Planning for the 2020 Census: A Collision between Research and Politics?

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Guest Essay

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EDITOR’S NOTE

THE VIEW FROM SOUTH LAWN

Our Editorial Board embraces its responsibilities as the publisher of an undergraduate academic journal. First and foremost, it is our job to present the newest, most exceptional research by a new generation of creators and thinkers. As our constitution states, it is the Journal’s mission to provide a forum for undergraduate research in the social sciences for students not only at Columbia University but also around the world.

Second, in producing the Journal each semester, we undertake to provide our readers with a diverse and engaging reflection of the turbulent world of contemporary and historical politics and society, while striving for methodological excellence in the material we publish. To accomplish this, it is essential that we work every semester to expand the number and diversity of people whose work is considered for the Journal. In this Fall 2019 edition of the Journal of Politics & Society, we present articles about the impact of social, cultural, and political movements on migration, colonialism, protest, education, infanticide, non-governmental organizations and aid provision, and women-centric legislation. These articles cover quantitative and qualitative methodologies, macro and micro perspectives, and domestic and international issues. This edition’s invited guest essay offers an exceptional perspective on the challenges facing the quantitative bedrock of the United States’ information system, the U.S. Decennial Census of Population.

This guest essay, written by former United States Census Bureau Director John H. Thompson, could not be better suited to the Journal’s mission. A statistician, researcher, and former President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, Mr. Thompson is profoundly familiar with the work required to produce methodologically rigorous data and analyses. Having overseen preparations for both the 2000 and 2020 Censuses, he is also perhaps uniquely familiar with the importance and complexity of upholding an institution’s methodological integrity in a turbulent political context.

Mr. Thompson’s essay is a brilliant example of how to navigate this dilemma. He peels away layers of political confusion to discuss what is necessary to conduct a comprehensive enumeration as massive and as consequential as the census – and how important it is that that process not be compromised.

The works of undergraduate research published in this edition further embody the Journal’s commitment to excellent research across discipline and context. Through their methodological rigor and diversity of both geography and discipline, this edition’s pieces are a testament to the perennial importance of thoughtful data collection and analysis.

In “University Participation in Grassroots Higher Education Advocacy,” Maxwell J. Hurst uses a mixed methods approach to examine what factors produce high rates of grassroots education advocacy in legislative districts throughout Minnesota. Hurst uses a combination of quantitative data and interviews to determine that districts with more University of Minnesota staff tend to see higher rates of grassroots advocacy participation.

In her essay, “A Tribe is an Island,” Lois Biggs explores the role of aesthetics in Indigenous and other marginalized communities’ protests through a cases study of the Indians of All Tribes occupation of Alcatraz Island from 1969 to 1971. Biggs combines theoretical frameworks to consider imagery and visual culture as powerful forms of protest for marginalized communities, despite art’s historical importance to and complicity with colonial institutions.

Martynas Jankus delves into the oft-ignored role of cultural values in migration theory in his essay, “Do Cultural Values Affect the Economic Decision to Emigrate? The Case of Lithuania.” Jankus examines the impact of culture on emigration through an analysis of Lithuania, which is an outlier in its high emigration rate given its status as a developed country. His findings support this theory that cultural values are important to emigration, particularly in outlier cases.

Rianna Jha analyses women-centric legislation in the United States Congress to explore which
factors are most likely to lead to congressional support for such bills. She compiles and examines an original dataset of over 600 bills introduced in the 115th Congress to determine trends in cosponsorship, election proximity, seniority, political party, and gender. Jha ultimately concludes that party affiliation has the greatest impact on congressional support for women-centric bills.

In “Institutions and Missing Women: Evidence from Qing China,” Shaoyu Liu examines patterns in female infanticide throughout China during the Qing dynasty using an original dataset of information from historical gazetteers. Liu finds that female infanticide occurred more frequently in southern Qing China. She then analyses additional variables in an effort to account for those differences. The author’s findings ultimately contradict the widely-held notion that Confucianism is associated with Chinese female infanticide.

Laura Wood seeks to challenge the assumption that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) simply react to global politics rather than influencing it. Wood’s cross-country analysis suggests that countries receiving aid from NGOs tend to have slightly more decentralized governments than do countries with less or no NGO activity. Using governmental decentralization as a proxy for NGO political impact, Wood concludes that NGOs may indeed be beginning to affect structural change in the countries where they operate.

In addition to publishing excellent undergraduate research this semester, the Editorial Board was delighted and honored to host a methodologically-focused migration research panel in collaboration with the Columbia University Institute for the Study of Human Rights. Panelists included Stony Brook Professor Nancy Hiemstra, Barnard College Professor J.C. Salyer, and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies’ Hannah Pool. The panel was moderated by Columbia’s Lara Nettelfield. It was a pleasure to learn from our panelists about ethical data collection and methodological rigor in immigration and forced migration studies, and we hope to be able to continue this conversation on campus and beyond throughout the coming semesters.

In closing, I would like to thank everyone who helps make the Journal of Politics & Society possible. On behalf of the entire Editorial Board, I thank our academic and administrative advisors, as well as our financial benefactors, for their continued support. Their encouragement, advice, and contributions help us grow and contribute to the Columbia community in increasingly meaningful ways.

Finally, we would never have been able to present this research to the Columbia community without the diligent work of all our wonderful Editorial Board and Executive Board members. It has been an honor and a pleasure to work alongside each of them in producing this edition, and I look forward to continuing our work together as we prepare to publish the next.

Ciara O’Muircheartaigh
Editor in Chief

New York City
December 2019
GUEST ESSAY

PLANNING FOR THE 2020 CENSUS: A COLLISION BETWEEN RESEARCH AND POLITICS?

JOHN H. THOMPSON

Planning for the 2020 Census began before the end of the 2010 Census and was based on rigorous research and data driven decision making through the end of the Obama administration. Unfortunately, the Trump administration and Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross attempted to add a question on citizenship to the 2020 Census questionnaire that was not supported by scientific research and was most likely politically motivated.

I had the privilege of serving as the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau from August 2013 through June 2017. I also served as an expert witness in two of the lawsuits that were filed to block the addition of the citizenship question. In this essay, I will contrast aspects of the planning for the 2020 Census that were based on research against the unsupported attempt to add the question on citizenship to the 2020 Census questionnaire. In discussing the latter, I will summarize my expert report and testimony that I prepared for Robyn Kravitz, et. al. versus the U.S. Department of Commerce lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The report contains numerous citations that provide detailed support and documentation of my discussion.¹

The decennial census is one of the cornerstones of our democracy, and it follows that the 2020 Census results will be of great importance to our nation. The Constitution requires that the Decennial Census be used for reapportioning the Congress of the United States and the Electoral College. The 2020 Census will also be used for numerous other functions to support good policymaking and economic growth including: redrawing Congressional and local voting districts; allocating over $1.5 trillion of federal funds annually; informing sound policy development; providing critical information for state, local and tribal government planning; and supplying critical information to large and small businesses to generate growth and job creation.

Inaccuracies or errors in the 2020 Decennial Census will have great consequences on these uses for the subsequent 10-year period.

As background, the decennial census has been conducted every 10 years starting in 1790. The Census Bureau is required by law to conduct an enumeration of all residents of the United States as of April 1 in the census year. The law also requires that the Census Bureau provide the 50 state numbers that will be used to reapportion to the House of Representatives to the President by December 31 of the census year; and to provide the detailed data to support redrawing Congressional and all other voting districts to each state by March 31 of the year following the census (for the 2020 Census these dates will be December 31, 2020 and March 31, 2021, respectively).

As I noted above, planning for the 2020 Census began as part of the 2010 Census and focused on two important objectives: modernizing the 2020 Census taking advantage of advances in mobile and geospatial technologies; and improving the census questions that collected Race and Hispanic origin data.

MODERNIZING THE 2020 CENSUS

Prior to the 2020 Census, beginning with the 1970 Census, the decennial census methodology was based on mailing each household in the United States a paper questionnaire to be completed and mailed back. The Census Bureau then conducted a large, labor intensive operation to send enumerators to conduct in-person interviews to collect the census information from those households that did not self-respond. Paper based methods were used to carry out this operation. That is, the enumerators were given paper questionnaires and lists of addresses to interview, and their supervisors used paper tracking materials to manage the operation. The Census Bureau refers to this operation as “Nonresponse Fol-

While paper-based methods worked well in 1970, they became increasingly difficult to adapt to the growing diversity and complexity of our society, including complex living situations, gated communities, evolving means of communication other than the mail, etc. In addition, the self-response rate has fallen to between 60 and 65 percent for the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Censuses. The only way in which the Census Bureau has been able to meet the challenges of carrying out the NRFU has been to deploy an increasingly disproportionate workforce of temporary enumerators along with the infrastructure to supervise and support them. The cost of the decennial Censuses has risen more sharply than can be explained by inflation and population growth. For example, the 2010 Census cost around $12.5 billion and it was estimated that if it was repeated in 2010 the cost would rise to $17.6 billion. In addition, there were serious concerns that paper-based methods would not be successful in 2020.

To address this situation, the Census Bureau put in place a multi-year research and testing program to modernize the 2020 Census. Three fundamental changes to the census were made possible by advances in technology:

- Develop the address list by using geospatial tools – Previously the Census Bureau would canvass (or walk) each street in the United States to update their address list. However, for 2020, much of this canvassing took place in an office environment using high quality imagery. The result was that the Census Bureau only needed to physically canvass about 35 percent of the country.

- Optimize the way in which households could self-respond – For the 2020 Census most households will be invited to respond through the Internet. In areas where the Census Bureau determines that using the mail is preferable (about 20 percent of the housing units), respondents will receive a paper questionnaire and will have a choice to either complete and mail it back or use the Internet. In addition, respondents can also respond using a telephone.

- Reengineer the NRFU operation – The 2020 Census NRFU will be conducted by equipping enumerators with a smartphone and their supervisors with a tablet. The use of mobile technology can be used in a number of ways to introduce efficiencies. For example, the workload can be optimized taking into account the location of the enumerators and the households that do not self-respond; and the supervisors receive real-time information regarding the progress and effectiveness of the workforce that they oversee.

Each of these initiatives was the result of extensive testing and iterative development. They are expected to provide significant gains over the previous decennial census methods. For example, the modernization initiatives for NRFU are showing 30 to 40 percent gains in efficiency over the old paper-based systems.

**IMPROVING CENSUS QUESTIONS TO COLLECT RACE AND HISPANIC INFORMATION**

Race and Hispanic Origin data has been collected in previous censuses by asking two questions. The first question asks for a respondent’s Hispanic Origin and the second question asks for a respondent’s Race. Researchers at the Census Bureau hypothesized that this information could be improved by asking only one question that combined both Race and Hispanic Origin. The Census Bureau conducted a test as part of the 2010 Census to study the effectiveness of a combined question. The results of this testing were promising but not conclusive.

Throughout 2014 and 2015, the Census Bureau research team shared and discussed plans for testing different question designs, and participated in numerous public dialogues about their research plans in order to obtain stakeholder feedback. In 2015 the proposed changes were extensively tested through the National Content Test (NCT), a nationally representative sample of 1.2 million housing units in the United States, including Puerto Rico. As a result of this testing the Census Bureau researchers concluded that the optimal design for collecting Race and Hispanic Origin information was through a combined question.

**PARTISAN POLITICS INFLUENCES PLANNING FOR THE 2020 CENSUS**

On March 26, 2018 Wilbus Ross, the Secretary of
the Department of Commerce, released a memorandum in which he directed that a question on citizenship be added to the 2020 Census questionnaire. This decision was in response to a December 2017 memorandum from the Department of Justice “requesting” the inclusion of the question for the purposes of enforcing voting rights. This action was taken against the recommendations of many census experts and advocates for populations that have been historically hard to count, including six former Directors. In particular, the former Directors expressed concerns that the question had never been tested in a contemporary census environment, and that there was a serious risk that large undercounts might result. It is also important to note that until this point the citizenship data from decennial census long through the 2000 Census and then from the American Community Survey had been found to be acceptable for enforcing the Voting Rights Act by the Departments of Justice under both democratic and republican administrations.2

I found both the Department of Justice memorandum and the Secretary Ross decision memorandum to be very troubling – First the Department of Justice memorandum was unclear and indicated a serious misunderstanding of the quality of the data from the American Community Survey. In effect, the Department of Justice said that while the decennial census long form had provided acceptable citizenship data to enforce the voting rights act, its replacement, the American Community Survey, would not adequately provide this information. As noted above in footnote 2, the American Community Survey replaced the decennial census long form in 2005 because it would provide higher quality data.

Secondly, the basis for the decision offered in the Secretary Ross Memorandum was seriously flawed. Secretary Ross considered four alternatives to provide the Department of Justice with the citizenship data they had requested:

- Option A – Do not add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census questionnaire (the status quo)
- Option B – Add the citizenship question currently asked on the ACS to the 2020 Census questionnaire
- Option C – Use administrative records to produce the data in lieu of adding the question to the 2020 Census questionnaire
- Option D – A combination of Options B and C. Secretary Ross did not explicitly describe this option in his memorandum.

Secretary Ross selected Option D that would add the ACS citizenship question the 2020 Census questionnaire and also make some undefined usage of administrative records.

There were a number of issues with the justification that Secretary Ross offered to support this decision. In particular three were extremely problematic:

- Secretary Ross claimed that since the citizenship question had been asked on the American Community Survey it had been adequately tested. As I described in my expert report this was in violation of well-established principles of questionnaire development and survey design.
- Secretary Ross cited Census Bureau research that indicated the ACS question had a high level of misreporting for noncitizens and implied that this would not be problematic if the question were included on the actual 2020 Census questionnaire. No research citations were given to justify this claim, and my opinion was that the misreporting would, at best, be the same, if not higher.
- Secretary Ross recognized concerns many stakeholders expressed that the addition of the question would result in increased undercounts of many population groups. However, he dis-
missed these concerns because he could not find any research indicating this would be the case. Since the question had never been tested in a contemporary decennial census environment, this was a foregone conclusion. The decision criteria should have been: Is there evidence that the question will not cause undercounts? Of course, if this had been the criteria, it would have precluded the addition of the citizenship question.

Three lawsuits were filed against the Department of Commerce and the Census Bureau to block the inclusion of the citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire in California, New York, and Maryland. The plaintiffs argued that the citizenship question should not be added because a number of constitutional and statutory principles had been violated including the Administrative Procedures Act (that is, Secretary Ross had been arbitrary and capricious).

Materials that were discovered as part to the litigation revealed troubling aspects behind both the Department of Justice request and Secretary Ross’s decision. Two that stood out to me were:

• Secretary Ross had actually requested that the Department of Justice write the memorandum asking for the citizenship question.

• Census Bureau researchers had conducted some exceptional research that led them to conclude and to recommend that the most accurate was to produce the citizenship data using administrative records instead of including the question on the census. Secretary Ross ignored their research and recommendation.

All three Federal Judges found for the plaintiffs and blocked the citizenship question based on a number of claims. All three Judges were consistent, however, in that they found Secretary Ross to have violated the Administrative Procedures Act.

The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court which upheld that Secretary Ross had violated the Administrative Procedures Act. It should be noted that this decision had much more far-reaching effects beyond blocking the citizenship question. Both the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis are in the Department of Commerce and produce a number of key economic statistics. If allowed to be unconstrained by the Administrative Procedures Act, future Secretaries of Commerce could arbitrarily change key national statistics such as the unemployment rate or GDP.

At first, the Trump administration resisted the Supreme Court decision, but ultimately accepted it, and directed the Census Bureau to use administrative records to produce the citizenship data.

The 2020 Census is now underway, but may not be free from future political actions of the current administration. The Census Bureau will provide the president with the 50 state numbers required for reapportioning the seats of the House of Representatives by December 31, 2020. The numbers that the Census Bureau will produce will include all residents, regardless of legal or citizenship status, of the United States as well as the overseas military and federal employees. However, it is not clear that the president must submit these numbers to the House of Representatives. December 2020 may prove to be very interesting, stay tuned.

In conclusion, I believe that a fair and accurate 2020 Census is incredibly important for our democracy. The Census Bureau will work very hard to achieve this goal, and you can help them by responding next spring, and if your situation permits, by signing on as a temporary census worker.

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UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN GRASSROOTS HIGHER EDUCATION ADVOCACY

MAXWELL J. HURST, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA AT TWIN CITIES

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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to further research on state-level higher education policy by bringing it into conversation with the study of political participation and grassroots advocacy. This study aims to find what state legislative district-level circumstances are favorable for participation in grassroots higher education advocacy. Using quantitative and qualitative data from the State of Minnesota and UMN Advocates, the University of Minnesota’s grassroots advocacy program, I analyze how the presence of different university-related groups affects the number of grassroots higher education advocacy participants and actions in a given legislative district. I found that grassroots advocacy on higher education issues in a given district has a strong positive association with the number of university staff in a district, followed by a moderate positive association with the number of alumni, and a weak—but significant—positive relationship with the number of students. A qualitative interview with the UMN Advocates program manager, Mike Miller, indicated that people with a high affinity for or great self-interest in a higher education institution advocate most often, and among them university staff is perhaps the strongest cohort of advocates. The results and findings of this study suggest that self-interest in, affinity for, and general connection with a higher education institution are predictors of participation.
H
ger education purportedly supports fundamental ideals of the United States such as the American Dream and American Exceptionalism. It is said to create opportunities for socioeconomic mobility for individuals chasing the American Dream and drives U.S. research and economic prosperity as a manifestation of American Exceptionalism—the belief that the United States is both unique and superior. Many believe that these values are central to American culture and the American story. Access to higher education has been paramount to socioeconomic mobility and the achievement of the American Dream because it prepares graduates for higher paying jobs. They are some of the primary venues for American entrepreneurship, innovation, research, and discovery that buttress any ideal of American Exceptionalism. Despite higher education’s integral role in supporting these American values, public funding for higher education institutions has fallen in proportion to their rising costs in recent years. In response to this ostensive misalignment between values and legislative action, political scientists have analyzed the various levers traditionally associated with policy making and appropriations, including party identification, economics, institutions, and professional lobbying.

The current scholarship on higher education support by state legislatures lacks research on how state legislatures respond to public political participation. Specifically, scholars have not studied grassroots lobbying efforts. The scholarship that does exist noticeably lacks much inquiry on how grassroots efforts relate to specific policy issues. Grassroots lobbying is becoming a more pronounced feature of the American political landscape, especially in the higher education debate. Universities try to mobilize their students, staff, and alumni base to elicit support from legislators.

This study aims to take a first step in bringing the scholarship on state public higher education in conversation with political participation and grassroots advocacy. In particular, I will analyze which populations in a given legislative district are most likely to engage in public higher education grassroots advocacy. I will do this through an analysis of participation in UMN Advocates, a grassroots advocacy program aimed at encouraging University of Minnesota supporters to engage their legislators on a variety of issues that affect the institution, including appropriations, capital investments, and tax policy. From this analysis, I conclude that those with the greatest affinity for and self-interest in the University display the strongest likelihood to advocate for it to government officials.

I intend to set the stage not only for further research into the effectiveness of grassroots advocacy efforts in garnering legislative support for public higher education institutions but also for these conclusions to better inform state advocacy and lobbying organizations in their work.

LITERATURE REVIEW
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND GRASSROOTS ADVOCACY
Conway gives what is perhaps the most basic and encompassing definition of public participation: “any attempt to gain information about or influence the structure of government and its institutions, the authorities who comprise these institutions, and the policies implemented by them.” This definition opens a spectrum of activities as venues for political participation. Voting and political campaign engagement are among the most studied acts of participation, but everything from professional involvement in government, politics, and policy to merely consuming political news and information falls within the definition’s scope.

Many scholars have investigated political participation to uncover which demographic factors correlate with a greater likelihood to participate. Higher incomes and more free time lead to a higher likelihood of donating to and volunteering for campaigns, respectively. These findings indicate that resource availability plays a key role. A person’s likelihood to contact their government officials increases with age, and men contact officials at a higher rate than women. Studies indicate that more formal education—and particularly more postsecondary education—leads to greater participation, backing scholars’ theories that education socializes political engagement.

Strong partisans—those who identify strongly with their political party—vote, protest, and engage in campaigns at a higher rate than those with weaker party identification. Trust in government is associated with higher participation. Internet access and use “is significantly related to political participation, especially among the young.” Technological advances have given more people the ability to participate in grassroots lobbying. Campbell looked at senior citizens’ participation in social security policy relative to income. She implied that self-interest mobilizes people to participate, overcoming other traits associated with...
a lack of participation. In Campbell’s example, low-income senior citizens would be thought to be less likely to participate than the middle- and upper-income cohorts, but a self-interest in Social Security mobilizes them to engage with political decision-making.\textsuperscript{10}

In political science literature, grassroots lobbying is defined as “a form of participation in which citizens contact government officials about policy issues.”\textsuperscript{11} I refer to this type of participation as “grassroots advocacy” in an attempt to distinguish it from professional lobbying. Grassroots advocacy serves as a middle ground in political participation. It is a higher level of engagement than simply voting but requires much less dedication than working professionally in government, policy, and politics.\textsuperscript{12} Citizens are spurred to grassroots advocacy by different kinds of stimuli. The most basic way of participating is by reacting to news.\textsuperscript{13} However, members of organizations and groups are more likely to participate overall, and groups may also mobilize public participation directly.\textsuperscript{14}

STATE GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER EDUCATION

United States public higher education institutions have been funded primarily by state governments throughout their existence. In the twenty-first century, state appropriations for higher education have seen real growth, alongside the whole of state appropriations.\textsuperscript{15} But, with growing appropriations, every state has experienced tax-revenue shortfalls which lead to tighter budgets.\textsuperscript{16} Increasing demands from other budget line items—such as healthcare, K-12 education, and welfare—have kept state higher education funding from meeting the fiscal demand generated by increases in enrollment, university budgets, and the wealth of states.\textsuperscript{17} Average state funding for higher education per $1,000 in personal income dropped 43 percent between 1989 and 2014.\textsuperscript{18} This has spurred public higher education institutions to resort to other ways of generating revenue, as evidenced in the doubling of the percentage of total educational revenue received from tuition over a similar period.\textsuperscript{19} Adjusted for inflation, published tuition and fees for public four-year institutions in the 2015 academic year were 3.22 times as high as those in the 1985 academic year.\textsuperscript{20} With a lack of support from states, colleges have to find money elsewhere. Thus, colleges have shifted a large share of the cost of education to students through tuition hikes. The increase in the burden that students’ must bear limits access to higher education to those that can afford it or are willing to take on massive loans.

The trend of declining state higher education appropriations has led scholars to research which conditions are favorable and unfavorable for higher education funding. Hossler et al. approached the higher education funding question through both data analysis and survey interviews of state officials, though they had difficulty finding significant variables beyond past funding and size of the specific higher education system.\textsuperscript{21} McLendon et al. confers perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of many political, institutional, and economic factors: legislative partisanship, legislative professionalism, term limits, gubernatorial power, citizen ideology, lobbying presence, and unemployment.\textsuperscript{22} This—in combination with a deeper analysis of economic factors by other scholars—rounds out an informative scholarly discussion on the factors affecting higher education budget outcomes.\textsuperscript{23}

McLendon and his colleagues find that partisan control matters for higher education appropriations, with Republicans being associated with lower levels of state higher education funding.\textsuperscript{24} Archibald and Feldman support this notion, finding that Democratic control of states’ lower chambers and executive branches has a positive effect on higher education funding.\textsuperscript{25} Dar and Lee bring economic factors into the partisanship discussion. Their research purports that state level higher education funding is conditional not only on partisan polarization but also on unemployment rates.\textsuperscript{26}

In terms of institutional factors, McLendon finds that term limits and greater institutional strength of the governor’s office suppress higher education funding, while legislative professionalism—the extent to which a position in the legislature is treated as a job or career through higher wages, longer sessions, and more staff—is associated with increased expenditures in higher education. They also found no evidence that a more liberal citizen ideology is associated with higher funding, despite other studies finding such a relationship.\textsuperscript{27}

McLendon et al. found that greater higher education lobbying presence correlates with greater funding in the area.\textsuperscript{28} Tandberg furthers the conversation on interest group effects, providing evidence that higher education appropriations are susceptible to politics and other traditional budgetary forces.\textsuperscript{29} He posits that a myriad of attributes—including political culture, economic demographic factors, institutions, mass political attributes, and interest group activity—forms a
decision situation. That situation, combined with other budgetary demands and policymaker attributes, leads to an appropriations decision. The model synthesized from this research suggests that, due to higher education funding’s sensitivity to political influence, higher education institutions can benefit greatly from special interest group involvement in the political and budgetary process.

Noticeably absent from this conversation is the study of how private citizens and the mass public can influence higher education policy decisions. Constituents and public officials are more connected than ever before, making it even easier to engage in grassroots advocacy and signal constituent preferences to politicians between elections. I posit that Tandberg’s conclusion regarding professional lobbying can be extended to grassroots lobbying. If vocational participation can affect the legislative support of higher education, it would logically follow that amateur grassroots participation would also have an effect.

In this work, I further the discussion of what effects higher education policy by exploring who participates in grassroots advocacy for public higher education institutions. In particular, I advance Campbell’s understanding of self-interest as a mobilizing force from the context of social security policy into the higher education realm.

METHODS
MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS
I offer the following model: Political participation on a given issue is motivated by a person’s self-interest in and connection to that issue or someone affected by that issue. My model is based on Campbell’s findings that self-interest in an issue is a strong factor in mobilizing a population to participate in the political process—despite other factors that would lead to a lower rate of participation in that population. Therefore, current self-interest mobilizes people to participate. Second, it is taken as common knowledge that those affected by an issue in the past still care about it or have empathy for those affected by it, and so they will continue to be involved in that issue. Third, I suggest that there can be community interest among those in contact with people affected by an issue, based on the intuition that a person’s relationship with someone interested in or affected by an issue makes them more likely to mobilize on that issue. Therefore, a large population of issue-affected individuals in a community would have an epidemic-like effect on the amount of participation in that community. With more affected individuals, there is a higher likelihood that others come into contact with the issue and incorporate it into their political activity. Put simply, people will act out of self-interest, personal connection, and an interest for their fellow community members.

In application to higher education, this model suggests that in legislative districts with large populations of people with a current or former self-interest in a given university will have more constituents participating in grassroots advocacy for the university, and those advocates will individually engage more often. I refer to the population with a current or former self-interest as the “university community,” which is made up of students, staff, faculty, and alumni. Community members’ relationships with the university vary in strength depending on affinity for the university and personal investment in its success. My hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1 — A large university community in a legislative district has a stronger effect on grassroots advocacy participation than staff, alumni, or student populations independently.

My first hypothesis is based on the previously described epidemic effect of community interest. When the university community is larger in a given district, more district residents come into contact with that community. Residents’ interpersonal relationships with University staff, students, and alumni create an interest-by-association to the university, thereby inciting more people in the district, outside of the immediate community, to advocate for the university.

Hypothesis 2 — A larger staff population strongly increases grassroots advocacy participation in a given district, more so than alumni and student populations.

As the data available does not differentiate between faculty and non-faculty employees, I will refer to them together under the title “staff.” Staff members have a strong self-interest in the government’s support of higher education. Higher education appropriations and capital investments affect employment levels, income, benefits, and workplace quality. Other policies enacted by the government may regulate how they carry out their work. Additionally, many staff positions, whether in academics or administration, at colleges and universities require some postsecondary education and
as previously mentioned, formal and higher education are both associated with greater political participation overall.

**Hypothesis 3** — A larger student population in a district moderately increases grassroots advocacy participation in a given district, but has less of an effect than that of staff and alumni.

Like staff, students have significant self-interest in government support of higher education. Policymakers’ decisions affect tuition, fees, and the overall educational experience. Despite participation being in the students’ best interest, I hypothesize that they will produce the weakest effect and be the least engaged of the three populations being studied. As stated previously, likelihood to engage in political participation increases with age. Traditional college students span the ages 18 to 22 and are therefore younger than the staff and alumni population. Further, college students have a limited availability of resources used in political participation. Students often have lower incomes and less leisure time, splitting time between their studies and work and splitting money between tuition and basic living expenses. The younger demographics’ infamous lack of participation and lack of disposable resources will, I predict, counteract some of the possible gains received from the importance of higher education policy in college students’ lives.

**Hypothesis 4** — A larger alumni population moderately increases grassroots advocacy participation in a given district.

Since alumni are not directly affected by changes in government policy relating to their alma mater, their interest in higher education policy is not as great as staff. However, alumni still tend to have a strong connection with their university. They may have spent a formative portion of their lives there and previously had a strong self-interest in its success while they were students. Alumni have, by definition, attained higher levels of education which is additionally associated with increased political participation. As college graduates, alumni are older and more likely to have greater resources of time and money, all of which are associated with greater participation. I posit that these demographic factors will make alumni more active than students in grassroots advocacy.

**Hypothesis 5** — The number of degrees awarded by the relevant institution to residents of a given legislative district moderately increases the grassroots advocacy participation.

This hypothesis is based on the intuition that a greater affinity for a university will give way to a higher likelihood to advocate for it. Those that receive multiple degrees from the university have a stronger relationship and interest in the university generally, but they also benefit from the extra value given to their degree and the greater professional networks that come from graduating from successful institutions. Graduate and doctoral programs require students to produce research, which would suggest that people who have gone through that program have a greater appreciation for academia. Additionally, those that have received more than one degree from an institution often have made the conscious decision to return to it, meaning they enjoyed their education there enough the first time around that they had a preference to apply to the university again.

**CASE SELECTION**

My hypotheses will be tested by investigating the state of Minnesota and its support for the University of Minnesota. The University is tightly woven into the state’s tradition. Chartered in Minnesota’s Territorial Laws, the University of Minnesota’s establishment predates the founding of the state itself. The institution has a strong alumni presence—61 percent of students stay in Minnesota after graduation and 356,000 alumni live in the state. Minnesota also has a culture of high political participation, leading the nation in voter turnout in eight of the last nine presidential elections. Additionally, the University of Minnesota has a grassroots advocacy program, UMN Advocates, aimed at garnering government support for the institution. UMN Advocates is run by the advocacy coordinators from the University of Minnesota Government Relations Office and University of Minnesota Alumni Association (UMAA). The program provides tools for those interested in all levels of participation, from staying up to date on the progress of University issues through the legislature to providing tools for advocates interested in running for office. UMN Advocates sends out regular newsletters during the state legislative session to inform members—referred to as “advocates”—of legislative news pertaining to the University.
also send out “action alerts,” which encourage advocates to contact legislators and voice their support for the University. Action alerts include tools that allow advocates to send prewritten tweets and emails to government officials. When an advocate sends a tweet, writes an email, makes a phone call, meets with a legislator, or otherwise contacts legislators or other government officials, UMN Advocates records it as an “interaction.” The UMN Advocates program has become a model for other universities around the country and has received recognition as a leader in higher education advocacy.\textsuperscript{35}

The university’s long tradition and abundant alumni base paired with Minnesota’s history and culture of high political participation makes Minnesota a most-likely case for this study. If the presence of staff, alumni, and students does have a substantial effect on grassroots lobbying participation, then Minnesota should confirm this strongly. Minnesotans generally participate politically at higher rates and many Minnesotans have strong connections with the university, so if personal interest in a higher education institution is linked to advocating for it, it should be seen in Minnesota. UMN Advocates’ record keeping also makes this a convenient case, since the organization keeps legislative district-level data on how many advocates engage in their program and how many interactions advocates have with legislators. This makes data collection and operationalization of grassroots participation very straightforward.

OPERATIONALIZATION AND VARIABLES
To gain an understanding of who community organizers see participate in grassroots advocacy, I conducted an interview with Mike Miller, the Legislative Advocacy Coordinator for the University of Minnesota. I asked him the following questions:

1. Can you explain the UMN Advocates program and its purpose and mission?
2. How does UMN Advocates reach out to or recruit advocates?
3. Who or what kind of people do you see participating in the UMN Advocates program the most?
4. During your time managing the program, what have you seen as the impact of UMN Advocates on the legislative process?
5. Do you have a sense of whether any demographic traits affect how people participate in UMN Advocates?
6. What other characteristics might affect participation? What do you wish a study on political participation through grassroots advocacy would look at?

Qualitative analysis of this interview provides insight into how the UMN Advocates program perceives grassroots participation trends. This brings a ground-level view of who is participating and some conjecture on why that may be.

After providing a qualitative sense of who participates, I present a quantitative analysis of the extent to which different groups participate. The independent variables for this study determine the strength of the university community in a given district. University community strength is operationalized by the amount of University of Minnesota students, staff, and alumni in a given legislative district. The student variable is the number of students whose permanent or home address is within a given district—which is not necessarily the district in which they matriculate. For the purposes of this study, staff includes faculty, administration, and other employees working for the University of Minnesota who live in a given district. The alumni variable corresponds to the number of University of Minnesota graduates residing in a district. Additionally, I include a separate variable for the number of University of Minnesota degrees earned by residents of a given district. This builds off the alumni variable and is aimed at capturing the strength of an alumni’s relationship with the University of Minnesota. Individual alumni are assumed to have stronger relationships with the university if they returned to it to pursue another degree. The data on these populations is sourced from the University Impact Data compiled by the University of Minnesota Government and Community Relations Office.\textsuperscript{36}

The dependent variable is grassroots advocacy participation, which is operationalized by the number of “advocates” in a given district and the number of “interactions” those advocates had with legislators. Advocates are defined as unique email addresses signed up to the UMN Advocates program, and represent a person engaging in advocacy for the University of Minnesota. Interactions are any tweet or email
sent to a public official by an advocate, as well as any phone call, meeting, or other contact made with a public official that UMN Advocates was made aware of. This data comes from the UMN Advocates records for the 2018 legislative session.37

DATA ANALYSIS
I have included an analysis of an interview with one of the directors of the UMN Advocates. This interview transcript was coded for how the university seeks out advocates, insight on who becomes an advocate, and differences among advocates’ participation and interaction with legislators. The qualitative component complements the quantitative analysis, providing some color to the data through an explanation of how different groups advocate differently.

I conducted a series of simple regression analyses to determine the correlation between the independent and dependent variables in each of the 134 Minnesota House Districts. In addition, I ran regressions on two control variables to provide context for the independent variables’ effects.

The control variables were the level of education and the partisan leaning of districts. Education level was operationalized through the percentage of the district’s population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Data was sourced from the 2012-2016 American Community Survey Profile Report published by the State of Minnesota’s Legislative Coordinating Commission.38 Putting the districts’ education level in comparison with the “alumni” and “degrees earned” allowed the effects of University of Minnesota alumni and degrees as a representation of connection with the university to be differentiated from the overall level of education in a district.

Partisan leaning is operationalized by assigning each district a score through a method similar to Cook’s Partisan Value Index. Using 2016 and 2018 Minnesota House election results, the percentage of votes cast for the Republican candidate is subtracted from the percentage cast for the Democratic candidate for each election. For example, if the Democratic candidate received 40% of the vote and the Republican received 55%, the district would have a -15 value for that election. The average of each district’s 2016 and 2018 value is then calculated, and a constant of 100 is added to it ensure a positive output. To demonstrate, a district with an average Democratic lean of 15% would receive a 115 score (15 + 100 = 115). A district with a 15% Republican lean would receive a score of 85 (-15 + 100 = 85). The equation below shows this scoring process, where R is the Republican share, D is the Democratic share, and the subscripts differentiate between the elections.

\[
\frac{(D_1 - R_1) + (D_2 - R_2)}{2} + 100 = P
\]

Districts in which only one candidate was on the ballot in either election were removed from the partisan lean analysis.1 Election results are sourced from the Minnesota Secretary of State Website (State of Minnesota, 2016; State of Minnesota 2018). Analyzing partisan leaning allowed for independent variable effects to be differentiated from effects related to partisanship, since Democratic partnership is associated with greater support for public higher education institutions.39

RESULTS AND FINDINGS
QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW FINDINGS
I spoke with Mike Miller from the University of Minnesota. Miller has worked for three years as the Legislative Advocacy Coordinator for the University’s Government and Community Relations Office, and his responsibilities include running the UMN Advocates program. The interview uncovered a few different trends that Miller has observed in leading UMN Advocates.

Miller has found that “communication styles differ from generation to generation.” People over sixty years old like to use the phone when contacting their legislators. Those in the forty to sixty-year-old range—Miller himself included—prefer to send an email. According to Miller’s observations, the cohort younger than forty years old—who he refers to as the millennials—tends to use social media instead. He added that millennials and students also “prefer face-to-face. They want to take visits to the [state] capitol, which is a little harder to organize.” He has perceived that students and younger people want to say what is personally important to them. Therefore, they shy away from prewritten emails, preferring to email only when they write the message themselves—which Miller noted as rare due to students’ busy schedules—or by sitting down with legislators in-person.

Among students, those involved in some type of partnership with the University—as a student government leader, student group member, Admissions Ambassador, etc.—engage in legislative advocacy more often. He

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1 Districts 12B, 18A, 28A, 40A, and 62B only had one candidate for Minnesota House in either the 2016 or 2018 election.
hopes to expand this group of student advocates to those studying political science, those who care about politics generally, and those who are involved in political groups off campus, like Young Republicans or Young Democrats. Generally, he suggested that older cohorts of advocates are more likely to interact with legislators, though admits that the type of advocacy that older cohorts tend to use—particularly email—are also the easiest for UMN Advocates to keep track of in their records. Both in-person meetings with legislators and social media communications sent to legislators that are not sent through UMN Advocates’ post are harder for them to track.

Miller said that the “highest volume of people who take action fall into two camps:” staff and groups directly affected by an issue at hand. In describing this first camp, Miller made a distinction between faculty and staff, something that cannot be done through the qualitative data set used in this study. Though he suggests that both groups actively participate in grassroots advocacy, he sees university staff as the advocates who take the most action. For the second camp, Miller gave an example to demonstrate how an issue can drive action. In late 2017, Republicans presented a federal tax bill. It included a provision that would make graduate students’ tuition waivers taxable. When UMN Advocates started advocating for the removal of this provision, they observed graduate students coming out “in droves” to act.

Throughout this interview, I found that UMN Advocates recruits supporters and promotes the program in a variety of ways. They engage potential advocates through social media, email, events, student group presentation, working with University of Minnesota Extension offices, and visiting all five system campuses. When looking for advocates, Mike said they “go to where people are, but fish where the fish are.” There are some venues that are better than others, and Mike tries to find a way to engage in “any place where people have an affinity for the university.” To illustrate this, he described the difference between setting up a booth at the Minnesota State Fair and presenting at the University of Minnesota’s Mini Medical School—two venues in which UMN Advocates engages potential supporters. Though the State Fair has a larger audience, Mike labels those that sign up as “low affinity targets” that only join to get University of Minnesota swag at the UMN Advocates booth. Those advocates end up having very low participation rates and do not take action on legislative issues. Conversely, presenting at Mini Medical School—a seven-week program put on by the UMN Medical School to teach community members about a particular medical topic—leads to fewer sign-ups, but higher participation in UMN Advocates’ advocacy initiatives.

When asked how UMN Advocates affects legislators’ decisions at the state capitol, Miller stated he had never seen a legislator flip a vote because of their grassroots advocacy. Instead, it has influenced whether bills or provisions end up being voted on or included at all in a final version of the legislation. Miller again referenced the 2017 tax bill, stating that after House Republicans received an overwhelming amount of pushback on the graduate student tuition waiver tax, they removed the provision from the final bill.

Finally, my interviewee expressed interest in a deeper exploration of UMN Advocates’ advocacy efforts. Miller conveyed that it is hard for him to gather data that would help him have an idea of who the “average” UMN Advocate is, or who is most likely to advocate, due to privacy policies. He would like to see how income level, age, and cultural background have an effect on one’s willingness to take action in advocacy. Miller suggested that cultural factors may be very important; first-generation Americans, those who are the children of refugees and other immigrants, for example, may be more likely to advocate for a cause they care about. Miller hypothesizes that they may be less intimidated by contacting a legislator, having lived with or understood real struggles, dangers, and fears. He contrasted this with his own upbringing and said that those who grow up in more sheltered homes may feel uncomfortable taking a stance on an issue or engaging in advocacy.

To summarize, Mike Miller feels that the best supporters of the UMN Advocates program are those with a great affinity for the University, those employed by it, people with a strong personal interest in the issue at hand, and older populations.

**QUANTITATIVE RESULTS**

Both the number of advocates and the number of interactions in a given district had a significant, positive linear association with each independent and control variable. As shown in Table 1, staff population in a district had the strongest association with participation in both dependent variable measures. The number of University of Minnesota degrees in a district had a moderate positive association with participation in the grassroots lobbying program, as did the amount of Alumni, while student population had a very weak association. The community aggregate score also had a moderately strong linear relationship with participation. The portion of a districts’ population that had attained at least bachelors’ degrees had a noticeably weaker effect on participation than the alumni variable. The impact of partisanship was weaker than all of the tested independent variables, except for the impact of students. Scatterplots for each variable can
be found in Appendix A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>Advocates</th>
<th>Interactions</th>
<th>N value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Aggregate</td>
<td>0.657*</td>
<td>0.675*</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumni</td>
<td>0.573*</td>
<td>0.617*</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>0.809*</td>
<td>0.824*</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>0.222*</td>
<td>0.226*</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMN degrees earned</td>
<td>0.616*</td>
<td>0.635*</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree or higher</td>
<td>0.446*</td>
<td>0.458*</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan lean</td>
<td>0.243*</td>
<td>0.264*</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *p<.0001.

District 60B was the largest, with four times more interactions and advocates than the next highest district in each measure. This hotbed of advocacy is likely due to 60B being the location of the University of Minnesota—Twin Cities’ Minneapolis campus, which is the University of Minnesota campus with the largest student and staff population. Students and staff with permanent residences in a different district may use their campus address or University mail address, respectively, when signing up for UMN Advocates and selecting the legislator to which their communications will be sent. Additionally, most out-of-state and international students matriculating through the University of Minnesota’s flagship campus reside in this district as well. District 60B was removed as a data point due to its outlier nature, though its presence in the data set did not greatly alter the results due to the study’s large population.

When the trend lines were drawn on the scatter-plots for each test variable, six outliers recurred in each chart, except for the chart showing staff effects.2 The University of Minnesota–Morris campus sits in one of these outliers and the rest are in close proximity to the University of Minnesota–Twin Cities campuses. The proximity of outlier data points to the University of Minnesota campuses suggests that University campus areas have unique participation communities, with more staff advocates and fewer alumni and student advocates relative to other districts.

IMPLICATIONS
The quantitative results and qualitative findings of this study provide interesting implications for grassroots advocacy participation. I will start by reviewing the outcomes of my hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 — A large university community in a legislative district has a stronger effect on grassroots advocacy participation than the presence of staff, alumni, or student populations independently.

My first hypothesis failed. There was a moderately strong linear relationship between the aggregate number of University of Minnesota community members and grassroots participation, indicating that a larger university community population does lead to greater grassroots support. However, the combined influence of the University of Minnesota community members did not create the epidemic effect suggested in the model. University staff, students, and alumni do not appear to inspire their friends, neighbors, and fellow community members to engage in university advocacy, at least not in a significant way. If university community members inspired others to act, an exponential relationship stronger than any of the other independent variables would likely emerge. A larger university community would probably provide more chances for more non-university community members to interact with and gain interest in university issues. This would turn a private, individual issue into a public one, and non-university community members would participate out of interest for those that are directly affected by university issues. Since the relationship is linear, an empathy-based community interest is not apparent in these results.

Hypothesis 2 — A larger staff population strongly increases grassroots advocacy participation in a given district, more so than alumni and student populations.

The results affirmed Hypothesis 2. I found a very strong positive correlation between staff population and advocacy participation, significantly stronger than the next leading independent variable. Also, unlike all of the other variables, no significant outliers were found in the staff analysis. These results support my model’s inclusion of self-interest as a major factor in mobilizing participation. Once again, staff have arguably the strongest interest in government supporting for their university because policymakers’ decisions can affect their employment, income, and benefits, as well as how they go about their work. This strong interest likely spurs them to advocate for their employer.

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2 Outliers: Districts 12A, 60A, 61A, 64A, 64B, and 66A.
Interview findings support this result, as UMN Advocates has found staff to be among the most consistent advocates taking action.

**Hypothesis 3** — A larger student population in a district moderately increases grassroots advocacy participation in a given district, but has less of an effect than staff and alumni.

The third hypothesis was not supported. Though there is a significant correlation between student presence and advocacy for their institution of enrollment, the correlation is weak. These findings challenge the part of my model stipulating that self-interest is a key mobilizing factor for those groups that do not normally participate. This model is based on implications from Campbell’s work focusing on social security and senior citizens (2002). Campbell found self-interest overcame low income status as a barrier to participation. Mixed results suggest that perhaps age is a stronger factor than income level in determining political participation, or that social security income produces greater self-interest for its recipients than higher education funding does for students.

**Hypothesis 4** — A larger alumni population moderately increases grassroots advocacy participation in a given district.

Hypothesis 4 was affirmed. The results of the alumni analysis support that a past self-interest or relationship in an issue mobilizes participation. The weaker effect of the alumni population, when compared to staff, reflects the theorized difference between staff’s self-interest and alumni’s personal relationship with their alma mater. This disparity can also be attributed to alumni likely being less aware of the University’s advocacy needs, whereas staff working at the institution see issues at the ground level. Nevertheless, alumni may still have an affinity for their alma mater, and that affinity and past stake in the institution leads them to participate at higher rates. Mike Miller supported this claim in the qualitative interview, stating that he sees those with high affinities for the University of Minnesota take advocacy action at higher rates.

My final hypothesis was also affirmed and supports the affinity-based mobilization model. Degrees earned in a district has a stronger correlation than simply the number of alumni. Those that return to the University of Minnesota after they have already received a degree from it likely enjoyed their first round of education there. They have a stronger relationship with and greater appreciation for the university, having spent more time and done more work there. Particularly since many additional degrees after bachelor’s—including master’s and doctoral—require completing scholarly research, more degrees would logically align with a greater appreciation for academia.

By comparing the effects of alumni and degrees-earned with the effects of education level, it is apparent that these variables are not simply acting as proxies for a district’s overall level of education. Instead, these variables have a distinct strength in mobilizing advocates in comparison to the portion of the district with college education alone. Additionally, all of the independent variables tested seem to be significantly more influential than the partisan lean of a district, which is often cited as a predictor for higher education support.

These results imply that current self-interest, past connection with an issue, and age play an important factor in grassroots advocacy for higher education institutions specifically, and on issues generally.

**CONCLUSION**

Participation in grassroots advocacy for the University of Minnesota is closely tied to the presence of University of Minnesota community members. The number of university staff, degrees earned, alumni, and students all have significant effects on the amount of grassroots participation in university issues. The implications of these findings are that community members with the greatest affinity for and self-interest in the university display the strongest likelihood to advocate for it to government officials. Additionally, factors previously studied such as age and level of education have effects that may make individuals more likely to participate in such advocacy.

Informed by these findings, UMN Advocates is on the right track in their approach to finding grassroots advocates. Mike Miller and his team should continue to engage staff, alumni, and others with a direct connection to the University. Miller’s visit to the Mini Medical School is a great example of UMN Advocates’ engaging most-likely advocates—
they are older, more educated, and show their appreciation and affinity for the university by choosing to return to it. Seeing as self-interest and connections with the institution are important in this kind of participation, UMN Advocates may be successful in enlisting the support of companies that recruit or employ large amounts of University of Minnesota graduates. UMN Advocates could present to employees at these companies or engage company leadership who may also have connections

Additionally, I believe there is an untapped opportunity to increase student involvement in grassroots advocacy. The current program is geared in favor of participation by an older population, but students’ self-interest in the University offers a huge potential in advocate recruitment. To do this, UMN Advocates may need to provide avenues for engaging legislators that students are more comfortable with by creating opportunities for face-to-face interactions between students and officials on campus. The program could host meet-and-greets and networking events. I would suggest inviting legislators to events that the university already hosts to give legislators a greater sense of community with the university and give opportunities for students, alumni, and staff to meet them. Another opportunity found at the intersection of students and alumni is engaging students’ parents. Their interest is similar to their students’ in that they want the university to be an environment that helps their student succeed. But, unlike students and like alumni, parents are more likely to have the demographic traits that are favorable for participation—older, more educated, higher income, etc.—when compared to students. UMN Advocates could present at Parents’ Weekend events and send information to parents with the university’s other mailings.

For further research, I suggest using the methods that Hall puts forth in Participation in Congress to determine the effectiveness of grassroots higher education advocacy. Hall provides a thorough framework to determine the extent to which legislators support issues by going on simple voting records. For example, the vote that a legislator takes on an omnibus higher education bill may not be a good measure of whether they support a specific institution or not. A legislator may vote against a bill because it gives the institution in question too much or too little money, or because they do not agree with a completely separate provision in the bill. Instead, a more robust method can be used which codes for support across many points of participation, and by suggesting that where and how much a legislator chooses to participate gives a better indication of the importance of an issue. Committee membership, statements made in committee and on the floor, bill sponsorship, and voting records all operationalize legislators’ support for higher education institution. For example, a legislator that is very interested in and supportive of a university would sit on higher-education committees, frequently speak in support of the university in committee and on the floor, sponsor and cosponsor bills and amendments that are university and higher education friendly, and support university interests in votes on bills and amendments on the floor, as well as in committee. Each of these variables could be measured independently and in aggregate, then analyzed against UMN Advocates’ participation data to gain insight on the effectiveness of their program and constituent participation generally. Scholars could also use available data to test or control for a variety of other facts that develop a legislator’s decision on public higher education. The level of education, types of industries, partisanship, and presence of different higher education institutions in a district as well as a legislator’s own education, party affiliation, and alumni status would all be important for further study. In addition, interviews of both grassroots advocates and legislators can be enlightening in finding out why advocates decide to participate and what type of participation is effective.

This study is just the beginning of a conversation on grassroots advocacy and participation in the higher education policy arena. The conversation on higher education and politics is an important one for today’s society, as we see state higher education funding unable to keep up with demand and, consequently, rising tuition. These findings can hopefully be used as a starting point for this academic conversation, while also informing professionals working in any kind of political advocacy in finding ways to maximize their effectiveness.
APPENDIX A
FIGURES

Figure 1. Relationship between members of university community and advocates per district. Pearson’s r = 0.811.

Figure 4. Relationship between alumni presence and interactions with legislators per district. Pearson’s r = 0.785.

Figure 2. Relationship between members of university community and interactions per district. Pearson’s r = 0.822.

Figure 5. Relationship between staff presence and grassroots advocates per district. Pearson’s r = 0.899.

Figure 3. Relationship between alumni presence and grassroots advocates per district. Pearson’s r = 0.757.

Figure 6. Relationship between staff presence and interactions with legislators per district. Pearson’s r = 0.908.
Figure 7. Relationship between student presence and grassroots advocates per district. Pearson’s $r = 0.471$.

Figure 10. Relationship between alumni presence and interactions with legislators per district. Pearson’s $r = 0.616$.

Figure 8. Relationship between student presence and interactions with legislators per district. Pearson’s $r = 0.475$.

Figure 11. Relationship between percentage of district population with a bachelor’s degree or higher and advocates per district. Pearson’s $r = 0.668$.

Figure 9. Relationship between alumni presence and grassroots advocates per district. Pearson’s $r = 0.785$.

Figure 12. Relationship between percentage of district population with a bachelor’s degree or higher and interactions with legislators per district. Pearson’s $r = 0.677$. 
APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

Mike Miller
University of Minnesota
Narrator

Max Hurst
Interviewer

December 13, 2018
at Morrill Hall
Minneapolis, Minnesota

This transcript has been edited for fluency and clarity.

MH: Hi Mike, thank you for agreeing to this inter-
view. Can you start by introducing yourself and your
position?

MM: I am Mike Miller. I’ve been the Legislative Ad-
vocacy Coordinator for the University of Minnesota
for three years now. And it’s really my dream job and
I’m a really happy person.

MH: Can you tell a little bit about what the UMN Ad-
vocates program is?

MM: UMN Advocates is the program by which we
connect staff, faculty, students, alumni, and well-wish-
ers to their legislators.

The design of the program is for it to be very
simple and very easy for people to get and stay. We try
to provide tools for everyone: from people who just
want to read about what’s going on at the legislature,
all the way up to people that want to run for office.
We’re looking at 2020 being the first time a UMN
advocate will run. I’m not going to say names yet, but
it’s looking more and more like that’s going to happen.
It’s really exciting stuff.

A lot of the things that we do are based on na-
tional best practices, and we have been recognized as a
leader in advocacy around the country.

We wanted to create a club, where people can
feel involved in the University and in politics, and I
think we’ve succeeded at that.

MH: How does UMN Advocates reach out to or re-
cruit reach members/advocates for the program?

MM: Lots of different ways. I go to a lot of events.
If there’s a college putting on an event, I go. My best
example is Mini Med School. The Medical School has
different people from the community come in to learn
about a medical topic for seven Tuesdays in a row. I
go there. I talk to them. Any place where people have
an affinity for the University, I try find a way to weasel
my way in and be a part of it.

We also use social media. We use emails. We
try to get on other people’s emailing list. I go to talk
to a bunch of different student groups. I try to really
get in with Extension and, of course, the system cam-
puses. I do my best to try to get out to the system cam-
puses three times a year. It doesn’t always work out; I
wish it worked out better.

Go to where people are, but fish where the fish
are. Don’t just stop people on the street. You would
think the State Fair would be a good place, but it’s not. Those are low affinity targets that are just signing up to get Goldy-on-a-stick. If I go to Mini Med, I’m going to get fewer sign ups, but those people are more likely to take action.

MH: Who or what kind of people do you see participating in the UMN Advocates program the most?

MM: It seems like the highest volume of people who take action fall into two camps.

One: staff. The staff here are fantastic. They get my emails and they go right to work. That’s across the board, no matter what the issue is. The staff is great. Now, that’s not to say faculty, students, alumni aren’t great. Of course they are. But I’ve noticed that staff is my strongest unit. The exception to that [and the second camp] is when an issue directly affects someone. For example, the Federal Tax Bill [had a provision] that would have messed with graduate student’s taxes on whether their tuition waivers would be taxable. They came out in droves. If something directly affects someone, that’s going to be my group. Those are the two trends I’ve noticed.

I would love to get more detail how to get more students involved. That’s my goal for this year is to get more and more students. I try to divide people into strata of likelihood of action. Students that are involved in student government, a student group, or some other manner of partnership with the University—such as through jobs or as Admissions Office tour guides—they are likely to get involved. They are great.

This year I really want to get that second level. Maybe political science students, people who care about politics, including those involved in a political group that’s not on campus. People who are involved in not College Republicans and College Democrats, but in Young Republicans and Young Democrats. How do I get to them? That’s my next target.

MH: In your statistics, you have number of “advocates” and number of “interactions”. What qualifies as an “advocate” and an “interaction”? Who do you see interacting the most?

MM: The number of advocates is the actual number of unique email address that took action. So, I can have 45,000 interactions and 15,000 advocates. That may mean everyone did 3 different interactions.

I’d count an interaction as anytime someone takes action to communicate with a legislator, whether that’s a tweet, an email, a phone call, a visit to the capitol, anything like that. It is not an interaction if they don’t communicate with a legislator. So, things like coming to an event, doesn’t count.

The people at the highest level are the staff. I’m counting Extension in with the staff, and I don’t know if they should be faculty or staff or what, but I just count them as staff. They respond quickest.

MH: During your time managing this program, what have you seen as the impact of UMN Advocates on legislative decision making?

MM: Oh my God. It’s been amazing. There was a research issue my first year that we were able to really move the needle on. [The legislature was] going to take 24 million dollars from the U. That was huge.

I’ve never seen it flip a vote, but what I’ve seen is people pull bills off the table. At the federal level, I’ve seen decisions like the Tax Bill I mentioned before. That decision wasn’t just because of UMN Advocates, but a bunch of universities did the same thing using us as a model. All of the House Republicans in DC got contacted and made the decisions. No one flipped a vote, but [the Republicans] pull[ed the provision]. That’s the impact we can have.

Ideally, the best way we can have impact is to show legislators that people care about Higher Ed in the same way that they care about K-12. Once we are able to start making the argument that people are voting based on higher education. When a legislator comes to your door people are willing to say, “You supported the University of Minnesota, and that’s a big factor in how I vote.” Once we show, we have 45,000 people that care about this.

My goal is 100,000. If we can get 100,000 unique email addresses to take action in a year, we could make a lot of change. Legislators think of voters as in blocks. “How do I get 100 votes here? How do I get a 100 votes there?” I haven’t looked at 2018 results yet, but I know there were a few races that were decided by under a hundred votes.

I’ve seen a change. We went from being told by legislators, “We never hear from your people!” to legislators pulling bills and provisions off the table. The year before I started, we had 1,000 emails that went to the legislature. From July 2017 through June 2018, we had 40,000. So in three years, we’ve seen a big jump.
MH: What differences in participation do you see associated in different demographics?

MM: I don’t have good data on that, but I’ve noticed that older people are more likely to take action. People are a little more established in their lives.

Communication styles differ from generation to generation. My parents—for example—will only use the phone. They don’t want to send legislators an email. They want to use the phone. I’ve noticed some of that in UMN Advocates. The 60 [years old] and up crowd want to use the phone. For the forty to sixty [year old] crowd—myself included—it’s email. I want to send emails. That’s what I’m comfortable doing. The millennials are more comfortable with the social media aspect of things, but also prefer face-to-face. They want to take visits to the Capitol, which is a little harder to organize. It seems like millennials are more comfortable doing that than sitting down and tapping out an email.

Students don’t seem to want to send the pre-written emails. They want to either write their own—which very few have the time to do because they’re busy as heck—or they just want to go down to legislators and talk about what’s important to them. So because of that, through the system we use I’ve just noticed that we get more people taking action through the email system who are in that 40-60. Like the staff here, that range of [air quotes] adulthood.

I would love to get more data on who is actually taking action, but I lot of it I can’t ask for because we have privacy rules that apply to the University. I’d really love to do a qualitative analysis of who the UMN Advocates are.

MH: Is there anything else that you think a study into political participation in higher education advocacy and grassroots lobbying should include?

MM: Age, income, and racial background would all be crucial for me know.

It would be very interesting to find out what cultural factors play into a willingness to take political action. Here’s my thought: if you are the child of refugees—people who are willing to pick everything up and go for a better life—it occurs to me that you are probably a person that has grown up knowing what real danger is, knowing what real fear is. You’re probably not intimidated to send a lawmaker an email. Whereas... you know, I just wonder is there a connection there or isn’t there. If you are a person who was—like I was—my parents were like helicopter parents. They were all over me. I never had to do anything for myself. Now, I’ve come out of that shell a little bit as I’ve grown older. But in college, I was in [the Minnesota Student Association]. I didn’t do this. I didn’t do any of the advocacy stuff. I always argued against it because I was mostly uncomfortable with taking a stand. I didn’t want to do it. And I get that. So I’m wondering how all of that plays into participation.

If I could put together a profile of the average advocate would allow me to focus on those people. Like I said, fish where the fish are. If I know that people between 22 and 26 with an immigration background—first generation citizens—are more likely to take action, I’m going to look at student groups that support those groups. I’m going to work with them more so than I’m going to work with a group of art students that get paid to paint and drink wine.

Right now, I don’t know who is most likely to be an advocate. I’d like to know what the means are. That’d be neat.

MH: Thank you, Mike.

Endnotes


The College Board, “Trends in College Pricing
Milbrath, Lester W. *Political Participation: How and...


“A Tribe is an Island:”

Placemaking, Protest, and the Alcatraz Occupation

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Abstract

Indians of All Tribes (IAT)’s 1969-1971 occupation of Alcatraz Island was a watershed moment in the history of 20th century decolonial protest. The occupation relied heavily on visual strategies, such as the détournement of government signage and the repurposing of carceral architecture, to mark the island as Indigenous land. By framing these strategies with Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s theory of decolonization and placing them in conversation with Jacques Rancière’s notion of the aesthetic break, this essay sets forth an understanding of the relationship between decolonial politics and visual culture. It also makes a case for the ongoing importance of aesthetics to Indigenous protest today.

Alcatraz Island sits on Ohlone, Coast Miwok, and Ramaytush land. Once a seabird habitat, and once a hiding place for Native people fleeing the California mission system, it served as a federal penitentiary from 1934 to 1963.

For nineteen months beginning in November 1969, a group of Indigenous activists and allies calling themselves Indians of All Tribes (IAT) occupied the island. IAT’s occupation, which made international headlines and brought unprecedented public attention to the American Indian civil rights movement, mobilized Indigenous communities across the U.S., strengthened intertribal partnerships, and laid a foundation for American Indian protest movements in the second half of the 20th century. “We came to Alcatraz with an idea,” writes one occupier, “we would unite our people and show the world that the Indian spirit would live forever.”

Mohawk writer and activist Peter Blue Cloud’s poem, “Alcatraz Visions,” published in an IAT newsletter, sets the scene of the occupation and expresses a similar optimism. The poem’s final stanza speaks to the protest’s radical approach to the land:

Steel bridges all around this bay,
connecting land in bumper to bumper pain,
dreams on Alcatraz are of a different bridge,
fashioned of sunlight and soft voices.

Here, Blue Cloud sets up a poetic contrast between the settler modernity of San Francisco, epitomized by images of steel bridges and dense traffic, and the sovereign Indigenous space that IAT created on Alcatraz, represented by an image of “sunlight and soft voices.”

Settler presence on Indigenous land is painful, he acknowledges, but the occupation represents a bridge toward solidarity, resistance, and decolonization.

This essay will take a closer look at this bridge, and at the radically Indigenous sense of place created by Alcatraz occupiers between 1969 and 1971. Through their visible acts of protest and placemaking, the occupiers “[changed] the cartography of the perceptible, the thinkable, and the feasible” in ways that continue to inform Indigenous art and protest today.

To contextualize my visual and political analyses, I will begin with a brief historical overview of the occupation. I will then introduce French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s notion of the aesthetic break, which provides an instructive framework for considering the symbolic productions of decolonial protests such as the Alcatraz occupation. Finally, I conclude with broader reflections on decolonial art and social movements in the 21st century.

A History of the Alcatraz Occupation and Its Symbolic Productions

A small group of Bay Area Sioux activists organized the first protest-occupation of Alcatraz on March 8, 1964. They argued that the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie returned surplus government lands to Native people and served as legal grounds for the reclamation of
the island.6 The occupiers, accompanied by reporters and legal counsel, spent four hours singing and drumming on Alcatraz before federal marshals removed them. However brief, their action garnered media attention and spoke to the discontents of Native people struggling under federal assimilation, relocation, and termination policies. Five years later, in the wake of a fire that destroyed San Francisco’s only Native social center, a second wave of occupiers made their way to the island. The fourteen activists, many of whom attended San Francisco State University, set out from a San Francisco pier on November 9, 1969. When their ferryman stopped short of the island, several members of the party—including prominent education activist Richard Oakes—jumped off and swam ashore anyway.7 Although the Coast Guard kicked them off several hours later, the activists gathered critical intelligence about the Island’s layout and galvanized support for the largest, most ambitious landing yet.

In the early hours of November 20, eighty-nine Native people of varied ages and tribes made their way to Alcatraz with the goal of laying the groundwork, not only for a long-term occupation, but for the island’s transformation into a Native university, museum, and community center. Calling themselves Indians of All Tribes (IAT), the group issued a proclamation that claimed the surplus federal property “by right of discovery.”8 They offered the federal government a treaty: they would buy Alcatraz “for twenty-four dollars in glass beads and red cloth, a precedent set by the white man’s purchase of a similar island about 300 years ago.”9 Their sardonic proclamation, addressed to “the Great White Father and his People,” drew attention to the continued impact of colonial violence and broken treaties on Native communities, and looked toward a future of Indigenous sovereignty. Through reclaiming, occupying, and reshaping Alcatraz, IAT made this sovereign future tangible. As word of the occupation spread through the Bay Area and eventually through the U.S. at large, thousands of Native people and allies visited the island in support of IAT. Thousands of others sustained the occupation from afar, sending much-needed food and supplies. Over the next nineteen months, occupiers took up residence in former cells, held regular powwows and cleansing ceremonies, and built a fluctuating but vibrant community, all while navigating infrastructural problems and negotiating with stubborn U.S. officials. As notes from the organization’s 1969 National Conference show, IAT’s ambitions for the island grew in scope over time, with plans to build not just a community center but traditional dwellings, a desalination plant, and modes of non-polluting transportation.10 Countless reminders of Indigenous presence surrounded the occupiers as they lived, worked, and danced on Alcatraz. Spray-painted letters along the walk to the main cell house read “You are on Indian Land,” the word “Indian” underlined for emphasis.11

On January 3, 1970, community leader Richard Oakes’s thirteen-year-old stepdaughter Yvonne fell to her death, marking a tragic turning point for the occupation. The Oakes family soon left the island, as did a slew of student occupiers returning to university. The tense ensuing months, criticized by some occupiers as “a combination of powwows and of constant street fighting,” were marked by dwindling resources, trouble with non-Indian arrivals (and possible infiltrators), and unsuccessful negotiations with the federal government.12 U.S. officials offered the occupiers space for a cultural center at Fort Mason, a former U.S. army post next to Fisherman’s Wharf, but refused to accede to the occupiers’ demand for a title to the island itself.13 The notion of Alcatraz as a sovereign Indigenous place, or, in Grace Thorpe’s words, “the first ‘free’ land since the white man came,” was too central to the movement for compromise.14 The number of occupiers dwindled over the last few months of the occupation, a fire of unknown origin destroyed several buildings on June 1, 1971, and government officers removed the last fifteen protestors from the island at gunpoint ten days later on June 11.

Despite its conclusion, the Alcatraz occupation managed to not only draw public attention to the situation of Indigenous people in the U.S., but to spark similar demonstrations in the coming decades, many of which drew on its symbolic power. Donna Hightower Langston describes the occupation as “the beginning of a new movement and of a newfound pride and racial consciousness” for Indigenous people.15 This movement, pride, and consciousness mobilized Indigenous activists and paved the way for high-profile demonstrations in the following years. The American Indian Movement (AIM), known for their occupations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) offices in 1972, and of Wounded Knee in 1973, cited Alcatraz as “the symbol of a newly awakened desire of the Indians for unity and authority in the white world.”16 In addition, IAT’s use of text and art to stake out presence on land continues to influence contemporary Indigenous movements like the 2016 Dakota Access Pipeline.
The Alcatraz occupation, however, represents not just a watershed moment in the history of U.S. Native protest, but an important milestone in a broader history of decolonial social movements. The visual materials the occupation produced demonstrate both reinstatement of Indigenous relationships to land and interplay between aesthetics and political mobilization. Throughout their nineteen months on Alcatraz Island, IAT occupiers employed visual strategies to recuperate Alcatraz as a decolonized place where they could refashion Indigenous ways of life. Drawing on ideas from critical art theory, particularly Rancière’s notion of the aesthetic break, I will show how IAT’s radical acts of placemaking opened possibilities for decolonial political construction and community building on Alcatraz and beyond.

LITERATURE REVIEW: DECOLONIZATION, PLACE, AND PROTEST
In order to understand the Alcatraz occupation’s aims and visual strategies, we must first understand the idea of decolonization and its entanglement with place. Further, to understand the occupation’s outcomes, we must first understand the relationship between art, politics, and protest. This section outlines the land-based understanding of decolonization, discussed by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in their 2012 article, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” that I draw on throughout this paper. It also introduces several theoretical concepts that structure and support my arguments about art and politics.

DECOLONIZATION
Tuck and Yang’s article lays out a framework for comprehending both the mechanisms of settler colonialism and the radical, land-based nature of decolonization. Settler colonialism, they explain, “is different than other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain.” In order to maintain sovereignty, settlers must completely possess the land they occupy. In order to possess this land, they must transform it into a source of capital. Tuck and Yang agree that their drive toward possession precludes any relationships to land that do not conform to capitalistic modes of ownership. The epistemic, cosmological, and, above all, personal relationships of Indigenous communities to the land must be erased. “Everything within a settler colonial society,” the authors continue, “strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear from the land.” They draw on anthropologist Patrick Wolfe’s understanding of settler colonialism as a structure, as opposed to an isolated event, in order to emphasize the ongoing nature of the settler colonial project and need for ongoing resistance.

Decolonization must continually seek to overturn this structure and bring about “the repatriation of Indigenous land and life.” I understand the Alcatraz occupation as a decolonial act intended to bring about this repatriation, and thus focus on the ways in which IAT occupiers developed affective relations to land.

THE AESTHETIC BREAK
Rancière introduces the aesthetic break in his 2008 book, The Emancipated Spectator, which engages broadly with questions of spectatorship in modern and contemporary art. Rancière is skeptical of the notion, propagated by theorists like Guy DeBord, that modern audiences are passive consumers who must be made aware of their state through artistic critiques of the spectacle. In the chapter “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community,” he offers another lens through which to view the relationship between modern art and life: that of dissensus and the dissensual community. “Human beings,” he writes, “are tied together by a certain sensory fabric, a certain distribution of being together” called the sensus communis. Both politics and art can be understood as transformations of our shared sensory fabric. This structure accounts for how, in the face of the Marxist alienation produced by modern capitalism, human beings come to live “apart together” in a state of dissensus. In response, contemporary art projects such as Sylvie Blocher, François Daune, and Josette Faidit’s 2005 project, Campement Urbain, often aim to create a sense of community and anticipate a politically mobilized “people to come.” Although Rancière is generally critical of these efforts, he locates modern art’s radical potential in the “aesthetic break” that accompanies dissensus. Understanding “exactly what is disconnected [in art] and what is at stake in that disconnection,” he argues, is crucial to understanding why aesthetics are politically charged.

The aesthetic break is the separation between an author’s intentions when creating a work and a reader’s affective response when encountering it. In other words, it represents the breakdown of a “regime of concordance between sense and sense,” which is epitomized by classical theater. Plays such as
Molière’s Tartuffe and Voltaire’s Mahomet, Rancière explains, mirrored human virtues and vices onstage with the expectation that spectators would change their behavior in response. These works assumed that poiesis, the act of creation, and aisthesis, the “forms of perception and emotion through which [a work] is felt and understood,” were entwined. At some point, however, a dissensual gap between art and its reception arose. Rancière traces understandings of this gap back to Rousseau’s Letter to M. D’Alembert on the Theatre, in which the political philosopher questions the existence of a “direct line” from performance to initial audience response to subsequent behavior outside of the theatre. Aesthetics, Rancière argues, is the very breakage of these lines, “the rupture of the harmony that enabled correspondence between the texture of the work and its efficacy.” The aesthetic break can frustrate artistic attempts at political mobilization. Although it is tempting to believe “that the reproduction in resin of the commercial idol will make us resist the empire of the ‘spectacle’ or that the photography of some atrocity will mobilize us against injustice,” critical works of art are never guaranteed to change the minds and/or behaviors of their viewers. However, Rancière argues that, when accompanied by concrete forms of mobilization, artworks that engage the aesthetic break can open up radical political possibilities that are grounded in “dis-identification” rather than in mimesis. In this paper, I use the Rancière’s concept of the aesthetic break, and link it to Tuck and Yang’s theory of decolonization to account for the radical possibilities opened by IAT during the Alcatraz occupation.

DÉTOURNEMENT

The Situationist International (SI), a leftist art organization active from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, merged anti-authoritarian Marxist principles with a French Surrealist fascination with “the unexpected, the bizarre, [and] the magical aspects” of the modern city. Collective avant-garde action, the organization argued in its “Report on the Construction of Situations,” requires a coherent political critique and revolutionary program. Concerned with emerging modernity, lagging political action, and the bourgeois capacity to stupefy the proletariat through “televisioned imbecilities,” the organization proposed means of intervention in what member Guy Debord described as la société du spectacle. Through constructing game-like “momentary ambiances of life”—called “situations”—in the urban realm, Situationists aimed to reawaken political consciousness and desires against the grain of the spectacle. These situations took several forms. One was the dérive, an improvised drift through the city meant to reveal the psychogeographical forces that shape the urban environment. Another, more relevant to the Alcatraz occupation, was détournement, the highly visible “reuse of preexisting artistic elements in a new ensemble” for the purpose of turning capitalism and other power structures against themselves. In the fifth section of this paper, I interpret IAT graffiti as an example of détournement, linking my analysis to Rancière’s critique of critical art.

DECONSTRUCTION

French philosopher Jacques Derrida believes that language is a site of power, and that the practice of deconstruction can unsettle such power. His theories are grounded in the notion that différance, or the unstable relation between words and their presence in our minds, is a fact of language. Différance can be demonstrated by examining a phrase as outwardly simple as IAT’s rallying cry, “We Hold The Rock,” which, read through a Derridean lens, raises major questions. Who comprises the group indicated by “we?” What does it mean to “hold” something? And what is “The Rock?” A place, a boulder, a pebble picked up from the ground? We know, from its context, that the phrase denotes the occupation of Alcatraz Island by a coalition of Indigenous activists. But Derrida sees revolutionary potential in this semantic instability, in the différance of sentences like these. Différance pushes us to ask questions about contexts and to examine the traces present in all language.

Traces, or “fleeting images” that run through our heads as we read, is another concept central to Derridean deconstruction. For instance, pop culture mavens may associate the phrase “The Rock” with professional actor and wrestler Dwayne Johnson, while prison history buffs will recognize it as an appellation for Alcatraz Island. Each association represents one of the phrase’s traces. Derrida argues that by locating, following, and clarifying traces, we can move toward the truth of the language that structures our world, and, through truth, ultimately toward justice. He acknowledges that this process of deconstruction creates an infinite loop in which language is necessary for the deconstruction of language (in turn requiring further deconstruction), and thus never reaching an ultimate goal. Despite this flaw, he
believe that following traces is a necessary process, and can push us toward justice even if it cannot help us grasp it. I draw on Derrida’s framework to interpret IAT’s engagement with Alcatraz’s prison architecture, again linking my analysis to Rancière and the aesthetic break.

DECOLONIZATION AND THE AESTHETIC BREAK ON ALCATRAZ
As Tuck and Yang argue, decolonization is a concrete rather than abstract process, one that requires tangible recuperation of Indigenous land and affective relationships to it. In overturning settler colonial structures of domination and possession, it “implicates and unsettles everyone.” Revolutionary Martiniquan philosopher Frantz Fanon, one of Tuck and Yang’s primary influences, comes to similar conclusions in The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon argues in the book’s first chapter that decolonization, a process that “sets out to change the order of the world,” must speak to a colonized people’s desire for “bread and land.” Fanon also comments on decolonization’s affective nature, citing its potential to “fundamentally [alter] being” against the grain of colonization. Viewed through the lens of Tuck, Yang, and Fanon’s frameworks, the Alcatraz occupation represents a decolonial act, or political ideals and goals. A critical analysis of the Alcatraz occupation must, in turn, incorporate both political and aesthetic perspectives. Toward this end, Rancière’s notion of the aesthetic break explores the relationship between politics and aesthetics as well as the revolutionary potential of art. The aesthetic break accounts for not only why but how the Alcatraz occupiers’ visual strategies opened up decolonial possibilities on the island.

Several examples from the Emancipated Spectator demonstrate the aesthetic break’s political potential. In “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community,” Rancière analyzes an excerpt from Le Tocsin des travailleurs (The Workers’ Tocsin), an anti-capitalist newspaper published during the French Revolution of 1848. In a third-person diary entry, a joiner writes that when he works on a home with a beautiful view outside its window, he “stops his arms and glides in imagination toward the spacious view to enjoy it better than the [owners] of the neighbouring residences.” While apolitical at first glance, the anecdote reflects the newspaper’s revolutionary goals. Being a worker under capitalism, Rancière explains, requires the alignment of one’s arms and one’s gaze. The break between the joiner’s laboring body and his distracted gaze disrupts this alignment between bodies and their functions, between cause and effect, and thus presents a challenge to the capitalist system.

In a similar vein, Rancière discusses a break between cause and effect in the joiner’s diary that centers on the disjunction between authorial intention and reader response. By recommending his comrades read works by Goethe, Chateaubriand, and Senancour, the joiner infuses these works with radical ideas that the upper-class authors never intended to endorse. Both diary excerpts, Rancière argues, create a “new
configuration” of the sensory fabric, and in doing so, open space for new social relations and revolutionary forms of community. Altogether, the political potential of the aesthetic break rests in this capacity to reconfigure social relations. Aesthetic experience, he writes, “allows for new modes of political construction of common objects and new possibilities of collective enunciation,” all of which rest on the disjunction of cause and effect.43

A second manifestation of the aesthetic break, the rupture between a work of art’s mise-en-scène and its original destination, helps account for the link between aesthetic experience, everyday life, and political mobilization. To demonstrate this rupture, Rancière examines the encounter between spectators and artworks in a museum setting. An artist, for example, may intend for a work of art to be displayed in a specific context, such as a religious ceremony or a patron’s home. However, within a museum, the same work is “disconnected from any specific destination” and offered up to spectators who encounter it with an “indifferent gaze” that is applied uniformly to every other work in the gallery.44 The break between destination and mise-en-scène mirrors the break between function and bodies expressed through the revolutionary joiner’s diary, since both are structured by the larger break between cause and effect, and carry the potential for reconfiguring the social fabric. Beyond the museum and Le Tocsin des travailleurs, where can these reconfigurations occur? Rancière argues that because aesthetic experience tears works from their original destinations, there is no such thing as a “private paradise for amateurs and aesthetes,” no art world cut off from the social world.45

Rancière’s theory shows that the realm of art and the realm of politics are one and the same. Because of this, we can use the aesthetic break to understand the revolutionary potential of not only artworks but social movements and acts of protest like the Alcatraz occupation. As Rancière shows in his analysis of the joiner’s diary, the aesthetic break “overthrows the ‘right’ relationship,” as defined by oppressive structures, “between what a body ‘can’ do and what it cannot.” Because the function of the joiner’s body under capitalism is to work, his disruptive moment of reverie represents a challenge to capitalism itself. Alcatraz occupiers challenged settler colonialism in a similar manner, albeit on a much larger scale. As Tuck and Yang explain in “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” the function of the Indigenous body under settler colonialism is to be absent, to disappear from the land.47 In occupying Alcatraz, IAT protestors refused this function and, by holding community gatherings and marking Alcatraz buildings with graffiti, made themselves as visible on the land as possible. These visually-apparent modes of protest activated the aesthetic break, opening space for reconfigurations in the sensory fabric that challenged settler colonial structures and their requirement that Indigenous communities disappear. Along these lines, the aesthetic break challenged the colonial imperative to reorient relationships between people and land into those of owners and property. Thus, in order to decolonize Alcatraz, it was important for occupiers to reclaim affective, non-capitalistic relationships to the land.

Not only did their modes of protest make them visible on the land, they reclaimed these relationships and succeeded in making Alcatraz an Indigenous place. The second rupture between destination and mise-en-scène accounts for this transformation. When the U.S. government constructed Alcatraz Federal Penitentiary in 1934, they invested the island’s built environment with federal and carceral power. Its foreboding prison structures were meant to represent and maintain government structures. However, because aesthetic separation dislodges a work from its original destination, IAT occupiers were able to reframe the island’s built environment as an Indigenous home rather than a site of colonial oppression. During a nineteen-month period on the island, their acts of place-making invested former prison buildings with hope for an Indigenous future.

By engaging several aesthetic ruptures, the Alcatraz occupiers pursued a decolonial reconfiguration of the sensory fabric encompassing land and life. Sovereign Indigenous presence on Alcatraz, a place imbued with federal and colonial politics, represents a break between the “cause” of settler colonialism and the intended “effect” of Indigenous absence. Through visible modes of protest the occupiers engaged with this break in order to decolonize the island and create an Indigenous place.

UNITED STATES INDIAN PROPERTY

In a 2017 interview with The New Inquiry, former IAT “quartermaster” Adam Fortunate Eagle discussed the occupation’s use of humor, explaining that:

Satire and humor win more friends than righteous anger or indignation. . . Humor is the weapon of the
downtrodden. Anger and hostility only serve to prolong the guilt complex of the dominant societies. If we’d gone ‘Argh, White Man, argh!’ that would have gotten us nowhere! So bring him into the story, make him laugh! [laughs] 48

Occupiers brought the White Man into the story from the moment they released a proclamation addressed to the “Great White Father and his people” and proposed the creation of a “Bureau of Caucasian Affairs.” While their tactics were, as Fortunate Eagle suggests, subversively humorous to outsiders, they were just as important in shaping community on the island itself. As Rundstrom argues in “American Indian Placemaking on Alcatraz, 1969-1971,” IAT’s proclamation marked “the beginning of the creation of an Indian place.” The ironic inversions expressed in this proclamation, he explains, “[functioned as powerful rhetorical devices]” that would inform the occupiers’ modes of protest over the next nineteen months. 49 These modes of protest, which often took the form of public art, signified Indigenous presence on, and connection to, the island through ironic engagements with aesthetic separation. A photograph of occupiers playing ball games, taken on November 26, 1969, provides an instructive example. 50 In the image, four Native people stand on a concrete lot in front of former prison offices—one clutches a football, two look on with interest, and one, mid-jump and hands outstretched, tosses a basketball into the air. Behind and above them, in the center of the photograph’s frame, rests a graffitied sign whose jubilant, defiant tone reflects the playful scene. The sign originally marked Alcatraz as “United States Property,” forbidding non-government boats and declaring that “no one [was] allowed ashore without a pass.” Protestors crossed out “states” and added text to claim the island as “United Indian Property,” a visual act underscoring the occupation’s pan-Indian politics, and, by declaring Alcatraz “Indian Property,” its goal of land repatriation. They removed “no one” from the final sentence, resulting in a disembodied phrase—“allowed ashore without a pass”—that spoke to the movement’s inclusivity. These humorous plays on the text of the sign both critiqued government policies and, as Rundstrom argues, worked to produce a sense of community on the island.

However, as Tuck, Yang, and Fanon’s theories suggest, decolonization requires not only struggle against colonial structures such as those represented by the original sign, but the resurgence of an Indige-
In this parodic-serious stage we are confronted with the “urgent necessity and the near impossibility of bringing together and carrying out a totally innovative collective action,” a sense that, Debord argues, carries mobilizing potential.\textsuperscript{55}

IAT’s repurposing of government signage and buildings on Alcatraz can be understood as a reuse of existing elements in a new ensemble, as an act of \textit{détournement} that aimed to turn U.S. settler colonialism against itself. Because \textit{détournement} is “a negation of the value of the previous organization of expression,” this act made it possible for occupiers to negate the value of federal power and to offer an Indigenous organization of expression in its place. While the aforementioned “United Indian Property” is a relatively straightforward example of \textit{détournement} and Indigenous expression during the occupation, changes made to a seal on the main cell-house are more ambiguous and similarly revealing. Two sets of alterations to the seal, a stars-and-stripes shield guarded by an eagle with raised wings, were made. The first consisted of a sign hung from the eagle’s neck reading “This Land Is My Land,” a quotation from Woody Guthrie’s populist folk anthem.\textsuperscript{56} The second consisted of the repainting of the shield to read “FREE,” the shield’s vertical stripes serving as the letters of the word itself.\textsuperscript{57} Rundstrom argues that, although outsiders read the alterations as the work of pro-government infiltrators, they were instead “[strokes] of placemaking.”\textsuperscript{58} The Guthrie declaration expresses an Indigenous connection to the land of Alcatraz, the addition of “FREE” refuses the island’s carceral history, and, taken together, the two acts appropriate the eagle and shield’s symbolic power for revolutionary means. This example demonstrates how IAT used \textit{détournement} as a means of placemaking and appropriation, but just how effective was this tactic in achieving the occupation’s overall goal of decolonization? In “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community,” Rancière critiques \textit{détournement} in terms of its political efficacy, providing a means for evaluating the occupation’s ironic rhetoric.

As Debord explains in “Détournement as Negation and Prelude,” \textit{détournement} reflects the meeting of the parodic and the serious, which in turn expresses the simultaneous impossibility and necessity of revolution. The Situationists hoped to inspire a “revolution in everyday life” through the construction of situations, but they acknowledged that these situations were, and indeed their entire program was, “essentially transitory.” Using the aesthetic break, Rancière gives a possible explanation as to why lasting revolution is so difficult to achieve through Situationist means. The break between cause and effect which itself makes aesthetics political, he explains, “stands in the way of all strategies for ‘politicizing art.’”\textsuperscript{59} Critical art, the category through which the politics of art are generally understood, seeks to mobilize spectators toward action by making them aware of political situations. By creating a clash between heterogeneous forms, such as Rosler’s bourgeois interiors and graphic war photographs, critical art “[produces] a sensory form of strangeness,” provoking spectators to examine the cause of the strangeness and, in turn, to see the work’s political subject matter in a new way.\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Détournement}, which aims to spark political mobilization through juxtaposing old and new forms, is a form of critical art and thus subject to the same aesthetic limit. Rancière cites the \textit{House Beautiful} series in order to frame this limit: even as art absorbs the aesthetic break into representation, its own political goals face the same rupture. “There is no reason why the sensory oddity produced by the clash of heterogeneous elements should bring about an understanding of the state of the world…[there is] no direct road from intellectual awareness to political action,” he writes, recalling Rousseau’s \textit{Letter to M. D’Alembert on the Theatre}.\textsuperscript{61} In other words, despite its goals, a work of critical art cannot guarantee that its audience will respond with behavioral change. Because of this disjunction, critical art as practiced by the Situationists often comes to “[revolve] around itself” rather than produce a revolution in everyday life.\textsuperscript{62}

Of course, the aesthetic break does open space for political reconfigurations of the sensory fabric, but this effect cannot be calculated—not by artists and, in the case of Alcatraz, not by protestors marking their presence through ironic graffiti. While IAT’s \textit{détournement} of government signs may have engaged one aesthetic rupture between settler power and Indigenous placemaking, it is challenged by the break between visibility and mobilization. The White Man may be laughing, but is he ready to confront the settler colonial system in which he’s implicated? Rancière argues that the distance between critical art and its efficacy can persist “so long as there [are] patterns of intelligibility and forms of mobilization strong enough to sustain the artistic procedures that were supposed to produce them,” so long as concrete action accompanies the visible.\textsuperscript{63} In the case of Alcatraz, occupiers’ acts of détourning the island’s built environment were
accompanied by strong “patterns of intelligibility and forms of mobilization,” demonstrated in part by their engagement with its architecture. This engagement shows how IAT staked out not only presence on, but affective relations to, the land they reclaimed.

DECONSTRUCTING COLONIAL TRACES

In “Towards a Situationist International,” Guy Debord describes the Situationist program as an “essentially transitory” one, stating that “eternity is the grossest idea a person can conceive of in connection with his acts.” An occupier’s comment on plans for Alcatraz’s future, recorded in the minutes of IAT’s 1969 National Conference, stands in stark contrast: “it is important. ... to use contemporary architecture, knowledge, and art skills to express [traditional Indian art ideas] in a way to say that this must last forever.” This section will explore the reasons why, and strategies through which, IAT aimed to build Alcatraz toward “eternity.” Although little construction actually occurred during the Alcatraz occupation, occupiers made extensive long-term plans for the construction of an Indian university, community center, and museum on the island. Understood through the aesthetic break and through Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, these plans represent a concrete means of decolonizing Alcatraz while dealing with its carceral and colonial histories. Because the Alcatraz occupation comprises a break between the “cause” of settler colonialism, expressed by government space, and the “effect” of Indigenous absence, challenged by Indigenous presence and placemaking, any acts of placemaking and visible protest must go against the grain of government space. IAT addressed this immediate need in part through its détournement of government signage. In order to secure the island’s long-term decolonial future, however, it needed to replace government space with something new, something Indigenous, something with the capacity to last forever. As occupier Woesha Cloud North writes in her recap of the 1969 National Conference, published in the occupation’s second newsletter, “it was better to start fresh than to make do” with the island’s existing built environment. Before an analysis of IAT’s plans to develop Alcatraz, a discussion of Frantz Fanon and Eyal Weizman’s writings on decolonization and physical space can help contextualize their decision to start anew.

In the first chapter of The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon writes that “to destroy the colonial world means nothing less than demolishing the colonist’s sector,” emphasizing the necessarily transformative, often violent nature of decolonization. Fanon’s argument diverges from Tuck and Yang’s in its treatment of metaphor as an important rather than superfluous consideration for decolonial movements. From his perspective, “demolishing the colonist’s sector” is an act that engages the rhetorical, the psychological, and the physical, particularly when it comes to dealing with colonial spaces and their symbolic power. For instance, he views physical symbols of colonialism like flags, signs, and military barracks as “not only inhibitors, but stimulants” with the capacity to escalate action amongst colonial subjects. But what happens to these symbols after the advent of action?

In Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation, architect and spatial theorist Eyal Weizman discusses Fanon’s ideas in relation to Palestine’s 2005 decision not to re-inhabit evacuated Israeli settlements. This choice, Weizman argues, marks resistance to the “strong temptation...throughout the history of decolonization” to reappropriate colonial infrastructure. He suggests that such reappropriation “[tends] to reproduce colonial power relations in space,” frustrating decolonial efforts to build a new society. He quotes Fanon’s warning, given amidst the Algerian liberation struggle of the 1960s, that recuperating physical and territorial manifestations of the colonial world could once again “mark out the lines on which a colonized society will be organized.” Colonial villas and palaces, Weizman explains, can become homes for a new elite class, and military installations can become centers for new and similarly power-hungry national regimes. Because “politics creates place” in this manner, place must preemptively create politics. Just as Rancière shows that critical art cannot be effective without coherent forms of mobilization to sustain it, Fanon and Weizman’s work shows that a decolonial program cannot be effective without coherent plans to handle and supplant colonial space. Although the occupation ended before they could bring their plans to fruition, IAT occupiers understood the necessity of leaving colonial space behind in order to build a lasting Indigenous place. They supplemented their critical acts of détournement with altogether new physical, and, by extension, political structures grounded in Indigenous ways of being and relating to land. However, they also developed subversive means through which to preserve and reckon with the island’s colonial physicality. These means can be understood through Derrida’s concept of deconstruction. IAT’s plan to deal with
colonial space, which encourages Alcatraz visitors to deconstruct carceral architecture, reflects Derrida’s belief in the power of the trace.

Woesa Cloud North gives an overview of IAT’s ideas for the island’s design and layout in her recap of the 1969 National Conference. After relating their decision to “start anew,” she writes in parentheses that conference participants “were aware of the need of a museum [arrangement]” that would, through preserving fragments of carceral architecture like “masonry so arranged with iron bars, rusting barbed wire, [and] cramped spaces suggestive of masses of men herded about by armed guards,” remind visitors of “social practices in American society of the twentieth century.” Although this proposal echoes the ironic language of the IAT proclamation, critiquing the detached lens through which museums in the United States tend to discuss Indigenous culture, it can be read as a different way of engaging the aesthetic break between settler power and Indigenous presence, or, here, between settler architecture and Indigenous reoccupation. IAT occupiers recognized the near-impossibility of removing all colonial traces from the idea “Alcatraz,” particularly in the broader cultural and political spheres. Instead, plans to rebuild the island could incorporate means of reckoning with these traces on the organization’s own terms. By preserving fragments of Alcatraz’s carceral architecture, recontextualizing them as part of a public exhibition, and linking them to a critique of 20th century American social practices, IAT could encourage visitors to the island, Indigenous people, and settlers alike, to deconstruct the notion of “Alcatraz” as a site of colonial power.

This plan, however subversive, is still frustrated by the aesthetic break: although the imagined exhibition could aspire toward decolonial justice through deconstruction, it could not calculate audience reaction or audience behavior. In practice, it would function as a form of critical art, aspiring toward a political outcome but requiring supplemental strategies and mobilizations to actually achieve change. IAT’s plans to reckon with and deconstruct traces of colonial architecture laid the groundwork for a strategy that could effectively accompany its détournement of government signage: the creation of a new Indigenous environment. The organization’s plans to create this environment, which speak to Rancière’s advocacy for work that “presents itself as the anticipated reality of what it evokes,” represent a way of not only manifesting but also sustaining Indigenous land and life on Alcatraz.

“THE IDEA AND THE ISLAND IN HARMONY” Rancière concludes his critique of critical art with a summary of its failure in relation to other forms of contemporary activist art. Critical art’s inability to mediate the “being apart” of the work and the “being together” of a new community” through producing awareness, he writes, led some artists to conclude that art requires no mediation whatsoever. These artists create work that is the “direct presentation” of the community they wish to create, in which artists and their subjects “directly [fashion] new social bonds.” Rancière describes the work of contemporary Cuban artist René Francisco as an example of this community-anticipating activist art. After receiving a grant to create work focused on Havana’s poor suburbs, Francisco chose to partner with an elderly woman, refurbishing her home alongside a crew of artists who worked as masons, plumbers, and painters. He filmed the work and screened it at the Havana and Sao Paulo biennials, projecting the woman’s face on one wall and a feed of the refurbishment directly opposite. Altogether, artistic interventions such as these, which “[appear] as a metaphor for [their] own ‘extra-artistic’ outcome” and represent one means of effectively incorporating the aesthetic break, make use of the fluid boundary between art and everyday life to imagine an other, more cooperative world. In a similar sense, IAT’s plan to rebuild Alcatraz anticipates the reality of a decolonized community on the island. It does so by centering Indigenous relationships to land, and by offering concrete methods of placemaking to reify those first expressed in IAT’s proclamation.

The occupation’s second newsletter contains a pencil sketch of Native figures carved “Rushmore-like” into the island’s cliffs. The cliff faces, like many of the island’s detourned signs, are marked with the phrase “Indian Land.” The sketch accompanies an editorial that ends with an injunction, “Alcatraz the Idea and Alcatraz the Island Must Always Be in Harmony.” Both the sketch and this closing line reflect the ethos of IAT’s plans for reconstruction. By infusing the island’s layout and architecture with Indigenous knowledge and traditions, occupiers sought to place “Alcatraz the Idea and Alcatraz the Island” in harmony, blending affect with land to create an Indigenous place. Cloud North’s 1969 National Conference Summary lists seven key ideas for the island’s redesign, which were meant to “express the unique pur-
pose that Alcatraz Island is dedicated to the American Indian.” The ideas, which range from calls to build a lighthouse and roundhouse decorated in traditional Indian style to a suggestion that “it would be more appropriate if Alcatraz were given an American Indian name,” combine Indigenous traditions and built forms with 20th century technological capacities.

The second newsletter also references two symbols central to the teachings of many tribes in proposing that “decoration of the main building [should] include the universal eagle symbol,” and that “other traditional shaped buildings [should] surround the main building in the four directions.” The universal eagle—visible in the photograph of the basketball players—expresses the widely held Indigenous belief that eagles “represent strength, protection, and above all, good wisdom.” The exact meanings of the Four Directions, expressed in a Medicine Wheel, vary between tribes, but they generally represent dimensions of well-being and the cycles of life. IAT’s plan to incorporate these teachings architecture works on several levels. On one level, it draws on their symbolic power to give the new construction affective meaning that reflect the shared Indigenous values of a future, decolonized Alcatraz. On another, it secures the island’s decolonized future by projecting Indigenous ways of life onto its land, thus rejecting the capitalist modes of land ownership enshrined by settler colonialism. Altogether, occupiers planned to invest Alcatraz with the visible political ideal and goal of a sovereign Indigenous community. IAT’s plan to rebuild the island represents a “pattern of intelligibility and form of détourment and deconstruction.”

Tuck and Yang argue that because decolonization strives for the repatriation of Indigenous land and life, it requires the relinquishment of settler futurity in favor of Indigenous futurity. The 1969 National Conference comment that new construction must be built to “last forever” signifies this commitment to Indigenous futurity, which IAT sought to secure through short-term and long-term methods of placemaking. The occupation, however, came to an end on June 11, 1971, precluding fulfillment of the occupiers’ decolonial dreams. One month later, under watch of armed patrols and guard dogs, government forces razed a cluster of apartment buildings on the island’s southern terrace, ostensibly for safety reasons. Rundstrom, however, argues that because the demolition focused on occupier residences marked with graffiti, it should be understood as “an unambiguous assertion of federal authority and an unmaking of place no less powerful in its message” than the June 11th removal.

How should we understand the outcomes of the occupation in the face of its forcible end and this “unmaking of place?” As discussed earlier in the section, IAT’s visual strategies can be understood as the direct presentation of a decolonized community to come. Although occupiers did not gain title to Alcatraz or carry out their plans to rebuild it, their engagements with the aesthetic break sparked a process of community building that continues to serve as a model for contemporary decolonial social movements. Applied to poems written by occupiers, Rancière’s notion of art-as-monument and his proposal for an art grounded in “sensory riches” can explain how and toward what this process worked.

**IMAGINING COMMUNITY**

Rancière discusses and evaluates several ways of incorporating the aesthetic break into art. One approach is to, like René Francisco, directly present envisioned future communities in an artwork. However, Rancière finds more sustainable political hope in artworks that “[explore] the potential of community entailed in separation itself.” He introduces the films of Portuguese artist Pedro Costa, whose work explores life in Portuguese slums, as an example of work that does so. Costa’s 2006 film Colossal Youth follows an elderly Cape Verdean immigrant named Ventura as he wanders between his demolished former neighborhood and the housing project he now calls home. The film returns several times to a love letter that “talks about a separation and about working on building sites far away from one’s beloved,” and blends an array of poetic images from letters written by Cape Verdean immigrants and by imprisoned French poet Robert Desnos. Works like this letter, Rancière explains, amass the “sensory riches” of marginalized lives and arrange them in a form that affirms marginalized existences. They constitute a democratic approach to art “in which the form is not split off from the construction of a social relation or from the realization of a capacity that belongs to everyone.” Rancière contrasts this approach with relational art, which, he believes, relies too often on “fancy,” unsustained interventions in daily life.

However, he qualifies his argument that art should amass the sensory riches of marginalized lives by insisting that “[art] cannot be the equivalent of the
love can present these riches to greater political effect than members of that community themselves. His understanding of art, community, and separation can be applied to social movements in which marginalized people gather the “sensory riches” of their community to create art that affirms it. In the case of Alcatraz, these sensory riches consist of the teachings, symbols, and words that occupiers wove into their graffiti and plans for reconstruction—into their acts of placemaking. Altogether, the visual strategies employed by IAT occupiers reflect both Rancière’s notion of relational, community-anticipating art and his notion of art that locates community in separation itself. Regardless of their approach to separation, however, all of these visual strategies strive toward the shared goal of a decolonized community.

Tuck and Yang understand settler colonialism as a structure that requires an ongoing commitment to disappearing Indigenous people from the land. In response, decolonial movements must continually provide alternate structures and alternate communities that center Indigenous relationships to land. Even though the Alcatraz occupation did not result in lasting land repatriation, it presented—in some cases literal—blueprints for decolonial structures and communities. Rancière’s discussion of political artworks as “monuments” explains how a path from placemaking to decolonization emerged from the occupation’s visual culture. As Rancière demonstrates in the first half of “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community,” political protest and artistic practice are capable of reconfiguring our shared sensory fabric. And, because of the rupture between destination and mise-en-scène, politics and artistic practice can and often do occupy the same spheres and manifest in the same visual actions. When visual actions—such as those employed by IAT occupiers—reconfigure the sensory fabric to achieve political goals, they mediate and substitute for a future community. Or, in Rancière’s words: “the artwork is the people to come and it is a monument to its expectation, a monument to its absence.” Applied to Alcatraz, his notion of art-as-monument to community speaks to the close relationship between the occupation’s visual productions and its affective ones. IAT’s artworks engaged the aesthetic break in order to make Alcatraz an Indian place, and in doing so, created monuments to a future community in which “Indigenous land and life” could be fully repatriated. The effects of the aesthetic break “dis-identified” occupiers from settler colonial structures, sparked decolonial political mobilization, and, altogether, created what Rancière calls a “community of dis-identified persons.”

Poems written and published by occupiers, several of which frame relationships between occupiers in terms of land, offer a glimpse into what this community could look like. One such poem is Peter Blue Cloud’s “Alcatraz,” published in IAT’s January 1970 newsletter. The poem, like “Alcatraz Visions,” frames scenes from the occupation, such as “a Navajo child [whimpering] the tides pull” as “Sioux and Cheyenne dance lowly the ground,” with broader reflections on community and resilience. Just as Costa’s Colossal Youth amassed the stories of immigrants and prisoners to describe an experience of emotional separation, “Alcatraz” gathered traditional Indigenous symbols and practices in order to describe a community whose silhouettes are “katchina dancers” and whose members “[dream] in eagles. . . in the shadow of Coyote’s Mountain.” The poem combines the “sensory riches” of various tribes to illustrate the occupation’s pan-Indian politics and speak to the intertribal nature of a decolonized community to come. It also speaks to the centrality of place to decolonization, and to the community that IAT anticipates. Blue Cloud weaves the phrase “and a tribe is an island” throughout the poem, even repeating it twice in the second stanza’s second line. Aside from heightening the poem’s emotional impact, this repetition underscores the inextricable relationship between Indigenous identity and Indigenous place, a relationship that the Alcatraz occupation sought to recognize, celebrate, and protect.

As Tuck and Yang state in “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Indigenous people are “those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a place - indeed how we/they came to be a place.” Above all, the goal of decolonization is “to be a place.” In making Alcatraz a place, IAT aimed toward this goal, toward concrete repatriation of Indigenous land and life, toward a decolonial community. American Indian Movement (AIM) protests in the 70s and 80s drew on IAT’s visual means of contesting settler colonial relationships to land, and Indigenous protests today continue to draw on these means. In 2016, the Standing Rock Sioux mounted a months-long protest against construction of the proposed Dakota Access Pipeline on their land, which would disturb sacred sites and pose a serious health and environmental threat. These protests,
broadly known through the hashtag #NoDAPL, drew nationwide media attention and employed modes of radical placemaking similar to those employed by IAT. Protestors, known as Water Protectors, lived and built communities on the site of the proposed construction. Onaman Collective, an art collective founded by Ojibway, Michif, and Métis/Cree artists Christi Belcourt, Isaac Murdoch and Erin Konsmo, produced one of the most well-known images from the protests: a print of a bird figure, arms stretched toward the sky, declaring simply that “water is life.”\textsuperscript{109} Alterations on the poster spread throughout the #NoDAPL frontlines and across social media, always accompanied by the same text. Water is life, a tribe is an island—the contexts differ, but the words express the same relationship between Indigenous people and Indigenous land, the relationship that decolonization must reclaim. By making these relationships visible, by commandeering the break between settler colonialism and Indigenous disappearance, Native people anticipate the reality of a decolonial community to come.

CONCLUSION

Thinkers like Rancière, Debord, and Derrida sought to break down art’s complicity with oppressive institutions, to suggest visual and poetic means of moving toward justice.\textsuperscript{101} Excepting Debord’s Situationist program, which played a notable role in Paris’s 1968 student uprisings, their theories focus more on the artistic and academic spheres, and less on large-scale social movements. My attempt to understand the Alcatraz occupation through these theories is more than an intellectual exercise, it seeks concrete possibilities for resistance at the intersection of artmaking and protest led by marginalized groups. As Rancière shows in The Emancipated Spectator, the visible and the political are inextricably linked. Understanding their entanglement—and the ways in which social movements engage with this entanglement—can help us to both make sense of this world and, like IAT, envision a more just one.

In late 2012, the National Parks Service (NPS) oversaw a partial restoration of IAT graffiti, citing the occupation’s importance to the history of Alcatraz.\textsuperscript{102} NPS employees partnered with Native communities to replicate, trace out and paint the words “Peace and Freedom. Welcome. Home of the Free Indian Land” on the island’s restored water tower.\textsuperscript{103} The New York Times framed their coverage of the event with a pithy headline, “Antigovernment Graffiti Restored, Courtesy of Government,” that underscores its vexing politics. It is a radical act for an Indigenous occupier to write “Indian Land” on government property, an act that, in creating a break between settler colonialism and Indigenous presence, affirms the artist’s connection to the land and her intention to reclaim it. The U.S. government’s choice to re-write her words decades later, however, is a more ambiguous act that demonstrates the aesthetic break’s incalculable nature. It marks an affective response to IAT’s visual strategies, but not the change in behavior or shift in decolonial policy that occupiers sought. It’s debatable whether the restoration served to re-make place or to appropriate the narrative of the occupation. However, government-led projects are not the only markers of Indigenous presence on Alcatraz today, and the radical possibilities opened by IAT’s acts of placemaking remain open. Echoes of the occupation’s dissensual, sovereign community are discernible every November, when thousands of Native people and allies gather on the island for a sunrise ceremony. Their “Unthanksgiving” celebration commemorates the occupation, links it to contemporary political struggles, and, if only for a morning, re-marks Indigenous presence on the land.\textsuperscript{104} Next year’s Unthanksgiving gathering will mark 50 years since IAT landed on Alcatraz. In the meantime, as the #NoDAPL protests show, Indigenous people will continue to locate possibilities in the break between settler colonialism and Indigenous disappearance, to build visible communities rooted in place, and, above all, to envision a decolonized world.

One photo of the 2018 sunrise ceremony, taken from above and published in The Guardian, shows crowds of attendees gathered around a bonfire.\textsuperscript{105} Several carry tribal flags, several stare out over the harbor, all prepare for a day of dancing, singing, speaking and remembering. The San Francisco skyline is visible in the background, as is the silhouette of a bridge linking Oakland with the city’s Financial District—land connected, as Peter Blue Cloud wrote in “Alcatraz Visions,” in bumper-to-bumper pain. But in the foreground of it all stands a community, visible against all odds in the early morning light, reconstructing a bridge built by Indians of All Tribes forty-nine years earlier. Sunlight and soft voices, growing louder.

Endnotes

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Bibliography


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Emigration is a nuanced and underexplored subfield of migration. This dissertation aims to showcase that current migration theories on micro, meso, and macro levels of emigration do not encompass a significant dimension: culture. Therefore, they lack explanatory capacity, especially in outlier cases. This dissertation develops the cultural perpetuation framework by exploring the empirical cultural dimensions on a global, European, and national level in Lithuania, which has the most significant case of emigration in the developed world. The outlier case of Lithuania reaffirms the empirical and theoretical findings, as its exceptionally high survival values, low masculinity, and low indulgence result in more emigration since these values over-signify the perceived effect of economic, physical, welfare security, and restrained societal norms. In addition, a participant observation shows that these Lithuanian cultural values are relatively prevalent in the public sector; such identified cultural discrepancies between policymakers and the general population may be the cause of the ineffectiveness of the Lithuanian government’s policy for the emigration crisis.
effects determined in the regression analyses. This will address the primary research question and determine whether cultural values have a statistically significant effect on migration. The qualitative analysis of participant observation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania will be utilized to determine the dominant cultural values within the policymaking environment in contrast to the Lithuanian public. This will address the secondary research question and determine the potential effect that cultural values have within the public sector. In Section 5, the combination of the quantitative and qualitative results will be examined in combination with current micro, meso, and macro level migration theories to establish the cultural perpetuation framework and showcase the improved explanatory value in global and outlier cases.

The overall analytical aim is to determine specific cultural values that may perpetuate emigration via inducing or increasing migration-related preferences within the population or by affecting the policy-making environment. This would allow migration theories to utilize the cultural perpetuation framework and increase their explanatory capabilities. The findings confirm the analytical aims, revealing a statistically significant relationship between changes in emigration and migration levels and the cultural values of survival, masculinity, and indulgence. The participant observation indicates divergence between cultural values prevalent in the public sector and the Lithuanian population, partially explaining the ineffective emigration policy approach of the Lithuanian government. The dissertation concludes that cultural values do have a statistically significant effect on migration levels and can be used as an explanatory tool in migration.

LITERATURE REVIEW: LITHUANIA, EMIGRATION, AND CULTURE
The current level of knowledge regarding emigration and Lithuania is substantial. It encompasses theoretical economic, social, and psychological approaches. However, only interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks can unravel the complex processes of migration. The literature review will first evaluate the theoretical approaches to Lithuanian emigration on micro, meso, and macro levels, focusing on behavioural migration models, migrant networks theory, and neo-classical migration theory. At the same time, it will highlight the relevant limiting factors of the theoretical approaches. This will demonstrate that while migration theories provide significant explanatory capabilities, the neglect of cultural influences limits their theoretical scope, especially in outlier cases such as Lithuania. The empirical data collection advancements in cultural studies have provided many statistical insights that can now be utilized in cross-cultural and case study approaches. Moreover, culture has become academically linked with economics and politics. While emigration is an economic decision, however, research has often neglected the emerging effects of culture on migration. The second focus of the review will therefore be to evaluate the theories of national cultural values, their validity, causal potential, and applicability in relation to migration. This section of the literature review will argue that culture has a potential causal and amplifying effect on migration.

OVERVIEW OF LITHUANIAN EMIGRATION
Studies of global migration emphasize that the Lithuanian emigration crisis poses the largest non-military threat to the welfare of the state, due to the small population size of Lithuania. Lithuania has a high standard for maintaining population statistics. Thus, academic analyses have highlighted several contributing political factors, such as corruption, taxation, the Baltic austerity model, as well as individual level characteristics. Political scientists use migration theories on many levels focusing on behavioral characteristics, migrant networks, and economic structural factors to explain the causation of emigration. The dominant notion is that supply and demand drive emigration: low wages, high unemployment, and educational attainment are the primary supply factors, while a lack of labor supply and increasing socio-economic inequality in western Europe are the demand factors.

MICRO-LEVEL MIGRATION
On a micro level, the literature focuses on behavioral migration models and psychosocial analysis. These are based on the five big personality traits – those of extraversion, openness, neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness – and HEXACO personality inventory surveys to compare Lithuanian non-migrants, intending-migrants, and emigrants. Emigrants tend to be more extroverted, more open to new experiences, less agreeable, and more emotionally stable, while those considering emigrating have more risk tolerance. On the other hand, high conscientiousness results in decreased chances of emigration due to the tendency to conform and feelings of responsibility towards one’s country. Such study of personality traits
is different from cultural values, however, because it focuses on the tendency of certain personalities to emigrate. This also makes it hard to determine causality as emigrants may have adjusted their personalities due to other factors influencing the decision to emigrate, such as cultural values or wage levels.\textsuperscript{9}

**MESO-LEVEL MIGRATION**

On the meso-level, the theory of social and migrant networks as a factor perpetuating emigration is of principal focus.\textsuperscript{10} Emigrant populations abroad create migrant networks that encourage non-emigrants to emigrate and provide aid in finding jobs and buying homes. These networks therefore decrease the overall risk of emigration.\textsuperscript{11} Surveys showcase that 80 percent of emigrants found their jobs via migrant networks. Overall, 80 percent of emigrants have emigrants within their close social circle.\textsuperscript{12} Such networks, therefore help maintain cultural ties with the country of origin by forming communities based on collective identity that new emigrants can integrate into, mitigating cultural shocks, and thus reducing the uncertainties of emigrating. This is evident as out of the large number of Lithuanians planning to emigrate, only a small percentage consider the presence of a large Lithuanian population in the host country as an important factor.\textsuperscript{13} However, the migrant network theory has limited explanatory value in regard to causality; it attempts to explain the sustainability of migration without considering individual preferences and perceptions that are influenced by cultural values.\textsuperscript{14}

**MACRO-LEVEL MIGRATION**

On a larger scale, political scientists utilize the neo-classical migration theory of supply and demand, based upon the theories of wages, labor supply, and unemployment factors.\textsuperscript{15} Low wages were cited by emigrants as the most significant supply factor in 2005, since Lithuania’s income per capita was one-third of the EU average when it first joined the EU.\textsuperscript{16} Unemployment has been cited as the second most significant factor, and regression analysis indicates that there is a correlation between annual emigration levels and the unemployment rate.\textsuperscript{17} Analysis of the unemployment rate, the Gini coefficient, and the Tax Freedom Day index indicates that these supply factors explain up to 70 percent of the variation in emigration rates.\textsuperscript{18} The demand factors are also significant as the past decades marked labor shortages in western Europe. Survey data confirms the importance of some of these demand factors, as 52.9 percent of emigrants cite higher income abroad and 36.2 percent cite the possibility of self-development as significant factors influencing the decision to emigrate.\textsuperscript{19} However, macro theories cannot explain why wages are so important to Lithuanians, nor can they explain cultural motivations in emigration, such as self-development.

**CULTURE AND MIGRATION**

While the migration theories based on networks and supply-demand are significant in showcasing the economic factors in emigration, they lack explanatory certainty when considering the broader distinctions of Lithuania’s cultural nuances.\textsuperscript{20} Political scientists have critiqued migration theories by asserting that there are cases with distinct supply-demand factors, but no emigration occurring.\textsuperscript{21} This is evident considering the economic differences between the OECD nations or labor market differences within the EU, to which the migratory response has been relatively low over time.\textsuperscript{22} While it is certain that poorer economic conditions in Lithuania drive emigration, such an explanation by itself does not stand up to universal application. Other European countries that have lower wages, higher unemployment rates, and more uncertain political environments than Lithuania do not experience such high emigration. Namely, countries such as Bulgaria and Romania in many aspects are worse off than Lithuania along these dimensions, yet Lithuania experiences ten times higher emigration as a percentage of total population than the aforementioned countries.\textsuperscript{23} It is evident that neo-classical supply-demand and emigrant networks play a role in emigration, but so must culture.\textsuperscript{24} For example, cultural nuances are apparent when comparing Lithuanians with the large Polish minority in Lithuania; Polish minorities are less likely to emigrate despite facing the same socio-economic issues as the rest of the Lithuanian population.\textsuperscript{25} Migrant networks may promote emigration as a perceived solution to issues citizens may face in Lithuania. Networks may internalize and engrave emigration as a response to cultural perceptions of Lithuanians.

Political scientists like Radavičius highlight that culture, in combination with political economics, needs to be explored further in order to understand the unique phenomenon that is taking place in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{26} Cultural values and cultural economics are a recently developed theoretical perspective exploring the effects of culture on economic decisions and institutions.\textsuperscript{27} Scholars of cultural economics highlight the impor-
tance of cultural trust, religious values, education, and economic preferences in the economic growth of the state. These, in combination with the cultural values and national preferences, should provide a critical insight into the recent migratory behavior of Lithuanians.29

OVERVIEW OF EMPirical CULTURE
The scope and qualities of culture have been contested throughout history.30 Some cultural aspects independently shape the economic environment and are therefore a causal variable, while others are themselves the effect of economic and social conditions instead.31 The empirical advances of Hofstede, Inglehart, and Schwartz in cultural research have provided statistically measurable differences of national cultures. Culture is collective, learned through the social environment of a society, and constitutes particular behavior influences. Culture shapes the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the members of a society, which not only has an effect on their decision-making but also on the institutions within the state.32

CULTURAL EFFECT ON MIGRATION
Empirical cultural values have become the central variable in determining cultural differences via mass-opinion social surveys.33 Geert Hofstede quantified cultural values by utilizing one of the largest surveys in history, the IBM Survey. The survey evaluated the prevalence of certain values, such as power-distance, a preference for hierarchical inequality,34 and masculinity-femininity, measuring the convergence of male and female value preferences towards ego or social goals in society.35 These values represent national cultures because Hofstede’s data showed distinct, unique value combinations clustered within national borders. Therefore, the prevalence of particular cultural values may permeate political institutions and affect policy-making.

Hofstede’s cultural values can be linked to migration. With micro-level personality theories, some studies show that Hofstede’s cultural values influence the personality traits that differ amongst emigrants and non-emigrants.36 Migrant networks theory is interconnected with the cultural values of uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. Since migration research indicates that migrant networks collectivist nature reduces economic risk in the destination country via risk-pooling, they encourage more risk-averse individuals to emigrate.37 Unemployment welfare in the destination country decreases risk, providing an opportunity for more individuals from a culture with high uncertainty avoidance.38 These connections make it possible to envision a link between cultural values and migration.

The prevalence of some of Schwarz’s empirical cultural values has been demonstrated to predict the pattern of left-wing vs right-wing voting behavior and ideological self-identification in cross-cultural studies.39 Culture can influence voting and ideology, which provides further optimism that it may also influence migration. Hofstede and Schwartz’s cultural values are partially encompassed in Inglehart’s cultural dimensions of survival and self-expression. Inglehart’s dimensions concentrate on the importance of economic and physical security as well as the traditionalism-secularism dimension that represents the ongoing shift from religious to secular values.40 They are essential as the prevalence of survival values may contribute as an enhancer of supply-demand factors as observed in neo-classical migration theory.

CULTURAL VALUES AND CULTURAL ECONOMICS
Cultural economics have shown that cultural values affect preferences, thereby influencing economic outcomes. For example, societies where individuals believe poverty is caused due to unfortunate events have higher social spending. This is based on cultural values related to the perception of risk, autonomy, and egalitarianism, which are all encompassed in Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s indices.41 Cultural economics also show that institutions are permeated by culture, be it altruistic cultural tendencies that promote more altruistic behavior or individualist and egalitarian tendencies that promote less corruption, more innovation, and democratic accountability.42 Therefore, culture affects institutions and may influence policy proposals surrounding emigration. In some cases, however, cultural effects on institutions can be less prominent as seen in the case of Mexican culture, even though emigration in Mexico remains high.43 Therefore, it is essential to analyze the relationship of culture, institutions, and migration on a case by case basis.44

THE VALIDITY OF CULTURAL METHODS
Political scientists have criticized the universality, coherence, and causality of cultural dimensions.45 First, the universality and coherence criticism that claims cultural values are not universal, or cannot be assigned to nations, can be addressed via empirical studies on
cultural values and national cultures. These studies address the effect of ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, and spill-over effects within national borders by plotting data of individual value scores by region, rather than ethnicity or nationality. The results revealed that individuals still cluster within national lines due to their shared cultural values. Moreover, multiple subsequent studies conducted by political scientists have not only reaffirmed or extended the scores achieved by Hofstede, but have also discovered intricate relationships between cultural values and national phenomena.

Culture also has the capacity to be causal, as specific cultural aspects such as self-expression levels can influence the extent of democratization when controlled for prior historical effects. Democracy does not simply emerge when a country reaches a certain level of GDP. It rather depends on whether changing wealth affects the country’s cultural values. This causal effect is also statistically significant, as the long-term stability of Inglehart’s cultural value variance is comparable to the variance of GDP per capita.

However, the empirical approach is limited, as some aspects of culture cannot be recorded quantitatively. Cultural indices are prone to effects from non-cultural or sub-cultural factors, such as education. It is arguably impossible to determine the ‘correct’ definitions of cultural dimensions via consensus. Hofstede’s indices have been critiqued for simply being averages that can hardly account for individuals on the margins of proposed cultural groups. Generalization via cultural indices should be perceived as a mere statement of a state’s central tendency within the narrow scope of said indices, rather than as a complete representation of all citizens. A significant uncertainty revolves around the fact that certain cultural values have been determined to be static or dynamic. Hofstede’s index scores have been changing over generations, but the order and distance between the national culture scores have not changed primarily because parents tend to pass down their cultural values. Therefore, it is essential to consider multiple statistically significant indices. Hofstede’s cultural value indices will be considered as they are static and better describe the individual level, while Inglehart’s cultural dimensions will also be used to account for more dynamic cultural values on a national and institutional level.

The recent development of cultural studies has led to global empirical indices that categorize cultural values. It is evident that Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s cultural indices provide increased explanatory value if combined with the available migration theories. As the phenomenon of cultural economics indicates the effect of cultural values on people and institutions, it prompts the investigation into whether emigration may be a culturally affected outcome. The validity of empirical culture has been reaffirmed revealing continuous clustering within national lines and causational effects.

METHODOLOGY
This section will serve to highlight the methodological approach in exploring the impact of cultural values on emigration, the data available for analysis, and its limitations. The methodology will utilize the data from Hofstede’s cultural indices surveys available online, in addition to the World Value Survey data (WVS) provided by Ronald Inglehart. Hofstede’s surveys were performed on an organizational level via IBM employees in fifty different countries, with a sample size of 117,000. The validity of the survey results that formed the cultural indices has been reaffirmed in subsequent studies in a total of seventy-six countries. The mean net migration value of emigrants and immigrants per thousand people, over a five-year period from 2007 to 2012, was obtained online from the World Bank. Net migration is measured by calculating the annual number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants in the country per 1,000 population. The participant observation (PO) was carried out over a period of two months at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania. The active participation was specifically within the Department of Economic Relations, but the nature of the Ministry’s environment and the wide array of events in the Ministry ensured adequate interaction with other departments as well. The government officials were the subjects and their communications and conversations regarding politics, economics, and culture were observed in their working environment.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question this paper aims to answer is whether cultural values can perpetuate migration. Moreover, if they can, which specific values are the driving forces behind emigration in Lithuania? Furthermore, what effects may cultural values have on the Lithuanian public institutions and their policy approaches to emigration? Bivariate and multivariate regression analysis will address the main research question by establishing the statistical significance of
cultural values as causal factors in emigration. Multivariate regression analysis attempts to measure the effect of several independent variables on a dependent variable. The secondary question will be addressed via qualitative participant observation to establish the prevalence of specific cultural values within the public sector and their potential effects on policy.

**HOFSTEDE’S CULTURAL VALUE INDICES**

The analysis will involve the following cultural values, derived from Hofstede’s research:

- **Power-Distance (PDI)** is based on the society’s preference for human inequality in terms of prestige and wealth, indicating the prevalence of hierarchies in a given culture.
- **Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)** measures the cultural attitude towards the fear of the future, such as employability stability.
- **Individualism-Collectivism (IDV)** is based on in-group preferences, familial, and societal ties.
- **Long-Term Orientation (LTO)** measures the preference for pragmatic approaches based on truth over virtue-based traditional approaches.
- **The Indulgence value (IND)** is derived from the perceived source of life satisfaction as either individualistic or societal, as well as the associated necessity of regulating social norms.
- **Masculinity-Femininity (MAS)** is based on the preferences for ego goals, assertiveness, social goals, and cooperation, which measures the overall extent to which the values of men and women converge in society.

These cultural values manifest in certain perceptions and behaviors in a culture. Power-distance manifests in the acceptance of hierarchies, or lack thereof, in public and private organizations and even family. PDI can have profound effects of the perception of prestige, authority, and has been seen to propagate revolutionary movements in states. UAI is based on perceived necessity of rules, employment stability, and stress. However, uncertainty avoidance is not risk avoidance; UAI is the fear of the unknown future. Societies adapt to uncertainty differently depending on historical and social context. Differing levels of UAI can affect policy and perception of the political process, as high UAI often correlates with slow decision-making progress and alienation of the citizenry.

IDV describes peoples’ lives in a community, where more collectivist communities have many shared values, and the more individualistic communities do not. Individualist communities’ values particularly differ on moral subjects.

LTO showcases the relationship between the short-term reliance on tradition, virtue of the society (low LTO) or pragmatic, adaptive long-term view of society’s future (high LTO). High LTO stresses delayed gratification, family, heritage, and productivity at work. High LTO has often been shown to be a benefit for a country, especially in economic terms.

IND measures a society’s perception that the free gratification of basic human needs is essential for enjoying life. Low Indulgence societies are dominated by restraint i.e. strict social norms that limit certain behaviors within society, such as leisure, sexual endeavors, dietary choices, and freedom of speech. Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and some Asian nations are some remaining cultures with low Indulgence.

Studies of Hong Kong, the United States, and the Netherlands have revealed that high MAS countries distribute wealth in accordance with performance rather than with egalitarian measures. As Tang and Koveos have shown, MAS is affected the least by changes in economic conditions, suggesting that such a cultural trait is based on institutionalized traditions and is thus of a more static nature. Therefore, the implications of MAS in terms of political priorities are the extent to which solidarity with the weak is favored over rewarding the strong. This often results in a correlation between the MAS index and unemployment, as well as wealth inequality.

MAS levels may have an effect on emigration levels due to several factors. The lack of solidarity and support for the poor in high Masculinity countries may break citizens’ bonds with society, as a high Masculinity score has been shown to be correlated with more internal armed conflict. The lack of welfare may turn away those in need, motivating them to look for external options such as emigration. However, countries with low Masculinity may participate in the active limitation of gratification for high performing individuals in the job market via taxation and wage regulations, leaving those with high skills, work capacities, or high MAS preferences feeling less fulfilled. Overall, low MAS cultures are also more tolerant and forgiving, being more accepting of soft drugs, divorce, and bribery. Therefore, these societies also tend to be more accepting of emigration, whereas
high MAS societies tend to be more skeptical and may criticize those leaving their home behind.\textsuperscript{67} The results of the analysis will reveal whether low or high levels of MAS have a more significant effect on emigration levels.

**WORLD VALUES SURVEY (WVS) CULTURAL DIMENSIONS**
Inglehart’s WVS values are Survival and Self-Expression. They are concentrated on the importance of economic and physical security in addition to a Traditionalism-Secularism dimension that represents an ongoing shift from religion to secular values and the process of bureaucratization.\textsuperscript{68} Citizens that are driven via intrinsic motivations tend to be happier rather than those pressured by extrinsic factors. WVS indicate that people have an innate need for self-expression. The suppression of this need by either economic, existential constraints, or societal norms will result in lower fulfillment and life satisfaction and may thus perpetuate emigration.\textsuperscript{69}

**PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION**
The participant observation was based on active participation, where the researcher took on an official, intern position in the environment. As an intern, the researcher was assigned responsibilities in relation to day-to-day activities such as statistical analysis and communication. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was chosen partly due to accessibility, as it is open to providing student interns with experience in the public sector. Moreover, foreign affairs have an underlying link with the migration of people, and the Ministry has a dedicated department for emigration policy. The observed department of External Economic Relations is a driver of economic development in Lithuania, which has become apparent as a culturally significant factor for Lithuanians. Observations were recorded in field notes, where the observation and its location were noted as quickly as was feasible. In order to avoid bias, the participant observation was carried out before doing an in-depth review of the intricacies of the cultural dimensions. Otherwise, the researcher may have unconsciously recorded more details relating to the cultural values he anticipated to be significant, resulting in confirmation bias.\textsuperscript{70} Therefore, all observations that appeared to be relevant to migration or its economic, cultural or social counterparts were recorded. Upon review, irrelevant statements in regard to niche economic or political areas which could not be related to the cultural definitions were subsequently omitted.

The data was then coded and categorized according to different cultural values in accordance with the definitions and the categorization of the authors of the indices used in the analysis. For example, statements made concerning worries about the stability of the Lithuanian economy were categorized as pertaining to Inglehart’s Survival cultural values. The coding was reviewed by other individuals, both experienced and unexperienced with political research, after a briefing on cultural values and the aforementioned categorization templates.\textsuperscript{71} This allowed for a more scrupulous coding procedure that would provide more reliable findings.\textsuperscript{72}

The participant observation method was chosen because little academic inquiry has been aimed at cultural nuances within the public sector. It serves as a qualitative insight into the cultural values in an institution, which could complement empirical analyses by showcasing how cultural values manifest in institutions of influence.\textsuperscript{73} Therefore, participant observation allows direct study of the institutions involved in political decisions that address issues that are culturally relevant to Lithuanians.\textsuperscript{74} The participant observation was partially covert, as not all individuals were aware that the information would be recorded. However, this should not raise ethical concerns because the research was aimed at cultural values which is not a very controversial area in Lithuania. No sensitive, unethical, or controversial observation was encountered during the research at the Ministry.

**HOFSTEDÉS CULTURAL VALUE INDICES & WORLD VALUES SURVEY DATA PROCESSING**
Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s empirical categorizations of culture are currently the most advanced and statistically reliable data available. Producing new surveys or conducting interviews for the sake of this paper would not have been as effective. This is simply because Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s original empirical data had been gathered from very large samples of surveys and interviews already. The empirical approach via bivariate and multivariate regression analysis was chosen because culture is a broad concept and a complex phenomenon to represent in a cross-nationally comparable manner. This empirical approach allows replication since most data is publicly available, and it also is generalizable, due to the large number of cases. The multivariate analysis may demonstrate relative causality by showcasing the significance of specific cultural
values over other factors often regarded as drivers of emigration, such as wage levels. Utilizing additional indices apart from Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s to reaffirm the importance of the cultural dimension and perceptions in Lithuania was preferable. The index data on Lithuania was formed via in-depth indicator analysis providing insightful information about Lithuania, and primary research in this area would have required significant resources.

CULTURAL VALUE INDICES PROCESSING ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Hofstede’s cultural indices and Inglehart’s WWS dimensions will initially be applied on a global scale to specifically identify the presence of a relationship between all available cultural values of countries and migration. The global sample analysis will then omit countries with intense government failure or repression to ensure those are not significant factors influencing migration levels, because culture is theorized to become increasingly less relevant in the presence of significant coercive threats. To deduce such government failure in states, the Fragile State Index (FSI) will be used because it provides data for the majority of the world and relies on extensive indicators related to violence and oppression. Therefore, only countries that have a median (60 out 120) fragile state score or lower will be included in the controlled sample. The global sample will omit states that are highly involved in intra-state and interstate war as such factors would also pose additional significant motivations for migration in certain countries, irrespective of culture. This method of control will rely on the Global Peace Index (GPI) as it measures internal state violence and international conflict and militarization, factors that decrease the influence of cultural values. Only states with a very high or high peace score according to the GPI will be included in the sample.

CULTURAL VALUE INDICES PROCESSING ON EASTERN EUROPEAN SCALE

After the results of the bivariate analysis on a global scale are presented, the analysis will then focus on Eastern Europe in order to showcase the relationship between migration and culture in the specific context of post-Soviet Eastern Europe. The Eastern European sample will rely on the same categorization as used by the United Nations Statistics Division. However, it will also include the Baltic states due to the aforementioned historical connection. Moreover, only countries that are part of the European Union will be included in the sample in order to limit the influence of borders that limit freedom of movement, and because the EU member states are also the most common destinations of Lithuanian emigrants. More specifically, Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s cultural indices of the sample countries will be processed via bivariate regression analysis in order to identify the relationship of these cultural values on emigration. This will allow us to determine the key indices which correlate with emigration in Eastern European countries. The identification of these key indices will highlight the main indicators to be focused upon when analyzing the intricacies of the Lithuanian case.

CULTURAL VALUE INDICES MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS ON EASTERN EUROPEAN SCALE

The multivariate analysis will attempt to test the significance of cultural value dimensions in Eastern Europe when controlling for impactful socio-economic variables. However, due to the small sample size, the results should be viewed critically. The multivariate regression formulas are as follows:

Model 1

\[ Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + \varepsilon \]

Model 2

\[ Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + \varepsilon \]

CULTURAL VALUE INDICES ANALYSIS IN LITHUANIA

The analysis of Eastern European EU countries will reveal any statistically significant specific cultural val-
ues and dimensions that need to be considered further. Those cultural values will then be analyzed in Lithuania. Specific Lithuanian political, social, and economic indices that correspond to the nature of the significant cultural dimensions found in the regression analyses will be selected.

The Economic Wellbeing Index, Economic Freedom Index, Safety and Crime Index, Homicide Index, Global Peace Index, and the Democracy Index have all been selected to explore the relationship of survival-self-expression dimension in Lithuania. The index datasets are collected annually, and the publication periods range from 6 to 20 years. The Masculinity index focuses on solidarity with the weak and the perceived necessity for competition. In order to investigate Masculinity, the Gini Coefficient, the Climate Change Performance Index, the Global Competitiveness Index, unemployment, social benefits, and social transfers in kind will be utilized.

In order to explore the Indulgence Index, which focuses on life satisfaction and restraining societal norms, the World Happiness, Human Wellbeing, Environmental Wellbeing, Social Progress, Legatum Prosperity, Human Development, and Quality of Life indices were selected. Regression analysis of the indices and emigration serves to indirectly reaffirm and explore the importance of the cultural dimensions by demonstrating a connection between emigration and certain political or economic aspects of Lithuania that have been predicted to be significant by cultural dimensions.

LIMITATIONS
The normal limitations associated with empirical cultural data collection and analysis apply. Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s data are updated infrequently, which makes it hard to compare cultural value scores with annual migration data. To this end, cumulative four-year periods of migration had to be used. This may make the relationship between cultural values and migration less explicit. Hofstede’s samples have been critiqued for being predominantly collected at organizational level; however, this arguably ensures a more controlled environment of the subjects across nations, making cultural differences clearer. The cultural differences would be clearer because the subjects were from comparatively similar environments and educational backgrounds. The participant observation could have been limited by the researcher’s age and occupation which would discourage the representatives to discuss their true perceptions of cultural, economic, or social issues and solutions in Lithuania. The complexity of the coding procedure may have distorting effects due to error or cultural misconceptions, while the economic nature of the participant’s department may affect the data. While these limitations are important, the data remain the most extensive cultural data available which will provide the best available insight.

FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survival-Self Expression</th>
<th>Traditional-secular</th>
<th>T-S Controlled for Fragile State Index</th>
<th>T-S Controlled for Peace Index</th>
<th>T-S Controlled for Peace Index</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Migration</td>
<td>0.50***</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table 1: All Available countries – WVS Dimensions associating with Net Migration, bivariate correlation, Pearson’s r (N = 80)

Table 1 shows the bivariate correlations of the available global sample of countries’ (80) net migration and Inglehart’s Survival-Self-Expression (S-SE) and Traditional-secular (T-S) dimensions. Furthermore, it showcases how the relationship changes when states that are fragile and war-ridden are excluded. Overall, it shows a statistically significant positive correlation between the Survival-Self Expression dimension and the country sample, even when considering state fragility and armed conflict. This indicates that as survival values increase so does emigration.
Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations of the sample of countries net migration (37), excluding states with significant state fragility and armed conflicts, with Hofstede’s cultural value indices and Inglehart’s dimensions. The findings indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between net migration, the Survival-Self-expression dimension, and Indulgence. Furthermore, the table shows the significance of the relationship between other cultural indices within the specific sample. This indicates that as survival values increase so does emigration, and as indulgence values decrease emigration tends to increase as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Distance</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Masculinity</th>
<th>Uncertainty Avoidance</th>
<th>Long-term Orientation</th>
<th>Indulgence</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
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</thead>
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<td>.07</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.83**</td>
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<td>Traditional values</td>
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<td>.75**</td>
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<td>.27</td>
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<td>-.09</td>
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<td>Indulgence</td>
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<td>.40</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>-.71**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 3: Eastern European (EU) States – Cultural Value Indices associating with Net Migration, bivariate correlation, Pearson’s r (N = 12)

Table 3 shows the bivariate correlation of only Eastern European states within the EU net migration levels, with Hofstede’s cultural value indices and Inglehart’s dimensions. The findings reaffirm previous findings and showcase a stronger statistically significant correlation between net migration, the Survival-Self-expression dimension, and Indulgence. The findings also indicate an additional statistically significant cultural dimension correlating with Net migration in eastern EU: Masculinity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-38.076</td>
<td>16.865</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival Values</td>
<td>4.139</td>
<td>8.869</td>
<td>0.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculinity Index</td>
<td>0.268*</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indulgence Index</td>
<td>-0.607</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.0734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly wage</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-1.393</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>-0.0001**</td>
<td>0.000002</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>-6.7**</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² = .97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R² = .94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 4 shows a model that determines the multivariate effect of cultural values and relevant economic, social factors on net migration in eastern EU countries. The findings indicate that only Masculinity, Monthly wage, GDP, and Homicide have a statistically significant effect on net migration in a multivariate analysis. The results should be viewed with caution due to an unexpectedly high R2 value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculinity Index</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>Unemployment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly Wage</td>
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<td>39**</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 5: Hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models Estimating Effects of Masculinity and Economic, Social Factors on Net Migration (n = 12)
Table 5 shows a model that determines the multivariate effect the previously established statistically significant indices of masculinity and relevant economic, social factors on net migration in eastern EU countries. The findings indicate that cultural value of masculinity remains the only value that has a statistically significant relationship with net migration in a multivariate analysis.

Table 6 shows the relationship of indices in Lithuania that are relevant to the Survival and Self-expression values, with the net migration of Lithuania and number of annual emigrants from Lithuania. The findings indicate that safety, crime, economic freedom, and democracy indices have a statistically significant relationship with either net migration or number of annual emigrants from Lithuania.

Table 7 shows the relationship of indices in Lithuania that are relevant to the Masculinity values, with the net migration of Lithuania and number of annual emigrants from Lithuania. The findings indicate that social benefits and social transfers in kind have a statistically significant relationship with the number of annual emigrants from Lithuania.

Table 8 shows the relationship of indices in Lithuania that are relevant to the Indulgence values, with the net migration of Lithuania and number of annual emigrants from Lithuania. The findings indicate that happiness and human development have a statistically significant relationship with the number of annual emigrants from Lithuania.

Chart 1 shows the approximate prevalence of Hofstede’s and Inglehart’s cultural values in the public sector. The particular findings indicate that Long-Term Orientation, Survival, and Secular values are the most prominent.
**DISCUSSION**

Tables 2 and 3 showcase the multiple statistically significant correlations between indices and net migration. They highlight three indices that significantly correlate with net migration. The Survival-Self-Expression dimension significantly correlates with net migration globally (0.68***), where state scores leaning towards the survival axis correlate with negative net migration (emigration), while scores leaning towards self-expression correlate with positive net migration. The Masculinity index correlates with net migration in Europe (0.65*), indicating that states with high MAS scores tend to have positive net migration, while states with low MAS scores tend to have negative net migration. States with low Indulgence (0.71*) tend to have negative net migration, while the opposite is true for states with high Indulgence culture. In Table 4, a multivariate analysis which aims to analyze the effect of multiple independent indices on net migration has identified that Masculinity was the only cultural value that remained significant when socio-economic factors were controlled for. Table 5 isolates MAS, reaffirming its significance. However, this does not mean that the analysis should solely be restricted to MAS. Survival and Indulgence, while not strictly causal, can still have a perpetuating effect on migration by increasing the likelihood of emigration due to the nature of these cultural values.

**SURVIVAL AND SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES’ EFFECT ON MIGRATION**

The Survival and Self-Expression dimensions tend to oppose each other, as Survival values signify economic and physical security and economic order, while Self-Expression values emphasize participation, subjective well-being, trust, and tolerance. This is because cultures that focus on achieving economic survival tend to regard self-expression as a secondary objective, and vice-versa. Societies with cultures that have very Survivalist values emphasize economic performance, while high Self-Expression states value individual autonomy and quality of life. Emigration, due to perceived economic benefits and liberation from restrictive social norms, is attractive to survival values. Self-Expression values strongly correlate (0.90) with democratization and economic development. They may also engender democratization and development since democratic development is the most rapid in countries that had the highest self-expression values prior to democratization.
Analyzing trends that appeal to highly Survivalist Lithuanian values can shed light on the impact of survival values on emigration. Lithuania’s Survival value score is one of the highest in Europe, as seen in Figure 4. Table 6 showcases the relationship between indices corresponding to Survival and Self-Expression values. Homicide index has a moderately negative relationship with net migration (-.56), suggesting that more people emigrate from Lithuania as the homicide rate increases. The strong positive relationship between the crime index and the number of annual emigrants (.75) means that as crime increases, so does emigration. The economic security aspect has not been entirely distinguished, as a moderate relationship between the annual number of emigrants and economic freedom index (.52) has been identified. It indicates that as economic freedom increases, so does emigration. This, however, may only apply until a certain level of economic freedom has been reached, at which point remaining in Lithuania may be more appealing. A similar relationship is apparent between the democracy index, which encompasses the Self-Expression paradigm, and the annual number of emigrants (.59). The above data suggests that as Lithuania’s democracy level increases, so does emigration. This could stem either from the perceived irrelevance of democratic advancement in low Self-Expression value society, or the additional freedom granted via democratization that allows for the implementation of emigration-friendly policies. For example, democratization allowed Lithuania to join the European Union, reducing barriers to emigration, while currently, Lithuanians are exerting pressure on the government to introduce dual citizenship to reduce difficulties for the emigrants.

Survivalist values also appear to perpetuate emigration in both the theoretical supply and demand and the migrant networks perspective. According to the meso-level migration theory, migration tends to occur within familial or societal networks, because this is more secure. Such emigration channels are even more perpetuated by Survival cultural values, because Lithuanians regard economic security as most important. Migrant networks minimize the financial risks of emigrating, and the Survival values push the majority of Lithuanians to acquire employment through networks. This also suggests that the expansion of these networks, and therefore a further reduction in financial risk, will become increasingly more appealing to Lithuanians. In relation to macro-level Neo-Classical migration theory, prevalent Survivalist cultural values emphasize the push factors for Lithuanian emigration. The Survivalist culture of Lithuania influences, among other things, crime, wage levels, and financial stability being seen as more significant than another culture might. As showcased by a 2016 survey, 52.9 percent of Lithuanian emigrants regard higher income as the most significant factor while considering emigrating, indicating further that economic security is a crucial factor.

Historically, as physical constraints on human choice decrease, the desire for Self-Expression takes higher priority in a society. This is particularly evident when tracking the cultural changes across the Survival-Self-Expression dimension. During the USSR occupation, Eastern European states moved towards Survivalist polarity. After the USSR collapsed, most moved further towards Self-Expression, apart from Lithuania, which remained relatively constant. This may be because the social and moral norms of the tsarist, and then communist, Russian occupation remain prevalent. The post-USSR adjustment of Survivalist values in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia directly corresponds to the differences in emigration rates. The Survivalist values perpetuating economic migration also cross into social migration which has been exemplified among the Lithuanian youth. According to the recent surveys, 71 percent of student emigrants claim higher education standards as significant and 85 percent claim higher quality life as significant when considering emigration.

The participant observation also established the prevalence of Survivalist values in the public
sector. Chart 2 compares the prevalence of Survivalist values proportionally to other values to showcase the differences visually. It indicates that Survival values are more prevalent in the public sector than in Lithuania overall, suggesting that the observed public sector is relatively culturally aligned with the public, and therefore is most aimed at addressing economic insecurity. This was evident in the coded data collected via PO, where reoccurring emphasis was recorded over the urgency to gain foreign direct investment and its perceived essentiality in rapidly creating jobs and economic security. Additionally, the emphasis on the concern over investment outflow from Lithuania and reducing economic security reaffirmed the dominance of Survival values.

**MASCULINITY AND LITHUANIAN EMIGRATION**

The Masculinity index refers to the values of men and women within society. High MAS scores indicate that men and women have differing values, while low MAS score indicates that values converge. However, the state of gender roles is not precisely what the MAS index indicates. It is more a gendered term describing the dominant cultural approach towards life in society, specifically the choice between ego achievement, such as having a successful career, or social and quality of life achievements. Masculinity was the chosen label because it is the only cultural dimension where men and women across nations score differently on a national level.

Table 7 showcases the relationship between indices corresponding to the MAS index. Interestingly, the Gini coefficient appears to not have a significant relationship with emigration, suggesting that wealth inequality may not be the key factor in emigration. A surprising positive correlation arises between the annual level of social benefits provided by the government and the annual number of emigrants (.57*), (.59**), suggesting that as social benefits increase, so does emigration. Social benefits are a significant part of Lithuanian politics and economy with stable on average increase in benefits. The low Masculinity culture of Lithuania results in more solidarity with the weak and increased social spending accordingly. This factor may perpetuate emigration because, as previously established, the highly Survivalist Lithuanian culture aims to achieve economic security. Social benefits certainly improve economic security. However, this is limited as the level of benefits in Lithuania is low. They therefore do not eliminate the appeal of higher economic security abroad. Speculatively, benefits may also provide funds needed for emigration, as initial costs of emigration can be high. As GDP, wages, and unemployment are highly interlinked with social benefits, this factor perhaps explains the significance of MAS alongside the aforementioned, in Table 5, model 3. There is also evidence that emigration can increase social benefit levels if there is enough foreign investment, which could partially explain this relationship too.

From micro-level migration theories of behavioral and psychosocial analysis, it is possible that the cultural value of MAS may affect personality and behavioral traits. For example, the conscientiousness trait that reduces emigration may be influenced by high MAS, as Hofstede has argued that the cultures propagate different attributes in the genders. As Lithuanian men tend to score slightly higher in conscientiousness, MAS perhaps has a relationship with male attributes in Lithuania. Lithuania’s Masculinity index score is 19 out of 100. As high conscientiousness reduces the chances of emigration, the low MAS culture in Lithuania results in fewer highly conscientious individuals and therefore, higher rates of emigration. In consideration of macro Neo-Classical migration theory, inequality, a significant theoretical and practical factor cited by Lithuanians, should be paramount in relation to low MAS index of Lithuania. However, it appears that inequality may only be significant in relation to other factors, not MAS. The minor relationships between emigration, unemployment, and competition confirm low MAS Lithuanian tendencies.

The participant observation produced significant results regarding Masculinity. Chart 1 showcases that high MAS was one of the least prevalent cultural traits in the observed public sector in relation to other traits. Chart 3 suggests that the prevalence of MAS in the public sector in comparison with the population is significantly lower. The level of MAS in the public sector has several implications in policy making, as well as the involvement of the public. Low MAS at an institutional level aims at an approach, focused on cooperation and perceived quality of processes rather than competition and assertiveness. This theoretically would allow civil servants to cooperate and propose nuanced policy, that considers policy more pragmatically, cooperatively and perhaps less ideologically. Hence, there are significant correlations between low Masculinity scores and innovation levels in recent findings. Innovative policy is a necessity in the Lithua-
nian emigration crisis and low MAS could be of aid.\textsuperscript{98}

However, the extent of such a dynamic is not entirely clear in the public sector, and it also presents drawbacks. Firstly, higher MAS value plays a role in increasing public service motivation, which may be due to the potential of competition that is available in high MAS environments. This is almost entirely not present in the Lithuanian Government as discovered during the participant observation.\textsuperscript{99} High MAS countries also ensure higher liquidity to maintain competition which financially aids business and produces relatively more economic growth. This is especially significant when considering the dominant role of Survival values in the Lithuanian culture. Evidently high MAS in combination with other cultural values in financial institutions results in more democratic litigation of economic conflicts.\textsuperscript{100} Most importantly, the difference in prevalence of MAS values within the public sector and the population can result in misalignment of policy expectations. While the difference between the public sector and the population is not very large, consensual policies may only emerge occasionally when the public demands an optimal solution, producing negative consequences in relation to trust and other cultural values.\textsuperscript{101} For example, low MAS in combination with high Survival values may pose problems due to the contradiction between the culturally perceived need for economic progress and the need for reduced competition, which results in the Baltic Austerity model.\textsuperscript{102}

**INDULGENCE AND LITHUANIAN EMISSION**

The Indulgence index involves the society’s acceptance of free gratification of basic human needs and its perceived necessity for life fulfilment. Low Indulgence societies are dominated by restraint and strict social norms that limit certain behaviors within society, such as leisure, sexual endeavors, dietary choices, freedom of speech, and more.

Lithuania has an Indulgence score of 16 out of 100, which is particularly low. As low Indulgence induces low subjective happiness, people tend to emigrate to states with less restrictive norms, increasing the potential to achieve higher Indulgence and happiness accordingly.\textsuperscript{103} On a meso-level, the emigrant communities that form abroad in order to maintain collective cultural identity may indicate the presence of low Indulgence. The communities form to maintain familiar, and possibly restraining norms, which may be an optimal alternative from fully indulging into the culture of the host country.\textsuperscript{104} The fact that 36.2 percent of emigrants consider the possibility of self-development abroad as a significant factor further highlights the low cultural Indulgence in Lithuania, showcasing that the restrained norms are unwanted by some Lithuanians.\textsuperscript{105} Recent findings also suggest that Indulgence can depend on region and age, as younger people tend to be more Indulgent. While the difference is not major, the most significant finding demonstrating the importance of Indulgence as a cultural value is that educational background and income have no effect on Indulgence scores. People with higher Indulgence can adapt and be Indulgent in ways other than financially, as many turn to their familial and community relationships for mutual Indulgence. This also explains the tendency to form emigrant communities abroad to remain Indulgent despite the cultural, language, and financial barriers. It also suggests that Lithuanians who may score higher on Indulgence are more likely to emigrate.\textsuperscript{106}

The cultural value of Indulgence also appears to be an important factor to consider when utilizing micro-migration theories. Considering the micro-migration theory of psychoanalysis, evidence suggests that high Indulgence societies score higher on extraversion. As Lithuanian emigrants also tend to score higher on extraversion it strengthens the case that emigrants tend to be more Indulgent than non-emigrants.\textsuperscript{107} Restraint is a powerful cultural value which statistically affects birth rates more than education or wealth. At the same time, it also has the capacity to shape gender roles in society. It is plausible that individuals, non-adherent to such restraint may choose to leave.\textsuperscript{108} Survival and self-expression values can influence Indulgence. This is because positive experiences have a more positive effect on countries that lean towards Self-expression than Survival, while negative experiences impact people from idealistic, survivalist cultures more.\textsuperscript{109}

The participant observation showed that indulgence is a cultural value that is as limited in the public sector as in the Lithuanian population. Indulgence correlates with the perceived importance of social progress, basic human needs, foundations of well-being, health, opportunity, and personal freedom of choice, the lack of which may be reflected in policymaking.\textsuperscript{110} Perhaps, this may be the reason that there is a statistical relationship between indulgence and prosperity, since the aforementioned factors are very relevant in prosperity measures.\textsuperscript{111} This may be especially true when considering that the government has a big impact on freedom of choice, which can lead to higher Indulgence.\textsuperscript{112} Indulgence also plays a role in public service motivation, as public servants are not constricted by restrictive norms within institutions. This may be the underlying driver of
the strong relationship between indulgence, government quality, and socio-economic development.\textsuperscript{113}

INDIVIDUALISM, UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE, AND LONG-TERM ORIENTATION

The direct relationship of the indices of Survival-Al-Self-expression, Masculinity, and Indulgence with migration has been shown. However, it is important to acknowledge that other indices display a condition-al effect on the established main indices. Indulgence (.65) has a relatively strong negative relationship with Long-term Orientation (-.56). This suggests that societies with high long-term orientation (LTO) scores tend to also score low in indulgence and vice versa. Lithuania has an LTO score of 82 out of 100, which is very high. LTO showcases the relationship between the short-term reliance on tradition (low LTO) and a pragmatic, adaptive long-term view of society’s future (high LTO). Therefore, the aforementioned relationship may stem from the fact that long-term planning in an underperforming economy may demotivate individuals to seek short-term indulgence when comparing their situation to other countries. Especially in relation to neo-classical macro migration theory, factoring in better economic indicators in other states presents a more positive option for an individual influenced by a highly Long-Term Orientated culture. Hence emigration becomes an inviting and pragmatic choice in cultures with high LTO. In contrast, cultures with low LTO may not factor in the potential economic situation of their state in the future and therefore are subjective-ly happier and capable of indulgence in their society. These cultural factors may have significant influence on the perceived need to emigrate.\textsuperscript{114}

Considering the meso-level migrant network theory, the relationship between LTO, emigration, and remittances studied by Čábelková reveals that high LTO countries receive the most remittances. Lithuania in fact receives the most remittances in the EU.\textsuperscript{115} This relationship may have emerged because high LTO families perceive sending off family members for remittances as an effective long-term strategy to aid in survival.\textsuperscript{116} LTO also perpetuates this because it has a strong relationship with family heritage, long-term planning, and delayed gratification.\textsuperscript{117} LTO cultural values have even been identified as a driving factor of family business prevalence.\textsuperscript{118} High LTO induced planning essentially makes emigration a beneficial strategic option, because it increases the potential of higher economic security in the future.

Moreover, LTO has a very strong negative relationship with Uncertainty Avoidance (-.86). Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) is based on the perceived necessity of rules, employment stability, and stress. However, uncertainty avoidance is not risk avoidance. UAI is rather the fear of the unknown future. Societies adapt to uncertainty differently, depending on historical and social context. Therefore, repetitive occupation by foreign states gave rise to high UAI in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{119} High UAI in most nations manifests into distinct phe-nomena, and is most apparent in younger democracies. For example, in high UAI countries, fewer people risk self-employment, and many feel less able to participate in political decisions.\textsuperscript{120} When comparing UAI indices and WVS data on confidence in political institutions, a correlation emerges showcasing that high UAI cultures trust institutions the least. Paradoxically, high UAI societies indicated a preference for high dependence on government institutions or government as the perceived solution. UAI cultural values permeate institutions as well, as survey data showcases that high UAI also manifest in governments. While high UAI correlates with negative attitude towards the political process by politicians.\textsuperscript{121} Overall, UAI cultural values induce risk-taking, negative outlooks on politics, and therefore perpetuate emigration.

It is important to note that the negative relationship between UAI and LTO in Eastern European countries is seen at the higher end of both indices, because the states used in the sample have an average UAI score of 75 and LTO score of 64. It is evident that high UAI indirectly enhances emigration: firstly, setting aside the negative relationship between UAI and LTO, the high scores of both indices in Eastern Europe ensure that the negative effects of both cultural values have an impact. Secondly, relatively lower UAI scores in countries like Slovakia, Estonia, and Lithuania perpetuate higher cultural values of long-term orientation. Therefore, the lower strain of the fear of the unknown future allows the society to indulge in long-term planning more. Overall, the small difference in the already high UAI and LTO indices serves as an indicator, which showcases whether the culture stresses fear of the unknown future and dissatisfaction with institutions more, or the overemphasis of usually modest long-term prospects of the economy. Either way both options may perpetuate emigration.

The nature of high UAI cultures relies on the methods the culture uses to deal with ambiguity and unknown factors. Therefore, in relation to macro
neo-classical migration theory, the push factors such as unemployment pose an uncertainty. These factors are perceived as more significant than in other cultures, pressuring individuals to consider risk-taking choices, such as emigration, in order to limit the ambiguity of the future. This high UAI cultural value in Lithuania explains recent findings on a micro-level psychosocial analysis that identified emigrant personality traits considered in the literature review. High UAI risk-taking for the potential to limit the uncertainty of the future explains the findings that Lithuanian emigrants have higher risk tolerance than the domestic population. In addition, high LTO also explains the findings that Lithuanian emigrants are more open to new experiences and are more emotionally stable. This is because a measured dimension in LTO is the importance of being able to adapt to new circumstances. High LTO cultures encourage citizens to be prepared to encounter changing circumstances in life, which seems to encourage emigration.

The participant observation also provided insight into the additional cultural indices. Chart 1 and Chart 2 show that LTO is a very significant value in the public sector, and it is also the only cultural trait that is proportionally more prominent in the public sector than in the population. Long-Term Orientation has implications in political institutions, precisely because the dimension has been shown to have multiple effects on economic growth factors. Therefore, there is a correlation between high LTO and rapid economic growth. This is precisely the case in Lithuania, as it has been one of the fastest growing economies in Europe during the last decade. LTO may enhance economic growth, because low LTO countries spend resources examining uncertainties, while high LTO countries eliminate indecisiveness and completely capitalize on opportunities. On a more political level, high LTO states stress values about the future that are significant in cultural economics, such as education, frugality, or perseverance, while low LTO stress traditions and social spending.

High LTO also produces a better work ethic because individuals focus on planning, which has the potential to aid policy making, as seen in centralized high LTO countries such as Japan. As LTO is also significant in business trust, this factor may transfer to public institutions. Evidently, LTO also increases the state’s financial liquidity, because short-term solutions are less preferable than long-term results. As debt is a long-term issue, it becomes unappealing to high LTO countries, including Lithuania, which strive to have low debt and little inflation. However, it is unclear whether the positives of high LTO will be enough to counteract the negatives manifested due to low Masculinity, low Indulgence, low Individualism, and high Uncertainty Avoidance at the policy level. In that case, the positives of LTO cultural values may be outweighed by the other values that perpetuate emigration in the policy making process, resulting in poor emigration solutions.

Another dimension that has become apparent during the participant observation is Individualism, or lack thereof. Chart 3 indicates that in the public sector, proportionally to other cultural indices, Individualism is the least prominent and is significantly lower than in the population. Being part of an organization often necessitates collectivist outlooks, which perhaps lowers levels of individualism. While individualism was not a statistically significant factor in relation to migration, it may be an influential factor in the case of Lithuania. Additionally, Institutional Collectivism is the extent to which institutions distribute resources, rather than reward merit, which may have implications due to lack of competition over policy creation. There is also evidence that Collectivist countries in Europe tend to produce more emigrants, possibly because prosperity negatively correlates with collectivism due to the aforementioned competition-policy dilemma.

High individualism is often criticized for the focus on maximizing personal well-being and breaking down social institutions. As the public sector is dominated by collectivist values, the opposite may be occurring, and therefore, Lithuanians scoring higher on individualism may be more likely to emigrate. In fact, a study by McCrae determined that high individualist countries are more extroverted, and as the micro-migration theory of psychoanalysis identified, emigrants are also more extroverted. This is especially apparent when considering the findings showing that collectivist societies conform to social norms and ingroup pressures. This indicates that more collectivist Lithuanians remain in Lithuania while individualists emigrate. Lack of individualist perspective in the public policy sector explains this dichotomy further.

**CONCLUSION**

It is evident that while migration theories are essential in understanding migration, they are limited in explaining certain migratory tendencies and outlier cas-
es. Lithuania’s alarming emigration has been explored through micro-macro level migration theories which stress the Neoclassical migration job market supply and demand. In addition, psychosocial analysis of behavior has become prominent demonstrating the extroversion, risk-aversion, and consciousness differences among Lithuanian emigrants. Migrant networks also explain migration in Lithuania, which helps illustrate the reliance on familial and social ties in the cycle of emigration. However, these theories fail to adequately explain the disproportionately high emigration levels observed in Lithuania. Cross-national emigration differences indicate the influence of culture, which is statistically identifiable with respect to varying economic, political, and social phenomena. These cultural analyses have also been proven relatively reliable and causal. Culture research has already identified potential links with migration, as culture is becoming more utilized in economic and migration studies. This is precisely the area explored in this dissertation via bivariate regression, multivariate regression, and participant observation analysis.

The findings have revealed that survival values, low masculinity, and low indulgence have a strong relationship with emigration. This relationship is exemplified in Lithuania to a significant extent, making it an outlier case. In Lithuania, survival values are prominent as Lithuanians stress the importance of economic and physical security, which directly correlate with emigration. The low masculinity culture of Lithuania has a negative effect on Lithuanians when combined with high survival values, dissatisfying them with either the lack of welfare or competition, and polarizing policy expectations. Survival values and indulgence directly emphasize the economic push factors in Lithuania. These values also promote migrant networks and communities abroad due to reduced financial risks, and lower, yet culturally familiar, restraint levels. The participant observation also revealed the prevalence and divergences of the aforementioned cultural values within public institutions that could result in policy ineffectiveness. The cultural uniqueness of Lithuania should serve as a model for other states to understand the cultural perpetuation framework and achieve a more harmonious society via policy.

Endnotes


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LADYLIKE LEGISLATION
A STUDY OF WOMEN-CENTRIC COSPONSORSHIP IN THE 115TH CONGRESS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to identify which factor most dictates congressional support for women-centric bills. Cosponsorship is utilized as a mechanism to measure legislator engagement, and reelection proximity, seniority, party, and gender are all considered as potential predictors for support. Based on analysis of an original database containing 656 bills from both chambers of the 115th Congress and author interviews with congressional staff, this thesis argues that party is ultimately the strongest indicator of women-centric bill cosponsorship, though it is not the sole determinant. While the database confirms that gendered behavior is prevalent, party regardless poses a greater saliency to the extent that Republican females do not cosponsor women-centric bills at a sufficiently high frequency to outpace male Democrats. Such a dynamic is only exacerbated by variations in party performance rates, which demonstrate that the very act of cosponsorship is more partisan than previous literature has indicated. Ultimately, this thesis concludes that the behavior of Democrats and females is more “feminine” and collaborative, while that of Republicans and males is more “masculine” and individualistic; this disparity accordingly shapes how congressional members engage with women-centric legislation.
In October 2017, the 115th Congress achieved a rare feat of bipartisanship. President Donald Trump signed into law the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, a bill mandating the executive office to design a global strategy promoting the political participation and leadership of women in fragile democracies within one year. The Women, Peace, and Security Act was developed by female members on both sides of the aisle, with Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) as its original sponsor in the Senate and Rep. Kristi Noem (R-SD) as its author in the House. Sen. Shaheen and Rep. Noem each amassed a bipartisan batch of cosponsors, assembling a total of thirteen Republicans and seven Democrats in both chambers. Even though a direct link between cosponsorship and final passage has not been fully substantiated by existing studies, this paper asserts that cosponsorship is effective in measuring the scope and diversity of legislative support. For example, the fact that the Women, Peace, and Security Act made it from committee to a successful floor vote and finally to the president’s desk can be explained, in part, by its cosponsor roster.

This anecdote appears to be a promising indication that bills like the Women, Peace, and Security Act—legislation with women-centric policy content—are quite palatable in the modern Congress, even one as discordant as the 115th in which Republicans controlled both houses and many Democrats favored an obstructionist approach to the legislative agenda of the incumbent president. While its legislative triumph might be an encouraging narrative of female collaboration and bipartisan support for women’s issues, it masks a far more complex relationship between congressional members and women-centric legislation. In reality, women-centric cosponsorship is frequently plagued by the often thorny dynamic that characterizes party-gender conflict in a progressively partisan political climate.

Utilizing cosponsorship as a mechanism to gauge legislator attitudes, this research probes how women-centric legislation is received by members of Congress generally and what role gender plays in this process in contrast to traditional institutional factors, such as reelection proximity, seniority, and party. Contingent on trends derived from 656 bills introduced in both chambers during the 115th session, this thesis establishes that while all members of Congress are multidimensional actors and that several competing factors influence their behavior, party is ultimately the strongest predictor of support for women-centric bills particularly in the contemporary context of high partisanship. Gender is potent enough that the members of Congress most receptive to women-centric legislation are Democratic women, but the impact of party-ideology cohesion in the current political climate is sufficient enough that Republican women are still more conservative than their Democratic male peers. This conclusion generates a congressional performance spectrum in which Democrats and women are more “feminine” and collaborative, while Republicans and men are “masculine” and individualistic, a dichotomy which shapes how members engage with policy proposals centered on women’s rights.

INTRODUCTION

CONCEPTS DEFINED

This thesis primarily engages with two concepts that require definitions: cosponsorship and women-centric legislation. Cosponsorship is defined as the joint sponsoring of a legislative bill. For the purposes of this research, cosponsorship is also considered in light of its scope, including cosponsor characteristics such as gender, party, and political power. Women-centric legislation proves trickier to define. First, all bills introduced in Congress are referred to a committee system that organizes legislation according to their content. The committee system is thus useful in correctly signaling what issues a bill predominantly focuses on. Therefore, a major difficulty in determining what legislation qualifies as women-centric is the absence of a committee exclusively for women’s issues. Without the committee shortcut, it is necessary to establish another procedure to conclude which bills are appropriate for this category. Secondly, nearly all legislation impacts women, and a bill may create benefits for women even if it is not stated as a policy objective. Furthermore, the landscape of women’s issues is eclectic, and the perceived saliency of each issue varies widely across individuals. Women are by no means a homogenous group, and their perspectives are highly influenced by compounding identifications, such as race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, and socioeconomic status. Moreover, women’s issues often intersect with those of other marginalized constituen-

1. The following is an example of a stated women-centric policy objective from the text of The Women, Peace, and Security Act: “To ensure that the United States promotes the meaningful participation of women in mediation and negotiation processes seeking to prevent, mitigate, or resolve violent conflict.”
cies, and legislation addressing the concerns of these constituencies would likely be favorable to women as well.

Given the above limitations, women-centric legislation is defined as any bill that has explicitly gendered language in its title: women, woman, girl(s), gender, maternal, mom, maternity, or mother. Because this thesis seeks to discern the perceived significance of women’s issues for policymakers, it is imperative that the bill be specifically geared toward women as a constituency: women must be the intended target, and not the external recipient, of the legislative benefits. The inclusion of gendered terminology in a bill’s title indicates that the lawmaker purposefully intends for the legislation to address women and guarantees that any cosponsoring member also recognizes that women are the bill’s focus. Therefore, any legislation meeting these criteria would aptly qualify as women-centric, with emphasis on the centricity. Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer posit that these women-centric bills are most often attached to “policy areas that are explicitly about women, those that have conventionally been associated with women or the private realm, or those that aim for feminist outcomes.” As a result, they generally fall into categories such as healthcare, welfare, domestic issues, and workplace discrimination. Hence, women-centric legislation ideologically aligns more frequently with liberalism, though bills taking conservative stances on these topics are evident as well.

Admittedly, this method may be problematic. There are certainly bills that are aimed to address women-specific concerns that do have gendered language in the actual policy but not in the title. The aforementioned definition would fail to identify these bills as women-centric. Further, this method does not account for the fact that staffers weigh different considerations when crafting bill titles. Sometimes they want clever names, or ones that result in catchy acronyms. Other times they may simply use the straightforward “A bill to...” format. Excluding gendered language from the name of a legislation that is otherwise centered on women does not necessarily reflect a calculated omission. Regardless, incorporating gendered language in the title is a deliberate choice, and using the name criteria outlined here netted a substantive sample of women-centric bills for the dataset. As such, enough women-centric bills are derived using this process to be representative of the broader cosponsorship trends for women-centric legislation, even if a selection of women-centric bills is rejected by this procedure. Due to the lack of a women’s committee in Congress, this method provides the most expedient and accurate means of classifying these bills with available resources.

Finally, this definition does not contemplate the political implications of the selected bills in order to avoid exerting partisan bias on the research. Whether or not the policy proposals put forth actually advance women’s interests is often a matter of subjectivity, usually contingent on ideological preferences. For example, when considering reproductive health, liberal Democrats are likelier to consider bills improving access to abortion services as being in the best interest of women, while conservative Republicans tend to feel conversely. To avoid these dogmatic debates, all bills are treated as women-centric if they meet the standards discussed in this definition, regardless of potential policy repercussions. Rather, this definition stresses that there is significance simply in the writing of a bill that places women and the issues they predominantly encounter at the center of a policy discussion, especially in the context of a Congress which historically ignored women as a distinct constituency.

Ultimately, defining women’s issues is a complex task because women as a group are heterogeneous. Thus, producing an exhaustive list of relevant problems is nearly impossible. Arguably, all issues are women’s issues. But it is still objectively true that certain issues are more strongly linked to gender and that some experiences are unique to women alone. This tightened definition of women-centric bills alleviates some of the complications with operationalization by concentrating on legislation that most explicitly addresses female constituents.

For purposes of clarity, it is also imperative to establish a definition of the ideological spectrum as applicable to this thesis. Ideology and party are distinct but related terms, with ideology shaping the objectives and core values of parties. This research does not examine ideology as a separate factor because ideology in the 115th Congress correlates so strongly with party that liberals dominate the Democratic party, conservatives the Republican party, and moderate members pose a small statistical impact. However, ideology will still be referenced throughout this discussion, as party-ideology cohesion is useful in explaining homogeneity within the respective parties and because existing literature on cosponsorship frequently alludes to ideology. In order to define the ideological spectrum, this thesis will utilize the DW-NOMINATE scaling
method which contextualizes liberalism and conservatism within contemporary American politics by scoring legislators relative to the roll call behavior of their peers in that Congress. This produces a range where -1 is the furthest left; 0 is perfectly moderate; and 1 is the furthest right. When this data is graphed, a larger spatial distance between lawmakers indicates a greater ideological difference. On this continuum, “liberals” lean toward the left and “conservatives” the right; moderates show little proclivity in either direction. Because the scope of the American political mainstream has largely been restricted to liberal vs. conservative, this thesis will not consider more granular divisions of further left and right and will instead center on these three groups.

To more accurately tailor this understanding to the 115th Congress, members can be assigned an ideological position based on the extremes of this specific Congress. In the Senate, accounting for this produces a range of 1.70 points, where the moderate bracket is -.23 to 0.33; in the House, the spectrum is 1.63 points, with moderates scoring between -.16 and 0.39. Members on either side of the respective moderate cohorts can thus be characterized as either liberal or conservative, and these legislators comprise 84 percent of the 115th Congress according to the definition outlined above. Moreover, there are no liberal Republicans or conservative Democrats. This is further illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 which depict members as clustering away from the moderate middle. It is thereby justifiable to charge the Democratic party as liberal and the Republican party as conservative when broadly discussing the behavior of party members in the 115th Congress as the vast majority of legislators within each party conform to this definition. For historical assessments of previous Congresses in which ideological cohesion within the party system was not as pronounced, this thesis will distinguish between ideology and party as appropriate.

WOMEN & THE CONGRESS
Women’s concerns were neglected by Congress for most of American history. It was not until 1921, one year after the Constitution was amended to enfranchise women, that the body passed its foremost law which can be considered women-centric: The Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act. Originally introduced by Congress’s first female member, Rep. Jeannette Rankin (R-MT), the bill appropriated funds for maternal healthcare clinics. Marking one of the federal government’s earliest ventures into social welfare policy, it is explicitly inclusive of women in its language. Women-centric legislation, however, languished over the next four decades–through the Great Depression, World War II, and the resurgence of gendered, white domesticity in the affluent 1950s–until the emergence of feminism’s second wave in the 1960s. By declaring that the personal is political, second wave feminists contended that the problems women face are so deeply structural that they demand political redress. Accordingly, in this period, female members of Congress sponsored legislative actions such as Title IX in the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Rights Amendment. Both were ambitious attempts to effect policy with direct and often immediate implications. More recent women-centric legislation has addressed workplace challenges, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, as well as the intersections of other marginalized groups, such as the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) which extends domestic violence protections to LGBT+ victims. However, as the congressional response to women’s issues has evolved over time, cosponsorship trends indicate that support for women-centric legislation has also grown more partisan. For example, while forty House Republicans cosponsored the initial VAWA bill in 1993, none crossed the aisle to cosponsor the 2013 reauthorization.

Female members have also been integral in stimulating federal legislative momentum on women’s issues despite the limited role they have historically been afforded. Congresswomen were original sponsors for the vast majority of women-centric legislative milestones, and the increasing complexity of these bills correlate with women’s rising numbers in Congress. Women have served in Congress for over a century since the election of Rep. Rankin (R-MT) in 1916. In the ensuing decades, women participated in Congress almost continuously, though their numbers were sparse and the most common route for female legislators up until the seventies was to succeed a deceased father or husband. The heyday of second wave feminism saw the election of prolific female members such as Rep. Bella Abzug (D-NY), Rep. Barbara Jordan (D-TX), Rep. Patsy T. Mink (D-HI), and Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D-NY), but the major breakthrough for women’s representation did not transpire until 1992. Dubbed the “year of the women,” the 1992 election cycle led to four new female senators and
twenty-four congresswomen. Scholars have speculated that this wave arose both from a bevy of new congressional districts and a backlash to the treatment of Anita Hill by the all-male Senate Judiciary Committee in the year before. Female representation has risen steadily, but not rapidly, since—in the 115th Congress, women comprised 20 percent of all members, a record high. In light of these underpinnings, the modern relationship between women and the Congress remains complex. Women currently comprise 50.5 percent of the American population, and since every member has female constituents, it follows that women’s issues should be a legislative priority for all congressional policymakers. Yet this is often not the case, as many gendered bills routinely fail to pass in Congress because they cannot accrue the necessary support. As one congressional aide explains, “The trouble with women’s issue bills is that most people have already, in the past, tried to write bills addressing women’s issues, but there simply aren’t the votes for it. And this creates less space to introduce women’s legislation.” Fundamentally, this appears to reflect a policy disconnect between legislators and a constituency that composes half of their electorate.

In both chambers, members of Congress register varying levels of recognition toward women’s issues. Several offices employ staffers who specialize in civil rights, women’s issues, or even a more specific policy focus, such as women’s health. Certain members also emphasize support for women’s issues on their official websites by including a section under their “Issues” or “Priorities” page discussing their positions on women’s issues and detailing their legislative record on the topic. For example, Sen. Maggie Hassan (D-NH) has a “Women’s Health & Economic Opportunity” page, Sen. Christopher Coons (D-DE) has one entitled “Women’s Rights,” and Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (R-WA) highlights “Maternal Care.” However, many offices do not treat women’s issues as a distinct policy area the way they do other unique concerns of their constituencies. For example, no matter his or her place on the ideological spectrum, nearly every member of Congress includes “Veterans” or “Veterans Affairs” as a policy priority, even though veterans are a much smaller portion of their constituencies than women. Voting rates do inform policy prioritization, and in the 2016 election veterans voted at a rate 6 percent higher than civilians. But women are also a more active voting bloc than men, producing a gender gap of 4 percent in 2016. Moreover, in every election since 1964, women have voted in larger numbers than men and at higher rates since 1980, a trend which persists even in midterm elections when turnout is lower across all demographics. Therefore, even within the context offered by voter participation, the lack of consistency with which legislators’ agendas position women’s issues indicates that members are divided not just on the basis of policy stances within the topic, but also in merely recognizing that it is a legislative area deserving of acknowledgement.

Accordingly, the convergence of party identification with gender has proven rather complicated in present circumstances. As the political climate has grown more partisan, and as the very concept of women’s issues has become increasingly politicized, the question arises as to whether gender really has more influence than party in dictating legislative behavior. The 115th Congress faced an array of provocative women-centric issues, including efforts to defund Planned Parenthood, attempts to expand access to contraceptives under all healthcare plans, and the Supreme Court nomination of Brett Kavanaugh, a conservative judge with sexual assault allegations. These events often placed some Republican congresswomen at the margins of their party’s official positions, with public attention concentrating on their actions and legislative fate frequently hinging on their decisions. Consequently, one opinion that has emerged suggests that such gendered expectations may inadvertently restrict women in politics. Following Sen. Susan Collins’ (R-ME) critical affirmative vote on Kavanaugh despite immense pressure to oppose his nomination, a proliferation of opinion editorials reasoned that female policymakers should enjoy the same autonomy as their male colleagues to legislate based on ideological beliefs and without the responsibility of representing an entire gender. Even Collins’ female Senate colleagues who vehemently disapproved of Kavanaugh seemed to resent that extraordinary demands were placed on her and Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) alone, in a sense absolving their male peers in the party from any obligation to women. “I don’t think it’s their responsibility to be the only beacons of virtue,” Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) maintained. “I expect that from all U.S. senators, and I expect it from our Republican male colleagues as well.” Sen. Shaheen (D-NH) agreed: “I think we’re seeing differences in the way senators are being treated and the way they’re being viewed in terms of this issue.” While it is indisputably important that women’s issues be championed legislatively,
substantive representation as a conduit is more nuanced than a mere superficial glance would suggest.

COSPONSORSHIP
Legislative cosponsorship in the Congress is a relatively new phenomenon. The Senate first adopted cosponsorship in the mid-1930s, and the practice was prohibited in the House until 1967 when the rules were amended to allow up to twenty-five cosponsors on a bill. Unrestricted cosponsorship was finally approved by the House in 1978. In the beginning, the practice produced mixed results, and some members, unfamiliar with cosponsorship, responded with hesitation. Since then, however, cosponsorship has become a tactic widely used by members in both chambers. For example, in the 2017 legislative year, nearly 100 percent of congressional members cosponsored at least one piece of legislation.

A bill’s sponsor is the representative or senator who originally introduces it on the floor. A piece of legislation may only have one sponsor in each chamber even if it is a collaborative effort by multiple offices. However, a member in the opposing chamber may introduce identical legislation. Each bill contains a list of its cosponsors in its text. To accrue cosponsorship for the bill, the sponsor’s office usually circulates a “Dear Colleague” letter to some or all members of that chamber detailing the proposed legislation and asking for support, though this is not a required step in the process, and members may attract cosponsors through other methods. Members whose names are included in the bill’s cosponsorship at the time of initial floor introduction by the sponsor are considered “original cosponsors.” Representatives may decide to cosponsor a bill in the House up until it has been ordered reported from its referred committee. If an unreported piece of legislation is scheduled for the floor, members then have the option to cosponsor the bill up until the time of a floor vote or a motion to suspend the rules. Senators can cosponsor a bill up until the legislation is presented to the bill clerk on the floor. A senator might still request to cosponsor while the bill is being considered on the floor; however, to do so requires unanimous consent. A cosponsor may also choose to have his or her name removed from a bill within the timeframe discussed above.

The effect that cosponsorship has on a bill’s chance at passage is debatable. Some scholars have claimed that cosponsorship merely wastes time, and there is considerable literature to demonstrate that the impact of cosponsorship is “positive, but limited.” One study argues that cosponsorship “matters for legislative success, but only barely,” acknowledging that while “cosponsored bills are more likely to make it out of committee…the impact is slight.” Alternatively, others contend that cosponsorship can be effective in herding the bill through the legislative process because party leadership often uses cosponsorship as an internal cue to decide whether legislation is worth scheduling for a floor vote. Furthermore, a report examining cosponsorship networks found that as a bill’s cosponsorship numbers near majority support, “the marginal effect of each additional cosponsor on the probability of passage quickly increases.” Fowler’s model depicts the influence of cosponsorship on passage as plateauing once legislation obtains support from 49 to 51 percent in the chamber.

While the empirical effect of cosponsorship on final passage is debatable, there is no doubt that legislators themselves place value in the practice, as evidenced by the time and energy congressional offices expend on obtaining cosponsors. Sponsors of legislation find cosponsorship conducive to agenda-setting because they feel it signals “low cost information about the political benefits of a bill” to other members and party leaders, thus minimizing transaction costs.

Substantial cosponsorship numbers indicate that a bill is acceptable to wider constituencies and accompanying issue publics and, as a result, is likelier to pass more efficiently. Moreover, the ideological diversity of a bill’s cosponsor roster can be successful at conveying bipartisan support, indicating that “the bill is uncontroversial and therefore, low cost.” Conversely, legislation with cosponsorship composed largely from one end of the ideological spectrum is considered higher cost and invites closer examination.

If the motivations for sponsoring offices to obtain cosponsors appear rather straightforward, the impetus for cosponsoring offices are myriad and varied. Fowler presents the case that there are two primary kinds of cosponsors: active and passive. “Active cosponsors” emerge as a result of the Congress’s one sponsor only rule. These are members who worked with the sponsoring office to write the legislation in question. Appropriately, they tend to be original cosponsors. “Passive cosponsors,” by con-

2 The bill will open with the introductory language such as: “Senator Sponsor (for herself, Senator Original Cosponsor #1 and Senator Original Cosponsor #2) introduced the following bill…”
trast, are those who decide to sign onto the bill after it has been introduced and had no role in crafting it. While the primary motivation for active cosponsors is credit-claiming, there are several potential incentives linked with cosponsorship for passive cosponsors.

Increasingly, lawmakers perceive cosponsorship as a form of “position taking.” The term first emerged in David Mayhew’s 1974 analysis of congressional behavior, The Electoral Connection, where he defines cosponsorship as the practice of utilizing both legislative mechanisms (i.e., floor speechs and roll call votes) and external venues (i.e., the media) to stake out positions more for the sake of electoral reward than for actual policy implementation. Cosponsorship was still in its infancy at the time of Mayhew’s writing. However, he does identify it as an “inexpensive position taking exercise…regardless of political outcome.” Campbell similarly argues that cosponsorship provides an opportunity for legislators to reflect the popular positions of their constituencies in a substantive, yet economical way, noting that lawmakers often reference their cosponsorship records in constituent correspondence to indicate that they have “tangible evidence” to demonstrate their active support for the concern at hand. In discussing the strategical context of cosponsorship, Koger states that the practice was employed largely in attempt to combat the number of bills introduced for the mere purpose of position taking; cosponsorship offers much of the associated merits while diminishing entailed effort. Koger’s analysis also demonstrates the incentive for members to use cosponsorship as a form of messaging for constituents. He cites one legislative director who explains, “Even if a bill doesn’t move, cosponsoring helps clarify your message.” Similarly, a Democratic member highlights the appeal of cosponsorship for the minority party, offering, “[When you’re in the minority], a lot of votes and legislation that come up don’t address the problems that are important to you…if you want to show your constituents who you are…you’ve got to cosponsor bills.” And finally, a staffer for a female Democratic senator concurs: “Sometimes you get on a bill that doesn’t have a high likelihood of passing, but you support the idea, the message.”

Another motivation for cosponsorship is coalition-building. Members often consider the collaborative behavior which cosponsorship demands conducive to their entrepreneurial goals. Fowler’s study of cosponsorship networks finds that social connectedness amongst legislators, and reciprocal relationships in particular, underlie the practice, contending that “the cosponsor [trusting] the sponsor or [owing] the sponsor a favor…[increases] the likelihood of cosponsorship.” Furthermore, interpersonal connectedness is strongest when a bill has a smaller, rather than a more expansive coalition of cosponsors.

Koger offers a comparable perspective, including an anecdote from a Republican congressman suggesting that many members cosponsor after they are personally approached with a sign-up sheet by another member on the chamber floor. An analysis by Bernhard and Sulkin finds that cosponsorship is utilized as legislative currency because it functions as a “commitment device to help legislators trade votes.” They also argue that cosponsorship, in a sizable body long dominated by hierarchal rule, has “[contributed] to the decentralization and egalitarianism of the House in the post-Watergate era” because the exercise harnesses legislative momentum in a manner that empowers weaker political actors to accrue policy success without entirely acquiescing to the wont of powerful House leadership or committee chairs. Therefore, by deciding to cosponsor, individual members have the opportunity to develop both legislative leverage through personal networks and internal recognition by forming coalitions.

Finally, members may be encouraged to cosponsor simply because they find the proposed bill to be good policy that deserves support on the merits of its content alone. While policy appeal is likely a prevalent element for all bill cosponsors, some members are so galvanized about certain issues they back them on face value, and outside incentives are essentially rendered negligible. As a result, they may cosponsor without peripheral benefits. As one Republican congressman put it: “If I believe in an issue, I cosponsor the bill to give it energy.” Likewise, a legislative staffer for Rep. Jacky Rosen (D-NV) states that her office makes recommendations for legislation cosponsorship on the basis of “her views, and what feels effective in advancing [her] policy goals, while keeping in mind the view of her constituency.” Referring to policy areas that Rosen is particularly passionate about, she adds, “When Jacky first came to the office, [Rosen] was one of Nevada’s U.S. senators; the interview referenced throughout this thesis was conducted at the time of her campaign for the seat, but prior to her November 2018 victory, when she was still a first term Congresswoman for Nevada’s 3rd district (Henderson-Las Vegas).
she told us what she feels strongly about, and she is personally overwhelmingly pro-women... so Jacky actively looks to cosponsor [Planned Parenthood/reproductive healthcare bills] and improve on women’s issues.” An aide for a female Democratic senator similarly shares, “We consider relevancy to the state, if it’s something that people in the state are passionate about, have reached out about...she cosponsors on big, key policy issues—like reproductive rights—that she really supports, or wants to take leadership on.” Cosponsorship can thus be considered a venue for policy specialization, especially for freshmen minority members who may not have desirable committee assignments.

Some scholarly work also demonstrates that for members who belong to demographic groups historically marginalized by Congress—both in representation and in legislative focus—cosponsorship can be particularly valuable in their efforts to advocate causes predominately associated with those constituencies. Rocca and Sanchez theorize that because the concerns of racial minorities are often deemed trivial by majority-white populations, “agenda setters in Congress have little incentive to address minorities’ policy priorities,” and, as a result, black and Latinx members “must turn to non-roll call activities to voice their constituents’ interests.” Likewise, Canon’s study of the 103rd Congress finds that black members cosponsored more than their white colleagues generally—11,540 bills vs. 4,010, respectively—and that black legislators were also more likely to cosponsor bills with racial content. Canon also emphasizes the extensive use of cosponsorship by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), quoting a staffer who relays: “The CBC sticks together. They cosponsor each other’s bills even if it has nothing to do with their own constituents.” Pinney and Sera’s analysis of CBC cosponsorship trends between 1971 and 1993 similarly finds “cohesiveness” amongst caucus member cosponsorship, including particularly high rates for legislation related to black interests. The same evidence in racial bills can be observed in gendered bills as well. For example, Rocca and Sanchez note that female legislators have used “collective influence” historically and that their effect is even more pronounced as they comprise a larger congressional cohort than racial minorities.

Moreover, in her book The Difference Women Make, Swers examines the 103rd and 104th Congresses and concludes that female members are especially prone to utilizing cosponsorship for gendered legislation. While the use of cosponsorship by other marginalized groups, such as LGBT+ or members with disabilities, remains understudied due to their still modest representation, the unique employment of cosponsorship for targeted policy content by black, Latinx, and female members illustrates the practice’s attractiveness as a tool for minority legislators to circumvent the limitations of the roll call vote, which has systematically been controlled by in-group actors. Still, a complete understanding of cosponsorship motivations ultimately demands a distinction between choosing to cosponsor a bill and only voting in its favor. With rare exceptions, all bill cosponsors vote for the legislation. However, many members who did not cosponsor will nevertheless support the proposal when brought to the floor for a vote. Jacky Rosen’s aide explains the gap between the two in this way:

“Cosponsorship is more explicit. She is putting her name on the bill’s solution and giving it her personal endorsement; it is directly reflective of her views. A vote is more of a straight cost and benefit analysis; it might not be everything she wants when she votes yes, but it has some things that she wants—more good than bad—so she’ll vote for it. This is particularly true for spending bills and CR (continuing resolution) packages.”

Similarly, a legislative director for a Republican expounds, “If you just vote yes, you had no role in bringing it to the floor. There’s more credit in cosponsoring a bill and then voting for it.” An aide for a female Democratic senator has a comparable take: “[She cosponsors] something that she wants to champion.”

Bernhard and Sulkin also put forth the argument that because members choose whether to cosponsor, this indicates they consider the potential costs of the act, for if there were none, “all supporters of legislation might cosponsor to receive the benefits.” Given these perspectives, it can be established that cosponsorship indicates a level of support for the legislation that is more forceful than merely voting in the affirmative, and therefore incurs its own cost-benefit analysis.

LITERATURE REVIEW

GENDER

Members are often attracted to cosponsorship because it allows them to harness political power through coalition-building. In her book, Gendering Legislative Behavior, Barnes argues that women policymakers
are more willing to engage in activities that stimulate “legislative collaboration” such as cosponsorship.\textsuperscript{54} By studying behavior patterns of women in five legislatures throughout the world, including in the United States Senate, she contends that female lawmakers are drawn to legislative collaboration for two chief reasons. First, women are rendered weaker political actors because of the formal and informal barriers that they face: “Women are marginalized in the legislatures in which they serve and consequently find themselves in positions of institutional weakness.”\textsuperscript{55} These restrictions include restricted access to party leadership and desirable committee posts due to exclusion from personal networks and the prevalence of negative stereotypes about female capability to legislate. Consequently, legislative collaboration offers women a way to brandish greater power. Second, women are “socialized to be more cooperative and consensus” than men, which perhaps kindles a preference for collaboration but is also linked with rewards for “conforming to gender stereotypes,” especially when contrasted with the penalties female politicians incur for being self-assertive.\textsuperscript{56} Barnes also reasons that women more often choose fellow women as their collaborators because they share the experience of “being marginalized within other out-of-power groups.”\textsuperscript{57}

A number of scholars have similarly posited that women legislate differently than their male colleagues, and that this delineation is largely shaped by divergent attitudes toward collaboration. Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer find that female legislators employ consensus building as a political approach at a higher rate than men, who are more inclined to “prefer competitive solutions.”\textsuperscript{58} Gagliarducci and Paserman’s analysis of bill sponsorship and cosponsorship also supports theories of distinct predilections for cooperation amongst female members of the House, though they specify that in regard to cosponsorship recruitment the gender gap is only statistically significant within the Republican Party, in which women are more apt to successfully seek out cosponsors for their bills than men in their party.\textsuperscript{59} Anzia and Berry also advance the idea that congresswomen “outperform” congressmen because they anticipate sex discrimination both from their voting electorate and within the institution.\textsuperscript{60} This accordingly makes them more active and legislatively efficient as members; in examination of bill cosponsorship between 1984 and 2004, women cosponsored, on average, twenty-six more bills per congress than their male counterparts.\textsuperscript{61}

Some congressional staffers for women members agree with these academic conjectures. Rep. Jacky Rosen’s legislative assistant feels that “women inherently collaborate better, and they collaborate better when it’s a women’s bill.”\textsuperscript{62} Likewise, an aide to a female Democratic senator theorizes, “Women senators tend to work better and have values that are more similar. This can open up opportunities for bipartisanship [because] gender can create a connection that perhaps party affiliation cannot.”\textsuperscript{63} There is also evidence to suggest that women in Congress recognize this relationship and have traditionally made a concerted effort to embrace the camaraderie instigated by gender. For example, throughout her thirty years in the chamber, Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) used her Senate hideaway as a gathering space for female senators on both sides of the aisle, hosting “power workshops,” bipartisan coffees, and welcoming events for freshman women.\textsuperscript{64} In another instance, Sen. Susan Collins revealed that when she took to the floor in 2013 to call for an end to the Republican-initiated government shutdown, “The first three people who called me to offer to help were women senators. The first was Lisa Murkowski, Kelly Ayotte was second, and Amy Klobuchar was third…women’s styles tend to be more collaborative.”\textsuperscript{65} And Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN) concurs, explaining that women in the Senate are still such a minority that there is a persistent motivation to “stick together” and build connections professionally, such as working on mutual policy areas, and personally, such as holding regular Senate women’s dinners.\textsuperscript{66}

Literature also suggests that women’s representation in Congress is more substantive than descriptive–female lawmakers are actually inclined to uplift women-centric issues. Vega and Firestone discover a significant impact of gender on legislative behavior beginning in the early nineties, which aligns with the election year of 1992 and a rise in female representation.\textsuperscript{67} They write that “congressional women display distinctive legislative behavior that portends a greater representation of women and women’s issues” with women policymakers introducing women-centric legislation proportional to their number; gender forms a cohort more cohesive than some ethnic congressional groups.\textsuperscript{68} Relatedly, Swers’ analysis of roll call data confirms that gender influences behavior and is strongest with legislation that is heavily gendered, such as abortion and women’s healthcare bills.\textsuperscript{69} Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez likewise support theories of descriptive representation as substantive, determining
that female legislators who succeed men in a congressional district are more purposeful advocates for women, sponsoring women-centric bills at a higher rate than their male predecessors. Numerous studies have produced comparable results to those discussed here; some additionally emphasize the presence of critical mass effects, though there appears to be no consensus on the frequently controversial theory of critical mass, which holds that once a threshold number for representation is crossed the level of influence exerted by women on policy will intensify dramatically. 4

PARTY

In the 115th Congress, there is very little evidence to support a necessary delineation between party and ideology. While in prior eras there were liberals to be found in the Republican party and conservatives in the Democratic party, such a phenomenon no longer exists. Figure 1 shows all members in the House on the DW-NOMINATE ideological scale, with -1 being the furthest left, 1 being the furthest right, and 0 being perfectly moderate. Figure 2 illustrates the same information for the Senate. Data was retrieved from the Voteview project at the University of California, Los Angeles. As the ideological breakdown in the two figures demonstrates, the contemporary party system is heavily oriented around ideology, with only a select number of moderates remaining.

It can therefore be established that in the 115th Congress, the vast majority of Democrats are liberals, and the vast majority of Republicans are conservatives. Members act according to their ideological placement. In studies of cosponsorship as an institutional tool, existing research literature predicts a few patterns that are applicable on the basis of high party-ideology cohesion. Kessler and Krehbiel find that “policy extremists on both sides of the political spectrum are more likely than moderates” to cosponsor legislation, especially early in the legislative cycle, and that liberals in general cosponsor more than conservatives do. 71 Wilson and Young concur that liberal ideology correlates with higher cosponsorship rates. 72 Furthermore, Campbell, Wilson and Young, and Koger all conclude that members of the minority party cosponsor more than those in the majority. Yet again, cosponsorship appears to meet a disparity in resources: Because the minority party does not have the ability to bring legislation to the floor for a final vote, there is greater incentive to cosponsor as a means of signaling legislative goals. In the 115th Congress, Democrats were the minority in both the House and Senate, and Republicans also held control of the executive branch.

Additionally, party is expected to have a potent effect on how members perceive women-centric issues. Women-centric bills generally fall into categories—welfare, corporate regulation, healthcare, etc.—that Republicans are ideologically predisposed to oppose. Legislation in these categories are often hard policy initiatives that entail spending and an increased government role, both of which traditional conservatism rejects. But perhaps even more so, the realignment of Republicans with “moral majority” social conservatives from the 1980s onward has been integral in generating a massive gap in how the parties engage with feminist demands. The New Right coalition formed in large part as a response to liberalism’s post-war heyday and the emergence of rights revolutions in the sixties, including second-wave feminism. Since then, the Republican party has maintained its voter bloc with the use of cultural messaging that often appeals to the populist right by emphasizing a traditionalist societal framework and so-called “family values.” Particularly in the Trump era, Republican voters tend to be white males and are more likely to be culturally resentful, hostile to the “cultural outlooks of growing prominence in mainstream culture associated with multiculturalism, social liberalism, feminism, and protection of the environment.” While reproductive health is perhaps the paramount example of this antipathy, most women-centric concerns beyond valence issues can be dismissed by the Republican party because feminism as a movement has not been conducive to the social agenda that sustains their voting base. Rather, as Bashevkin explains, post-Reagan Republican rhetoric contains either “a strong element of organized antifeminism” or, as Stacey posits, an alternative emphasis on a “post-feminist family ethic.” Conversely, the Democratic party has made a deliberate effort to present itself as willing to take on women’s issues. This divide is effectively demonstrated by the respective party platforms from the 2016 general election. In the Democratic platform, the term “women” appears forty-nine times; in the Republican platform,
twenty-eight. However, usage of the word in the Republican platform is on eight occasions part of the expression “men and women.” It is thereby not a reference to women as a distinct group in those instances. The Democratic platform utilizes the phrase “men and women” just twice. The Democratic party platform also contains distinguishing remarks about women in eighteen of its policy planks while the Republican party platform only does so in six. This contrast between party platforms also reflects deep rifts over several women-centric issues. According to their platforms, Republicans and Democrats agree on just two women-centric topics: women in the military (though they differ on combat roles) and combatting sex trafficking of women.

Still, questions persist about the intersection of party with gender. Given the ideological rift on views of feminism, there is sizable debate over where the greater allegiance lies for Republican women. In her study “Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women’s Issue Bills Than Their Male Colleagues?,” Swers concludes that gender plays a “much more significant role” in the voting of Republican women than their Democratic counterparts. Because liberal ideology is associated with women-centric issues, and Democrats are far more likely to be liberals, any gaps in behavior between Democratic women and Democratic men are quite slim; Republican women, by contrast, must consciously forsake their party’s conservatism to vote with their gender. In her subsequent analysis of cosponsorship trends, “Connecting Descriptive and Substantive Representation,” Swers again emphasizes the significance of Republican women’s behavior, contending that moderate Republican women more regularly cosponsor women-centric welfare bills than conservative Democratic men. Both these assessments were made based on studies of the 103rd and 104th Congresses, and Swers offers the caveat that these patterns are heavily contingent on the ideological predilections of Republican women. She writes in 1998, “The impact of gender may be reduced if more highly conservative women are elected to Congress.” In other words, for gender’s influence to be more pronounced than that of party, there must be a consistent trend of Republican women splitting with their party’s conservatism on women-centric bill cosponsorship.

Republican congresswomen have become more conservative since the Congresses on which Swers conducted her analyses. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Republican women were “more sympathetic to feminist and other liberal causes,” but this brought them in direct conflict with their party’s agenda. As a result, they were often penalized by their male colleagues. Beyond sustaining institutional punishment for bucking the party line, many moderate Republicans were ousted from office by voters during the right-wing Tea Party sweep of the 2010 midterm election, which moved the Republican party a lot further toward the populist right. Moreover, some moderate Republicans who clung to their seats in marginal districts throughout the 1980s and 1990s were consequently replaced by Democrats in the Bush era. Accordingly, very few moderate Republican congresswomen remain. Frederick reveals that in the 108th and 109th Congresses, Republican women were “ideologically indistinguishable” from their male peers in roll call data for women-centric legislation, which is significantly different from what Swers had found in the early 1990s. Carroll offers that these conservative female members do not feel, as their moderate predecessors did, that they have any obligation to be a surrogate for women more broadly; she postulates that ideological filtering “affect[s] the way congresswomen perceive women’s interests, and thus the way in which the responsibility they feel to represent women is translated into behavior on public policy.” Additionally, this new generation of conservative Republican women has, in an effort to make itself electorally palatable for its party, pointedly spurned the attitude that liberal policies were in the best interest of women. Rep. Jacky Rosen’s staffer agrees with these estimations: “Republican women are more likely to cosponsor bills that are more symbolic and message-focused, [rather] than a hard policy bill.”

PROXIMITY TO REELECTION

Proximity to reelection as a factor affecting cosponsorship is essentially made negligible in the House, where all members are scheduled for reelection every two years. However, reelection proximity is a potential influencer on senators who serve six-year terms according to a staggered election cycle. At the beginning of the 115th Congress in January 2017, Class I senators faced reelection in two years, Class II senators in four, Class III senators in six years, and Class IV senators in eight years. As a result, proximity to reelection has been shown to affect cosponsorship rates. For example, in the 107th Congress, Rep. Marge Roukema (R-NJ) was rejected for Chair of the House Financial Services Committee; a far more conservative male colleague was given the post. The DW-NOMINATE model calculates Rep. Roukema’s ideology score for that Congress as 0.162.
and Class III senators in six. A handful of senators made announcements that they would forgo reelection to retire at the end of the 115th Congress, and a couple of senators who were appointed to finish out the terms of previous senators were up for special elections outside of their class.

Mayhew identifies reelection as the primary motivation for congressional actions, writing, “Congressmen must constantly engage in activities related to reelection.”

Reelection is seen as the chief goal because none of the other objectives Mayhew points—accruing institutional power and crafting good policy—can be achieved without it. Cosponsorship may qualify for some of the reelection seeking activities that Mayhew defines: position taking and credit claiming. Cosponsorship offers members an opportunity to bolster their legislative resume on issues that their constituents care about with less required effort than sponsoring, but with greater agency to assert ownership of the bill than simply voting affirmatively. The fact that congressional policymakers tout cosponsorship records on the campaign trail seems to affirm the theory that they see the cosponsorship of specific bills as important to their reelection efforts.

Shepsle, Dickson, and Van Houweling examine the impact of senatorial election cycles and posit that constituents adhere to Fiorina’s retrospective voting rule, or what they call “the WHYDFML Principle (“What have you done for me lately?”). In other words, Shepsle et. al believe that members intensify certain actions when reelection is in sight, because constituents are more likely to be paying attention to their decisions. It follows then that legislative behavior varies amongst reelection classes, including cosponsorship selections. Hall takes the same view, contending that cosponsorship is more a performance for external actors than internal ones, and that member constituencies shape cosponsorship decisions because of the reelection interest. Campbell finds an impact of reelection proximity on cosponsorship, but only for members in marginal seats. Finally, Sweeney tests out this theory on the cosponsorship trends for “reversal legislation,” or bills that overturn a Supreme Court ruling. He sees no statistically significant influence exerted by proximity to reelection on reversal legislation cosponsorship but does not void the arguments advanced by Shepsle et. al, Hall, and Campbell on this basis. Instead, he reasons, “Given the electoral incentives driving the cohort effect, legislation which is well suited for position taking and credit claiming will likely demonstrate a strong cohort effect.”

Mayhew clarifies that position-taking almost always occurs with valence issues, or those with no real ideological component and low political costs. Because valence issues are ultimately benign sentiments that the vast majority of any American constituency can agree on, it is electorally rational that policymakers pursue those for position-taking rather than more contentious matters, or wedge issues. Women-centric legislation is fascinating in this regard, because as a policy area it straddles both the most basic of valence issues (e.g., women should have equal opportunity to attend school) and the most controversial of wedge issues (e.g., abortion). Therefore, the attractiveness of cosponsoring women-centric bills as reelection nears likely varies on the bill content and how the member’s constituency feels about more controversial topics.

**SENIORITY**

Seniority as a factor is more tied to internal incentives for cosponsorship than electoral motivations. As noted earlier by Bernhard and Sulkin, a major attraction of cosponsorship is that it gives weaker actors a channel to harness political power by building coalitions. Seniority correlates strongly with institutional power in the Congress, as members with long tenures generally have established reputations in their chamber and hold positions in party leadership or committees. Because junior members do not have that accessibility to elite resources, they may be more compelled by the benefits of cosponsorship than their senior counterparts. Cosponsorship levels the playing field: as Swers explains, “First-term minority party members with limited influence over the policymaking process are just as free to cosponsor a bill as members of the committee with jurisdiction over the issue.” Additionally, senior members can be more selective about what bills they cosponsor because they perceive heavier costs with the act, given their high profile. For example, House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) cosponsored just three bills in the 115th Congress.

Campbell concludes that seniority has an effect on cosponsorship, but only in the House. He postulates that this is due to a distinction in seniority privileges between the two chambers, writing, “Unlike junior members of the House, junior senators enjoy regular contact with a larger portion of their chamber, are accorded significant public attention, and are generally not expected to become experts in a specialized
policy area. For this reason, senators have the opportunity to develop a reputation and influence without great seniority. Rocca and Sanchez and Harward and Moffett also note that freshmen members of the House cosponsor more in general to promote their policy agenda.

On the opposite end of the seniority spectrum, both Kessler and Krehbiel and Wilson and Young find that House legislators with amply longer tenures cosponsor less frequently. This appears to align with the Koger’s analysis, which establishes a significant relationship between seniority and cosponsorship for House members that were first elected prior to 1978, the year unlimited cosponsorship was first authorized. But a major caveat persists in applying their results contemporarily: in the 115th Congress, just a handful of members remained who began serving prior to 1978, before cosponsorship was readily used. If unfamiliarity with the practice, rather than a unique set of impetuses for senior legislators, is the instigator for this difference, then the phenomena observed by these studies may no longer be as pronounced. One might maintain that a viable alternative to cosponsorship is always unilateral sponsorship, and there is evidence in literature to indicate that senior members do sponsor more. Yet, cosponsorship and sponsorship are not mutually exclusive options. While senior members may sponsor at a more rapid rate, this does not necessarily make them any less likely to cosponsor than the rest of the body.

METHODS & ANALYSIS
RESEARCH DESIGN
Cosponsorship behavior is applied as a tool for measuring legislator attitudes toward women-centric bills. The impact of cosponsorship on bill passage is unsettled, but policymakers regardless consume resources to collect cosponsors, and each member of Congress cosponsors. Because legislators clearly regard cosponsorship as a valuable practice, cosponsorship decisions can be utilized to reveal how much significance congressional members ascribe to certain policy areas regardless of the legislative outcome. Furthermore, cosponsorship as an instrument is selected because it is a more overt indication of support than voting affirmatively, and a more collaborative action than unilaterally sponsoring legislation. Cosponsorship is also “not structured by party discipline or negative agenda control,” which is particularly imperative for intraparty factors such as gender, and which also enables the inclusion of data from the many bills that are never sent to the floor for a vote. These complexities with cosponsorship decisions therefore create greater space to assess how discrete elements inform legislative actions regarding women-centric bills.

To determine how certain factors may uniquely impact cosponsorship decisions on women-centric legislation, the cosponsorship trends of women-centric bills are contrasted with those of bills that are not explicitly women-centric in order to discern any significant differences in legislator behavior. More specifically, three main datasets are generated for cross-comparison according to gendered associations of each policy area. Dataset 1 is the variable of interest, comprising hard-feminine, women-centric legislation, namely bills with titles containing keywords women, woman, girl(s), gender; maternal, mom, maternity, or mother. Dataset 2 is a control variable, consisting of non-gendered education bills, with titles that include words education, educator(s), teacher(s), school(s), student(s), or college(s). Finally, Dataset 3 is another control variable, encompassing hard-masculine national security legislation, with titles containing the phrases national security, border security, secure borders, or defense; given that explicitly masculine items such as “man,” “men,” and “boy(s)” generally do not appear in the legislative lexicon, this selection instead registers the traditional gendering of defensive measures as implicitly masculine.

Terms for the selection criteria are identified on the basis of how effectively they retrieve bills from the intended policy area and exclude bills from unwanted policy areas. For example, the term “mother” and its various derivatives is chosen for Dataset 1 because it refers to a specific condition almost entirely exclusive to women, but the term “families” is rejected because it is quite broad and not explicitly restricted to a woman’s role. Likewise, Dataset 3 includes the term “national security” but not just “security,” since the term “security” too often flags social security bills, which are unrelated to the issue of national security. Additionally, the term “military” is omitted for Dataset 3 because it frequently nets legislation dealing with veterans’ affairs or military families; the term “defense” more successfully captures the martial aspect of national security legislation. As a final caveat, the coding of each dataset reflects societal associations with the legislative content in order to typify gendered behavior patterns in the Congress and does not necessarily imply that these bills cannot legislate benefits
for the opposite gender or non-binary people.

The search criteria for the three datasets produce 656 bills introduced in both chambers during the 115th Congress. The 115th Congress is selected for examination both because it is the completed Congress with highest women’s representation to date and because information for this congressional session is most readily accessible. After amassing the qualifying legislation, each bill is sorted into an original database with a list of its cosponsors. Cosponsors are then evaluated for the following, quantifiable factors of influence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influencing Factor</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Democrat, Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Female, Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>1-6 years served, 7-12 years served, 13-18 years served, greater than 18 years served</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to Re-election</td>
<td>In the Senate: Class I (reelection in 2018), Class II (reelection in 2020), Class III (reelection in 2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor rendered negligible in the House</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

Party, seniority, and proximity to re-election are chosen as factors because they have been previously recognized as traditional influences on cosponsorship in existing research literature. These factors are intended to represent a wide enough range of influences on legislative behavior to properly control for all potential explanations for statistically significant differences found in the data.

Every member that served at some point in the 115th Congress is included in the datasets, coming out to a total of 447 representatives in the House and 102 senators in the Senate. Hence, although the number of active members in the House and Senate are 435 and one hundred, respectively, this sum accounts for members that died, resigned, were appointed, or were elected during this period. The data is frozen as of the end of October 2018, and thus members that signed on to any of the studied bills after that date are not counted, nor are any bills that would otherwise be qualify-

Table 1 summarizes the membership of the 115th Congress. The table shows that Republicans control both chambers, and that Republican men constitute the largest group and Republican women the smallest.

Table 2 shows membership by seniority, dividing the term lengths into four groups: 1 to 6 years, 7 to 12 years, 13 to 18 years, and greater than 18 years. In both chambers, the largest group is the first while the smallest is 13 to 18 years. In terms of party and gender, Republican men with 1 to 6 years of service comprise the largest group in each chamber. At the other extreme, there are only two Republican women who have served over eighteen years in the House and no Republican women who have served 7 to 12 years in the Senate.

Table 3 shows senators by proximity to reelection as well as seniority. The proximity to reelection is evaluated as a factor only for the Senate because senators serve overlapping six-year terms while all House members serve concurrent two-year terms. The table shows a fairly balanced distribution among those having two, four, and six years to reelection, with each representing approximately a third of the chamber. In the group with two years to reelection, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans is nearly five to one. In the groups with four or six years to reelection, the Republicans outnumber Democrats nearly two to one. The largest group is Republican men who have served seven to twelve years and have six years to reelection. On the other hand, there are no Republicans with thirteen years or more of service who have two years to reelection. Also, there is only one Republican woman in the groups with two and six years to reelection.

Table 4 presents a summary of the bills evaluated, including gender of bill sponsors. The table shows that there are many more bills in the House than in the Senate. Of the three topics considered, the num-

6 There are currently three Independents in Congress: Rep. Gregorio Sablan (Northern Mariana Islands), Sen. Bernard Sanders (Vermont) and Sen. Angus King (Maine). All three caucus with Democrats and are therefore categorized as Democrats; There are currently no members of Congress who openly identify as non-binary.
ber of education bills is more than double the number of the other two topics combined. This is expected, as education is selected as a topic to represent a somewhat neutral issue that can serve as a control dataset to which women’s issues and national security issues can be compared. In terms of sponsor gender, men outnumber women in education and national security bills, but there are more women than men sponsoring women-centric bills. This is especially notable in the Senate, where women sponsors outnumber men by a ratio of nearly two to one, although men outnumber women in the Senate by nearly three to one, as shown in Table 1. To a certain extent, the more active role of women in sponsoring women-centric bills can be considered a tactical gesture: Rep. Jacky Rosen’s aide noted: “The Democratic party has a strategic goal of have women introduce bills that are women-centric. They feel that is a more effective way of introducing [this legislation].”

Table 5 summarizes cosponsorship data on all the bills shown in Table 4. Despite the ratio of education bills to women’s bills being greater than four, the numbers of cosponsors for the two topics are very similar. The large number of cosponsorships for women’s bills results in a mean number of approximately forty-four cosponsors per bill in the House, compared to about eleven for education and thirteen for national security. The table shows large variations in cosponsorship activity, with standard deviations greater than the means. Also, the median values are not close to the means, reflective of the wide dispersion in the distribution of the number of cosponsorships by bill. The Senate numbers display a similar disparity. The number of cosponsors in the House ranges from 257 to 0 and in the Senate from forty-eight to zero. Given the incongruence in the number of bills evaluated for each topic, as shown in Table 4, and the extreme variation in cosponsorship support, it is not instructive to compare cosponsorships for the full dataset.

Table 6 shows the same statistics as Table 5 except that it is limited to the bills with the top thirty cosponsorships for each topic. This table shows better agreement between mean and median and has improved standard deviations. For example, the mean for education bills in the House is fifty-nine, with a median of forty-four and a standard deviation of thirty-eight. These numbers show a more accurate statistical correlation than the corresponding values in Table 5, where the mean is eleven, the median is three, and the standard deviation is twenty-two. It should be noted that the magnitudes of the numbers, such as a mean of fifty-nine instead of eleven, is not important for comparing cosponsorship activity across topics, as only relative values are relevant, not absolute values. Other groupings from top twenty to forty were explored but the best statistics resulted when considering the thirty most cosponsored bills. To discount the effect of the large number of bills having no sponsors or only one or two sponsors and to provide a fair comparison of the three topics, the analysis in the subsections that follow is based on the thirty most-cosponsored bills for each topic and a total of ninety bills for the three topics. Table 7 shows cosponsorship by party and gender.

**IMPACT OF REELECTION PROXIMITY**

At first glance, graphing cosponsorship data for the three reelection classes in the Senate (Class I, Class II, and Class III) appears to indicate that proximity to reelection is a salient factor in women-centric cosponsorship; Table 8 clearly demonstrates a spike for members in Class I, those senators with two years or less to reelection. But a closer analysis of the data presented reveals that what seems to be the influence of proximity to reelection is merely a veneer for the effect of party. Of the three reelection classes, Class I boasts the largest portion of Democratic senators, with Republicans defending only five Senate seats in 2018 (see Table 3). Republican senators are allocated far more evenly between Classes II and III, which coincidentally happen to be those classes with lower reelection proximity. Because Democrats are generally far more likely to cosponsor and to support women’s bills, the sharp uptick for Class I cosponsorship is mainly driven by the distribution of party in reelection classes and not so much by the nearness to reelection. An aggregate examination of proximity to reelection crossed with the party and gender factors shows this, too; for example, the women-centric cosponsorship rate fluctuates little across the three classes for female Democrats (see Table 8).

Why do these trends defy theories developed by literature? One potential explanation is that senators do not find position-taking on women-centric bills particularly conducive to their reelection interests. However, the control datasets (education and national security) effectively negate this idea, as the cosponsorship patterns for those policy areas remain at a consistent level of support according to party and regardless of reelection class (see Table 8). A more plausible
reason is that there really is a cohort effect but it exists because parties typically accrue seats in a series of predictable waves, which subsequently results in large swaths of mutual party senators sharing the same reelection class. For example, the majority of Class I are Democratic senators because they won election in 2012, a presidential election year where Barack Obama headlined the ticket; most Class II senators are Republicans because they were elected in 2014, a midterm election year where the incumbent president’s party is inclined to lose seats in the legislature; and most Class III senators are also Republicans, because they rode Donald Trump’s coattails in the 2016 election. Additionally, the meager showing of reelection proximity as a predicting factor does not necessarily imply that members do not perceive cosponsorship as having position-taking utility, but rather that senators who do take advantage of its strategic benefits do so throughout their term and not just prior to reelection. Only an incredibly small percentage of constituents is so politically engaged that it monitors its senators’ cosponsorship records or seeks out such information, and these individuals likely do so regardless of reelection proximity. Most constituents may only become aware of what their senator has cosponsored if that member purposefully references cosponsorship history through public channels, such as a campaign website, a political ad, or a televised speech. While these constituents are receiving the information in high proximity to reelection, it is not necessary for this material to reflect cosponsorship activity which only ensued in the two-year run-up to that election. What matters is that the cosponsorship transpired, not when it took place. Therefore, cosponsorship as position-taking is not contingent on the reelection proximity link, and members have no strong incentives to change their cosponsorship behavior according to reelection schedules.

**IMPACT OF SENIORITY**

Like with reelection proximity, simply graphing the data appears to indicate that seniority has saliency, albeit with different trends for each chamber. In the House, cosponsorship rises over tenure length and in the Senate, cosponsorship drops with seniority (see Table 9 and Table 10). On the face of it, these patterns seem to convey that seniority’s influence is not only evident, but it is also the very opposite of what the literature projects. Again however, the purported effect of this factor in reality simply masks the role of party. By accounting for party dispersal over term length blocs, it’s revealed that seniority has no impact. In the House, the spike happens in the 18+ years group; but 66 percent of those members are Democrats, of which 32 percent are females, further exacerbating the interference of outside factors (see Table 2). In other words, these members cosponsor more frequently, seniority notwithstanding, and those legislators who are more hesitant about cosponsorship to begin with (Republican and male) also show no modifications when controlling for seniority (see Table 9).

The same relationship persists in the Senate, where a general trend line depicts the highest cosponsorship rates for the 7–12 years cohort, and then demonstrates a drop-off in cosponsorship for subsequent term length blocs. The 7–12 years group has the highest percentage of Democratic senators, at 56 percent of members in that category (see Table 2). Detailed examinations also reinforce that seniority does not alter legislative behaviors otherwise established by party and gender (see Table 10). Further, there is no evidence to suggest that junior House members cosponsor at statistically significant higher rates.

Why do junior House members fail to cosponsor with greater frequency than their more tenured peers? A conceivable cause for why such a phenomenon does not materialize is that seniority matters less than it once did in the House. Traditional congressional norms long dictated that the powerful committee system be oriented around seniority, but members began to chip away at these customs in 1974. Following an enormous post-Watergate wave for the Democrats, massive bands of junior members descended on the House and dismantled the use of the seniority system for choosing committee chairmen. Effacing the seniority system proved more expedient for the reelection needs of freshmen, and also offered young liberal Democrats a mechanism to navigate Congress without bowing to the whims of elder, conservative Southern Democrats. The strain on seniority was further aggravated twenty years later by Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA). Gingrich helped to recapture the House for Republicans in the 1994 midterms after
decades of Democratic control by capitalizing on conservative backlash to the Clinton presidency and touting a “Contract with America.” When he assumed the House leadership position, Gingrich often allocated lucrative committee posts, such as Appropriations, Commerce, and Judiciary, to new and inexperienced ideologues over senior members who were effective specialists but had working relationships with Democrats, a quality and choice that Gingrich resented. Erosion of seniority’s clout in the House continues in the contemporary era. For example, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) won over intraparty challenges to her speaker bid for the 116th Congress by promising incoming freshman attractive committee assignments. With so much power now concentrated in party leadership, and with media usage an efficacious medium for junior members to individually raise their public profiles, lack of seniority may no longer be as compelling a factor for junior members to cosponsor at higher rates.

**IMPACT OF PARTY**
The data reveals that House Democrats are 2.5 times more likely to cosponsor women-centric legislation compared to the average bill, and that Senate Democrats are 2.4 times more likely (Table 11 and Table 12). Identifying as a House Republican, however, makes a member 57 percent less likely than the average to cosponsor women-centric legislation and, for Senate Republicans, probability of cosponsorship diminishes by 58 percent (Table 11 and Table 12). When considering averages for women-centric legislation only, Democrats are also more probable cosponsors (185 percent in the House and 172 percent in the Senate), while Republicans have a much lower likelihood to cosponsor (32 percent in the House and 30 percent in the Senate). Democrats cosponsor more than Republicans do in all three categories—even for national security bills, a decidedly more conservative policy area—but they demonstrate a strong and consistent preference for women-centric bills. House Democrats cosponsor women-centric bills roughly 3.4 times more than they do security bills and 1.5 times more than education bills; Senate trends are similar. Republicans, on the other hand, show only weak preferences. In the House, they favor security bills, while in the Senate they cosponsor more women and education bills. Yet, the margins between category cosponsorship rates for Republicans are so slim that it is difficult to ascribe much significance to these patterns. Two things are perfectly clear regardless: Democrats cosponsor more than Republicans generally, and especially for women-centric bills.

The major takeaway from examining party as a singular factor is that Democrats are very energetic cosponsors, while Republicans are quite apathetic about the exercise. Subsequently, there is more evidence to suggest that Democrats are particularly passionate about women’s issues than there is to indicate Republicans are especially hostile. When contrasted with the women-centric cosponsorship activity of Democrats, the Republican response is considerably chillier. But when compared within their own group for cosponsorship rates in the control datasets, Republicans on the whole do not appear to engage with women’s bills in a markedly different manner. Given the high ideological coherence in both parties, this implies that there are statistically significant distinctions in how liberals and conservatives view the mere act of cosponsorship. Research literature indicates that liberals cosponsor more, but does not suggest that conservatives cosponsor at drastically lower levels. Since cosponsorship is a rather low-cost means of indicating legislative support for members of both ideologies, why does this gap exist? A viable explanation is a severe disparity in perceptions of how to best solve problems, where liberals are more attracted to collaborative actions—like cosponsorship—and conservatives would rather take an individualist approach. While this aligns with the extremes on both ends of the political spectrum (far left as communism and far right as fascism), this also reflects party messaging. Democrats often stress the importance of the common good, robust communities, and global cooperation, whereas modern Republicans tend to emphasize private enterprise, the nuclear family, and American isolationism. As a result, it is possible that Democratic legislators cosponsor more generously than their Republican colleagues because they employ criteria for participation that are somewhat less stringent.

And while the statistics cannot definitively prove that Republicans are noticeably unsympathetic

8 The 2016 presidential election exemplifies this perfectly. Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, who once penned the book It Takes a Village, ran on the slogan “Stronger Together.” Republican candidate, Donald Trump, by contrast touted that he would “make America great again” and promote “America First” policies, including the building of a wall on the Southern border.
to women-centric legislation as compared with other policy areas, the database does show that Republicans—much as the cross examination of party platforms predicts—focus on women in niche contexts. Women-centric legislation comprises a minority of the bills that Republicans most support en masse and the few bills that they do back in large numbers are most often maternal healthcare bills. This does not necessarily indicate that some Republicans do not cosponsor women-centric bills in other contexts, but it does indicate that Republicans as a whole most approve of women-centric legislation when it places women in the traditional role of motherhood.

**IMPACT OF GENDER**

Women legislators cosponsor more than men across all categories and in both chambers, even for the “masculine” national security dataset (see Table 11 and Table 12). For women-centric cosponsorship, being female makes a member of the House 2.3 times more likely to cosponsor women’s bills than the average and the rate in the Senate is almost identical. By contrast, identifying as male increases probability of women-centric cosponsorship by just 11 percent in the House and nine percent in the Senate. When considering only women-centric legislation, female members in both chambers are 1.7 times more likely to cosponsor than the average member. Female lawmakers also present a strong preference for women-centric legislation when compared with other policy areas. In the House, they cosponsor women’s bills 3.4 times more than they do national security bills and 1.6 times more than education legislation; in the Senate, females cosponsor women-centric legislation 3.6 times more than national security bills and 1.3 times more than education bills. Male lawmakers also demonstrate a preference for women-centric legislation in both chambers, but their support is considerably weaker than that of their female peers.

Accounting for party also produces some nuance. As it has already been established that party is a strong factor in dictating legislative behavior, whatever gaps in women-centric cosponsorship rates persist between Democratic men and Democratic women, and Republican men and Republican women, can be attributed to gender. There is a margin for Democratic men and women: House females are 28 percent more likely to cosponsor women’s issues than House males and Senate females are 36 percent more likely than Senate males. Yet the gender gap for Democrats is rather slim compared to the one for Republicans, where House females are twice as likely to cosponsor women-centric legislation than their male peers and nearly three times more probable in the Senate. Thus, dependent on party differences, the impact of gender is more pronounced for Republican females, as Swers found. Because all Democrats tend to share a liberal ideology, which makes them more welcoming of cosponsorship as an activity and women-centric bills as a policy area, there is less variation when controlling for gender. By contrast, Republican women must purposefully rebuff their party’s ideology both to cosponsor at higher rates and demonstrate a discernable preference for women’s bills, thereby making the influence of gender more salient. They do this to a certain extent and outperform the males in their party for women-centric support. However, when compared with Democrats, the influence of gender is not enough for Republican females to cosponsor women-centric bills at a sufficiently high frequency to outpace even male Democrats.

Remaining within the realm of gendered legislative behavior, this thesis also assesses whether the gender of a bill’s sponsor impacts cosponsorship trends for the three categories. The idea is consequentially substantiated that some policy areas are gendered, causing legislators to perceive colleagues of a specific gender as being more successful “experts” for those subjects. A corollary effect is that members may feel, consciously or not, that they are expected to introduce more legislation for these gendered topics. The data indicates that members are more likely to cosponsor women-centric bills that are sponsored by women, coloring that policy area as distinctively feminine. It also reveals that members show a preference for national security bills that are sponsored by men. These predications confirm that the “hard feminine” dataset, women-centric bills, is more frequently associated with the female gender and that the “hard masculine” dataset, national security bills, is more often connected with the male gender, although the latter association is weaker.

**PARTY VS. GENDER**

A combination of all the studied factors reveals the group that most often cosponsors women-centric legislation in the 115th Congress is Democratic female members of the House with 7–12 years of experience, and the cohort least likely is Republican male members of the Senate with 13–18 years of seniority.
and 4–6 years to reelection (see Table 11 and Table 12). However, since it is now clear that the data does not corroborate that reelection proximity or seniority impacts legislator behavior generally, no significance can be ascribed to either of the reelection groups or the seniority bracket. Still, this finding reinforces the idea that female Democrats are most wont to cosponsor women’s bills and that male Republicans are the least prone. In establishing that reelection proximity and seniority are both negligible factors, all persisting differences can be explained by considering party and gender.

Because the party gap is larger than the gender gap, it can be determined that it is party which exerts stronger influence and is ultimately the most salient factor: women-centric cosponsoring behavior of Democratic females more frequently aligns with the males in their own party than the women in the Republican party. This is exemplified by comparing statistical rates for Democratic men and Republican women, the actors positioned between either performance extreme. In the House, Democratic males are 2.8 times likelier to support women-centric legislation than Republican females, while they are 2.2 times more prone to cosponsor women’s bills in the Senate (see Table 11 and Table 12). These results conclusively demonstrate that when the two factors are juxtaposed in a vacuum, party outweighs gender. Consequently, congressional members can be ranked in likelihood to cosponsor women-centric legislation as follows: Democratic females, Democratic males, Republican females, and, lastly, Republican males.

Ideological disparities do play a role in Democratic men’s greater likelihood to cosponsor than Republican women, with some moderate Republican women cosponsoring women’s bills more frequently than the most moderate of Democratic men. However, current party-ideology cohesion is so high that these Republican women are outliers with anemic effects on the statistical trends. Rather, it is the more pronounced influence of that party-ideology cohesion which appears to encourage the ideological filtering discussed by Carroll, in which the average female Republican in the 115th Congress employed an approach to legislating so oriented around her party’s conservatism that she was able to effectively reject women-centric bills on the basis of their liberalism. Democratic men, conversely, act according to a set of ideological predilections that make them more sympathetic to women-centric legislation than would otherwise be prescribed by their gender identification. Essentially, support for women’s bills is so high in the Democratic party that identifying as Democrat intensifies cosponsorship rates for men in the party so that they are much closer, though not perfectly equal, to their female peers. These push-and-pull elements on both sides of the ideological range is what generates observed party-gender incongruences where Democratic males are more frequent cosponsors of women-centric legislation than Republican females.

That being said, even if party is the most powerful factor dictating legislative behavior, this thesis has found compelling evidence to indicate that gender matters too. Moreover, the results give credence to the theory that congressional actors do behave according to external cues such as personal identity, as gender is decisively more salient than two of the studied institutional factors, which each proved ultimately inconsequential. It remains the case that, while the Republican women in the 115th Congress are influenced by their gender, its impact does not adequately shift their women-centric cosponsoring behavior to the extent that they are indistinguishable from Democratic women.

CONCLUSION

In the November 2018 midterms, Americans elected a record breaking 113 women to the Congress. The 116th Congress’s freshman class is the most diverse in American history, including the youngest congresswomen ever elected, the first Native American congresswomen, and the first Muslim congresswomen. Consequently, women comprise nearly 24 percent of the 116th Congress, with 102 members in the House (23.4 percent) and 25 in the Senate (25 percent). It might also be noted that the vast majority of these new female legislators are Democrats—more specifically, 84 percent of the 116th Congress’s female delegation are Democratic women. But while female Democrats encompass more than 40 percent of their party’s lawmakers, a percentage steadily approaching parity, the number of Republican women has declined from the prior Congress to just 7.5 percent of their party.

The fact that the majority of female legislators in the 116th Congress are Democrats is unsurprising given what this thesis has ascertained. For all cosponsorship activity, and for women-centric cosponsorship patterns in particular, Democrats and females are quite conflated, while Republican and males are similarly linked. This produces a spectrum where the behavior
of Democrats and women tends to be “feminine,” or more collaborative and centered around women; and the behavior of Republican and men tends to be “masculine,” or more individualistic and less focused on women.

By observing the cosponsorship trends of the 115th Congress, this study has come to a number of major conclusions. Firstly, women-centric legislation in general receives higher rates of cosponsors than bills dealing with both education and national security. Democratic women, Democratic men, and Republican women all prefer women’s issues for cosponsorship over other policy areas, though the intensity of support diminishes in that order. Republican men sometimes show an incredibly small preference for women’s issues, but they are such passive actors in general that this is neither statistically significant nor consistent. The overall trend does prove, however, that there have been sufficient generational shifts in how women’s issues are perceived so that most congressional members recognize the importance of this policy area. That the majority of women-centric legislation is not law reflects both that cosponsorship has little effect on final bill passage, and that the party leadership of the 115th Congress, almost entirely Republican men, did not ascribe enough value to women’s issues to schedule these bills for floor votes. So, while support for women-centric bills is strong in certain corners of the Congress, apathy still persists in others.

Secondly, the very act of cosponsorship is divisive. It is far more partisan than previous literature indicates: Republicans are largely indifferent toward cosponsorship while Democrats use the tool with enthusiasm. Likewise, the exercise is also gendered. Women cosponsor more frequently than men, though this disparity is less pronounced than the one separating party activity. Both of these incongruences suggest that Democrats and women are far more willing to embrace collaborative actions than Republicans and men.

Thirdly, contrary to some theories advanced by scholars, seniority and reelection proximity are found to have essentially no impact on legislative cosponsorship. Any variations that the dataset seems to produce are in reality the influence of party, resulting from party distribution across tenure lengths and reelection classes. As discussed earlier, reelection proximity is likely a negligible factor because members can utilize their cosponsorship records for position-taking throughout their entire terms and intensify their references to it, rather than their actual behavior, as reelection nears. That the influence of seniority is trivial is probably the result of increasing power concentrated in party leadership and the crippling of the committee system. Therefore, junior members can overcome their secondary status by performing as good partisans and utilizing outside venues to build recognition.

Fourthly, Democratic women comprise the group that cosponsors women-centric legislation with the highest rates of regularity and consistency. Democratic men rank second, and Republican women are third. Republican men represent the group least likely to cosponsor women-centric legislation, compared both to the average bill and to the average member of Congress. This finding strongly verifies that party messaging on women’s issues is accurate. Democrats demonstrate a deliberate preference for supporting women in numerous policy contexts, while Republicans are generally concerned with women only when it relates to issues of abortion access or maternal healthcare.

Finally, to answer the party vs. gender debate that prompted this thesis’s research: party is the most salient factor dictating a member’s likelihood for women-centric bill cosponsorship. Gendered behavior is certainly present in the Congress and sex differences help to explain intraparty deviations in women-centric cosponsorship patterns, particularly for Republican women. Additionally, there is little doubt that female legislators generally provide substantive representation for women. But on the whole, party still proves to be more potent. Republican women are sufficiently conservative that, while still cosponsoring women’s issues more habitually than Republican men, they remain close enough to their party’s ideological core that Democratic men rather easily outperform them. Congressional members are not one-dimensional actors, so it should be made perfectly clear that party is certainly not the lone factor predicting cosponsorship of women-centric legislation—but it is definitively the most forceful.

Based on recent trends, it can be expected that the political climate will remain deeply partisan and that high ideological cohesion will persist in the near future, prompting the conjectures that thesis has put forth to endure. It is possible that at least part of the Republican party’s lethargic cosponsorship activity was precipitated by their majority role in the 115th Congress, and so future research might consider whether there are significant fluctuations in Republi-
can behavior when they assume the role of the minority party and accordingly have far less control over the floor agenda. But to truly build a bipartisan consensus on women-centric legislation so that female constituents feel most adequately regarded, moderate Republican women must reemerge in the legislative landscape. Without female Republicans who felt, much as they did in the eighties and nineties, an obligation to women more broadly, the status of women’s issues in the Congress is somewhat eroded. Such an expectation is certainly weighty, as women who are Republicans select into that group because they align with the intrinsic beliefs of their party and, as a result, such shifts in the ideological composition of female Republicans cannot be profoundly anticipated. Yet should Republican women ever realign more closely with Democrats than with their male colleagues on women’s issues, structural support for women-centric legislation in the Congress will intensify sharply.

FIGURES & TABLES

Figure 1: 115th Congress House Ideological Spectrum

Table 1: 115th Congress Membership

Table 2: Congress Membership by Seniority

Note: The table excludes Bob Corker (retiring), Jeff Flake (retiring), Orrin Hatch (retiring), Al Franken (resigned), Luther Strange (resigned), Thad Cochran (resigned), and John McCain (deceased).

Table 3: Senate Membership by Seniority and Proximity to Reelection

FIGURES & TABLES

Figure 2: 115th Congress Senate Ideological Spectrum
### Table 4: Number of Bills Evaluated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Cosponsor Statistic</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Percent Cosponsoring Based on Median</td>
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### Table 5: Cosponsorship Statistics Based on All Data Evaluated

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<th>Chamber</th>
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<th>Security</th>
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<td>Mean Number per Bill</td>
<td>36.70</td>
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<td>Standard Deviation per Bill</td>
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<td>Percent Cosponsoring Based on Mean</td>
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<td>Percent Cosponsoring Based on Median</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
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### Table 6: Cosponsorship Statistics Based on Top 30 Co-sponsored Bills

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<th>Cosponsor</th>
<th>Mean No. Cospon per Top 30 Bill</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Percent of Maximum Possible</th>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>55.90</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
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<td>House Male</td>
<td>55.90</td>
<td>26.77</td>
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<td>House Female</td>
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<td>Senate Female</td>
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<td>Senate All</td>
<td>17.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>House Male</td>
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<td>23.23</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>House Female</td>
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<td>12.7%</td>
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<td>8.0%</td>
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<td>Republican</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>4.47</td>
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### Table 7: Cosponsorship by Party and Gender

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Cosponsor</th>
<th>Mean No. Cospon per Top 30 Bill</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Security</th>
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<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Male</td>
<td>55.90</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Female</td>
<td>34.03</td>
<td>15.53</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Male</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Female</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate All</td>
<td>17.83</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8: Cosponsorship by Proximity to Reelection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Term Length</th>
<th>Mean No. Cospon per Top 30 Bill</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Percent of Maximum Possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>1-8 yr</td>
<td>39.57</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;8-14 yr</td>
<td>57.37</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;14 yr</td>
<td>57.37</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9: Cosponsorship by Seniority in the House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean No. Cospon per Top 30 Bill</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Percent of Maximum Possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>55.90</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Male</td>
<td>55.90</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Female</td>
<td>34.03</td>
<td>15.53</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Male</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Female</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate All</td>
<td>17.83</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>40.70</td>
<td>23.23</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Male</td>
<td>40.70</td>
<td>23.23</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Female</td>
<td>31.77</td>
<td>15.77</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Male</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Female</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate All</td>
<td>17.83</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Term Length</th>
<th>Mean No. Cospon per Top 30 Bill</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Percent of Maximum Possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>1-8 yr</td>
<td>39.57</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;8-14 yr</td>
<td>57.37</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;14 yr</td>
<td>57.37</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10: Cosponsorship by Seniority in the Senate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Term Length</th>
<th>Mean No.</th>
<th>Cosponsor per Top 30 Bill</th>
<th>Percent of Maximum Possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>1-6 yr</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7-12 yr</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13-18 yr</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;18 yr</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1-6 yr</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7-12 yr</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13-18 yr</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;18 yr</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>1-6 yr</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7-12 yr</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13-18 yr</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;18 yr</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Likelihood of House Cosponsorship Compared to Average Bill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Cosponsor Group</th>
<th>Average for All = 1.00</th>
<th>Average for Topic = 1.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party + Gender</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(1-6yr Term)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(7-12yr Term)</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(17-18yr Term)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(&gt;18yr Term)</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Cosponsorship by Seniority in the Senate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Cosponsor Group</th>
<th>Average for All = 1.00</th>
<th>Average for Topic = 1.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party + Gender</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(1-6yr Term)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(7-12yr Term)</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(17-18yr Term)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>(&gt;18yr Term)</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Likelihood of House Cosponsorship Compared to Average Bill
Table 12: Likelihood of Senate Cosponsorship Compared to Average Bill

Endnotes

sponsors.
8 Drew DeSilver, “Women have a long history in Congress, but until recently there haven’t been many,” https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/01/14/women-have-long-history-in-congress-but-until-recently-there-havent-been-many/.
9 Ibid.
11 Olga Zoraqi, personal communication, May 12, 2018.
15 Ibid.
19 Ibid, 3.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid, 228.
26 Fowler, “Legislative cosponsorship networks,”
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32Ibid.
33Ibid.
34Senate staffer, personal communication, October 31, 2018.
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41Zoraqi, personal communication.
42Ibid.
43Senate staffer, personal communication.
46Ibid, p. 192.
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62Zoraqi, personal communication.
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66Tina Smith, personal communication, November 28, 2018.
68Ibid.
72Wilson and Young, “Cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress,” 27.


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82 Ibid, 445.


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86 Frederick, “Are Female House Members Still More Liberal?” 98.

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88 Mayhew, Congress, p. 49.

89 Ibid, p. 16.

90 Ibid, p. 73.


95 Ibid.

96 Mayhew, Congress, p. 62.


99 Ibid, 419.


105 Zoraqi, personal communication.


107 Steven Smith and Christopher Deering, Committee in Congress (United States: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997), p. 50.


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INSTITUTIONS AND MISSING WOMEN
EVIDENCE FROM QING CHINA

SHAOYU LIU, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

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ABSTRACT
By constructing a prefecture-level dataset documenting the prevalence of female infanticide from historical gazetteers, I find systematic differences of female infanticide patterns across regions in Qing China (circa 1644-1911). Female infanticide and male-biased sex ratios were more prevalent in the south than they were in the north. To explain the reasons for such differences, I explore various institutional and environmental factors. I find that clan density proxied by the number of genealogies, soil texture and soil quality were strongly associated with prevalence of female infanticide in particular. However, different from a prominent view that attributes Confucianism as a cultural determinant of sex selection in China, my research shows that the impacts of Confucianism—or at least some aspects of it—do not hold a robust relationship with premodern sex selection.

In recent decades, China’s “missing women” problem, referring to the shortfall of female population compared to that of males, has generated considerable interest and heated debate among researchers. Birth sex ratio (defined as the number of males over 100 females) in China was 116.9 in 2000, far exceeding normal birth sex ratio range 105.0-107.0. The major form of prenatal sex selection after the introduction of ultrasound technology, sex-selective abortion, has been shown to be the key reason that accounts for the serious “missing women” problem in contemporary China. Sex selection and high sex ratio have deep historical roots in China. Before the advent of modern ultrasound technology, the primary sex selection method in China was female infanticide. As early as the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), Chinese and foreign sources widely documented the severity of female infanticide and the astonishing excess of males in China. In the 1920s, American economist John Lossing Buck concluded that China’s sex ratio “was larger than that for any other country listed” based on his survey of forty thousand households in rural China. Based on extensive historical evidence, it is plausible that certain slow-moving historical factors contribute to the practice of sex selection and the persistence of male-biased sex ratio in China.

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I collect historical data on female infanticide in county-level gazetteers, and combine them with prefecture-level estimates of prevalence of female infanticide in the Qing dynasty in order to explore geographical differences of historical female infanticide. While female infanticide was prevalent in the south, it was much rarer in the north and southwest. The geographical variation of female infanticide was largely consistent with sex ratio data drawn from a sample of 80 prefectures for which I could find records of population sex ratio data.

I then seek to understand reasons that lead to such differences across regions. I test various hypotheses highlighted by historians and demographers. These include a large number of socioeconomic factors such as the clan (i.e. a patrilineal kin group tracing ancestry...
back to a common male ancestor), Confucianism and dowry, as well as environmental factors such as soil, rainfall, and land productivity. I find that clan density, proxied by the number of clan genealogies, holds a positive and robust relationship with the prevalence of female infanticide. This empirical finding is consistent with historians’ argument that the clan institution is associated with son preference and higher gender inequality. Besides that, I also find that population density and loam soil texture are positively correlated with prevalence of female infanticide, suggesting that population pressure and environmental factors may directly affect sex selection.

However, the results of my analysis do not support the prominent claim that Confucianism uniformly leads to female deficits. My proxies of Confucianism—number of chaste women and Confucian academies—do not display a robust positive relationship with female infanticide. It is likely that Confucianism, as a cluster of institutions and cultural values, may have heterogenous effects on sex selection decisions, meaning some aspects may affect such decisions while others may not. I hence suggest some preliminary conjectures in Section 5.

The paper is structured as follows: The next section sets forth the relations between my argument and related literature. Section 3 provides a historical overview of sex selection and potentially relevant institutions in historical China. In Section 4, I present the construction of the data on institutions, namely the clan, Confucianism and dowry, among other variables. In Section 5, I present empirical results linking historical data of sex selection and measurements of institutions, and perform robustness checks. Section 6 discusses caveats and implications. Section 7 offers concluding remarks.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper complements a number of historical, demographic, and sociological studies on premodern sex selection behavior. Currently, studies that use quantitative methods on premodern sex selection and mortality primarily apply micro-level data to study individual choice of sex selection. Using data of 33,000 children from the Qing Imperial Lineage, Lee et al. (1994) documents that death rate for female infants during the first day of life was ten times higher than male infants, suggesting the prevalence of female infanticide among the Qing nobility. Based on individual-level data of 12,000 Chinese peasants in Liaoning province in the Qing dynasty, Lee et al. (1992) find female infanticide was prevalent and female infant mortality rate was significantly higher than males. There was also a number of studies on female infanticide in China on macro level, yet such studies were mostly qualitative. My paper thus contributes to this ongoing literature by quantitatively examining potential determinants on female infanticide on a national scale.

This paper also relates to a growing literature in economics that seeks to explain the historical origin of gender roles. Rossi and Rouanet (2015) find that ethnic groups that have traditional patrilineal kinship system display stronger son preference and male-biased sex ratios in Africa. Boserup (1970) and Alesina and Nunn (2013) argue that historical use of ploughs—which provide an advantage in farming to men relative to women—explains cross-country differences in female labor participation rates and sex ratios today. Fredriksson and Gupta (2018) find that pre-colonial agricultural experience, namely years from the agricultural transition to 1500 AD, is correlated with higher birth sex ratio today. Carranza (2014) finds that loam soil texture, which is suitable for deep land tillage, is associated with larger female deficits in India.

While a large part of this literature discusses cross-country variation of gender roles, my analysis focuses on historical sex selection in China specifically. This allows me to explore the country-specific factors and regional variations. This approach is similar to the work by Chakraborty and Kim (2010), who investigate regional variation of sex ratio in early 20th century India. Chakraborty and Kim (2010) find that clusters of institutions, including family system (exogamy and cross-cousin marriage), religion (Hindu, Muslim and Sikh) and caste (religious and others), largely account for systematic differences of sex ratio in north and south India. However, my findings posit interesting contrast with their work and point to the impact of country-specific institutions. China does not have many of the institutions that are found in India, such as cross-cousin marriage, caste and Hindu religion. Hence, the institutions that account for sex ratio variation in India likely do not explain the variation in China. My findings on the relation between the Chinese clan and premodern female infanticide thus provides supportive evidence that country-specific historical institutions are closely tied to sex selection.
3 HISTORICAL CONTEXTS
3.1 INSTITUTIONS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA
3.1.1 THE CHINESE CLAN

Many institutional factors have been postulated by scholars to explain China’s missing women problem. One particular reason for female deficits that has been discussed extensively is the Chinese clan.14 According to this literature, the patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal nature of Chinese clan lead to strong preference of sons over daughters, which ultimately results in female infanticide.15

The Chinese clan is a patrilineal kin group of related individuals with a common surname tracing ancestry back to a common male ancestor.16 As early as in the Shang dynasty (c.14th century BC – c. 1046 BC), the clan had already held the social functions of allocating wealth, social standing, and power.17 By the Qing dynasty, the patrilineal clan had become so prominent that it was regarded as a hallmark of Chinese culture.18 The Chinese clan shares the characteristics of patrilineality and patrilocal similarity to clans in many other societies, but is distinct in its strict hierarchical nature.

Patrilineality essentially refers to a system of inheritance in which family line and family property are only traced through male heirs. This system puts the value of sons over daughters, both in terms of property inheritance and ritual importance. First, since daughters could not inherit family land property, parents without a son could only choose to adopt a male heir, who was usually regarded as less trustworthy than a biological son. Otherwise, they have to relinquish their rights to select an heir and transfer such rights to clan elders.19 Thus, bearing a son is the only way that parents would expect to hold onto the family property and secure their standard of living in old age. Second, only sons could practice family ritual, which is a fundamental clan activity.20 This was another motivation for parents to bear a son in order to ensure continuation of ancestral rituals and survival of ancestral spirits.

The Chinese clan practices patrilocal marriage. When a woman marries into a clan, she ceases to be a member of her natal family and joins her husband’s family and lineage. Such marriage pattern not only cuts off her ties with her own parents, but also her social relationship in her lineage. Since daughters will always eventually be removed from them both physically and financially, parents cannot expect a daughters’ support in their older years and also their future contribution on social networks in their own lineage. In families with stronger clan ties, the expected returns from daughters are even lower. Thus, for parents, raising a daughter likely accrues less expected economic benefit than a son would.21 In such a system, the key strategy for parents was “to take more from daughters to give more to sons and thus get more for themselves.”22 The low perceived value of daughters, not surprisingly, corresponds to prevalent sex selection and male-biased sex ratios observed in Chinese clans by anthropologists.2

The Chinese clan is also characterized as a hierarchical institution based on seniority and gender. The power of the patriarch, usually the senior male member in a family, consists of two parts: the power of father over children, and the power of husband over wife. Such powers include disposing of family property, selling wives, and punishing family members. Beyond the extended family, a hierarchical relationship exists between the family patriarch (jiazhang), lineage patriarch (zuzhang), and clan patriarch (zongzu zhang).23 Such hierarchy strictly based on seniority and gender, may be a specific reason why the Chinese clan has persistent impact on gender inequality.24

3.1.2 CONFUCIANISM

A prominent view attributes Confucianism as the cultural root of gender inequality and excess female mortality. As early as the early 20th century, Christian scholars have charged the tolerance of female infanticide on Confucianism.25 More recent works emphasize the inherent gender hierarchical values in Confucianism such as “to place emphasis on men and to slight women.”26 Indeed, an aspect of Confucianism that is of “utmost importance” is its gender ideology.27 Confucianism places a particular emphasis in continuation of the family line by male heirs. In a sense, the survival of a family depends solely on the production of male heirs.28 This notion of continuing the family line through male heirs in Confucianism is consistent with patrilineal descent. As many dimensions of Confucianism and the clan are entangled, scholars have noticed the potential strengthening role of Confucianism on clans.29 Greenhalgh argued that Confucian culture contributes to the development of “the most patriarchal family system that ever existed.”30 Das Gupta argues that Confucianism incentivized people to develop corporate groups of patrilineages and

2 Guo (1987) studies 22 clan genealogies that documents total number of males and females in the clan and finds that sex ratios in these clans range from 104 to 222. Guo (2008) finds high unmarried rate for male members in clans in Hunan province and suggests high sex ratio as the cause.
resulted in a rigidly patrilineal kinship system that led to persistent prejudice against women. What’s more, Confucianism associates producing a son with the concepts of filial piety. A frequently cited Confucian axiom writes, “There are three unfilial things, and having no descendants is the worst.” Thus, producing a son is an imperative task for parents to conform to filial piety sanctioned by imperial law, and is also a key channel to improve a woman’s status and her bargaining power in the family. Another core doctrine in Confucianism is female chastity; Women should stay in the household realm, which is “women’s sphere proper”, to protect their chastity and show their loyalty to husbands. Foot binding and determination not to remarry essentially express the female virtue of lifelong binding with husband. The emphasis on chastity, leading to the seclusion of women in the domestic realm, could potentially strip women’s bargaining power in family and thus weaken the perceived value of a daughter compared to a son.

3.1.3 DOWRY
Dowry is also a frequently mentioned cause of missing women. Dowry is the transfer of property to the couple or groom at the time of marriage. It is now widely believed that large marriage payments to the groom’s family are associated with son preference. In China, dowry payment typically cannot be reverted to the bride’s family after the women become widowed or divorced. The economic cost of dowry could worsen the perceived value of having a daughter. It is thus not surprising that dowry is regarded as a fundamental cause of female infanticide. For instance, in 1879, the proclamation by Governor Cheng of Zhejiang Province criticized the heavy burden of dowry that led to female infanticide:

“The main cause of this crime comes from the excessive amount of spent on marriages. I have learned that among the people a man does not marry a girl without making extensive preparations. The costs sometimes rise from one hundred to one thousand taels of silver…The father-in-law and mother-in-law of the new bride measure the hate or love that they will show to her, on the importance or the scantiness of her dowry.”

3.2 FEMALE INFANTICIDE IN QING CHINA
Female infanticide has a long history in China. Before the advent of modern ultrasound technology which makes prenatal sex-selective abortion possible, female infanticide was the most prevalent form of postnatal sex selection. The legalist philosopher Han Fei documented incidences of female infanticide as early as in the 3rd century B.C. By the Qing dynasty, female infanticide had become a serious social problem in China both for its prevalence and severity. The practice of female infanticide as a local custom was found in twelve provinces. Various sources note that around thirty to forty percent of female infants were killed in some prefectures. Such a high level of female infanticide not surprisingly leads to an excess of males. For example, in Guangxin prefecture in Jiangxi province, the local gazetteer writes “three or four out of ten baby girls are drowned (by their parents), and females are outnumbered by males by thirty to forty percent.”

4 DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
In this section, I discuss my data sources for the dependent variable of female infanticide, and the main independent variables of interest including clan, Confucianism, dowry, and other historical covariates. The data for clan and Confucianism are available in 227 prefectures, and data for dowry is available for 105 prefectures out of 318 prefecture-level administration regions in the Qing dynasty in the early 19th century.

4.1 FEMALE INFANTICIDE DATA
It is a challenging task to obtain precise quantitative measurement of female infanticide even today, because of the concealed character of such practices. Thus, my measurement focuses on whether female infanticide was observed in a prefecture. My data source mainly comes from the Zhongguo fangzhi ku (China Gazetteers Database) developed by Beijing Erudition Repository (Boston, MA: Elibron Classics, 2005), Vol 12, October 1843, 540-548.
Digital Research Center. It encompasses over 4,000 volumes of gazetteers, 2,729 of which were written in the Qing dynasty, the period of interest. This dataset essentially covers all the prefectures and counties in China proper, the region of interest to this study. To measure female infanticide, I specifically look for “ni nü” (to drown girls) and “bu ju nü” (not raise girls), the most commonly used text to refer to female infanticide in the gazetteers. To fully utilize the information in county gazetteers below the prefecture level, I use fraction of counties that report the practice of female infanticide within a prefecture as the proxy for the prevalence of female infanticide. This measurement gives more variation than simply using an indicator of whether female infanticide is observed in a prefecture. I find female infanticide was observed in 472 counties, and in 124 prefectures out of 319 prefectures in Qing China. A map of the prevalence of female infanticide on the prefecture level is shown in Figure 1.

A potential concern is omitted observations. In other words, if female infanticide actually existed in a prefecture but was unreported in gazetteers, then this will bias our results either upward or downward. To deal with this concern, first, it is worthwhile to mention that government officials had incentives to record female infanticide, because the efforts to ban female infanticide were regarded as politically laudable. Government officials in the Qing dynasty frequently launched campaigns to combat infanticide, mostly in the forms of official proclamations banning infanticide, publicly circulated essays condemning the practice, and the establishment of foundling hospices. Further, my data is generally consistent with historians’ arguments that female infanticide was more prevalent in the south and east than the southwest and north.

Another important issue is that the reports of female infanticide may not actually reflect the severity of the practice. This may bias our estimates downward. Without precise historical data that document the severity of such practices, we could only explore the variation of its existence across regions. Nevertheless, historians found the most evidence of female infanticide in Jiangxi, Fujian, Hunan, and Zhejiang provinces. These provinces also have high prevalence of female infanticide in my sample in Figure 1. In other words, based on historians’ arguments, the prevalence of female infanticide largely correlates with its severity, therefore making this measurement justifiable.

4.2 MEASUREMENTS OF CLAN
Following measurement of clan in existing literature, I construct a clan density measure by dividing the number of clan genealogies by population or area in a prefecture to proxy the strength of clan. Clan genealogy is a book compiled by a clan that documents its history. Clan genealogies should reflect the essential characteristics of the clan for several reasons. First, writing genealogy is closely associated with ancestral worship, which is a crucial belief in Chinese tradition. According to Feng (2009), recorded genealogy is used to determine the relationship between ancestor and clan members, and strengthen the cohesion among clan members. Second, writing genealogy itself implies the mobilizing power of the clan, because writing genealogy usually includes considerable effort in collecting information on clan history and clan members. Third, clan genealogy provides the basis of power for clan patriarch. Clan genealogy includes the code of conduct, including norms of behavior, conventions and punishment rules, which the clan patriarch replies upon to organize the clan. As recording gene-
alogy is “essential to the existence of a lineage”, clan density arguably provide a reasonably good measurement of clan.49

I obtain data on genealogies from Huaren jiapu zongmu (Genealogy Knowledge Service Platform) collected by the Shanghai library. This database is regarded as the most comprehensive database for Chinese genealogy thus far. It includes more than 54,000 genealogy books of 608 surname groups. Of all the compiled genealogies, over 25,000 were written the Qing dynasty. As some prefectures were more sizeable than others, I use the number of genealogies in each prefecture divided by its population as a measurement of clan density.8

Although the number of genealogies has been used as a proxy of clan in many works thus far, it is crucial to point out certain caveats to interpret this measurement. The number of clan genealogies, excluding repeated ones, essentially captures the number of clans; however, it does not provide information on clan population and the differences between strong and weak clans. As women generally have lower status in larger and stronger clans, this measurement may not be ideal in capturing the particular effect of a strong clan, which could hold more collective property and possess higher mobilization power of clan members.50 Also, if clans are so large that they cover the whole population, then the number of genealogies essentially captures clan fractionalization instead of population share of clan members.9 These potential measurement errors could be significantly improved if the content of genealogy books becomes digitized, so that researchers could analyze and exploit the variation of many clan characteristics. Nevertheless, since genealogy relates to the essential nature of the Chinese clan, the number of genealogies probably provides the best possible measurement of clan at this point of time.

4.3 MEASUREMENTS OF CONFUCIANISM

It is a challenging task to measure Confucianism empirically, since it encompasses a wide variety of institutions, customs, and social norms. Another difficulty specifically related to this topic is that many Confucian norms and practices are entangled with those of other institutions, such as the clan. To estimate the impact of Confucianism, I use the number of honored chaste women—the epitome of Confucian gender ideology—as my main proxy.51 Honored chaste women were those who received “testimonial[s] of merit” (jingbiao) from the imperial Qing government until the end of Jiaqing period in 1820. In the Qing dynasty, the promotion of female chastity was taken to the extreme.52 Imperial and local governments built chastity memorial arches to honor chaste women, and the cult of widowhood elevated chaste women to the role of cultural heroes.53 To promote chaste women as role models, the government kept systematic records—records of honored chaste women and divided them into two categories: “chaste widows” (jiefu) who did not remarry after their husband’s death, and “widow martyrs” (lienu), who died to resist rape, committed suicide out of shame after sexual assault, purposely mutilated themselves to reduce pressure to remarry, or sacrificed themselves after their husband or fiancé’s death. My calculation, based on the Daqing Yitongzhi (Atlas of the Great Qing Dynasty) compiled by the Qing government, shows that at least 73,820 women had received the testimonial of merit from the emperor across 268 prefectures by the early 19th century.10, 54

8 I use the average population in five population censuses (1776, 1820, 1851, 1880, 1910) in the Qing dynasty to reduce measurement error, following the method used by Chen, Kung and Ma (2017). Number of genealogies normalized by land area essentially gives me the same result. See Appendix.


10 My calculation excludes those women who received the award for casualty in war and mass rebellions, since these awards are arguably less related to the idea of chastity. Also, I do not include chaste women in frontier regions, which are not in my main sample. It is worth mentioning that the number of chaste women enumerated in local gazetteers (awarded locally) far exceeds the number enumerated in the Official Daqing yitong zhi. According to one compiler of local gazetteer, “first we list those who were recorded in the previous gazetteer. Next come those who have received testimonials of merit from the emperor. Next appear those reported by neighbors (linli), local groups (xiangdang), and lineages (qinzu), and verified by our editors.” Xinming (Guangdong) xian zhi 1758, juan 24. I did not use enumeration in local gazetteers because
The number of honored chaste women provides a good proxy for Confucian values for women across regions. Represented

According to the Yongzheng Emperor, even people living in “remote mountains and deep valleys” and the very poor should have been able to “receive imperial favor” based on their merits. A potential benefit is that the number of honored chaste women could provide a consistent proxy across regions. However, if the number of recorded honored chaste women was determined by local authorities based on different criteria, then the difference between the number of chaste women across regions may reflect unobservable local characteristics instead of capturing the true effect of Confucianism on women. This was arguably not the case. Each year, lists of potential candidates were submitted by local governments to the central government, and it was the central government that evaluated them based on their deeds alone to determine whether they should receive the official testimonial. Therefore, the selection of chaste women should be relatively exogeneous to local influence and provide a consistent measurement across regions.

Since Confucianism also played fundamental roles in local education, I also enumerate the number of Confucian academies to capture the effect of Confucianism on education. The data for Confucian academies is compiled from Ji’s Zhongguo shuyuan cidian (A Compendium on the Chinese Academies), which lists Confucian academies for the period up to 1904.

4.4 DOWRY DATA
Unfortunately, there is no existing systematic dataset documenting the dowry system in premodern China. To empirically measure the heterogeneity of dowry system across China, I construct measurements of dowry practice based on qualitative descriptions of local marriage customs in gazetteers. Some local gazetteers do not provide consistent information on chaste women across regions.

Since the Jingbiao system separated the Manchus and their associates (Mongols and Han Chinese in Eight Banners) with Han people, and recipients of testimonial of merits were disproportionately biased towards ethnic Manchus (Lu, 2012), I choose to exclude observations with significant Manchu recipients (Shuntian Fu, Fengtian Fu and Jinzhou Fu).

4.5 OTHER VARIABLES
In addition to the key variables of clan, Confucianism, and dowry, I control for a large number of covariates that may possibly affect premodern sex selection behavior in my estimates. These controls include geographical, environmental, historical, economic, political, and cultural covariates.

4.5.1 BASELINE GEOGRAPHICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
4.5.1.1 DISTANCE TO COAST AND RIVER
I choose to control for distance to the coast and distance to a river in the analysis. Distance to the coast is important because prefectures located near the coast were historically more influenced by Western trade and missionary activities. Christian missionary activities may have directly affected norms and behaviors related to sex selection, as many missionary groups spread Christian views on abortion and launched campaigns against infanticide in Qing China. Distance to rivers largely dictated inland transportation in premodern times and may correlate with the spread of Western technology and knowledge. Hence, I include measurements of distance to the coast and distance to a river from the prefecture capital. The data on historical geolocation of rivers and coast are provided by China Historical GIS (CHGIS).

4.5.1.2 RAINFALL
Rainfall may be associated with sex selection either by indirectly affecting agricultural conditions or by directly affecting child survival. In China, southern rice-growing with monsoon climates have higher
rainfall than northern wheat-growing regions. To test the direct effect of rainfall on sex selection, I include aggregated annual rainfall into my analysis. The data on rainfall are obtained from University of Delaware Precipitation Data.\textsuperscript{12}

4.5.1.3 SOIL QUALITY
Carranza (2014) emphasizes the importance of soil texture on female infanticide in India.\textsuperscript{62} To account for the potential effect of soil quality, I include controls for soil quality in my analysis. The measures of soil quality include soil texture, moisture, nutrition availability, and workability. Data are obtained from the Harmonized World Soil Database.\textsuperscript{63}

4.5.1.4 AGRICULTURAL SUITABILITY
Agricultural suitability affects economic prosperity and many other human behaviors, especially in agricultural societies of premodern times. Anthropologists and historians argue that sex selection may be a direct response to agricultural conditions. The logic is that in years of agricultural failures, families would control the number of children they intended to have through infanticide.\textsuperscript{64} Agricultural conditions may also have an indirect effect on sex selection through their impact on various institutions such as the clan and dowries.\textsuperscript{65} To control for the direct effect of agricultural suitability on sex selection, I include two measurements for agricultural suitability in my estimates. The first measurement is the Caloric Suitability Index, developed by Galor and Ozak (2016), which captures the variation in potential crop yields across regions.\textsuperscript{13} This dataset estimates average caloric suitability for each cell of size 5’ by 5’ in the world, and I match it to each prefecture. The second measurement is the registered cultivated land area in each prefecture, enumerated in the land tax chapters in the Daqing Yitong zhi.

4.5.2 HISTORICAL CONTROLS
4.5.2.1 ECONOMIC PROSPERITY
Some scholars claim that poverty was a primary cause of female infanticide in traditional Chinese society.\textsuperscript{66} To capture the effect of economic prosperity, I employ two proxies, population density and urbanization. For population density, I calculate prefecture population density using the average population in five national censuses (1776, 1820, 1851, 1880, 1910) in the Qing dynasty, divided by the area of the prefecture. This data is obtained from Cao (2000).\textsuperscript{67} For the urbanization rate, there is no precise measurement in the relevant period on the prefecture level. Thus, I turn to Rozman’s (1974) classification of Chinese cities on four levels: very large (Beijing), large (population of 300,000 and above), mid-level (population between 70,000 and 300,000), small (population between 30,000 and 70,000), and others (population less than 30,000).\textsuperscript{68}

4.5.2.2 POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF PREFECTURES
To account for a number of potential economic and social covariates for which direct measurements are difficult to obtain due to the limitation of historical data, I turn to official government designations of each prefecture on four levels in 1820 based on four special criteria: chong (important in transportation and communication), fan (important in business), pi (difficult to gather taxes in) and nan (high in crimes). Based on these criteria, all prefectures are designated into four groups: zuiyao (greatest importance), yao (considerable importance), zhong (mid-dling importance), and jian (little importance). These designations are collected from the CHGIS.

4.5.2.3 RELIGIONS
A vibrant existing literature discusses the potential effect of religion on gender inequality. Cross-cultural studies show that religion has a persistent effect on gender well-being outcomes.\textsuperscript{69} The most important traditional religions in China are Buddhism and Taoism. Buddhism, which emphasizes karmic justice and opposes killing, including infanticide, may attenuate sex selection and biased sex ratios.\textsuperscript{70} Taoism, according to many scholars, challenges the prevalent patriarchal view on women, and various Taoist deities appear in traditional folklores as judges for the punishment of drowning girls.\textsuperscript{71} To evaluate their impact on sex selection, I use the number of temples of each religion as a proxy for their influence. Data on Buddhist temples are obtained from CHGIS (2007), which geocoded 2,408 Buddhist temples across China before and during the Qing period. Data on Taoist temples are obtained from the siguan (temples) chapters in the Daqing Yitong Zhi (1842).\textsuperscript{14}

5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 EMPIRICAL SETUP
To examine the impact of clan on sex ratios, I use the...
following baseline regression:

\[ Y_p = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot Clan_p + \beta_2 \cdot Confucian_p + \beta_3 \cdot Clan_p \cdot Confucian_p + \beta_4 \cdot X_G + \beta_5 \cdot X_H + \tau_p + \epsilon_p \]  

Equation 1

The dependent variable \( Y_p \) is the sex selection practice of the population of a prefecture \( p \). The key explanatory variables are \( Clan_p \), the measurement of clan density proxied by the number of genealogy books compiled in the Qing dynasty divided by land area, and \( Confucian_p \), the number of honored chaste women normalized by land area in prefecture \( p \). To explore the interaction between clan strength and Confucianism, I add an interaction term between the two. \( X_G \) is a set of baseline control variables, including distance to the coast, distance to a river, and agricultural suitability. \( X_H \) is a set of historical controls consisting of three parts. The first part is historical economic prosperity, for which I use two proxies, population density and urbanization. The second part consists of the political importance of a prefecture as designated by the government. The last part is religion, consisting of measurements of the strength of Buddhism and Taoism. \( Tau_p \) is the province fixed effect controlling for unobservable effects related to provinces. I report robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level to deal with the potential within-province correlation of the error term.

To explore the effect of dowry (although on a subnational scale because of data limitations), I add dowry as an explanatory variable in equation (2):

\[ Y_p = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot Clan_p + \beta_2 \cdot Confucian_p + \beta_3 \cdot Dowry_p + \beta_4 \cdot X_G + \beta_5 \cdot X_H + \tau_p + \epsilon_p \]  

Equation 2

### 5.2 OLS RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable is prevalence of female infanticide</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.064***</td>
<td>0.045**</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>0.047***</td>
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<tr>
<td>( \text{Clan density} )</td>
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<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
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<td>Chaste women</td>
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<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>( \text{Confucian density} )</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province Fixed Effect</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment controls</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics controls</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Culture controls</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>227</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
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<td>0.746</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.795</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted ( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.758</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Results are reported with robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered on province level. The units of observation are prefectures. Clan density and chaste women density are normalized by population and then take natural log. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.

Table 1: OLS Estimates: Clan and Confucianism on Female Infanticide

Table 1 reports the ordinary least square estimation results. In all specifications, the result consistently shows that clan strength has a significant, positive effect on female infanticide.

However, it is perhaps surprising that Confucianism, proxied by the number of honored chaste women in a prefecture, does not have a significant positive impact on female infanticide, nor do its interaction term with clan, or the number of Confucian academies have. This result suggests that it is necessary to take a closer look at potential channels of Confucianism.

In section VI, I will discuss potential explanations for why Confucianism may not lead to more sex selection.

### 5.3 ROLE OF DOWRY

To understand the effect of dowry on practice of female infanticide, I add my measurements of dowry into equation (2) in prefectures for which I have dowry information. I report the regression results in Table 2. Table 2 shows that in my sample of 105 prefectures, dowry has a positive effect on female infanticide, but the effect is not significant when province-fixed effects are included. However, after the inclusion of dowry dummy variables, the effect of clan density on female infanticide remains significant.
5.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Given the results above, it is likely that clan strength has a crucial effect on sex selection behavior. In this section I pursue a list of robustness checks to validate this argument.

5.4.1 DROPPING REGIONS WITH SIGNIFICANT ETHNIC MINORITIES

It is plausible that measurement errors of sex selection and various explanatory variables were greater in regions with significant ethnic minority populations, since the imperial government generally had less influence in these areas. Hence, I report the results of equation (1) in Table 3, this time excluding prefectures in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces in which there were significant populations of ethnic minorities.

The results in Table 3 have slightly larger estimates of the coefficients. The effect of clan strength on female infanticide remains significant, consistent with the estimates in Table 1.

Table 2: OLS Estimates: Clan, Confucianism, and Dowry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable is prevalence of female infanticide</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0.070***</td>
<td>0.048***</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clandensity * clandensity</td>
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<td>-0.020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: OLS Regression Excluding Ethnically Minority Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable is prevalence of female infanticide</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>dowry</td>
<td>0.259***</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.083*</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>clandensity * clandensity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.024)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 presents province-level sex ratio data obtained from imperial memorials. Both data-
sets provide consistent suggestions that the southwest and north had relatively normal sex ratios, but that sex ratios in the south and southeast were abnormally high. These data are also consistent with qualitative evidence that female infanticide in these regions led to high sex ratios.\textsuperscript{16} For example, in the 17th century, Fujian gazetteer (Fujian tongzhi) writes about female infanticide in Pucheng County, stating that “the prevalence of drowning girls here is more prevalent than other counties, and six or seven out of ten males are without wives.”\textsuperscript{73} In the Guangxin prefecture in Jiangxi province, the local gazetteer writes that “three or four out of ten baby girls are drowned (by their parents) and thus females are outnumbered by males by thirty to forty percent.”\textsuperscript{74} Although the enumeration of population in different prefectures may not be accurate based on contemporary standards, the prevalence of female infanticide is generally consistent with data on population sex ratios, thereby adding confidence to the main results.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Provinces & max & min & mean & std & n \\
\hline
Southwest & 130.94 & 101.1 & 117.07 & 8.15 & 31 \\
Northwest & 146.59 & 107.84 & 123.42 & 12.22 & 10 \\
North & 128.23 & 111 & 118.39 & 7.47 & 6 \\
Southeast & 145.83 & 108.34 & 132.69 & 12.46 & 7 \\
East & 180.33 & 107.4 & 136.05 & 26.85 & 5 \\
South & 215.22 & 112.2 & 145.58 & 28.17 & 16 \\
Total & 215.22 & 101.1 & 125.07 & 20.16 & 80 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Summary Statistics of Prefecture Level Sex Ratios Grouped by Macro Regions}
\end{table}

\textbf{5.4.3 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE APPROACH}

In this section, I pursue an alternative strategy by using an instrumental variable approach. The choice of instrumental variables is based on historical determinants of clan development. Two explanations have been proposed to explain the geographical variation of clan strength. A group of scholars argue that the Chinese clan emerged in times of population migration.\textsuperscript{75} Greif and Tabellini (2017) emphasize that military conflicts between Han Chinese political regimes and ethnic minorities triggered the migration of clans to the south. Specifically, they assert that the conflict between the Jurchen Jin and Song dynasty in the 12th century was a critical historical juncture that lead to mass clan migration and “forever altered the territorial distributions of the Han people.”\textsuperscript{76} It is also plausible that the migration of clans was triggered by historical weather shocks such as drought and flood. Weather shocks may directly lead to migration in cases of large famines, or cause wars and conflicts which force people to migrate.\textsuperscript{77} These historical weather shocks could be possible instruments for clan migration. However, most clan migration preceded precise historical weather data, so I am not able to pursue this strategy.\textsuperscript{17}

Another group of historians links clan development to agricultural patterns. Several channels have been identified. According to Hu (1948:15), Hsiao (1960: 329), and Potter (1970), agricultural surplus is essential to finance lineage organizations that provide many public services including education, defense, and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{78} Freedman (1966) and Potter (1970) suggest that stronger lineages developed in regions with rice agriculture because rice agriculture generates significantly larger annual surplus than other crops for clan activities.\textsuperscript{79} Freedman steps further and argues that the food surplus accumulated in a highly productive rice economy leads to clan corporate prop-

16 In Guiyang county, Hunan, the governor writes, “inspecting the pao-chia (household registration) and enumerating (persons) family by family, we found that males outnumber females by seven out of ten”. (refer to Guiyang Xianzhi, 1867[18]). For more records of sex ratio in gazetteers, see Wang (2006) for summary.

17 Annual whether data on the prefecture level only starts from the 15th century in the Ming dynasty (State Meteorological Society, 1981). Most clan migration occurred before the Ming dynasty (Ko 1997).
Wetland rice agriculture demands intensive capital and labor in land reclamation, irrigation channels, planting, transplanting, and harvesting. While wet rice agriculture has a higher yield than other crops, it is also much more risky as few other crops can be grown in submerged water. Hence it is plausible that in rice growing areas, the clan took the responsibility of pooling and distributing resources as corporate property, which in turn "promoted the development of large agnatic communities." Another channel discussed by Huang (1985), emphasizes the difference of collaboration required in wetland versus dryland cultivation. He notices that in northern China where dry land agriculture was the norm, agriculture required more animal power and less collaboration within families. Hence, dry land agriculture does not have "sufficient economic importance to form a basis for strong lineage organizations." 

In light of the arguments made by these historians, I use the geo-climate suitability of wetland rice as an instrumental variable. I obtain data of the geo-climate suitability of wetland rice agriculture from the FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database. The database contains suitability and potential yields for wetland rice for five arc-minute by five arc-minute grid-cells globally. Notice the potential yield calculated in this database is determined by natural conditions including temperature, precipitation, sunlight, and soil quality. These conditions are not determined by human activities, so this instrument solves the issue of the endogenous choice of rice cultivation. I use the suitability of cultivating wetland rice with low input level, meaning production based on "the use of traditional cultivars, labor intensive techniques, and no application of nutrients, no use of chemicals for pest and disease control and minimum conservation measures." This corresponds well to cultivation methods in premodern times. I construct the instrument by matching grid-cells to each prefecture and calculating the average estimated potential production of wetland rice in each province. To deal with the potential concern that rice suitability has a direct effect on the economic value of women, thus violating the exclusion restriction. Existing literature discusses this possibility: Bardhan (1974) argues that rice transplantation requires more intensive female labor, and survival chances of girls should therefore be higher in rice growing regions than in wheat growing regions. However, Jacoby (1993) finds that the contribution of female labor in rice agriculture was less than that of male labor. Quisumbing (1996) suggests that the relative role of males and females in rice agriculture may also depend on technology, which affects the nature of gender division of labor by task. Nevertheless, the literature does not reach a consensus. The empirical analysis by Chakraborty and Kim (2008) also does not show that rice cultivation directly hold correlates with historical sex ratio in India. The discussions among these scholars mainly focus on the economic effect of rice agriculture on women, but my analysis takes on a new approach; rice agriculture

Table 5: Instrumental Variable Estimates: First Stage

| IV Estimates: Second Stage: Dependent Variable is female infanticide |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Clan density | 0.274*** | 0.264*** | 0.217*** | 0.204*** | 0.160*** |
| (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.035) |
| Province Fixed Effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Geographical controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Environmental controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Economics controls | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Culture controls | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 220 | 220 | 220 | 219 | 219 |
| R² | 0.301 | 0.354 | 0.477 | 0.511 | 0.580 |
| Adjusted R² | 0.298 | 0.345 | 0.457 | 0.480 | 0.552 |

Notes: Clan density is normalized by population and then take natural log. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust. *** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
may affect sex selection through the alternative channel of historical clan development. Given the positive relationship between rice agriculture and clan strength, this channel may be very significant in the context of China specifically; the instrument may not be ideal, but does shed light on the role of the environment on historical clan development.

6 DISCUSSION

6.1 CONFUCIANISM

patriarch As Confucianism does not hold a robust relationship with female infanticide as shown above, in this section I attempt to clarify Confucian views on female infanticide, and highlight several alternative explanations. According to Edlund and Lee (2013), Confucianism has “not only a unilineal view of descent emphasizing the male line, but also lack condemnation of infanticide.” It is undeniable that certain Confucian values were discriminatory against women. However, the role of Confucianism on female infanticide in pre-modern times demands a second look. In the setting of historical China, Mungello argues that “on the one hand Confucianism encourages female infanticide by honoring age over youth and males over females. And yet the cruelty of drowning girls is at odds with the fundamental Confucian value of Benevolence (Ren)…one might compare Confucianism’s attitude toward infanticide to the conflicted role of Christianity in regard to slavery. Although some Christians claimed that African slavery was justified by certain passages from the Bible, others argued that it was a violation of the fundamental teaching of love that Jesus preached.” The conflict of female infanticide with the core Confucian doctrine may be a key reason why the Qing literati repeatedly initiated combat against female infanticide, by issuing official proclamations, writing essays, and establishing foundling hospices. This could be one reason why the role of Confucianism is unclear.

Another potential reason is specific to the concept of widow chastity in Confucianism. The promotion of widow chastity may actually reduce female infanticide by increasing the value of women in the remarriage market. The number of honored chaste women perhaps not only reflects the strength of Confucian gender norms, but also results in a large number of women missing from the marriage market. Rowe finds a large number of young women became widowed because of the prevalence of child marriage and high rate of child death. Guo estimates that chaste widows, counting only those who received official recognition, numbered over one million in the Qing dynasty. Because of the strict criteria for eligibility to receive the testimonial of merit, apparently a much larger number of women chose to remain chaste in widowhood in reproductive age than those who were honored. Such a large number of women refusing remarriage potentially increases the comparative advantage of women in the marriage market, therefore possibly increasing the perceived value of having a daughter.

It is also possible, although counterintuitively, that chaste widowhood may have increased the status of women and thus increased the potential value of having a daughter. According to Rosenlee, remarriage for a widow, usually in the form of selling by her parents-in-law, entailed losing her right to inherit the property of her deceased husband on behalf of her sons, and also led to a decrease in her status from her sons’ mother to the new bride in hierarchical families organized by the principle of seniority. On the other hand, chaste widows were regarded as community honors and formed the collective memory that represents “local custom.” Chaste widowhood was thus a rare chance for a woman, who was excluded from the civil examination system and ritualistic recognition associated with being an official, to bring honor and real benefit to her family. The families of chaste widows may have received a gift of silver, and the chaste widow would be memorized in local history books, enshrined in temples along with filial sons.

These explanations are conjectures that remain to be tested and verified. However, the empirical result, along with alternative explanations, indicates that various dimensions of Confucianism, and their interaction with social environment, may have had a heterogeneous effect on people’s behavior regarding sex selection.

6.2 CLAN AND DOWRY

While various descriptive evidence suggests that the clan and dowry are more or less related to female infanticide, their institutional traits differ significantly. The clan may be classified as a slow-moving institution that has lasting influence. Historians and economists have noticed not only the persistence of the institution itself, but also the persistence of cultures associated with it. The clan’s rigid gender hierarchy, unilineal view of ancestry, and roles in sustaining cooperation may intervene in people’s economic decision making and infiltrate cultural norms.

18 “Any woman who became widowed before age 30 and remained widowed until age 50, or died before 50 and had been widowed for more than 15 years, could be awarded the testimonial of merit and enshrined in the temple honoring chaste and filial persons (jiexiao ci)” (Fang Dashi. Pingpingyan Sangcan tiyao, referring to Daqing Huidian, Huæ lou zhihao cunban. Hefei, Li jingdianfanke, 1900).
In other words, while the economic value of sons could be higher in clans because of institutional traits associated with the clan, such as patrilocal marriage and patrilineal descent, it is also likely that the clan relates to the strong belief of son preference. Although son preference is hard to directly observe in a historical context, recent work on contemporary China provides empirical evidence that the clan strongly relates to an individual’s son preference and also to higher sex ratio at birth, suggesting the embedded and slow-moving nature of the clan. Dowry, as a social custom, may not have a persistent effect on sex selection compared to the clan. According to a large number of contemporary and historical sources, the main reason that dowry may lead to infanticide is the financial cost incurred the bride’s family. There are abundant instances that show that the cost of dowry fluctuated considerably in history. Evidence from Qing gazetteers documents cases where the custom of expensive dowries disappeared over several years, and also cases where dowry prices soared over decades. If the price of dowry fluctuated considerably depending on various socioeconomic reasons, its effect on sex selection may be less stable over time. Moreover, bride price coexisted with dowry in Chinese history. The bride price could sometimes exceed that of the dowry by far, thus making a son economically more burdensome in this regard. Hence, it is perhaps hard to arrive at a conclusive answer to the effect of dowry on sex selection behavior over the long run.

6.3 GEOGRAPHICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

In previous sections, I have discussed the effects of institutions on female infanticide and highlighted the impact of the clan. However, this does not mean that geographical and environmental factors are not important. In fact, I find that soil texture, soil quality (nutrition), and rainfall are positively correlated with female infanticide (see Table 10), and loamy soil texture and soil quality are statistically significant in all specifications. These findings are generally consistent with existing literature. Chakraborty and Kim find that higher rainfall is associated with higher population sex ratio, and Carranza finds that loamy soil texture correlates to higher deficits of girls in the context of India. A particular empirical challenge is to disentangle the effects of these constant environmental factors from the effects of institutions. While environmental factors such as soil, rainfall, and agricultural conditions may have a direct impact on sex selection, they may also affect the endogenous formation and evolution of institutions, and could even have differential direct effects on sex selection depending on existing institutional factors. I have already discussed the role of rice agriculture on clan development in previous sections, and scholars have also argued that plough-oriented agriculture may relate to dowry. How does environment affect the formation and evolution of institutions? To what extent can sex selection behavior be explained by institutional factors alone?

7 CONCLUSION

This paper explores sex selection and sex ratio imbalance in premodern China. By collecting historical prefectural-level data from gazetteers, I find that the prevalence of female infanticide and sex ratios varied systematically across regions in Qing China. Female infanticide was more prevalent and the sex ratio was higher in southern China than in northern China. I then attempt to understand the impact of various institutional and environmental factors on sex selection behavior. In particular, I find that female infanticide was more prevalent in regions with higher clan density, verifying existing hypotheses raised by demographers. Other institutional factors such as Confucianism and the dowry system hold less robust relationships with female infanticide, at least in my choice of measurements. For environmental factors, loamy soil texture and soil quality correlate with female infanticide, suggesting that sex selection behavior can be at least partially explained by environmental factors.

The results of this paper also raise questions to be explored in future research. An empirical challenge is to disentangle the effects of environmental factors from that of institutional factors. The direct effect of geography and environment on sex selection may gradually vanish at least in areas where patterns of agricultural activities have changed fundamentally over the last century. Yet, institutions may persist and continuously affect social norms and people’s choices. Also, premodern institutions may change over time and interact with the development of formal institutions and penetration of Western knowledge. Their direct and indirect roles on sex selection behavior and sexist beliefs in China today largely remain a puzzle. These are difficult questions to ponder and answer. Nevertheless, as historical institutions persist into the present day, and socio-cultural factors continue to affect sex selection decision-making, a better understanding of China’s historical institutions could help us understand the roots of gender inequality today.
APPENDIX

A. URBANIZATION IN THE QING DYNASTY
Rozman (1974) originally uses a three-level classification of Chinese cities: level 1 (over 1,000,000), level 2 (300,000-899,999), level 3a (70,000-299,999) and level 3b (30,000-69,999). In my analysis, I code 3a as 3, 3b as 4 and those prefectures without any classified city as 5.

B. DOWRY SYSTEM
I ranked dowry practices on a scale from 1 to 3. If the custom of marriage includes little to no transfer of property or gifts from the bride’s family to the groom’s family, I code it as 1. If the custom of marriage includes dowry but varies depending on the economic condition of the bride’s family, I code it as 2. If the custom strictly requires a large dowry, I code it as 3.

C. SEX RATIO
My sex ratio data are taken from 2 sources. The prefecture-level sex ratio data are obtained from digitalized local gazetteers at Beijing Erudition Digital Research Center. This includes 80 observations in 14 provinces, for which year of observations range from 1660 to 1908, with most data from the period between 1741 to 1851. The provincial level data are obtained from Gongzhongdang Qianlong Chao Zouzhe (Official memorials of the Qianlong era) Taipei, National Palace Museum, 1982.

Figure 3: Clan Density (ln(genealogy/population)) Mapped to Administrative Boundaries in 1820

Example: female infanticide in Pingyang county, Zhejiang province, documented in a biography in Gazetteer of Guangzhou (Guangzhou fuzhi) (1879), V127.
Table 7: Sex Ratio Data in Six Provinces

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Macro Region</th>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1751</td>
<td>Zhiili</td>
<td>North</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>Zhiili</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>116.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>Zhiili</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>121.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Zhiili</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>119.46</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>East</td>
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<tr>
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<td>East</td>
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<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
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</tr>
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics

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Data are retrieved from *Gongzhongdang Qianlong chao zouzhe* (Official memorials of the Qianlong era) Taipei, National Palace Museum, 1982.
## Table 9: OLS Regression Listing all Covariates

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**Notes**: Results are reported with robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered on province level. The units of observation are prefectures. Chlor density and child women density are normalized by population density and then take natural log.
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Notes: Results are reported with robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered on province level. The units of observation are prefectures. Clan density and elastic women density are normalized by land area and then take natural log.

Table 10: Genealogy Normalized Using Land Area Instead of Population, Listing all Covariates
### Table 11: OLS Regression using Indicator of Female Infanticide (1 if female infanticide is observed in prefecture, 0 if not) instead of Fraction of Counties that Observed Female Infanticide

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Results are reported with robust standard errors. The units of observation are prefectures. Clan density and chaste women density are normalized by population and then take natural log.

**Notes:**

***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.

Table 11: OLS Regression using Indicator of Female Infanticide (1 if female infanticide is observed in prefecture, 0 if not) instead of Fraction of Counties that Observed Female Infanticide
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Guo, Songyi 郭松义. Qingdai renkou wenti yu hunyin zhuangkuang de kaocha 清代人口问题与婚状况的考察 (The investigation of population and marriage conditions in the Qing dynasty) (Zhongguo shi yanjiu 中华史研究, 1987(3)).

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CHANGING OF THE GUARD
THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ON DECENTRALIZATION

LAURA WOOD, VASSAR COLLEGE

ABSTRACT

Over the last few decades, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have gained considerable influence in global politics. However, the economic literature concerning these organizations has failed to analyze this trend, and simply assumed that NGOs react to change rather than initiate it. In this paper, I propose an economic formalization of the impact of NGOs on governmental structure in aid-recipient countries, using decentralization as an indicator for governmental organization. In this cross-country analysis, the results suggest that there is a small, but positive correlation between NGO activity and levels of decentralization. This correlation persists when NGO presence is instrumented for by the log of the total number of people affected by natural disasters, a variable that acts as a control for potential endogeneity between the decentralization and aid presence variables. This relationship indicates the early stages of a trend in which NGO presence correlates positively with decentralization, contributing to new directions in the research.

In recent years, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become a popular topic among economists. This is due largely to a spike in NGO activity and influence over the past three decades. Most economic studies were prompted by the “industrialization” of development NGOs following the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization. Original NGO structures were typically private, voluntary associations whose members raised funds in support of a shared mission. These organizations were characterized as “close-knit and self-sacrificing,” similar to many current grassroots organizations. However, in the post-Cold War era, the NGO template changed due to shifts in donor preferences and developments in foreign aid policy. Since then, NGOs have increased their influence in developing countries and have become major actors in not only development projects, but also public service delivery and governance. NGOs now provide all manner of basic services from healthcare and emergency response to educational and employment programs. As of 2015, NGOs supplied about 50 percent of total healthcare expenditure in Haiti. Moreover, 80 percent of the country’s education was run by NGOs or private institutions. In terms of governance, these organizations are involved in democracy building, conflict resolution, and political advocacy. NGOs in Kenya have gained seats on policymaking committees and participate in planning and budgeting to promote the democratization of public services. Further, some research argues that NGOs in Brazil played an important role in advocating for a democratic transition after the economic crisis in the 1980s. Even in the United States, NGOs maintain a close relationship to the government and regularly advise on US foreign assistance policy. Over this period, the roles NGOs occupy have shifted dramatically in both the public and private spheres—from development intermediaries to key power brokers.

As NGOs have repositioned themselves in the development context, the definition of these groups has become less clear. The literature commonly defines them as groups independent from governments or political parties, not-for-profit, and non-criminal. More formally, the World Bank defines them as “private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services or undertake community development.” In addition to these broader objectives, the World Bank divides these organizations into two categories: “operational” and “advocacy.” For the purposes of this study, I intend to focus on operational NGOs, which are primarily development focused, rather than advocacy NGOs, which are policy driven. This is mainly due to the greater availability of
data on NGO development projects. Moreover, since today’s development projects are the main avenue through which NGOs offer economic and welfare services traditionally provided by governments, focusing on operational NGOs allows me to better trace the shift in power dynamics between governments and NGOs.\(^{13}\)

Despite the ever-increasing connection between NGOs and governance, the growing body of literature surrounding this so-called “business of poverty” focuses on the impact of these organizations on development indicators such as poverty and growth. Most studies that do focus on NGOs and governing institutions are restricted to the effects that institutions have on NGOs. In the past, these two relationships have been the most common in the literature. Organizations usually “followed” the aid money donated from more developed economies and established themselves in countries in need of development projects. Under this framework, their success depends on the political, social, and economic environment of the recipient nation. If NGOs achieved their goals, their activities would subsequently impact development indicators.

However, the power of NGOs in the global development sphere has expanded tremendously from simply following indicator outcomes. NGOs have grown in number and scope for over forty years. According to the Union of International Association’s *Yearbook of International Organizations*, international NGOs increased from 14,000 in 1985 to 25,000 in 2011 and 38,000 in 2018.\(^{14}\) David Korten, a prominent international development scholar, argues that in the late 1980s, NGOs had evolved beyond the early stages of “organizational evolution,” and entered into a third generation.\(^{15}\) They increased in size, professionalized staff, and moved beyond grassroots operations. Further, Michael Bratton observed that NGOs gained a voice in the international development arena.\(^{16}\) Moreover, while a majority of foreign aid was provided to governments in need for distribution, by 2004, NGOs “were responsible for about $23 billion of total aid money or approximately one third of total overseas development aid.”\(^{17}\)

The growing influence of NGOs over the past three decades suggests that the nature of the relationship between NGOs and aid-recipient governments is changing. Traditionally, governments are thought to dictate NGO behavior, but the expansion in NGO power suggests that the reverse relationship may exist and that these organizations drive government activity. This study intends to fill the gap in the current literature, which focuses mainly on factors that influence NGOs, and, instead, to analyze the potential influence that NGOs may have on their recipient governments. To study the extent of this impact, I chose to use decentralization as a proxy for government structure. Decentralization is defined as the transfer of power from a country’s central government to sub-national governments, semi-independent government organizations, or the private sector.\(^{18}\) This phenomenon often occurs in developing countries as a result of disenchantment with traditional forms of centralized government, predominantly national, caused by perceptions of corruption, lack of accountability, or failure to provide adequate services.\(^{19}\) Decentralization is a particularly useful gauge of governance as it can provide a quantifiable standard to evaluate changes in government structure and is frequently associated with the economic growth and development of a nation. A causal relationship between NGOs and decentralization would indicate that NGOs may be encroaching on the power of their governmental counterparties. A quantitative definition of decentralization is included in the Empirical Strategy section below.

Because this research relies on an analysis of an already well-documented causal relationship, it faces a major problem of endogeneity. It could be that decentralization is a poor development indicator and, thus, that NGOs establish themselves in decentralized countries. It may also be that decentralization solely has an effect on NGO activities, while a perceived NGO impact may actually be caused by an outside factor such as the maturity of institutions within the recipient government. Although this may present a major challenge to this research, analysis of growing NGO authority is important to theories of aid policy and to the power dynamics of international development.

The results of this study reveal that NGO presence has a small, but positive, correlation with decentralization. Although not statistically significant in all analytical specifications, the data suggest that the impact of NGOs may need several years to fully take effect and that at this point, only the early stages of a trend are visible. However, studying the relationship over this longer time scale potentially introduces other confounding variables, suggesting that the effects of long-term political trends, economic cycles, or country-specific conflicts are also useful directions for fu-
ture research on the influence of NGOs on government structure and behavior. Additionally, this research exposes the poor quality of decentralization and NGO data, demonstrating the need for more in-depth study of NGOs and their potential influence. This study supports the idea that NGOs can impact decentralization and, more broadly, the governmental structure of aid-recipient countries.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is no particular literature that investigates NGO impact on decentralization, although a significant body of work may be combined to develop a useful empirical model for this study. A number of studies have explored the classification of decentralization in a development context. In a seminal work that provides a theorem for decentralization, Wallace E. Oates asserts that the transfer of power to local governments would improve public efficiency on the grounds of economic efficiency. Another theoretical framework, produced by Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, proposes a method of comparison between decentralized and centralized provision of goods. The authors find that decentralization may cause conflicts of interest in local jurisdictions driven by differences in public spending needs. Despite extensive theoretical definitions, few studies of decentralization provide ways of measuring the phenomenon. In Raymond Fisman and Roberta Gatti’s 2002 analysis of decentralization on corruption, the authors quantify decentralization as “the subnational share of total government spending.” The World Bank also uses this measure to determine decentralization. These works, while useful for gathering analytical and conceptual frameworks, do not consider the impact of NGOs.

The existing literature surrounding the relationship between NGOs and decentralization is split into two categories. The first analyzes the effect of existing decentralization in governments of developing countries on NGO activities. These studies find that decentralization can be helpful to NGO performance depending on regional political context. For instance, Bratton finds that in Africa, decentralization allowed for easier negotiation between political entities and NGOs. However, the authors note that the same would not be true in Latin America or South Asia. The study suggests that decentralization is helpful to NGOs if governments are stable and confident; otherwise, battles for autonomy and service provision are likely. Another study by Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt breaks down decentralization into political and economic components and uses the Oates’ decentralization theorem. The authors find that fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on NGOs whereas political decentralization has no effect.

The other body of decentralization-NGO literature examines the impact of the decentralization of aid distribution on NGO performance. Current studies have produced mixed results about the impact of aid distribution on NGOs. Some find that aid decentralization has a negative impact on NGO performance due to conflicts of interest or lack of quality membership. A study conducted by Dean Chahim and Aseem Prakash showed that NGOs had gained an unprecedented level of influence in Nicaragua and that their performance was limited by their need to secure donor funds. The need for donor funding that is amplified in a scenario of decentralized aid distribution is found to alter the priorities of NGOs and their members and, thus, their performance. Other studies focus on the political implications of decentralized aid distribution on NGOs. Brown et al.’s analysis revealed that aid funneled through NGOs led to shifts in political preferences in local communities in Brazil. This NGO activity would, then, change the political context and potentially lead to the problems suggested by the aforementioned body of literature.

While there is ample literature on decentralization generally, and specifically on the impact of decentralization on NGOs, economists have devoted little attention to the reverse relationship. This is surprising given the growing influence of NGOs on governance in developing nations. However, there are two recent empirical economic studies that suggest NGOs can influence government policy behavior, indicating a potential causal relationship in which NGOs are influencers in the state-NGO dynamic. Youngwan Kim focuses on the influence of NGOs on states’ foreign aid policy behavior. The author concludes that NGOs, acting as agenda-setters and policy advisers, have a statistically significant impact on the US foreign aid agenda. Additionally, Kendra Dupuy et al.’s analysis of the effect of NGOs on regulation in aid recipient countries finds that several middle-to-low-income nations instituted restrictive legislation on NGOs in attempts to limit the amount of foreign aid money funneled into these organizations. The governments believed that by bypassing the state, NGOs would
gain influence in their nations. Although not focused directly on decentralization, these studies’ interest in the power of NGOs to influence government policy demonstrates that economists are beginning to notice the growing authority of NGOs in the aid and development sphere.

There is also literature that references the direct influence of NGOs on decentralization, but it is limited to anthropological, geographical, and political studies. Anthropological studies suggest that decentralization caused by the presence of NGOs is a result of donor influence. Gina Porter argues that in the Ghanian context there is evidence of "donor-sponsored decentralization." This decentralization then leads to a new tier of local NGOs that are not focused on the needs of the people. Instead, they focus on the prosperity of the people who started the organizations, reinforcing a pattern of decentralization. Geographical studies concentrate more on the inequality between areas and their relative vicinity to NGO activity. Nonetheless, they too find that the impact NGOs have on governance and decentralization is heavily donor-sponsored. Alternatively, certain political studies focus on the accountability of NGOs, focusing less on the donor issue. Jennifer Brass found that in Kenya, NGOs are a major part of public service provision, and that there exists a relatively strong partnership between the two entities. It could be that in developing countries, it may be helpful to have decentralization supported by NGOs.

My study builds on the theoretical frameworks of decentralization proposed by Oates and Fisman and Gatti and on Kim and Dupuy et al.’s analysis of NGO influence to create an economic formalization of the impact of NGOs on decentralization in the governments of developing countries. My research explores the opposite directional relationship from that currently addressed in the literature, and will help establish a basis for future research on NGOs’ ability to influence the behavior and structure of aid-recipient governments.

III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To analyze the impact of NGOs on decentralization, the main hypothesis is that as the presence of NGOs increases, the level of governmental decentralization increases. I will use the general specification:

\[ \text{Decentralization} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ NGO presence} + \delta + \epsilon \]

NGOs primarily move to countries to provide public services for populations in need and tend to choose countries where governments are unable to provide for their populations. Therefore, I expect that the presence of NGOs will affect the way governments provide those services. With NGOs on the ground, governments may choose to delegate or to forego the delivery of certain services. This point has been discussed in several non-economic studies, but has not been analyzed using an empirical economic model.

There are several different measures for decentralization, but government expenditure is the most widely supported in the literature as an appropriate measure of decentralization. Emulating Oates, Fisman and Gatti, and the IMF, I will use the total expenditure of local and state governments (central government) divided by the total expenditure of the general government (the sum of state, local, and central). There are also other measures of decentralization suggested by the IMF, which include tax effort, revenue, and compensation of employees as other indicators of decentralization. However, due to data constraints, primarily a lack of reporting in tax and revenue surveys, these variables did not provide measurable results.

The variable “NGO presence” will be defined as the number of foreign aid-sponsored development projects present in a given country per year. Focusing solely on the number of organizations present in a country does not take into account the full extent of NGO activity. However, when searching for more in-depth indicators, the data is lacking. Most NGO data relies on self-reporting by each individual organization and there is currently no database or study that has compiled or streamlined the statistics. To overcome this issue, I utilized data on aid-sponsored projects to create a proxy for measuring NGO involvement. Kim employs a similar strategy to measure the impact of US-based NGOs on foreign aid policy behavior. Their study utilizes the foreign projects data of forty countries to quantify NGO impact in aid-recipient countries. In the following section, I expand on modifications to NGO presence, which narrows the scope of the variable to better suit the purposes of this analysis.

Several studies refer to the close relationship between NGO activity and foreign aid-funded development. Bratton found that in the 1980s there was a large influx of foreign aid into the voluntary sector. He indicated that there was a shift in policy where the aid-donating governments shifted economic resources
away from recipient governments to NGO-sponsored development projects. Janet G. Townsend et al. discuss how in the 1980s and 1990s foreign donors, especially governments, “increasingly sent ‘direct funding’ to NGOs,” for development purposes.42 This study goes on to describe NGOs as “the executing agents of an aid policy.”42 Dupuy et al. reference that Western governments “realized NGOs would find it difficult to raise resources internally within resource-poor countries, and viewed international financial support as an appropriate way to establish and strengthen the domestic [recipient country] NGO sector, and to support the on-the-ground work of international NGOs.”43 This larger supply of funding has led foreign aid-funded NGO activity to grow exponentially. The theme of the authors’ study focuses on aid-recipient governments setting restrictions on the amount of aid funneled into NGOs. This indicates that there is a substantial amount of foreign aid money associated with NGOs. Nicola Banks et al. suggest that NGOs have now been coopted into the international aid system.44 These studies demonstrate that most foreign aid-sponsored development projects are carried out by NGOs, and thus, provide a useful proxy for NGO presence.

I will also utilize instrumental variable analysis to account for possible endogeneity. As an NGO-to-decentralization relationship has not been studied, the current literature has failed to produce an established set of instruments for NGO presence. However, Kim found that the logged number of individuals affected by natural disaster was a useful candidate.45 They observed that NGOs act first in areas struck by a natural disaster. Although the author focuses on the influence of NGOs on foreign aid policy, this instrument is still applicable to my research.46 In the middle-to-low-income nations that I observe, NGOs have greater resources to provide relief in the event of a natural disaster. They commonly have an infrastructure in place to provide emergency care earlier and more effectively than an aid-recipient government. The main issue with this instrument is that it may not be completely exogenous itself. Natural disasters can affect GDP growth, which then impacts the level of decentralization in a country. However, the close relationship between NGOs and governments of recipient countries make it extremely difficult to find a perfect instrument. To analyze the relationship between those affected by natural disasters, decentralization and NGO presence, I carried out a simple correlation test. Table 1 below shows the correlation between those affected by natural disasters, NGO presence, and standardized decentralization. The correlation between NGO presence and those affected by natural disasters (.3749) is much higher than the correlation between affected citizens and decentralization (.0997), indicating that the instrument has a much stronger impact on NGOs than decentralization. Thus, the log of people affected by natural disasters is an effective instrument to support the direction of the relationship in which NGOs influence decentralization.

Additionally, I plan to use several controls that account for aspects of NGO activity and levels of decentralization that are present in the current literature. The most important is the log of the total dollar amount of aid committed to a given country per year. Aid donation is included as a control for the maturity of institutions within a country. This is most likely correlated with NGO activity in a state and decentralization, which would make aid donation a useful confounding variable. The logarithm is used to reduce the influence of outliers and the amount of variation in the model. Other controls will include income, population, region, infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births, NGO regulation in the recipient country, and governance indicators. Income, population, and region are all standard measures that control for differences in a country that could affect decentralization or NGO activity. The log of income and population is taken to account for outliers across this diverse set of countries. Infant mortality accounts for the socio-economic differences between the predominantly aid-recipient countries. Statistics specific to poverty do not provide enough data to produce robust results. Restrictive NGO regulation in recipient countries would directly impact how NGOs would be able to effect change in a given country. Finally, governance indicators include control of corruption, accountability, rule of law, political stability, and government effectiveness. Control of corruption measures perceptions of the government’s use of power as a means of private gain, including both “petty and grand” forms of corruption.47 Account-
ability gauges a government’s ability to obey the rules of society such as upholding property and contract rights. Political stability accounts for the likelihood of political instability and the potential for politically motivated violence. Government effectiveness captures perceptions of an administration’s ability to provide public services and to create and implement policy. Together, these governance measures control for the political and institutional differences within the countries in this study. These measures are standardized for ease of interpretation with standard deviations ranging from -2.5 to 2.5. Additionally, I will include lagged variables (2, 5, 10, and 16 years) for NGO presence to account for the time it may take NGO influence to take effect. These are modified by the aforementioned control variables in order to account for the existence of broader macroeconomic trends over the given time periods.

IV. DATA

The data for this test were selected from two sources: the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY) and AIDData’s Research Release from 2016. The GFSY data measures a variety of government activities in 190 countries from 1972 to 2015, including revenue, taxes, and expenditures. Due to a lack of data in other years, I restricted the sample to the period between 1995 and 2011, and to countries that reported data for local or state and central governments. I also removed developed countries such as the United States because as with most developed countries, they tend to be aid-donating rather than aid-receiving. Additionally, their governments tend to be more stable and thus, would not experience a comparable level of NGO influence on their government structure. Kim notes that the relationship between NGOs and developed governments is informational and advocacy based. NGOs directly lobby the governments of developed countries or garner domestic support for aid distribution to developing nations. Thus, NGOs in this context have influence on policy behavior, but not on the operating structure of the government, which is the primary focus of this study.

This left a remaining thirty-three middle-to-low-income countries that were predominantly aid-recipient nations. The AIDData dataset is a database of 1.5 million aid-sponsored development activities from 1947 to 2015. The data have been limited to the time period and countries available in the GFSY data. Together, these datasets allowed me to test the effect of NGO presence on the incidence of decentralization.

This study may encounter econometric issues. First, the issue of adequate data may pose a problem for the final results. The GFSY dataset relies on government self-reporting of their spending at each level of government. Due to this reliance on self-reporting, there were several missing values of decentralization spanning different time periods. This is a pervasive issue associated with survey-originated data. To support a robust number of countries, I use two multiple imputation methods to fill missing decentralization values, a strategy common in the literature. The first method is STATA’s “regress” imputation method, which fits a Gaussian normal regression model to a data set filled in with statistically inferred observations (Greenspan, 62; Stata Journal). Note that these values are statistically-based “best guesses” and are not real observations. The predictive mean matching method “pmm” is similar to “regress” except that it only imputes values that were actually observed for other units. Thus, the range of imputed values will always lie between the minimum and maximum of what is observed in each variable. The latter method is growing in popularity because its range limitations help control for implausible values. Both models were used to ensure that the type of imputation method did not affect the results.

As discussed above, this study is also at risk of endogeneity bias. I will use the log of people affected by natural disasters to help control for this issue. The data on those affected by natural disasters were pulled from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ (CRED) EM-DAT database. Additionally, the data for the majority of controls were compiled from the World Bank database. The data for NGO regulation were pulled from Dupuy et al.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std. Decent</td>
<td>4.59e-99</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2.87e+17</td>
<td>1.26394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Decent - Imputed</td>
<td>8.16e-10</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3.245099</td>
<td>2.386852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Presence</td>
<td>223.513</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>382.2307</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(donation)</td>
<td>20.05473</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>1.956786</td>
<td>7.600903</td>
<td>24.87009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>5.177163</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>1.115382</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.2672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Pop)</td>
<td>15.70375</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>1.798359</td>
<td>11.22929</td>
<td>19.31599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>20.70182</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>16.11828</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-1.323059</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.7451957</td>
<td>-1.444359</td>
<td>2.41669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>-0.0723297</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.6893149</td>
<td>-1.770218</td>
<td>1.340561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>-1.289497</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.7298794</td>
<td>-1.70773</td>
<td>1.763961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>-0.0873817</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.7720255</td>
<td>-2.114264</td>
<td>1.538779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Effectiveness</td>
<td>-0.0072515</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.7031962</td>
<td>-1.340613</td>
<td>2.433312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Regulation</td>
<td>0.9950521</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>0.293478</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Summary Statistics
V. RESULTS
I. OLS REGRESSION

Table 3 reports the results of OLS regressions on the thirty-three countries from the GFSY data. The first regression was done with the missing values included. In the second regression, I controlled for aid donation. Aid donation is a key confounding variable, which helps to account for the effect that aid may have on both NGOs and decentralization. The next regression shows the results of a limited time period between 2006 and 2011 because those years had the most decentralization data for each country. The third and fourth regressions include one of the two imputation methods discussed above. They produce coefficients that are close to one another, indicating that the results are not affected by the imputation method.

NGO presence has a negative coefficient, indicating that NGOs have an overall negative relationship with decentralization. The coefficient is also statistically insignificant and very small. It implies that an increase of one project decreases decentralization by -1.15e-04 standard deviations. This may seem small, but as we see above in the summary statistics, the average number of projects is approximately 246 projects and the average yearly increase in projects is 49.39. Thus, it is more likely that, if 100 projects enter a country, decentralization will increase by 0.01 standard deviations - shift of 0.4 of a percentile. Additionally, shifts in government structure and the impact of NGOs may take time to materialize, indicating a need for lagged variables.

Table 3: Simple OLS Regression
(Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Effect Std. Decentralization (No aid)</th>
<th>(2) Effect Std. Decentralization</th>
<th>(3) Effect Std. Decentralization</th>
<th>(4) Effect Std. Decentralization</th>
<th>(5) Effect Std. Decentralization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO Presence</td>
<td>-1.15e-04</td>
<td>0.000211*</td>
<td>7.07e-05</td>
<td>4.37e-05</td>
<td>4.62e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.000108)</td>
<td>(0.000123)</td>
<td>(0.000144)</td>
<td>(0.000110)</td>
<td>(0.000110)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Aid Donation</td>
<td>-0.135***</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0292)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.0222)</td>
<td>(0.0228)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.0112</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imputation</td>
<td>YES - Regress</td>
<td>YES - PMM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When controlling for aid, the results suggest that NGO presence has a positive correlation with decentralization, significant at one standard level of significance for the non-imputed regression. The coefficient also increases in magnitude, implying that NGOs may have a stronger influence than previously expected. Aid donation has a negative impact on decentralization, indicating that aid money in and of itself supports the centralization of government. The coefficients on both variables decrease and the level of significance falls when the imputed values for decentralization are added. This suggests that NGOs may not have as strong of an influence on decentralization.

II. FIXED EFFECTS, CONTROLS, AND LAGS

The next set of regressions included controls, country and time fixed effects, and lags. The results above indicate the need for controls in order to account for some other variables that may affect decentralization. Country fixed effects are crucial to this analysis as there is a wide variety of countries from different regions and development backgrounds, which could affect the impact of NGO presence. Additional controls explain other political and economic factors that could influence NGO impact on decentralization. Finally, two-, five-, ten-, and sixteen-year lags were included to account the time it may take for NGOs to have an influence on government structure. Two-, five-, and ten-year lags are standard time periods when considering lagged effects of a given variable. I chose to include a sixteen-year lag because it spanned the longest time period possible with the available data. The development process takes a long time to take effect, thus I assumed it was necessary to include a lagged variable beyond ten years. Table 4 shows the results of these regressions including different sets of controls and lags for comparison. For clarity, I conducted regressions with the “regress” imputation, which is more commonly used in the literature. Due to the lack of data for some indicators, the number of observations reduces to 336 and with the later lags 194.

The results of the first regression show that by adding country and time-fixed effects and controlling for aid, the coefficient on NGO projects decreases, but remains positive. The coefficient also becomes statistically insignificant at all three standard confidence levels. When adding the first set of standard socio-economic controls, we see the impact of NGO presence decreases, but without statistical significance. This may indicate that NGOs have lesser impact on decentralization than expected. GDP, population, and infant mortality account for the inherent structural differences in countries, which affect decentralization and thus explain several effects that NGOs seemed to have in
the initial regression. With the addition of NGO regulation and all governance indicators, the coefficient on NGO presence becomes negative, indicating that when controlling for different factors of governance, NGOs may, in fact, have a small but centralizing effect.

However, this tentative finding changes with the addition of the lagged variables. Initially, with the two- and five-year lags, the results show that NGOs correlate negatively with decentralization. However, looking on to the ten- and sixteen-year lags, the coefficient on NGO presence becomes positive and much larger than other coefficients in the table. These results are mostly statistically insignificant except for the coefficient on the ten-year lag, which indicates that this specification is particularly important to the relationship between NGOs and decentralization. However, the ten year output could be influenced by long-term macroeconomic or political trends. I controlled for these trends by using variables such as the log of GDP, infant mortality, accountability, corruption and political violence (for more explanation, see the empirical strategy section). The lack of significance may be a result of data constraints which limited the duration of the study and the number of countries that could be analyzed.

Table 4: Country Fixed Effects, Controls, and Lags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect on Standard Decentralization</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(2-year lag)</th>
<th>(5-year lag)</th>
<th>(10-year lag)</th>
<th>(16-year lag)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO Presence</td>
<td>9.71e-05</td>
<td>3.29e-05</td>
<td>-4.16e-05</td>
<td>-4.17e-05</td>
<td>-7.08e-06</td>
<td>0.000140</td>
<td>0.000223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000145)</td>
<td>(0.000156)</td>
<td>(0.000127)</td>
<td>(0.000196)</td>
<td>(0.000128)</td>
<td>(0.000214)</td>
<td>(0.000216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lndonation</td>
<td>-0.0343</td>
<td>0.0231</td>
<td>0.0488</td>
<td>0.0488*</td>
<td>0.0483*</td>
<td>0.0755**</td>
<td>0.169**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0254)</td>
<td>(0.0225)</td>
<td>(0.0241)</td>
<td>(0.0241)</td>
<td>(0.0240)</td>
<td>(0.0340)</td>
<td>(0.0753)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LeGDP</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
<td>0.0384</td>
<td>0.0384</td>
<td>0.0378</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0904)</td>
<td>(0.0957)</td>
<td>(0.0959)</td>
<td>(0.0954)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LePop</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>1.531</td>
<td>1.531</td>
<td>1.519</td>
<td>0.0520</td>
<td>-1.706</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.800)</td>
<td>(1.489)</td>
<td>(1.496)</td>
<td>(1.491)</td>
<td>(2.461)</td>
<td>(2.924)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>0.00645</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
<td>0.0370</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0062)</td>
<td>(0.0099)</td>
<td>(0.0089)</td>
<td>(0.0101)</td>
<td>(0.0303)</td>
<td>(0.0332)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>0.0912</td>
<td>0.0912</td>
<td>0.0921</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.437)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.810*</td>
<td>-0.263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
<td>(0.632)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Effectiveness</td>
<td>0.953**</td>
<td>0.953**</td>
<td>0.956**</td>
<td>0.963*</td>
<td>1.433**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS

The final table shows the results from a 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) regression estimates, using the log of the number of people affected by natural disasters as an instrumental variable. As discussed in section three, this instrument is not perfect as it is closely correlated with decentralization, but it is the best possible variable to measure the effect that NGOs have on government.

The results indicate that when we account for endogeneity, the regression produces a statistically significant coefficient for NGO presence both with and without controls. This analysis also shows that with added controls, the effect of NGO projects on decentralization changes from a negative one to a positive one. This change suggests that there may be a causal relationship in which NGO presence positively influences decentralization.

1 Due to data constraints, as the lagged variables were created, some countries lacked sufficient data to produce results and thus, STATA removed them from the country set.
Table 5: 2SLS IV Regression
(Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Effect on Standardized Decentralization</th>
<th>Effect on Standardized Decentralization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO Presence</td>
<td>-0.000533**</td>
<td>0.00214*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.000270)</td>
<td>(0.000121)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(donation)</td>
<td>-0.00134</td>
<td>(0.0571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>-0.0581</td>
<td>(0.0774)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>0.0124***</td>
<td>(0.00469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Population)</td>
<td>-0.444***</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>-0.549***</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-0.753***</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>1.059***</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>-0.228*</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>0.628*</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Regulation</td>
<td>-0.650**</td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Robustness Check - OLS with Fisman and Gatti (2002) Data
(Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Effect on Std. Decentralization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO Presence</td>
<td>0.000979***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.000103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(donation)</td>
<td>-0.0770**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0306)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To address the issue of robustness with respect to time, I repeated a basic OLS regression using a combination of my decentralization data and the decentralization statistics from Fisman and Gatti (2002), in which they averaged levels of decentralization from 1980 to 1995. Applying these statistics to this study, I assumed that the average from Fisman and Gatti (2002) could act as a proxy for the level of decentralization for each year from 1980 to 1995. This choice restricted my sample to countries that were present in both the Fisman and Gatti study and in my dataset, leaving me with eight countries: Brazil, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Israel, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, and Thailand. A simple OLS regression revealed that NGO presence did, in fact, have a positive relationship to decentralization. The effect is also statistically significant at all three standard confidence levels (see Table 6).

To further test the robustness of the results, I ran several regressions using two different measures of decentralization: revenue collection and tax effort (see Appendix C). As described in the empirical strategy section, decentralization related to government revenue collection is defined as the total revenue collected by local and state government divided by the total revenue collected by the general government. Tax effort is the “sum of tax revenue and compulsory social security contributions.” Decentralization defined by tax effort is, then, a ratio of tax effort from local and state governments divided by the tax effort of the general government. The first regression for each measure included all relevant controls used in the previous analyses as shown in Table 5. Due to data constraints, the lagged time periods were limited to five and ten-year timespans and no country-fixed effects were applied. The results revealed that NGO presence has a positive and statistically significant relationship to decentralization. However, NGO seems to have a stronger impact on tax effort than on revenue collection. This may be due to the fact that revenue collection tends to be more centralized than tax effort, and is thus less permeable to the influence of NGO activity. Next, regressions included fixed effects and included five- or ten-year lags applied to the number of NGO-funded projects. The five-year lag changed the NGO coefficient from positive to negative, indicating that within a few years a government may respond to NGO presence by centralizing. Within the ten-year time frame, the NGO-decentralization relationship turns positive.
in terms of revenue collection, but remains negative with respect to tax effort. These findings suggest that in the early stages of NGO involvement, recipient governments may initially centralize in response to the perceived threat of an NGO takeover.

Finally, I examined the effect of NGO presence on the incidence of decentralization (see Appendix D). I created two new decentralization variables that specify changes in decentralization over one-year and five-year periods, and the regressions included all relevant controls. This showed that NGO presence correlates positively with changes in decentralization, and the relationship is statistically significant in the five-year period. The results suggest that an addition of one hundred projects increases the five-year growth of decentralization by 0.00399 standard deviations, or a shift of 0.2 of a percentile. Although this shift in growth is small, considering the rapid expansion of the NGO industry and the long length of NGO presence in recipient governments, NGO impact could grow to be more qualitatively significant.

VI. DISCUSSION
Throughout this study, I have assumed that decentralization could be a product of NGO presence in a given country. The results from the simple OLS regression indicate that NGOs have a negative impact on decentralization, although the effect is small and statistically insignificant. However, when accounting for aid donation, a key confounding variable, the results demonstrate that NGO presence actually correlates positively with decentralization. Additionally, the coefficient for NGO presence increases, doubling the effect that first OLS regression demonstrated. The effect may still seem small, but as this effect compounds over several years, NGOs may prove to have a significant influence on decentralization.

When I included additional controls, lagged variables, and country and time fixed effects, regressions revealed a notable trend in the relationship between NGOs and decentralization. The results demonstrated that NGOs might have an initial, negative impact on decentralization. This could be due to, as Dupuy et al. discuss, reactionary policies by recipient governments to centralize in response to increased NGO activity. In these cases, the aid recipient governments perceive NGO involvement as a threat to their power. Those governments may be right. In the long run, starting with the ten-year lag, NGOs have a small, but positive correlation with decentralization, which nearly doubles over the sixteen-year period. This suggests that, although it may take some time, NGOs do, in fact, increase decentralization.

The 2SLS IV regression produced more promising results for the impact of NGOs on levels of decentralization. The log of the total number of people affected by natural disasters acted as a strong instrument to indicate a causal relationship in which NGOs affect decentralization. Without these controls, NGOs seemed to lead to less decentralization. However, when I included them, the NGO presence coefficient became positive, indicating that there is a positive correlation between NGOs and decentralization. This result was also significant at a 90 percent confidence interval. The robust results associated with this instrument suggest that there could be a positive causal relationship in which NGO presence amplifies decentralization within developing countries.

Overall, the study struggled to produce a robust set of statistically significant findings. This may be the result of certain constraints that limited the scope of the research. Chief among these constraints was the lack of data, as I was limited by both country and time period-specific statistics. Insufficient decentralization data prevented a full exploration of the long-term effects of NGO activity and aid on decentralization levels. While IMF collects decentralization information, much is left to government self-reporting, which often leads to a lack of data as well as data inaccuracy. Thus, many reliable local and state government statistics were missing, limiting me to only thirty-three countries. Decentralization, as a measurement, also suffers from an identification issue, as demonstrated by the robustness checks in section 4.4 in which decentralization can be positively or negatively affected by NGO presence depending on how it is measured. This ambiguity suggests that the analysis would benefit from new, more specific measures of decentralization. Further, NGO presence is difficult to quantify. Most of the data on NGOs rely on self-reporting from individual organizations, leading to incomplete, disorganized, and often incompa- rable datasets. Aid-sponsored projects may be a useful proxy, but it is possible that this was insufficient to establish an empirical relationship.

The lack of significant findings could also indicate that NGOs may not directly impact decentralization. But the growing literature on NGO influence, both in economics and in other disciplines, suggests it may be that the power of these organizations has not
yet been realized. This may indicate that the trend of NGO influence is still in the early stages of development. Or, from an empirical perspective, the data or the modeling might still be insufficient to prove satisfactorily the existence of this impact. A useful addition to this model may be to focus on a group of specific NGOs, and to include a variable that captures their level of maturity. The maturity of these organizations impacts their funding, and, thus, influences the influence that these organizations may exert over recipient governments.

VII. CONCLUSION
This study provides a unique perspective on the influence of NGOs on recipient countries, addressing a gap in the current literature that neglects the impact of NGOs on levels of government decentralization. Although results were largely statistically insignificant, this study may nonetheless function as the beginning of a body of literature that examines specifically the impact of NGOs on governance. Many economists assume that NGOs simply support, or fail to support, development in recipient nations, while others have proposed that NGOs are driven by donors, both governmental and private. These assumptions are well documented with proven causal relationships in which NGOs both impact development and are influenced by governments. However, these studies neglect the current shift in power between NGOs and governing entities. NGOs have grown more powerful in global politics and in the international development regime. They are becoming independent entities that have the power to impact policy and government ability. For instance, in Haiti, NGOs now provide over 80 percent of government services. They run, in practice, most of Haiti’s education and health facilities. With this in mind, it is hard to imagine that these organizations are only affected by governments without affecting those governments. Although it may take time for the proper data to emerge, my initial findings show that a relationship exists between NGOs and decentralization. This relationship suggests that this study may function as a valuable stepping-stone to more in-depth research on NGO activities, their relationship to aid, and their effects on developing countries.

A. COUNTRIES USED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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## APPENDICES

### B. CORRELATION TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
<th>LdDonation</th>
<th>LdGDP</th>
<th>LnPdp</th>
<th>Infant Mortality</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>Govt. Effectiveness</th>
<th>Political Stability</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>NGO Reg</th>
<th>LnTotal Affected</th>
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<td>LnPdp</td>
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<td>0.926</td>
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<td>Infant Mortality</td>
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<td>0.8915</td>
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<td>Govt. Effectiveness</td>
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<td>0.41</td>
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<td>Political Stability</td>
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<td>-0.463</td>
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<td>0.1763</td>
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<td>0.2851</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>Restricted NGO</td>
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<td>LnTotal Affected</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
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### C. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: DIFFERENT MEASURES OF DECENTRALIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Decentralization in Terms of Revenue Effort</th>
<th>Decentralization in Terms of Tax Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO Presence</td>
<td>0.000399** (0.000110)</td>
<td>0.000612 (0.000188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donation</td>
<td>0.0297 (0.0318)</td>
<td>0.0174 (0.0204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag of 5 years</td>
<td>0.00129** (0.000526)</td>
<td>0.000223 (0.000519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag of 10 years</td>
<td>8.37e-05 (0.000747)</td>
<td>0.000951 (0.00102)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) 1-year period</th>
<th>(2) 5-year period</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO Presence</td>
<td>Change in Decentralization</td>
<td>Change in Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## D. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: CHANGE IN DECENTRALIZATION
Endnotes

3 Ibid, 199.
4 Nazneen Kanji and David Lewis, Non-Governmental Organizations and Development (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 1-10.
7 Kanji and Lewis, Non-Governmental Organizations and Development, 1.
12 Ibid, 14.
16 Ibid.
17 Kanji and Lewis, Non-Governmental Organizations and Development, 2.
27 David S. Brown, J. Christopher Brown, and Scott W. Desposato, “Promoting and preventing politi-
28 Kanji and Lewis, Non-Governmental Organizations and Development, 17.
30 Kim, “The unveiled power,” 156-159.
33 Ibid, 138.
42 Ibid, 884.
43 Dupuy et al., “Hands off my regime!” 302.
45 Kim, “The unveiled power,” 130-133.
46 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
50 Kim, “The unveiled power,” 2-3.
51 Ibid.
54 Ibid, 1-3.
55 Dupuy et al., “Hands off my regime!” 299-311.
57 Ibid.
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