3).

Next, I need to aggregate (3) to model health-income relationship on a macroeconomic level. To distinguish between the effects of aggregation and relative income hypothesis, I first express individual health and income as deviations from world averages \( (\bar{h}, \bar{y}) \) and income \( (\bar{y}, \bar{y}) \):

I then sum these deviations for each country, and divide it by the population of the given \( s \). The resulting variables are life expectancy and per capita GDP respectively, both still expressed as deviation from the world mean life expectancy and GDP per capita. This is the final formulation.

In other words, I first express health and income of each individual as a deviation from the world mean, and then compute country averages of these deviations. This is done for each time period (note that this is why there is no time subscript on the variables of this model).

(5) demonstrates that even if inequality has no effect on individual income \( (\theta = 0) \), it will still affect average country health. This was at the heart of the critique by Gravelle et al. A nonzero \( \theta \) will thus serve as evidence in favor of relative income hypothesis.

3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

3.1. Data

The dataset is an unbalanced panel of

\[
h_{is} - \bar{h} = a + \beta (y_{is} - \bar{y}) - y(y_{is} - \bar{y})^2 - \theta g_{is}
\]
eighteen years (1989-2006) and thirty-six countries categorized as follows:

Countries were chosen to represent different types of economies and to maximize data availability. Developed countries are taken from Wilkinson and Pickett; emerging countries are taken from the IMF classification (World Economic Outlook 2012). Altogether, there are 648 (potential) data points for each variable. Gaps in data are driven by frequency of surveys (especially true for the main explanatory variable of interest, the Gini coefficient), and these depend on the decisions made by statistical agencies. Hence, there is no reason to believe that the missing data are related to any economic factor. Instead, we can treat the gaps in data as random errors that should not result in measurement error bias.

The UNU-WIDER database is a comprehensive collection of international inequality data. It is not perfect, though: to cover so many countries, the database merged many individual Gini coefficient surveys. As a result, the income inequality data are not perfectly comparable across countries. Moreover, the source varies also within countries because most inequality surveys are not conducted annually (with the exception of the USA). There are several inequality databases for each country. They usually differ by their definition of income, by looking at pre- or post-tax inequality, by unit used (household vs. Individual income), and by the frequency of their data. When selecting the data, my methodology was to use as few datasets as possible (within and across countries) and to choose the most similar ones (across countries). I assume that different versions of Gini move together over time, so that a particular definition should not matter once we difference the data.

Health expenditure per capita is included to control for international differences in healthcare that may be unrelated to a country’s level of income and inequality. For example, after the 1989-91 revolutions in Eastern Europe, some countries (such as Hungary) saw less damage to their healthcare sector than others (such as the Baltic countries). Wilkinson and Pickett also included health expenditure in their health-inequality research.

The public expenditure measure was included to control for a materialistic causal effect that runs from inequality to low social cohesion to low public spending.

When choosing a measure of the control variable (secondary school enrollment, health expenditure, and public spending), I picked the ones with the highest correlation coefficients with life expectancy. Consequently, the relative income hypothesis will be easier to reject and easier to defend if accepted by the data.

The following table presents correlations between all variables, demonstrating a significant degree of multicollinearity (at the 5 percent significance level).

### 3.2. Panel Regressions on Non-Transformed Data

The focus of this section rests on the absolute income hypothesis and the detection of any inequality-health relationship. Direct testing of the relative income hypothesis via Deaton’s transformation follows in part 3.3.

I start with simple pair-wise correlations of the three main variables: life expectancy, per capita GDP, and inequality as captured by the Gini coefficient.

Figures 1 to 3 confirm that the relationship between income and health is concave. Life expectancy declines only mildly with higher levels of income inequality, and the link between inequality
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>“Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.”</td>
<td>World Bank Code: SP.DYN.LE00.IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product per capita</td>
<td>Thousands of constant U.S. dollars (PPP, base year: 2000) per inhabitant (inflation adjusted)</td>
<td>“GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.”</td>
<td>World Bank Code: NY.GDP.PCAP.KD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school enrolment</td>
<td>Percent ratio</td>
<td>“Net enrolment ratio is the ratio of children of official school age based on the International Standard Classification of Education 1997 who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers.”</td>
<td>World Bank Code: SE.SEC.NENR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditure per capita</td>
<td>Constant U.S. dollars (PPP, base year: 2000) per inhabitant</td>
<td>“Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditures as a ratio of total population. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not include provision of water and sanitation.”</td>
<td>World Bank Code: SH.XPD.PCAP.PP.KD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure</td>
<td>Percent of GDP</td>
<td>“Cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing goods and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends.”</td>
<td>World Bank Code: GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment inflow</td>
<td>Current U.S. dollars</td>
<td>“Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors.”</td>
<td>World Bank Code: BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and GDP is unclear. As one would expect, the impact of GDP per capita on life expectancy is much less pronounced in developed countries. The inequality-health gradient is the steepest for Eastern Europe. In emerging countries, income grows slightly with inequality, which results in a positive link between inequality and life expectancy.

Of course, these correlations do not represent causal relationships – they may be confounded by omitted variables and the panel nature of the data. To correct for this, I estimate a range of regressions, which are presented and discussed in the remainder of this section.

I carry out specification tests to find the correct econometric approach, using the functional form (A) (see below) for the testing. The Appendix provides more detail on specification tests and other econometric issues.

First, I use the Hausman test to distinguish between random and fixed effects model: does each country have an intercept that carries over through time? The null hypothesis of random effects was rejected at the 5 percent significance level, so fixed effects regressions were run in the paper.

Second, the Roy-Zellner test was used to check whether data are pool-able. The hypothesis that the slopes are the same for all countries was rejected at the 5 percent significance level. I continue to treat the data as pool-able, but this result needs to be taken into account when evaluating the outcomes of this analysis.

In this section, I start with six different functional forms.

I use cluster standard errors to control for possible heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Only these standard errors are reported.

**Results and Discussion**

Table 3 summarizes the results of these six FE regressions on raw data.

Overall, the fit is very good ($R^2$ between 29.9 percent and 66.8 percent). Across all regressions, the data do not reject the absolute income hypothesis. As expected, income improves life expectancy, and this relationship is concave.

Only one regression, E, finds a significant link between Gini and life expectancy.

Following Gravelle et al., an interaction variable
**THE RELATIVE INCOME HYPOTHESIS IN LIGHT OF PANEL DATA**

**Figure 2**

![Figure 2](image)

**Figure 3**

![Figure 3](image)

\[
\text{lifeexpect}_{st} = \begin{array}{c|c|c}
\beta_{GDPpcst} & \delta Gini_{st} & \text{A} \\
\beta_1 GDPpc_{st} + \beta_2 GDPpc_{st}^2 & \delta Gini_{st} & \text{B} \\
\beta_1 GDPpc_{st} + \beta_2 GDPpc_{st}^2 + \gamma_1 Gini_{st} + \gamma_2 \text{healthexp}_c + \gamma_3 \text{seconschoolen}
\text{rolltot}_c + \gamma_4 \text{expense}_c & \delta Gini_{st} + u_{st} & \text{C} \\
\beta_1 \frac{1}{GDPpc_{st}} + \beta_2 \frac{1}{GDPpc_{st}^2} & \delta Gini_{st} & \text{D} \\
\beta_1 \log(GDPpc_{st}) + \beta_2 \log(GDPpc_{st}^2) + \gamma_1 \log(Gini_{st} \times GDPpc_{st}) & \delta_1 \log(Gini_{st}) + \delta_2 \log(Gini_{st}^2) & \text{E} \\
\end{array}
\]
between the Gini coefficient and GDP per capita was added in Regression C to simulate epidemiological transition. 65 This variable is highly insignificant, mirroring Gravelle's results. There are several possible interpretations: either the data detects no epidemiological transition or all the countries in the dataset have already passed the transition. The results so far do not allow us to distinguish between these two explanations.

In Regression D, I add control variables, but the coefficients of income and inequality do not change. Originally, all three control variables (healthcare expenditure per capita, secondary school enrollment, and total public expenditure) were included, but a series of joint-significance tests showed that healthcare expenditure is the only significant one. The other two insignificant variables were excluded from further regressions.

An alternative way to approximate the concave health-income relationship is by the reciprocal function of GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared (as in Regression E). This was Rodgers' preferred specification, and it indeed provides more support for a link between life expectancy and inequality, suggesting that the quadratic function may not be the best way to model the income-health relationship. 66 Nevertheless, the p-value of Gini is still only 0.08 percent, while $R^2$ drops to 29.9 percent. By switching from a quadratic to a reciprocal function, we traded goodness of fit for significance of inequality variable. This suggests that the functional form of Regression E puts greater importance on inequality than the competing regressions.

Regression F reproduces the preferred translog

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 (various FE specifications on all countries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP pc. squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP*GINI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditure p.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: p-values in parentheses: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. GDPpc and GDPpcsq in regression E are in reciprocals of the variables. All variables in regression F are in logs.
specification from Gravelle et al. The qualitative results are identical to the quadratic specification.

One may argue that Gini is insignificant because the dataset combines developed and developing countries. To investigate this possibility, preferred specifications in Regressions D and E are repeated for country subgroups. Regression D was chosen because the lack of control is often criticized as the weak spot of relative income research, and Regression E presents a different functional approximation of the problem, slightly accentuating the role of inequality. In other words, Regression D is stricter while E is more lenient when testing for an income-health relationship. The results can be seen in Table 4.

These findings largely echo the full-sample regressions, albeit with a few discrepancies. While the values of the income coefficients are as expected (income is most important in emerging countries, followed by Eastern Europe), income plays a statistically significant role only in developed countries. This suggests that other factors—perhaps institutions, political stability, or quality of healthcare—play greater roles in determining life expectancy of people in Eastern European countries.

Diminishing returns of income on life expectancy are detected in all types of countries, which suggests they have all passed the point of epidemiological transition. This is why the interaction term between Gini and GDP per capita in Regression C was not significant—all the countries in the sample have passed the transition, and thus there is no variation on which to base an estimate for the impact of the transition on life expectancy.

However, significance of control variables does differ between country groups. Secondary school enrolment is more important in emerging countries than anywhere else. At low average levels of education, an extra year of schooling may have a much bigger marginal impact on life expectancy compared to countries where the average length of schooling is already high.

The Gini is insignificant in all but one case.
This means that, contrary to the Wilkinson and Pickett result in the Sprit Level, these regressions reject the hypothesis that inequality can explain the international variation in life expectancy. Gini may be insignificant because it is either collinear with the second moment of average income or it may simply not matter. Further interactions may be in play, but this model does not allow us to make further assertions, so we cannot distinguish between alternative explanations.

To conclude, the results support the absolute income hypothesis, an increase in average GDP per capita by $1000 USD will improve life expectancy by seven months, thirteen months and more than three years in developed, Eastern European and emerging countries, respectively. The uniformly negative coefficient on GDP per capita squared serves as evidence of a negative relationship between income inequality and life expectancy via the aggregation effect. Gini is almost universally insignificant, which may occur for a variety of reasons between which we cannot distinguish at this stage of the analysis.

Comparing the full sample and sub-sample outcomes, the sum seems to give stronger results than its parts. This only highlights the sampling sensitivity of the income-health relationship; subsample results are more reflective of the underlying relationships than the full-sample regression.

3.3. Panel Regressions on Transformed Data

Although the evidence for a health-inequality relationship is sparse so far, this does not indicate anything about the health-inequality relationship on an individual level (see section 2). To address this problem, I use the model introduced in part 2.3. I showed how expressing individual health and income as deviations from the world means and averaging them over states enables us to distinguish between the effect of aggregation and the relative income hypothesis.

To put it simply, I decompose the variation in individual income into the deviations from the country average plus the deviations of the country average from the world average. The country-world deviations capture the concavity of health-income relationship. If the variation of income within a country has only as big an impact on health as the variation of income across countries, then inequality (which is a function of income variation) does not have any extra influence on health. However, if the relative income hypothesis holds and inequality per se affects health, then we expect the within-country income variation to influence health differently than the international income variation. Thus, variable θ will be non-zero.

Regression G below is equivalent to model equation (5). Time subscripts were added to capture development over time.

When estimating Regression G, the individual data that were used to derive this regression are not actually needed to estimate the parameters of the model, as accounted for by the aggregation done in part 2.3. Thus, I only use data on a country level.

To distinguish between the transformed and original variables, the latter are labeled life expectancy and GDP per capita, while the transformed ones are income and health.

The point of interest in this regression is the parameter θ, which measures the impact of inequality on individual health. A t-test of θ is carried out. Under

\[ \theta \] = 0, which are significantly different, then we conclude that inequality affects health in the direction specified by the sign of θ.

Results and Discussion

The results are summarized in Table 5. The lack of significance of income variables and the low R² are suspicious. I hypothesize that they result from the low variation among transformed data. The bottom line of Table 5 presents p-values of θ under the null hypothesis θ = 0, which are insignificant in all cases. Interestingly, the p-value is smallest for developed and Eastern European countries. We would expect, given the relative income hypothesis, that relative deprivation affects life expectancy only once a country is rich. The puzzling conclusion is that the sign of θ (implied by coefficients on income squared and Gini) is positive for all but emerging countries, suggesting that income inequality increases average life expectancy. Overall, then, θ provides little evidence of a negative individual relationship between income inequality and life expectancy. If the only problem was little
variation in the data, θ would be insignificant, but its values would be in line with the hypothesis. But because it is both insignificant and its values fail to tell a consistent story, we must conclude that this regression failed to find any evidence in favor of the relative income hypothesis.

Controls for education and healthcare expenditure were added to the original regression (Regression G). At first, the measure of public expenditure as percent of GDP was included as well, but this variable was omitted in the end because it was insignificant. If inequality caused a breakdown of trust and social cohesion, leading to lower public expenditure, the public expenditure variable would be significant and positive. These results show this is not the case; public expenditure does not have a role in explaining life expectancy.

Hence, the relative income hypothesis is unambiguously rejected.

**Addressing the Possible Endogeneity of Income**

One of the threats to the consistency of the estimated results is endogeneity of income. The condition, \(E(\epsilon_i | x_i, a_i) \neq 0\), could arise for several reasons, including measurement error, omitted variables bias, or reverse causality. Time-invariant omitted variables are not a problem thanks to the fixed effects estimation, but country-specific time trends (idiosyncratic historic development) or a confounding variable for life expectancy and income (e.g. preferences for healthcare) would be problematic. Reverse causation is a threat, too, because health can be understood as an input—a form of human capital.67

To address the endogeneity problem, I use annual inflow of foreign direct investment to instrument for GDP per capita. FDI increases investment, which in turn promotes higher wages, so average income in a country is higher. Given that these countries have passed epidemiological transition, their health profiles should be similar enough and FDI flows should not depend on the health of the population.

The instrument proved valid only for developed countries, so the instrumentation did not address income endogeneity in the full sample of countries.

**Table 5 (FE regression G on full sample and sub-samples)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>all countries</th>
<th>Developed Health</th>
<th>Emerging Health</th>
<th>East Europe health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-1.515*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.79)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income squared</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-.079**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.84)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school enrolment</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.95)</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditure p.c.</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-.314</td>
<td>3.923**</td>
<td>-1.662</td>
<td>-14.522**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.65)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value of θ</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Furthermore, instrumenting for income did not lead to different results and conclusions: income significantly and positively affects life expectancy; this relationship exhibits diminishing marginal returns, and the relative income hypothesis is not supported by the data.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1. Discussion of Results and Ideas for Further Research

In Section 2.1, I introduced three main income-health theories: that absolute levels of income improve health; that income inequality is detrimental to health of all members of the society; and that income changes in response to good or bad health. The aim of this paper was to test the second relationship, the relative income hypothesis.

This paper fails to find consistent evidence to support this theory. The hypothesis that income inequality is detrimental for every member of the society was not supported by the data. If there is a relationship between income inequality and population health, it is more complex than one suggested by simple cross-sectional correlations that dominate the literature.

The reliability of my results largely depends on the assumptions about the data. The plausibility of a cross-national study can be questionable when the underlying data are not directly comparable. In this respect, this paper follows the benevolent approach of most literature.

Using the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality is susceptible to problems. The Gini coefficient does not allow for a full description of income distribution because Lorenz curves representing very different inequality patterns may intersect. Unfortunately, more suitable alternatives such as Generalized Entropy indices are rarely reported.

Another threat to internal validity is structural change. Deaton and Paxson and Ruhm show that mortality is procyclical. Preston and Hill compare the main factors behind life expectancy across different time periods for developing countries, and conclude that this relationship changes significantly. Between 1930 and 1960, socioeconomic factors accounted for only thirty percent of life expectancy variation, while explaining a majority of it in 1965-1979. The cases of transitional East European economies are a good example of how changes in unobservable country-specific factors, such as institutional background, influence the health-inequality relationship. For instance, while inequality was uniformly rising, Russia and Ukraine experienced a persistent increase in mortality to their 1970s levels, but a U-shaped life expectancy pattern was observed in the rest of the sample. Chow tests of structural stability and a richer set of controls could address this.

Dynamics of the health-income relationship may also play a role. Blakely et al. suggest a lag as long as fifteen years may be appropriate.

Income endogeneity, although briefly addressed in section 3.3, remains a concern. Although Instrumentation showed that income is exogenous in developed countries, a different instrumental variable should be used for Eastern Europe and emerging countries to arrive at credible estimates. Overall, the instrumental variable results did not contradict previous findings of this paper, but an extensive research on income endogeneity would add credibility to the results.

External validity of the results is much less problematic, although the Roy-Zellner test from part 3.2 suggested that country responses to changes in income and inequality may be too idiosyncratic to pool. This raises the question of the transferability of single-country findings.

Future research should focus on a more realistic modeling of the health-income relationship. An error correction model may be used to infer the long-term relationship between health and income. Most importantly, clearly distinguishing between individual and aggregate health-income relationships will be essential for formulating comprehensible policy recommendations, which I address in the final section.

4.2. Policy Implications

This paper finds no support for the relative income hypothesis. Increased government income redistribution, then, may not result in improved health of the population. If UK political leaders wish to reduce income disparities, this must be argued on grounds other than mortality rates.

However, this paper has a second, equally important message: the data underlying most research are not truly adequate to answer the posed questions. Policymakers should first and foremost support initiatives such as the Luxembourg Income
Study. Creating internationally comparable datasets will significantly decrease the uncertainty of our results.

Finally, one must note that even the most accurate research on the relationship between health and inequality is not enough to state whether a government should aim for greater income redistribution. This is a decision that can only be made by careful examination of the benefits, costs, and values associated with such a policy.

5. APPENDIX TO THE EMPIRICAL PORTION OF THE PAPER

Prior to running the regressions described in the main body of the paper, I conducted the following specification tests.

There are several models that can be fitted on panel data: pooled effects, fixed effects, and random effects.

Because each makes different assumptions about variable endogeneity and disturbances, I employ several tests to choose the most appropriate one.

First, is the data poolable (i.e. can I fit the same health-income slope to all countries)? I use the Roy-Zellner test as opposed to the Chow test. Both compare a pooled model (\( c_i = c_0 \)) to an unrestricted version with country-specific slope parameters (\( c_i \)), but Roy-Zellner estimates a random-effects regression instead of OLS to take into account the composite structure of disturbances \( \varepsilon \) if random/fixed effects are present - \( \varepsilon \sim (0 + \mu, \sigma_a^2 + \sigma_c^2) \) vs. \( \varepsilon \sim (0, \sigma_c^2) \) in the Chow test.

The Roy-Zellner test was performed on regression specification A:

\[
\text{life expect}_{st} = \alpha + \beta \text{GDP pc}_{st} + \delta \text{Gini}_{st} + \varepsilon_{st}
\]

The hypothesis that the slopes are the same for all countries was rejected at the 5 percent significance level, suggesting that countries respond idiosyncratically to movements in GDP and Gini.

Second, are there any country-specific effects? To test this, I estimate (A) by OLS, including country dummies to allow 36 country-specific intercepts. The F-statistic for their joint significance is \( F_{3, 35} = 13.96 \), which rejects the null hypothesis of all dummy coefficients being equal at the 1 percent significance level. Together with the Roy-Zellner test, this suggests pooled model does not fit the data.

Finally, I carry out the Hausman test, which compares random-effects with fixed-effects coefficients. If the null hypothesis of RE holds, these coefficients are statistically identical. The comparison of coefficients in (A) yields a p-value of 0.11; when I add the square of GDP per capita to the regression (specification B), the chi-squared test statistic of 79.62 unambiguously rejects the null at the 1 percent significance level. A fixed-effects model is therefore used throughout this paper, i.e. variables are time-demeaned prior to regression to eliminate unobservable state-specific fixed effects.

The data transformation carried out in the model is not a standard econometric procedure, as Deaton suggested it to tackle the aggregation problem in particular. In a more general sense, however, transformation of variables is nothing unusual: it is typical to log variables to smooth out time series, to give the variable a normal distribution, or to be able to directly estimate elasticity parameters. Time series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pooled model (by OLS)</th>
<th>( y_{st} = \alpha + \beta x_{st} + u_{st} )</th>
<th>Slope and intercept homogeneity; Gauss-Markov assumptions hold.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random effects (by FGLS)</td>
<td>( y_{st} = \beta x_{st} + (\alpha_s + u_{st}) )</td>
<td>Slope homogeneity; composite disturbance ( \varepsilon \sim (0 + \mu, \sigma_a^2 + \sigma_c^2) ) result in serial correlation. O? consistent as long as conditional mean independence holds: ( E(\alpha_s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effect (by OLS on time-demeaned data)</td>
<td>( y_{st} = \alpha_s + \beta x_{st} + u_{st} )</td>
<td>Slope homogeneity, but intercept heterogeneity = country-specific effects, which are correlated with ( x_{st} ): ( E(\alpha_s x_{st}) \neq 0 ). Estimates consistent conditional on ( x ) and ( \alpha ): ( E(u_{st}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
variables are often expressed as differences relative to the lag value, which equals the growth rate. The goal here is to transform a non-stationary series into a stationary one. Variables in Real Business Cycle models such as inflation and output are usually transformed into deviations from the steady state. Finally, some data are normalized so that the variance is a constant proportion of the mean of the variable (e.g. Box-Cox transformation). To conclude, although the particular variable transformation is relatively unique, this general process is widely used in econometrics.

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IMPLICATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND GLOBALIZATION IN OECD NATIONS

BEN GOTTESDIENER, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS (2014)

ABSTRACT
Dependence on foreign energy both constrains a state’s ability to act independently in the international system and increases its vulnerability to other state and non-state actors. Moreover, one of the major oil-supplying regions, the Middle East, continues to be extremely politically unstable, further contributing to the vulnerability associated with dependence on foreign energy. Today, with many states refocusing political capital into the goal of energy independence, it is increasingly important for scholars to understand the consequences of energy independence upon state behavior. This study seeks to explain how differing levels of energy independence affect a state’s level of global engagement. I have quantified energy independence for the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in order to statistically analyze the possible relationship between energy independence and political and economic globalization. To the extent that global engagement provides states with some remedy to the vulnerability linked to their energy dependence, I hypothesize that as countries are increasingly energy independent, they are likely to be both increasingly politically and economically disengaged in the international arena. The statistical analysis supports these hypotheses.

INTRODUCTION

“Since the first price explosion of 1973, we have learned that the energy crisis is not a mere problem of transitional adjustment; it is a grave challenge to the political and economic structure of the free world.” – Henry Kissinger

Energy independence is defined as the sufficient production of energy domestically to meet domestic demand for each source of energy, freeing a state from relying on foreign sources of energy. It is increasingly clear that dependence on foreign energy both constrains a state’s ability to act independently in the international system and increases its vulnerability to other state and non-state actors. Moreover, one of the major oil-supplying regions, the Middle East, is currently extremely politically unstable, further contributing to the vulnerability associated with critical-resource dependence. From a historical perspective, instability in oil-producing regions has demonstrated the dangers of energy dependence most notably during the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973. Today, many countries have made energy independence a national priority; however, very little is known about the consequences of this independence upon their behavior in the international system.

There are two main sides to this unresolved debate over the implications of energy independence. Some argue that as a country becomes increasingly independent, it is more likely to become more isolationist.¹ A state does not need to rely on the international marketplace and the international political arena to ensure access to this critical resource if it is able to meet domestic demand through domestic production. Thus, the country becomes more inward looking, and prioritizes domestic policy over international issues. Others argue that as a country becomes increasingly independent, it will become more globally engaged.² Such a state does not have
the limitations of acting in the international political and economic arena with the constraints of ensuring a reliable flow of energy, allowing the state free rein in conducting its foreign policy. Much of the debate, however, is focused on anecdotal literature appearing through mainstream media outlets.

This study seeks to examine this same puzzle – whether there is a relationship between differing levels of energy independence and level of global engagement – but in a new light. In particular, I offer an empirically-driven and quantitative test to study the nature of this relationship.

I hypothesize that as states become increasingly energy independent, they are more likely to be politically and economically disengaged in the international arena. I argue that countries are heavily engaged because the international arena and its institutions give them some protection against vulnerability stemmed from lower levels of energy independence. Thus, I expect to see a negative relationship between energy independence and political and economic globalization because I believe that states with higher levels of energy independence are less vulnerable, making them less inclined to engage.

ENERGY AND GLOBALIZATION: LITERATURE REVIEW

To date, little scholarly work exists dedicated to the implications of energy independence. Moreover, because energy independence has never before been quantified on an international scale, all prior work on the subject has been speculation on the consequences of independence or analysis of the possibility that a state becomes independent. In spite of all of these speculations, no work has been devoted to empirical analysis of the relationship between energy independence and globalization. There has been much written on energy dependence and energy security. Much of the work on energy security and the dangers of dependence focuses on the United States' history of dependence and how each subsequent oil crisis demonstrates the dangers of relying on foreign sources for such a vital resource.

Daniel Yergin, a prominent scholar on energy history and security, has written two books on the subject. In *The Prize*, Yergin chronicles the emergence of oil as the lynchpin of a successful globalized economy and how all modern societies became reliant on energy. This analysis is valuable because it provides the historical backing for the creation of the term “energy dependence.” Yergin describes the dependence of societies at first on coal and now petroleum, detailing the dangers associated with this reliance. In *The Quest*, Yergin takes a more contemporary approach to energy security analyzing only the Cold War years. Yergin’s most significant contribution is his analysis of major current global themes and conflicts through the lens of energy, demonstrating the magnitude of energy issues in dictating international affairs. He looks at the role of energy in the Gulf War of 1991 and the role of energy in the emergence of China as a contemporary global power. By establishing the crucial role of energy in these major international themes and conflicts, Yergin lays the foundation for future scholarship on the relationship between energy dependence and international affairs.

James Hamilton argues that energy dependence compromises energy security. Hamilton uses the catastrophic 1973 and 1979 supply disruptions and their effect on the United States economy as examples to support his argument. Through his economic analysis, Hamilton argues that the doubling in oil prices and rise in the price of gasoline during both crises squeezed the supply for petroleum products, nearly halting the largest economy in the world. If one resource can have such a drastic effect, Hamilton argues, then it is dangerous to depend too greatly upon it.

Cohen, Joutz, and Loungani (2011) argue that there is a relationship between energy diversification and energy security. Although their study focuses on trends in the diversification of petroleum and natural gas in the OECD, the conclusion of the study is a proposed relationship between diversification and energy security. The study quantifies energy diversification, but it does not include a measurement of energy security to accurately test this relationship. The importance of this study is in the proposed link between diversification and energy security and overall vulnerability. Although this proposed relationship is ancillary to the proposed relationship between energy independence, vulnerability, and globalization, it is a similar relationship that serves as a model and basis for the formation of this hypothesis.

Similarly, Bengt Johansson (2013) argues that domestic renewable energy sources contribute to energy security. Johansson claims renewable energy
resources, “... do not suffer from the same long-term resource availability problems as finite fossil resources and their geographical location is less concentrated, but other issues such as dependence on variable flowing resources and competition for scarce land resources will grow in importance.” Both of these arguments claim that diversification of sources, especially those that are not imported and exported like renewables, contribute positively to energy security. There are however, limitations to these arguments. The main counterargument is rooted in the fact that alternative energy sources, mainly solar and wind, rely heavily on a finite set of natural resources that are known as rare earth metals (REMs); the supply of which is dominated by China. The reason this is significant, is because China has on numerous occasions demonstrated its willingness to cut the supply of these resources to the global market, thus limiting the contribution to energy security as Johansson argues. As recently as 2010, China abruptly cut exports by 40%, citing environmental concerns.

Jonathan Chanis (2012) defines interdependence as mutuality or a reciprocal relation between interdependent entities. With this definition, he argues that full energy independence in the United States is unrealistic. He cites the interdependence between Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s largest oil exporters, and the United States, the world’s largest oil consumer. This relationship, Chanis argues, is a factor that cannot be ignored when determining the probability of the United States achieving energy independence, even if the United States can produce enough energy domestically to meet demand, due to the mutual reliance created by the purchase of oil by the United States. Chanis claims, “the essence of ‘interdependence’ involves reciprocal vulnerability—the inability of one side to damage the interests of the other without also damaging itself.” Although he uses interdependence to argue that the United States will never be energy independent, the link between energy independence and interdependence is an important relationship that he builds upon in his argument. He also presents the relationship between interdependence and vulnerability, which the argument in this study is based upon.

Most prominently, my study builds on Michael Ross’s earlier research on the demand for international institutions (such as the UN, NATO, World Trade Organization and others). The term “demand for international institutions,” is best exemplified by Bernice Lee (2013). Lee argues that, “Keen to guarantee their access to resources in a time of scarcity, Middle Eastern importers of food and Asian importers of raw materials are building economic and trade relationships with the major producing regions.” To fulfill the desire to guarantee their access to resources, states are creating and/or joining international organizations that help them achieve these goals. Thus the term “demand for international institutions” refers to countries creating or joining international organizations that help them achieve their goals. International relations theories have suggested that an increase in the transnational flow of goods, services, capital, information, and people generates a demand for international institutions. In other words, interdependence fosters political globalization. As the transnational flow of these goods, services, capital information and people increase, increased cooperation is necessary in order to ensure the smooth and efficient transfer of these goods (Mitrany 1966, Haas 1964, Keohane 1982). Functionalist theory, introduced by David Mitrany (1966), states that international cooperation and integration through the presence of international institutions is necessary in the search for material efficiency. In A Working Peace System, Mitrany (1966) argues that an “international organization must do the same things which national governments do in modern society, only with a difference in scale. It must do those things which cannot be done well, or without friction, except on an international scale.” He goes on to argue that the efficient administration of limited resources on a supranational scale is essential for cooperation and for the creation of his ideal “working peace system.”

In 1958, Ernst Hass introduced neo-functionalist theory building upon Mitrany. Neo-functionalist theory argues that international integration is the process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties and activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.” Although similar to the functionalist argument, Haas argues his point on a regional scale, not on a broad international scale as Mitrany does.

Both Haas and Mitrany establish the relationship between interconnectedness and the demand for international institutions on both the national
and regional scale. Robert Keohane added to the debate in 1982 when he published “The Demand for International Regimes.” Keohane focuses on the demand for international regimes and was the first to suggest the causal link between interdependence and the demand for international regimes. Keohane argues, “increased issue density [when several issues are closely linked] will lead to greater demand for international regimes and to more extensive regimes. Since greater issue density is likely to be a feature of situations of high interdependence, this forges a link between interdependence and international regimes: increases in the former can be expected to lead increases in the demand for the later.”

Keohane’s main contribution may be in articulating the difference between interconnectedness and interdependence. This difference is important in determining how the flow of certain types of goods and services spurs demand for international institutions. Interconnectedness refers to the flow of goods, services, and capital across international boundaries. Interdependence refers to the mutual dependence of the flow of such goods, services, and capital. Keohane claims that “a country that imports all of its oil is likely to be more dependent on the continuing flow of petroleum than a country importing furs, jewelry, and perfume (even of equivalent monetary value) will be on uninterrupted access to these luxury goods. Where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness.”

In 2011, these theories were applied to the energy space, when Ross examined the unbalanced global engagement among oil exporting states. Ross demonstrates that states that export oil tend to be more politically disengaged and more economically engaged in the international arena. Ross states that “if they were economically influential but politically well-integrated, their status would be unremarkable. If they were both economically and politically marginalized, they would be of lesser concern.” Ross argues that “oil-exporting states have achieved high levels of economic integration, and economic influence, yet remain relatively unfettered by the network of treaties and intergovernmental organizations that typically accompany this level of influence.” Ross defines this phenomenon as “unbalanced globalization.”

Ross shows empirically that oil wealth is associated with high levels of economic integration and low levels of political integration. Oil-rich countries seem to shun international institutions that have a political character and that require legally binding commitments. While he confirms the conventional argument that interdependence cultivates political integration, he shows that petroleum exports have the opposite effect.

Ross argues, “countries with abundant reserves of petroleum—the commodity on which virtually all modern economies depend—are freed from the incentives that lead other countries towards cooperation and reciprocity.” In other words, the dependence that spurs the demand for international institutions is removed as the oil exporters have limited dependence on goods from other nations while the international community is continually reliant on their oil.

Ross’ work introduced the relationship between globalization and energy issues and examined a unique relationship between oil-exporting states and globalization that is contrary to existing literature and theory. However, Ross’ study focuses solely on oil-exporting states, or according to prior international relations theory, certain states that increase the transnational flow of goods (in this case oil). Given the debate, this study aims to test Ross’ finding in a broader way with a slightly different method and a different data set that includes the OECD countries and not exclusively oil-exporting states.

Thus, where this study adds to the existing literature is by analyzing what happens when energy independence, rather than energy interdependence, is used as the independent variable. I also believe Ross neglected the inclusion of political variables (such as political system, legislative districting, among others) to his analysis, which could be extremely important to this story. I argue that energy independence allows states to be less engaged, and energy dependence results in states being more engaged. Much work has been done analyzing the dangers of energy dependence, but where the study adds to the literature is by analyzing the implications of energy independence.

ARGUMENT

The literature, as demonstrated above, suggests that interdependence, defined as mutuality or a reciprocal relation between entities, spurs demand
for international institutions. In other words, interdependence spurs political globalization. Those who are involved in international markets want to be engaged in the international institutions that regulate these markets. Ross adds to the existing literature by showing that interdependence spurred by oil wealth does have this effect, yet he does not fully explain why this is the case.

If everyone depends on one state, that state does not need to be engaged in these international institutions. Thus, weak countries that are reliant on others for critical resources must desire international engagement because the international arena and its institutions give those states protection against their own vulnerability. In my opinion, their decreased vulnerability explains why oil exporting states are less engaged. It is not about oil exporting, but about dependence and independence, which is precisely why I introduce the variable of energy independence instead.

A state achieves energy independence when the production of each major energy source meets that source’s domestic demand. Energy independence, however, is not binary; it can be achieved to varying degrees. In this study, the focus is not on whether or not a country is wholly energy independent, but instead on the degree to which a country is energy independent. This study does not seek to test the relationship between wholly energy independent countries and globalization, but rather tests the relationship between varying levels of energy independence and globalization.

Ensuring a steady supply of energy is of critical importance to any state. For countries with higher degrees of energy independence, this is more apparent because a majority of the state’s energy mix is produced by domestic producers. Guaranteeing a steady supply of energy becomes significantly more complicated for states that have very low levels of energy independence. These countries rely heavily on foreign sources of energy and need to devote significant time and effort to ensure a steady supply. This task is mostly in the hands of foreign producers and governments, often in volatile regions of the world. Thus, I believe there is a link between differing degrees of energy independence and a country’s vulnerability. States that rely heavily on foreign sources of energy are more vulnerable because the steady flow of energy is only partially under each country’s control. These countries also have a greater risk of being exposed to global energy shocks or volatility in energy producing regions.

One of the best examples of this vulnerability can be seen in the United States during the 1973 OPEC Oil Embargo. Up until the late 1950s the United States was wholly energy independent. However, in the early 1960s, domestic consumption began to outpace domestic production.\(^{21}\) This meant the United States could no longer produce enough energy to meet both domestic and global demand. At the same time, the epicenter of global petroleum production shifted to the Middle East.\(^{22}\) Middle Eastern oil-producing states began ramping up production to meet increasing global demand. By 1973, the United States imported 6.3 million barrels of oil per day, 48 percent of which came from OPEC.\(^{23}\) Thus, American energy dependence on foreign sources was born. Soon thereafter, the 1973 crisis caused dependence on foreign oil to become commonly recognized as dangerous and the term “oil weapon,” was coined by David Yergin.\(^{24}\) Before this crisis, reliance on foreign oil was never viewed as an issue or concern. Oil was simply a global commodity exchanged in a global marketplace that was never thought of as having the potential of becoming a political weapon. However, in October of 1973, Egypt and Syria together attacked Israel with the support of other Arab oil-producing countries and the Soviet Union. The same day, the United States supported Israel financially and militarily. On October 16, the member states of OPEC raised prices by 17 percent and announced cuts in oil production. The next day, the OPEC ministers agreed to enact an embargo on exports of oil to the United States as a consequence of the United States’ support of Israel.\(^{25}\) The embargo lasted until March 17, 1974 and had near-crippling effects on the United States economy, as domestic production of energy could not meet demand.\(^{26}\) The price of oil quadrupled, and the price of retail gasoline increased by 40 percent in a matter of months amidst massive shortages throughout the country.\(^{27}\) This 1973 embargo serves as a quintessential example of the connection between energy dependence and vulnerability.

The connection between energy independence and vulnerability brings international engagement into the equation. I hypothesize that states with low levels of energy independence are heavily engaged
because the international arena and its institutions give them some protection against vulnerability, whereas those higher levels of energy independence are less vulnerable, thus making them less inclined to engage. Thus, I expect to see a negative relationship between energy independence and both political and economic globalization. This conclusion leads me to formulate the two hypotheses that I intend to test in this research.

METHODOLOGY

This study differs from prior literature by offering a quantitative observational approach. I have created a cross sectional time series data set consisting of the energy independence variable, political and economic globalization, and political variables over the years of 1980-2010. The sample consists of thirty countries in the OECD. I tested my hypotheses through a multivariate regression by creating eight fixed-effects models, four for each dependent variable. The first two models were basic fixed-effects models. Models 3-8 included a one-year lag (3,4), a three-year lag (5,6), and a five-year lag (7,8) of the dependent variable. The reasoning behind including a lagged dependent variable of differing degrees was to attempt to determine how long it takes the relationship to be reflected in the dependent variable if the relationship is not immediately evident. The lagging of the dependent variable proves to be significant to the results.

There are many motivations behind using a fixed-effects model for the study. A normal multivariate regression for a cross sectional time series dataset indicates that the effect should be consistent with no geographic difference. However, I contend that there exist significant political, economic, and cultural differences between the countries in the dataset. Thus, by employing a fixed effects model, the study controls for idiosyncratic cultural and geo-political characteristics of each country.

DATA AND VARIABLES

I have created a cross-sectional time series data set to test the hypotheses. There are four types of variables in the data: energy independence, a binary political variable measuring whether or not the states uses a single member district system, political globalization, and economic globalization. Data for these variables has been collected for each OECD country between the years of 1980 and 2010.

I have chosen to limit the analysis to these countries for several reasons. First and foremost, it is logistically simpler to assemble relevant data for OECD member-countries, as energy statistics for these countries are reliable and readily available. Through the Energy Information Administration, all data relating to these countries’ energy production and consumption by each major energy source is available for easy and transparent access. The most important aspect of defining energy independence is having reliable data available by source. If all or one of the sources of energy used to calculate independence is unreliable, the results will be tainted. Thus, I found it to be extremely important to ensure the countries included in this study were providing reliable data to the EIA.

The study excluded four states in the OECD from the analysis: Israel, Luxembourg, South Korea, and Japan. The reason for omitting Israel and South Korea is because they are extreme outliers that result from the paramount security threats that skew the policies of these countries. Non-military security issues, such as energy policies, do not significantly influence policy-making in these countries. I reasoned that a different vulnerability means these countries would not approach energy policies in a similar manner to the other OECD countries. This was confirmed when the analysis showed that these countries were extreme outliers.

In the case of Luxembourg, I reasoned that the country was quantitatively different in the way it is globalized both politically and economically because of its miniscule size (population, area, resources) compared to other members of the OECD. This was supported by the fact that Luxembourg is approximately one-hundred percent energy dependent. Luxembourg also presents extreme outlying data in terms of political and economic globalization. Thus, I concluded it was necessary to exclude Luxembourg from this study because of its unique size and nature. Again, this was confirmed when the data showed it was an outlier.

Lastly, I excluded Japan post-hoc from the analysis primarily because it is an extreme outlier in terms of its levels of economic globalization (though the reason for this is not entirely clear). After a personal interview with Andrew Sobel, a recognized authority on the matter, I hypothesize that there may be a few possible
explanations. Japan has an incredibly high savings rate and consequently Japanese savers hold most of Japan’s public debt, leading to lower levels of cross-border capital flows. Moreover, Japanese consumers tend to buy Japanese products when available in a consumption category for several reasons. Among these are hidden protectionism (versus explicit tariff barriers) due to health and safety regulations, content regulation, and forms of industrial policy. On top of this, social and cultural norms contribute to the lower exposure of the Japanese economy to globalization. While I acknowledge that this post-hoc exclusion of Japan might weaken the analyses, the fixed effects analysis strategy relies on the notion that there might be unique circumstances in a given country that might lead to different conclusions on its energy policies and its levels of political and economic globalization. Japan simply turned out to be an extreme case that required its exclusion from the analysis.

The study ultimately examines thirty OECD countries to better understand the interplay of factors important to energy independence and political and economic globalization in the majority of developed countries. I acknowledge that the results need to be approached with slight caution because the results are based on models including thirty-four countries. However, despite this, I still believe the results are valid because the thirty OECD countries included in the model, all of which have market economies and similar economic structures, exhibit a robust relationship.

The focus solely on OECD countries poses two limitations to this study. First, it leaves out Brazil, China, Russia, and India, four of the largest forces driving global energy production and consumption. Unfortunately, reliable and precise data from these countries is not presently available. The hope is that with time, the quality of the data coming from these and other emerging economies will improve, allowing for their inclusion in similar studies. Second, and along similar lines, the OECD is not necessarily wholly representative of the entire world and does omit many of the largest oil producers in the Middle East. One must understand that this study and its conclusions are only representative of the thirty OECD countries included in the study. The reasons for this are rooted in the reliability of data from countries outside of the OECD and the desire to compare a group of countries with similar levels of economic development due to the outcome variable being economic and political globalization. The similarity of the economic structures of the countries included in the study allow for the relationship to be clearly exhibited while limiting the interference of dissimilarities between countries and other variables that could not be controlled for.

The main independent variable in the study is energy independence. This variable has never been precisely quantified, so I developed a method to do so. Energy independence, however, is not binary; it can be achieved to varying degrees. In this study, the term energy independent does not refer to whether or not a country is wholly energy independent but instead, to what degree a country is energy independent. I divided energy production and consumption into five major categories: petroleum, natural gas, coal, renewables, and other. The main reasoning behind using these five categories is the breakdown of data made available by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). I then took domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption of each source of energy to determine what percentage of consumption of each source comes from domestic production. From there, I determined what percentage of total consumption comes from each source and created a weighted average of the states’ independence of each source to get an aggregate energy independence measure from zero (wholly dependent) to one hundred (wholly independent). For example, the United States produced 20.79 British Thermal Units (BTUs) of petroleum in 2012 and consumed 34.69 BTUs. Thus, the United States is 59.93 percent independent for petroleum (20.79/34.69=.5993). Since petroleum accounts for 36 percent of the United

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Consumption % of total consumption</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Weighted Independence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>20.79</td>
<td>34.69</td>
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<td>5%</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>67.81</td>
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</table>

**NET ENERGY INDEPENDENCE:** 79.8170347
States’ total energy consumption, I multiplied 59.93, petroleum independence, by 36 percent to calculate a weighted independence of ~21.86. I did this for each category of energy sources and summed up the five measures of weighted independence to get a measure of energy independence on a scale of 0-100. Table 1 provides an example calculation for the United States in 2012.

This measure does have its imperfections. It is impossible at this point in time to accurately measure where every unit of energy consumed is produced. The global energy arena operates in an international marketplace, and ultimately market forces dictate where a country gets its energy. Even if the United States produces 100 hundred units of petroleum and consumes 100 units of petroleum, the global marketplace of imports and exports could lead domestically produced petroleum to be exported while foreign oil is imported. Despite the measure’s imperfections, I believe it is a good indicator of states’ energy independence. It shows the ability of a country to power its economy from domestically produced energy if necessary, thus serving as a measure of the country’s vulnerability. If the United States is producing 100 units of petroleum and consuming 100 units of petroleum, the United States would still be producing enough petroleum to meet domestic demand even if another energy crisis arises or another embargo halts the global marketplace.

In considering the more indirect effects that the larger political structure has on the relationship between energy independence and political and economic globalization, I included a couple of political variables in the models. The political framework of a country impacts policy adoption, and the literature on the impact of political institutions is expansive. It is not the goal of this paper to replicate or attempt to refute any of the already existing works. This study simply draws expectations from well-established findings from that literature, as they relate to the potential impact of political institutions on the relationship between energy independence and political and economic globalization.28

The study includes a binary political variable in order to avoid variable-selection bias and control for domestic politics affecting the dependent variables. This variable measures whether or not a country’s legislature consists of single-member districts (SMD) (1) or multi-member districts (0). I include this variable primarily because a 2010 study by Costa, Christensen, and Sened demonstrated the significance of the role SMDs play in affecting a country’s energy policy, and its alternative energy policy in particular.29 There are a few main explanations of the role of SMDs in existing literature that make the inclusion of this variable so important. The first hypothesis I have based on the literature is of procedural nature. The literature shows that SMD systems tend to create two-party systems.30 In two-party systems, one party usually receives a mandate, allowing for easy passage of uncontroversial legislation like international agreements and treaties. Thus, I believe there may exist a positive relationship between SMDs and globalization because of the ease of passage of international agreements in two-party systems. I also hypothesize that countries with two-party systems might possibly prioritize and execute the process of achieving energy independence differently. SMDs and subsequently two-party systems operate with what is generally conceived as a clear mandate to the majority, winning party to do as it sees fit. On the other hand, multi-member district countries (MMDs) and multiparty systems operate through coalition forming. I believe the coalition forming aspect of MMD and multi-party system countries leads to more creative policies to appease smaller, goal-oriented parties, and this might be a variable in influencing a country’s level of energy independence. Although the fixed-effects model does control for country-specific variables, I believe it is important to include SMDs as an independent variable to further granulate whether or not this variable is significant in influencing energy independence or the dependent variable of globalization. As Costa et al. argue, citing Nobel Laureate Douglass North, “These macro level political institutions do not directly dictate how an economy functions, but they do affect the way in which actors function within an economy.”31

In some initial runs, the study also included a variable that captured whether a system was parliamentary, presidential or ‘hybrid.’ The idea was similar to trying to capture the feature that the president has some degrees of freedom in conducting international relations policy in most presidential systems. This variable was later omitted as it never proved to be significant in the many models tested, a subset of which is reviewed below.

The dependent variables are political and economic globalization. The KOF Index of
Globalization is a well-accepted measure of political and economic globalization which “employs the number of embassies and high commissions in a country and, the number of international organizations to which the country is a member and the number of UN peace missions a country participated in. In addition, it includes the number of treaties signed between two or more states since 1945.” These inputs are indicative of a state's level of political engagement in the international arena, as it measures diplomatic relations, involvement in international peacekeeping coalitions, as well as international treaties the country signs. The index then combines these inputs to produce a 1-100 measurement.

The index defines economic globalization as the “long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges.” Included in the measure of economic globalization are actual flows of goods, including “a sub-index on actual economic flows includes data on trade, FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] and portfolio investment,” as well as a second sub-index that “refers to restrictions on trade and capital using hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade (as a share of current revenue), and an index of capital controls. Given a certain level of trade, a country with higher revenues from tariffs is less globalized.”

I ultimately decided to separate political and economic globalization and not use the KOF index of overall globalization for a few reasons. First, although I hypothesize that the relationship between energy independence and both political and economic globalization will be the same, I felt it was necessary to separate them because of the qualitative differences in the variables and the potential impact of energy independence on each. Much speculation exists regarding the impact of energy independence on geopolitics and economic involvement separately, so I strived to fine-tune the method to address theories pertaining to globalization as a whole, but also to those specifically related to politics and economics. Moreover, the aggregate index of globalization includes social globalization, which makes up a sizeable portion of the measurement. I felt that including social globalization would dilute the dependent variable and mask potential relationships by adding an ancillary factor and drifting away from the crux of the hypotheses.

The main shortcoming of using this index as the dependent variables in this study is the slow moving nature of the measurement. Energy independence can move extremely rapidly, and as a result, engagement in the international arena can as well. This measure of engagement, however, is slow moving and might take time to accurately indicate significant changes in involvement. This is the main reason why I lagged this dependent variable in models three through eight. With that said, this is a reliable, well-respected, and well-calculated measure of engagement and is the only measure available. Despite its slow-moving nature, I am still very confident in its ability to measure international engagement and its relationship with energy independence for this study.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The first pair of models analyzed the relationship between energy independence and political and economic globalization. The first model confirmed H1, demonstrating a significant negative relationship between energy independence and political globalization. The second model confirmed H2, demonstrating a significant negative relationship between energy independence and economic globalization. Models one and two also both indicated a significant positive relationship between SMDs and political and economic globalization.

I also hypothesized that the relationship might be more robust if I lagged the dependent variable. The thinking behind this decision was that if a relationship did exist between energy independence and globalization, the relationship with changing levels of energy independence might not be reflected in the globalization measures immediately. Thus, I tested the dataset by lagging globalization one, three, and five years in models three to eight to test this.

I capped the lag at five years to limit the number of data points lost with each year of lag.

In models three and four, I tested the relationship between energy independence and political and economic globalization with a one year lag. Again, H1 and H2 were confirmed and the relationship between the variables was maintained; the coefficient of energy independence was negative and significant to the same degree as models one and two. SMDs were also equally as significant in affecting the outcome.

In models five and six (three-year lag) and
Table 2: Selected fixed-effects model results (P=Political Globalization, E=Economic Globalization)

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* Indicates p-value < .05, Standard error in parentheses

seven and eight (five-year lag), the results again confirmed H1 and H2 as these models maintained the negative, significant relationship between the variables. The energy independence coefficient was again virtually constant in models five and six compared to three and four, and subsequently, the coefficient was virtually constant in models seven and eight compared to five and six. SMDs also remained significant in all models, with a strong positive relationship as previously demonstrated.

**DISCUSSION**

There are many key points derived from these results. First, it is clear that a robust relationship exists between energy independence and political and economic globalization, and the hypotheses were confirmed in all models. This relationship was maintained in strength and significance when I included the one, three, and five-year lags. Although the relationship remained virtually constant across all models, it is impossible to perfectly pinpoint how long it takes changes in energy independence to be reflected in the relationship with political and economic globalization. However, it was clear that increases in lag maintained the strength of the relationship. This simply indicates that the impact of changes in energy independence may take time to be reflected in the relationship with the globalization measurement in certain cases, but the fact that the relationship was robust, negative, and significant with no lag and robust, negative, and significant with each increment of lag only further supports the validity of the relationship.

This negative relationship between energy independence and political and economic globalization corroborates the hypotheses. Countries that are increasingly energy independent are less inclined to be a part of the international institutions that protect states from said vulnerability, possibly because they are less vulnerable. The argument, however, is not one
of causal nature. There are countless variables that impact political and economic engagement. Whether it be the Cold War, Western interests in Israel, the fear of a nuclear Iran, or combatting terrorism, international engagement is not only about energy. I simply hypothesized, tested, and confirmed that a statistically significant negative relationship exists between energy independence and political and economic globalization.

In terms of the relationship between SMDs and political and economic globalization, the robust positive relationship in all models is no surprise. Although they were initially included as a control variable, I believe there is a straightforward possible explanation to the SMD results. Existing literature suggests that SMDs create two-party systems, and thus, legislatures in SMD countries usually have a clear mandate to act, as one of the two parties will always have a majority in the legislature. This mandate and clear majority indicates increased ease in committing to and passing legislation, which lead to treaties, international trade agreements, and other forms of international engagement. The United States has only recently become an anomaly. Closed primaries and safe seats most likely due to increased polarization cause this across the board that have both parties entrenched in their positions, resulting in gridlock.

Ultimately, I believe the fixed-effects model was the optimal way to test the hypotheses. With a cross-sectional time series data set spanning thirty years and thirty countries, I felt controlling for country-specific variables were important. Once I controlled for each country, the results were robust. A linear model would not have provided such compelling results.

CONCLUSION

While many have speculated about the implications of energy independence but no empirical analysis has been performed to test the implications, thus making this study the first of its kind. By creating a method to quantify energy independence and test its relationship with political and economic globalization in the OECD countries, I hope I can provide a base study for others to build on.

One point that I referenced many times but never fully pursued is the global nature of energy prices and how the global market for energy fits into the story. The argument focuses on energy independence protecting a state from vulnerability stemming from supply disruptions, but there exists a separate but related question of whether or not a country is truly “independent” if it is not protected from price shocks. Even if the United States produces sufficient amounts of each source of energy to meet consumption, a major conflict in the Middle East will still create a major price shock that the United States, despite its energy independence, will not be wholly protected from. It will be protected from the catastrophe of not having enough energy to meet demand, but it will not be protected from the cost of this energy. This is a topic I look forward to pursuing in the near future by arguing that renewable energy is the key to limiting energy-related vulnerability. True freedom from energy-related vulnerability assumes protection from both shortages and price hikes, and I hypothesize that renewables are that solution.

Future studies that build off of this one could be relevant to developing countries outside of the OECD, which are not included in this analysis. The majority of global energy consumption growth in the coming decades will come from the emerging markets of developing states. As consumption quickly outpaces production in these economies, theses countries will be faced with a similar issue that developed states face today: ensuring a safe and steady supply of energy amidst consumption growth. As these countries become increasingly globalized, understanding the relationship between energy independence and global engagement will be critical to the formulation of future energy and foreign policies in these countries.
Appendix: Complete table of fixed-effects model results and Energy Independence / Globalization Data

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The Relationship Between Energy Independence and Globalization in the OECD Nations

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N: 870
R²: 0.64
Adj. R²: 0.57

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INTRODUCTION

On June 21, 2013, bonfires, torched cards, demolished lampposts, and a million people filled the streets of Brazil. The protesters gathered to denounce corruption, poor public services, police brutality, and — to the disbelief of FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) organizers and investors — the upcoming 2014 World Cup. While this was not the first time that a host country had experienced political and social unrest in the days and months leading up to FIFA’s flagship event, most observers had believed that the fabled Brazilian attachment to soccer would prevent any large-scale protests, even in the face of ballooning government spending on the event. Popular opinion of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil seemed headed in the same direction as that of the South African FIFA World Cup in 2010, which suffered a similar controversy in light of unpopular multi-billion-dollar stadium construction costs and contentious securitization policies.

Much of the discontent revolved around the belief that corporate interests determined political decision-making. Ever since Uruguay held the inaugural 1930 FIFA World Cup, the mega-event has been used as a platform to rebrand countries, regenerate economies, and accumulate social capital. These benefits weigh heavily on the minds of bidding countries during the process of selecting a host nation. More recently, FIFA appears to have been making a concerted effort to have the Cup hosted in developing countries. In the past 15 years, FIFA has accepted bids to host the event from countries in both Asia and Africa. The 2010 games were held in South Africa; and the 2014 event will be held in Brazil, while the 2018 and 2022 Cups will occur in Russia and Qatar, respectively.

This pivot to developing countries underscores the commercialization of the World Cup, manifested through deregulation and privatization, hallmarks of corporate-driven governance. Corporate-driven governance in this paper refers to actions that large, private associations take to dictate political decisions, thereby circumventing existing democratic procedures. While politicians and corporate bodies often claim that mega-events such as the World Cup spur development and ultimately benefit the public, this paper will demonstrate that corporate-driven governance, manifested through stadium construction and securitization, subordinates the interests of those living on or near the mega-event sites to corporate interests.

I look specifically at stadium construction and securitization and their effects on local development and local democratization in the South Africa and Brazil World Cups and argue that the processes of FIFA World Cup stadium development and securitization are...
guided by corporate-driven development principles that significantly and negatively impact local development and democratization.

I have chosen the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the 2014 Brazil World Cup as case studies because they are highly comparable examples of securitization and stadium construction. Furthermore, because the two countries undertook the momentous tasks of securitization and stadium construction very recently and within just a few years of each other, temporal bias can be eliminated. Because Brazil will also host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, there is some overlap with World Cup and Olympic Securitization policies. Similarly, South Africa has hosted mega-events such as the Rugby World Cup in 1995 and also plans to host other major sporting events in the future with its greatly augmented mega-event infrastructure.

As the world’s largest single-event sporting competition, the World Cup has substantial political, economic, and social implications for the host countries. It is thus reasonable to assume such countries will pursue securitization measures for the World Cup. Securitization is the process through which an actor enacts and enforces measures to protect an object it feels is threatened; relevant stakeholders identify security risks and risk groups and then implement risk-management policies. In this study, corporate and state interests are the actors creating and enforcing such policies that aim to protect the World Cup. When the whole world is watching, the stakes are high. The securitization process consists of exclusion zones, stringent stadium design requirements, and heightened security at the transnational, national, and local-urban levels. Some of these policies are designed to ensure that the World Cup games run smoothly, yet many of these required rules and policies exist primarily to promote the financial interests of FIFA and its corporate sponsors. This trend toward a policy of profit-seeking can also be seen in FIFA’s gradual expansion of monopolistic control over event venues, surrounding areas, and — more recently — main infrastructure (airports, train stations) and accommodation sites (hotels, training centers, etc.).

The other manifestation of corporate-driven governance, stadium construction, operates under similar market rationalities. Large corporate bodies influence national policies to direct public tax dollars toward stadium construction despite the effects such policies have on displaced residents.

The paper is divided into five main sections, beginning with the grounding of the theory of corporate-driven governance in the common literature of mega-event research. It then examines the processes of securitization and stadium construction using the cases of the 2010 South Africa FIFA World Cup and the 2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup.

The twin processes of securitization and stadium development are the most glaring manifestations of corporate-driven governance in mega-event planning. The processes of FIFA World Cup stadium construction in developing countries like South Africa and Brazil result in a governance structure “where decisions of public policy are made by business coalitions and international organizations like the IOC and FIFA.” Informed by corporate-driven governance, securitization and stadium construction curb or suspend the civil liberties of the local community, under the assumption that mega-events such as the World Cup are held for the “good of the public.” To further explain this, I turn to the phenomenon Cornelissen calls discursive framing, which legitimizes stadium building and securitization as “extraordinary and extra-legal [practices] to protect the collective.” While these processes may provide the local community with development and democratization, corporate-driven governance still dictates priorities, thus subordinating the public interest.

Discursive framing, a concept originally defined by French social theorist Michel Foucault, is a rhetorical framework employed by a privileged group in order to direct and shape particular ideas, actions, and preferences in the larger group. When Swiss football administrator Sepp Blatter, the eighth and current president of FIFA, outlined FIFA’s legacy in a recent interview about the upcoming games in Brazil, he framed the prevailing discourse around football and the “greater good:”

“In football, the whole country gets the legacy… Football involves the whole country. The country improves airports, hotels, highways, telecommunications, [and] sustainability programs.”

While there are undoubtedly some immediate short-term benefits from World Cup securitization...
and stadium construction policies, the systemic influence of FIFA through corporate-driven governance channels power away from local communities and toward mega-event organizers, international corporate sponsors, and government officials, thereby inhibiting sustainable local development.

Securitization measures are not illogical. As successful bids for hosting mega-sporting events pivot from Western nations to the global South, there are added securitization obstacles arising from the inherent political, social, and economic conditions of these developing host nations. Leading mega-event scholar Scarlett Cornelissen details the increased securitization complications and needs:

“In settings where heightened income polarities, societal violence, porous borders and disputed state capacities overlap with ‘standard’ security risks such as terrorism, increased attention and investment is being given to this process of securitization.”

Addressing these complications is an arduous task for developing nations such as Brazil and South Africa. The ramifications of addressing the complications surrounding securitization amount to a political mega-project spanning local, national, and transnational levels of policy. However, through discursive framing, policy makers and FIFA officials are able to justify far-reaching securitization policies. When justifying stadium construction, they use discursive framing to over-emphasize the potential economic, political, and societal advancements that follow these mega-events.

By portraying both securitization and stadium construction as public goods, officials implicitly fail to take into account how their supposed societal benefits harm individuals. This mode of corporate-driven governance sets a dangerous precedent with a legacy far more pernicious than an unused stadium or a new hotel. Eick describes how the heightened securitization can potentially create a “new military urbanism,” where the precedent of a wide-reaching and advanced security apparatus remains influential even after the fans leave. The perceived success of a World Cup can also shift priority away from legislative procedural norms in order to suit the needs and desires of a corporate environment at the cost of civil liberties. The broader implications make it even more imperative to better understand how stadium construction and securitization policies influence development and democratization in developing contexts.

With this recent trend of successful bids from developing countries of the Global South in mind, however, it becomes increasingly important to analyze the impacts of the Cup on the host country. Proponents of the cup insist that economic growth generated by the Cup makes hosting it a net gain for the country. Detractors point to the enormous political, economic, and social investment a host country must make to host the World Cup as evidence of the event’s harm. Yet, no prior literature on the subject offers the in-depth look at stadium construction and securitization necessary to make a nuanced argument about the ultimate effect of the World Cup on host countries. To fill this gap in the literature, this paper analyzes the specific repercussions of these two particular sets of costs on local development and democratization associated with the two cases of the 2010 South Africa FIFA World Cup and the 2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup.

2010 SOUTH AFRICA WORLD CUP: STRUGGLES OF SECURITIZATION

South Africa, with a GINI Index of 63.1, is the second-most economically unequal state in the world, only behind Lesotho. This differs greatly from the 2006 World Cup host country, Germany, which scores thirty-six points higher in the GINI Index. In addition to being economically unequal, South Africa is one of the world’s most dangerous countries. Hundreds of thousands of South Africans live in massive slums, and the national unemployment rate is roughly 25 percent. Combined, these factors raised security concerns for the mega-event and necessitated extensive securitization procedures during the run-up to the event.

Unfortunately, this need for securitization was co-opted by the interests of event developers and came at the expense of local individuals in South African communities. FIFA, the South African 2010 Local Organizing Committee (LOC), the South African government, and multi-national corporate sponsors saw these games as a platform to position their products instead of an opportunity to improve the collective welfare of the South African people. A “beautification” campaign created extensive exclusion zones for sponsors such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola while marginalizing local, non-
FIFA affiliated actors such as the slum-dwellers’ organizations and other local community voices.¹⁶

This corporate-driven governance was seen primarily in extensive slum-eviction legislation passed for the purposes of security and “beautification”. One of the more controversial legislative acts, the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act of 2007, aimed “[t]o provide for the progressive elimination of slums in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal; to provide for measures for the prevention of the re-emergence of slums; to provide for the upgrading and control of existing slums; and to provide for matters connected therewith.”¹⁷ Another controversial policy was the N2 Gateway Pilot Project, a state-sponsored housing and relocation project in the city of Cape Town, which was criticized by major organizations such as COHRE as being harmful to the local communities’ well-being and having the narrow aim of a “beautification project” for the World Cup.¹⁸


Acclaimed international reporter Dan McDougall conveyed local accounts of evictions carried out by state-sponsored mercenaries known as the Red Ants. In April, right before the 2010 World Cup began, McDougall wrote that the Red Ants “have become a growing force in the past few months as South African cities have begun a campaign of ‘beautification’ before the World Cup begins in June.”¹⁹ These state-sanctioned mercenaries have allegedly aided in the forcible clearing of hundreds of shacks, destroyed slum-dwellers’ property, and were notorious for their brutality and violence.²⁰

Xenophobic rhetoric led many to believe that the Red Ants’ actions were motivated by ethnic tensions. The Red Ants evicted mostly Zimbabwean immigrants from more than 100 shacks within the two-kilometer radius of the Mbombela Stadium.²¹ These actions were justified under the FIFA requirements of a two-kilometer exclusion zone to give FIFA-licensed corporate sponsors a monopoly on food and merchandise sales.²² The Center on Housing Rights & Evictions (COHRE) has proclaimed that much of the escalation in slum eradication was directly linked to the 2010 World Cup preparations.²³

These events soon sparked persistent and organized protest by the 20,000 strong slum-dwellers’ movement, Abhali baseMjondlo (AbM). In 2005, AbM staged a dramatic roadblock to resist state-sponsored police oppression and intimidation of the slum-dwellers. The use of live ammunition, armored vehicles, and helicopters against the AbM highlighted the extent to which the state deployed violent forces against the slumdwellers.²⁴

The opposition to the Slums Act and subsequent state backlash directed against the AbM reveal dramatic obstacles to democratization that occurred as a result of the pressures of securitization policy leading up the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Though the South African Constitutional Court overturned the Slums Act in 2009, the initial formulation and implementation of the Act demonstrates how far the South African legislature was willing to go in order to “securitize” the cities in preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup—even at the expense of the welfare of slum-dwellers.

The consequences of these securitization policies are still being seen. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that “tens of thousands of South Africa’s poorest people face eviction from inner-city suburbs across the country ahead of the 2010 World Cup.”²⁵ This report also focuses on the movement of evictees to temporary housing commonly known as “transit camps,” which are not intended for extended use. One resident recalled, “[t]hey promised us toilets and good houses at the transit camp… but we are left to die. We have been thrown away.”²⁶ A Durban High court recognized the decrepit state of the ‘transit camps,’ and ruled on September 19 that city officials would be imprisoned if permanent housing was not properly sought.

While the corporate-driven governance preceding the World Cup did make South Africa more accessible to foreign viewers, it came at a significant expense. It is important to note that, in some circumstances, the securitization processes led to an improvement in urban planning, as dilapidated buildings were cleared out of inner city areas and replaced by new housing and commercial developments. However, the local low-income communities that lived there previously were sent to the periphery of the city, where job opportunities...
and livelihoods are scarce, schools are far away, and housing is unsatisfactory. These peripheral relocations have been shown to perpetuate the sprawling, fragmented, and racially divided character of South African cities.  They usually began as temporary living spaces for displaced workers and former slaves, but eventually turned into permanent living spaces. Strangely, favelas are commonly located in highly urban settings, often in close proximity to wealthy neighborhoods. The close proximity of these favela neighborhoods to the major wealth centers of cities, which serve as sites for mega-event complexes, has heightened the interest in securitizing the areas through the government termed processes of “pacification.” At the same time, the slum neighborhoods had developed complicated socio-political structures and forms of self-governance that are averse to governmental interference and securitization measures.

The security concerns associated with the favelas, as well as the close proximity of some of them to the football stadium in Rio, have made

2014 BRAZIL WORLD CUP SECURITIZATION: DECEPTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION

The securitization controversy prior to the Brazil World Cup has centered on the government occupation of the Brazilian slums. This process, deemed “pacification” by the Brazilian government and “cleanings” by many anti-slum occupation activists, pertains largely to Brazil’s urban centers, which are home to some of the world’s most vastly populated slums and unlicensed living developments, commonly called favelas. These favelas consist of large unregulated settlements, are often in geographically precarious locations, and in some cases date back to the 1960s and 1970s. They usually began as temporary living spaces for displaced workers and former slaves, but eventually turned into permanent living spaces. Strangely, favelas are commonly located in highly urban settings, often in close proximity to wealthy neighborhoods. The close proximity of these favela neighborhoods to the major wealth centers of cities, which serve as sites for mega-event complexes, has heightened the interest in securitizing the areas through the government termed processes of “pacification.” At the same time, the slum neighborhoods had developed complicated socio-political structures and forms of self-governance that are averse to governmental interference and securitization measures.

The security concerns associated with the favelas, as well as the close proximity of some of them to the football stadium in Rio, have made the securitization procedures in the favelas necessary as Brazil prepares for the World Cup. The securitization of these favelas can best be broken down into three phases: first, by creating the necessary legal and institutional framework for securitization through the 2011 Master Plan, then by actually carrying out pacification, and finally through the use of discursive framing in order to sell the securitization. At each stage of this process, corporate-driven governance played an intimate role in framing government policy.

Despite oftentimes vocal local opposition, the city government in Rio de Janeiro enacted its securitization policy in preparation for the World Cup. To do this, it first created the legal and institutional basis for the pacification process, which resulted in the revised 2011 Plano Diretor do Município do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro Municipal Master Plan). The Master Plan was created and implemented by the Poder Executivo Municipal (the executive council) of Rio de Janeiro to form a basis for urban development strategy in advance of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. This plan lays out clear favela development objectives to “urbanize” and “develop” these slum areas to allow private partnerships and corporate-driven development to occur. Section VI, “Do Reassentamento de Populações de Baixa Renda Oriundas de Áreas de Risco (The Resettlement of Populations of Low Income from Risk Areas),” of the plan identifies the geographic areas considered “risk areas” such as “fragile hillsides,” “lowlands characterized as areas of geotechnical or environmental risk,” and other geographic areas of the city where favelas exist as targets of relocation. In addition, Section VII extends this favela targeting, citing other geographic areas in the city where favelas are typically located as “underutilized properties” and “risk areas.” These locales are subsequently zoned to become sites of new housing projects at the discretion of the executive council, which has the additional authority to label the favelas as illegal and subject to “regulation.” Chapter VI specifically authorizes police and military control of riverbanks, hillsides, and other areas where favelas are present. The policies of this Master Plan are extremely broad and vague, giving a large amount of discretion and power to the UPP forces without thorough democratic oversight, despite significant protests by many local
community members. Thus, the new Master Plan policies dismantled existing power structures within the favelas and asserted the authority of the state in preparation for pacification.

Given this institutional framework for pacification, the Brazilian government then took the next step of forming an elite paramilitary police force, the Unidade de Policía Pacificadora (Pacifying police Unit or UPP) in 2008. This force has commanded thousands of military personnel, tanks, and helicopters into individual favelas in order to drive out gang leaders that controlled the slums. After a larger intervention to begin the securitization process, protocol called for the institution of a smaller UPP force consisting of a command center within the favela in order to maintain order.

In some cases, these policies have been implemented peacefully and successfully, as in slums such as the Lins favela in the Northern Zone of Rio de Janeiro. In that case, military forces moved at dawn without a shot fired, secured the territory, and were welcomed by the inhabitants. As Jonathan Watts describes in his account: “Then [followed] street cleaners with brooms and buckets of whitewash, and finally satellite TV salesmen with a three-month special offer to first-time subscribers.”

Other favelas, however, have seen another side, such as massacres and alleged executions by UPP forces. The “pacification” of the Complexo do Alemão favela is no exception to the violence and controversy that has characterized the securitization process. In June 2007, in anticipation of the upcoming Pan-American Games, the Brazilian government ordered 1,300 state and federal police to surround the favela. According to an official investigation, nineteen residents were killed in the favela in order to maintain order. In that case, military forces moved at dawn without a shot fired, secured the territory, and were welcomed by the inhabitants. As Jonathan Watts describes in his account: “Then [followed] street cleaners with brooms and buckets of whitewash, and finally satellite TV salesmen with a three-month special offer to first-time subscribers.”

If they’d asked what the community really needed, they would have built schools, or a university. In what is considered the biggest complex of favelas of Rio de Janeiro alone there are only two schools, let alone a university. But they don't listen to us. Instead, they built a teleférico that don't listen to us. Instead, they built a teleférico.

Second, UPP actions have been plagued by disregard for local input in development decision making. UPP policies have limited the freedoms of those living in the favelas, particularly by preventing typical lifestyle practices and inhibiting the expression of cultural identities. For example, the policies subjected artists to arrests for lyrics deemed politically threatening, which are typically understood to include songs of the genre baile funk, an important cultural cornerstone to the musical and art life of the favela. The disadvantaged political position of the tens of thousands of favela residents has stilled their opinions regarding local development priorities, increasing their vulnerability to instrumentalized policies such as the PAC. In the interviews conducted by Sluis in the Complexo do Alemão favela, one favela resident expressed frustration at the government’s decisions:

If they’d asked what the community really needed, they would have built schools, or a university. In what is considered the biggest complex of favelas of Rio de Janeiro alone there are only two schools, let alone a university. But they don’t listen to us. Instead, they built a teleférico.
Cable Car project. Instead, these projects are driven by corporate interest and serve to harm locals.

The sideline of local interests through the use of discursive framing to further empower large business coalitions and international organizations and corporations exemplifies the executive committee's instrumentalization of the PAC program. The 2011 Master Plan also laid the ground for other types of securitization policies, namely city planning programs such as PAC (Growth Acceleration Program) and PAC2 (Growth Acceleration Program-2). The PAC and PAC2 projects invested nearly $306 billion through 2010 in Rio de Janeiro, with a commitment that promised additional expenditures of $582 billion from 2011 to 2014. While, on the surface, many of these programs would seem to have been beneficial to the areas, they often led to problems. One such significant PACs-funded project was the construction of a cable car in the Complexo do Alemão favela in Rio de Janeiro. The cable car was intended to connect the favelas and make them more safely accessible to tourists; however, it resulted in small restaurant and store developments around the favela, which were tightly regulated by the government and which gave contracts to fast food chains like McDonald's and Bob's Burgers. The prioritizing of corporate interests marginalizes the involvement of the local community and has left the residents of the favela with only low wage positions at these chain restaurants. In addition, these cable car stations are built in areas that the master plan defined as “areas of risk” which contradicts the regulation set forth by the 2011 municipal development plan.

At the same time, state-sponsored development policies such as PAC and PAC2 are overseen by organizations such as the executive council and other corporate-influenced government institutions. Evidence of this oversight can be seen through the selective targeting of favelas that are only in areas deemed of interest to the business coalitions and international organizations such as FIFA and the IOC. This examination into “pacification” policy implemented for the World Cup in Brazil further demonstrates that this mega-event securitization policy fails to address local development interests due to its lack of sustainability and corporate-driven aims, such as in the case of the Complexo do Alemão.

ii A Portuguese term used to denote the area and people living outside of the favela. Terms such as this represent the common racial and socio-economic tensions that exist between favela and non-favela residents.
dwellers.

Delving deeper into the corporate-driven governance of pacification policies we can see the pervasive discursive framing and the consequential jeopardized development opportunities for local communities. Yet the sustainability of this model is highly questionable, even if the implementation of some progressive social programs and infrastructure in specific favelas succeeded.

AFRICA 2010: STADIUM CONSTRUCTION POLICIES AND IMPACT

Much like development in Brazil, corporate-driven discursive framing and instrumentalization of the law legitimized stadium development in preparation for the South African World Cup. Here, we must note that the construction of stadiums forms an integral part of two main objectives that Maguire cited as underlying a host country’s responsibilities: first, using the mega-event as a form of “soft power,” and second, leveraging the games as a way to address internal concerns such as economic regeneration, nation-building, and development. Maenning and Plessis describe the importance of stadium developing, arguing that Durban’s new King Senzahgakhona would be “the anchor of a concept to develop the city area and re-image Durban as one of the leading sports cities in Africa.”

From the beginning, the decision to build the new Moses Mabhida stadium was controversial. Although the initial plan was to renovate the preexisting Kings Park Stadium, the agreement fell apart when a policy shift required the construction of an entirely new stadium. This new stadium would be built on the site of the Kings Park Soccer Stadium, costing the city an additional $240.7 million, compared to the projected cost of $5.3 million for the renovation of Kings Park. This controversial decision to build the Moses Mabhida Stadium delivered the same seating capacity that Kings Park Stadium would have offered: 70,000 for the World Cup and 54,000 after the games. The choices behind this change in construction plans can be attributed to corporate-driven governance when considering the potential for greater profits from the construction of a new stadium as compared to a relatively simple renovation.

As a centerpiece of development, Durban’s new stadium was of great importance to the plans of FIFA and the LOC. However, it is not obvious whether local South Africans, and indeed the country as a whole, truly benefitted from the construction of the new stadium. According to a study by Grant Thornton, after accounting for $1.8 billion in construction costs, the Games increased GDP by one and a half percentage points, infusing $3 billion into the South African economy. A study conducted by Bohlmann and van Heerden disputes these numbers, which have been found to vary significantly, and concluded that the games have only contributed to a 0.94 percentage point increase in GDP. This lack of consensus on the economic effect of stadium building makes an economic justification for the stadium difficult.

In fact, we see a detrimental impact on local development after examining construction labor policies, as well as the decisions of corporations that received contracts for the Soccer City stadium construction. Although many politicians claimed that funding the stadium was justified by the influx of local, high-quality construction jobs, a closer examination undermines these claims. Seventy percent of the local job opportunities from these ventures paid less than $245 per month, which is 10 percent below the national median income. Seventy percent of the 2,200 local employees were also only on limited contracts, and were thus subject to high levels of job instability. One example of this fluctuation is the decision by security firm Stallion Security to fire over 3,600 contracted security workers “without warning.” More broadly, only one hundred workers were offered permanent employment with the main contractor after the project was completed.

In addition, the sudden change in focus of the quinquennial Johannesburg Integrated Development Plan (IDP) reflected the financial burdens of the 2010 World Cup. According to Hlatchwayo, in 2000, the IDP issued extensive policy recommendations to increase local public participation, with priorities such as “the provision of infrastructure, housing, and township establishment, development planning, local economic development, the protection of the environment, the provision of public health services, local safety and security, and a focus on delivering services such as water, housing, and electricity.” Following the 2006 elections, with the kickoff of the World Cup less than five years away,
priorities shifted, as demonstrated by the new five-year 2009/2010 IDP. “The 2010 World Cup is the biggest project the city of Johannesburg has ever undertaken. It is therefore not surprising that in the current IDP revision, the 2010 project features prominently.”\textsuperscript{58} Ward meetings, regional meetings, sectorial meetings, and the Growth and Development summit promoting the 2006/2011 IDP did not serve as forums for genuine public discourse, because they operated under the terms of corporate-driven government.\textsuperscript{59} Often, these gatherings existed solely to serve as a “rubber stamp” for government policies.\textsuperscript{60} This marginalization of the public exacerbated developmental issues, and made locals unable to voice their needs through accountable, democratic institutions.

A massive budget shortfall, which occurred as a result of underestimating construction costs for the Soccer City stadium, was balanced by decreasing funding for public services, a move that exacerbated the project’s detrimental impacts on local economic welfare. In the area affected by the budget shortfall, the eThekweni municipality, features a 44 percent poverty rate. Moreover, 8.5 percent of households have no annual income and 9.9 percent of households have an annual income of less than $948, with the average family of four earning less than $1 per day per person.\textsuperscript{61} However, the stadium’s final construction cost of $98.3 million drastically overshot the initial allotment of $34 million, and "put pressure on a council that [was] under pressure to deliver basic services."\textsuperscript{62} City department heads were required to slash their budgets by $65.86 million, prompting eThekweni’s deputy mayor Logie Naidoo to speak on the matter and note that “the extra 2010 World Cup costs ‘will certainly affect service delivery.”\textsuperscript{63} The $334.2 million spent on the construction of Soccer City could have provided 202,380 people with permanent housing in the province of Gauteng through the local government’s Reconstruction and Development Program.\textsuperscript{64} This comparison illustrates the significant opportunity costs of the World Cup stadium construction projects.\textsuperscript{65}

In this way, instrumentalized law and corporate-driven discursive framing produced troublesome development projects and policies for local South African communities that were in close proximity to stadium constructions. Pillay and Bass’s conception of “associated development prospects”—additional development projects incidental to the required infrastructure—reveal a corporate-driven approach that sidelined local development projects.\textsuperscript{66} We can therefore see that corporate-driven governance is far less effective at promoting long-term local community and infrastructure development, largely because of FIFA’s strict regulations regarding stadium construction, which sacrifice local community development interests in favor of private, corporate interests.\textsuperscript{67}

After the drone of fans and their vuvuzelas faded and the multi-national sponsors and construction companies left South Africa, the true impact of the World Cup stadium constructions became apparent. Despite the billions of dollars allocated for World Cup preparation, South African President Jacob Zuma insisted that, “it was worth every penny spent;”\textsuperscript{68} However, when looking at various construction projects that were not only over-budget but detrimental to local community development, this statement seems increasingly unsubstantiated. President Zuma’s claim embodies the rampant discursive framing that rationalized the stadium construction policies on the basis of supposed economic benefits for local communities.

**BRAZIL 2014: CONTENTIOUS WORLD CUP STADIUM CONSTRUCTION**

The headline read “Soccer Stadium the Stage as Brazilian Anger Erupts,” as tens of thousands of people protested outside of the newly built stadium in the Brazilian City of Belo Horizonte. Shortly after, for the first time in twenty-five years, the Brazilian Supreme Court sentenced a Member of Parliament to thirteen years in prison on corruption charges. Tensions remained high across Brazil as twelve new or remodeled stadiums are prepared for FIFA inspections. At the time of this writing, Brazil is projected to spend $18 billion in construction and remodeling—out of $33 billion over all—with stadium construction alone projected at least to cost $3.3 billion.\textsuperscript{69} As in South Africa, Brazil’s controversial expenditures has been scrutinized for prioritizing public funding of stadiums that serve private interests over much needed public social services.\textsuperscript{70} Mega-event expert and theorist Christopher Gaffney speaks of the evolution of mega-event ideology, comparing Brazil’s hosting of
the upcoming 2014 World Cup to the time it hosted the 1950 World Cup. Contrary to the democratic ideologies that were at the forefront of the 1950 World Cup, the discourses surrounding the 2014 World Cup reflect the exigencies of an increasingly globalized and corporate-influenced political economy. This ideological shift and its effects on World Cup stadium construction in Brazil have sidelined local democratization and development interests in the name of “civic boosterism” and broader corporate-privileged development.

I argue that, as in the case of the 2010 South Africa World Cup, Brazil’s stadium construction policies were delivered through a model of corporate-driven governance, in which deregulation, privatization, and the funneling public funds toward corporate interests dominated government policy. In turn, corporate-driven governance undemocratically directed funding and policy attention away from local development issues, creating environments that threatened local civil rights and hampered local development. As Gaffney stresses, the driving mantra of mega-events is “accelerated development” that creates corporate-privileged “dreamworlds.” These “dreamworlds” empower the executive government to meet the stringent deadlines set by FIFA and ensure that all event-related projects are carried out so as to fully cash-in on the benefits of “civic boosterism.” While the effects of stadium construction are known to positively affect certain aspects of society, they adversely influence democratization within the local communities. This section analyzes the impact of Brazilian stadium construction prior to the 2014 World Cup on local communities.

The construction of the Arena da Baixada, a stadium located in the southern city of Curitiba, is an important example of how corporate-driven governance was able to work in practice. On January 13, 2010, it was determined that Curitiba’s Arena da Baixada would be one of the twelve World Cup stadiums. The private club that used the stadium, Atlético Paranaense, realized that they would be short on funding for the necessary renovations, to which FIFA president Marcos Malucelli responded that the club should not go into debt because of the World Cup. Malucelli claimed that additional responsibilities resided with the local city and state, prompting the Municipality of Curitiba to allocate roughly $40 million toward “special building potential” to Atlético Paranaense’s private construction project of Américo Guimarães Stadium.

However, this private funding of the Arena da Baixada led to a significant decrease in public involvement in policy-making. One of Brazil’s rising domestic investigative journalism organizations, Comitês Populares, takes a close examination of the funding streams in their article, “A Partnership for the Cup: The People Pay and the Club Takes.” Although the process of issuing a building certificate, along with the requisite funds, was legally permitted under the Municipal Master plans, the process remained thoroughly undemocratic. The allocation of this large sum of public funds was not subject to local referenda or any other significant process involving public input. Comitês Populares reported that the only public engagement in the decision making process were two public hearings where citizens, civil society organizations, and social activists voiced strong concerns and strong objections. Furthermore, requests for specific information regarding these projects and participation went entirely unanswered. Leandro Franklin, Chair of the Human Rights Legal Practice department at the University Federal do Paraná, points out that this form of public funding is often given without public consultation, and can be deceptively sold to the public as private expenditures. Marginalization of the general public and exploitation of public funds under the guise of mega-event “civic boosterism” displays the rampant corporate-driven governance fomented by the World Cup stadium construction process.

The political process for funding the Arena da Baixada in Curitiba highlights significant local development concerns. These concerns involve the exclusion zone policy, which prioritizes the short-term business interests of large national construction conglomerates and FIFA and its international corporate sponsors. The allocation of public funds away from local development and into stadiums is a clear example of Gaffney’s discussion of “neoliberal dreamworlds,” where public space is restructured and commoditized “in the image of global capital.” In 2007, the then-Sports Minister Orlando Silva, like many other World Cup promoters, asserted that stadium projects wouldn’t require public money; however, the latest estimates, however, show that 91
percent of costs associated with the 2014 World Cup will be publicly funded.\textsuperscript{80}

This use of public funds carries with it substantial pernicious impacts on local public services. Thus, as was the case in South Africa, corporate-driven governance has also affected the long-term prospects for local development in some parts of Brazil. While local organizing committees and pro-mega-event evaluators laud the renovation and construction of all twelve World Cup stadiums, serious concerns remain regarding the legacy of these state-of-the-art stadiums. Stadiums such as the Arena da Amazônia in Manaus, which cost $256.7 million dollars, are in communities with lower league soccer teams, whose games are attended by less than 500 spectators in a stadium with a host capacity of 46,000.\textsuperscript{81} These stadiums may see little public use after the end of the World Cup and cost significant time and resources in areas where both are in short supply and have pressing public service needs. For example, government sources in 2012 reveal that 20.2 percent of houses in Manaus do not have proper plumbing. Nationally, roughly 15.1 percent of Brazilian children up to four years old live in areas where sewage runs outdoors.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, rather than being spent on much-needed infrastructure in places like Manaus, public money has been spent on what are expected to be, in the aftermath of the World Cup, largely underutilized football stadiums.

Diminished labor rights for stadium construction workers further exemplify the lack of substantive public oversight that resulted from corporate-driven governance in Brazil. Outcry over the paucity of workers’ rights, as in the case of the construction of the Arena da Baixada, demonstrated the failings of stadium construction policy. For instance, work on this stadium project in Curitiba, Brazil, was suspended when Brazilian judge, Leonora Colnago, ruled that there were safety concerns.\textsuperscript{83} Judge Colnago wrote, “countless infractions have been committed, in various stages of the building project...[that there was] a serious risk of workers being buried, run over and of collision, falling from heights and being hit by construction material, among other serious risks.”\textsuperscript{84} This placed pressure on preparations as FIFA was unrelenting in its demand that all twelve stadiums, including Arena da Baixada, be “ready for delivery in December and [that] no delays will be tolerated.”\textsuperscript{85} The inflexibility of FIFA policy further aggravated civil rights disputes because local labor rights standards violations, evictions, and displacements. Because local politicians were given little room or time to address labor safety issues. The pressures FIFA and powerful government actors placed on local officials and workers were further exacerbated when the Judge Colnago’s ruling was overturned to reopen construction a day after FIFA inspection visits began.\textsuperscript{86} The threat to workers’ safety and rights was not limited to Curitiba, and in just one example of workplace tragedy, a twenty-two year old construction worker fell 115 feet to his death on December 14, 2013 at the Arena Amazonia only weeks before the stadiums were due for completion.\textsuperscript{87}

Given their influence in local politics, FIFA also plays a very significant role in fueling the practices of instrumentalization of law and general corporate-driven governance. The then-recently passed “World Cup Law” signed by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff highlights the nature of controversial and sweeping FIFA-oriented legislation. The law entailed a series of legislative measures that Roberto Gurgel, Brazil’s Federal Prosecutor, challenged as unconstitutional. Gurgel contended that the law violated citizens’ “constitutional guarantee to equal treatment, as well as provisions of Brazilian tax law.”\textsuperscript{88} Gurgel, in his filing, writes:

> The World Cup law violates the constitution by requiring the state to assume civil responsibility - instead of FIFA - for any damages during the events. “The exception given to FIFA, its subsidiaries, legal representatives, consultants and its employees manifestly violate” the taxpayers’ equal status under Brazilian law. ... “Legislators cannot favor a taxpayer in detriment to another, but may only identify situations in which there are differences which justify different treatment.”\textsuperscript{89}

The questions posed by the Federal Prosecutor raise important concerns surrounding the general democratic procedures through which policy at all levels of government is implemented. These allegations of civil rights violations apply not only to government politics, but also to the FIFA-mandated “stadium exclusion zones” and the resulting labor rights standards violations, evictions, and displacements.

**CONCLUSIONS**

This paper advances the existing theoretical
notions of development and democratization in hosting the 2010 South African and 2014 Brazilian FIFA World Cups. More specifically, it scrutinizes the securitization and stadium development processes. As mega-event hosting venues in developed nations fade in importance and developing nations increasingly host them, the impacts on local democratization and development are even more hazardous. The harmful effect of hosting mega-events in developing nations becomes most apparent upon dissecting the implications of corporate-driven governance via processes inherent in the political, social, and economic environment surrounding the World Cup. For both Brazil and South Africa, corporate-driven governance has taken the forms of discursive framing and instrumentalized law. The detrimental effects of policies that have been promoted and implemented as a result of corporate-driven discursive framing and instrumentalized law include the disenfranchisement of the local population of their rights to just governance and sustainable development. These forms of marginalization, which originate from both World Cup securitization and stadium development, weaken the political and socioeconomic participation of the local communities while building and fortifying a hegemonic corporate-driven system that consistently undermines local interests.

The magnitude and regularity with which corporate-driven governance marginalizes local communities in developing nations necessitates the reconsideration of hosting the FIFA World Cup as a mechanism for development. The World Cup is headed to Brazil, Russia, and Qatar. These three countries share much in common with South Africa, particularly with respect to the existence of many contentious debates about democracy and the outlook for overall development. While the 2014 FIFA World Cup has not yet taken place, immense infrastructural development and new policies have and their effects on democratization and local development are slowly being revealed. While the 2022 World Cup games remain years ahead, the initial stages of stadium construction have already brought controversy. A recent assessment of stadium construction in Qatar by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) projects that more than 4,000 workers will risk their lives in the next seven years while working on World Cup facilities, with a weekly death toll that could rise to twelve workers.90

The reality is clear. Developing nations will continue to struggle with maintaining ethical standards for development and democratization as they host mega-events such as the World Cup.

Addressing these issues will require significant international cooperation and investment commensurate with the abandonment of existing corporate-driven policies and norms. The incredible monopoly that the FIFA brand possesses over the world’s most popular and profitable sport promises immense opportunities for host countries. Yet FIFA’s ability to demand sweeping legislation in host countries, set its own security and construction standards, and put on a show for almost half of the world places unparalleled power in the hands of its executives. Though this concentration of power has proven to be highly vulnerable to corporate-driven governance, a reorientation of development policy toward local and more democratically accepted priorities in the host countries is essential in order to ensure that the hosting of mega-events does not come at the expense of the host countries’ citizens.

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