THE VIEW FROM SOUTH LAWN

The 20th edition of the Journal of Politics & Society serves as an opportunity to reflect and look ahead. Established in 1989, the Journal has showcased critical analysis, penned both by undergraduate students and leading scholars and statepersons. In recent years, the Journal has grown in leaps and bounds. Its call for papers has extended beyond the gates of Columbia University to across the country and around the world. Originally only distributed to Ivy League campuses, the Journal, thanks to former Editor-in-Chief Jacob Weaver, enters its third year of distribution in bookstores nationwide.

Despite these changes, the Helvidius Group remains committed to its primary purpose: to provide a forum for undergraduate scholarship in the social sciences. The Journal now often drifts away from the United States and toward Latin American indigenous movements and Middle Eastern water conflicts, but we continue to highlight the vast potential for astute and relevant undergraduate research.

While we celebrate two decades of growth, we are soberly aware of the grave environment that exists beyond these pages. We face not only a global financial crisis but also a changing security environment. In light of these challenges, we are proud to present guest essays by Dr. Richard N. Haass and Mr. Jan Egeland. Dr. Haass describes possible security outcomes of the global recession as well as recommendations for the Obama administration. Mr. Egeland sees the costly preponderance of unilateralism in recent years as a catalyst for multilateralism’s renaissance. We have already seen many of their recommendations take flight as defense spending has been reallocated to asymmetric warfare and interstate grievances have been channeled through the United Nations.

In addition, we hope that the featured essays not only contribute to an informed discourse but also galvanize readers to engage with such critical issues. We are pleased to present Dayea Diana Park of Georgetown University with this year’s Peter and Katherine Tomassi Prize, which has been generously funded for its
second year by the Journal’s founder Peter and his wife Katherine. Park challenges neorealist explanations of South Korea’s weapons export strategy and illuminates the government’s efforts to develop relationships with energy-rich countries through arms sales. Park’s scholarship is incredibly salient today, as we struggle to curb the official and illicit proliferation of dangerous weapons technology.

Also, as the current administration calls for a new relationship with Latin America, Andrew Lyubarsky examines the impact of indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, while Tina Thomas studies the peculiar Argentine-Venezuelan relationship. In light of the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, Alexander Schellinger criticizes U.S. state-building efforts in Georgia as an impediment to democratization. Timothy de Swardt analyzes why certain countries, despite the low benefits and high costs incurred, signed the Rome Statute. On the eve of the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Iraq, Caitlin Naidoff evaluates a proposed ethnic partition of the country from a historical-statistical perspective. In our online section, Andrew Langer explores the tensions over water in the Middle East, and Gaurav Bhatnagar questions the “Islamicization” of Kashmiri politics and unearths the underlying political motivations.

This year’s essays focus on the crossroads at which we stand. Our decisions will have a deep impact on the future of political representation, international arbitration, conflict resolution, and natural resource distribution. In this respect, we can view our tenuous circumstances as an opportunity for positive change. I can only hope that this scholarship helps to inform our choices.

It has been a privilege to work with the staff of the Helvidius Group and Jacob Weaver; this publication is the fruition of their hard work and endless patience. And whether this is the twentieth time you will be reading the Journal or the first, I hope that you enjoy this year’s edition.

Josh Mathew
Editor-in-Chief

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Most of the analysis and commentary on the global economic crisis has focused on the economic consequences. This is understandable, but it is not sufficient. The world does not consist of stovepipes, and what happens in the economic realm affects political and strategic policies and realities alike.

This crisis, which began in the housing sector in the United States, is now more than a financial crisis. It is a full-fledged economic crisis. It is also more than an American crisis. It is truly global. Moreover, the crisis is unlike any challenge we have seen in the past. It is qualitatively different than the sort of cyclical downturn that capitalism produces periodically. This crisis promises to be one of great depth, duration, and consequence.

This crisis was not inevitable. It was the result of flawed policies, poor decisions, and questionable behavior. It is important that this point be fully understood lest the conclusion be widely drawn that market economies are to be avoided. The problem lies with the practice of capitalism, not the model. Nevertheless, the perception is otherwise, and one consequence of the economic crisis is that market economies have lost much of their luster and the United States has lost much of its credibility in this realm. It is inconceivable in these circumstances to imagine an American official preaching the virtues of the Washington Consensus. This is unfortunate, as open economies continue to have more to offer the developing world than do the alternatives. It also adds to the importance that the U.S. economy get back on track lest a lasting casualty of the crisis be modern capitalism itself.

The impact of the economic crisis will be varied and go far

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This article is adapted from testimony given before the Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives on March 11, 2009.
Beyond the image of capitalism and the reputation of the United States. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair was all too correct when he testified in the U.S. Senate in February that “the primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.” The crisis will have an impact on conditions within states, on the policies of states, on relations between states, and on the thinking of those who run states. Initial reactions around the world to the crisis appear to have evolved, from some initial gloating at America’s expense to resentment of the United States for having spawned this crisis to, increasingly, hopes that the American recovery arrives sooner and proves to be more robust than is predicted. This change of heart is not due to any change of thinking about the United States but rather to increased understanding that the recovery of others will to a significant extent depend on recovery in the United States. In a global world, what happens here affects developments elsewhere and vice versa. Decoupling in either direction is rarely a serious possibility.

The crisis is clearly affecting the developed world, mostly as a result of the centrality of banking-related problems and the high degree of integration that exists among the economies of the developed world. Iceland’s government has fallen; others may over time. Many governments (including several in Central and Eastern Europe but outside the Eurozone) will require substantial loans. The economies of Japan, much of Europe, and the United States are all contracting. World economic growth, which averaged four-to-five percent over the past decade, will be anemic this year even if it manages to be positive, which is increasingly unlikely. It is worth noting that the most recent World Bank projection predicts negative growth for 2009.

Change of this sort will have consequences. There will likely be fewer resources available for defense and foreign assistance. The reduced availability of resources for defense makes it even more critical that U.S. planners determine priorities. Preparing to fight a large-scale conventional war is arguably not the highest priority given the enormous gap between the relevant military capabilities
of the United States and others and the greater likelihood that security-related challenges will come from terrorism and asymmetric warfare. State-capacity building, on the other hand, the sort of activity the United States is doing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, will continue to place a heavy burden on U.S. military and civilian assets. Also remaining highly relevant (and deserving to be a funding priority) will be standoff capabilities, i.e., missiles, bombs, and drones, designed to destroy targets associated with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Developing states may appear to be less affected by the economic crisis than wealthier countries at first glance. Though their growth on average is down by half from previous years, it is still positive. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. This growth is measured from a low base in absolute and relative terms. The reduction in growth in some instances has been dramatic. Developing country exports are down as demand has dropped in the developed world. Also reduced are aid flows and most importantly investment flows to the developing world. Commodity prices are much lower, a boon to those who rely on imports but a major problem for the many who are dependent on the income from one or two exports.

A few countries merit specific mention. One is China. China’s economic success over the past few decades constitutes one of history’s great examples of poverty reduction. This process, one that has involved the migration of millions of people every year from poor rural areas to cities, will slow considerably. The already large number of domestic political protests in China over such issues as land confiscation, corruption, environmental degradation, and public health is likely to grow. Absent renewed robust economic growth, the chances are high that the government will react by clamping down even more on the population lest economic frustration lead to meaningful political unrest.

Russia is in a different position, one characteristic of countries dependent on raw material exports for much of their wealth. The Russian economy is contracting after a period of boom. As is the case with China, this suggests the likely assertion of greater po-
itical control. But Russia is not as fully integrated as China is with the world economy. There is thus a greater (although impossible to quantify) chance that Russia’s leaders will turn to the time-honored resort of manufacturing an overseas crisis to divert attention than will China’s.

Iran and Venezuela are two countries that are heavily reliant on energy exports and whose foreign policies have been counter-productive (to say the least) from the U.S. perspective. But at the same time, it is possible that one or both will pull in their horns. Venezuela is already showing some signs of this, with its more welcoming stance toward international oil companies, though this may well be simply a tactical adjustment to immediate needs. And at least in principle, Iran’s government might find it more difficult to make the case to its own people for its continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons option if the Iranian people understood that this stance was costing them dearly with respect to their standard of living.

Iraq is another oil producing country whose wealth is closely associated with the price of oil. Here the effects of the economic crisis are sure to be unwanted. There is the danger that disorder will increase as unemployment rises, prospects for sharing revenue shrink, and the ability of the central government to dispense cash to build broad national support diminishes. In light of the multiple challenges already facing the United States, the last thing the Obama administration needs is the specter of an unravelling Iraq.

Two other countries are worth highlighting. Pakistan’s economic performance is down sharply for many reasons, including a decrease in both foreign investment in the country and exports from it. Pakistan has little margin for error; the possibility that it could fail is all too real. The worsened economic situation makes governing all that much more difficult. The consequences of a failed Pakistan for the global struggle against terrorism, for attempts to prevent further nuclear proliferation, for the effort to promote stability in Afghanistan, and for India’s future are difficult to exaggerate. Second, North Korea is another nuclear-armed state whose instability is worsened by the economic crisis. At issue is the extent to which South Korea (along with China and Japan) can provide
resources to the North to help stave off a collapse that could lead to a massive humanitarian crisis and a war on the Korean Peninsula.

Another serious consequence of the global economic crisis, one that affects both developed and developing countries, is the reality that protectionism is on the rise. In the trade realm, some seventeen of the G20 governments have increased barriers to trade since they met last November. Negotiated free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea continue to languish in the U.S. Congress. The president lacks the Trade Promotion Authority essential for the negotiation of complex, multilateral trade accords. Prospects for a Doha round global trade pact appear remote. The volume of world trade is down for the first time in decades.

The economic but also strategic costs of this trend are high. Trade is a major source of political as well as economic integration; one reason China acts as responsibly as it does in the political sphere is because of its need to export its products lest potentially destabilizing unemployment jump sharply. Trade has other virtues as well. More than anything else, trade is a principal engine of global economic growth. The completion of the Doha round might be worth as much as $500 billion to the world in expanded economic activity. One-fourth of this expanded output would occur in the United States. This is the purest form of stimulus. For the United States, exports are a source of millions of relatively high-paying jobs; imports are anti-inflationary and spur innovation. Alas, the economic crisis will make it difficult if not impossible to conclude new trade pacts and to gain the requisite domestic support for them. Economic nationalism is on the rise, and when this happens, the will and the ability of political leaders to support policies that are perceived to hurt large numbers of their citizens (but which in reality help many more) invariably goes down. In addition, the economic crisis may make it more difficult to reach agreement on a global climate change pact when representatives of most of the world’s countries gather in Copenhagen late this year. Developed and developing countries alike will resist commitments that appear to or in fact do sacrifice near-term economic growth for
long-term environmental benefit.

What, then, should be done to limit the adverse strategic effects of an economic crisis that is certain to get worse and persist for some time?

The United States—the Obama administration and the Congress—should resist protectionism. “Buy America” provisions in the stimulus legislation will increase costs to American consumers and all but make certain that other countries will follow suit, thereby reducing the prospects for American firms to sell abroad. Already, in retaliation for the U.S. decision to end a program allowing Mexican trucks access to American roads, Mexico has raised tariffs on some 90 American products worth over $2 billion. More American jobs are likely to be sacrificed than preserved overall. Increased protectionism will also dilute the strategic benefits that stem from trade and its ability to contribute to international stability by giving governments a stake in a stable international order. Bringing countries into the world trading system (best done through WTO accession) makes strategic sense, too, as it gives them an interest in maintaining order at the same time as it opens government decision-making to greater degrees of transparency. Similar arguments hold as to why “lend national” provisions are counterproductive.

Recession cannot become this country’s energy policy or a reason not to decrease U.S. consumption of oil, imported or otherwise. Lower prices will dilute any economic incentive to consume less oil. Regulatory policy will be the principal means of discouraging demand and encouraging the development of alternative energy sources and technologies. Reduced demand is essential for strategic reasons (so as not to leave the United States highly dependent on imports and so that countries such as Russia, Venezuela, and Iran do not benefit from dollar inflows), for environmental reasons, and for economic reasons, i.e., not to increase the U.S. balance of payments deficit. The goal should be to use this moment of temporarily-reduced prices to take steps that reduce this country’s vulnerability to oil price fluctuations in the future.

On the financial front, the United States should work with other developed and reserve-rich countries to increase the capacity
of the IMF to assist governments in need of temporary loans. Current capacity falls short of what is and will be needed. It would also be helpful if aid budgets were not victims of the economic crisis. Aid is needed on a large scale not just for humanitarian reasons (to fight disease and other threats) but also to build the human capital that is the foundation of economic development. Aid will also be a necessary substitute in the short and medium run for investment. Absent sufficient capital flows we are likely to see greater misery and an increased number of failing or failed states.

There are two final points. Much of this analysis is focused on the consequences of the economic crisis for global security. But it is important to keep in mind that the relationship is not only one way. Developments in the political world can and will have an effect on the global economy. Imagine the economic consequences of, say, a Taiwan crisis or fighting between India and Pakistan or an armed confrontation with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. This last possibility is the most worrying in the near term and underscores the importance of trying to negotiate limits on Iran’s enrichment program lest the United States be confronted with the unsavory option of either living with an Iranian near or actual nuclear weapons capability or mounting a preventive military strike that, whatever it accomplished, would be sure to trigger a wider crisis. Iranian retaliation for such a strike, for example, could include attacks on oil-related shipping and installations, leading to energy prices several times their current level.

Finally, getting through this economic crisis should not be confused with restoring prolonged calm in the markets or with sustainable growth. Enormous stimulus measures here at home coupled with equally unprecedented increases in the current account deficit and national debt make it all but certain that down the road the United States will confront not just renewed inflation but quite possibly a dollar crisis as well. At some point central banks and other holders of dollars will have second thoughts about continuing to add to their dollar holdings, currently larger than ever given the desire for a safe harbor. Ongoing U.S. requirements for debt financing, however, will likely mean that interest rates will
need to be raised, something that could choke off a recovery. This underscores the importance of limiting stimulus packages to what is truly essential to reviving economic activity and of taking other measures, such as entitlement reform and the already discussed steps to reduce oil use, lest the current crisis give way to another one of a different stripe.
There can be no doubt that the last several years have been characterized by an unprecedented level of mobilization at the state level against reigning neoliberal development orthodoxy in South America. This has taken a wide variety of forms, with moderate social-democratic left governments who respect existing institutional frameworks arising in Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, and more radical, populist governments taking power in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The leaders of these latter three countries have used their popular mandates to institute greater societal changes, resting their legacies on new constitutions that would restructure the power balance of their society in important ways. Bolivia and Ecuador, the two countries considered by this study, are unique in their paths toward constitutional change, insofar as wide-ranging constitutional reforms have always been an integral demand of their powerful indigenous movements.

One of the core demands for both movements was that of “plurinationality,” which served up an ambitious challenge to the Western liberal conceptions of the nation-state upon which the new Latin American democracies rested. The plurinational state would reject the conception of the individual as the sole right-bearing subject and a unitary, non-ethnic conception of national government. A 1994 Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador (CONAIE) document defined the plurinational state as:

...a new political structure: administratively decentralized, culturally heterogeneous, and open to the direct and par-

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Special thanks to Sara Vogel, who worked with the Ecuadorian Constitutional Assembly in April 2008 and provided her interview notes for the purpose of this paper.
ticipatory representation of all indigenous nationalities and social sectors, particularly those that have been marginalized and excluded from the state structure and dominant socioeconomic development models. (Andolina 727)

In practical terms, it would institutionalize indigenous judicial and administrative practices outside of the state, guarantee indigenous participation in state agencies, allow ethnically-designated communities economic autonomy and control over national resources and land distribution, and foster a mixed economy based on the promotion of local markets (729). In contrast to the liberal model of the state, the plurinational ideal would recognize and make official the existence of different juridical and economic models within a single nation-state. Albeit to differing degrees, both Bolivia and Ecuador’s new constitutions now declare the countries to be plurinational states.

The rapid delegitimation of existing political institutions and party systems, as well as the history of indigenous organizing, allowed for these two left-wing populist governments to take power and utilize constitutional assemblies as a means of inducing change in their societies. The two cases provide an intriguing contrast in the relative success of indigenous actors in state politics over time. While the Ecuadorian federation CONAIE established itself as the most coherent indigenous organization in Latin America and was the progenitor of the Constitutional Assembly, its political fortunes faded over time. They have come to oppose many of the initiatives of the Correa administration. Their political arm, Pachakutik, has also become increasingly feeble in electoral terms, bringing in only 2.2 percent in the 2006 Ecuadorian elections, in contrast to the 53.7 percent landslide victory of the heavily-indigenous Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party in Bolivia in 2005.

How could such a dramatic reversal have occurred? The conclusion of this paper is somewhat surprising: the Bolivian system was initially less open to contestation and the Bolivian indigenous movement was less willing to compromise with state actors than were their Ecuador counterparts, which actually led to a greater
level of long-term success for the Bolivian indigenous movement. When both political systems faced legitimacy crises, the fact that the Bolivian indigenous organizations had consistently stayed outside of the government allowed the Bolivians to credibly claim to represent not only their communities but also all those excluded by the neoliberal program. In contrast, Ecuadorian indigenous organizations had participated as partners in the power structure; thus, when the Ecuadorians faced the reality of acting as minority partners in a democratic party-system that had very little legitimacy among the population, the outsider status that had initially made CONAIE so attractive as an aggregator of social discontent with neoliberalism faded. It gave way instead to a view of the indigenous movement as just another interest group in a corporatist regime seeking to advance its cause at the expense of the rest of the society. Indeed, one can see that the key reason that the fortunes of CONAIE and the Bolivian indigenous movements crossed has a great deal to do with the strategies they pursued regarding electoral politics—both the timing of their entrance into the electoral arena and the manner in which they decided to do so.

As such, Bolivia and Ecuador show that a movement which is defined as being the most compromising or “pragmatic” is not always the most successful. In societies in which the institutions are formally democratic but popularly discredited, the authenticity and “purity” that come from a systematic exclusion from the levers of power often serve as more powerful weapons than does the access to those institutions. The new constitutions produced in the two countries clearly demonstrate how quickly and successfully the Bolivian indigenous movement was able to move from exclusion to consolidated state power relative to the Ecuadorian movement.

**ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES AND EXISTING LITERATURE**

The phenomenon of indigenous mobilization supplanting more traditional forms of agitation based on social class and labor status has been discussed at length by a variety of authors. While poverty and social exclusion among the indigenous population has
been a relative constant across both time and geographic boundaries, the emergence of organizations explicitly making rights-based claims on the basis of their indigenous status is an entirely contemporary phenomenon and one that is not present everywhere. Deborah Yashar, in analyzing why indigenous movements arose in Ecuador and Bolivia but not in ethnically similar Peru, highlights the impact of neoliberal policies that challenged the political foundations necessary for local community autonomy and discusses the importance of having political associational space and transcommunity networks in successful organizing (283). The breakdown of mid-twentieth-century corporatist regimes that sheltered indigenous communities and assimilated them into the nationalist state repoliticized ethnic cleavages and led to a surge of political and cultural activity based on indigenous identities.

The work of Nancy Postero adds a level of complexity to Yashar’s analysis, suggesting that, particularly in Bolivia, processes of decentralization and the promotion of “multicultural citizenship” by the neoliberal state itself helped energize the indigenous movement. The fact that indigenous organizations were recognized as legitimate political actors at the municipal level did not change the fact that they remained marginalized from national decision-making and economic power. However, their partial inclusion did encourage the organizations to challenge the system beyond the boundaries of the local politics to which they were confined. They also challenged the limited notions of citizenship opened up by the programs of neoliberal multiculturalism (225). Donna Lee Van Cott expands on the necessity of party system fragmentation or dealignment in addition to a permissive institutional environment, in considering the relative successes of ethnic-based parties. The most successful of these parties, the Ecuadorian Pachakutik and the Bolivian MAS, were also characterized by a willingness to make alliances with non-indigenous actors as part of a broader anti-neoliberal front (224).

The approach developed in this paper builds on the work of the writers who examined institutional change in these countries from the standpoint of indigenous mobilization and is applied to
Bolivia and Ecuador’s recently ratified constitutions. However, not all analysts ascribe these constitutional processes to the democratic inadequacies of the liberal model and mobilizations of indigenous actors, and it is important to consider what is perhaps the most popularly held alternate explanation for the relative radicalism of the institutional reform projects in the two states.

This alternate view, supported by Kurt Weyland, argues that the crucial factor is:

…the natural resource bonanza of recent years and the resulting windfall gains accruing to Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. These rents discredit the neoliberal insistences on constraints, suggest the availability of great opportunities, and thus stimulate radicalism and voluntarist attacks on the established socioeconomic and political order. (5)

According to this view, nations that have not experienced such windfalls have opted for more moderate center-left governments that have not sought to enact wide-spanning constitutional reform projects.

The view of the paper is that this explanation is excessively reductionist and insufficient to justify developments in Bolivia and Ecuador. The demand for a Constitutional Assembly in both countries was raised by movements hostile to neoliberalism since 1990, before any commodity boom, and in both cases, the original call was based not in a desire for nationalization and socialized corporatist economies, but for a recognition of land and territory rights—a demand which is historically far deeper and unrelated to global commodity prices or the discovery of resource deposits.

The nationalist energy policies adopted by the Correa and Morales government are of course influenced greatly by the commodity boom; as Allyson Benton underscores, “all hydrocarbons-producing nations have an incentive to find ways to increase state income from the sector to take advantage of rising earnings to investment ratios, regardless of policy preferences” (2). In periods of low commodity prices, the tendency is to lower state investment
and raise incentives for private investors through permissive tax and royalty regimes, while high commodity prices produce political incentives to increase state control to generate maximum revenues. In this light, rational economic thinking, not unthinking radicalism, promotes state control during such periods and is not necessarily correlated with constitutional reforms.

Furthermore, Weyland claims that “the collapse of party systems in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador did not precede the rise of radicals and populists—as a true cause would—but coincided with it” (12). He interprets the Bolivian system of “pacted democracy” as a particularly strong system that managed to sustain agreements for market reforms beyond the expectations for the chronically unstable nation. The ability of the political elites to find consensus, however, did not correlate with the social situation in the nation. As Wolff describes, the two nations had a “formally functioning but publicly delegitimized democracy” that promised representation, participation, and equality but instead delivered a policy convergence around an increasingly unpopular neoliberal program (5).

Five years before the election of Evo Morales, the national government was unable to handle the massive civil conflict of the Cochabamba “Water War,” which was a broad-based anti-privatization struggle that had nothing to do with windfall natural gas profits and everything to do with skyrocketing prices of basic necessities and participants’ non-market conception of natural resources. The MAS party had also nearly taken first place in the 2002 elections, running principally on a platform of defense of coca cultivation.

There is also no reason to suggest, as Weyland, does that “people expected the country to turn into a rentier economy and receive enormous revenue streams” (26). Firstly, antipathy to an extractivist economic model in both countries is quite high, particularly in the case of the Amazonian sectors of CONAIE, but also reflected more broadly within the Bolivian indigenous movement. While this conception of natural resources would be the cause for confrontation with the Correa regime in Ecuador, it has to be noted that the impetus for constitutional change did not come from special interests expecting oil-based windfalls; instead, it was made
in terms of indigenous cultural autonomy and territory rights, which constitutes an entirely separate discourse. Considering the Bolivian case further, the pervasive social mobilizations against the privatization of water and for land reforms in the tropical lowlands and indigenous autonomy do not fit into the interpretive schema of demands of a rentier economy. Even as the partial nationalization of the natural gas industry has significantly raised national revenue and decreased foreign direct investment in its natural gas sector, the social programs announced by the Morales administration do not appear to be nearly on the scale of what “enormous revenue streams” would entail.

What both the Correa and Morales administrations have sought is an increase in policy space for the government, counter to the expectations of international financial institutions. Obviously, a resource boom facilitates greater policy experimentation in the economic realm because the governments have more money to work with. However, as of yet, there is little proof that governments have overspent their budgets or promoted inflationary policies, and the states in question have in fact run budgetary surpluses. Overemphasizing the effects of national resource price fluctuations at the expense of political factors relating to particular phenomena of social mobilization and the instability of party systems presents an incomplete depiction of populist governments and constitutional reforms. It is impossible to simply extrapolate the content of these reforms merely from the countries’ energy policies, particularly since the principal demands in question were developed and popularly promoted during periods of low commodity prices in the 1990s. This study asserts the importance of indigenous organizing and popular discontent with neoliberal party-systems as the key factors for their emergence.
History of Indigenous Organizing and Political Success in the Ecuadorian Party-System

Within Ecuador in 1990, the newly-formed national indigenous federation CONAIE declared its demand for a Constitutional Assembly in a dramatic ten-day protest labeled the Levantamiento Nacional Indígena. In this mobilization, where the movement paralyzed economic activity in the country, CONAIE called for a new constitution that would recognize Ecuador as a plurinational state, protect and recognize communally-held land titles, and challenge the natural-resource extractivist model that was leading to environmental degradation in areas with indigenous populations.

After seeing their support in the population steadily increase and forming links with progressive non-indigenous organizations in urban areas, the Ecuadorian CONAIE, operating through their political party Pachakutik, decided to enter national politics in 1996. They joined an unstable political system suffering from extreme multi-partyism and very low percentages of support from the population. For a time, they enjoyed great success in this context and were, according to Wolff, “increasingly seen as not only promoting particular indigenous interests and values, but as representing a new force leading an anti-neoliberal and anti-establishment platform” (4).

The confederation’s social strength and organizing vitality stemmed from a specific form of politicization that Wolff calls a combination of a “negative macro-political focus with a positive pragmatist stance as to concrete micro-political claims” (3). Embedded in the base territories of indigenous groups, the organization had a mandate not only to conduct politics over issues of national importance but also to show that it could concretely improve the lives of the constituencies it was representing in order to maintain their support. Though at the national level, CONAIE’s political power and social credibility came from the rejection of unpopular governments, politicians, political practices, and politics, this defi-
ant stance was compromised by the tantalizing possibilities that concrete government concessions promised. As governments grew increasingly willing to negotiate with the indigenous groups—offering management of development funds, local projects and microenterprises, and limited participation in national administration—conflicts and divisions between different organizations emerged, both inside and outside CONAIE. Maintaining a purely negative macropolitical stance grew untenable, as their increased political power suggested the ability to get some of their immediate claims met.

This led Pachakutik to participate in coalitions as minority partners with other political actors, most prominently with Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez and his Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), which had organized on a nationalist platform opposing neoliberal economic reforms and dollarization. The group participated in the PSP’s attempted rebellion against neoliberal president Jamil Mahuad in 2000, in which CONAIE president Antonio Vargas briefly served on a one-day “Triumvirate of National Salvation” with Gutiérrez (Jameson 16). They eventually achieved national power as a partner of PSP after the election of Gutiérrez in 2003.

With this event, indigenous politicians were granted cabinet positions for the first time, with Nina Pacari becoming Foreign Minister and later CONAIE president Luis Macas Minister of Agriculture. Macas was optimistic about the possibilities opened by this move, declaring in the early days of 2003 that “Ushay is a Kichwa word that means power, which is to perfect living conditions and the capacity to develop ourselves collectively…. The government can be another instance of continuing to build ushay” (17). However, as Miguel Carvajal presents it:

...[I]n the midst of the triumph of the “new”—of the “military patriots” who played with the reinvention of the patria and of the “incorruptible, patient, and unbending Indians—very few people had calculated the torturous path that awaited the government alliance.” (5)
In government, the indigenous ministers were able to push some small agenda items, particularly in the field of agriculture, but ultimately fell into the dilemma of what Yashar calls the “Herculean task”: in a context in which they did not hold a majority, they were confronted with a choice between “working to deliver on some issues through legislative compromise, logrolling, and coalition-building (potentially seeming to betray some of the ideals of the movement) or maintaining their ideological purity and hence seeming ineffective (because they cannot achieve concrete goals)” (Yashar 303). The synthesis of micro- and macropolitics that made CONAIE an effective organization had begun to unravel, as they went to both extremes during their stint in office.

By March 2003, with these indigenous ministers still in his administration, a supposedly “left-wing nationalist” President Gutiérrez had made a friendly visit to the United States, proclaimed his support for a Free Trade Area of the Americas, signed a letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and formed an alliance with the right-wing Social Christian Party (PSC). The participation of the leadership in a government that was actively supporting the economic status quo against which CONAIE had organized enraged them and led to the resignation or removal of their ministers. By July, the confederation had declared its opposition to the government.

CONAIE emerged from the experience extremely weakened. It was bad enough that it had shown faulty judgment in supporting and collaborating with Gutiérrez who, in addition to reneging on his populist promises, was fast developing a reputation for corruption. It was worse that they had showed themselves to be entirely impotent in changing the direction of his policies from the opposition. To preserve the stability of his power, Gutiérrez successfully fomented division within the indigenous movement, naming former CONAIE president Antonio Vargas the new Minister of Agriculture and obtaining the support of Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos (FEINE), a religious federation of indigenous groups separate from CONAIE. In sharp contrast to a 1999 poll that named CONAIE the third most trusted institution in the
country behind only the Church and the military (Yashar 303), a 2003 poll showed that 58 percent of the population has “little or no confidence” in the movement (Lucero 146).

By 2005, the country was up in arms against the Gutiérrez presidency, but CONAIE was notably absent from the demonstrations that would ultimately oust Gutiérrez in April. A weakened CONAIE movement angrily decried the political system in which they had fared so badly. Pachakutik then substantially disassociated itself from progressive urban and mestizo elements with which it had formerly worked, and it instead adopted a more ethnocentric discourse.

Even as the organization retreated into greater indigenism, it found itself unable to successfully rally its bases against the “traitorous” government. Buoyed by high oil prices and high levels of remittances from Ecuadorians working abroad, Gutiérrez largely avoided the type of austerity programs that would galvanize indigenous dissent. In addition, he managed to skillfully dispense economic patronage to neglected municipalities in an effort to undermine the support and to mobilize capacity of his former allies. Although the indigenous movement’s prior organizing had likely led the government to hold back on its structural adjustment agenda, the lack of such active policies contributed to CONAIE’s demobilization and partial cooptation (Wolff 10).

The 2006 elections that propelled Rafael Correa, a dissident finance minister with ties to the anti-Gutiérrez movement, into the presidency were characterized by a confluence of factors favoring a populist movement with a strong anti-systemic critique and credible claims to outsider status. Correa’s candidacy catapulted ahead of that of his competitors when he declared that “in order not to legitimate the sewer that is the National Congress,” his Alianza PAIS party would not run any legislative candidates and would press all of its hopes on a Constitutional Assembly that would replace the governing functions of a hopelessly corrupt party system. This Assembly would, according to Conaghan, both “cleanse the body politic of its dysfunctional institutions and at the same time mark a definitive break with neoliberalism,” thereby reconstituting
the state’s central role in the economy (Conaghan 4). Freidenberg argues that Ecuador has always been characterized by extreme institutional fragmentation and extremely low confidence in political parties, which has led to the emergence of outsider candidates. However, Correa’s total refusal to negotiate with either existing parties or institutions and a clearly enunciated nationalist program stood in stark contrast with Gutiérrez’s electoral cynicism and led to great popular support.

Although we have seen that the idea of a Constitutional Assembly restructuring Ecuador is an idea presented by CONAIE 16 years before Correa’s election, the indigenous movement did not form a part of Correa’s coalition, preferring to run Macas on a Pachakutik-only line. A year after the landslide victory of the indigenous Morales in Bolivia, CONAIE, supposedly the strongest and most regionally-consolidated indigenous movement in Latin America, achieved its most dismal showing ever, with a sixth place finish of less than three percent. The major surprise of the election was that Gilmer Gutiérrez, brother of the disgraced former president, garnered a third-place finish with 17 percent due to heavy support from the indigenous and rural poor. CONAIE was unable to compel its constituency to vote for its own candidates, many of whom had retained fondness for the Gutiérrez government. The Correa administration did not appoint any indigenous ministers, nor did they list many indigenous collaborators for their Government Plan. Thus, at the very moment in which the neoliberal policies against which they had struggled for decades were being seriously contested, ironically through the means (Constitutional Assembly) that they themselves had demanded, CONAIE was sidelined from the action.

The entire electoral experience of Pachakutik, but particularly their ill-fated flirtation with Gutiérrez, tied the popular perception of the indigenous movement to the old party-system against which Alianza PAIS was railing. Due to the fact that they had negotiated and signed pacts with corrupt political parties and held cabinet-level positions under an extremely unpopular president only several years prior, any kind of anti-systematic position they could take
was incredible to the general population. CONAIE’s weakened state would have repercussions in the Constitutional Assembly and the actual text it produced.

Implications for Constitutional Change

In the Constitutional Assembly, according to Jameson, there were important overlaps between the policy initiatives of the Correa administration and the demands of CONAIE, but also significant disjunctures. The targets against which Correa defined himself were also the enemies of CONAIE: multinational financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, owners of Ecuadorian sovereign debt, the private sector in control of the oil industry, strong regional economic interests such as those centered in Guayaquil, the national Congress, and free-trade advocates (Jameson 10). However, while Correa’s major preoccupation was strengthening the central state in order to obtain more policy space for economic initiatives outside the neoliberal framework, CONAIE attacked the state and called for the devolution of power and resources to indigenous communities and organizations, and for a regime of indigenous autonomy that would transcend the cultural realm and promote economic self-determination.

When CONAIE first entered the Constitutional Assembly, Pachakutik assembly-members allied themselves with Correa and his Acuerdo País representatives. They spoke very highly of the President of the Assembly Alberto Acosta who, “unlike many in the government, came from a tradition of accompaniment of the indigenous movement, of the workers, the ecologists, the feminists, of all the movements that were for an alternative society” (Rhon qtd. in Vogel). Pachakutik Assembly Member Monica Chuji referred to the Correa government in April 2008 as a regime that “seeks to overcome the long night of neoliberalism, seeks to recover the historical demands of all the social sectors of the indigenous, the afros, the peasants, etc.” (qtd. in Vogel). The governing coalition declared itself to be in favor of plurinationality, one of the core CONAIE demands, and CONAIE became a strong supporter of
the constitutional process. On March 11, 2008, they organized a demonstration of 25,000 of its members in Quito in support of plurinationality and the assembly and claimed that they served as a much-needed mass base to a Correa administration that had risen to power without institutional connections to social movements.

The honeymoon between CONAIE and Correa would prove to be short, however. Although the constitutional text approved by the Assembly included the juridical concept of plurinationality, CONAIE had been pushing for “prior consent” of communities before any kind of economic exploration of their territories would be legal. This was out of line with Correa’s nationalist economic program, which, while critical of multinational corporations, sought to fund government programs with the country’s oil wealth, which constitutes 40 percent of the state’s revenue.

Thus, Article 57 of the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution, which details the “collective rights” of indigenous “communities, peoples, and nationalities,” includes:

4. The conservation of the unproscribable property of their community lands, which will be inalienable, unseizable, and indivisible. These lands will be exempt from the payment of taxes.

5. Maintenance of the possession of ancestral lands and territories.

6. Participation in the use, usufruct, administration and conservation of the renewable natural resources that are found in their lands.

7. A prior consultation, free and informed, within a reasonable time-frame, regarding plans and programs of prospecting, exploitation and commercialization of non-renewable resources that are found in their lands and which could affect them environmentally or culturally...If the consent of the community consulted is not obtained, it will proceed in conformance with the Constitution and the law.

Although this recognizes the validity of indigenous collective landholdings, it calls only for a consultation regarding any kind of ex-
tractive enterprise on indigenous lands, and, by providing for the possibility of resource exploitation in the absence of consent, does not actually require that the state respect the outcomes of this consultation. It also grants the indigenous groups the right to “participation” in the use of their renewable resources, but does not necessarily grant them sole dominion over them.

One of their key demands having not been met, CONAIE adopted a position of support for the Constitution mixed with criticism of the government. As Monica Chuji explained in a November 2008 interview, “[in regards to plurinationality] the new constitution, albeit in a limited manner, reflects a lot of the people’s aspirations. It is the product of a collective force. [However], I began to see a continuation of the same old line and of the extraterrorist model. There was no change on this issue” (qtd. in Vogel). By mid-November 2008, CONAIE was back in the opposition, rallying thousands of people across Ecuador in protest of the potentially environmentally disastrous repercussions of a new mining law passed by the Correa administration and of a water law which they claimed could lead to privatization. The mining law increased government control over the sector and put stricter environmental safeguards on operations, but fell short of the total ban on open-cut mining and prior consent that the confederation had been seeking.

The conflict between developmentalism and environmentalism/indigenous protection in the Correa administration is exemplified by the Yasuní-Ishpingo Tambacocha Tipituni (ITT) Initiative. In this encounter, the Ecuadorian government proposed to refrain from oil exploration in an ecologically sensitive area populated by the “voluntarily isolated” Tagaeri and Taromenane peoples in exchange for subsidies from the international community, which would total approximately half the projected revenue of the oil extraction. While environmentalist and indigenous groups initially lauded this Correa initiative, it is now clear that financing such a project—which required an initial international down payment of $350 million—is quite difficult. Despite ongoing talks with the governments of countries such as Germany and Hungary, Correa
declared in February 2009 that “I will not permit that 900 million barrels of oil remain underground, that we become like beggars seated on top of a sack of gold, because the international community is all talk” (Globovision 2009). The president further declared that if the necessary funds were not raised by June, he would either ask Congress or declare a public referendum on the issue of oil exploration in the area, regardless of the desires of the indigenous groups living in the territory.

Issues such as these have led to an increasingly acrimonious war of words between Correa and CONAIE leaders, with the president calling their opposition “infantile” and “fundamentalist” and claiming that it was “absurd to be seated on hundreds of billions of dollars and for romantic notions, novelty, fixations or whatever, to say no to mining” (qtd. in Moore). He accused the movement of having “lost its compass, playing a game with the right-wing sectors which they had historically criticized, and which the current government is combating” (qtd. in “Correa”). In response, while underlining his support for the Constitution, Marion Santi, the new president of the confederation emphasized that the indigenous movement has learned from its experience with Gutiérrez and would make no more alliances with the government (Denvir). It remains to be seen whether CONAIE will be able to mobilize successfully in response to his administration, given the high levels of public support the President enjoys and his striking victory in the constitutional referendum.

BOLIVIA – FROM PROTESTS TO PROPOSALS

History of Indigenous Organizing and Claims-Making

In the Bolivian case, the demand for a constitutional assembly was first made in 1990 by the Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (CPIB), a regional affiliate of the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), the major organization of indigenous peoples in the Bolivian lowlands. After failing to protect their ancestral territory against encroachment from both large-
scale agrobusiness and small-scale coca cultivators from the Andean highlands, the group decided to undertake a dramatic 650 kilometer march to the national capital of La Paz in which they presented their demands for land titling before President Jaime Paz Zamora (Yashar 213).

According to Pedro Nuni, the current vice-president of CIDOB, the lowland indigenous movements understood that the current Constitution was inadequate for a permanent resolution of the question of indigenous autonomy and rights to territory, which would require unprecedented new legal norms for land use. The movement called for a plurinational state with collective rights and recognition for all the native peoples of the country (Nuni). Starting with the 2000 conflict over water privatization in the city of Cochabamba and ending with the 2003 mobilizations over natural gas exports that led to the renouncement of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, this call eventually developed a national character and was adopted by a heterogeneous assortment of social movements without an explicitly indigenous character. These mobilizations would form the principal basis for President Evo Morales’s MAS political movement, led principally by Quechua-speaking migrant coca farmers from the Chapare region. According to Yashar, this “second-generation movement,” which had the participation of many who organized around a Marxist class basis in the mining industry, adopted a more indigenist rhetoric upon seeing the success of the ethnic-based claims of the Andean Katariista movement and of the Amazonian CIDOB (Yashar 18).

The political party system in which such claims developed differed dramatically from that of the radical multi-partyism prevalent in Ecuador. In the 1990s, Bolivia was said to have an extremely (even surprisingly) stable party system known as “pacted democracy,” in which power was primarily shared between three parties. These were the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) of former dictator Hugo Banzer, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) of Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, architect of Bolivia’s 1985 neoliberal reforms, and the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) of Jaime Paz Zamora, a former dis-
sident against the Banzer dictatorship who had since made amends with the dictator. After the emergence of democracy in the 1980s, it became clear that no political party would come close to winning a majority of the popular vote. Whereas in Ecuador this would lead to a runoff election between the two frontrunners, in Bolivia the President was selected by the Bolivian Congress, leading to coalition governments in which sometimes the second or even third place finisher would assume the presidency.

Pacted democracy was praised by political scientists for encouraging power-sharing between different factions in a democratic consensus and bringing institutional stability to a country known for chaos and conflict. However, that the political parties were able to reach agreements amongst themselves in the Congress turned out to be an illusory stability increasingly out of touch with the social situation in the country. Van Cott adds that the restrictions on entry that pacted democracy generated:

...sustained a relatively homogenous political class with low levels of ideological and programmatic differentiation, resulting in an increasing emphasis on personalities and personal relationships and a decline in political meaning apart from professional advancement (159).

This led to what Alenda calls an “intrinsic weakness in the governments since 1985, in their incapacity of achieving the consensus for the application of structural reforms or responding to the demands of society maintaining the ‘dynamic equilibrium’ which is the base of any governability” (9). She justifies this view by pointing to six states of siege declared by various presidents from 1985 to 2000, mostly in response to labor union or miner mobilizations.

By the time of the Banzer administration (1997-2001), social discontent with the government was obvious. Increasing social instability was evidenced by violent conflicts with the cocalero unions in the Chapare and the so-called “Water War” of Cochabamba, in which the government unsuccessfully exercised repression on a wide variety of social movements protesting (successfully) against
the privatization of water in the city. By 2001, poll results suggested that Bolivia was the most critical country in Latin America regarding the exercise of democracy in their country, with many favoring its disappearance and almost half of the population believing that parties were not necessary for democracy (Alenda 10; Madrid 492). While the crucial moment of rupture with this system was yet to arrive, clearly any appearance of political party stability was deeply misleading.

The response of Bolivia’s fragmented indigenous movement to this political climate varied widely. The lowland CIDOB became the darling of the international community, marketing itself successfully to international organizations by astutely receiving significant foreign aid and combining their indigenous rights’ agenda with an environmental preservation argument for the Amazon. Although it had once made overtures to join with the numerically-larger highland Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) in the 1980s, by the 1990s it was concerned with maintaining an independent stance. As Lucero argues, CIDOB was not only “more ‘green’ but less ‘red’” than the CSUTCB, which persisted in a radical, anti-imperialist posture, did not seek aid abroad, and had very limited cooperation with the government; meanwhile the cocalero unions principally functioned as outlaws who were periodically subject to government crack-downs (152). In this environment, the incentives for CIDOB were to maintain a more moderate, accommodationist stance towards the central government.

Reasons for the attitude taken by CIDOB are presented in a sociological encyclopedia of Bolivian social movements written by current Vice President Álvaro García Linera. First, the 1953 land reform undertaken by the MNR revolutionaries affected primarily the western highlands and broke the oligarchic hacienda system of land tenure for the highland Quechua and Aymara. Its provisions were never applied to the lowlands, where the old system of land tenure persisted with fewer changes and lands were sold off in large quantities to foreign immigrants and businessmen. As such, the primary enemy for CIDOB became the local landowning interests
of the lowland provinces, primarily in Santa Cruz and Beni. Given their numerical weakness vis-à-vis non-indigenous inhabitants of the lowlands, they tended to appeal to the central government as a potential ally against these landowners. Their appeals to state power were partially vindicated in responses such as the 1996 passage of the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA) Law, which was a land reform that sought to regularize and redistribute landholdings in the lowlands and recognize indigenous “Community Lands of Origin” in which they could exercise considerable autonomy (García Linera 245).

Unlike western indigenous groups—which were subject to selective repression by central government authorities during the Barrientos and Banzer dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s—and the cocaleros—who have aggressively been targeted by the Bolivian state’s implementation of U.S.-backed coca eradication programs—the lowland indigenous groups do not have a history of violence with representatives of the Bolivian state. Far from the political power of La Paz and in many cases geographically remote, the state neglected both their development and their political incorporation before the mid-twentieth century. Even when the state enacted policies favoring landowners in the tropics, it was always the landowners themselves who were the face of domination in the region, not the central authorities.

CIDOB was thus unique in not adopting an oppositional discourse towards the central government, arguing instead that its role was to help the government resolve problems and enforce its laws, particularly those favorable to indigenous interests. Gains were discursively presented not as conquests, but as examples of a good government pushed to do well and broadening its base of legitimacy (248). In exchange for this attitude, they were rewarded amply: CIDOB president Marcial Fabricano became Vice-Minister of Indigenous Affairs under the second Sánchez de Lozada administration. However, while it “seduced a sector of the political elite and the public ready to entertain a multi-ethnic vision of Bolivian society,” CIDOB was not able to garner electoral power (Van Cott 168). Its attempts to run indigenous candidates led to returns of
less than four percent and a failure to elect a single representative.

The accommodationist perspective in the western highlands was represented by the Kataristas, led by the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari de Liberación (MRTKL) and former Vice President Victor Hugo Cárdenas. This movement arose in the desire of Aymara intellectuals to work in the interstices of ethnicity and class and was initially heavily tied to the CSUTCB. While the MRTKL created the foundation of the ideological base from which more radical movements such as the MAS would feed, some Kataristas took a turn towards mainstream politics, allying with the MNR in 1993 and gaining the vice presidency after helping the right-wing Sánchez de Losada gain a plurality of the vote. Although on its own the Katarista could not garner much more than two percent of the electorate, they were widely credited with enabling the MNR's victory.

While Cárdenas successfully advocated for various reform measures undertaken during his administration, most notably the Law of Popular Participation and the INRA Land Reform, he did so by participating in an administration that furthered the privatization process with the “capitalization” of public companies, an agenda opposed by much of the indigenous movement at the time. As the government advanced policies opposed by CSUTCB and other groups occupying the political left, Cárdenas was perceived as out of touch with the indigenous masses, serving primarily as a figurehead, and the Kataristas never developed into an autonomous electoral force.

While CIDOB and the Kataristas showed moderate tendencies and maintained a good international image, the pacted democracy was crumbling rapidly. Discontent with the Banzer administration, the success of the anti-privatization forces in the Cochabamba water conflict, coupled with an untimely intervention by the US ambassador, led to a meteoric rise in support for Evo Morales and MAS, which narrowly finished second to Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in the 2002 elections with 20.9 percent of the vote. The three main parties of pacted democracy saw their vote-share slip to a mere 40 percent (Alenda 15).
MAS differed dramatically from any other political party. Growing out of the Asamblea Soberana de los Pueblos, a militant confederation of coca growers who were fighting coca eradication, they organized to govern their own municipalities under the decentralization of the Law of Popular Participation. Organizing as a social movement and not as a top-down political party, MAS began to reach out to highland indigenous groups and become a dominant force in the CSUTCB, seeking to aggregate both Quechua and Aymara speakers under the leadership of the half-Quechua, half-Aymara Morales. From the original reference point of coca cultivation, it began to amass a variety of unfulfilled social demands. Unlike other parties, MAS maintained a position of militant opposition, not only refusing to cooperate with any of the old parties, but also actively blocking the implementation of their policies and seeking to topple the foundations of their legitimacy. They developed characteristics that Raul Madrid calls “ethnopopulist”: instead of using exclusionary rhetoric and platforms to mobilize members of a particular ethnic group, they sought to appeal to a variety of marginalized identities.

The total inability of Sánchez de Losada’s second administration to govern in 2003 made clear what was developing during Banzer’s presidency: the system of pacted democracy was no longer sustainable and was ripe to be wiped away by a movement that could capture mass popular discontent. As the 2003 government took up unpopular tax hikes—mandated by the IMF to decrease Bolivia’s deficit—and sought to export natural gas at preferential rates through Chile, the country’s historic enemy, this powerful new “ethnopopulist” movement arose around Evo Morales and the MAS.

In February 2003, battles between an elite police unit and the army left several dead in one of the main squares of La Paz. By October 2003, total mayhem emerged in the streets. A broad coalition of social movements led by the more radical elements of the indigenous movements, the CSUTCB of Felipe Quispe and the politicized neighborhood federations of the capital’s poor sister-city El Alto, blocked all routes into the city. In the conflict to re-
open the routes, more than 80 people were killed and cities all over Bolivia were shut down as people called for Sánchez de Losada’s resignation. Unable to govern the country despite the support of all the old political forces, the president submitted his resignation and fled to the United States.

Thus, between 2003 and 2005, all the elements that were previously viewed as “antiquated” and “obstructionist” rose to prominence in the context of a general discrediting of the existing political regime. At that time, 95 percent of the population believed that democracy had not brought them any economic benefit (Lucero 156). The 2005 election that brought Evo Morales to office was characterized by the absolute collapse and discrediting of the three major parties, with the MIR virtually disappearing, the MNR garnering 6.5 percent of the vote, and the ADN having to reconstitute itself under the new name of Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS), which finished with a solid 28.6 percent. MAS, on the other hand, was able to run as the only organized large-scale political force which had not participated in any prior government, and had a solid record of protesting them at every step. To cement its support, MAS was careful to maintain an inclusive ethnic rhetoric, complementing the indigenous Morales with a non-indigenous vice presidential nominee and speaking in traditionally populist terms as they made anti-establishment claims, promised to use the national state for redistributive and interventionist aims, and relied on the significant personal appeal of Morales (Madrid 491). In such a way, they were able to garner the support of 71.1 percent of self-identified indigenous and 63.6 percent of self-identified mestizos who spoke an indigenous language, along with sizable minorities of the white middle classes. Ironically, it was the very systematic exclusion of these more radical movements from decision-making in the past that led to their credibility and popularity in 2005. As in Ecuador, a Constitutional Assembly was to be MAS’ aim as well. However in Bolivia, the indigenous movement would be the guiding motor for its realization.
Implications for Constitutional Reform

Historical divisions between lowland and highland Bolivian indigenous groups notwithstanding, most major organizations in the country expressed support for and campaigned for the constitution. Both rhetorically and juridically, the indigenous rights language in the Bolivian constitutional project is far stronger than in its Ecuadorian counterpart. The prologue of the Bolivian constitution offers a striking indigenist paean to Bolivia’s multicultural and indigenous composition and the popular struggles of the last several decades:

The Bolivian people, of plural composition, from the depths of history, inspired in the struggles of the past, in the indigenous anticolonial uprising, in independence, in the popular liberation struggles, in the indigenous, social and unionist marches, in the water wars and those of October [about gas], in the struggles for land and territory, and with the memory of our martyrs, construct a new State....

We leave behind the colonial, republican, neoliberal State. We assume the historical challenge of collectively constructing a Social Unitary State of Plurinational Communitarian Law, which integrates andarticulates the purposes of advancing towards a democratic, productive, and peacefully inspired Bolivia, committed with the development and free determination of its peoples.

This prologue is consonant with MAS’s ethnopolitical rhetoric, which is simultaneously indigenist and inclusionary. It celebrates the indigenous majority in historically unprecedented ways while inviting non-indigenous populations to participate in the construction of the new state and refraining from claims that the indigenous experience represents the totality of the Bolivian experience.

The current Bolivian vice president, Álvaro García Linera, was one of the key ideological architects of the constitution and the
concept of plurinationality. He maintained that the prior Bolivian model, based on principles of Western liberalism, was a monocultural, Spanish-speaking, non-indigenous state that had been superimposed on a plurinational society. While it made claims to universality and equal representation, it could not help but reinforce an exclusionary and racist society, for the supposedly “universal” institutions and values which existed at the national level were in fact all Western in origin. Furthermore, he maintained, such a state represented only those who were integrated into the modern, capitalist mercantile sectors of the economy, leading to a “dis-encounter between state life and the socioeconomic composition of the country” and a state that was “permanently under suspicion” and thus weak (Garcia Linera 55). Thus, transforming a multilingual, multiculturization into a stronger state-form would require “demonopolizing the ethnicity of the state, permitting dominated and excluded ethnicities to share in the structures of social recognition and political power” (66). Such a state would be consonant and organic with its actual social composition.

In terms of content, the Bolivian Constitution goes far beyond any other national precedent in inscribing indigenous rights. Article 5 declares not only Quechua and Aymara but also 36 other indigenous languages to be official alongside Spanish, and mandates that the “plurinational Government” and departmental governments use at least two official languages: Spanish and the indigenous language most appropriate for the community they are working with. Indigenous nations are recognized as viable collective entities regardless of existing municipal or departmental boundaries and are accorded a great degree of autonomy.

The chapter on “Indigenous Peasant Originator Autonomy” outlines this autonomous regime. Article 289 states that “Indigenous-peasant-originator autonomy consists in self-government as an exercise of the free determination of the nations and indigenous peoples, whose population has their own territory, culture, history, languages, and organization or legal, political, social and economic institutions.” In addition to guarantees of community justice norms and cultural development, one of the strongest articles that guaran-
tees their rights to territory is Article 403:

The integrity of indigenous territory is recognized, which includes the right to the land, to the exclusive use of renewable natural resources in the conditions determined by the law, to a prior and informed consultation and the participation in the benefits resulting from the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources that are found in their territories; the ability to apply their own norms, administrated by their structures of representation and the definition of their development in accordance with their cultural criteria and principles of harmonious coexistence with nature.

The principal difference between this and the Ecuadorian model is that here, communities would have the exclusive right to any renewable natural resources on their land and not merely the right to “participation.” However, in regards to non-renewable resources, principally hydrocarbons and natural gas, the state is still the main actor, as other articles of the Constitution mandate that hydrocarbons are the “inalienable property of the Bolivian people” and prohibit any private entities, domestic or foreign, from acquiring them as property.

There are several reasons why the Bolivian indigenous movement accepted state ownership of natural resources while the Ecuadorians opposed it. A degree of a highland, Quechua-Aymara bias exists in MAS, while most of the hydrocarbons in question are located in the lowlands, where the indigenous groups were organized with CIDOB. However, the lowland groups, while not directly articulated via MAS, also supported the new constitutional draft because it implied a generous recognition of their territorial jurisdictions and extended rights over other resources in their territory.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has demonstrated that, despite the strength and unity of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement in the 1990s vis-à-
vis its Bolivian counterpart, CONAIE suffered a diminished political capacity in the constitution produced by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Assembly as compared to that of Bolivia. The strongest movements in Bolivia now exercising state power are those that were systematically excluded from the political system in the 1990s. During that time they were believed to have an unreasonably conflictive and antiquated position marked by low levels of international support, with the dominant cocalero faction of the Bolivian government even labeled as “terrorists” and “drug traffickers.” In Ecuador, however, the CONAIE party lost its political clout in the Constitutional Assembly due to its previously pragmatic stance. This outcome challenges typical assumptions that movements that are more compromising will achieve greater electoral and political success. It is precisely those movements that decided to enter their respective political realms during the neoliberal period, CONAIE/Pachakutik in Ecuador and CIDOB/the Kataristas in Bolivia, that find themselves in a significantly weakened position today. When the Bolivian state and international development organizations picked the indigenous actors with whom they wanted to work, they unwittingly empowered the “radical” movements that had emerged during the “water” and “gas” wars to become the dominant and almost politically hegemonic force in the country. An examination of the increasing politicization of social conflicts by these movements makes clear that in times of rapid systemic delegitimization, radicalism wins credibility.

Pachakutik misinterpreted the Gutiérrez candidacy as the “populist moment” it had been waiting for and, because of that, was too quick to form an alliance with a candidate who did not seriously strive to transform the political system consonant with its demands. The party did not have a correct reading of the political situation and its policies did not reflect the complete lack of legitimacy with which the Ecuadorian population considered their national government. This led to a loss of credibility, and it weakened and divided Pachakutik just at the time that the party’s political project could have come to fruition; Correa capitalized on Pachakutik’s demands and ran an anti-systemic campaign at precisely the
time when Pachajutik could have won. While it can still continue to protest Correa’s ideas on resource extraction, and there is some evidence of increased mobilizational capacity in recent months, it is doubtful that Pachakutik has anything to gain from an oppositional stance towards a stable left-populist government. There are numerous reasons why MAS was able to maintain a longer-standing and more credible oppositional stance towards the Bolivian government than did Pachakutik in Ecuador. The first was the intransigence of the Banzer and Sánchez de Losada governments regarding the issue of coca eradication. The willingness of the state apparatus to use repression instead of negotiation against mostly nonviolent farmers led to both an impossibility of compromise and a vindication of their purely negative position. In addition to this seemingly irreconcilable conflict, the second Sánchez de Losada government also refused to negotiate with the demands of the increasingly powerful social movements, believing that it could push through its unpopular gas export plan through aggressive police action. The Bolivian state, despite the supposed political consensus of its pacted democracy, did not prove skillful at the divide and conquer tactics that successfully demobilized CONAIE. Instead, it minimized any chance of cooptation and virtually guaranteed indigenous unity, as groups like CIDOB that did not actively participate in the opposition were forced either to change their position or to become politically irrelevant. In an atmosphere of continued repression, the pressures to pursue a micropolitical project and compromise with the existing system in exchange for economic assistance were far less than in Ecuador. In Bolivia, the bases of the movements were more likely to accept an unambiguously “negative” program when the government was pursuing the destruction of their economic livelihoods and continuing repression.

These findings also suggest that class-based movements have not entirely surrendered the mantle to those organizing on the basis of indigeneity. The most successful movements were syncretistic, mixing ethnic and traditional leftist class appeal. Stemming from the strong presence of communists in the Bolivian miners’ movement, the Marxist influence on the discourse of the cocalero or
CSUTCB leaders was key to integrating many of those who were discontented with neoliberal reforms. Inclusionary populist movements with urban support like the MAS have successfully institutionalized indigenous demands, whereas movements with a solely ethnic identification have floundered. The story in these two Latin American cases is not as simple as the triumph of identity politics over social class frequently assumed to have taken place in the turn to the postmodern. While the traditional left may have needed to adopt the discourse of indigenous rights to remain relevant in the Andes, the indigenous groups have had to borrow quite a bit from the traditional left to be successful.

Works Cited


Since Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in 1998, Latin America has experienced the economic and political sway of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution. The Revolution calls for a unique form of democracy and development shaped by Chávez’s idea of socialism. Countries like Bolivia and Nicaragua have enthusiastically answered its rhetoric, whereas those like Chile and Brazil have given Chávez a much cooler reception. Somewhere along this bipolar divide, however, lies Argentina, which has taken quite an “ambiguous” stance in its relations with Venezuela (Castaneda 39). On the one hand, one would expect relations between the two countries to be close, with full cooperation in a wide range of areas; Venezuela was one of the few countries that helped Argentina after its devastating peso crisis of 2001, and the new Perónista in power in Argentina seemed to be part of the rise of leftist movements in Latin America. However, the rhetoric of the Kirchners, Néstor and Cristina, is far more cautious than that used by their counterparts in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. What we find is that definite areas of non-cooperation exist alongside areas of cooperation, making it the “ambiguous” case of Latin America, a puzzle that begs for further investigation.

EXPLANATION OF THE TOPIC

Several scholars have speculated on what can be seen as the rising pink tide of Latin America. Starting with Hugo Chávez’s victory in Venezuela, a wave of leaders, parties, and movements generically labeled “leftist” have swept into power in one Latin American...
country after another. Chávez’s election was followed by Lula’s in Brazil, Kirchner’s in Argentina, Vázquez’s in Uruguay, and Morales’ in Bolivia (Castaneda 29). Many scholars have speculated as to why the sudden surge in leftist tendencies has been possible. New York University Professor Jorge Castaneda, for example, attributes the cause to the fall of the Soviet Union, Latin America’s extreme inequality, and the spread of democratization and democratic elections (Castaneda 30).

Castaneda emphasizes that the face of the left in Latin America is not uniform; there are really two lefts in the region. One is open-minded and modern and has radical roots; the other is close-minded and stridently populist. The former emphasizes social policy but within a more or less orthodox framework. Countries who follow such an idea include Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. For the latter group of countries, however, rhetoric is much more important than substance, and power is more important than its responsible exercise. These states are more sympathetic to the Bolivarian Revolution and include Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.

In order to illustrate this dyad with an empirical example, one can refer to the ways these countries cooperate within international organizations. According to a high-ranking official within a regional intergovernmental organization, Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua are active in criticizing international financial organizations; they actually want a new International Monetary Fund and World Bank. These four countries are also quick to support each other in disagreements. The other left seems to be less interested in Latin American and Caribbean affairs. Chile, for example, believes that “they are the most civilized from the institutional point of view” (Official). The country frequently aligns with the United States, Europe, and the Pacific Ring against its Latin American neighbors. As a telling indication of Chile’s position, President Michelle Bachelet spoke for two and a half hours in her State of the Union address, yet there was only one mention of Latin America and the Caribbean (Official). Brazil also considers itself a big player in the region. Brazil has attended G8 and Security Council meetings under the request that it represent Latin American views. However,
Brazil does not consult with its neighbors before these meetings, and in turn, the other left has become quite agitated (Official).

Castaneda categorizes Argentina in the second left but with its qualification as a “somewhat ambiguous case” (Castaneda 39). It is from this remark that I embark on my research project, for this ambiguity cannot be so easily disregarded. From the study of the Argentine case, this paper demonstrates that if two developing countries enter a bilateral relation with differing motivations, their relationship will be ambiguous. In the Argentine-Venezuelan case, Chávez is motivated by ideology while Kirchner is motivated by economic need. The strongest relationships are those with a shared ideology on both sides. This is not the case with Argentina and Venezuela, so their relationship contains disagreements alongside agreements.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT

Understanding the structural forces that govern the Bolivarian Revolution has several important implications.

First, this work aims to fill a gap in political science and international relations research. Scholarly work on the Bolivarian Revolution has been limited to articles in academic journals and newspapers. Books on the subject are not as prevalent.

Several reasons explain this paucity of work. First, the Bolivarian Revolution is an entirely new phenomenon, having emerged in 1998 after the election of Hugo Chávez. This social, economic, and political movement is very much defined by Chávez, and thus attempts to project the roots of the movement to earlier eras of Venezuelan history are tenuous. Scholars grapple with less than ten years of history in their attempts to define and analyze the movement. The Chávez regime releases little information to the press and what is reported is highly regulated by the regime. The Freedom House index from 2006 rates the freedom of press in the country as “not free.” The summary states:

A hostile political atmosphere under the government of President Hugo Chávez has fostered a steady decline in press
freedom over the past several years, and that trend continued in 2006. State initiatives have eroded the influence of private media, in which the previous dominance of pro-opposition outlets has been dwindling. Among other actions, the government has enacted legislation prohibiting the broadcast of certain material, intimidated and denied access to private media, attempted to shut down pro-opposition outlets, and harassed journalists employed at such outlets. (Freedom House)

Finding work on the relationship between Venezuela and Argentina has been even more difficult for a third reason. Most scholarly work on the bilateral relations between Venezuela and other Latin American countries has focused on those issues of great visibility. The Venezuelan-Colombian relation has been emphasized because of border permeation and guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the American press has specifically stressed this relation because Colombia is one of America’s most faithful allies in the region. Brazil’s relations with Venezuela have been highlighted because of Brazil’s role as the dominant power in Latin America. Venezuela’s relations to Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia have also been broadcast to a great degree, mainly because of these countries’ interest in emphasizing the spread of the Bolivarian Revolution. Argentina, though a crucial player as this paper will show, often falls under the radar of study.

Second, this research is of particular interest because it focuses on two developing countries. It is common for scholars to point to relations between developed nations, or between a developed and developing nation. With this focus, we miss the dynamics of a huge swath of foreign policy that concerns only developing countries. Specifically, this project emphasizes the importance of ideology in the foreign policy of developing countries, which current schools of thought do not stress.

Finally, this project has great implications for policy decisions made by the United States regarding this region. Understanding how bilateral relations work in South America and what motivates leaders like Hugo Chávez should be a central element in crafting U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.
These last two points will be discussed at greater length in this paper since their implications are worthy of more detailed explanation. To address the lack of research, I traveled to Venezuela and Argentina in the summer of 2008 to collect sufficient data. Much of what follows in this report is from my observations and field study.

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

An analysis of the Argentine-Venezuelan relationship is difficult without using some conceptual frameworks to aid understanding. Realism, liberalism, and constructivism have been regarded as the most prevalent schools of thought in international relations theory. It is my belief that these theories cannot in and of themselves completely explain every international situation, but they will be enumerated upon here in order to provide background for understanding Chávez and Kirchner’s general motivations for engaging with each other.

I will demonstrate that constructivism can be used to explain the crux of Chávez’s foreign policymaking with regard to Argentina, while liberalism better describes Kirchner’s actions toward Venezuela. I support this claim in the next sections of this paper, where I draw upon the history of the countries’ generally lukewarm relationship and the marked affinity that began when Kirchner became president in Argentina. Through first-hand accounts from my research this past summer and a review of secondary sources, I will suggest that although the countries are closer than ever before in their history, Kirchner and Chávez approach the relationship with different motivations. As a result, the alliance between the two is ambiguous, thus explaining Argentina’s position apart from the two lefts of Latin America.

Realism

In realism, the principle actors in world politics are states, rather than non-governential organizations (NGOs) and multina-
tional corporations (MNCs). Realists approach world politics in a very Hobbesian manner: politics involves a struggle for power between states in pursuit of their national interests. Domestic issues play no role in determining foreign policy, so states cannot be driven by economic or social goals. Thus, the role of ideology takes a backseat to more rational drivers such as the need for survival and the protection of sovereignty, and, in order to achieve these goals, a state will try to amass resources (“Introduction to International Relations”).

Realism does not adequately explain the actions of Chávez and Kirchner. Chávez is highly motivated by ideology, and not necessarily rationality. Though he frames his Bolivarian Revolution as protecting Latin America from imperialism, his actions are all but rational. As for Kirchner, domestic issues play a central role in shaping his foreign policy. His goals are largely economic. He depends on the financial support of Venezuela to sustain his country. This all contradicts a central component of realist thought.

Liberalism

A branch of liberalism called interdependence theory was developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye to refer to complex transnational interdependencies between states. Interdependence theorists note that such relations, particularly economic ones, are increasing, while the use of military force and power balancing are decreasing. Reflecting on these developments, they argue that the decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic forms of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states (Beavis). Neoliberalist theory is another school of liberalism that believes nation-states are, or at least should be, concerned primarily with absolute gains rather than relative gains compared to other nation-states. Neoliberalists argue that the line between domestic and foreign policy often becomes blurred (Keohane & Nye). As will be shown, Kirchner’s foreign policy towards Chávez is best explained by this theory.
Constructivism

Constructivism seeks to demonstrate how core aspects of international relations are socially constructed, that is, how they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. The theory holds “(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt 1). This is the best framework to understand Chávez’s interest in Kirchner.

Asymmetrical Motivation

Literature on these traditional theories of international relations tends to describe a particular situation as falling completely within one of these camps. None of the literature I have encountered explains a case where countries approach their relations with different motivations, when one theory can be used to describe one party while another theory best describes the other. Traditional international relations theories do not necessarily preclude a situation where two countries enter into a relationship with different motivations, but they say nothing about what transpires when this occurs.

This paper will develop a new idea, which I have termed “asymmetrical motivation,” to describe the situation in which two parties have starkly different motivations for entering a relationship. A bilateral relation where the two parties embody similar motivations is more clearly definable than one governed by asymmetrical motivation. As such, in Latin America, the liberalist-constructivist relation of Argentina-Venezuela has a more ambiguous nature than the constructivist-constructivist motivation of Venezuela-Bolivia and Venezuela-Nicaragua and the liberalist-liberalist motivation of Venezuela-Brazil and Venezuela-Chile.1 Moreover, along this

1 The liberalist-liberalist dyad will not be discussed at greater length in this paper, due to space constraints. Chávez knows that strong economic cooperation with Brazil and Chile
gradation of relations, those countries that share a similar ideology are closest allies. This observation stresses the importance of shared ideology in international relations, but particularly among developing nations. Financial dependence on another nation is not enough to engender good relations. This, coupled with ideological affinity is the best recipe for a strong alliance.

**HISTORY OF ARGENTINE-VENEZUELAN RELATIONS**

In order to understand the uniqueness of the contemporary Argentine-Venezuelan bilateral relation, we must understand the history of the ties between these two countries. Argentina and Venezuela have never had particularly close relations, contrary to what those in both governments would like their citizens to believe. Thus, their relatively close affinity today requires explanation.

The Early Years

Officials in both the Argentine and Venezuelan governments are keen to have people believe that the two countries have historically had close ties, and that the current era is simply a continuation of such a past. In Relaciones Diplomaticas entre Venezuela-Argentina: 1833-1999, for example, then-Venezuelan ambassador to Argentina, Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, describes the 166-year history of bilateral relations between the two countries as marked by “solidarity, close cooperation, and excellence,” noting a speech made by Argentine Foreign Minister Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarrini in 2000: “Argentina will never forget the attitude of Venezuela in the past, the attitude in the present, and the attitude the State pronounces for the future” (Parejo Hernández). However, the evidence for such a close relation is weak; I found in my research only two incidents in the above period that brought the countries close
The first close relation was when the two countries began their respective processes for independence within a month of each other in 1810. Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín, the two heroes of Latin American independence, came from Venezuela and Argentina, respectively, and the affinity between them was clear. In 1822, Bolívar wrote to San Martín: “It is with great satisfaction, dignified friend and sir, that I give you, for the first time, the title that my heart has guarded for a long time. I call you Friend and this name will be the only one that we should keep for life” (Parejo Hernández 13). Dr. Roger Capella, former Venezuelan ambassador to Argentina under Chávez, also characterized the historic relationship between Venezuela and Argentina only in regards to Bolívar and San Martín (Capella).

The second period of affinity was during the Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (known to Argentines as the Malvinas). The Falkland Islands lie in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina. Their name and sovereignty had long been disputed. The Falklands War began on April 2, 1982, when the Argentines invaded and occupied the Islands and South Georgia, and ended with the Argentine surrender on June 14, 1982 (Smith). Before the war even began, Venezuela was one of the first countries to declare solidarity with Argentina over the sovereignty dispute. Venezuela decided to support Argentina because of its own belief in self-determination and non-intervention. Venezuela made this position clear in various international settings, including meetings of the Organization of American States and the United Nations (Luna).

These two incidences of close cooperation are not enough to deduce that relations have been strong throughout the history of these two nations. Instead, according to the vast majority of my interviewees, Argentine-Venezuelan relations have historically been fairly distant and lukewarm. Differences in their interests and cultures did not compel the two nations to engage naturally or extensively with each other.

Venezuelans descend from a very mixed background, from
African, European, and indigenous ancestors; essentially, they have a Caribbean culture. Argentines descend from Italians and Spaniards; their heritage is distinctly European. According to Francisco Monaldi, professor at the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (Advanced Institute for Administrative Studies), even the way they do business is different. Argentines are harsher and more direct. Hence, they give off the impression of being arrogant and pretentious. Monaldi illustrates this with a telling example from within SIDOR, an Argentine steel company with a production base in Venezuela: “When Argentinean workers came to work at SIDOR in Venezuela, their interactions with the Venezuelan workers were poor. Their clashing cultures did not allow them to work well together. The Argentines actually had to bring in Mexican workers to ease the transition and relations with the Venezuelans” (Monaldi).

The two countries are in completely different subsystems of Latin America. Venezuela is situated on the Caribbean, a region of great strategic importance to the United States. Venezuela’s neighbor is Gran Colombia, which includes the Panama Canal (an entrance for China) and Colombia. In contrast, the Southern Cone region, which encompasses Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, is important to Argentina (Scholar). Because of these different locations, the two countries have vastly different interests. Venezuela is oil rich; Argentina is a middle-tier player in energy resources, but a crucial one in food production. Jonathan Coles, the Venezuelan Minister of Agriculture from 1990-1993, summed up the historical relationship between the two countries well: “There was zero interest in Argentina during my term as Minister. The Southern Cone was just seen as totally different. San Martin and Bolivar had their meeting and that was it” (Coles).

The Menem, the de la Rúa, and the Duhalde Years

When Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency in 1999, he maintained this lukewarm relationship with Argentina for several years, during the presidencies of Carlos Menem, Fernando de la
Rúa, and Eduardo Duhalde. He shifted his behavior when Néstor Kirchner was elected (Edmundo Gonzalez).

During his campaign, Chávez only visited three countries in Latin America: Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia. In Argentina, he met with President Carlos Menem. There were certain sympathies between the two leaders, but Chávez was only really interested in being a part of Mercosur, a regional trade agreement to promote free trade and fluid movement of people, currency, and goods. Chávez visited Brazil and Argentina because they were the two powerhouses of the organization. Chávez was so adamant about securing a spot in Mercosur that Carlos Menem was the only Latin American president to have a private meeting with Chávez on the day of his inauguration. In that 7:30 a.m. meeting, only eight people were present: Hugo Chávez, Edmundo Gonzalez, Carlos Menem, and five other Argentines (Edmundo Gonzalez). When Chávez assumed office in 1999, the United States called governments throughout Latin America to ask their opinion of the new Venezuelan president. The person who spoke most highly about Chávez to U.S. President Bill Clinton was Carlos Menem. However, this was only because Chávez asked him to do so (Edmundo Gonzalez). So, though cordial, the relationship with Menem was not particularly defined by a shared ideology, only pragmatic interests. In fact, disagreements between Chávez and Menem soon arose. For example, there were differences concerning the essence of democracy and the creation of a new constitutional assembly in Venezuela (Edmundo Gonzalez). All in all, the Argentine-Venezuelan relationship maintained the same rapport as in past years.

When Fernando de la Rúa came to power in Argentina in December 1999, Chávez did not attend the inauguration. He sent Vice President José Rangel instead. The first time de la Rúa and Chávez met was a few months later at the inauguration of the president of Uruguay, Jorge Batlle, in March 2000. Relations became worse when, later that year, treaties and agreements between Venezuela and Argentina failed to crystallize. In Argentina, Chávez was not particularly popular—he appeared half-guerrilla, was still part of the military, and he had participated in a coup. As such,
there was apprehension toward Chávez in Argentina because of the country’s own troubled past with military dictatorship and coups. However, Rangel sought to improve relations. Edmundo Gonzalez actually suggested that Rangel go to Buenos Aires for the second time in 2000. Later that year, Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini came to Venezuela to mend relations which then became fluid and diplomatic, but nothing more significant or special (Edmundo Gonzalez).

In December 2001, Fernando de la Rúa was forced to end his term as president in response to protests against his handling of the economic crisis. Eduardo Duhalde replaced him. Duhalde seemed to have some sympathy for Chávez. At the meeting of the Grupo de Río en Costa Rica, for example, Duhalde supported the democracy of Venezuela and adamantly opposed the elite coup attempt of April 2002. Relations seemed to be getting better, but Duhalde was not in power long enough to fortify relations (Edmundo Gonzalez).

**NÉSTOR KIRCHNER AND CHANGES TO THE RELATION**

The period of 2003-2004—when Néstor Kirchner assumed power in Argentina—was a significant turning point in the relationship between the two countries. However, those working for the Argentine and Venezuelan governments, though they recognized a marked increase in commerce between the two nations, did not sense a political change. Moreover, the newfound commercial affinity just “balanced their historical unity” (Binaghi). This section will show that the two countries did actually become significantly closer, both economically and politically, with the start of Néstor Kirchner’s term.

**Increased Economic Affinity**

The economic affinity between Argentina and Venezuela since 2003 has been substantial. The commerce between them does not balance their historical unity; it goes above and beyond
any relation they may have had before. Between 1999 and 2002, Argentine exports to Venezuela actually decreased slightly; the same was true of exports out of Venezuela to Argentina. In total, the commercial exchange between the two nations decreased from about $300 billion to $152 billion. Lukewarm political relations seemed to parallel economic ties during the presidencies of Menem, de la Rúa and Duhalde in Argentina. A change came in 2003, however, with an even greater spike in 2004. In these years, the total commercial exchange increased, and nearly tripled between 2003 and 2004. The export of petroleum in particular doubled from 2003 to 2004, and then increased nearly twenty-fold between 2004 and 2005. Whereas the value of petroleum sold to Argentina used to equal the value of non-petroleum products, this changed dramatically in 2004 and by 2007, petroleum made up nearly 93.25 percent of all exports to Argentina (Asociación Venezolana de Exportadores). Although exports to the rest of the world also increased during these years, the rate of increase did not nearly rival the rate of increase to Argentina. Whereas total exports to the world increased by about 24 percent between 2001 and 2007, total exports to Argentina increased by about 192 percent in the same time period. Chávez spent more than twice the amount of money on Argentina from 2005 to 2007 than he spent on even his closest allies, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. The timing of this spike in economic activity thus emphasizes Chávez’s particular interest in maintaining close relations with the new Argentine president, Néstor Kirchner, as it corresponded with Kirchner’s assumption of power (Asociación Venezolana de Exportadores).

As further evidence, both Argentina and Venezuela have significantly increased their services and activities since 2003 in order to keep up with the new economic affinity between the two nations. For example, the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA) and the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial (INTI) are public, decentralized institutions in Argentina that have demonstrated increased activity during Kirchner’s presidency, most notably in their relations with Venezuela. INTA provides the technical “know-how” to improve agrarian functions
in countries throughout Latin America; farmers learn how to manage agricultural machines, how to produce the best milk, and other skills. According to Javier Binaghi, Secretary of the Economic-Commercial Division of the Argentine Embassy in Caracas, INTA provided 33 courses to Venezuelans last year (Asociación Venezolana de Exportadores). This year they are providing 55 courses, with an enrollment of over 600 Venezuelan students (Cipolla). In 2007, INTA sent a permanent representative to Caracas, Venezuela’s capital, for the first time in its history. INTI, on the other hand, provides the “how-to” information for those in the agrarian business. INTI coordinates, assesses, and designs industrial technology and factories of the state, called “fabricas,” throughout South America. According to Federico Merke, Academic Sub-Secretary of the Argentine Council for International Relations, INTI used to primarily concern itself with quality control. However, this changed with the arrival of Enrique Martin as the new president of INTI, who is widely regarded as a fervent Chavismo, that is, one who is the sympathetic to the left-wing ideology espoused by Chávez. Martin is changing the institutional mission of INTI into one of “inventing solidarity through technology.” Over a hundred Venezuelans are now enrolled in INTI classes to learn about social cooperatives (Merke).

The history of the Cámara de Comercio Venezolano-Argentinea (Venezuelan-Argentinean Chamber of Commerce) is also a telling indication of how economic relations between the two countries have changed with the rise of Kirchner. The Cámara works with Argentine companies seeking to initiate operations in Venezuela. The organization determines what documents are needed to enter Venezuela, how to work with the exchange control system, what permission is needed, and other technicalities. The Cámara was formed in 1973, but went through a prolonged period of inactivity during the latter half of the twentieth century. Its function was only revitalized in 2003, coinciding with the start of Kirchner’s presidency. The organization realized that an immense number of treaties were being signed between Venezuela and Argentina, and so it was in their best interest to restart operations (Borguillos).
Increased Political Affinity

“Before Chávez, Venezuela never cared about Argentina. But, that has completely changed” (Lladós). This is quite true even when considering the newfound political affinity between the two nations. Juan Battalame, an expert on national security, gave the example of his classroom in Buenos Aires. In the 1990s, there were no military officers from Venezuela taking his course. Today, there are four to five in his class but only two Americans and two European military officials (Battalame).

Cooperation between the two nations in joint venture projects also seems to be at an all-time high. In February 2007, Chávez and Kirchner opened the first joint-venture oil well in the Venezuelan state of Anzoategui, in the Ayacucho 6 block. This venture is part of the so-called Magnificent Reserve plan in which the Uruguayan state company, the National Fuel, Alcohol, and Portland Administration, is also a partner. In the same month, the two nations also announced the creation of Banco del Sur, a regionally controlled multilateral lender intended to lessen South America’s economic dependency on rich countries. In August 2007, Argentina and Venezuela pledged new oil and natural gas investments in Bolivia, which is seeking new investors after nationalizing its energy sector in 2006 (Bank Information Center).

Argentina approved Venezuela’s bid for entry into Mercosur even as the issue was still being hotly debated in Brazil and Paraguay. In March of 2008, Néstor Kirchner allowed Chávez to use Argentina for a rally attacking U.S. President George W. Bush, who was visiting neighboring Uruguay. Under the Kirchner administration, 40 of the 140 bilateral agreements Argentina has have been with Venezuela (Russell).

THE “AMBIGUOUS” CASE OF ARGENTINA

Though the political relations between the two nations has grown stronger since the presidency of Néstor Kirchner, there have been clear constrictions, hence the ambiguity of their relationship.
Venezuela asked Argentina to join the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of our America (ALBA), an international cooperation organization based on the ideas of socialism and economic integration. Argentina issued a conditional acceptance. For example, Argentina wanted to receive some benefits of ALBA, like energy and economic help, but did not want to receive Cuban doctors, educational help, or an ALBA house. This clearly illustrates Argentina’s need for financial support from Venezuela but also its reluctance for sharing Venezuelan ideology. This act was indicative of Argentina’s ambiguity towards Venezuela, seeming almost “half-in and half-out” (Luna).

Argentina’s actions within intergovernmental organizations also symbolize its ambiguous stance. While Argentina actively supports the Venezuelan approach in criticizing the international system, they are very careful in passing judgment about the domestic policy of other Latin American countries. They value the idea of non-interventionism, and so are hesitant to criticize the domestic policy choices made by other countries, unlike Venezuela and Bolivia who have no qualms in condemning others’ domestic policies (Official).

As for the joint venture projects between the two nations, in a conversation with Catalina Smulovitz, Director of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the Universidad Torcuato di Tella in Buenos Aires, it was pointed out that most of these projects have not been started, or if they have, efforts have been halted in the middle of production. The reason for such stagnation seems to be that not enough money is being funneled into these projects, and Kirchner may be doing this purposely. This would suggest that although Argentina may owe Venezuela for its bond purchases, Argentina is hoping eventually to wean itself off Chávez and Venezuela (Smulovitz).

**HUGO CHÁVEZ’S INTEREST IN ARGENTINA**

In order to address this ambiguity, we must understand the motivations behind this relationship. As shown earlier, both real-
ism and liberalism are inadequate in explaining the motivation of the Venezuelan president. Ideology plays a central role in Chávez’s foreign policy, and only constructivism properly accounts for such a dimension.

**Constructivism as an Explanation**

Those who seek rational explanations for Chávez’s behavior towards Argentina may point to the Argentine peso crash of 2001. The critical period of Argentina’s economic crisis started in 1999 with the decrease of real GDP. The peso then crashed in 2001 to a third of its value, a devastating blow to the Argentine people. Using a rationalist approach, one would think that Chávez would have given aid to Argentina immediately when the currency failed. However, the economic and political relationship between the two nations did not strengthen until 2003, two years after the economic crisis had peaked. Chávez did not start buying bonds or selling petroleum to the ailing country until Kirchner entered office in 2003. Why was this the case? According to Edmundo González, Chávez wanted to wait for someone who seemed to share his own mindset to become the Argentine president before courting the country (Edmundo González). Carlos Moneta, who worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of Kirchner’s term supported this claim, saying that this interest in Argentina came as soon as Kirchner entered office (Moneta). In fact, Venezuela’s constitution itself mandates that the country engage with other Latin American countries to promote the Bolivarian Revolution:

The people of Venezuela...in invoking the historical example of our Liberator Simón Bolívar...with the supreme goal of reestablishing the Republic...which promotes the peaceful cooperation between the nations and drives and consolidates the Latin American integration in accordance with the principle of non-intervention and self-determination of the peoples, the universal and indivisible guarantee of the human rights, the democratization of the international society, nuclear disarmament, ecological equilibrium and the juridical environmental assets and the common and irrenounceable...
Chávez only found the ability to do this through what he saw as an ideological affinity with Néstor Kirchner. Kirchner was a Peronist, and in Chávez’s mind, this meant great similarities to Chavismo. In fact, on a visit to Argentina, Chávez proclaimed that he had read Juan Perón’s biography and he could indeed call himself a Peronist (Asbert). Both Perón and Chávez share a very similar background. “Though Hugo Chávez has been compared to socialist icons such as Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende, his military background places him squarely with Juan Perón. Castro was a lawyer turned guerrilla fighter and Allende was a career parliamentarian while Chávez and Perón own their pre-political careers to the military” (“Perón & Chavez: Separated at Birth?”). Juan Perón had formative experiences abroad as a young man in the military. He was present in Spain, for example, during the civil war. He witnessed the deep ideological rifts that fueled that conflict. In Il Duce’s Italy, Perón saw elements of the corporatist vehicle of social control. Combined, Perón’s travels explain in part the kind of paternalistic populist society he sought to construct in Argentina. Hugo Chávez, like Perón, became inspired by international experience, specifically the Peruvian military regime of Juan Velasco. The political program of Velasco’s regime centered on Plan Inca, which included nationalizations of foreign oil companies, land reform, and normalized relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Chávez has sought to reconstruct a similar system in his own country. The Peronismo and Chavismo that arose from such experiences, however, were not ideologies in the intellectually rigorous sense of the term, and in this regard, the two leaders share another similarity. Nearly everyone I spoke with classified both Peronismo and Chavismo as a “way of doing politics” or “catchall politics” (Calle). Both Perón and Chávez incorporated elements of socialism, fascism, communism, and even elements of corporatism into movements that do not strictly fall into one category versus another. Finally, both leaders used populism as the overarching dis-
course to support the people rather than the elites. They depended on the reaction of mass audiences and so they sought to give audiences what they desired (Marcano & Tyszke).

The importance of ideology in Chávez’s foreign policy can be demonstrated even further by his actions following his triumph in the recall referendum of 2003. With a new injection of confidence, Chávez sought to make the Bolivarian Revolution even more influential in his foreign policymaking. In November 2004, Chávez organized a meeting with all the ministers, vice-ministers, governors, and the Minister of Defense, to present a PowerPoint highlighting what changes would be made to his foreign policy. Some ideas included enhancing relations with the common people and solidifying Bolivarian circles and ties (Gerbasi). Essentially, Chávez wanted a new international order—a multipolar world against capitalism, aligned with emerging countries like Cuba, Argentina, India, China, and Russia (Mazzei). Even those within the government recognized his radical vision for a new type of foreign policy. Dr. Roger Capella, former ambassador to Argentina who was removed from his post by Argentina for alleged ties to Iran, said that Venezuelan foreign policy indeed entered a new era around 2003 and 2004. According to Cappella, Venezuela used to be a country without any foreign policy. Its foreign policy was wholly based on the United States: “Whatever was the foreign policy of the United States, was the foreign policy of Venezuela. Chávez finally released the country from its imperial hold in 2003-2004 by turning to Latin American countries, like Argentina, instead” (Capella).

Realist explanations for Chávez’s behavior are weak when compared to this constructivist explanation. Both economically and politically, his decision to ally with Argentina cannot be considered rational.

First of all, Venezuela was the only country that bought Argentine bonds after the peso crisis of 2001. All other countries and international financial institutions deemed any kind of purchase of bonds too risky. Indeed, if Argentina defaults again, the bonds that Venezuela bought are going to be of little value. The risk that Chávez’s actions have brought has been demonstrated in the statis-
Venezuelan bonds fell for a second day, with the nation’s debt trading at more than 6.5 percentage points above United States Treasury securities. That puts Venezuela behind only Argentina, also struggling with rising inflation, in economic risk measures of large Latin American countries” (Romero). There is some profit the Venezuelan government makes from this purchase of bonds, however, that should be recognized. This profit occurs because of the two exchange systems that exist in the country—the official rate of 2.15 and the black market rate of 3.30. After purchasing the Argentine bonds, Venezuela sells them for bolivares, not dollars. Individuals do not mind buying the bonds for more than 2.15 because they can sell it for 3.30. So, Venezuela can sell the bonds at 2.55, for example, and claim a profit. However, a lot of corruption underlies this process. Venezuela sells the bonds to favored banks, using unbridled discretion. Banks give a commission or fee to the Venezuelan government in return. Then, the banks can sell the bonds at 45 cents more, for example, at 3.00 bolivares, which is a profitable deal. These select banks benefit, as well as select individuals in the Venezuelan government. The entire country, however, does not. Moreover, this exchange system undermines the country’s own foreign exchange system. According to all the economists I spoke with, Venezuela could be achieving better with the dollars they are using to buy the Argentine bonds. Thus, this practice, though profitable for some, is ultimately harmful to Venezuela as a whole (Monaldi).

Moreover, the diesel and fuel oil that Venezuela produces is not of the quality that Argentina needs or requests. It contains too much sulfur and other excess compounds. Therefore, in order to sell petroleum to Argentina, Venezuela must first buy the refined product from Mexico and Norway, and then send it to Argentina. Venezuela also sells this oil to Argentina at important discounts. Overall, there is no economic gain from this transaction (Diego Gonzalez). The debt of PDVSA, the Venezuelan state oil company, has thus been increasing at an extraordinary rate. Officially, it has $16 billion dollars of debt, but this is only international debt. If internal debt and labor are included, that figure rises to about $30
billion. During Diego Gonzalez’s time as an engineer at PDVSA in the 1990s, debt was only $2-3 billion at most (Diego Gonzalez). In fact, according to anonymous observations made by a financial planner, the company that does the current auditing of PDVSA cannot actually properly audit because PDVSA is a “mess” (Financial Planner).

Instead, could Chávez have a political reason for aligning with Argentina? He does want to acquire political power in order to combat American power. Juan Battalame, Professor of International Relations at the Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (Argentine University of Business) calls this the “prestigio de la revolución” or the “prestige of the revolution” (Battalame). However, politically, Argentina does not have as much sway in the international arena as Brazil and Chile, the rising powerhouses of the region. Chávez’s relationships with these countries are quite distant, though, and this is primarily because Chávez understands that the leftist tendencies of Presidents Lula and Bachelet are quite different from those of Kirchner. This is enough to subdue his advances towards these countries.

Chávez knows that economically and politically, he does not gain much from his relationship with Argentina, yet he continues with the practice. Thus, his actions cannot possibly be explained with realist logic. Briefly, Chávez does not act from a liberalist lens either: power balancing is indeed at the forefront of his agenda. Cooperation with the United States is nonexistent and domestic issues do not necessarily drive his foreign policy. Therefore, it appears that constructivism has played the primary role in Chávez’s foreign policy towards Argentina.

KIRCHNER’S INTEREST IN VENEZUELA

What explains Kirchner’s willingness to ally with Venezuela? In contrast to what Chávez appears to believe, ideology is far less of an incentive for Kirchner than it is for Venezuela. Rather, it is economic need coupled with a short-term foreign policy vision that determines Kirchner’s relationship with Venezuela. Kirchner’s for-
Economic Need

The Argentine peso crisis of 2001 left the country economically devastated. Argentina did not have credit in the international market, and was billions of dollars in debt. By this crisis alone, Argentina became one of the few cases around the world of a country that went from being a developed to a developing nation. And, in Argentina’s eyes, no one stepped in to help during this time. Memories del Incendio, written by former President Duhalde about the economic collapse of his country, claims that the United States “desuella la mano,” or de-linked its hands from Argentina (Duhalde). The IMF and World Bank were equally culpable in their lack of support. To make matters worse, the governmental structure of the country was going through a concurrent upheaval, with a number of men assuming the position of president over the course of the next two years. However, with the semblance of political permanence that came with the rise of Néstor Kirchner, the new president also hoped to bring some sort of financial stability. Kirchner took office with a fiery speech that called on Argentines to rethink its economic plan. The 1990s image of Carlos Menem dancing with Hillary Clinton in the White House was over; Washington had praised Argentina as a model economy in Latin America, but Argentina “had fallen doing their homework” (Cardenas). Kirchner would not stick to this homework any longer. Although de la Rua and Duhalde had indeed engaged with Leftist ideology, it was only with Kirchner that a complete restructuring of the domestic economic model was completed (Official). In placing the domestic crisis at the top of Kirchner’s priority list, the new president naturally turned to Venezuela, which emerged as the only cushion during this time of struggle.

The extent to which Argentina has depended on Venezuela to help the country out of its financial crisis is incredible. In December 2005, Kirchner decided to liquidate the Argentine debt to the IMF in a single payment, without refinancing, for a total of $9.81
billion. The payment was partly financed by Venezuela, which bought Argentine bonds en masse. From 2005 to 2006, Chávez bought more than $3 billion worth of bonds from Argentina, issued by the government following the debt restructuring (“An alternative Dracula makes a buck,” The Economist). In August 2007, Chávez bought another $500 million in bonds (Associated Press). The total amount of Argentina’s debt held by Venezuela is currently estimated at around US$40 billion (Clarín). However, the reliance of Argentina on Venezuela for a large portion of its financing needs has not been well received in Wall Street circles. On July 18, 2006, Goldman Sachs Emerging Markets Research noted: “Instead of trying to restore its credibility with the broad capital markets, the government keeps on relying on Venezuela as its main credit supplier” (“Economy of Argentina”).

**Short-Term Foreign Policy Vision**

In Venezuela, Kirchner saw a quick fix to his economic crisis. He did not think ahead as to what this relationship with Venezuela would mean for the future. During the peso crisis, the Chief of Cabinet organized a meeting of political scientists and other academics to talk about the crisis and to outline some solutions. This group was called the Cabinet for the Strengthening of Democratic Governance. Julio Burdman, a former member and now Director of the School of International Relations at the Universidad de Belgrano (University of Belgrano), recalls that the government was desperate during this time. They felt that Argentina was falling to pieces. Their mindset in developing policies was very short-term (Burdman). Yet this mindset still governs much of their foreign policy, as Argentina has not yet fully recovered from the crisis. Jorge Castro agrees with this idea. Castro was the Secretary of State of Strategic Planning under Menem from 1998-1999. He was a personal counselor to the President for conflicts, economics, and external affairs. Castro claims, “Kirchner has no long-term strategy. All the foreign policy he does is based on domestic issues” (Castro). According to Carlos Moneta, Kirchner has even refused
to have dinners with presidents of foreign countries when they are in Argentina (Moneta).

In this regard, Kirchner’s way of doing foreign policy is quite different from that of Chávez. Chávez works from the outside in. That is, he has envisioned a world governed by the Bolivarian Revolution and has structured his bilateral relations and his domestic policy along this line. Kirchner, on the other hand, works from the inside out. His priority is domestic, and foreign policy is an appendage to this (Liendo). In this way, liberalist thought best explains Kirchner’s blurring of domestic and foreign policy, as well as his economic goals.

The Role of Ideology

Hugo Chávez thought he was dealing with Perón when he first decided to fortify relations with Argentina, but Kirchner leads with his own brand of Peronismo, called Kirchnerismo, which has proven to differ from Chavismo in three important respects. First, there is disagreement over Jews and Israel. Argentina is home to the largest Jewish population of South America, many of whom have loudly expressed their displeasure at the relationship between Venezuela and Argentina. The Jewish population is mainly concerned about Chávez’s ties to Iran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has called for the destruction of Israel, and his country is suspected of having a hand in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people and wounded more than 200. Kirchner, though, has consistently sided with the Jews of his nation, refusing to attend the inauguration of President Correa of Ecuador because of the presence of President Ahmadinejad (Barrionuevo). On another occasion, Kirchner invited Chávez to San Isidro, the private residence of the Argentine president. All the directors of the Jewish community were there, unbeknownst to Chávez, and Kirchner asked the Venezuelan leader to explain if he was anti-Jewish or not. Chávez, of course, replied in the negative, but the act firmly cemented the Kirchners on the side of the Jews (Romero).

Second, they disagree on interactions with Washington.
Kirchner is essentially anti-United States, but he understands that “even if he does not like his neighbor, he still has to live with him” (Romero). Therefore, Kirchner is far more cautious than Chávez with what he says about the United States. Finally, Kirchner is undoubtedly a capitalist. There exists a strong private sector in Argentina that has no counterpart in Venezuela because of Chávez’s strong aversion to such development.

Essentially, Kirchner is against the neo-liberalism of the 1990s and the role of international economic institutions, much like Chávez. By and large they hold starkly different ideological views (Merke).

ARGENTINA EXPLAINED BY ASYMMETRICAL MOTIVATION

Thus, it has been shown that the primary motivation of Chávez for engaging with Kirchner is ideological. The Venezuelan president searches for shared ideology throughout Latin America, a process that constructivism explains well. Kirchner’s primary motivation though, for engaging with Venezuela, can only be explained in liberalist terms. In order to fulfill his domestic needs, Kirchner has conflated domestic policy with foreign policy. And though economic interest pulls Kirchner into Venezuela, ideology does not do so with the same vigor.

For Chávez to acquire strong allies, both economic need and ideology must exist on the other side. This is what one observes in the populist left of Latin America. Leaders like Morales of Bolivia and Correa of Ecuador need Chávez for his petrol dollars: “Chávez has been replacing the international financial institutions in a way, functioning as a source of capital without the conditionalities that the Bretton Woods institutions usually impose on borrowing countries” (Rouaux). However, these countries also share fundamental similarities with the Venezuelan president in regards to ideology. Neither economic nor ideological forces, however, pull Lula of Brazil and Bachelet of Chile into such a cozy relationship with Chávez; hence they occupy positions in the more distant, social democratic left.
For Kirchner, however, the forces pull in opposite directions. Kirchner seems close to Chávez because he depends on Venezuela for financial support, hence the strengthened economic affinity. But there are limits to the friendship Kirchner bestows on Chávez since he disagrees with the Venezuelan on important ideological issues. Hence, there is ambiguity. This is even more proof that ideology is critical, as economics is not enough to keep Kirchner invested and adherent to Venezuela at all times.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

This research has both theoretical and practical implications, namely regarding the literature on relations between developing nations and foreign policy towards Latin America. The literature concerning relations between developing nations is limited. And, though this project focuses on only one case study, it sheds light on certain topics and themes that may be of particular interest in the study of developing nations. Eduardo Mayobre, a specialist in energy and oil issues, argues that the major error in the relations between developing nations is that these countries seek to be the same as others in the world. Unlike the European Union, which was formed to regulate commerce that already existed, Latin American countries are attempting to foster integration that is simply not ready to exist in the region. This is the motivation behind Chávez in the Argentine-Venezuelan relationship, and so the long-term prospects of such an arrangement seem bleak (Mayobre). This project also indicates that the role of ideology may be more important in the relationship between developing nations than developed nations because in developing countries, like Argentina and Venezuela, foreign policy is not as institutionalized as it is in developed nations. In Argentina, the relationship with Venezuela is not managed by the Foreign Ministry but by the Planning Minister, Julio De Vido. During the Néstor Kirchner administration, five people in total conducted the foreign affairs of the country: Néstor Kircher, Cristina Kirchner, De Vido, Chief of Cabinet Alberto Fernandez, and Secretary to the President Carlos Zanini (Russell).
Venezuela, Chávez made four fundamental changes to the structure of the Foreign Ministry since assuming power. Before, there was one Minister, one Vice Minister, and then Sector Directors who were in charge of departments like International Policy, Economics, Culture, and Judiciary. Now there is one Minister of Foreign Policy, and beneath him five Vice Ministers who are divided by the following regions: Africa, North America, Latin America, Asia and Oceania, and Europe. Beneath each Vice Minister, there are other departments: Borders, Human Resources, Strategy, Administrative Services, Planning, and others. While decentralization is often considered a form of power sharing, this paper evidences how Chávez has ostensibly devolved powers in order to dilute the power of top officials. According to Jesus Mazzei, a diplomat in the Borders division for Latin America, this decentralization has allowed Chávez to concentrate policymaking power in his hands and a few select others (Mazzei). Because of this lack of institutionalized policymaking in developing nations like Argentina and Venezuela, the ideological basis for foreign relations takes a more prominent role, and depends on the heads of state. So “if we have another guy in office in Venezuela, he may not want to buy Argentine bonds like Chávez is doing” (Montamat). This lack of permanency makes foreign policy between these nations quite fickle in nature. “All the foreign policy in Latin America is between presidents. For example, Venezuela just left the Andean Community of Nations [CAN]. It just left because Chávez did not like Uribe [President of Columbia]. This is the Latin American idea of foreign policy. Political sympathies change a lot in Latin America” (Vera).

Finally, this project has great implications for foreign policy towards Latin America. We must not forget that: “Although international relations and foreign policy researchers assume different perspectives—macro, in the one case, and micro in the other—the foreign policy subfield continues to be intimately linked to the broader…approaches that have been the analytical underpinnings of the field of international relations after World War II” (Braveboy-Wagner). Specifically, the ambiguity created by asymmetrical motivation could allow a space for third party actors, like the
United States, to exert their influence. As for the specific case undertaken in this thesis, Argentina’s affinity to Venezuela, as shown, largely depends on economic need, not ideological affinity. Under the George W. Bush administration, the United States repeatedly snubbed Argentina in the belief that Kirchner is strengthening ties with Chávez. In 2007, President Bush avoided Argentina on his South American tour, visiting only Brazil and Uruguay. In March 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to only Brazil and Chile for meetings, again disregarding Argentina (Barrionuevo). Actions like this are likely to push Argentina further away, when the United States could replace Venezuela as the primary provider of financial assistance to Argentina. As an alternative to direct assistance, the United States could also grant Argentina access to the international market, namely to the Paris Club and the International Monetary Fund. It seems that Argentina needs financial assistance more than ideological likeness creating a space for the United States to step in.

CONCLUSION

This is an exciting time to study this topic: we may currently be witnessing a possible shift in relations between Argentina and Venezuela. Venezuela’s own economic system is at risk with the recent plummet of oil prices. The Venezuelan economy depends so much on oil that this price drop has been disastrous. One should wonder if Chávez will be able to continue buying Argentine bonds and providing the oil that the Kirchners request. Moreover, with Barack Obama’s victory in the recent U.S. elections, Chávez may need to recreate or dismantle his paradigm of the imperialist United States, which could mean great changes in the foreign policy of a leader so focused on ideology. It will be interesting to see how this theory of asymmetrical motivation functions amidst all these changes. It is my prediction that as Chávez loses his money, he will most likely lose alliances as well, with Argentina going first.
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TRIGGER MECHANISMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: STATE SIZE AND BARGAINING TACTICS

Timothy de Swardt

After years of negotiations, the Rome Statute was signed on July 17, 1998, creating the International Criminal Court (ICC)—the first permanent world court designed to address war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The General Assembly’s first attempt to negotiate a treaty establishing an international criminal court had come short in 1954, and it was not revisited until the end of the Cold War (Lee 2). In 1992, spurred by the International Law Commission, the General Assembly decided to re-examine this area of international criminal law. Six years later, the ICC was a reality.

The Rome Statute grants the Court considerable power and independence, and many point to its “trigger mechanisms”—the processes within the restructured Court framework that skew the adjudication on all international criminal disputes (Ralph 36). As a result of the prosecutor’s capacity to initiate investigations without state approval and his exclusive ability to bring cases for trial, the trigger mechanisms within the structural framework of the Court appear to leave states with little control over the Court’s primary functions of investigating and prosecuting war criminals. At the outset of negotiations, many powerful states, including all five members of the Security Council, were expressly opposed—and still are—to trigger mechanisms that grant referral powers to an independent actor with such a limited role for states. Along with the diminished voices of signatories in influencing the Court’s adjudication process, the trigger mechanisms will likely increase the number of investigations at the ICC. Not only will the number of these investigations be in the exclusive domain of the independent

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prosecutor, the increasing number of investigations will consequently constrain state behavior in new ways to voice opposition to the Court’s decisions, particularly among larger and more powerful states.

Given the low benefits and high costs signatories of the Rome Statute face in bringing cases to the Court—primarily as a result of the powers granted to the independent prosecutor—this paper seeks to understand the context in which states decide to use the embryonic “trigger mechanisms” of the ICC and the pronouncement’s effect on the rapidly evolving norms of international criminal law. This paper first asks what interest states had in supporting these trigger mechanisms, particularly in light of the independent prosecutor’s unchecked, powerful mandate of authority in the legal process. Second, it inquires how those states articulated and realized their preferences over those of other states.

OVERVIEW

No party can refer an individual case to the ICC, but only a “situation in which one or more of such crimes [within the jurisdiction of the court] appear to have been committed” (Rome Statute Article 13). Currently, a situation is a general “series of events” in which war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide were committed.\(^1\) There are three ways in which a situation may be brought before the ICC. First, any state party to the Rome Statute, or a non-state party that has decided to submit temporarily to ICC jurisdiction, can refer a situation to the prosecutor. Second, the Security Council can pass a resolution to refer a situation, even one that occurred on a territory of a non-signatory. Third, the prosecutor can independently petition the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) for permission to initiate an investigation into a situation without state or Security Council approval. This capacity is unprecedented

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\(^1\)Article 5.2 of the Rome Statute also provides for the eventual inclusion of aggression. Note that Article 17(1)(d) also requires that the crimes be of “sufficient gravity” to fall within its jurisdiction: war crimes, for instance, must be “widespread and systematic,” and crimes against humanity must be “part of a plan or policy, or part of a large-scale commission.”
in international courts and is often cited as the most revolutionary aspect of the Rome Statute (Olásolo 39; e.g. Ralph 36).

The prosecutor must inform any interested state of an investigation he commences, unless it was initiated by the Security Council (Rome Statute Article 18.1). An “interested state” is any state that might normally have a claim to prosecute the crimes in question (Hall 1998a 131). If any such state wishes to take over the investigation, “the prosecutor shall defer to the state’s investigation” (Rome Statute Article 18.2). This principle, known as “complementarity,” essentially preserves states’ rights to investigate and prosecute crimes domestically if they wish. The prosecutor may appeal a state’s request to take over an investigation to the PTC. If the PTC determines the state is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to take over the investigation, the state must return its investigation to the prosecutor. Crucially, it is the ICC that makes this determination, not the interested state (Rome Statute Article 17).

It is also important to note that the constraints on the prosecutor’s power are all negative constraints. The Security Council may defer an investigation already begun by the prosecutor under Article 16, or an interested state may defer an investigation under Article 18, but the prosecutor does not need either actor’s positive consent in order to commence an investigation. However, having conducted an investigation into a situation, the prosecutor has the exclusive power to bring individual cases to trial at the Trial Chamber, although states or the Security Council may request the PTC to review the prosecutor’s decisions.

Secondary Functions of the Trigger Mechanisms

The trigger mechanisms as formulated are likely to have two important consequences. First, as a result of having an independent prosecutor, there are likely to be more war crimes trials. The rules allowing the prosecutor to initiate an investigation without the prior approval of states or the Security Council suggest the number of investigations will increase; other international courts that allow non-state actors to refer cases, such as the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECHR), have seen similarly high incidences of trials (Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 475).

Second, even if those investigations are taken over by states under the complementarity principle, there is the possibility under Article 17 that the ICC may determine a state to be “unable or unwilling genuinely” to investigate or prosecute war crimes, making complementarity conditional. Conditional complementarity will likely put pressure on states to conduct trials at certain standards of transparency, efficiency, and fairness. This will occur primarily through legal precedents in determining inability and unwillingness to bring the accused to justice. As Dempsey argues, “that constitutes an unprecedented challenge in the sources of national lawmaking, one that diminishes the traditional notion of state sovereignty” (Dempsey 52).

WHY DID STATES VOTE FOR THE TRIGGER MECHANISMS?

Primary Proponents: the Like-Minded Group

The first countries to propose an independent prosecutor were Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in early 1994 (Report of the International Law Commission 24, 46). By August 1995, several others states, such as Greece, Austria, and the Netherlands, advocated for an Independent prosecutor as well (Glasius 2002 153). Australia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Ghana, and Italy joined shortly thereafter.

These states formed the Like-Minded Group (LMG), which was to grow substantially in later years. Throughout its existence, the LMG was an informal coalition. No full-scale historical study of the LMG has been conducted, so its precise origins and membership are hard to trace. By the end of 1996, however, many states had actively declared their membership in the LMG, and it grew to include over 40 states. By the time of the Rome Conference in 1998, this number had increased to over 75, including the United Kingdom and many smaller states, such as Benin and the Solomon
Islands (Schabas 16, Bassiouni 1999a 31). Throughout negotiations, it was this group that advocated most forcefully for the independent prosecutor and a reduced role for the Security Council. Therefore, one must look to the LMG in order to understand the origins of state interest in the ICC’s trigger mechanisms.

The Trigger Mechanisms as a Result of Power and Coercion

Under a realist interpretation, one would expect that powerful states dictated to smaller states which trigger mechanisms to include in the Rome Statute (Goldstein et al. 385-399). Rudolph argues that war crimes tribunals, and the rules governing them, are controlled by powerful states (Rudolph 2001). Realists hold international law to be epiphenomenal, which means that it will not encroach significantly on the interest of states, especially powerful states (Abbott 365). Despite this, the preferences of the Great Powers—the permanent five of the Security Council—are not reflected in the trigger mechanisms as formulated in the Rome Statute.

From the outset of the negotiations, these states argued that only the Security Council should have referral rights. This argument failed to hold sway. They also proposed that individual members of the Security Council should have the right to veto any investigation, but this was overturned with the so-called “Singapore Compromise.” Most importantly, these states were firmly

2 Members argued that “the primary purpose in establishing a permanent international criminal court was to avoid the necessity of the Security Council establishing ad hoc tribunals to deal with crimes under international humanitarian law.” Under this system, as with the Ad Hoc Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the Security Council alone could control which investigations were started and which were not. However the ICC would obviate the need to establish a new tribunal each time a situation arose (Summary Record of the 27th Meeting).

3During the preparatory meetings prior to the Rome Conference, there was a strong divide between those states that argued the Security Council must pre-authorize any investigation by the ICC, and those that felt it should have no referral powers at all. Singapore made a proposal, subsequently known as the ‘Singapore Compromise,’ whereby the Security Council would have the right to defer an investigation. Any trial commenced would go ahead unless the Security Council’s members collectively agree that an investigation should be stopped, and passed a resolution to that effect. This subtle difference in effect retains the Security Council’s collective right to control investigations at the ICC, but it does not give
opposed to the prosecutor's power to initiate investigations independently (Glasius 2006, 52). On a similar note, the great powers also believed the ICC should have no rights to determine if a state is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute war crimes.

Though the wishes of powerful states were not fully realized in the Rome Statute, power-based theories are not completely at a loss to explain the ICC's trigger mechanisms. For instance, the preferences of middle powers were accepted over the preferences of smaller states. It is certainly possible that this may be a result of aid-based coercion: 19 out of 22 of the world's largest aid donors were middle powers that supported the independent prosecutor and the reduced role of the Security Council at the time of the Rome Statute's passing (OECD Fact Sheet). Nonetheless, this does not explain why Great Powers, with the most influence and money, lost the support of many small states to the middle powers.

**Trigger Mechanisms Reflecting State Interest**

If great power preference does not account for the trigger mechanisms in the Rome Statute, can they then be explained by state interest? After all, 83 percent of states at Rome supported the independent prosecutor by the end of the Rome Conference, and 86 percent of states voted for the Rome Statute overall on July 17, 1998 (Glasius 2006, 59). One possible explanation is institutionalist, which sees state interest as exogenously constructed. In such a framework, the ICC would have been created to fulfill a particular function. Here, interest is analyzed purely at the international level without consideration of domestic politics, individual leaders, interest groups, or norms. Under an institutionalist framework, it is not immediately evident why states, especially the primary pro-

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4 An important caveat is that while nineteen out of twenty-two seems an impressive number, the three states unaccounted for are the first, second, and third highest aid donors respectively (the US, Japan, and France), all of whom opposed the independent prosecutor at Rome. Their collective aid outweighs the combined aid of the remaining nineteen.

5 See Abbott & Snidal, 421-456; Keohane et al., 457-488; and Koremenos et al., 1-40.
ponents of the ICC and its independent prosecutor, would have an exogenous interest in the trigger mechanisms. In thinking through this issue, a cost-benefit analysis proves a useful analytical method to see what advantages or disadvantages might come as a result of the ICC's trigger mechanisms.

Costs

For many states, it is unlikely that the independent prosecutor will come as a sovereignty cost. As it is typically defined, a sovereignty cost can best be understood as “the symbolic and material costs of diminished national autonomy,” including “the potential for inferior outcomes, loss of authority, and diminution of sovereignty” (Abbott 375; Abbott and Snidal 437). These costs are “at their highest when international arrangements impinge on the relations between a state and its citizens or territory” (Abbott and Snidal 437). Complementarity, which allows states to take over investigations that the prosecutor may initiate, will reduce sovereignty costs substantially, since a state will retain its authority to regulate its citizens’ behavior through its own judicial system. In 1951 and 1953, the International Law Commission’s draft statues for an international court did not include the principle of complementarity, and each of these drafts were roundly rejected (Bassiouni 1997, 14). Such an example helps to illustrate states’ chief concern with maintaining a level of sovereignty through complementarity.

However, complementarity is conditional, and not all states will be as well-protected by it as others. Many developing states might incur higher sovereignty costs than established powers. Developing states that are either engaged in or emerging from conflict should reasonably be expected to face a greater incidence of “situations” than developed, stable states. The more situations that occur, the more likely the state is to be investigated by the ICC. On top of this, the ICC’s ability to determine that a state is “unable or unwilling genuinely” to investigate or prosecute war criminals will further increase the sovereignty costs. As William Schabas argues, many developing states do not have established and recognized ju-
dicial systems that the ICC would necessarily deem “able and willing genuinely” to bring defendants to justice (Schabas 2004, 86). For small, developing states, then, an independent prosecutor presents unique sovereignty costs.

Great powers also incur sovereignty costs as a result of the ICC’s independent prosecutor. More often than their smaller peers, their foreign policies may entail military presence overseas; indeed, many of the Security Council members have recently conducted or are conducting military operations on foreign territory—most obviously, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States, United Kingdom, and other NATO powers. Consequently, their potential for involvement in war crimes situations is higher, and an independent prosecutor invites the possibility of sovereignty costs. Nonetheless, complementarity would likely lower such costs for these powers. The ICC is not likely to determine that they are unable or unwilling to prosecute war crimes: “the difficulties involved in challenging a State with a sophisticated and functioning justice system would be virtually insurmountable,” according to Louise Arbour, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (qtd. in Schabas 2004, 86).

In contrast to the small and large states, middle powers seem to face few of these sovereignty costs. These very middle powers—states such as Canada, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Argentina—came together first to form the LMG and to vocalize support for the ICC’s independent prosecutor. For such states, uncertainty about potential war crimes violations is comparatively slight given their limited involvement in foreign military operations. As with the great powers, though, it is difficult to imagine the ICC considering their judicial system as ineffective. Thus, they have little reason to fear a challenge to their judicial system by the independent prosecutor or the ICC. In a cost-benefit calculation, their costs are lowest of all states.

Benefits

From the outset, state benefits from the ICC trigger mecha-
nisms are not immediately clear; however, the secondary effects of an independent prosecutor help to elucidate these state interests. One rational choice motivation for state interest may be that an independent prosecutor would reduce future threats to global peace and security. Though there is very little evidence either that prosecution regularly deters future war criminals or that prosecution is correlated with an end to violence in war crimes situations, states may nonetheless have perceived that the ICC’s independent prosecutor would contribute towards global peace and stability (Dietelhoff 10). In fact, the Rome Statute’s negotiating records suggest states believed the ICC would achieve this goal. Nevertheless, whether this actually constitutes a “benefit” that would be in the self-interest of states depends on the state. For small states, global peace and security might be a means of ensuring their own survival, reducing internal instability, or aiding economic growth. On the other hand, the core proponents of the ICC, the already stable and prosperous middle powers, were considerably less likely to benefit from global peace and security than small states; achieving such ideals will not likely increase the chances of their survival or, for instance, increase economic productivity.

Another potential gain from signing and ratifying the Rome Statute may be what Abbott and Snidal identify as the “reputational benefits” of international law (427). The authors argue that states have an interest in “hard” law because it creates useful credibility and reputational benefits for compliant states. First, commitments to one area of international law lend credibility to a state’s commitments in all areas of international law, and such commitments may be beneficial to smaller states’ chances of receiving foreign aid. However, neither of these potential benefits would apply to the core proponents of the ICC, who were primarily aid donors, not aid recipients, and whose commitments to international law were already credible at the time of ICC negotiations. It is not incorrect to say supporting the ICC and the independent prosecutor had useful reputational benefits, but it is important to realize that these benefits extended mostly to the small states—states that were secondary supporters of the ICC.
Finally, if we assume that the core supporters of the ICC (i.e., the LMG) hoped to reduce war crimes and to establish global peace, then, an institutionalist argument could be made that having an independent prosecutor would concretely “lock in” or cement that interest. In other words, the LMG sought to create an independent prosecutor as a means to an end—reductions in war crimes and global peace. Indeed, the negotiating records of the Rome Statute indicate that the LMG aggressively advocated for an independent prosecutor for precisely this reason. In as much as this is an institutionalist argument, it is a weak one. While it is true that having an independent prosecutor would lock in middle power preference, it is unclear how these preferences—reductions in war crimes and global peace—would constitute a “benefit” or be in the rational self-interest to these particular states. There is a further caveat to the “locking in” argument. As already noted, 83 percent of states eventually supported the independent prosecutor, with 86 percent supporting the ICC generally. If the LMG had strong-armed consensus on the independent prosecutor against the will of other states, then we might expect a larger discrepancy between these two figures. Thus it seems the primary proponents of the independent prosecutor—that is, middle powers—had both little to gain and little to lose from the trigger mechanisms of the ICC. At the same time, the low costs clearly are important to understanding why these states supported them.

Cost-benefit Analysis of the ICC’s Trigger Mechanisms.

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<th>Costs</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
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<tr>
<td>Developing States</td>
<td>Very high: more likely to be investigated, complementarity is conditional and less likely to apply</td>
<td>High: reputational benefits, possible benefits from peace and stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Powers</td>
<td>Low: not likely to be investigated, complementarity applies</td>
<td>Low: no reputational benefits, benefits from peace and stability already in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Powers</td>
<td>High: more likely to be investigated.</td>
<td>Low: no reputational benefits</td>
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Liberal Theories

So far, state interest has been assumed as exogenously given, and it has not been analyzed at the domestic and decision-maker level, as liberal theories do. Although liberal theories remain a rational choice analysis, they are applied to states as well as non-state actors, such as domestic political parties, special interest groups and NGOs, or individual leaders.

Andrew Moravcsik, in his widely-cited article, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes,” argues that human rights regimes can only be explained by looking at “the domestic self-interest of national governments” (Moravcsik 220). Using the ECHR as a model, Moravcsik contends, “the primary proponents of binding international human rights commitments in postwar Europe were neither great powers, as realist theory would have it, nor governments and transnational groups based in long-established democracies, as the ideational account would have it.” (Moravcsik, 219).  

Rather, Moravcsik argues that the historical record indicates new governments in recently emerging democracies were the states most active in advocating for the ECHR.

Liberal republicanism, which contends that newly-formed democratic governments attempt to “lock-in” domestic commitments to the rule of law, democracy, and human rights through international law, may offer a compelling explanation for the origins of the ECHR and its trigger mechanisms, but evidence for this theory in the case of the ICC’s trigger mechanisms is not overwhelming, despite the same surprising conclusion that powerful states did not support high levels of access to the ICC, let alone coerce other states into supporting them.

The “primary proponents” of the ICC were the LMG, of which some states—about fifteen in total—were indeed emerging democracies at the time of the Rome Conference. 7 States that

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6 Ideational theory, according to Moravcsik, argues that “Governments accept binding international human rights norms because they are swayed by the overpowering ideological and nonnative appeal of the values that underlie them.” (Moravcsik 223).

7 This number was derived from the Freedom House country rankings. Freedom House,
were either “Not Free” or “Partly Free” but that had become “Free” within ten years prior to 1998 included nine Central and Eastern European countries, as well as countries such as South Africa, Chile, and Venezuela. Though many supporters of the ICC were emerging democracies, Moravcsik’s theory does not apply for two reasons. The first is that all of these emerging democracies only joined the group later and were thus all secondary proponents of the independent prosecutor. The second is that they did not necessarily vote for the Rome Statute to lock in domestic policy goals as Moravcsik would predict. In the case of the ECHR, Moravcsik’s evidence for his conclusions—that emerging democracies were the primary proponents of the ECHR, and that they were motivated by domestic policy preferences—is primarily derived from speeches, negotiation records, and European Parliamentary records (Moravcsik 237). But in the case of the ICC, the analogous evidence offers surprisingly little to suggest that emerging democracies were notably active in the LMG, or that they were vocal in their support out of domestic political interest.

Normative Values

At this point, it becomes clear that the preferences of the core proponents of the ICC and its high-access trigger mechanisms (i.e. the LMG) did not find their origin in power or self-interest. Neither institutionalist nor liberal arguments can account for the fundamental origin of state interest in the ICC’s trigger mechanisms, although they may reveal the rational choice strategies by which that interest was locked in. While some states may have supported the independent prosecutor as a means to cement their preferences, these preferences constitute values, or norms, more than they rep-

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8Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.

9The records of the ICC’s development, including the records of the International Law Commission, the Sixth Committee (the committee in the General Assembly that discusses international law), the Ad Hoc Committee, PrepCom meetings, and the Rome Conference itself.
resent self-interest.

I argue, then, that to understand why the primary proponents of the ICC’s trigger mechanisms supported high levels of access to the Court, one must look to norms, values and principles. The LMG was initially a coalition of middle powers who shared a set of norms and preferences about the Court, including the independence of the prosecutor. Indeed the independent prosecutor was one of four key “cornerstones” of the LMG’s policy preferences (Glasius, 2006, 23). Though the LMG is defined principally by the states that it comprises, it is important to note that the LMG initially formed around a group of individual delegates to the Sixth Committee—the committee in the General Assembly that deals with international law (Glasius, 2006, 22). It may seem obvious, but the LMG’s preferences were articulated by individual decision-makers, not states. For the most part lawyers by profession rather than practicing diplomats, these delegates may have been more concerned with the legal functionality of the Court than with representing “state interest” as defined in any of the rational choice theories discussed above. In some cases, these lawyers came from states that did not favor the establishment of the ICC and have yet to sign or ratify the Statute.¹⁰ That the LMG formed around such delegates explains more clearly why state interest is highly obfuscated in the trigger mechanisms.

Moreover, in their speeches and debates at the Sixth Committee, delegates consistently underscored normative values in explaining their support for the ICC as well as their advocacy for the independent prosecutor, the reduced role of the Security Council, and the situation/case distinction. They argued that without these three elements incorporated into the statute, the ICC would be beholden to state control and political interference and would have no capacity to act where it was most needed. Indeed the likelihood of more trials as a result of the independent prosecutor and of trials conducted at certain standards of impartiality, transparency, and efficiency, as determined by the ICC, strongly informed

¹⁰ For instance, M. Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt, S. Rama Rao of India, and Lionel Yee of Singapore.
and influenced the LMG’s preferences. LMG states stressed the importance of values such as legitimacy, global justice, the rule of law, non-politicized and impartial trials, global peace and security, assisting war crimes victims, avoiding “victors’ justice” or violations of the principle nulla crimen sine lege, and the moral obligation to end human suffering.\(^{11}\)

**DEVELOPMENT OF NORMS**

While it seems clear that those states who advocated most forcefully for the independent prosecutor did so primarily as a result of normative preferences, we still do not know why their preferences were realized in the Rome Statute while those of other states were not. Although 83 percent of states ultimately supported the independent prosecutor, not all states shared this preference to begin with. Indeed, those who did in December of 1996 amounted to only 23 percent (Dietelhoff 17).

The mass atrocities witnessed in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda were one of the most important factors underlying why states adopted such a position. Prior to 1993, the main reasons behind state efforts to create the ICC had been instrumental (e.g., to prevent and try drugs crimes). While the International Law Commission had expanded the Court’s mandate to include war crimes, it was not a state-led effort. It was only after the creation of the ICTY that many states came to see the importance of such a mandate. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) lent the process further urgency. Those in favor of the independent prosecutor repeatedly and energetically invoked these incidences of ethnic cleansing and genocide as evidence of the necessity of this trigger mechanism. They argued in meetings that the brutal nature of the conflicts and the scale of deaths were unconscionable; states had a moral obligation to prevent further conflict, and one way to realize this objective was to have an independent prosecutor.

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\(^{11}\) For examples of states espousing these values, the meeting records of the Rome Conference are particularly helpful. See Summary Records of the Committee as a Whole, contained in UN Doc. A/CONF/13 (Vol. II).
(Kirsch and Oosterveld 1141-60). From a legal perspective, the two tribunals also constituted evidence of a “growing consensus or international norm concerning the institutionalization of humanitarian law” (Leonard 36).

One must also look to the role of domestic politics to understand how these norms developed. First, the change in administration in 1993 in the United States had a clear impact on the United States’ statements and policy preferences. An examination of the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee meeting records clearly shows a shift in attitude between 1992 and 1993. Under the Bush administration in 1992, the United States’ Sixth Committee members consistently argued for a total moratorium on the International Law Commission’s work on the ICC. Under the Clinton administration in 1993, they viewed the work as “excellent, thoughtful, serious and deserving of attention by member states” (Morris and Bourloyannis 350).

More direct evidence of domestic politics impacting norms comes from the United Kingdom. The change from a Conservative to Labour government is cited by numerous sources to have been highly influential on negotiations (e.g. Hall 1998a, 132). This occurred in mid-1997, just over a year before the Rome Conference. In that time, the United Kingdom changed positions dramatically, withdrawing its previous opposition to the independent prosecutor (Hall 1998a, 132). It also accepted a reduced role for the Security Council under the Singapore Compromise and did not oppose the judicial review powers granted to the ICC in its trigger mechanisms. Because this massive change came from a member of the Permanent Five, it crucially undercut the unity of the Security Council in its opposition to the independent prosecutor. U.K. support for the independent prosecutor lent increased momentum to the LMG and the NGO coalition. While the United States and the United Kingdom were far from the core proponents of the ICC or its trigger mechanisms, changes in their governments did create the conditions under which the LMG could succeed in advancing its normative preferences.
A new body of scholarship argues that one must look at a process known as the “New Diplomacy,” a method of negotiating international treaties that is a “bold break from traditional processes [by using] innovative methodology and...amazing speed” (Davenport 18). It consists of coalition building with non-state actors, agenda control, accelerating negotiations to force results, wide-ranging lobbying efforts, occasional policy-making for small states, a break from consensus politics, and a tendency for its proponents to implement “take it or leave it” package deals.

Coalition Building

One of the principle factors in the success of the LMG was its tactic of coalition building. Both Glasius and Leonard study this coalition extensively (Glasius, 2006; Leonard). They assert that one must look to the role of persuasion and discourse to grasp why small states accepted LMG proposals for the ICC trigger mechanisms. In this endeavor, the LMG was supported and goaded by a vast array of NGOs—over eight hundred in total—under the umbrella of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). Almost all accounts of the ICC’s history stress the importance of NGOs to negotiations (e.g., Kirsch and Holmes, Bassiouni 1999a, Bassiouni 1999b, Glasius, Benedetti and Washburn, and Arsanjani).

With regard to the prosecutor, NGOs performed two major functions. Firstly, they persuaded wavering states that the position was both desirable and achievable (Glasius 2002, 60). NGOs pressured unsure states to support high access levels on normative as well as functional grounds. They argued that having an independent prosecutor and curtailed Security Council powers, in both referral and deferral, were essential to the successful administration of justice. Indeed, the likelihood of more trials and fairer trials, discussed above, factored strongly into their support for the trig-
ger mechanisms as formulated (see, for instance, Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee, par. 113). In making these normative arguments, NGOs used governments’ own statements against them to push them into compliance:

Governments had made a lot of statements of the Yugoslav-an and Rwanda Tribunals about international justice. Those governments really made very strong statements but of course in a different context. And it was very easy to use those statements against them to push them further (C.K Hall qtd. in Dietelhoff 26).

The coalition was further strengthened by the support of the prosecutors for the ICTY and ICTR. The former made important appeals for an independent prosecutor at the fifth meeting of the Preparatory Committee in December 1997 (Hall 1998b, 339). There it was stressed that the prosecutor needed the power to initiate investigations proprio motu in order to avoid politically motivated trials. Additionally, both prosecutors attended the Rome Conference as independent experts. There, they made an important impact on delegations, arguing that the independence of the prosecutor would be necessary for the effective functioning of the court (Glasius 2006, 11).

Secondly, the CICC also played an important function in convincing states of the feasibility of an independent prosecutor. Glasius argues that many small states did not support the independent prosecutor simply because they believed such a position would never be realized in the face of U.S. opposition (Glasius 2006, 56-60). To that end, the CICC circulated a daily newsletter at Rome that demonstrated where each state stood on controversial matters. By showing in hard numbers that many states were not opposed to an independent prosecutor, even if they had not directly supported it, they were able to demonstrate that the United States, while vocal in its opposition, was not necessarily in the majority (Glasius 2006, 59). The focus shifted from powerful states to the number of states, as each had only had one vote. Phillip Kirsch, the chairman of the conference, concluded that the independence of the prosecutor was one of “the features that might not have appeared without
Leadership and Agenda Control

A further reason the LMG-led coalition was successful lay in its ability to gain and hold key leadership positions throughout the negotiation process. First, this meant that it could control the “rules of the game” as the Statute developed, and, second, that it could directly influence critical decisions at key moments.

The Ad Hoc Committee, the first committee in which states were to debate directly the draft statute, was chaired by Adriaan Bos, the Netherlands’ delegate to the Sixth Committee. He also chaired the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings—six meetings of state representatives, and in some cases NGOs, convened to prepare a draft statute in advance of the Rome Conference. Bos made several tactical decisions that strongly changed the rules of the game in the LMG’s favor. He divided the agenda up into working groups that were chaired by delegates from LMG countries (Glasius 2002, 44). The working groups on trigger mechanisms in both the Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committees were chaired by Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, a founding LMG member from Argentina. Another crucial victory was the attendance of NGOs at all of these meetings and at the Rome Conference itself (Benedetti & Washburn 23).

Bos also scheduled several informal meetings outside of the Ad Hoc and PrepCom meetings. In some cases, critical aspects of the draft statute were negotiated at these meetings—a prime example being the power of the ICC to take over investigations if it determines a state is unable or unwilling to do so (“Decisions Taken By The Preparatory Committee” 10). Likewise, non-substantive but nonetheless necessary administrative work was conducted at these informal meetings.13 Not all states were invited to these informal meetings.

13 For instance, after the fifth PrepCom there was no single, consolidated draft statute. Many substantive changes had been made to the ILC draft statute, but they had yet been merged into a unified, coherent document. Bos organized an informal meeting of states and NGOs at Zutphen in January 1998, where he drafted a consolidated text, known as the “Zutphen Draft.”
meetings, yet NGOs were (Benedetti and Washburn 11). Indeed, when one such meeting, the Courmayeur Meeting, lacked the necessary funding to go ahead, an NGO covered the costs (Bassiouni 1999b, 447).

Perhaps Bos's most important contribution was to argue that the ICC should be established by multilateral treaty. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and PrepCom Committee, he presented this view to the Sixth Committee multiple times as if it were a given that all states agreed with him (see, for instance, Summary Record of the 25th Meeting, par. 26). In fact, many did not. The LMG preferred a multilateral treaty because it gave equal voting power to all states. Against this view, the great powers had argued the ICC should be established by Security Council resolution, as had been the case with the ICTY and ICTR.

Bos's ability to dictate the rules of the game, so to speak, was further enhanced by his nomination to chair the Rome Conference as well. However, he fell ill a few weeks before it started and was subsequently unable to fulfill this role. In his place, he recommended the Canadian lawyer Philip Kirsch. At this point, Canada was the chair of the LMG, and Kirsch, together with the rest of the leadership of the conference (again, all from LMG states) still maintained substantial influence over the outcome by drawing up the agenda for the conference in advance at a meeting funded by NGOs (Bassiouni 1999b, 446-447). Kirsch scheduled trigger mechanisms and the independent prosecutor to be discussed amongst the last items on the agenda. He also ensured that trigger mechanisms were debated not in a working group, but in the Committee as a whole, which he chaired himself.

Kirsch also made other crucial decisions that prevented states who did not share his preferences on trigger mechanisms and other matters from wielding too much influence. He limited the time for speechmaking, worrying that powerful states opposing the Court might obfuscate and delay the progress of the statute if given the chance (Benedetti and Washburn 28). More crucially, about three weeks into the Rome Conference, when it became clear that states were locked into entrenched positions on trigger mechanisms, ju-
risdiction, and other controversial aspects of the Statute, Kirsch organized a meeting at the Canadian Embassy, inviting only LMG states and the CICC. At this meeting, he drafted a “Bureau Paper” that purportedly represented an aggregate of state views on the Statute’s most controversial matters, including its trigger mechanisms. This draft included an independent prosecutor, despite a large number of states who opposed such a move at that stage in the conference. U.S. delegates expressed outrage at Kirsch’s actions and claimed that he had inserted LMG preferences throughout the draft that was produced as a result of this meeting—an accurate criticism.

Despite vocal opposition to his leadership, Kirsch continued his aggressive approach in ensuring the high-access trigger mechanisms were included in the final draft. He and the leadership of the Committee as a whole kept the drafting process in their own hands as the deadline approached for the end of the conference. Negotiations had become “increasingly informal and untransparent” such that no delegate “knew what was going on that last week except John Holmes, the Canadian Ambassador, Kirsch, and some key leaders of the Like Minded Group,” according to William Pace (qtd. in Glasius 55).

Kirsch, and those working with him, wrote up a final draft of the Rome Statute that included an independent prosecutor and presented it to the delegations on the last day of the Rome Conference. With no time left, states were left unable to negotiate this or indeed any other provisions at all. States were presented with a “take it or leave it package” that left them with no choice but to take it.

Although 83 percent of states ultimately supported the independence of the prosecutor, Kirsch’s unilateral actions are an important variable in explaining why powerful states, such as the members of the Security Council, were unsuccessful in their opposition. More importantly, Kirsch’s aggressive leadership strongly influenced wavering states to vote for the Independent prosecutor.
“Conditions of Uncertainty” and Incomplete Information

A final factor to consider is that the coalition’s success was facilitated by small states’ lack of information throughout the negotiation of the Statute. Many small states did not send delegations to the Ad Hoc and PrepCom meetings (Hall 1997, 186). Further, due to translation delays, there was very little time between when the final draft of the Statute was sent out and the start of the Rome Conference (Bassiouni 1999b, 445). The Statute had not received significant media attention in many smaller countries, and many delegates were unaware of its key provisions (Bassiouni 1999b, 445). This was partly because the draft was extremely long—173 pages, with 1300 different square bracketed proposals—such that it was hard to analyze coherently (Bassiouni 1999b, 445). As a result of these factors, when they arrived at Rome, it took these delegations two weeks just to learn what the key issues of the Statute actually were, let alone to determine where they stood on them (Bassiouni 1999b, 449).

Once at Rome, small states faced new practical problems. Many delegations were unable to communicate regularly with their home capitals as a result of technical inadequacies at Rome, including a dearth of fax machines (Bassiouni 1999b, 450-452). The building’s layout was, “to say the least, confusing,” and often delegates arrived late or not at all for meetings (Bassiouni 1999b, 450). Moreover, many of the meetings at Rome lacked translators and were conducted only in English (Bassiouni 1998a, 29, fn. 148). Consequently, non-English speaking nations were unable to participate fully in debates or understand what progress was made.

The greatest problem small states faced at Rome, however, was the sheer number of meetings that were held. In order to ensure each state had a representative at every meeting of the Rome Conference, each government would have had to send at least ten delegates (Bassiouni 1999b, 450, fn 27). This number would be even higher if one factored in the informal consultations (“informs” and “informal informals”), of which there were up to 12 a day (Bassiouni 1999b, 449). One-hundred and twelve states out of 163
had fewer than 10 delegates. Of these states, at most 22 ultimately rejected the Statute or abstained in the final vote, constituting no more than 20 percent of states.\textsuperscript{14} Over four-fifths of the states who could not attend all meetings ultimately voted for the statute. In contrast to these states, LMG delegations had sufficient staff to attend most meetings. LMG states had more than 10 delegates on average and not only participated in every meeting but were able to actively and aggressively pursue their preferences in the absence of opposition.

According to Kofi Annan, for those 112 delegations who could not attend all meetings or who were otherwise unable to comprehend the progress made on the Statute, NGOs played an “unprecedented role” in informing delegations of key issues and ultimately persuading them to adopt LMG stances (Annan ix-xi). For many delegations, the briefings provided by NGOs were their only sources of information on meetings. In some cases where states were short of delegates, NGOs even provided states with their own personnel to attend meetings as acting delegates (Pace and Thieroff 394). This presented NGOs with a clear opportunity to influence policy—an opportunity they did not pass up (Glasisus 2006, 43).

CONCLUSION

I have sought to address two questions in this paper: why states supported the trigger mechanisms as they are formulated, and how they were able to incorporate their preferences.

In a cost-benefit analysis, the primary proponents of the trigger mechanisms, middle powers, had no compelling interest in an independent prosecutor or the reduced role of the Security Coun-

\textsuperscript{14}It was probably even less than this number, but since the vote was not disclosed to the public, we do not know. We do know that in total 27 states either rejected or abstained from the vote, including China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Mexico, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, Qatar, the USA, and Yemen, who voluntarily made their votes public. This leaves 22 states unaccounted for. I am assuming that these states had less than 10 delegates; if they did not, the argument would be even stronger in favor of the hypothesis that having less than 10 delegates led to a positive vote.
council. Nonetheless, while they stood to gain little from the ICC’s trigger mechanisms, they would accrue the lowest costs from the independent prosecutor, as compared to other states. If these costs had been higher, their support for the independent prosecutor may not have been as substantial as it was.

The evidence indicates that the middle powers’ preferences in trigger mechanisms were largely shaped by normative values. The negotiation records clearly demonstrate that delegations from these states argued repeatedly and vigorously that the independence of the prosecutor and the reduced role for the Security Council were essential to effectively bring war criminals to justice, to end human suffering, and to foster global peace and security. It seems probable they preferred these trigger mechanisms precisely because they challenged state authority, not in spite of their doing so.

The middle powers built influential coalitions with other states and NGOs in the form of the LMG and the CICC, respectively; its aggressive bargaining tactics, sometimes referred to as “the New Diplomacy,” were highly successful in marginalizing the influence of great powers and aligning the preferences of small states with their own.

As a result, the Rome Statute includes Article 13(c), granting the prosecutor the power to take independent action if and when states do not. Although the current prosecutor has yet to investigate a situation of his own will, early indications are that he is not afraid to challenge state authority in the face of strong opposition, as evidenced by the recent indictment of Hassan Omar Al-Bashir in an investigation initiated by the Security Council.

However, Article 13(c) on its own would not be a major step forward to realizing the aims expressed by the middle powers and their allies during negotiations without the added authority of Article 17.2, which makes complementarity conditional. Even if states take over investigations initiated by the prosecutor, he may appeal such action if states do not conduct investigations and prosecutions at certain standards of impartiality and fairness determined by the ICC.

Amnesty International expressed the perceptual impact of
the Rome Statute as follows:

The true significance of the adoption of the Statute may well lie, not in the actual institution itself... but in the revolution of legal and moral attitudes towards the worst crimes in the world. No longer will these crimes be simply political events to be addressed by diplomacy at the international level, but crimes which all states have a duty to punish themselves or, if they fail to fulfill this duty, by the international community in accordance with the rule of law. (qtd. in William Pace and Mark Thieroff 396)

The combination of the independent prosecutor and conditional complementarity makes this secondary impact of the ICC a significant one.

Works Cited


THE ISLAMICIZATION OF POLITICS: MOTIVATIONS FOR VIOLENCE IN KASHMIR

Gaurav Bhatnagar

The conflict over Kashmir is the longest unresolved conflict on the UN Security Council docket. It began in 1947 and has continued for six decades without any significant progress toward peace. Due to the rapid rise in the influence of pan-Islamic groups operating in Kashmir over the past decade, scholars have tended to cast the conflict as an Islamic conflict. This paper seeks to address two related questions: first, why has the conflict in Kashmir been interpreted by scholars and commentators as one motivated primarily along religious lines, as a battle between Islamic militant groups in response to religious persecution by a Hindu government? Second, is that characterization accurate? In other words, is the motivation for violence in Kashmir best explained by religious or secular and political factors? In addressing these questions, this paper will focus on the motivations for conflict with specific attention to the various militant groups operating in the region and how both the groups and their grievances have shifted over time. Accurately identifying the motivations for conflicts—especially those that are cast as Islamic conflicts—is important in order to prevent the spread of misconceptions, as these false impressions of conflicts often shape the opinions of the conflict and proposed solutions.

This paper concludes that although the original motivations for the conflict were primarily political, the recent surge in influence of pan-Islamic groups has caused the media and scholars to mischaracterize the essential nature of the conflict as primarily religious. Though religion has influenced how militant groups have mobilized and used symbolism, this popular depiction is flawed because the fundamental grievances and motivations are predominantly political.

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Definitional Note: Political vs. Religious

This paper will characterize separatist groups operating in Kashmir as being primarily motivated by either political or religious reasons. Politically-motivated groups are drawn to violence in an attempt to address their secular grievances and pursue their secular goals. Secular grievances include rigged elections, human rights violations, and poor governance, such as corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Secular goals include demands for the establishment of a democratic government and for self-determination and independence. While the grievances and goals of politically-motivated groups are secular, Kashmir also houses an overwhelming number of Muslims who regard the mosque as a place of social gathering and political planning as well as a house of worship. Thus, even secular goals and the process of political organization that accompanies their realization often occur along religious lines.

Religiously-motivated groups, on the other hand, are drawn to violence in an attempt to address their religious grievances and pursue their religious goals. Their primary religious grievance stems from the perception of religious oppression. For example, Hindu government oppression of a Muslim minority population may lead these groups to support a merger with Pakistan or the creation of an independent Islamic state. Some religiously-motivated groups—particularly those who ascribe to a pan-Islamic ideology—are also motivated by the desire to spread Islam.

Methodology

This paper employs a two-part methodology. The first section divides the conflict into distinct time periods, starting with the outbreak of violence in 1989 and highlighting the primary actors involved in the militancy within each era. The second part assesses the relative importance of religious and political factors in the motivation of violence during each time period. In order to determine whether militant groups operating in Kashmir are primarily motivated by political or religious factors, I examine three
sub-areas: first, the background of each group including the nature of its establishment and composition; second, the ideologies and objectives of the groups, including the ultimate visions for Kashmir; and third, the tactics and activities each group uses in its advocacy and campaigns, including the source of its funding and the targets of its attacks.

Although this paper divides the groups into separate time periods, it does not argue that groups were only active in the time period under which they are listed. Rather, they are categorized by the time periods in which they either emerged as important players in the conflict or by the time periods in which they played a prominent role. This division helps to organize the conflict into different time periods and to illustrate how groups with similar ideologies arose during the same period.

Relationship to Current Academic Writing

The conflict in Kashmir has spurred debates amongst scholars over the validity of historical claims made by India and Pakistan to the region. One aspect of the conflict that has not been sufficiently examined in the existing literature is the comparative motivations of a wide range of separatist groups involved in the conflict; few scholars have attempted a nuanced discussion of the ideological dynamics of Kashmiri separatism. This paper seeks to build on the existing literature about Kashmir to present a more comprehensive treatment of the varying motivations and ideologies of separatist groups in the region.

Ashutosh Varshney, a professor at the University of Michigan, has argued that the conflict is rooted in the clash of Kashmiri, secular, and Islamic nationalisms. This paper adopts and expands Varshney’s recognition of the role that nationalism has played in motivating violence. Instead of speaking of the conflict as monolithic, this paper assesses the comparative role that nationalism has played—vis-à-vis religion and other secular factors, including levels of governance and the democracy—during the various phases and within the various separatist groups of the insurgency.
Indian journalist and scholar Prem Shankar Jha has argued that the conflict stems from middle-class frustrations. He contends that the lack of employment opportunities available to the middle class has fueled growing economic unrest and that the revolts have arisen due to frustrations caused by the lack of economic opportunities. However, Jha’s theory of economic deprivation does not explain the distinctly anti-Indian animus of the violence, nor does it explain the affinity of separatist groups for a merger with Pakistan, which had a track record of failed economic development in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. This paper builds on Jha’s economic argument in two important respects. First, this paper recognizes the role played by economic frustrations in motivating violence while also explaining the anti-Indian nature of the insurgency by situating it within the broader context of poor governance and repression by the Indian government. Second, this paper analyzes the ideological motivations of the pro-Pakistan and pan-Islamic groups, which extend well beyond the desire for economic stability.

Sumit Ganguly, a professor at the University of Indiana, argues that the origins of the conflict are rooted in a combination of political mobilization and institutional decay. Specifically, he posits that increased education and widespread access to mass media, such as newspapers, television, and video and tape recorders, have spurred the revolts. Although this paper agrees with his fundamental premise that the conflict originated in response to secular political factors, it seeks to extend significantly beyond the scope of his argument. Ganguly’s heavy emphasis on politics in his explanation lacks nuance, as it does not explain why different groups mobilized and fought in different ways; specifically, he does not address the fact that the groups mobilized in a manner that was under the aegis of religion and unrelated to the state, and thus immune from the developments in education and media he emphasizes. Hence, this paper provides a comparative taxonomy for understanding why specific groups chose to fight, recognizing the role that religion played in both ideology and mobilization.

Kashmir is often viewed by scholars and political commen-
tators as a religious issue: a battle between Indian secularism and Pakistani Islamism. Samuel Huntington’s renowned “clash of civilizations” theory serves as an example, identifying tension between the Hindu and Muslim “civilizations” of South Asia. Huntington argues that cultural and religious identities have served and will continue to serve as the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. This paper attempts to expose this understanding as overly simplistic and inherently inaccurate, as conflicts assumed to be the product of religious binaries can often be explained by a more nuanced relationship with politics. This paper concludes that in Kashmir, conflict was primarily motivated by political factors even though actors mobilized along religious lines. In order to best understand this dynamic, this paper examines the ideology and tactics of the primary militant actors from 1989 to the present.

THE CONFLICT IN KASHMIR

Before the 1947 Partition of British India, there were approximately 650 independent princely states that were forced to accede to either India or Pakistan. Kashmir, the largest and only centrally-located kingdom, refused to accede; the King of Kashmir at the time, Hari Singh, yearned for an independent Kashmir (Bose 16). Frustrated by Singh’s equivocations, Pakistani-sponsored tribesman invaded Kashmir and compelled Singh to request protection from the Indian government. India pointed out the illegality of sending in troops without Kashmiri accession to India and pressured Singh to formally accede. Primarily because of his dislike of Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of Kashmir’s largest political party, the National Conference, lent his support to the accession and became Prime Minister after the accession. In response to Kashmir’s accession, India introduced Article 370 to the Constitution, which granted Kashmir a special status within the Indian Union. Under Article 370, Kashmir would be allowed to maintain a separate flag and constitution and had immunity from any law passed by the Indian Parliament unless the state legislature also
ratified it. There were exceptions, however: “the maharaja’s accession to India in October 1947 had limited the jurisdiction of India’s central government to three categories of subjects: defense, foreign affairs, and communications” (Bose 58). By conditioning the extent of the accession, this article allowed India to pacify Kashmiri demands for independence.

From the time of accession until the elections in 1987, Indian governance of Kashmir was rampant with corruption and mismanagement. The Indian government used its own laws to vindicate its corrupt actions; Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution “empower the center to dismiss elected governments of India’s states in the event of a breakdown of law and order and to assume their legislative mandate” (Bose 81). On multiple occasions, India declared democratically-elected governments void and instead installed governments that were sympathetic to Indian interests. In effect, these articles gave India the power to dissolve state governments and place them under federal control. Although the articles specify “a breakdown of law and order” as a precondition for the use of this power, the Indian government retained the ability to categorize any event as such; unsurprisingly, arbitrary determinations were made in order to secure control over the state. Despite decades of negligence by the Indian government, the primary outbreak of violence occurred after the 1987 elections in Kashmir. Farooq Abdullah, Sheikh Abdullah’s son and the chief minister of Kashmir at the time, was viewed as a puppet of the Indian state because of his pro-Indian stance during the rigging of general elections. The 1987 elections pitted two major political groups against each other: the separatist Muslim United Front (MUF) and the pro-India National Conference (NC). Candidates for the MUF asserted that the elections were rigged because the National Conference had defeated them in many areas that were regarded as strongholds of MUF supporters. These allegations sparked immediate violence and riots throughout Kashmir.

The example of Muhammad Yusuf Khan and his campaign manager Yasin Malik best exemplifies the corruption that plagued the elections. Khan ran for office within the jurisdiction of the
MUF, resulting in a landslide victory. The decision was then annulled by Indian troops, who awarded the victory to the opposition and incarcerated both Khan and Malik for a year. The Indian government denied both individuals court appearances while subjecting them to torture and other human rights violations. The cruel treatment and undemocratic behavior displayed by the Indian government prompted both to cross the Line of Control—the line that separated Pakistan-controlled Kashmir from India-controlled Kashmir—into Pakistan for arms training in hopes of liberating Kashmir from the Indian government (Bose 49-50). Many Muslims, particularly youth, fled to Pakistan for similar reasons and joined a host of insurgent groups, fighting for the right of self-determination for Kashmir, whose population was rapidly growing.

The 1947 partition created two countries: India and Pakistan. The primary difference between these two countries was the dominant religion: Islam was prevalent in Pakistan while Hinduism was prevalent in India. The high percentage of Muslims living in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and the high percentage of Hindus and Buddhists in Indian-administered Kashmir make this religious distinction clear. Islam’s prevalence in Pakistan demonstrates that militant groups with Islamic ideology, which will be discussed below, favor the integration of Kashmir with Pakistan. Although some groups cite corruption by the Indian government, the dominance and spread of Islam in Kashmir is at the core of some groups’ ideology.

TRAJECTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT

This part of the paper divides the Kashmir conflict into three separate time periods in order to differentiate between the types of separatist groups that have operated in Kashmir. Though the groups continued to operate during multiple time ranges, the time divisions are assigned in order to illustrate when different separatist groups first emerged and when they were recognized as the most prominent separatist players in the conflict. This part tracks the rise of secular Kashmiri nationalism from 1989 to 1993, the emer-
gence of pro-Pakistani ideology from 1994 to 1999, and the rise of pan-Islamic groups from 2000 to 2009.

**Period 1: 1989-1993—Secular Kashmiri Nationalism**

The first stage of the Kashmiri insurgency began with the violent aftermath of the rigged elections and was marked by the reign of secular nationalism. The primary separatist activity during this period was conducted under Kashmir’s first major militant group: the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).

**Background**

Although the JKLF was founded in Birmingham, England in 1977 by Kashmiri expatriates, the initial group of Kashmiris that crossed the Line of Control for arms and training established the organization in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, in 1987. The HAJY (Hamid, Ashfaq, Javed, and Yasin)—comprised of members from the aforementioned first group—was the core leadership of the JKLF in its early years. By the mid-90s, all members of the JKLF, save one, had died in their quest for azaadi or freedom. The significance of these martyrs resides in the influence they had on other young Kashmiris “to take up arms and continue the struggle,” thereby enlarging the size and scope of the JKLF (Bose 104).

The JKLF’s initial attack occurred in 1989 with the much-publicized kidnapping of the daughter of Rubiya Sayeed, the Indian Minister of Home Affairs. The JKLF continued to carry out targeted attacks, such as the killing of government and security officials as well as other general attacks that resulted in the deaths of innocent bystanders (Ganguly). The two primary leaders of this rising movement were Yasin Malik and Anamullah Khan. Malik was imprisoned, and after his release in 1995 he embraced a non-violent approach to liberating Kashmir primarily because Pakistan had cut its funding of the JKLF. Khan, however, refused to adopt a similar approach and the JKLF split into two groups, one led by
Khan and the other by Malik (Schofield 268). Thus, Malik’s faction focused on arousing public opinion to support its objectives while Khan’s faction promoted itself as a struggle on three fronts: political, diplomatic, and armed. After denouncing the use of violence in the conflict, Malik expressed his desire for a democratic approach involving representatives of Jammu and Kashmir. Malik remained consistent with his non-violent approach and reiterated the JKLF’s intention of including Jammu and Kashmir in the independence talks. In a 2005 interview Malik said, “We are not against the democratic process. I want the Kashmir issue to be resolved through democratic means. Now what problem does India have in holding an election for the sake of electing true [Jammu and Kashmir] representatives? If they are sincere in resolving the Kashmir problem then they can discuss the issue with these elected representatives” (Hakim).

Ideology

The JKLF has a simple goal: to establish an independent Kashmir linked by a common history and nationalism, not religion (SATP). Paradoxically, throughout their history they have supported a broad referendum in which the residents of Kashmir vote on the end status of Kashmir, thereby allowing the possibility of a merger with Pakistan or a pan-Islamic alternative. Despite this, they have openly maintained their desire for an independent Kashmir. In fact Malik has specifically denounced the Line of Control becoming the permanent border. He contends, “When the Kashmiris themselves want to live together, and for which they have sacrificed one lakh [100,000] people, what are you offering them in the name of peace?...Now if the status quo is to form the basis of the solution, how will we be able to ensure peace” (Hakim)?

Although the JKLF originally received funding for its missions in Pakistan, Pakistan ceased its financial support because the JKLF did not support their goal of Kashmir’s integration with Pakistan. Moreover, its transformation from a group focusing on international support to a group focusing on domestic support has
diminished its allies in terms of other groups able to provide it with members and funding. The group has, however, maintained the same goals and has been consistent in articulating its ideal resolution to the conflict. For example, in interviews conducted with high-ranking members of the JKLF, such as Yasin Malik, members of the group have consistently indicated their desire for Kashmir to become an independent state and for the involvement of Kashmiris in peace talks that currently only occur between India and Pakistan (Hakim).

The JKLF has also cited corruption within outside governments as a basis for an independent Kashmir immune from the Indian and Pakistani governments. Furthermore, Malik contended that the primary reason for the increase in militancy was the incessant atrocities committed by the Indian government. He believes that if the Indian government “stops the atrocities and the suppression in Kashmir, and allows a genuine space for the nonviolent struggle,” there would be less militancy (Lal). Malik has brought the corruption rampant throughout the Indian government to the forefront in an attempt to gain support for the JKLF cause, specifically addressing the government’s claims that news from Kashmir was exaggerated.

Tactic/Symbols

The JKLF flag—composed of a small white triangle, a red stripe, and a green stripe—is meant to symbolize the group’s ideals. The white color represents the religious minorities of the state and the group’s peaceful efforts on political and diplomatic fronts to achieve its objective; the red stripe represents the group’s revolutionary ideas and its members’ belief that they could not achieve their objective unless they shed their own blood and that of the enemy too; and the green stripe represents the Muslim majority and the greenery of the state (JKLF).

Additionally, although the JKLF was primarily motivated by political compulsions—specifically, an independent Kashmir—it has an inescapable Muslim character due to the fact that currently
99 percent of the valley (after the exodus of Kashmiri Hindu Pandits in the early 1990s) is Muslim. Despite these religious affiliations with Kashmir, however, the JKLF’s support for a referendum as well as its consistently articulated goal of an independent Kashmir are indicative of its primarily political motivations.

Moreover, Sumit Ganguly, in his article “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay,” attempts to identify the structural cause of the initial outbreak of violence for which the JKLF was responsible. He contends that the conflict arose due to political and primarily secular motivations. He argues that “growing levels of literacy, higher education, and media exposure” resulted in greater political mobilization, with the inevitable result of greater political demands; this mobilization, when coupled with the ethnic tension present in the region, had forced the state to accommodate the demands. Ganguly argues that institutional decay, which prevented the accommodation of these demands, proved to be the lynchpin for the conflict when it was coupled with Pakistani propaganda targeted towards insurgent groups.

Period 2: 1994-1999—Pro-Pakistan Groups

The second time period is composed of pro-Pakistan groups that were supported by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency. Although the JKLF was still active during this time, they had become weaker because Pakistan had begun patronizing the Hizbul Mujahideen. Further, JKLF leader Yasin Malik was incarcerated, temporarily halting the JKLF’s activity.

Hizbul Mujahideen—Background

Of all the extremist groups currently operating in Kashmir, Hizbul Mujahideen is the largest. Hizbul Mujahideen was formed in 1989 as a militant wing of an Islamic organization named Jamaat-e-Islami, which was under the leadership of Ahsan Dar. The
group was primarily composed of a mixture of foreign and Pakistani forces, and was commanded by Muhammad Yusuf Shah, a former politician who ran for office in Kashmir and later changed his name to Syed Salahuddin (SATP). Similar to the JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen split into two factions, with Salahuddin and Hilal Ahmed Mir as their respective leaders.

An important event that involved the Hizbul Mujahideen was the Kargil War that occurred in 1999. The war took place as a result of Pakistani soldiers and members of Hizbul Mujahideen penetrating the Indian side of the Line of Control. This culminated in a lengthy war between India and the militant forces in which India ultimately regained control of military posts and drove the opposition forces across the Line of Control (Bose 141). Hizbul Mujahideen not only participated in aggressive physical combat, but also worked in collaboration with Pakistani forces. For example, they aided the Pakistani soldiers by helping to capture Indian army posts during the Kargil War.

Hizbul Mujahideen—Ideology

Hizbul Mujahideen’s ideology is far more Islamist than the JKLF’s secular nationalism. A clear departure from the JKLF era, Hizbul Mujahideen supports integration of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. This has earned it the political and military support of the Pakistani government, and the ISI is a major source of financing for the group. In addition to Pakistani aid, it has gained support in the Kashmir Valley and in the Doda, Rajouri, and Poonch districts as well as branches of the Udhampur district in Jammu (SATP). Moreover, Hizbul Mujahideen has strong relations with Jammat-e-Islami, an Islamist Pakistani political group, and is supported by both political and religious groups overseas. Salahuddin, Hizbul Mujahideen’s commander, has often justified his group’s violence by citing the Indian government’s retaliation against the family members of militants. For instance, he contends that “[t]his sort of revenge precipitates retaliation,” while making clear that his battle is with the Indian government and not the Indian people (Rediff India Abroad). Salahuddin insisted this govern-
ment persecution has only aided the cause of Hizbul Mujahideen by fostering more recruits that are disgusted with the ruthlessness of the Indian government.

Moreover, Saluhuddin has used the failing dialogue process as a justification for violence. He believes the process “does not hinge on the core issues of Kashmir” and thus believes that diplomacy will not be able to resolve the issue. Still, he has raised the possibility of a ceasefire if India were to accept four conditions: “India should recognise that Kashmir is a disputed issue; it should release all the political and jihadi leaders; it should withdraw forces from the Kashmir valley and send them back to the 1989 position; and it should stop human rights violations in Kashmir” (Rediff News).

Hizbul Mujahideen—Tactics/Symbols

The Hizbul Mujahideen is strongly opposed to the idea of an independent Kashmir to the point where it has both conducted military campaigns against the JKLF and assisted the Indian government in its battle against the JKLF by providing intelligence (SATP). It has assisted the Indian government in an attempt to destabilize the JKLF because of its agenda of Kashmiri independence, as opposed to a Pakistani merger. Despite this information sharing, its members continue to fight against the Indian government. This was clearly illustrated in Hizbul Mujahideen’s role in crossing the Line of Control and its consequent involvement in the Kargil War.

Hizbul Mujahideen’s motivations are both religious and political. They can be seen as harboring religious motivations because part of their ideology contends that Pakistan was formed as a homeland for the Muslims in South Asia; furthermore, they wanted Kashmir to integrate with Pakistan because they wanted a unification of Muslim groups and forces. Despite their religious rhetoric, it is difficult to determine their true motivations because of their close ties to the ISI, which uses them as a political weapon and is not truly interested in their ideology. ISI’s neglect of Hizbul Mujahideen’s ideology may seem to indicate that the ISI has co-
opted them. The two groups, however, share the same ultimate goal and therefore their relationship should be seen as more balanced. Although it is unfair to characterize their motivations as entirely religious or political, this paper concludes their motivations are primarily political due to their role established by the ISI as a de facto second army of Pakistan fighting for Kashmir’s accession rather than as an ideological Islamic goal. Although fighting for Kashmiri accession may be seen as an ideological Islamic goal in some cases, Hizbul Mujahideen has framed their ideology in political terms. They have justified their actions by citing misconduct by the Indian government as well as the deteriorating peace negotiations, both political reasons. While the presence of these political reasons does not entirely rule out religious motivations, it indicates that Hizbul Mujahideen’s motives are primarily political.


The third time period can be described as the emergence of pan-Islamic groups that tend to possess a more extremist mindset than the previous groups. There were two primary groups operating during this time: Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba.

Jaish-e-Mohammed—Background

Jaish-e-Mohammed, roughly translated as “The Army of Mohammed,” was founded by Maulana Azhar in 2000 in Pakistan shortly after he was released by Indian authorities. It is primarily composed of foreign individuals, many of whom fought the Soviets in Afghanistan (SATP). Jaish-e-Mohammed is well known for the December 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament in which five gunmen opened fire in the Parliament House resulting in nearly a dozen deaths (Bose 142). In fact, Azhar was detained in connection with this attack but was never formally charged. This attack increased tensions between India and Pakistan, ultimately leading to a standoff between the two nations. Both nations gathered and placed troops along the international border and the Line of Con-
control. News of the standoff sparked conversations regarding potential nuclear war between the two rivals. Tensions receded, however, following an international diplomatic meeting, which resulted in both Indian and Pakistani withdrawal of the troops from the border regions.

Jaish-e-Mohammed—Ideology

Jaish-e-Mohammed places a large emphasis on Islam and its universal potential. As a result, its objective is to liberate Kashmir, unite it with Pakistan—both are motivations shared by Hizbul Mujahideen—and spread Islam throughout India, specifically to Delhi, Amritsar, and Ayodhya. Its emphasis on Islam has led to associations with groups that share similar beliefs regarding religion and Islam, such as the former Taliban regime of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and other Sunni militant groups. These organizations now provide funding and support to Jaish-e-Mohammed. Apart from the high-profile 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, Jaish-e-Mohammed has carried out its operations primarily in the Jammu and Kashmir region. Its attacks have been categorized as mainly suicide attacks, focusing on high security targets such as military bases and other security camps (SATP). This is indicative of the approach Jaish-e-Mohammed takes to the conflict: its members are willing to approach their goal without much concern for the loss of human life. This makes it essential for law enforcement officials to be able to detect their attacks further in advance.

Jaish-e-Mohammed—Tactics/Symbols

A combination of militants from Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba hijacked an Indian Airlines Flight in 2000 and held the flight hostage. The separatists ultimately released the hostages but not before tensions between India and Pakistan increased. India accused Pakistan of plotting and supporting the hijacking while Pakistan retaliated with allegations of Indian-spon-
sored terrorism. This attack was one of many that were targeted at non-Muslims and, specifically, Hindus and Sikhs.

Lashkar-e-Toiba—Background

The second group that was prominent during the pan-Islamic period was Lashkar-e-Toiba, which translates as Army of the Pure. This group was founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in 1990 during the last days of the Afghanistan resistance against Soviet occupation. Although their first involvement in the Kashmir conflict occurred in 1993, they did not reach prominence until 1999. Similar to Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Toiba is primarily composed of foreigners who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and have a Muslim background (SATP).

Lashkar-e-Toiba—Ideology

The primary goal articulated by Lashkar-e-Toiba, like Jaish-e-Mohammed, is to implement Islamic rule throughout India as the first step to Islamic world dominance (SATP). Consequently, they want Pakistan to become a part of a universal Islamic state because Saeed believes that “Muslims throughout the world are one country” (Bearak). Although support for their objectives is not widespread, they have gained funding through two primary methods. First, the ISI has funded them because they have been viewed as a useful tool in fighting India and Afghanistan. Second, they have been involved in earthquake relief and have established houses, clinics, and temporary mosques for the victims; this has given credibility to their name and has increased sponsorship by Muslim communities and individuals. In addition to these forms of support, Lashkar-e-Toiba has built relations with numerous insurgent groups that also focus on Islam as a center point, specifically the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other prominent terrorist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.
Lashkar-e-Toiba—Tactics/Symbols

While their primary areas of operation are within Jammu and Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Toiba has carried out attacks in parts of India including New Delhi and Mumbai. Moreover, their networking and growing ties with Islamic extremist groups across India has allowed them to coordinate attacks within India while receiving necessary support.

They are notorious for their unique methods of attacks. Their primary mode of aggression is fidayeen, which are squad suicide attacks. Moreover, their well-planned raids on villages and often deceptive tactic of wearing uniforms of security forces has caused officials to dedicate a larger amount of time and focus to them compared to other extremist organizations (Bose 144-145). Their ultimate goal is not only to make Islam the dominant religion but also, in the words of their leader, “to destroy the forces of evil and disbelief...to bring death to oppressors” (Bearak). Therefore, as Lashkar-e-Toiba’s goal of Islamic supremacy suggests, their primary motivations are religious: they are not concerned with the self-determination of Kashmiris, but rather, a universal following of Islam.

Emergence of Religious Motivations

The emergence of pan-Islamic groups brought religion to the forefront of the conflict. Prior to this emergence, militant groups such as the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizbul Mujahideen placed the status of Kashmir—whether it would become independent or integrate with Pakistan—at the forefront of the discussion. The rise of pan-Islamic groups including Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed marked the first time the leading militant groups did not support self-determination. Instead, Islam became the primary discussion topic: the pan-Islamic groups expressed their desire for an agenda that “includes the restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of India” (SATP).

Although there is no academic consensus for the explanation
of why pan-Islamic groups suddenly turned to Kashmir to further their cause, one potential explanation is that Kashmir presented itself as an easy target as a predominantly Muslim region torn by over a decade of incessant conflict and polarization. Pan-Islamic groups may have seen the region as an opportunity to expand their battle to a new front—South Asia—by changing their rhetoric to emphasize spreading Islam throughout the region and continent. Engaging themselves in the Kashmir conflict brought attention to their ideology and attracted supporters within South Asia who were opposed to the current players and political options. Furthermore, the Indian government’s record of abuse and corruption resulted in the persecution of a primarily Muslim population in Kashmir, which may have also sparked Islamic nationalism: in this case, political actions sparked religious retaliations. In an attempt to take vengeance against the Indian government for its brutal actions, many Muslims turned to the ideology of pan-Islamic groups as an expression of their feelings toward a “secular” Indian government that they believe had neglected them.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of Kashmiri militancy since 1989 demonstrates the complexity of motivations for the violence. The conflict cannot be deemed solely a religious or political conflict; rather, both factors played a significant role in shaping the motivations of different groups. While it is evident that the pan-Islamic groups, which joined the conflict later, emphasize Islam and are motivated by religion, other groups such as the JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen, which represented the vanguard of violent Kashmiri separatism, have predominantly political grievances and motivations. This paper concludes that although groups that placed less emphasis on the religious dimensions of the conflict initiated the violence for political reasons, the mobilization occurred on religious lines. This was inevitable because of the overwhelming Muslim population in Kashmir and the centrality of the mosque to political mobilization in light of the Indian government’s crackdown on political activity.
As the conflict has progressed, Kashmir has witnessed an influx of foreign-based militant groups giving the conflict a decidedly religious turn in terms of the composition, ideology, and motivations of those fighting. The recent emphasis on religion has seemingly corroborated the interpretation that the conflict in Kashmir is a religious battle being pitched between Islamists and a Hindu government. This interpretation misrepresents the conflict by ignoring the political motivations responsible for the past two decades of the conflict.

This paper’s more nuanced understanding of the motivations has practical implications for efforts at conflict resolution. Despite the religious context often accorded the conflict, any attempt to remedy the causes of violence must address both the religious and political components of the conflict. Given the significant political dimensions of the conflict’s origin and ongoing grievances, the Indian government—though perhaps less able to mollify the religious extremist groups in Kashmir—should attempt to mitigate the secular motivations for violence through the arsenal of political remedies and reforms, including good governance, free and fair elections, and respect for civil liberties.

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During my years in Secretary-General Kofi Annan's senior management team, I saw firsthand how international multilateral action with heroic local and regional efforts effectively helped build progress and peace in war-torn societies, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, eastern Congo and Burundi, Angola and Southern Sudan, northern Uganda, Kosovo, and Nepal. Through the United Nations, we also coordinated massive international relief in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 South Asian earthquake, and the 2006 Lebanon War as well as in the Horn of Africa, southern Africa, and Darfur. In several of these overwhelming emergencies, hundreds of thousands of lives were predicted to be lost. Though its heightened effectiveness has not been recognized by much of the world media and many national parliaments, multinational action, building on local capacities, averted the most somber of these predictions. More often than not, I have seen how the international community, in spite of often half-hearted investment by the powerful and the rich, has succeeded in providing life-saving assistance and protection to those in greatest need. Through the United Nations and other international organizations, we can organize tremendous processes of change if we have a sufficient minimum of political support and resources from the most powerful capitals and the richest nations.

**LEARNING FROM THE PAST**

We fail as a collective humanity when multilateral action lacks a unity of purpose. We fail, tragically and repeatedly, when the United Nations and regional organizations are not provided by

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their member states with the political will and the economic and security resources needed during crises. Senseless bickering and passive neglect among the powerful nations have produced suffering in Darfur, in Afghanistan, among Palestinians, and among the growing numbers of climate change victims in southern nations.

The past decade has offered numerous examples that illustrate the inadequacy of uncoordinated multilateralism and, even worse, unabashed unilateralism.

First, there was no lack of early warnings from us in the United Nations about the growing conflict in Darfur, but most member states were not interested. Many Asian and Arab nations wanted to protect the regime in Khartoum rather than the defenseless civilians in the western desert. The United Nations had facilitated cease-fire agreements in Darfur, but they were not enforced by member states. The humanitarian workers were asked, as in Bosnia in the 1990s, to feed and shelter millions while armed men surrounding the 140 camps planned their next massacres with impunity. It seemed as if Srebrenica and Rwanda were ancient history.

Second, in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2002 to 2003, there were countless warnings against the irresponsible inability of Security Council members to agree on how to deal with Saddam Hussein. There were equally clear warnings that the use of force by the U.S.- and U.K.-led coalition could lead to disastrous results. Those politicians, who chose to rely on speculative, unsubstantiated, and ultimately false intelligence, rather than on the warnings of U.N. staff on the ground or Secretary-General Annan, can now hardly sleep well at night. American and Iraqi medical experts have documented that countless Iraqis died in the 40 months that followed the invasion. In no other place on earth have so many been killed by blunt violence during the last five years as in post-invasion Iraq. Millions died in the Congo and in the Sudan from preventable disease and malnutrition, but Iraq was for years, like no other place, the home of murder and massacres.

Third, a decade with no coherent international efforts to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or to end the Israeli occupation and border closures of Gaza and the West Bank produced what I called
a "ticking time bomb" when I visited Gaza in 2006. Less than a year later, Gaza exploded into the worst internal strife ever. In January 2009, we saw yet another full-scale Israeli invasion, hundreds of dead Palestinian children, and continued rocket fire from Gazan militants into Israel. We reaped the fruit of our inaction: more fertile grounds for new extremism. When you lock 1.5 million Gazans in a cage smaller than an average Norwegian municipality and deprive hundreds of thousands of angry youth of hope, you do not get boy scouts or choirmen; you get long lines of new terrorists.

Lastly, there would not have been a relentless increase in natural disasters and extreme weather if this global generation had managed to unite around curbing greenhouse gas emissions and preventing climate change as member states generally promised in Rio de Janeiro at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Seven times more livelihoods are, in our time and age, devastated by natural disasters than by war. Humanitarian field workers cannot believe that many politicians and industrialists still argue that our explosive global economic growth has not changed the climate. For many years, extreme droughts, hurricanes, and floods have devastated the lives of more and more people. The destructive effects of natural disasters, as always, are much greater in poor developing countries, but even in Europe, the extreme heat wave of 2003 took tens of thousands of lives. Decades ago, leading scientists on United Nations climate panels agreed that policy and behavioral change were urgently needed. If North Americans, Europeans, Chinese, and others had started the process of change there and then, we would have had positive results at a lower cost.

In spite of and because of all this, I believe there is still reason for optimism. The coming years can and will see a revival of multilateral action partly because the experience of recent years has proven the costly futility of unilateral force. Since 2003, the United States has spent the incomprehensible sum of one trillion dollars on its war and still unsuccessful nation building project in Iraq. That is several times more than the combined bill of all United Nations humanitarian, developmental, environmental, peacekeeping,
peacemaking, and democracy-building efforts in a hundred countries during the same years.

The age of investment in joint, collective, and coherent action through the United Nations has arrived for the rich and the powerful member states. As we move from a unipolar world of U.S. dominance to a multipolar world in which China and India will also become superpowers, it will be crucial to not only recognize the political importance of Beijing and New Delhi, but also to demand they assume their shares of international political and economic burdens. Just as the United States cannot shrink from its obligation to push for a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, China cannot pretend to be a developing nation when it is a dominant investor in Africa, and as such, it must play a leading role in enforcing an end to the carnage in Darfur. In the new world, the Security Council and the G8 should reflect economic and political realities.

Just as Iraq is the symbol of unilateral impotence, the momentous positive change that has taken place in some of the worst war zones of our generation in Africa is a signal of multilateral potency. A few years ago, war, chaos, and massacres reigned from Liberia to Angola and from Southern Sudan to Sierra Leone. Cost-efficient multilateral action with local and regional allies helped bring and build peace.

THE GROWING STRENGTH OF MANY

Several factors have created new opportunities for us to achieve greater global progress, and in the coming generation, much more can be achieved. First, even with the less than generous investment of previous generations in peacemaking and peacekeeping, the Human Security Reports document that there are half as many wars now as when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Before the global economic recession, World Bank economists could for the first time record that there were under one billion people who live on less than the index-linked 1.25 dollars a day and fewer than two billion who live on less than two dollars per day, even in a growing
world population of 6.7 billion. Thus, those of us in the growing global middle and upper classes have fewer absolute poor to lift out of abject misery and fewer wars to end.

Second, superior technology has increased the potential for information sharing and multilateral action. When in the spring of 2004 the regime in Khartoum blocked our access to the civilians in Darfur for months, our experts were able to plan in detail relief operations with advanced satellite imagery and computer programs that could identify the locations and sizes of displaced and refugee populations in Darfur and Chad. We could use other satellite data and computer projections to determine whether there was underground water in the region and whether the roads to the camps would be usable in the coming rainy seasons. U.N. specialized agencies and interagency teams now make use of sophisticated models projecting weather patterns, livestock availability, migration trends, and patterns in local tension. We have advanced early warning systems for hunger, disease, and conflict, which make it impossible to claim we did not know what was brewing.

Third, we have the biggest and most efficient network of like-minded intergovernmental, governmental, and non-governmental organizations that serve as paths for future investments in peace and development. Humanitarian agencies can now feed, vaccinate, and provide primary school for children for a few dollars a day, even in the remotest areas. Such investment is, dollar by dollar, more cost-effective than any private or public venture in any Northern or Western society. These non-governmental and U.N. organizations will also speak up more for neglected peoples. During my three and a half years as U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator, the improved efficacy of this international aid network allowed me to advocate more effectively than I had dreamt of before assuming the position in 2003.

A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Every working week for more than three years, I spoke to the international media about unmet relief needs following natural di-
sasters such as the South Asian earthquake when helicopters had to be urgently found, about forgotten emergencies such as in northern Uganda when 20,000 children had been kidnapped, and about the abuse of civilians and the rape of women in Darfur and eastern Congo. Several heads of state from Zimbabwe to Sudan came after my scalp. In previous years, I would not have been able to keep my job, but Secretary-General Annan had great integrity and always defended my right to speak the truth.

However, we must also hold world leaders accountable to their obligation to defend defenseless civilians threatened around the world. World leaders from the United States, China, Russia, Europe, the Islamic world, and Africa—some 190 heads of state and governments in all—solemnly swore at the September 2005 World Summit to uphold a "responsibility to protect" vulnerable communities when their national authorities cannot or will not provide such protection.

I was there when it happened. For many months, diplomats from all U.N. member states had sat in windowless basement meeting rooms to ponder the Millennium Plus Five Summit declaration. For the first time, there was a decisive majority of states who rose above the medieval principle of not "interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states," and the following text was agreed upon by consensus when kings, presidents, and prime ministers met in the General Assembly Hall of the United Nations:

...We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII...should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

This "responsibility to protect" is more revolutionary than many world leaders seem willing to admit. They cannot anymore be passive bystanders to carnage. We must aim to translate this responsibility into action to provide protection for beleaguered and
threatened communities. In my seventh and last briefing on the protection of civilians to the Security Council in December 2006, I appealed to the members to make sure that "your responsibility to protect must be depoliticized, become a truly shared interest, and translate into joint action by all members of this Council and our global organization."

What does this mean? It means that more countries must give more forces to peacekeeping and peace enforcing operations undertaken by the United Nations or such regional organizations like the African Union. These forces need to be operationally capable. It means that these and other U.N. member states will need to enforce economic sanctions on and individual judicial accountability for political and military leaders who attack civilian populations. If the new and emerging powers such as India and China did more to defend women and children worldwide, the Western powers, with their questionable global post-Iraq vision, could and should do less to push such moral causes. More than anything, it means we must recognize that we are neighbors and we are culturally and politically linked; we cannot stand by as civilians and non-combatants are killed, raped, and mutilated. Empowered by new opportunities and obligated by longstanding responsibilities, we must act immediately, forcefully, and coherently with other U.N. members to end the abuse.
WHAT HAS WASHINGTON DONE?:
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF STATE-BUILDING ON DEMOCRACY IN GEORGIA

Alexander Schellinger

In September 2008, shortly after the war between Russia and Georgia, Freedom House—an organization funded largely by the U.S. government—wrote in a letter to “relevant committees” in Congress:

Georgia’s democracy deficit was an important but underappreciated factor in the recent crisis over South Ossetia. Because of the lack of independent television, inadequate institutional checks and balances, weak political opposition and a marginalized civil society, President Saakashvili was free to make his decisions during the crisis without the need to consider other views. One wonders if the decision-making process would have been enhanced if stronger democratic institutional mechanisms had been in place. (Freedom House)

The Freedom House letter suggests that there is a strong correlation between democratic deficits in Georgia and President Saakashvili’s ability to go to war with Russia. The letter’s implication is obvious: had more robust democratic institutions been in place, the war between Russia and Georgia might not have occurred. In this paper, I argue that U.S. government assistance to Georgia since 2003 has failed to support robust democratization, focusing too much on strengthening the executive branch of the Georgian government. Once Saakashvili took office, Washington reduced funding to critical democratization programs, especially those that supported independent media and civil society organizations. This shift in U.S. assistance, which contributed to the slowdown of democratic

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consolidation in Georgia, demonstrates that U.S. aid is critical to Georgia’s political development.

Due to its strategic location and nascent statehood, “democracy in Georgia is a matter of international interest” (Nodia and Scholtbach 1). There are many factors influencing democratization in Georgia; “international interest,” or assistance, is just one of them. Yet the role of the United States is preeminently important for democratic developments in Georgia. Relations between Georgia and the United States are buttressed by close personal ties between former President Bush—who in 2005 became the first U.S. president to visit Georgia—and Saakashvili, who named a Georgian highway after Bush. American assistance to Georgia is critical for the development of democracy; unfortunately, however, it has set the wrong incentives for the Georgian government.

An assessment of U.S. assistance to Georgia after the 2008 war with Russia is sobering. If one assumes that Washington pursued an idealist agenda vis-à-vis Georgia, then the war left no doubt about the failure of this agenda. The war demonstrated, in fact, that President Saakashvili has almost unchecked authority and that the current state of democracy in Georgia is dire. Some argue that Washington’s pronouncements about Georgian democracy were insincere, and that what Washington really sought was a reliable strategic partner in a critical region. Even such a realist assessment, however, does not fully explain the events of August 2008. Today, Georgia faces domestic instability and international insecurity—Washington’s assistance, it seems, has furthered neither moral nor pragmatic goals. As one important step to support either an idealist or a realist agenda, the new U.S. administration should stop funding initiatives that contribute to a hyper-presidential government and redirect assistance to independent media and civic organizations.¹

¹ Many development organizations from European countries, such as the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the British Department for International Development (DFID) have also concentrated their resources on state-building, and economic, and legal reforms rather than on civil society projects. This essay centers on the role of the U.S., but research on European development organizations and democracy in Georgia should be done.
U.S. INTERESTS

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has actively pursued strategic interests in Georgia. In the second half of the 1990s, the United States under Bill Clinton became increasingly involved in energy projects in the South Caucasus through the creation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, and Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa pipelines, each of which involved billion dollar investments from American and British oil companies (Penev 35). These pipelines were of vital importance to Washington, which sought to develop the energy corridor from the Caspian region via Georgia in order to bypass Russian and Iranian territories.

In its annual reports, the State Department mentions “U.S. Strategic Interests” in Georgia. Of these interests, a number have been of vital importance since 2003. According to the U.S. government, Georgia is an outpost on the “frontier of freedom,” an ally in the global war on terrorism, a supporter of the Iraq war, and a partner in an energy-rich region (“U.S. Government Assistance”).

The U.S. government has been referring to Georgia as a part of the frontier of freedom since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the first of the so-called “color revolutions” (Bush). In November 2003, thousands of Georgians took to the streets to protest official election results, and the largely non-violent protests led to the dismissal of President Eduard Shevardnadze and the subsequent inauguration of Mikheil Saakashvili, the pro-Western opposition leader.

In the years since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has moved to the forefront of the U.S. agenda because of supposed “concerns about threats posed by terrorist groups in the area”—and because of its outspoken criticism of Russia. Georgia has also become an important ally of the United States in the war in Iraq, contributing some 2,000 soldiers before Tbilisi was forced to withdraw its troops in light of its war with Russia (Baev; Collin).

In May 2005, President Bush visited Georgia and addressed thousands of enthusiastic Georgians on Liberty Square in Tbilisi: “You are building a democratic society where the rights of minorities are respected, where a free press flourishes, a vigorous opposi-
tion is welcome, and unity is achieved through peace” (Bush). With increasing frequency, the Bush Administration relied on Georgia as an example of a major success in its democracy-promoting strategy (Gvosdev).

THE DUAL GOALS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD GEORGIA

According to Henry Kissinger, American foreign policy has been most successful when it balanced “morality and pragmatism,” and—conversely—serious errors have occurred whenever the United States “lost the sense of balance between our interests and our ideals” (Kissinger 190). While idealist-oriented policymakers generally see democratization as an end goal, realist strategists tend to use it as a means to advance other interests. It was the overlap of these two approaches that made U.S. democracy promotion in Georgia partially successful—until the transfer of power to Mr. Saakashvili.

Both idealists and realists had an interest in fostering political competition under the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze. The democratization of Georgia, the end goal of the idealist faction, was the priority of realists as well, since it was assumed that a regime change in Tbilisi would allow the United States to advance its interests in the South Caucasus. However, in the aftermath of the war between Russia and Georgia, it has become clear that neither the idealists nor the realists have achieved their goals in Georgia.

Since 2003, America has limited its support for independent media outlets, civic organizations, and opposition parties. Instead, the U.S. has given priority to state-building, with the intention of strengthening the institutional capacity of the Georgian government. It is possible, of course, that Washington based its decision to shift its resources on its experiences with democracy promotion in the 1990s. Thomas Carothers notes that the halt in the global democratization process in the 1990s was partly due to the United States’ insufficient focus on state-building. In many cases, states were too weak to achieve democratic consolidation, and their transitional stages became permanent “grey zones” of illiberal, partial, or
weak democracies. The lack of focus on state-building on the part of “democracy aid practitioners” was an important reason for the failure of democratization in the 1990s:

... [D]emocracy aid practitioners did not give significant attention to the challenge of a society trying to democratize while it is grappling with the reality of building a state from scratch or coping with an existent but largely nonfunctional state. (Carothers 2002 8-9)

The second Bush Administration’s focus on supporting Georgia’s executive branch, which effectively translated into enhancing Saakashvili’s powers, harmed the realist—and perverted the liberal—agenda. Washington might have sought a genuine Georgian democracy, but its uncritical and unlimited support for Saakashvili has had adverse effects. Worse yet, it has created a quasi-authoritarian regime.

In August 2008, Georgia engaged in a war with Russia over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Throughout the 1990s, South Ossetia and Abkhazia found themselves in a perpetual state of conflict with Georgia. Though these conflicts remained frozen during the early 2000s, they turned hot in the summer of 2008. Russia, defending the autonomy of regions that had been attacked by Saakashvili’s forces, decisively defeated Georgia. The war with Russia harmed Georgia’s territorial integrity, economy, and international reputation. Now, the prospects of reintegration are even more unlikely and the government of Saakashvili faces stiff political opposition. The potential of Georgia to serve as a strategic partner against Russia has been weakened.

Herein lies the paradox of U.S. government assistance to Georgia: Washington’s help was intended to strengthen democracy in Georgia while enhancing the country’s national security. In reality, U.S. assistance has weakened the democratization process, creating a dangerous situation whereby Saakashvili can unilaterally engage in a war with an adversary as powerful as Russia.
INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR

In the years before the Rose Revolution, the U.S. government supported free media in Georgia through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and various State Department programs. Foreign media assistance can have ambiguous effects on democratization, but there is evidence that U.S. media support in Georgia actually strengthened independent media organizations and improved professional journalism (Carothers 1999; “U.S. Government Assistance”). U.S. support of television channel Rustavi 2, for instance, allowed the channel to become an important platform for the opposition during the Rose Revolution.

In the annual report to Congress in 2000, the U.S. government noted its support of 31 commercial and 19 regional television stations, as well as exchange and training programs for Georgian journalists at media outlets such as The Washington Post (“U.S. Government Assessment” 45). In 2001, the U.S. supported the training of more than 400 print journalists through the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), and assisted 31 television stations and more than ten independent radio stations (“U.S. Government Assistance” 54-55).

When Saakashvili was elected, the focus of U.S. assistance changed drastically. USAID and the Department of State dramatically reduced funding for independent media programs. USAID assisted no “media civil society organizations” in 2006—and just five in 2007. Moreover, in November 2007, USAID announced plans to assist another five organizations in 2008 (“USAID Performance Report”). These numbers were released by the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi just days after the Saakashvili regime brutally suppressed demonstrators in Tbilisi and raided Imedi TV and Kavkasia, the only independent television stations left in Georgia at the time.3

2 The U.S. government continued to support the provision of internet access, but the internet plays a marginal role in Georgia’s political landscape.

3 In September 2007, the arrest of Irakli Okruashvili, an opposition politician, led to a series of demonstrations reaching a climax in November, when 50,000-75,000 people demonstrated for new elections. In response, the Georgian government dispersed the rallies with violence and declared a “state of emergency.” Independent television stations
In its 2008 *Nations in Transit* report, Freedom House supported its decision to downgrade its rating of independent media freedom in Georgia:

[…] Georgian media demonstrate weak editorial independence and low professional standards and are often used to promote the political interests of their owners. […] Temporary suspension of Imedi, the major opposition-oriented TV and radio, questioned the government’s commitment to media freedom and exposed the fragility of media pluralism. (233-234)

Despite the “fragility of media” in Georgia, Washington has not begun any initiative to support independent media outlets. In USAID’s 2007 annual report, published after the November demonstrations, the U.S. government justified its position:

Given the need to address the critical upcoming election needs [as a result of the events of November, Saakashvili agreed to early presidential elections], funds were not budgeted for a new start in media. Therefore the media sector assessment was postponed. (19)

The U.S. government’s assessment appears to be somewhat cynical. Georgian society, after all, can benefit from the presence of independent and professional media before elections, and “relatively small amounts of money can make a fundamental difference to newspapers or radio stations under siege” (Carothers 239). Nevertheless, the U.S. government remained firm in its redirection of assistance from the media sector to the Georgian executive branch.4

The once thriving civil society sector has also been weakened were raided, their equipment smashed while staff was intimidated at gunpoint. Another important television station, Rustavi Two, has become notably less critical of the government since 2006.

4 In the presidential elections of January 2008, opposition candidates received about 25% of the vote, despite highly restricted media access. Moreover, the ruling party by outspent the opposition candidates by a factor of 30 (Lanskoy and Areshidze 164).
by the shift in U.S. aid. Civic organizations in Georgia—which were instrumental to the success of the Rose Revolution—have been in decline. According to a 2007 Freedom House Report:

Many civil society leaders joined President Saakashvili in government and the organizations they left were unable to rebuild as the U.S. government redirected its democracy assistance funding away from supporting civil society to helping the Georgian government implement its reform plans. (“Aid to Georgia”)

Ironically, the author of Freedom House’s Nations in Transit, Ghia Nodia, joined the Georgian government in early 2008, a few months after the publication of the above letter. In The Political Landscape of Georgia, published in 2006, Nodia reaches a similar conclusion about the civil sector in Georgia: “Civil society institutions experienced a relatively high level of development before the Rose Revolution […]. However, once Georgia got a popular and active government, civil society started to look less robust than it did before” (30).

Like Nodia, many have left the civil society sector and joined the ranks of Saakashvili’s regime. David Darchiashvili, former executive director of the Open Society Institute, is now chairing a parliamentary committee for the Saakashvili government. It is a well-known tactic of authoritarian regimes to mute critical voices by incorporating them into their power structures (Tilly 170). The United States has been aware of the decline of the civil society sector, yet it has continued to redirect assistance to state-building efforts. The United States’ overall assistance to Georgia has been fairly constant since 2003, but sector assistance has changed significantly.

5 In 2005, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a $295.3 million compact with Georgia. MCC cooperation is dependent among other factors on a country’s democratization progress.
Of all the sectors of U.S. assistance to Georgia, “Security & Law Enforcement” has increased the most. In 2006, this sector consisted of about $12 million in “Foreign Military Financing,” $8 million in “Export Control & Related Border Security Assistance,” and $7 million in “Law Enforcement Assistance.” Assistance for “Democratic Reform,” which includes support for independent media and the civil society sector, has remained fairly constant. Yet even while assistance for democratization has remained steady at approximately $18 million per year, the composition of the “Democratic Reform” sector has changed greatly. After 2003, the U.S. government focused efforts on strengthening the executive branch. In a FY 2003 report, Washington summarized its assistance strategy for Georgia:

The USG [U.S. government] has offered its help to Georgia’s new leadership in advancing their declared agenda, which includes far-reaching political and economic reform and an aggressive anti-corruption campaign. (“U.S. Government Assistance”)

Figure 1: Three of the largest sectors of U.S. government assistance to Georgia from 2001 until 2006. The sector “Security & Law Enforcement” has been growing while other sectors remained fairly constant. [Values are not adjusted for inflation. Assistance through the Millennium Challenge Account is not included. Source: U.S. Department of State.]
Since 2003, Georgia’s economy has been growing at a rapid pace culminating in more than twelve percent growth in GDP in 2007 and a sharp increase in foreign direct investment. International resonance has been very positive. In 2008, the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation ranked Georgia 32nd, up from 68th, on its index of economic freedom (“Index of Economic Freedom”). The World Bank ranked Georgia 15th in its annual report on *Doing Business* in 2008.

There is a commonly held assumption that economic growth is more likely to take place under authoritarian regimes and that, once prosperous, countries will democratize. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi showed that authoritarian regimes, no matter how economically stable, offer no advantage in “attaining the dual goal of development and democracy” (Przeworski et al. 2). Nevertheless, the success of Georgia’s economic growth has made it relatively easy for the U.S. government to justify its support for the executive branch while overlooking democratic shortcomings. Even after the development of quasi-authoritarian rule, Washington has continued to support the Georgian government.

**ADVERSE EFFECTS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE**

Saakashvili has consolidated his power by amending the Georgian constitution, which is now markedly less liberal than it was prior to 2003. Shortly after the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili extended the powers of the president and contracted those of other institutions, most notably the parliament. The president now appoints the prime minister, cabinet members, and even officials such as university provosts. In addition, the president can dissolve parliament if it rejects the president’s choice of prime minister or the president’s proposed budget. As a result, parliament has lost one of its primary functions: control over the state budget, which is now entirely at the discretion of the president. “Parliament has largely become an implementer of executive initiatives” and has been called the “government’s notary” (Lanskoy and Areshidze 160; Papava 2). In 2007, Saakashvili pressed the parliament to extend “the term of
the standing Parliament from April to October–December 2008, anticipating security challenges that might stem from coinciding elections in Russia and Georgia in April 2008” (Nodia 236).

According to Lincoln Mitchell, “Saakashvili enjoys more formal power than Shevardnadze ever did” (672). In an attempt to consolidate power, Saakashvili reinvigorated Georgian nationalism and vowed to reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia long before the war in August 2008. “Indeed, it is Saakashvili’s populist and patriotic drumbeating that makes his preference for illiberal democracy so worrisome” (Kupchan 11). Saakashvili is ruling Georgia with a circle of close advisors who are rarely willing to consider dissenting opinions; as a result, the lines between the ruling United National Movement (UNM) party and the government have become blurry. Saakashvili’s largely uncontested power and the lack of opposition forces undoubtedly contributed to a situation whereby he was able to unilaterally declare war on Russia in August 2008.

David Usupashvili, chairman of the opposition Republican Party, charges the United States with contributing to the high concentration of power around Saakashvili: “The political elites [in Georgia] are supported by Washington, and this helps to keep them in power and arrests democratization” (Kupchan 12). Despite Saakashvili’s nationalist rhetoric, orders to crack down on peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi, the closing of independent television stations, and other blatant signs of anti-democratic governance, Washington continued to fund and support his regime.

The effects of U.S. assistance to Georgia are two-dimensional. First, U.S. support for the Saakashvili regime slowed down democratization in Georgia. Some scholars argue that post-Soviet states, with the exception of the Baltic countries, have not made any significant progress toward democratization. Carothers and Larry Diamond consider most post-Soviet states static “hybrid regimes,” with a mix of limited democratic elements—such as managed elections—in otherwise predominantly authoritarian systems (Carothers 2002; Diamond). Henry Hale argues that political changes in most post-Soviet states are cyclical rather than transformational. On Hale’s view, the Rose Revolution would be considered part
of a cyclical oscillation, with different elite factions competing for power.

In the case of Russia, Hale’s analysis appears to be very convincing. However, Georgia exhibits some important structural differences that may render Hale’s theory inapplicable. First, Georgian elites are less rich and influential compared with their Russian, Ukrainian, and even Central Asian counterparts. As a country with no significant resource reserves, Georgia had little wealth to distribute to patronage networks after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, a strong correlation between democratization and prospective European Union (EU) membership has been demonstrated, and the effects of prospective EU membership on democracy in Georgia are substantial: “For the Georgian case, democracy is analogous with becoming part of Europe [and NATO], because we look at EU [and NATO] not only as economic or military organizations but as clubs of democratic countries” (Rondeli). Additionally, unlike Russia and the Central Asian states, Georgia participates in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which provides further incentive to democratize. This essay follows Michael McFaul’s rather optimistic analysis of democracy in some post-Soviet states, such as Georgia, and considers the Rose Revolution a breakthrough on the path toward democracy. According to this theory, Saakashvili’s presidency has slowed, but not reversed Georgian democratization.

The second effect of U.S. assistance in Georgia was the creation of a false sense of security in Tbilisi. Without significant political opposition, Saakashvili increasingly oriented his country toward the West, making EU and NATO membership a top priority. Strong U.S. support for NATO membership encouraged Tbilisi to continue its rigorously pro-Western direction and allowed Saakashvili to strike an increasingly hostile foreign policy agenda with Moscow that was not mitigated by political opposition, independent media, or NGOs in Georgia. The most lucid example of this false sense of security is perhaps best found in Washington’s support for Georgian NATO membership. In an article for the Financial Times, Francis Fukuyama summarizes the consequences of
U.S. support in the following way:

The Bush Administration was not and could not have been serious about NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine to the extent that it meant providing not just arms and advisers, but real security guarantees of [American] forces. To the extent that that was so, leading the Georgians on to believe that we would get them into the club soon was a big mistake. (11)

Strong U.S. support for the Saakashvili’s regime posed significant obstacles for political opposition and encouraged him to overestimate the strength of Georgia’s position vis-à-vis Russia. Both factors significantly contributed to Saakashvili’s decision to engage in a war with Russia.

Despite the outcome, there is no evidence that Washington was seeking a war between Russia and Georgia. On the contrary, numerous U.S. government statements indicate the opposite. Just a few weeks before the outbreak of the war on August 7, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a press conference with Saakashvili:

It is extremely important that the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia be resolved on the basics—basis of principles that respect that territorial integrity, that respect the need for them to be resolved peacefully. We have noted concerns that violence should be—should not be carried out by any party. (qtd. in “Remarks with Georgian President”)

During a private dinner with Saakashvili, Rice was even more explicit in her demands. According to a senior administration official, “she told him [Saakashvili], in no uncertain terms, that he had to put a non-use of force pledge on the table” (qtd. in Cooper and Shanker A10). Despite Rice’s demands, Georgia went ahead with plans to recapture South Ossetia in a Blitzkrieg-like operation, thus risking open conflict with Russia, which had previ-
ously pledged to defend the territorial integrity of the break-away regions. Confirming Washington’s worst fears, Russia’s military crushed Georgia’s army and caused significant economic damage while harming Georgia’s state integrity.

Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Saakashvili extended his power base at the expense of democracy in Georgia. During his term, the Georgian constitution has become significantly less liberal, and the Georgian parliament has lost several important functions. He has drastically increased military spending and let relations with Moscow sharply deteriorate. Despite some early signs of Saakashvili’s “problematic ruling,” Washington has continued to support the executive branch of the Georgian system and neglected independent media and civil society sectors.

CONCLUSION

Referring to the political and economic reform process in Georgia, Alexander Rondeli, director of one of the few remaining Georgian NGOs, described Saakashvili’s regime as “social surgery without anesthesia” (qtd. in Schellinger). Before the recent war with Russia, there was a prevalent idea within the Georgian government that the Georgian people had to swallow some “sour pills” to overcome domestic and international challenges. For Saakashvili, democratic consolidation is clearly no longer a top priority. In his view, Georgia must first overcome security and economic challenges before making the “leap to democracy”. The problems associated with this theory are grave. It presumes that democratization can be “put on hold” and then “resumed” at the whim of governing elites.

For the Bush administration, Georgia has lost its place as the “beacon of democracy.” It has turned into the latest disaster of the administration’s democracy-promotion agenda. Washington’s strong support for the executive branch of the Georgian government perverted the “liberal agenda” of promoting democracy and security in Georgia. U.S. assistance strengthened the Saakashvili regime at the expense of independent media and the civil society
sector. Even Washington’s realist interests have been severely damaged as a result of unbalanced U.S. democracy promotion. After the war with Russia, Georgia’s national security was threatened, its territorial integrity severely harmed, and its economy shaken. Today, Georgia is less valuable to the United States as a regional partner, and Saakashvili’s government faces serious challenges from opposition leaders. The White House’s seemingly unshakable trust in Saakashvili’s democratization plans—a trust that was perhaps based on Georgia’s economic success—secured U.S. government assistance for Saakashvili’s government. The case of Georgia has shown that linking democracy promotion to a single political leader while neglecting critical elements of democratic consolidation is not an effective strategy. In a sense, U.S. government assistance has contributed to the rise of authoritarian elements—and an illiberal constitution—in Georgia.

Democracy in Georgia is not the only thing at stake; what is more important, perhaps, is the legitimacy of U.S. democracy-promotion efforts as a whole. The United States should promote broad democratization rather than hyper-powerful executive regimes. Otherwise, as Mitchell points out, “state-corporatist” models—such as China and Russia—may become an attractive alternative for hybrid regimes around the world (Mitchell 74).

The case of Georgia has important policy implications for U.S. democracy promotion. If some cases of the 1990s taught the U.S. that democracy promotion does not automatically reinforce state-building, the case of Georgia demonstrates how a strong emphasis on state-building can lead to the emergence of authoritarian elements and harm the broader agenda of democracy promotion.

There is hope that democracy in Georgia could benefit from more “de-personalized” relations between Washington and Tbilisi under the Presidency of Barack Obama. The new U.S. government should now consider shifting to a strategic balance between the promotion of state-building and support for civil society. This should include funding for independent media and civic organizations, as well as support for political parties in Georgia.

The rewards for Washington could be mixed. Georgia might
become less hostile toward Russia and perhaps more cautious on issues related to energy and the war in Iraq. Most likely, however, it would remain a reliable partner of the United States. On the other hand, if true democratization is resumed, Georgia could become a “true” outpost at the frontier of freedom and serve as an example of successful U.S. democracy promotion strategy.

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South Korea, an ally of the United States and a Newly Industrialized Country, has made great strides in its ability to equip its military and rely more on its growing domestic defense industries and less on foreign firms to procure its weapons systems. After a late start to an indigenous defense development program in the 1970s under President Park Chung Hee, it has recently emerged as a competitive producer in the global arms trade with a state-of-the-art defense industry that has successfully been able to make high-profile arms deals to sell its highly developed weapons systems. The government of South Korea has been integral to the growth of the industry and is active in aiding the increased defense exports. As is the case with other countries that have prominent defense industries, the South Korean government works closely with companies in developing, acquiring, and exporting weapons systems. In addition, the government has traditionally been intimately connected to its major domestic companies. This follows South Korea’s model of development throughout the twentieth century based on the principle of chaebol, in which the government worked very closely with the largest domestic corporations, providing export subsidies and other benefits to foster industrialization. Although the actual transactions and delivery are carried out by the companies themselves, the export of defense goods is ultimately monitored and led by the government.

In 2006, the Defense Acquisitions Program Administration (DAPA) was created within the Defense Ministry to consolidate eight subgroups that deal with weapons procurement (Sue-young). DAPA bolsters and coordinates existing civilian industries, such as

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the high-tech sector, heavy manufactures, shipbuilding, and defense industries to create its own version of a military-industrial complex ("Indigenous Weapons Systems"). With advantages in key civilian industries, its rapidly growing research and development (R&D) sector has already made significant strides in developing advanced weapons systems. For example, the Republic of Korea (ROK) deployed indigenous weapons for its military, such as the Sin Gung, a portable short-range surface-to-air missile; the HaeSeong, a long-range cruise missile; and the Cheong Sangeo, a lightweight torpedo ("Defense Procurement").

According to DAPA, its program will not only seek to supply its own military but will also emphasize an export promotion system. It has set a goal of reaching a total $1 billion in exports by 2010 (Lee). Notable accomplishments include the transfer of technology for the K-9 self-propelled howitzer to Turkey and the sale of trainer aircraft to Indonesia. Ongoing efforts include its bid for a contract with the Australian army to upgrade its self-propelled howitzers and a submarine deal with Indonesia. Recent literature on arms acquisitions and technology transfers have endeavored to develop theories that help explain why a country like South Korea would seek to promote weapons exports so vigorously. Neorealist theory states that a state actor would sell its arms to allies to bolster their relative capabilities, which would positively affect its own relative capabilities, especially when a threat from an enemy seems imminent. For example, the threat of Soviet encroachment led to the United States' support of indigenous defense industries in Western Europe and Japan during the Cold War (Pages). Historians have cited the arms trade as a way of securing national interests (Grant).

In addition to the sale of traditional weapons and defense goods, South Korea has been involved with the export of dual-use technologies and materials. Dual-use goods are items that are used for peaceful purposes but can also be utilized for military purposes. In terms of explaining the motivations behind the sale of dual-use goods, Matthew Fuhrmann of Harvard University concluded that a state would "channel dual-use trade toward destinations where se-
curity guarantees exist and away from targets where security threats are present to minimize its potentially negative security externalities” (648). That is, a nation would not sell potentially dangerous technologies to states that could use those acquisitions to threaten the seller’s security. They would seek to enforce certain security guarantees with the buyer nation in order to ensure that the dual-use technology would not be used for military purposes against other nations, but especially against its seller. Neo-liberal theorists posit a similar theory that exporting dual-use would be unlikely between a democratic country and a non-democratic country because democratic countries that adhere to international laws and norms would be more likely to curb the careless re-export of sensitive technologies and weaponry. A democratic country would also adhere strongly to the principle of abstaining from selling to countries on international sanctions lists (Fuhrmann 648).

South Korea’s behavior as a major exporter of weapons systems and technology cannot be fully explained by existing theories on arms and dual-use technology export, as stated above. Sales of weapons materials and technology transfers from South Korea are widespread and seem to be made regardless of the dangers they would pose to its closest ally, the United States, and even its own national security interests. Contrary to Fuhrmann’s and other theorists’ predictions of state behavior when it comes to weapons exports, South Korea sells its weaponry to democracies and non-democracies alike, to countries with all levels of security guarantees for handling critical materials, and even to countries on U.N. or U.S. sanction lists, such as Iraq and Myanmar.

This paper will seek to identify the strategy behind South Korea’s heavily promoted military export program. Why does South Korea continue to pursue an expansion of arms exports despite their potential setbacks to its national security, regional dynamics, and alliance with the United States?

My hypothesis is that the South Korean government promotes arms exports to strengthen strategic relations with countries in order to best increase its prospects for securing energy and natural resources abroad. Whether the recipient country provides
security guarantees, is an ally of South Korea, or has a democratic form of government is not the most important factor in determining its likelihood of receiving South Korean arms exports. Instead, it is the recipient country’s wealth of oil and energy resources that make the country a candidate for South Korean weapons and dual-use technology exports.

ENERGY INSECURITY

In his book, *Asia’s Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy, and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific*, Kent Calder argues that a great “Arc of Crisis” in East Asia stemming from rapid economic growth, growing shortage of energy, and existing geostrategic uncertainties will all lead to rapid arms buildup in the region (3-5). All of these elements are present in South Korea. After its growth from a developing country in the 1960s to one whose current GDP per capita is comparable to most European Union nations, South Korea still boasts an average of 4.4 percent growth in GDP per year (“Country Briefings”). This rapid growth will only continue to exacerbate South Korea’s dire need for energy in the future. Finally, South Korea faces significant threat from North Korea, which serves as a key motivator for its push to constantly revamp its military. Calder argues, “The uncertainties of the emerging East Asian power game, aggravated by energy shortage, have accelerated the dangers of a post-Cold War Asian arms race” (139). If Calder were correct about his assessment of the situation, the South Korean Defense Ministry would be devoted to the acquisition and import of weapons to bolster its relative military strength. However, the push for exporting its defense goods in major arms deals reveals another motivation. This paper will show that the promotion of the export of weapons and technology has helped address South Korea’s energy insecurity by facilitating strategic relationships with resource-rich countries. South Korea relies heavily on imports to meet its energy scarcity. It has no domestic reserves of oil and very little natural gas within its boundaries. It is the world’s second largest importer of liquid natural gas (International Energy Agency
The OECD International Energy Agency forecasted that under a business-as-usual scenario, one in which planned and existing policies are not accounted for, total primary energy supply will rise by nearly 70 percent from 2001 to 2020 (29).

Current total energy supply is comprised mostly of oil and coal. Nuclear power and liquid natural gas (LNG) make up the second largest component. LNG is the fastest-growing fossil fuel source, accounting for a 13 percent increase from 1995 to 2005, while the supply of oil only increased at 0.5 percent annually (25). Total final consumption of liquid natural gas also grew significantly during this period, with an annual increase of 27 percent (27). Roughly half of energy consumption was attributed to the industrial sector in 2004 and has been growing at an annual 8.5 percent since 1984 (25). Although it has a slower rate of growth than LNG, oil is still a major source of energy used by the industrial sector, making up 57 percent of the total industrial consumption (27).

According to the same report, South Korean energy policy objective is focused on expanding the use of natural gas, bituminous coal, and nuclear power, as opposed to a reluctant reliance on volatile foreign oil supply (29-32). “[South Korea] has also made efforts to explore for oil both in its own territory and abroad. Security of gas supply is of growing importance owing to the rising share of natural gas in Korea’s energy sector and the country’s total dependence on imported LNG” (23). Overseas resource development began in the late 1970s. In August 2006, 199 projects were underway in overseas fields and in off-shore exploration sites. The Vietnam 15-1 oil field, the Donghae-1 continental shelf gas field, the Caspian Sea oil field development, and development projects in Western China are among the most notable overseas development projects (32). There seems to be a clear correlation between a country’s energy resources and its receipt of South Korean weapons. For example, according to the OECD, South Korea’s consumption of coal will increase in the next thirty years (81). Indonesia and Australia, recipients of South Korean arms sales in recent years, are some of the main exporters of South Korea’s coal
supply. Indonesia and Australia are also South Korea's two non-OPEC suppliers of oil. In addition, oil consumption, which has more than doubled since 1990, has made South Korea the ninth largest oil importer in the world. Oil-rich countries in the Middle East are key targets of South Korean arms exports, particularly the United Arab Emirates. Iran, another key oil supplier, has received South Korean dual-use technology (89). South Korea is involved in overseas oil and gas development projects, with private investments totaling almost $3.5 billion by 2006 and $1.7 billion public investment through the state-owned Korea National Oil Corporation (91). It aims to increase the amount of oil exports procured through South Korea-developed projects abroad, and the countries in which these projects are located have received generous packages of defense goods from the ROK.

Liquid natural gas will become an important source of energy in the future as it is part of South Korea's program to diversify its energy resources and rely less in the oil-rich but volatile region of the Middle East. As it does with its oil, South Korea imports all of its liquid natural gas. The state-owned company Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) is the largest single buyer of LNG in the world (98). Major LNG suppliers to South Korea, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia, were also recipients of major arms sales from the resource scarce nation.

These specific weapons exports help illuminate the relationship between arms sales and energy deals. It is important to note that these buyer countries have important energy resources and therefore have the greatest potential for improving South Korea's energy insecurity. Moreover, South Korea is not merely interested in securing suppliers for its key energy resources, but it also seeks to own shares of overseas energy development sites. Many countries that received South Korean weapons systems were the same countries where these exploration and development projects were located. An analysis of government documents, press releases, and press conferences helps establish the causality between the national strategy for energy procurement and arms deals.

The strategic use of South Korean weapons materials includes
both the major sales of conventional weapons and the less conspicuous and often illicit transfer of dual-use technology to countries prohibited from international weapons trade. Both types of transfers have been instrumental in securing energy interests abroad.

**WEAPONS FOR ENERGY**

There are various cases in which South Koreans have been involved in selling weapons and technology that support the argument that the broad underlying purpose of these sales is to gain overseas energy sources abroad. In each of these cases, there is a direct correlation between the resources owned by the targeted buyer country and the occurrence of an arms sale. South Korea has rarely sold its weapons systems to a country with no natural resources which could not help ameliorate its energy insecurity. For example, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia, all of which are common recipients of South Korean weaponry, are replete with energy resources, such as oil, coal, and natural gas.

South Korea has also been actively involved in securing energy deals with these countries. Energy deals were announced after or concurrently with the weapons sales, which illustrates that the defense deal was certainly not the only goal to be achieved in the energy-rich countries. Arms deals with the aforementioned countries, as well as the Philippines, Australia, and Venezuela, have all culminated in important developments for South Korean overseas energy procurement. For example, although the Philippines may not be as resource-endowed as other Southeast Asian nations, namely Indonesia, South Korea has nonetheless taken advantage of its geography, climate, and potential sources of energy in offshore blocks. For example, the Philippine National Oil Company is considering the sale of half of its own stakes (ten percent) in its biggest natural development project, a deepwater gas-to-power project in the South China Sea (“Natural Gas”). The national oil company has also signed a deal to diversify its fuel source with biodiesel. By cooperating with the South Korean biodiesel producer Eco Solu-
tions Company Limited, it will establish *jatropha curcas* farms and oil mills that will extract oil from the seeds of these plants (“PIA”). In terms of arms sales, South Korea has tendered numerous retired munitions to the Philippines beginning in the mid-1990s, including the F-5A Freedom Fighter supersonic fighter plane and the Sea Dolphin. Australia, which purchased the Delos oil tanker made by Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Company to transform the civilian vessel into a warship capable of refueling Australian naval vessels, provides much of South Korea’s most important energy resources, including oil, coal, and liquid natural gas (Graham). President Lee Myung-bak and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd held talks to cooperate on these issues when the newly-elected Korean President made clear South Korea’s interests in expanding cooperative energy projects in Australia (“ROK”). The sale of naval ships to Venezuela is also not without Korean ambitions in acquiring stakes in its growing natural resources industry. Venezuela holds the world’s third largest crude-oil reserves, and it will be useful for South Korea to become involved with oil and gas exploration and development projects in the country. The state company Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) already owns a 14 percent share of Venezuela’s Onado oil field (“Energy Cooperation with Venezuela”). There have been numerous high-level talks to establish future joint ventures with Venezuela for hydrocarbon exploration and development in the Orinoco Belt region (“Venezuelan Oil, Gas”).

There have been cases in which the private sector took the lead in managing and completing a weapons deal with the government of another country, while other deals were directed by government officials. For purposes of clarification, these two types of cases will be treated separately in this paper. However, whether negotiated by the government, as in the case of Indonesia and Kazakhstan, or brokered by the head of a company, such as Daewoo in Bangladesh, the procurement of energy deals was the ultimate outcome of exporting weapons in each of the major case studies in this research, namely Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Bangladesh.
GOVERNMENT-LED NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS DEALS

Indonesia

Indonesia is a crucial country for South Korea’s supply of liquid natural gas. Its political and economic instability in the late 1990s put roughly one-fourth of South Korea’s total liquid natural gas consumption at risk (International Energy Agency 102). However, South Korea could not manage to abandon Indonesia, a country with such a large share of its most important source of natural resources in the future. Instead, it received South Korea’s largest sale of indigenous conventional weapons.

Indonesia offers the prime example in which South Korea has been able to obtain arms export deals and energy cooperation agreements through diplomatic means. Meetings between high-level officials from both yielded numerous cooperative deals to jointly develop weapons and work toward energy cooperation. These meetings and cooperative memoranda exemplify the role of weapons and defense cooperation in helping South Korea procure energy resources abroad. South Korea’s Korean Aerospace Industry (KAI) recently sold trainer aircraft to Indonesia in order to help bolster the Indonesian defense industry (Govindasamy). These trainer planes would then be reassembled by an Indonesian firm. KAI also agreed to a joint production facility with its Indonesian counterpart. Other opportunities in defense cooperation opened up after the transfer of the aircraft to Indonesia.

There have since been high-level diplomatic talks between the two countries over defense and energy cooperation. Earlier talks include President Roh Moo-hyun’s 2006 visit to Indonesia, where he discussed how South Korea and Indonesia could improve cooperation by working to jointly produce weapons and increase technology transfers (“Indonesian Leaders”). There was also an increased number of talks between lower-level officials, including visits to South Korea by Indonesian Air Chief Marshal in 2007 and a visit by Chief of Naval Operations of South Korea in 2008 (“Navy Chief”).
These exchanges led to the two countries’ first defense meeting on June 12, 2008. Among the topics discussed was the bilateral weapons exchange program between South Korea and Indonesia, particularly South Korea’s desire to win Indonesia’s new order for submarines (Byun). This would be the first order of submarines in the history of South Korean defense R&D (“Subs-for-Aircraft Deal”). However, not all of the topics discussed at the meeting were strictly defense-related. At a press conference following one of these meetings, a Ministry of Defense spokesman mentioned the vital role of Indonesia’s energy resources played in South Korea’s interest in selling to the country:

The Ministry of National Defense has actively sought the establishment of dialogue channels with Southeast Asian nations rich in energy resources to support the Seoul government’s so-called energy diplomacy ... To that end, we’ve decided to hold working-level defense talks with Indonesia for the first time among member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), given Indonesia is not only an energy-abundant nation, but also a major arms sales partner for South Korea. (Jung)

The press release regarding the defense talks carried a similar message:

The ministry has been working to hold dialogue with key Southeast Asian nations to help government efforts to secure stable sources of energy and expand room for the country’s military diplomacy... As part of those efforts the ministry will hold talks with Indonesia, a key member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a resource-rich nation that is also one of our country's key partners in the defence [sic] industrial sector. (Byun)

The changeover of South Korea’s presidential administration from a liberal to a conservative party has only seen an increase in
diplomatic exchange regarding arms sales. Energy cooperation has continued to rise. During the Group of Eight summit in Japan in the summer of 2008, President Lee Myung-bak promised to increase investments into Indonesia’s energy and resource sectors after speaking with Indonesian President Yudohyono. In turn, Lee asked Yudohyono to allow South Korea to supply Indonesia with arms and to support the ROK’s interests in oil, natural gas, coal, and forest projects in resource-rich Indonesia (“Subs-for-Aircraft Deal”). President Lee again made news when he held unscheduled talks with the President of Indonesia again during his visit to Brazil in November 2008, where they spoke on the same topics (“Energy Cooperation in Brazil”).

South Korea’s deals with Indonesia offer a clear demonstration of how the government’s push for acquiring arms deals with a nation is tied to its interest in that country’s energy resources. From the beginning, government statements regarding talks about Indonesia weapons sales have mentioned talk of energy cooperation, even when the dialogue had been conducted by the Minister of Defense. This shows that the Ministry of Defense is aware of the importance of these buyer countries to its energy insecurity and that goal of acquiring these resources is made clear to those involved in brokering deals with Indonesia.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is replete with natural resources that make the Central Asian country very attractive to South Korea and other resource-scarce countries. Located on the northeast shore of the Caspian Sea, it possesses the largest onshore and offshore recoverable crude oil reserves. According to the United States Energy Department, the growing oil industry is able to export approximately 1.2 million barrels a day, and this figure is expected to grow with continued influx of foreign direct investment (“Kazakhstan”). The Kashagan field, located near the northern portion of the Caspian Sea, is the largest oil field outside of the Middle East (Umurzakov 3). South Korea’s Samsung Corporation was one of the early inves-
tors of the Kazakh petroleum in 1996, which was still at an early stage of its oil production following the country’s independence from the Soviet Union (“1988-1999 Privatization”).

Furthermore, Kazakhstan can provide three other crucial components of South Korea’s energy program because of its wealth of liquid natural gas, coal, and uranium. Kazakhstan is expected to be a potential competitor in the region with Russia as a major exporter of natural gas and has made cooperative deals to export gas to other major areas in the region (Umurzakov 9). It also has the largest supply of coal reserves in the region that are amenable to South Korea’s current and future coal consumption. Although it still has net exports of coal, its production has fallen since becoming independent from the Soviet Union due to difficulties in attracting foreign investments into its coal industry (10). Finally, its wealth of uranium is very attractive to a country like South Korea, which seeks to fully diversify its energy sources by bolstering its nuclear power capabilities. Kazakhstan has the second-largest uranium reserves in the world, holding one-fifth of the world’s total. It will soon join Australia and Canada as the world’s major exporters of the resource (12).

Considering the potential benefits for increased ties with the country, it should be expected that South Korea seek to cooperate more closely with Kazakhstan. It has done so with numerous exchanges, agreements, and a notable weapons donation. The push for closer ties with Kazakhstan began as early as September 2004, when President Roh Moo Hyun was able to broker an agreement that encompassed the crucial tie between its use of military assistance and donations with access to the Central Asian state’s natural resources. In April 2005, the South Korean Defense Minister visited Kazakhstan, pledging to donate three retired Sea Dolphin fast patrol boats, the same model of boat that was sold to Bangladesh a few years prior (“Kazakhstan Navy”). Whereas South Korea could have profited from selling these retired boats to another country like Bangladesh, the decision to donate came in the same month as an important agreement with Kazakhstan to cooperate in a joint mining venture for uranium (Umurzakov 12). The donation of na-
val vessels certainly contributed to winning this deal. Furthermore, since the weapons donation, President Roh Moo Hyun signed an agreement with President Nursultan Nazarbayev on “military-technical cooperation, joint development of Caspian energy resources” (“PM to Visit Kazakhstan”).

South Korea has continued to make significant headway in other key efforts to gain stakes in Kazakh energy deals, including memoranda of understanding on oil exploration projects on various off and onshore oil blocks and the Kazakh-Korean Petrochemistry Working Group. According to a Kazakh news agency reporting on South Korean Prime Minister Han Seung-soo’s visit to the country in 2008, “The South Korean PM’s visit is part of President Lee Myung-bak’s policy of pragmatic diplomacy. Ensuring energy and resource security for South Korea is a priority” (“PM to Visit Kazakhstan”). More so than Indonesia, the focus of South Korea’s objectives has clearly been energy. The donation of South Korean patrol boats was embedded in a rigorous diplomatic effort to establish a working relationship with the energy-rich nation.

BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT IN BANGLADESH

Bangladesh is an interesting case in which a South Korean firm was complicit in its recent political controversies that revolve around its weapons and energy deals. The Sea Dragon and Sea Dolphin patrol and gun boat sales were completed without political disruption, but the sale of the DW-2000H frigate from Daewoo Corporation caused considerable political backlash for former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Hasina Wajed, who was charged in a high-profile court case for corruption (“Sea Dolphin”). Her administration came under fire for signing a deal with Daewoo Corporation, which was only the fourth lowest bidder for a frigate deal. This was not only illegal but allegedly incurred a loss of more than $88 million for the government. The Bangladeshi navy also detected irregularities in the ship, causing it to decommission the vessel (“Hasina”).
Bangladesh has a wealth of resources, such as coal and potential oil and gas, and has signed memoranda of understanding with South Korean energy firms, which included Daewoo Corporation, in November 2007 and December 2008 (Rahman). Daewoo Corporation’s double involvement in weapons deals and subsequent energy contracts with Bangladesh exemplify the major role of energy as a driver factor for arms sales.

Interestingly, the same company has been mired in the disputes over recent maritime boundaries between Bangladesh and Myanmar. This controversy, which sparked tension and military maneuvers between the two countries, began in October 2008 when Daewoo Corporation, also hired by Myanmar, began drilling a hydrocarbon exploration well in an off-shore block in disputed maritime territories. Myanmar warships allegedly escorted South Korean gas and oil exploration rigs in contested waters (“Myanmar”). Fortunately, South Korean diplomats, along with counterparts from China and India, all of whom received energy contracts from Myanmar, were involved with the multilateral efforts to quell the crisis.

Although it is not clear whether the sale of patrol and gunboats was orchestrated by the government, what is evident is that the government has been integral to maintaining key energy projects in Bangladesh by supporting diplomatic efforts to help manage the crisis. The motivation for intervention was clear: for protecting Daewoo Corporation’s energy exploration and development projects in the country. It is unclear whether Daewoo received pressure from the government to sell its frigates as a strategy to forge an energy deal with Bangladesh, but the immediate diplomatic support that the company received during the crisis represents the tight-knit relationship between the public and private sectors in South Korea.

ILLEGAL SALE OF DUAL-USE GOODS & DANGERS OF AN ARMS-FOR-ENERGY POLICY

South Korea’s illicit sales of dual-use technology have come
under international criticism. The ROK is a signatory of multilateral efforts to contain proliferation, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement of 1996. “The “agreed membership criteria” under the Wassenaar Arrangement are that participants have adequate export controls, adhere to the major existing nonproliferation regimes — the Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group — and have “responsible” export control policies toward the so-called pariah countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea” (Grimmett).

In the past decade, South Korea has failed to enforce an export control policy that could have avoided the transfer of vehicles, fiber-optic communication equipment, sophisticated military computer technologies, and radar systems to the Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime from the 1990s to 2001 (“Regime Finance”). The recent State Department sanctions on the South Korean firm, Yolin/Yullin Tech, which was among other firms and foreign entities that transferred “dangerous weapons and related material” to Iran, North Korea, and Syria (“US Sanctions”). These were either “goods, services, or technology” listed on the major multilateral export control lists and other items that could be used to build WMDs, cruise, and ballistic missiles. Exporting dual-use materials to these countries signified South Korea’s relaxed export policy that lacks significant end-use guarantee and restrictive measures that are expected of a member country under the Wassenaar Arrangement.

These transfers of materials and technology can actually come at odds with South Korea’s actual security for two reasons. The more glaring threat to its security is that all three of these buyer countries have ties with North Korea, a nation with which South Korea is still at war. The suspected nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Myanmar is just one of the many speculations between the rogue country and recipients of South Korea’s arms (Robespierre). Another important factor is that South Korea’s sale of dual-use goods to these countries may put a strain on its important alliance with the United States. Nonetheless, these exchanges seem to continue within the world of business, creating significant threats to its allies, as well as its own security.
There is reason to believe that the motivation for these exchanges may be resource-related. Both Iraq and Iran have a wealth of oil, still South Korea’s crucial energy resource. As seen in case studies of conventional arms, the sale of weaponry can pave the way for continued ties between South Korea and the recipient country. Moreover, the sale of weapons materials at reasonable prices could be utilized strategically to better win deals, especially with military regimes in countries like Myanmar.

The most illustrative case was the illegal sale of weapons materials by Daewoo International to the military junta of Myanmar in order to win energy deals with the government. Daewoo's former president and CEO, Lee Tae-yong, was tried for exporting weapons equipment and technology to build an arms factory in Myanmar (“Burma Problem”). Although the sale of defense materials to Myanmar may have been illegal, it locked in an energy deal that has been allowed to continue by the South Korean government. The decision to allow Daewoo to continue its energy projects in Myanmar reflects the South Korean government’s emphasis on energy procurement. Daewoo Corporation holds 60 percent of three natural gas fields in Myanmar and has announced the discovery of the largest gas reserve in which any South Korean company has ever held shares (“Burma Problem”). Daewoo continues to explore for hydrocarbons in Myanmar’s offshore blocks.

This behavior strikes a major difference from Japan, where there are similar firms seeking markets for defense products and dual-use technologies. According to the Energy Information Administration, “Japan has virtually no domestic oil or natural gas reserves and is the second-largest net importer of crude oil and largest net importer of liquefied natural gas in the world” (“Country Analysis Briefs: Japan”). In addition to sharing common energy insecurity, Japanese firms, like their Korean counterparts, receive a significant amount of support from the government. Its Defense Ministry continues to provide heavy protectionism for companies, such as Marubeni Corporation and Fuji Heavy Industries, which have successfully been able to provide for its need for defense goods, such as ships for its navy. However, unlike South Korea, Ja-
Japan reaffirmed in 2007 its commitment to its Cold War-era Three Principles on Arms Exports, which prohibits the sale of arms to any country ("Shiozaki"). Even with its potential for becoming a leading player in the global arms trade, Japan remains a rigorously compliant signatory to the Wassenaar Arrangement and has recently revised its foreign trade laws to tighten its regulations on arms exports to states under the United Nations embargoes ("Japan to toughen"). An explanation for this difference in behavior is that Japan is more secure in its energy needs than South Korea. Japan was the first country in East Asia to industrialize after World War II. Japan has the advantage of already having worked on creating strategic ties in resource-rich countries, whereas South Korea entered the race for energy years behind Japan. Therefore, South Korea's offers of weapons to resource-rich countries are used as a tool for gaining a foothold in energy development and procurement.

Also, after observing South Korea's illicit sales, it could be argued South Korea exports its weaponry to achieve a more comprehensive foreign policy strategy that allows more freedom than mere reliance on its alliance with the United States. In other words, while South Korea may still stand by its ally on many foreign policy decisions, it may also choose objectives that may be at odds with the United States' interests. This makes for such anomalies, such as trading illicitly with Saddam Hussein's government before it supported the United States in the Iraq War by providing troop and technical support for stability and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. South Korea's troops also conducted crucial humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2007 and in Iraq from 2003 to 2008 ("No Redeployment"). This assistance did not come without costs for the South Korean government, due to strong public opposition to the war ("South Korea Ends Iraq Deployment").

Furthermore, after withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, South Korea has continued to support its alliance with the United States. Examples could be seen in Special Measures Agreement (SMA) meetings between the two governments, in
which they discussed burden sharing for military expenditures and logistics on the peninsula. South Korea has agreed to increase its share of costs for maintaining joint security forces in the peninsula, which has amounted to a rise of 45.1 billion won from 2006 to 2007 (“Defense Cost-Sharing”). In addition, South Korea and the United States reaffirmed their commitments to their Mutual Defense Treaty. The two countries, represented by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and South Korean National Defense Minister Lee Sang-Hee, established their alliance at the Defense Consultative Talks in the same month that the U.S. State Department announced its sanction on Yullin Tech.

This proposed explanation simply describes South Korea’s foreign policy strategy. It is true that the sale of dual-use materials had potential to harm the ROK’s relationship with the United States. However, this was an aberration from the norm of South Korea’s whole-hearted efforts to support its most important ally. The argument, that the desire to export dual-use technologies to gain independence in foreign policy options from the United States, is insufficient to explain why South Korea wholeheartedly supported NATO operations in Afghanistan and state-building operations in Iraq. There is more to South Korea’s foreign policy strategy than gaining independence. As a rational actor, South Korea needs to gain specific resources to address its most glaring insecurity, its insufficient domestic energy sources. Therefore, whereas realist or neo-liberal explanations have failed to sufficiently explain South Korea’s arms sales, this paper’s pragmatic approach has helped shed light on how the country’s significant energy insecurity has driven the pattern of its arms exports.

CONCLUSION

The evidence found in this research illustrates how the South Korean government has pragmatically utilized its arms sales in order to secure resource deals abroad, which has key implications to understanding the global arms trade of the twenty-first century. The example of South Korea illustrates how emerging weapons
developers around the world may utilize its rapidly expanding indigenous defense program to address a specific insecurity. In the East Asian country, this was its pressing need for procuring energy resources. Realist and neo-liberal theories have both come short of explaining South Korea’s overarching strategy behind its weapons sales. The sales were directed to allies and non-allies alike, as well as a range of democratic and non-democratic countries with various levels of capabilities and willingness to comply with guarantees of handling the materials in a non-threatening manner. Instead, a pragmatic approach for explaining the motivation for the weapons exports was far more demonstrative of South Korea’s behavior. Indeed, the arms exports were made in the context of furthering South Korea’s energy objectives in resource-rich countries.

Moreover, this research has shown that a country’s rigorous export program, if left unchecked or poorly regulated, could profoundly endanger not only international security but also its own national security. When selling to countries with poor security mechanisms, there exists a possibility that these very weapons—material and technology—could be transferred to rogue actors and terrorist groups with nefarious intentions to use these goods against South Korea and its allies. Therefore, a major policy recommendation derived from this research is that South Korea should create stronger export controls and end-use guarantees, in accordance with international agreements and norms, as this is ultimately in the best interest in regards to South Korea’s overall national security concerns.

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In 1995, World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin famously prophesied the following: “If the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water.” Since the middle of the twentieth century, disagreements between the Republic of Turkey, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Iraq over the usage of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been frequent. This conflict over water will likely escalate by 2025, when Turkey—the nation in which the sources of both rivers are located—will suffer from water shortages of its own. This could lead to protests and low-level conflict among the citizens of the respective nations and even to a full-scale war between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Syria, whose relations with Turkey are considerably strained, may seek to mobilize the Kurds of Turkey against the Turkish Government, citing the destruction of the Kurdish territory as an appropriate cause for an uprising. The mobilization of the Kurds would give Syria a powerful hand in a potential conflict by turning a sizeable minority population against its own government. This future shortage of water—in conjunction with Turkey’s pro-Western and pro-Israeli ideals, seen as early as 1948, when Turkey was the first Arab nation to recognize the State of Israel—suggests that there is a high likelihood that a war among the three nations will occur.

Classical realism can be used to frame the looming Euphrates-Tigris conflict, specifically considering Thucydides’ belief that “the strong [Turkey] do what they have the power to do and the weak [Syria, Iraq] accept what they have to accept” (Doyle 83). Though states in the Middle East have always faced water shortages, the de-

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crease in water availability as the populations of Turkey, Syria and Iraq grow makes the probability of war among the three nations increasingly high. As such, Turkey must keep its riparian neighbors in mind when making policy decisions in order to avoid the militaristic balancing that could be exhibited by Syria and Iraq.

Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP) has amplified disagreements over water in an unstable region already facing water shortages. This paper argues that Turkey’s enormous and costly plan to generate electricity, improve irrigation, and redevelop its southeastern region under the GAP has failed. I will examine this “hydropolitical security complex,” as Michael Schulz describes it, by focusing on the effects of the GAP, Turkey-Syria relations, and Syria’s support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) since the 1980s (Schulz 91). Relations between Turkey and Iraq have also been affected by the GAP, but additionally by the recent Gulf War and U.S. involvement in the region, and a discussion of Turkey-Iraq relations is beyond the scope of this paper. The structure of this text is as follows: first, a discussion of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers themselves; second, the importance of water to the Middle East in general and to Turkey, Syria, and Iraq specifically; third, a look at the GAP and several of its dams; fourth, the effects of the GAP project; fifth, Turkey-Syria relations and the interplay between water and the PKK; and finally, the future of Turkey-Syria relations and the steps that must be taken in order to prevent a war over water.

THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER BASIN

The Euphrates River

Turkey is the nation farthest upstream on both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. It is well known for being water-rich, while its riparian neighbors, Syria and Iraq, are petroleum rich. The Euphrates River is the longest river in southwest Asia west of the Indus. Its source is in eastern Turkey, where it flows through the rest of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq until it combines with other bodies
of water to form the Shatt al-Arab waterway, an extremely crucial chokepoint that flows into the Persian Gulf. Control of the Shatt al-Arab has been the focal point of many conflicts in the Middle East, including the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War. Two tributaries, the Karasu and the Murat, form the Euphrates River. The Karasu is located north of Erzurum; the Murat is located on the slopes of Mount Ala, which is north of Lake Van in eastern Turkey. The two tributaries join northwest of Elazig to form the Euphrates and to cut through the Taurus Mountains, which divide the Mediterranean coast from the Anatolian plateau in southern Turkey. The river then cuts into Syria at Karkamis, which is downstream from Turkey’s Birecik. After flowing southeast across Syria, the Euphrates reaches its delta near Hit in Iraq. Near Nasiriya, the river turns into channels. While some drain into Lake Hammar; the rest join the Tigris River near Qurna to form the Shatt al-Arab, which combines with the Karun River and finally enters the Persian Gulf (Kolars and Mitchell 1-4).

The Tigris River

The Tigris River is the second longest river in southwest Asia. It originates in eastern Turkey near Lake Hazar and flows southeast to Cizre. It then flows through Syria for 32 kilometers before flowing into Iraq. Between Tikrit and Samarra, the river enters its delta and forms “the eastern part of the complex Tigris-Euphrates system, which both waters and drains the lowlands of Mesopotamia,” according to Kolars and Mitchell (6). Numerous tributaries enter the Tigris during its flow through Iraq. It then joins with the Euphrates River near Qurna and continues as the Shatt al-Arab for 179 kilometers until it reaches the Persian Gulf (6).

The History: Dams, Hydroelectric Power Generation, and Irrigation in Turkey

The usage of dams dates back to ancient times, as early as 3000 B.C.E. In Turkey, these systems were mainly urban water works,
unlike the irrigation and flood control systems that existed in Egypt and Mesopotamia (Kolars and Mitchell 8). However, Turkey’s desire to utilize its water resources for the generation of power began in 1935, with the creation of the Electrical Resources Survey and Development Administration. This independent agency was created to survey water resources in Turkey to find those suitable for generation power and producing electricity (Turan 192). Shortly after World War II, Turkey began to align itself with the West and used the United States’ funds and international agencies to stimulate economic development. The General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) was established in 1953 with the mission of constructing dams for power generation and irrigation. İliter Turan notes that the DSI has played an immense role in the “development and utilization of Turkey’s water resources from its very beginning” (Turan). Until 1950, Turkey possessed only three dams with standard irrigation or power generation capabilities. The numbers have risen drastically since then: six more dams in the 1950s, twenty-six from 1960–1969, thirty-one from 1970–1979, sixty-nine from 1980–1989, and thirty-seven from 1990–1997 (Turan).

Turkey’s use of hydroelectric power generation was an initiative in response to the temporary military takeover of Turkey in 1960. The leaders of this takeover supported drastic industrialization coupled with economic planning. Though Turkey has, over the past century, adopted a very pro-Western foreign policy, it chose to “reduce dependence on the outside world,” resulting in the decision to “emphasize the utilization of domestic sources for the generation of power” (Turan 193). This outlook is also one of the factors that influenced Turkey’s original desire to fund the entire project by itself. The Keban Dam, completed in 1975, is one of the best examples of early hydroelectric power generation in Turkey. It nearly doubled the electricity produced in Turkey at the time (194).

Turan holds that five factors contributed to Turkey’s implementation of irrigation projects. First, rapid population growth after World II led to an increased demand for food. Irrigation served to boost agricultural production. Second, loss of land, due to import substitution-oriented industrialization, led to “conversions in
land use where prime agricultural land was often taken over by industrial users” (195). Third, industrialization led to the need for more raw materials. Fourth, economic reforms from 1980-1983 made “irrigation more important in the minds of the bureaucrats traditionally involved in the making of water policy” (196). Fifth, population growth led to “socioeconomic and political pathologies, for which the expansion of irrigated farming was perceived as a cure” (Turan). The brief history of dams, hydroelectric power generation, and irrigation given above is an adequate starting point for the discussion of the Atatürk and Ilisu Dams, two of the most controversial dams in the Southeastern Anatolia Development Project because of their sheer size and impact upon neighboring communities.

THE SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP) is one of the largest dam and development projects in the world. It is comprised of twenty-two dam projects combined with nineteen hydropower plants in the southeast region of the country. The Kurds who call this region home have been struggling with the Turkish Government for autonomy for years. Consequently, it would be difficult for the Turkish Government to influence the regional reaction to its GAP project, regardless of its impact. Thus, the GAP has a human development facet that includes “economic and social quality-of-life improvements, such as transportation, non-farm employment opportunities, and improved education and health services” (Kolars and Mitchell 19). Turkey’s intentions for the project, other than electricity production, were to stop periodic flooding, create electricity, irrigate dry cultivated areas, and reduce poverty and underdevelopment in Turkey (Schulz 99). The project was initiated in 1977 by the DSI at an estimated cost of $32 billion. The projected date of completion was originally 2010, but is now 2047 due to financial issues (Sahan et al.). As of 2006, only fifty percent of the GAP project had been completed, and the Turkish government needed an additional $16 billion to finish it
(Benmayor). The GAP region spans nine provinces in the southeast of Turkey: Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Sıirt, Sanlıurfa, and Sirnak. This land constitutes 9.7 percent of the total territory of Turkey ("General Information of GAP and Atatürk Dam"). Residents of the region represent about ten percent of Turkey’s total population. The GAP is expected to double Turkey’s annual production of hydroelectric power and to irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land in the southeast region (Sansal). Though the project’s proposed irrigation and hydroelectric power plans will benefit the region, the project may also reduce Euphrates water flow to Syria by forty percent and to Iraq by up to eighty percent (Berman 3). These figures suggest that Turkey will be responsible for much of the decrease in quantity of water per capita in both Syria and Iraq. As the nation in control of the headwaters of both rivers, Turkey has a duty to consider the external effects of its actions.

Atatürk Dam

Work on the Atatürk Dam began in 1983 and was completed in 1990. It is one of the largest dams in the world, and is seen as the focal point of the entire GAP project. The Atatürk Dam is located on the border of the Adiyaman and Sanlıurfa provinces on the Euphrates River. It has an embankment 605 feet high and 5,971 feet long. Water from the river is fed to power-generating units with a capacity of 2,400 megawatts (Sansal). The creation of the Atatürk Dam was one of Turkey’s earliest efforts to subtly manipulate its neighbors. Turan points out that the start of construction was meant to coincide with the high point of the Iran-Iraq War, which, having neutralized Iraq and also Syria, prevented both from directly resisting the project (199). The construction of the Atatürk Dam led Syria to support the PKK prior to its denunciation of the group in the late 1990s as a means of resisting Turkey’s claim over the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.

Continuing its policy of not supporting projects where riparian states had not formed an agreement, the World Bank refused
to give financial support to Turkey for the construction of the dam. This policy was reinforced by World Bank Policy 7.50 for Projects on International Waterways (1994) and by the United Nations 1997 Watercourses Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Waters. Policy 7.50 offered a statement from the World Bank, holding that it would not support projects opposed by riparian states (Sahan 31). The UN Convention of 1997 emphasized a need for “agreement between watercourse states to avoid conflict” (UN General Assembly). The Convention states that “Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of Significant Harm to other Watercourse States...In the case of the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers, Turkey has not ratified [this] treaty and both Syria and Iraq have protested” (UN General Assembly 3). Though the filling of the Atatürk Dam in 1990 caused a significant shortage of water in Syria and Iraq, Turkey, however, did notify both nations of its intent.

Ilisu Dam

The contract for the controversial Ilisu Dam was signed in August 2007. The dam will be built on the Tigris River, forty-five kilometers from the Syrian border, and will take seven years to complete. It will be Turkey’s second largest reservoir and fourth largest in terms of electricity production. The reservoir will contain eleven billion cubic liters, power six 200-megawatt generators, and have a generating capacity of 3,833 billion kilowatts (Turkish Daily News, “Contract over controversial dam to be signed today”). This project is highly controversial because it will flood the area of Hasankeyf, a culturally important ancient city where an archeological dig is currently taking place. Furthermore, the dam will force fifteen to twenty thousand Kurds from fifty-two villages and fifteen towns to resettle (Warner). The pressure that Kurds in Turkey and in other Arab nations could put on the Turkish government in response may create even more of a rift between Turkey and its Kurdish minority population.
The Downside

Negative effects of the GAP project fall into four categories: environmental damage, health hazards, consequences for cultural preservation, and domestic politics. The Illisu reservoir will significantly reduce the auto-purification capacity of the Tigris, preventing it from cleansing itself of the solid waste and wastewater that it receives from major cities (Bosshard). Excessive irrigation has led to an increase in salinization, and four million hectares out of the entire 7.4-hectare GAP region now have a problem with increased bedrock exposure. Soil erosion affects 72.3 percent of the region (Sahan 7). The Illisu reservoir may also infest the region with waterborne illnesses such as malaria and leishmaniosis (Bosshard 4).

As mentioned above, the Illisu Dam will flood Hasankeyf, which is the only town in Anatolia that has survived intact since the Middle Ages. The city was awarded complete archeological protection by the Turkish Department of Culture on April 14, 1978 (Bosshard 4). This clearly presents a problem. The Illisu dam will violate the Turkish government’s prior decision regarding regional protection of Hasankeyf. Furthermore, GAP as a whole has led to severe domestic tension in the southeast. In April 2008, an argument over water led to the murder of five brothers. Ali Karakecili, a family member of the murdered brothers, told the Turkish Daily News that the GAP promised water, wealth, and development to the region, but that if appropriate measures are not taken, the situation could end in a proverbial blood bath: “instead of sending money, more focus should be paid to education” (Turkish Daily News). One hundred people drowned in the latter half of the 1990s in irrigation canals. Furthermore, the Birecik Dam submerged forty-six settlements under water. The project also affects women in the region, who cannot inherit land or property and are therefore unable to receive individual compensation during resettlement. As of 2001, resettlement was necessary for nine dams; eighty-eight subvillages, four districts, and a town were affected by the GAP project. Eighty-seven percent of the families resettled
themselves, and only thirteen percent wanted government-assisted resettlement (Sahan 8-9).

The GAP project aims to redevelop Southeastern Anatolia, but is doing much harm in the process. The fact that only 13 percent of families desired government-assisted resettlement proves that many Turkish citizens distrust their own government. Needless to say, Turkey has a serious problem on its hands that must be delicately handled, lest a conflict with its riparian neighbors or civil war occurs.

THE ROLE OF DIMINISHING WATER RESOURCES

In order to understand Turkey’s motives to pursue the GAP, it is important to recognize both the world’s need for water and the effects of population growth. As Turkey’s population continues to grow exponentially, the government needs to find ways to deliver water to its citizens. Projects like the GAP provide one way to deliver water for irrigation, production, and consumption.

The severe impact of population growth is made clear in a 2000 report written by the U.S. National Intelligence Council and scientific experts, which concluded that “by 2015, nearly half of the world’s population—more than three billion people—will be in countries lacking sufficient water, and that even more genetically modified crops or projects to desalt sea water will not substantially help” (Sciolino). The gravity of this situation only increases after considering that many of Turkey’s landlocked neighbors rely on Turkey to provide them with access to fresh water. While most nations in the Middle East mainly use water for consumption and irrigation, Turkey’s GAP seeks to use water for both irrigation and energy production.

As of 1999, the Middle East and North Africa were home to five percent of the world’s total population but held only 0.9 percent of global water resources (Berman and Whibey). Ilan Berman and Paul Michael Whibey underscore the severity of this situation: “the number of water-scarce countries in the Middle East and North Africa has risen from 3 in 1955 (Bahrain, Jordan, and Ku-
wait) to 11 by 1990 (with the inclusion of Algeria, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen). Another 7 are anticipated to join the list by 2025 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Oman and Syria)” (Berman and Whibey). The lack of fresh water in the region has already reached a crisis-like state and has contributed to several conflicts, including the Iran–Iraq War, which in part was fought over control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, among other factors including the threat Iraq faced from the Iranian revolution of 1979. The Iran–Iraq War proved to be a struggle for hegemony in the Gulf Region. The same situation may occur as a result of increasing tension between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over water rights. Turkey’s population expanded from 21 million in 1950 to 56.5 million in 1990 and 70 million today. Syria and Iraq are growing apace. This “[implies] increased water requirements” (Berman 95). Turkey’s regional obligations are twofold: first, to provide water for its own people and redevelop southeastern Anatolia, and second, to consider the fate of its neighbors downstream, who already have limited access to water.

The Euphrates-Tigris Hydropolitical Security Complex

Michael Schulz coined the phrase “the Euphrates-Tigris Hydropolitical Security Complex” to describe the manner in which Turkey’s control of the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers has affected and will continue to affect relations among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. He believes that water scarcity in regions such as the Euphrates-Tigris basin has linked national security with hydropolitics, creating this security complex. He defines “the hydropolitical security complex” as “including those states that are geographically part ‘owners’ and technically users of the rivers and further, as a consequence, consider the rivers as a major national security issue” (97). Turkey is both an owner and a user of the Tigris and the Euphrates, yet the Turkish government believes its riparian neighbors only fall into the latter category. Syria and Iraq both believe they are also “owners,” ignoring the criterion that the
state in which the headwaters reside is the only true “owner.” All three nations thus face some sort of threat from this hydro-political security complex, which has grown in complexity because of GAP and Syrian support of the PKK.

Turkey is known for taking a hard stance on control of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. In the summer of 1992, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel proclaimed: “The water resources are Turkey’s. The oil resources are theirs [the Arabs’]. We don’t say we share their oil resources; and they cannot say they share our water resources” (Kazen and Osman). Though Turkey has said countless times that it would “never use the control of water to coerce or threaten,” its control of these headwaters essentially allows it to manipulate and even blackmail Syria and Iraq if necessary (Schulz 119). Both Syria and Iraq believe that the water should be allocated according to a mathematical formula. Turkey, however, rejects the use of a formula and appeals to the International Law Commission. Syria and Iraq claim historic rights to both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers but Turkey sees this as irrelevant. Syria believes that Turkey’s “conception of rational usage” should be ignored. Similarly, Syria believes Turkey’s characterization of the water as Turkish (instead of international) is contradictory. Turkey believes in equitable water use for all three countries based on studies conducted, criticizing “the manner in which Iraq and Syria have mutually agreed to the amounts of water they want to receive” (El-Fadel, et al.). Furthermore, Turkey states its riparian neighbors have poor water systems, which would cause water loss. Iraq has had a relatively calm response to the situation due to its ability to easily access the Tigris River. Iraq also wants to maintain good relations with both Turkey (in order to “market its oil to the West) and Syria (“due to its own Kurdish problem”). Syria, however, holds that Turkey violated international law (El-Fadel, et al.).

Although Turkey has relatively high water wealth in comparison with Syria and Iraq, the Turkish government claims that it is, in fact, not rich with water resources. As such, amid these mounting pressures, it is unlikely that Turkey will change its position. A study conducted by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Department of Regional and Transboundary Waters in 1996 sought to debunk the myth concerning Turkey’s possession of water in order to ease tension between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.

The study noted that Turkey’s average annual surface runoff is close to 186 billion cubic meters, while the amount actually available for consumption is only 110 billion cubic meters, including twelve billion cubic meters of groundwater. As of 1995, Turkey’s population was roughly sixty million, leaving the amount of water per capita at 1,833 cubic meters. Countries that are objectively rich in water resources have between 8,000 and 10,000 cubic meters of water per capita every year, according to the study; therefore, “the available water per capita in Turkey is about one-fifth of the water-rich countries.” The study concludes, “the impression that Turkey has excess water derives from the fact that it is not at present in a position to fully utilize its water resources” (Department of Regional and Transboundary Waters).

The study presents the following table to compare water quantities per capita in some water-rich and Middle Eastern countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water-rich countries</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2110</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the table, as the study notes, Iraq possesses a larger quantity of water per capita than Turkey as of 1993. The study fails to mention, however, that by 2020 Iraq will have lost more than half of its quantity of water per capita than Turkey (Wolf). Moreover, Turkey will have slightly more water than Iraq and Syria. Turkey must pursue water development programs with its neighbors in order to sustain human development throughout the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, not just in Turkey.
TURKEY-SYRIA RELATIONS

While the hydropolitical security complex concerns all three nations, Turkey-Syria relations are the most prone to violence. For most of the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey-Syria relations were a struggle for relative gains in political and regional power. Each nation had its own tool for manipulating and indirectly pressuring the other; Turkey used its control of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and Syria supported the PKK. When Syria officially denounced the PKK at the end of the 1990s, it lost its means of resisting Turkey’s GAP through domestic terrorism. That decade also saw a dramatic increase in Turkey’s military capabilities. Turkey’s moderate alliance with Israel is also extremely threatening to Syria, which has been trying to reclaim the Golan Heights since the 1967 War. While examining the hydropolitical security complex that exists between Turkey and Syria, it is important to look at the Kurds and the PKK, and briefly to discuss the possibility of conflict between both nations.

Regional Dynamics of Kurdish Politics

The Kurds are the largest non-Turkish ethnic group in Turkey. They primarily reside in eleven provinces in the southeast region, though there are Kurdish villages throughout the rest of Turkey. Though the size of the Kurdish population has never been accounted for because the Turkish government does not consider them to be a separate ethnic group, a 1995 estimate placed the number of Kurds in Turkey anywhere from six million to twelve million (Metz). About half of all Kurds live in Turkey; the rest live in Iran, Iraq, and Syria, among other places. Kurds are thus considered the only minority group that could truly threaten Turkish national unity, power, and policy. As such, the Turkish government has tried to assimilate the Kurds through language suppression but has been unsuccessful (Metz).

Formed in the late 1970s by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK is a “terrorist organization” that originally “condemned the repressive
exploitation of the Kurds” and supported a revolution to overthrow the Turkish government (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 1). The PKK intended to set up a “democratic and united Kurdistan” influenced by Marxism and Leninism (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 1-2). The PKK’s first organized attack was on August 15, 1984, when it coordinated twin attacks in Eruh and Semdinli soon after Turkey reverted to democracy. The PKK’s frequent attacks led newspapers to begin using the word “Kurd” for the first time. In general, the attacks opened people’s eyes to the political and economic problems in the Kurdish provinces (Metz). Alan Makovsky notes the PKK’s impact in Turkey: “No issue is more emotional to Turks than that of the PKK. The separatist group has assaulted Turkey’s territorial integrity, wounded its pride, and shed the blood of thousands of its citizens. According to a Turkish government estimate published in November 1997, more than 35,000 people have died in the fighting” (Makovsky). In 1987, the PKK killed twenty-four people, including fourteen children, in a village in Turkey’s Siirt province. The PKK kidnapped and killed 217 teachers between 1984 and 1987 by shooting, hanging, or suffocating them. It has been responsible for the destruction of the rural education system through its burning rural schools. Between 1996 and 1999, it carried out sixteen suicide bomb attacks. By the end of the 1990s, over 3,600 schools closed in the region due to attacks and arson, and about 100,000 students could not be educated. Illiteracy rates in southeastern Turkey are still extremely high. The PKK is also accused of burning medical clinics and causing the deaths of countless doctors and nurses (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 3).

Since the end of the Cold War, the PKK and the Turkish government have competed to win the favor of the Kurds, who have become somewhat of a political and regional football because their allegiance affects whether or not the Turkish government can face minimal opposition in its pursuit of the GAP. The fall of the Soviet Union led Öcalan to change the PKK’s goal from communism to one of Kurdish nationalism. The PKK adopted an Islamic outlook, “taking advantage of Islam’s appeal to conservative Kurds” (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 3). The Turkish government, on the oth-
er hand, has tried to use its human development program to appeal to the Kurds. This is the route that Turkey should pursue under the GAP, while forming more moderate hydro-development plans with its neighbors.

Syria’s Proxy War and Turkish Brinksmanship

Syria’s support for the PKK dates back to the late 1970s, when the organization was supported by the Soviet Union and Syria “in the polarized world of Cold War politics” (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 2). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, PKK training camps were built in Syria and Syria-occupied Lebanon. Syria sheltered Öcalan while he was living there, though it explicitly denied that he was residing in Damascus. In early 1998, however, Öcalan gave an interview to a Washington D.C.-based journal at his home in Damascus (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 4). By the latter half of 1998, Turkey adopted the technique of brinkmanship to force Syria to denounce its support of the PKK. Turkish troops reached the Syrian border and directly threatened Syria with war. Turkish newspapers even had headlines reading, “We will soon say shalom to the Israelis on the Golan Heights,” implying that Turkey would campaign through Syria until it reached Israeli territory (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 4). Damascus immediately expelled Öcalan. Turkey and Syria signed the Adana Accord on October 20, 1998, in which Syria promised to cease the following activities within its territory: PKK propaganda, the supply of weapons and logistical and financial support to the PKK, PKK commercial enterprises, the establishment of PKK camps and “other (PKK) facilities for training and shelter,” entry of PKK members or their transit to third countries, and the presence of PKK leader Öcalan (Makovsky 3). Since the Adana Accord, Syria has made a serious effort to repair relations with Turkey, including sentencing several PKK members to thirty months in prison in June 2005 (Makovsky 7). Furthermore, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad has taken greater steps to improve Turkey-Syria relations since the death of his father and former President Hafiz in 2000.
The Future of Turkey-Syria Relations and GAP

Though the tension stemming from Syria’s indirect support of the PKK has cooled since 1998, war between Syria and Turkey still looms, as the region’s population grows and water resources dwindle. Should diplomatic proceedings between both nations fail, Syria might consider war with Turkey as a means of securing water for its citizens. Turkey would defend both its people and its resources from a potential Syrian offensive. As mentioned earlier, Turkey improved its military drastically throughout the 1990s, more than doubling its expenditure on military equipment between 1985 and 1996. It acquired about 200 fighter jets and nearly 1,000 M-60 tanks through US support. Furthermore, the Turkish economy grew in the 1990s with Turkey’s GDP tripled from 1980 to 1999 (Makovsky 4). Syria, on the other hand, has weakened since the end of the Cold War. The West and Israel believe Syria has plans for the production of nuclear weapons, and Israel destroyed a building in Syria in September 2007 believed to be a nuclear weapons facility. The slightest conflict between Turkey and Syria could potentially lead to massive destruction, especially if Syria were to seek a nuclear Iran as an ally. Furthermore, other nations may be dragged into war in order to defend their allies. Though Turkey has delivered its promise to provide 500 cubic meters/s of water annually to Syria, there is still a demand for more water. According to an article in the Turkish Daily News on January 3, 2008, Syria asked Turkey for more water to help it “combat the country’s drought problem” (Turkish Daily News, “Syria Asks for More Euphrates Water”).

The New “Face” of the GAP

Financial technicalities and protests have muddled Turkey’s efforts to complete the GAP in recent years. Instead of concentrating solely on hydroelectric production and irrigation, the GAP seems to have taken on a new face—one that supports regional re-
development and seeks to improve the quality of life in Southeastern Anatolia, especially in the wake of a destructive conflict with the PKK (Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration). It seems as though the Turkish government has seen the faults in its project and intends to correct them. Turkey must continue along this path in order to both redevelop the southeast and prevent conflict with Syria and Iraq. The new Ilisu Dam on the Tigris River will greatly affect Iraq, though the Iraqi government has tried its best to remain relatively neutral. The dam will require the forced resettlement of close to 34,000 people—many of whom are Kurds—and could negatively affect the lives of up to 78,000 people (Smith).

Turkey has also sought and received World Bank support for its non-GAP and water-related regional development plans. As of 2006, Turkey issued grants for two infrastructure development projects: the Saliniurfa-Harran Plains On-Farm and Village Development Project and the GAP Urban Planning Sanitation Project. In June of 2004 the World Bank supported the Anatolia Watershed Rehabilitation Project, “promoting sustainable natural resource management in twenty-eight microcatchments in Anatolia and Turkey’s Black Sea Region [to help] reduce environmental damage and raise incomes of communities affected by resource degradation” (World Bank, “Turkey Receives Support for Watershed Rehabilitation”). In March 2005, many countries in East Europe, including Turkey and the European Commission began working together to create a regional energy market called the Energy Community of South East Europe (ECSEE), supported by the World Bank (World Bank, “Energy Community of South East Europe APL No. 2 Turkey”). In April 2007, the World Bank helped Turkey implement the Electricity Distribution Rehabilitation Project, to “help improve the reliability of power supply to consumers in Turkey supporting the implementation of the electricity distribution network rehabilitation and expansion program” (World Bank, “Electricity Distribution Rehabilitation Project”). If we examine the Euphrates-Tigris hydropolitical security through a realist lens, it seems as if the Turkish Government is taking a more liberal (and
better) approach to fixing the GAP’s inability to create electricity, improve irrigation, and redevelop its southeastern region in order to secure the national interests of Turkey and refrain from tipping the balance of power in the region.

The GAP program has negatively impacted Syria, Iraq, and even Turkey itself since it began construction on the Atatürk Dam in 1983. The effects of the project are vast and reach all areas of life, from the destruction of historical landmarks and Kurdish settlements to the deprivation of crucial water resources in Syria and Iraq. Increasing water shortages in the Middle East will almost certainly lead to conflict between Turkey and its neighbors by the middle of the twenty-first century. This hydropolitical security complex must be directly addressed by all three countries, and will require forceful mediation on the part of groups such as the United Nations. The United States, the European Union, and the United Nations must demonstrate to Turkey that a looming water war is both very serious and real. Turkey must continue to pursue alternative means of energy production and irrigation through projects supported by the international community—projects that do not violate World Bank and United Nations policy or human rights. The “quality of life” dimension recently adopted is a good starting point for Turkey. Turkey, Syria, and Iraq must work together to reach an agreement over the water rights of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers before it is too late. Otherwise, a war for water in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin will likely occur.

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THE DANGER OF DIVISION: A HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF PARTITION IN IRAQ

Caitlin Naidooff

When sectarian violence was increasing in Iraq, many feared that the country would, upon American departure, erupt into genocidal civil war. The leading course of action being considered by the United States Congress, along with several military officials, was the institution of a partition that would divide the country into three ethnic regions, dominated by Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.

On September 26, 2007 the United States Senate voted 75-23 in favor of an amendment to the defense spending bill for 2008, authorizing the U.S. government to “encourage” a “federal” solution for Iraq (S. AMDT. 2011). The language of the amendment suggests the implementation of “soft partition”—an adaptation of strict partition that has been discussed most extensively by then Senator Joseph Biden, the amendment’s sponsor, and by Michael O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institute. Proponents of soft partition argue that it is significantly different from partition as it has been traditionally understood—that is, a partition resulting in the creation of distinct nation states, such as in the case of India and Pakistan.

A policy of soft partition would not divide Iraq into three independently governed nations but would instead take a federal approach, separating political and financial powers into regional governments that would have control over local linguistic and social policies (Brancati 14). Another alleged distinction between traditional and soft partition is the fact that the creation of regional units would not necessitate ethnic segregation. According to O’Hanlon, “it would be best to define three new autonomous regions as much by geography as ethnicity,” considering the com-

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plexity of ethnic relationships (O’Hanlon 16). A geographic division of Iraq would utilize natural boundaries that already exist such as the Tigris River. Furthermore, soft partition would enable more flexible borders than a traditional partition. People would be allowed to move from state to state more easily than if separate nations were created.

That said, while soft partition would not require ethnic segregation, there is a general consensus among proponents of the policy that this would be a preferable outcome. Both Biden and O’Hanlon have created proposals in which ethnic division is an objective. Additionally, Iraqis would be required to carry national identification cards that would indicate their ethnic and regional affiliation.

Under certain circumstances, this outcome would be plausible. According to Donald Horowitz, certain preconditions make partition involving ethnic segregation more likely to successfully decrease violent interactions between ethnic groups. He cites three primary factors that particularly impact the likelihood that partition would succeed: (1) the regions being created already experience a high degree of ethnic homogeneity; (2) there is a wholesale defection of forces formerly committed to a unified government, now willing to support partition; and (3) there is external foreign support for the movement (Horowitz 266).

My research suggests that none of these conditions is currently present in Iraq. In this paper, I will argue that the policy of partition is problematic generally because it necessitates a conception of ethnic groups as more cohesive than they are, and specifically because of the current conditions in Iraq. While a policy of soft partition may be different from that of strict partition in certain respects, it would still facilitate the imposition of ethnic separation, the policy’s most problematic component.

Furthermore, drawing on the research of Nicholas Sambanis, I will show that, from a historical-statistical perspective, partition has had an insignificant effect on preventing the recurrence of violence in post-ethnic civil war societies. Considering the high costs of implementing a partition in Iraq—both in terms of the operation and its potential negative effects, this paper suggests that the
burden of proof is on the advocates of partition to prove its effectiveness in the country.

CHALLENGING STATIC NOTIONS OF ETHNICITY

Partition theory’s underlying assumption that ethnic groups can be decisively and legally separated evinces a misconception of ethnic identifications as monolithic and stagnant. It frames ethnic conflict as a “clash of civilizations” based on ancient, primordial affiliations that cannot be overcome (Huntington). Many ethnic conflict theorists, however, indicate that the construction and reconstruction of group boundaries do not wholly occur prior to a conflict but can be codified in anticipation of a conflict. As ethnic conflict progresses, the development of tensions can influence the “shape and firmness” of the boundaries of ethnicity (Horowitz 74). This would suggest that ethnic identifications are dynamic and that ethnicity is not predetermined but is rather socially and contextually defined and redefined.

Additionally, while certain antagonisms may be directly related to clashes of identity, many external factors contribute to and alter the nature of ethnic conflicts. To successfully mitigate sectarian violence, policy proposals must address the multidimensionality of ethnic relationships. Due to its misconception of ethnic antagonism as a result of clashing, ancient or inherent identities, a partition policy would not adequately address material factors affecting the Sunni-Shiite conflict.

For example, one issue to be considered is the way in which sectarian violence relates to disputes over the distribution of oil revenue. In his book Resource Wars, Michael T. Klare contends that “conflict over valuable resources” is “often intermixed with ethnic, religious, and tribal antagonisms” and that it is the interaction of all of these factors that has resulted in the preponderance of third world conflict (Klare x). While O’Hanlon considers oil policy in his proposal for partition, he does not adequately address the potential risks of the partition plan regarding revenue distribution. A second factor that is not addressed by the partition policy is that of
political movements, and the way in which political systems have contributed to or detracted from certain conflicts. In the case of Iraq, the Baathist regime played a role in facilitating ethnic conflict.

ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION IN IRAQ

The fear of genocide in Iraq has sparked debate among theorists who suggest that ethnic groups in Iraq must be kept apart from one another in order to prevent civil war and draw upon Huntington’s theoretical parameters articulated in Clash of Civilizations in asserting that the contention between these groups has been and will continue to be irreconcilable. Upon historical examination, however, it appears that the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites is not age-old. Ethnic division has not always plagued Iraq in the way that it does today; rather, it has been codified and fostered by various interest groups at various times for political and economic gain. First, division was encouraged by Turkish interference, then by British colonialism, again under the Baathist regime, and finally by U.S. intervention.

The policies instituted by the British further evidence this point and are especially pertinent to the discussion of current proposals. The British perceived Iraq as fundamentally divided among distinct urban and rural populations. Certain policies created under the British contributed to the creation and codification of ethnic identities, which were “supplied by the dominant cultural stereotypes of the day” (Dodge xi). For instance, under the colonial administration, the Sunni Arab minority was designated authoritative control over a predominantly Shiite Arab population. As often seen in racially stratified societies such as colonial Iraq, differential employment that disproportionately privileges ethnic minorities served “to build up a fund of resentment among the subject peoples and pretensions among the agents of colonial rule” (Horowitz 159). In this way, the so-called ancient sectarian conflict in Iraq can be understood instead as “primordial affiliations [that were] historically constructed.”
When Britain relinquished direct colonial control of Iraq after World War I, British administrators devolved power to the Sunni leaders that they had been working with throughout the colonial period. As a result “inclusion of and comity among the different ethnic and religious communities were discarded to achieve Iraq’s formal independence as quickly as possible” (Dodge 31). Unfortunately, such actions have likely contributed to the complexity of the conflict today.

Following the rule of Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1962) marked by Pan-Arab nationalism among Sunnis and Shiites, the establishment of the Baathist regime in 1968 ushered in the return of sectarian violence to Iraq. The Baathists sought to facilitate the disintegration of “premodern tribalism” by using “extreme levels of violence... to co-opt or break any independent vestiges of civil society” (Dodge 159). In response to Baathist strategies of marginalization, reactionary cultural, religious, and ethnic groups gained support—especially among those who had been disenfranchised by Saddam Hussein, such as the Shiites.

The surge in sectarian violence that has occurred in recent years suggests that additional factors such as U.S. intervention could be contributing to the antagonism. Even throughout the Baathist period, joint Sunni-Shiite prayer services were commonplace. In considering ethnic conflict prior to US intervention, many first person accounts of the period assert that “most Muslims denied there was any real problem” (Rubin). While proponents of partition might argue that such statements exaggerate the potential for unified national identity in Iraq, at the very least they serve to demonstrate that interactions between ethnic groups in the region are complex, dynamic, and not categorically independent. It should be noted that this paper does not dispute the fact that there existed various distinctions between Sunnis and Shiites for hundreds of years. However, it does suggest that the violence of the sectarian conflict can, at least in part, be attributed to short-term political developments.
WHAT POLICIES ARE BEING PROPOSED IN IRAQ TODAY?

It cannot be ignored, despite relative periods of low-level ethnic conflict in Iraqi history, that the post-war insurgency has been ethnically divided and that the Sunni-Shiite conflict has become increasingly violent. According to Anthony Cordesman in a January 2007 insurgency update conducted by the Center for Strategic International Studies, “sectarian and ethnic divisions have expanded from the actions of extremists and activists to become popular movements with a steadily broader base” (Cordesman 10). The number of ethno-sectarian incidents had been steadily increasing from the start of the Iraq War and spiked dramatically starting in January 2006.

As a result of the violence, the number of refugees and internally displaced peoples continued to grow. As of January 2007, there were already two million refugees in Iraq, with between an additional 50,000 to 100,000 people being driven from their homes each month. In an unfortunate cycle of mutual reinforcement, massive displacement has contributed to further sectarian segregation, as a large portion of the internally displaced are moved into homogenous communities. Now less than 10 percent of Iraqi political parties represent more than one ethno-sectarian group (O’Hanlon 6).

Aside from overt violence, current studies indicate that ethnic discrepancies have permeated the political system as well. Many Sunnis report that they are not receiving the same services allowed to Shiite and Kurds. In one poll, 56 percent of Sunnis said that they had been subjected to police violence, while only 7 percent of Shiites reported similar experiences. Thus, as would be expected, government approval ratings are thus closely correlated with ethnic affiliation, with 85 percent of Sunnis reporting a dislike of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite (7).

Given these developments, policy-makers are under pressure to devise a strategy that targets ethnic violence in order to (1) prevent genocide and (2) facilitate respect for the national government. The emergence of soft partition as a viable option stems from
the underlying belief that, while “local governments may have less expertise...they have much higher standing with their own people” (O’Hanlon 27). Regional control would be preferable to the current federal system that is marked by a “lack of dependability and lack of independence from the ethno-sectarian conflicts” (27). The federal government of Iraq would not be abolished but would have significantly less power than in an integrationist system of national unity.

Though proponents of soft partition qualify their plan with the claim that it would not necessitate an ethnic division, the way in which they have devised the plan does, in fact, rely upon a separation of Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Utilizing the Tigris River as a marker, O’Hanlon assumes that the area north of Baghdad would be designated a Sunni region, while the area south of Baghdad would be explicitly Shiite. Dawn Brancati, in her article “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” more directly advocates an ethnic break up, calling for “division of regional borders along, not across ethnic/religious lines” (Brancati 17). Consistent with traditional partition theory, the use of ethnicity as a determining factor in the creation of new borders is considered to be a means of decreasing the frequency of interaction between ethnic groups and, consequently, decreasing opportunities for violence.

This is not to say that proponents of soft partition discount the possibility that it could exacerbate ethnic violence. Nearly all who have written in support of the policy acknowledge that the success of partition would require cautious planning and sensitive execution on the part of both Iraqi leaders and American policymakers. Chaim Kaufman, for instance, admits that “even when carried out safely, population transfers inflict enormous suffering” (Kaufmann 121). Still, he makes the case that “the international community should stop trying to prevent the movement of refugees away from threats of ethnic massacres and should instead support and safeguard their resettlement” (156). In a sense, proponents of partition suggest that the implementation of a formal partition policy will help to control for certain risk factors in a process that would occur anyway.
WHEN IS SOFT PARTITION LIKELY TO SUCCEED?

Wholesale support for partition

Research such as Horowitz’s shows that if partition is not agreed upon by all parties involved, it is far more likely to lead to “secessionist warfare” that would “reduce prospects for... post-partition harmony” (Horowitz 590). Even O’Hanlon concedes that an important factor for success is the willing participation of the Iraqi population. Commenting on the large-scale movements of people that would be involved in partition, he notes: “the key is to have the parties in Iraq accept the relocation policy at least informally” (O’Hanlon et al, 18). However, according to poll data, it seems this necessary condition would not likely be attained.

Despite the serious consideration of partition as a potential solution to ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq, the policy has garnered criticism from certain key parties involved in the region. Opponents of partition include Iraqi officials in the Maliki government, the Bush Administration, the Iraq Study Group, and “deeply splintered” Sunni Arabs who fear that, as the minority group, their rights would be endangered (1-2). Among the Shiite population, a 2006 poll indicated that 59 percent advocate the division of Iraq into separate states. O’Hanlon cites this statistic as a signal that Iraq is ready to move forward with the policy. However, one could also interpret this figure as an indication that a large number of Shiite are still opposed to partition. Since it is in the interest of each of these groups to find a solution to the quagmire in Iraq, it is all the more ominous that there has been such a reluctant and ambivalent response to proposals for partition.

Ethnic Homogeneity in Each Region

Despite clear antagonisms, the country is still characterized by a complex interaction of ethnic groups that would prevent complete homogenization. As O’Hanlon acknowledges, “the country is still too mixed demographically, with up to a third of marriages
across ethno-sectarian lines, and too unified culturally between its Sunni and Shiite Arabs” to allow for ethnic isolation (O’Hanlon 1). Brancati, advocating a policy of ethnic federalism agrees that “creating completely homogenous regions in Iraq is impossible because Iraq’s different ethnic and religious groups are intermixed in some areas of the country” (Brancati 17). Thus, even among proponents of partition, complete homogeneity is not considered feasible.

This is problematic for two reasons. First, according to the parameters set forth by Horowitz, ethnic heterogeneity decreases the likelihood that partition would mitigate violence. While proponents of partition may contend that ethnic isolation would not be legally required, Brancati and O’Hanlon both suggest using identity cards as a tool to help monitor population movements and regional demographics. This administrative task would prove controversial and complex for many including, for example, the children of one third of Iraqi marriages.

Ethnic heterogeneity also presents an obstacle to the implementation of partition, first, in regards to subgroup classifications that exist apart from the Sunni-Shiite divide. According to Horowitz, in the course of separating a population into two or three overarching categories, “subgroup cleavages will assume heightened importance” (Horowitz, 590). In Iraq, this could present itself among minority groups such as Turkomen and Assyro Chaldian Christians (O’Hanlon et al 16).

Second, the imposition of policies intended to encourage ethnic polarization is more dangerous when a population is ethnically heterogeneous. Even if ethnic groups could somehow be isolated—which, as discussed above, is unlikely—the necessary relocations could easily be manipulated in order to oppress minority groups. For instance, according to sociologist Daniel Elazar, society elites tend to support heterogeneity in general but impose homogeneity in groups that they control in order to “oust elements that they perceive as alien… and to achieve ideological, religious, or ethnic purity” (Stanovcic 367). O’Hanlon addresses the issue by suggesting that “coalition forces and Iraqi security units should plan for population movements that are fraught with danger” (17). However,
External Foreign Support

Horowitz is ambivalent in the case of the third precondition he cites as conducive to the success of partition. Although he asserts that “virtually all of the strong post-war secessionist movements have been supported by powerful international connections,” he also acknowledges that such support can provoke “the central government to secure its own, overwhelming outside aid” (272, 277). In the case of Iraq, there exist many interest groups that, even if they consent to partition, will likely disagree on the specific terms of implementation.

Conflict between Iraqi groups regarding the specific conditions of various partition proposals would complicate the issue of foreign assistance. While the US might pledge its support for partition, it could not simultaneously support various conflicting plans for implementation. The Maliki government, for instance could garner the support of the United States to implement one partition plan, while other interests, such as radical groups, could align with other foreign powers in favor of another partition plan. Given the discrepancy between the national interests of various groups in Iraq—ethnic or otherwise—external foreign support for partition would, at the very least, be a source of complication rather than encouragement.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTITION

In his empirical critique of Partition Theory, Nicholas Sambanis uses a dataset that includes all civil wars after 1944 to estimate the impact of ethnic partitions on the probability of war’s recurrence, on low-grade ethnic violence, and on the political institutions of successor states. In his initial analysis, Sambanis finds that the implementation of partition is correlated with a decrease in low-level violence. However, when he subjects the variable to
more rigorous models he finds conflicting results, indicating that “the partition variable is extremely fragile to different specifications of the model, in contrast to most of the other explanatory variables (such as human cost, war duration, war outcome, and the type of UN peace operations)” (Sambanis 23). Furthermore, he finds that the “positive impact of partitions on reducing low-grade violence is conditional on the involvement of a major power, on the patterns of third-party partial intervention in the war, on the type of war outcome, on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity... and on the size of refugee movements in the war” (16). From these results, he concludes that, on average, partition does not significantly reduce the possibility for new violence after its implementation.

For the purpose of examining the likelihood that partition would mitigate ethnic violence in Iraq, specifically, I will examine Sambanis’s dataset in relation to current data from the region. I will narrow Sambanis’s dataset to include only cases of ethnic civil war, to see if his findings still hold.

While the sample size for my examination of ethnic wars is limited, the results of my logistical and stepwise regressions, combined with the results of Sambanis’ examination of a larger sample, indicate that there is no significant statistical-historical evidence to indicate that partition is correlated with decreased violence in cases of ethnic civil war.

**Data Collection:**

The dependent variable in this equation is NOVIOL2. It is a dummy variable signifying the likelihood that there will be no violence two years after the implementation of partition. Below are listed the independent variables that I use in my regressions, and that I evaluate according to current conditions in Iraq.

**BORDER:** Variable denoting the number of land borders
6 (CIA World Factbook)

**COST:** Total number of deaths/displacements
3,124,180 as of January 2007 (Cordesman, CSIS Report)
To remain consistent with Sambanis, I will use the variable LogCost, rather than the direct cost value.

DEAD: Total number of Deaths
60,098 (Cordesman, CSIS Report)
I used the high number from a window given in January 2007, on the assumption that current deaths would be closer to the high estimate by this point. Again, for the sake of consistency in comparing my data-set with that of Sambanis, I will utilize the variable LogDead.

EH: Ethnic Heterogeneity index:
As discussed in the section above, this variable is one of the most important to consider because, as Horowitz and others have shown, the degree of heterogeneity at the sub-national level seems to be inversely related to the success of partition. However, for this study, it is impossible to determine ethnic heterogeneity at the sub-national level (that is, within the proposed partitioned states) for two primary reasons. First, because the Biden proposal does not yet delineate the borders of the proposed partition, we are unable to confine our analysis to the appropriate sections of the population. Second, accurate data collection of a defined region is nearly impossible due to the rapid movement of people amidst the violence, and the large number of internally displaced people.

As an alternative, I will measure the Ethnic Heterogeneity at the national level, using an index developed by Tatu Vanhanen, which was also used by Sambanis in his calculations. The index ranges from 0-144 and takes into account racial, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity via the formula below.

Unfortunately, it is likely that this calculation vastly underestimates the level of heterogeneity in Iraq because it does not allow for a consideration of tribal groups within these larger ethnic, linguistic, and religious categories. For example, while Iraq is 60 percent Shiite and 75 percent Arab, there are many tribes within these broad classifications that would not consider themselves politically or culturally aligned. I have decided to include the calculation because it allows for at least a low estimate of the average heterogeneity, but the reader should keep in mind that the results of
the analysis would be even more discouraging if I could accurately
gauge just how intermixed the country really is.
\[ \text{%largest racial group} + \text{%largest linguistic/national/tribal group} + \text{% largest religious group} = \text{Ethnic Homogeneity} \]
Iraq: 75% Arab + 75% Arabic-speaking + 60% Shiite (CIA World
Factbook)
Sum of the inverse percentages= Ethnic Heterogeneity
Ethnic Heterogeneity in Iraq = 25+40+25 = 90

GARM: Size of the government military
350,000 (globalsecurity.com)
GDPCAP: Real income per capita, PPP-adjusted
$1900 (CIA)
INTERVEN: Was there third party intervention?
   Binary- YES (code 1)
LOGCOST: Natural Log of Deaths/Displacements
   14.9547
LOGDEAD: Natural Log of Deaths
   11.0037
MAJOR: Was there a major power involved?
   Binary- YES (code 1)
MILOUT: Did the war end in military victory?
   Binary- NO (code 0)- since the war has not conclusively
   finished.
PART: Was there partition?
   Binary: YES (code 1)- because we are predicting the effect
   of partition on ethnic conflict.
RIDP: The number of people displaced both internally and exter-
   nally due to the war
   3,064,082 as of January 2007 (UNHCR via CSIS)
UNOPS: Number of UN peace operations
   There have been no official UN peace operations in Iraq.
WARDUR: The number of months that the war has gone on.
   56 as of January 2007 (CSIS)
WARTYPE: Is the war considered an ethnic conflict?
   Binary- YES (code 1)
Research Design: Part I

For the first component of my research, I replicate Sambanis’s table, but include only wars that involved some aspect of ethnic conflict (see Figure 1). Here I would like to point out that, while Sambanis uses a probit regression model, I employ a logistic model. Both models yield essentially the same results, however the logistic model does not assume normality in the probability distribution of the variable NONVIOL2. Because my sample size is smaller than that used for all ethnic wars, I did not want to assume normality, and thus, the logistic model is more appropriate.

My regression, confined to ethnic conflicts, supports the conclusion reached by Sambanis in his examination of all civil wars. Sambanis’ Model 1 indicated that partition was not significantly correlated with a decrease in low-level violence.

| Dependent variable: NOVIOL2 | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | z  | p>|z | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------------------------|------------|-----------|----|-----|---------------------|
| PART                        | 1.211267   | 0.837354  | 0.28| 0.782| 0.3124644 4.69547   |
| LOGDEAD                     | 0.8722071  | 0.1205988 | -0.99| 0.323| 0.6651587 1.143705  |
| OUTCOME2                    | 1.47811    | 0.3035159 | 1.9 | 0.057| 0.9883724 2.210513  |
| GARM                        | 0.9997127  | 0.0005478 | -0.52| 0.6  | 0.9986396 1.000787  |
| GDP                         | 0.9999873  | 0.0001464 | -0.09| 0.931| 0.9997004 1.000274  |
| WARDUR                      | 1.002719   | 0.0031947 | 0.85| 0.394| 0.996477 1.009     |
| EHPOP                       | 1          | 1.50E-11  | 0.21| 0.835| 1                   | 1       |

Research Design: Part II

As a second component of my research, I wanted to include additional variables in my regression, to see if further specifying the conditions to replicate those in Iraq might yield different results (see Figure 2). I expected that, given the data for these variables, the result would indicate that partition would be even less likely to succeed than when it was examined in relation to the variables
listed in Model 1.

On the contrary, Model 2 produces an odds ratio value of 3.79 for partition, indicating that, given this additional data, partition would be even more likely to succeed.

**Figure 2- Model 2: Ethnic Wars**

| Dependent variable: NOVIOL2 | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | Z   | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------------------------|------------|-----------|-----|-----|---------------------|
| PART                        | 3.792571   | 2.873603  | 1.76| 0.079| 0.8589832 | 16.74491 |
| LOGCOST                     | 0.7459285  | 0.0991094 | -2.21| 0.027| 0.5749108 | 0.9678186 |
| MILOUT                      | 0.184344   | 0.1398189 | -2.23| 0.026| 0.0416889 | 0.8151497 |
| PEACEOP                     | 1.113608   | 0.2551542 | 0.47 | 0.639| 0.7107254 | 1.74487 |
| WARDUR                      | 1.004588   | 0.0033685 | 1.37 | 0.172| 0.9980072 | 1.011212 |
| MAJOR                       | 0.4220978  | 0.2860141 | -1.27| 0.203| 0.1118504 | 1.5929 |
| INTERVEN                    | 1.555308   | 0.9565599 | 0.72 | 0.473| 0.4659106 | 5.191947 |
| EH                          | 0.9954509  | 0.0076347 | -0.59| 0.552| 0.9805991 | 1.010528 |
| TRUCE                       | 0.1149092  | 0.1114409 | -2.23| 0.026| 0.017173 | 0.768891 |

To understand this outcome, we can refer to Sambanis’s original examination, which also indicated that partition was significantly correlated with a decrease in violence. He eventually determined that his original model was not robust due to “overspecification.” This occurs when multiple interacting variables contaminate the regression, producing significant p-values for variable coefficients that would not be significant if examined individually. To see if my results were contaminated by overspecification, I performed a stepwise function and found that, in fact, they were. Upon the stepwise variable selection, partition dropped out as a significant factor, affirming the results obtained in Model 1.

**Research Design: Part III**

Some might contend that, since the examination did not reveal
any significant figures, the lack of correlation between partition and no violence is not necessarily indicative of the relationship of the factors, but rather of the weakness of the model itself. Therefore, as a final component of my research, I compare the cases of ethnic war in which partition as been implemented. Of 80 countries included in the sample, 18 have been the subjects of some version of a partition policy. Of the 18 cases of partition, nine experienced a decrease in violence and nine did not. While approximately two-thirds of non-partitioned countries experienced violence and only one-third did not, the Chi-squared test below indicates that there is no significant relationship between partition and no violence.

Figure 3- Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Yates’ continuity correction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Partitioned</th>
<th>Not Partitioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Violence</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X-squared = 0.5048, df = 1, p-value = 0.4774

Due to the unquantifiable nature of many of the variables involved, this estimate is by no means conclusive. However, given the risks associated with the implementation of a partition policy, there is not significant evidence to suggest that it will be successful. To the extent that we can measure the costs and benefits of partition, the results are not encouraging.

CONCLUSION

As the French mathematician, physicist and philosopher, Blaise Pascal once said: “diversity without unity means anarchy, and unity without diversity means tyranny” (Stanovcic, 365). This reality, regarding the complexity of creating constitutional and electoral systems, is too often overlooked in the idealistic desire of stable nation states to facilitate the stabilization of other nation-states. However, as historical analyses have demonstrated, the imposition of government systems is a risky business that often causes more
problems than it solves.

Accepting the complexity of nation building does not necessitate the abandonment of Iraq, or any other country in need of international support. However, the imposition of electoral systems implies an understanding of local cultural specificities that are impossible for a third party to obtain, particularly given the fluid and transient nature of ethnic affiliations. As a result, third parties often serve better as supporters rather than formulators of policy.

In this paper, I have argued that the imposition of a partition plan in Iraq would not be an appropriate course of action. First, I have suggested that ethnic conflicts have often been misinterpreted by third party policymakers. As a result, such intervention has sometimes exacerbated ethnic violence. In examining the misunderstanding that British occupants displayed during the colonization of Iraq, one can see the way in which inappropriate ethnic policies can legalize and codify once-vague group distinctions.

Second, a historical overview of partition has indicated that its success tends to rely upon specific conditions on the ground, including (1) a wholesale defection of forces formerly committed to a unified government and (2) the homogeneity of each new region. As I have demonstrated, these factors are not present in Iraq.

Finally, a statistical analysis of the likelihood that partition would mitigate ethnic violence has weakened the argument of partition’s advocates, who carry the burden of proof.

There exist several alternative solutions such as integrationist, consociationalist, and federalist models. Each policy would entail its own set of risks, and none presents itself as an ideal answer to Iraq’s complex dilemma. My point, however, is that such questions are not to be decided by an outside party. The United States should provide support to Iraqis in whatever system they choose, especially in the realm of security, but American policymakers do not have the nuanced understanding of local culture that is required for this process.
Works Cited:


