CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
1
Editor's Note: The View from South Lawn
Nicholas Hallock

GUEST ESSAY
2
China's Rise: A Threat to Global Norms?
Andrew J. Nathan

THE TOMASSI ESSAY
6
Turning Apolitical to Stay Political: Billy Graham, Evangelical Religion, and the Vietnam War
Grace Zhang

THE WEATHERHEAD EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE ESSAY
37
Crosses, Hammers, and Sickles: Sino-Vatican Relations Between 1949 and 1989
Boyao Zhang

ESSAYS
60
Variations in Forms of Sexual Violence: A Comparative Analysis of Bosnia and Rwanda
My Rafstedt

80
The Salience of Race Versus Socioeconomic Status Among African American Voters
Theresa Kennedy

106
It's Scotland's Oil: Energy and National Identity in Newspaper Coverage of Scottish Independence
Hart Mechlin

122
Should We Stay or Should We Go: The Shale Revolution and American Involvement in the Middle East
Emma Campbell-Mohn, Andrew Kragie, Ted Leonhardt, Anand Raghuraman, and Jason Singh
As we enter the twenty-seventh year of the Helvidius Group, I am pleased to write that the Journal of Politics & Society continues to provide a unique platform for undergraduate scholarship in the social sciences. I believe the Journal’s confidence in the contributions of undergraduates to academic literature is justified by the original and rigorous papers found on this journal’s pages and on our website.

Over the last few years, the Journal has undergone a pronounced shift away from domestic concerns and towards an emphasis on international matters. While a cursory glance at the journal’s table of contents might suggest a return to focus on the United States, this is not exactly the case. Many papers address far-flung policy issues, while the U.S. papers do not generally look inward; instead, they concern themselves with the interaction of the United States with the rest of the world.

The Guest Essay, written by Columbia professor Andrew Nathan, discusses the changing nature of Chinese international relations. While China is often viewed as challenging, and even rejecting, global norms, Professor Nathan argues that China complies with international regimes, including, most surprisingly, human rights. In the Mao era, China’s focus was internal; today, China’s rise as a global power has given it a new stake in international conventions.

The author of this semester’s Tomassi Essay, Grace Zhang, draws on Billy Graham’s personal letters to multiple presidents to shine a light on Graham’s unconventional road to political power. By appearing publicly apolitical, Graham had an enormous influence on policy through his relationships with American presidents. The paper concerns the U.S.’s role in the wider world through its analysis of Graham’s advocacy of the Vietnam War. Furthermore, the paper’s themes maintain relevance today; in particular, Zhang examines religion’s sway over U.S. politics and the role of personal relationships in shaping policy.

In the Weatherhead East Asia Institute Essay, Boyao Zhang traces China’s relations with the Holy See during the Cold War. While China and the Vatican did not establish formal diplomatic ties between 1949 and 1989, Zhang argues that the two states underwent a process of gradual rapprochement driven by China’s exit from the Cold War after Mao’s death in 1976.

In the next paper, My Rafstedt compares sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda. Examining sexual violence as a weapon of ethnic combat through a feminist lens, Rafstedt argues that the mythology and identity construction of the local population affected the acts of sexual violence committed. The social sciences often fail to look past the actions of political leaders, economic policy-makers, and historical ‘great men,’ and frequently ignore the role and plight of the powerless. In stark contrast to this norm, Rafstedt’s paper turns a microscope to some of the world’s most vulnerable populations while maintaining rigorous social scientific standards.

The remaining papers reflect the diversity of interests in the social sciences. Theresa Kennedy claims that despite greater economic diversity, African Americans’ shared past, and its resonance today, leads to a belief in ‘linked fate,’ the view individual outcomes are linked to race. This linked fate, Kennedy argues, is visible in the monolithic voting patterns of African Americans. In the next paper, five undergraduates at Duke University critique isolationism and argue for continued U.S. engagement in the Middle East despite a decreased American reliance on foreign oil. In the final paper, Hart Mechlin uses textual analysis to scrutinize references to oil in the British press leading up to the September 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, arguing newspapers referenced oil opportunistically to support or oppose Scottish independence.

The current Executive Board inherited a number of innovations from our predecessors, chief among them a new print format and online research summaries. We are proud to have continued these traditions and aim for new ways to reach new audiences and offer a broader array of topics and opinions.

Finally, I would like to thank the members of the Spring 2015 Editorial Board for having the dedication necessary to publish this quality of undergraduate scholarship, and I hope you enjoy this issue of the Journal of Politics & Society.

Nicholas Hallock
Editor in Chief

New York City
May 2015
GUEST ESSAY

CHINA’S RISE: A THREAT TO GLOBAL NORMS?
ANDREW J. NATHAN

Does the rise of China pose a fundamental threat to existing global norms? Not necessarily. To be sure, if the global order is defined as the structural distribution of power among states, then China’s rise by definition constitutes a fundamental change. But a shift in the structural distribution of power among states is not the same as a change in the nature of the norms that states have created to govern the interactions among themselves: what international relations scholars call “international regimes.” As China has risen it has joined—and, for the most part, complied with—most international regimes. Certainly, it has also worked to influence the way in which these regimes have evolved, but in this regard China is no different from the United States or other major powers.

There was a time when China rejected the international regime system as a matter of principle. During the Mao period, China rejected ideas like arms control, international human rights, intellectual property rights protection, the exchange of public health information, and so on, as hostile efforts by the incumbent superpowers to constrain the sovereign rights of other states. Therefore, under Mao, China accepted no foreign direct investment and conducted little foreign trade. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was a member of no international organization except, in the 1950s, those that formed parts of the socialist camp.

After the PRC regained the China seat in the United Nations in 1971, it began to join international organizations connected to the United Nations (UN), such as the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. It started to take an active role in UN bodies related to human rights. And it regained the China seat in bodies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asian Development Bank, and the International Olympic Committee. China has by now become a member of virtually all of the major international regimes in which it is eligible to participate. There are a small number of widely acceded treaties that China has not joined—often the same ones that the United States has rejected. These include the Rome Statute (the treaty that established the International Criminal Court) and the Land Mines Convention. Likewise, China and the United States are among the small number of countries that reject the informal international norm regarding the death penalty as a violation of human rights law. In short, China is roughly on the same level as the United States and other major powers in its participation in international regimes.1

Moreover, China has complied with the regimes it joined to approximately the same extent as other states. Take, for example, the international trade regime. The accession agreement under which China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 required it to phase in various changes over the course of five, ten, and fifteen years. A major study of China’s record during its first ten years of membership concludes that “Beijing is generally engaging in an ‘acceptable level of compliance’ with its WTO commitments and has demonstrated a willingness to abide by WTO rules and operate within the WTO system.”2

Now consider China’s participation in the international arms control and disarmament (ACD) regime. Because of the secrecy that attends arms transfers, it is difficult to be sure about how strictly China has complied with its ACD obligations. It is not clear from the public record that China has ever violated an explicit arms control treaty commitment after signing a treaty. However, even if China’s arms sales were legal under its international law commitments, the United States has often accused China of violating other, non-treaty nonproliferation norms or commitments. So far as we know, though, China eventually complied with U.S. demands in all of those cases.3

China complies in a formal sense even

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1 This essay draws material from a chapter to be published by Georgetown University Press in a book edited by Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge Bekkevold. Andrew J. Nathan is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.
with the international regime it likes least, the international human rights regime. It attends the necessary meetings and files the necessary reports on time with the relevant treaty bodies. It has undergone the Human Rights Council’s process of Universal Periodic Review. It participates in some programs with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and participates in bilateral human rights dialogues with Western states. In 2004, the National People’s Congress amended the Chinese Constitution to say, “The State respects and preserves human rights,” a gesture that seemed to symbolize the PRC’s investment in international human rights discourses.

China’s substantive rights performance is similar to that of many other countries; that is, it is mixed. The country has made progress in achieving many economic, social, and cultural rights. But China’s authoritarian government systematically violates many internationally recognized civil and political rights. However, the government does not position its rights violations as challenges to international human rights norms as such. Rather, it claims that its repressive acts are consistent with its interpretation of international human rights law or that it is engaging in a process to eliminate violations that still occur.

Overall, then, China joins and complies with international regimes much to the same extent as other major states—neither rejecting them nor trying to overthrow them. However (again like other major states) China has tried to influence the further evolution of the regimes it has joined. In doing so, has China sought to remake these regimes in some unfamiliar image, or has it merely sought to push regime norms in directions that serve its pragmatic interests better without changing their fundamental character?

In the international trade regime, the issues on the table in the long-running Doha Round of WTO negotiations have been of peripheral relevance to Chinese trade interests, which center on the export of manufactured goods. In these negotiations, China has tended to back the general developing-country position that calls for the elimination of agricultural subsidies by developed countries to allow developing countries’ agricultural products to be more competitive in world markets. Although some analysts have blamed China for the lack of progress in the Doha Round, most agree that China has adopted a relatively passive position in these negotiations; some even characterize the Chinese role as moderately helpful. In regional trade negotiations, China’s position favors the further opening of world markets to manufactured exports, which would obviously benefit China as a manufacturing powerhouse. China has so far not shown a clear desire to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement that the United States is negotiating with various regional partners, presumably because the TPP framework imposes environmental and labor rights conditions that Chinese policymakers view as unfavorable to China’s interests. It has instead worked to join or create bilateral and regional free trade agreements, such as the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, all of which set lower standards than the TPP on environmental and social protections.

In the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure, China has used its positions as a complainant, defendant, or interested party to try to clarify issue areas in its own interest; for example, by arguing that its pricing system does not constitute dumping. China has also begun to use its domestic laws to exert an influence on the international trading system. With the implementation of its antimonopoly law on August 1, 2008, China became one of three markets with the power to regulate the ability of transnational corporations to merge (along with the United States and the European Union). A wave of investigations of foreign firms operating in China on allegations of monopolistic behavior, fraud, or corruption, have been interpreted either as efforts to clean up the Chinese marketplace or as attempts to use the law to create advantages for home-grown competitors of foreign firms.

In all, China’s negotiating positions in the international trade regime can be characterized as pragmatic-interest-driven. These interests, and their corresponding negotiating positions, are in many respects the same as those of other major trading nations. Like these states, China hopes to expand international trade. In other respects, China’s interests are different—namely, in that China seeks to enjoy competitive advantages in its own and in others’ markets. The pursuit of these interests by way of trading agreements and institutionalized dispute
resolution is consistent with the basic open, rule-bound, character of the contemporary international trade regime. That being the case, China’s negotiating positions do not represent a threat to the essential principles of this regime.

China’s negotiating position in the arms control and disarmament regime tends to support the strategic status quo. China backs opposition to North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons development and proliferation. And it supports the further development of the ACD regime in ways that would further limit arms development, proliferation, and utilization. For example, China supports the declaration of nuclear-free zones, which the United States, as the dominant nuclear power, does not support. China also backs proposed treaties to ban the first use of nuclear weapons, to ban the development of antiballistic missiles, and to ban an arms race in outer space—all areas in which the United States enjoys advantages. China advocates the “norm of non-discrimination,” in which nonproliferation does not only target certain regimes like Iran and North Korea but is universalistic. In addition, China does not favor coercive measures (military strikes or sanctions) to enforce nonproliferation commitments but favors persuasive measures, a stance that comports with China’s maintenance of good relations with Iran and North Korea. As a major user of nuclear energy and a uranium importer, China favors the establishment of a global nuclear fuel supply mechanism, in which China would probably emerge as a major supplier.

In short, China is a supporter of the ACD regime, but like other countries pursues its own interests with respect to how that regime is applied and developed. A common theme running through China’s negotiating positions is the desire to use international agreements to weaken or constrain areas of American military superiority. As such, China’s negotiating positions are pragmatic, but consistent with the overarching norms of the arms control regime, which aims to retard the development and reduce the use of advanced arms.

Within the human rights regime, China has exerted considerable influence over the way the regime functions. In the Human Rights Council, China and cooperating states pushed a “principle of universality,” which reduced the degree to which individual countries are singled out for attention. The current process of Universal Periodic Review, which China helped promote, subjects every state—the United States as much as China—to review by the Council, and does so in a way that allows the state being reviewed and its sympathizers to heavily shape the agenda of the review. Similarly, China was one of the promoters of a Council initiative to have each state submit a Human Rights Action Plan, which allows each state to put forward its own interpretation of how international human rights norms should be interpreted for application in that country. China had already been doing this by issuing a series of human rights white papers in previous years. China has also worked to restrict the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the Council and in the Treaty Bodies and to restrict the length and content of mandates given by the Council to the so-called Special Procedures. The net effect of these efforts has been to position China in compliance with self-set priorities and to insulate it from serious pressure from the Human Rights Council—a definite improvement over the pressure China felt from the Council’s predecessor, the Human Rights Commission, in the early 1990s.

China has found wide support among other states for its position that it should be up to each state to determine how its international human rights obligations should be interpreted and implemented within its domestic political system. As a result, China and like-minded countries have tried to delegitimize international democracy assistance as a form of subversion. In a similar vein, China (along with Russia and others) has pioneered regulations and administrative measures that make it difficult for domestic NGOs to receive foreign funding without prior government approval.

China has for the most part compelled Western governments to tacitly accept the norm that government-to-government complaints about human rights issues should be conducted in private, and that public airing of such interventions is disruptive of diplomatic courtesy. In the process of state-to-state human rights dialogues, China established the practices that such dialogues should be secret and bilateral rather than multilateral, that foreign dialogue partners should not coordinate with one another, and that invitees to the nongovernmental specialist components of these dialogues need to be vetted by both sides (i.e., China can veto participants
proposed by the other side). It has sapped the value of human rights dialogues by frequently postponing them and when they meet, engaging on a merely pro forma basis.\(^5\) Given its diplomatic achievements in shaping the human rights regime in ways that blunt the regime's ability to embarrass or influence the Chinese regime, China does not appear to be aiming for any major changes in the regime or its abandonment.

In these and other global regimes, China's behavior does not show a pattern of promoting a distinctive "Chinese model" or an alternative vision of world order. If there is a larger pattern, it is that China tends to be a conservative power, resisting efforts by the United States and its partners to shape regimes in ways that are unfavorable to China and its partners. This happens fairly often, because the United States actively continues to try to shape the future evolution of regimes. In its competition with the United States and its allies, China often defends the more old-fashioned interpretation of sovereignty against efforts to reinterpret sovereignty in a more limited way. China in this sense is more of a status quo power than the U.S. On issues that relate to limiting sovereignty, China often argues the more traditional, conservative position, and existing law is often on its side. China's positions on human rights and humanitarian intervention are thus in a way non-ideological. In contrast, those of the United States and its allies are ideological, as they seek to promote certain values that are relatively new to the international system. On the other hand, when China has an interest in challenging the traditional interpretation of a norm or creating a new norm, it does so (e.g., in promoting its interpretation of innocent passage under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and or promoting the norm of non-weaponization of space).

As long as China remains roughly on its current trajectory—politically stable with a growing economy—its stake in various international regimes is unlikely to change dramatically. For example, it will continue to gain more than it loses from the trade, finance, and arms control regimes, and to resist Western efforts to strengthen the human rights, humanitarian intervention, and information freedom regimes. If China becomes an even stronger power relative to its rivals, it is likely to bid for more influence in existing regimes rather than try to overthrow them. If it suffers economic or political setbacks, it will have less influence on the evolution of the regimes, but will hardly be able to afford to abandon them. While China will continue to influence the evolution of global norms, it is hard to imagine a realistic scenario in which it will try to revolutionize or overthrow them.

**Works Cited**

TURNING APOLITICAL TO STAY POLITICAL
BILLY GRAHAM, EVANGELICAL RELIGION, AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Grace Zhang, University of Chicago (2014)

ABSTRACT

This essay explores the intersection between Evangelicalism and foreign policy in the context of the Vietnam War. As a handle into the topic, it focuses on examining how Billy Graham, a prominent religious actor, negotiated the public sphere and private halls of power in order to influence politics, and specifically the American foreign policy decision to intervene in Vietnam. More than just a religious figure, Graham was a political actor who was able to adapt to a changing political climate by shrewdly turning to an apolitical message in the public sphere in order to sustain his political role in the private sphere. Within the White House, Graham practiced a unique and masterfully subtle style of ‘friendship politics.’ He cultivated a level of intimacy with President Johnson and Nixon unmatched by any other religious leader at that time and often leveraged this connection to influence foreign policy. By examining the political maneuvers of a man at the forefront of Evangelical Christianity, this paper aims to shed light on how a religious group sought to find, and found, its way into the White House, a platform that was used to nudge diplomatic decisions towards the Calvary.

ONCE described as “the closest thing to a White House Chaplain,” prominent American Evangelical Preacher William F. (Billy) Graham shared personal connections with every American president from Harry Truman to Barack Obama. Relations between Preacher and president were particularly warm over the course of the Vietnam War during the Johnson and Nixon era, as suggested by frequent letters of correspondence, telephone conversations, and overnight White House visits. These exchanges often detailed Graham’s advice and personal support for the president as well as his policy decisions.

On July 11, 1964, Graham wrote a private letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson in which he voiced his support for U.S. escalation of the war against communism in Vietnam by painting the president as a Christ-like figure who was to save Christendom:

“My dear Mr President,

... I do not know whether you have seen some of the newspaper articles where I have been quoted as supporting you and telling the people what a dedicated man you are. You are now getting some unjust criticism, but remember that the most criticized men in American history were those whose names shine brightest in history... also remember they crucified Christ within three years after He began his public ministry. It is what God thinks about our actions and what history will say a 100 years from now that counts...the Communists are moving fast toward their goal of world revolution. Perhaps God brought you to the stop the Kingdom for such an hour as this – to stop them. In doing so, you could be the man that helped saved Christian civilization.”

Yet, only four days earlier, when Graham was asked in public to comment on the morality of the Vietnam War at a press conference in Ohio, he portrayed himself as firmly apolitical:

What do I think of Viet Nam I think I am as confused as most of the rest of us are but in studying these things we must realize that very few of us really know all the facts...And I think it
is very easy for some of us on the outside to give simple answers to complex problems, and it’s not quite as easy.2

Why did Graham maintain an apolitical front in public while playing a political role in encouraging the war in Vietnam in his private interaction with the president? Moreover, such a neutral public stance on Vietnam in the 1960s lay in stark contrast to his openly anti-communist, pro-intervention message during the Korean War in the 1950s. Graham had then publicly labeled the communists as “disciples of Lucifer [that have] slaughtered millions of innocent persons” and argued that American military strength was necessary for world peace.3 What caused this shift from political to apolitical in the public sphere?

This paper examines how Graham, a religious actor, negotiated the public and private halls of power in order to influence politics, and specifically, the American foreign policy decision to intervene in Vietnam. More than just a religious figure, Graham was a political actor who shrewdly turned to an apolitical message in public in order to sustain his political role in the private realm. The 1950s was characterized by an atmosphere of public religiosity, which allowed Graham, a rising Evangelical figure, to speak openly on political issues with little criticism. Moreover, this decade also mapped onto strident McCarthyism, providing a larger rhetorical space for Graham’s overheated political message. In contrast, the 1960s saw America’s post-war religious fervor become more subdued, and loud McCarthyite anti-communism similarly quieted down. The zeitgeist of the sixties was marked by increased secularization and war weariness. On the issue of U.S. intervention overseas, a single anti-communist, pro-war stance no longer dominated public opinion. In its place was a range of divisive and divergent opinions. This change in societal climate saw Graham moving along with the times, as he simultaneously shifted from vocal anti-communism to a public neutral stance that maintained a focus on converting individuals to Christianity. In keeping above the fray, the Preacher (Graham) avoided being perceived as violating the separation of church and state whilst sustaining his popularity and authority among an increasingly cynical American public. Navigating his public and private platforms of power, the Preacher consciously retreated from openly airing his support for war so that he might privately encourage the presidents towards intervention, an action he believed to be more efficacious.

How Graham negotiated his political role illuminates a moment in time when a religious group attempted to assert itself on diplomatic decisions. Though the subject of this study may be Billy Graham, he is not to be seen as merely an individual actor, but rather a conduit by which organized Evangelicalism courted political influence. He is representative of the movement for three main reasons. First, Graham's pro-war stance was not an independent view, but one rooted in biblical theology advocated by the greater Evangelical community. Second, Graham was not working alone, but had the backing and support of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA), formed in 1950 to support the evangelist’s crusade planning. Third, Billy Graham was considered a prominent leader of Evangelicalism in America, if not the face of the movement. A New York Times article once proposed, “If Evangelicals wanted to know where the movement was at any moment, the only sure guide was to look to where Graham is.” 4 Hence, to gain an insight into how Evangelicals attempted to shape foreign policy in Vietnam, it seems an appropriate choice to examine Graham and his political strategies.

Conventional accounts of US diplomatic history focus mainly on realist assumptions and offer balance-of-power, geo-strategic and economic explanations for intervention overseas. However, there has been a recent pushback in scholarship suggesting that such traditional interpretations cannot fully account for why America went to war. The presumed separation between church and state has led many scholars to dismiss that religion has a role to play in U.S. politics, let alone geopolitics. However, this essay proposes that its role in shaping statecraft is one that is worth exploring. Specifically, by examining the political maneuvers of a man at the forefront of Evangelical Christianity, this paper aims to shed light on how a religious group found its way into the White House.

Current scholarship on Billy Graham is largely journalistic or biographical in nature, focusing on his impact on the Evangelical movement and social ethics, but is less interested in his relationship to political power.5 Scholars during the Nixon era treat Graham as a spokesman for the 'silent majority' and an advocate for civil religion. A recent work by Steven
Miller examines Graham's presumed constituency in the South and argues that southern politicians and people alike had looked to him for regional leadership on matters of desegregation and civil rights. Yet, Graham's influence on policy seemed to have extended beyond national boundaries. More than just a phenomenon situated within the context of Cold War religiosity or the origins of American Evangelicalism, Graham was a shrewd political actor who moved with the times.

This essay is organized around three broad strokes of argument: political context, political style, and political complexity. The first section situates Graham in the historical and political context of a larger Evangelical movement. The second section focuses on Graham's political style, examining the shifting public and private dimensions of the Preacher's political and moral interventions. The final section of the essay aims to give nuance to the argument by highlighting the broader tensions and complexities of the nexus of religion and political power as they emerge in this case.

NEO-EVANGELICALISM: THE FIGHT TO RETURN TO THE FRONTLINES

Following the end of the Second World War, America witnessed an upsurge in public religiosity. This was the fruit of a concerted and organized campaign by the Evangelical Movement, a religious group that had long desired to reclaim its place of prominence and to influence national policy in a country which they deemed to be God's chosen nation. Leading this Evangelical fight to return to the frontlines of society was Billy Graham, a talented Preacher whose charming personality allured both people and politicians alike.

Working for the Youth for Christ, Graham, then just a thirty-one-year-old rookie evangelist, was scheduled to lead the ‘Christ for Greater Los Angeles’ Campaign in September 1949. Yet, it was this particular event that catapulted the captivating Preacher into overnight national prominence. Applying biblical prophecy to the contemporary world, Graham cried with a trumpet loud voice:

Western culture and its fruits had its foundation in the word of God... Communism, on the other hand, has decided against God, against Christ, against the Bible, and against all religion... Communism is a religion that is inspired, directed and motivated by the Devil himself who has declared war against Almighty God...
The Fifth columnists, called Communists, are more rampant in Los Angeles than any other city in America... In this moment I can see the judgment hand of God over Los Angeles, I can see judgment about to fall.

Because of the reported conversion of several famous Hollywood personalities, the campaign caught the attention of national and even international media. An advertisement in the Los Angeles Daily News on October 26, 1949 printed a picture of a young Preacher charismatically stabbing his finger at the sky with Bible in hand and proclaimed 5,000 conversions after “Billy Graham’s 5th Sin-Smashing Week.”

Following the end of the World War, Neo-Evangelical hope for an American religious revival seemed indeed to be well on its way—national religious membership surpassed 50 percent of the total population by 1945. Quickly noting the striking convergence between the national public mood and Evangelical concerns and aspirations, the Neo-Evangelicals seized the opportunity to reinsert themselves into public life. In the uncertain age of atheistic communist conquest and threats of a nuclear holocaust, the Neo-Evangelicals assured the American people that they could find their security and hope in their Evangelical heritage. ‘Spiritual Armageddon [was] Here’ and America’s weapon was ‘the saving Star of Bethlehem.’

Fully aware that the socio-political trend was in their favor, the Neo-Evangelicals then mounted a massive, vibrantly innovative, and creative campaign to regain public presence and bring renewal to America. Most striking of all their efforts were the citywide revival meetings, reminiscent of the tent meetings of the First Great Awakening. On Memorial Day of 1945, Youth for Christ, a rising para-church group, organized a Chicagoland Gospel Rally at the Soldier Field Stadium, which attracted nearly 70,000 people. These rallies “dress[ed] revivalism in more fashionable attire,” as Preachers copied popular entertainment styles, updated gospel music, and produced slick advertisements.

This brings us back to September 1949 at the Youth for Christ Los Angeles Gospel Rally. This revival meeting that skyrocketed Billy Graham to national fame was not a sudden anomaly but rather
a product of a momentum kick started by the Neo-
Evangelicals in the early 1940s. Billy Graham had
come to matter in American public life and, by
implication, so did the Evangelicals. Yet, this was only
a foretaste of what was to come.

THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY OF THE PRO-WAR
EVANGELICAL MOVEMENT

Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah
propose the concept of a “Political Theology,” defined
as “the set of ideas that a religious community
holds about political authority and justice.” These
ideas are formulated based on religious texts and
traditions, and represent how a religion’s theological
beliefs and statutes are translated into political ideals
and agendas. They contend that a religion’s political
theology in some part influences a religious actor’s
political activity and determines how he interacts
with the state.

The Evangelical movement’s doctrinal views on
war led them to believe that war was natural, given
that it was in man’s inherent evil human nature to
fight and war with one another. True peace could
not come until the second coming of Christ. Regarding the Vietnam War, Evangelicals saw U.S.
intervention as a necessary struggle during the
Cold War between the godly and the godless, given
communist antagonism towards God and religion.
In a magazine editorial, the National Association of
Evangelicals declared communists as “the enemies
of the American way of life.” Quoting the Apostle
Paul’s call to “stand fast in the freedoms wherewith
Christ has made us free,” Decision Magazine, a
household Evangelical periodical, ran an article
that claimed that Christians should support the war
because communism threatened the freedom of both
South Vietnam and America. In their eyes, once the
Vietcong won over Vietnam, at least a million South
Vietnamese would immediately be executed because
of their faith.

Evangelicals also supported the war in Vietnam
because of the fresh ground for missions to both
the U.S. military and locals. The military draft and
build up in the Vietnam War allowed for Evangelism
to reach recruit thousands whose experience in the
battlefield deepened their need and desire for God.
Additionally, the war in Vietnam also enhanced
the opportunity for missionaries to reach the locals. The
Asia-South Pacific Evangelism Congress in Singapore
in November 1968 boldly announced the “Christ
Seeks Asia” mission. In line with this vision, the
war in Vietnam presented missionaries with hope for
entry into a country that had previously been closed
off to the gospel.

Toft et al. argue that this very political theology
shapes and influences the political pursuits and
inclinations of a religious actor. Hence, through
examining the actions and message of Billy Graham,
the religious actor of the Evangelical movement,
I will demonstrate how political theology may be
directly translated into concrete political activity.

FROM POLITICAL TO APOLITICAL

In an interview on June 29, 1979, George
Champion, retired Chairman of the Board of
Directors at the Chase Manhattan Bank and key
patron of the 1969 New York Crusade, was asked
whether Graham had “changed in twenty-two years,
as far as his message concerned…[and had] he
addressed social ills more or less than he did when
he was here in 1957?” To this, Champion firmly
answered, “He hasn’t changed that I can see…He’s
preaching the Bible, and he’s referring to the Bible
all the time.” Despite Champion’s claim, a closer
examination comparing Graham’s public message in
the 1950s to that of the 1960s reveals quite a different
story. Specifically, the fifties saw Graham openly
preaching a fiery, fist-shaking clarion-call to arms
against communism, while in the sixties he carried a
mellower message focusing on Jesus and the Gospel
and little else.

The headlines of a New York Times article on
January 3, 1951 boldly read, “Graham says City is
No. 1 Target.” The thirty-two year old evangelist
had warned a gathering of 700 clergymen that New
York City “stood on the brink of catastrophe” as a
prime target for communist destruction. Like other
Evangelicals, Graham firmly believed and openly
preached that communism was the brainchild of the
Devil, and a godless ideology that clearly opposed
the doctrines of Christianity. In his eyes, the
Soviet Union desired international conquest, and he
feared that communism would take over the United
States and the world either by open aggression or a
fifth column within American society. Not only
did he preach against communism, he also urged
an open battle against it during his Crusades. In
September 1957, to an audience of over 100,000 men
gathered at Broadway in New York, Graham called America to arms as he loudly proclaimed, “Let us tell the world tonight that we desperately want peace but not peace at any price...let us tell the world tonight that [America is] morally and spiritually strong, as well as militarily and economically.” Following his visit to the troops in Korea in 1952, Billy Graham published and circulated a war diary titled I Saw your Sons at War in which he recorded his personal impressions of the war during his travels. The diary concluded with Graham’s remarks and recommendations on political situation of the country. Affirming President Syngman Rhee, he argued that although, in principle, the war should be fought by locals, in reality, the South Koreans could not hold out against the communist North on their own until their armies were properly trained and supplied. Hence, he urged the United States against an immediate withdrawal from Korea.

Moreover, Graham’s audience was not just the congregation at his crusades, but also the politicians in power as well. Upon hearing news reports of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950, Graham wrote a private telegram to President Harry Truman saying,

> Millions of Christians praying God give you wisdom in this crisis. Strongly urge showdown with communism now. More Christians in Southern Korea per capita than any part of the world. We cannot let them down.

Importantly, his private and public anti-communist messages were one and the same throughout the 1950s. Graham was unafraid to openly urge the Oval Office to take up arms and defend the freedom of United States against communism. For example, in April 1950, against the backdrop that the USSR was growing a nuclear arsenal, the Preacher publicly called on the president to announce a day of national repentance. Similarly, following his emergence at the White House lobby after a meeting with Eisenhower in 1956, Graham was quoted by the New York Times saying, “Militant Christianity is the philosophical bulwark the free world needs to add to its economic superiority in the “Cold War” with international Communism.”

Having heard Graham’s fiery message encouraging and urging war against communist domination, one would be extremely surprised to witness the same man later say, “I’m sure God is not limited to one particular government, and that’s the reason I do not carry on a major Crusade against any particular ideology.” This was during a press conference in response to a question which asked him whether the Christian Church had “written the [communist] world off” yet, by the 1960s Graham’s public message had experienced a noticeable shift in both content and tone, changing from politically charged to gently apolitical. When asked to give the Christian perspective on the morality or justice of the Vietnam War, Graham appeared ambivalent, stating, “I don’t intend to answer political questions...I have not made any statement on Vietnam [because] I don’t know the answer.” When further pressed on the church’s moral obligation to provide an answer, Graham maintained that the church should not impose their authority on the state:

> I remember Mr Dulles one time used to go to church and he said, “Here I am the Secretary of State with all the facts. I go to church and am hungry for a sermon on the gospel, hungry to hear something about the Bible. And all I get is a lecture on what I ought to be doing in foreign affairs by a man who is not competent to talk on foreign affairs."

Such a response was vastly different from the Preacher’s earlier public recommendations to the public and the White House on matters of diplomacy. In his war diary on Korea, Graham had clearly implied that the Americans should continue to fight the war because it was a matter of achieving “moral justice” and not just peace. In stark contrast, Graham now publicly denied getting involved in the politics of the Vietnam War. He was apparently asked to join in on a Senate-initiated foreign relations committee to discuss his views on foreign policy, but the evangelist told of how he denied the invitation because he felt that he lacked the proper skills.

Instead, the evangelist repeatedly emphasized that his main message was apolitical and centered on faith and the gospel. In an interview with Edward Fiske of the New York Times, he told the journalist that he symbolized “faith that works” and nothing more. He even went to the extent of denying his widespread popularity or leadership of the Evangelical world. Instead, he saw himself as “an individual...and a private citizen.” With this, he painted an image of himself as a humble evangelist.
who dutifully sought to preach the gospel rather than get involved in politics or lead political lobbies. Each time he was asked to comment on the war, Graham would squarely maintain that his chief objective was to convert people to Christianity.  

TURNING APOLITICAL TO STAY POLITICAL

Billy Graham’s motivations behind his apparent change in exterior posture from political in the 1950s to apolitical a decade later seem somewhat unclear. One might suggest that perhaps Graham’s personal convictions on the threat of communism had changed over the course of time. Yet, private correspondence in the later period between him, the BGEA staff and American politicians confirm a resolutely anti-communist stand. In 1964, the Preacher warned President Johnson in a private letter of the perils of a global communist revolution. Much of this private rhetoric still recalled that of Graham’s public diatribes in the 1950s. Since it is clear that the Preacher’s private views on communism did not change over time, the apparent transformation in content and tone of his public message suggests that it was likely a more calculated move on his part. As the religious revival of the fifties faded away and Time Magazine proclaimed that ‘God [was] dead,’  

it was unlikely that an Evangelical, even of Graham’s stature, could speak openly on political issues without criticism. Hence, the Preacher rode the ebb and flow of American religious fervor, astutely turning to an apolitical message in the public in order to maintain his mass popularity and hence, sustain his political role in the private realm. In other words, Billy Graham turned apolitical in order to stay political.

In the 1950s, a pervading sense of public religiosity continued to dominate and grow in society. Darren Dochuk argues that religion was the “third pillar of cold war culture,” and life in this decade revolved around “public displays of devotion.” Church membership rose from 49 percent in 1940 to 69 percent in 1960, and in one year alone, the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, published first in 1952, sold more than 26.5 million copies. Hollywood saw the production of Christian ‘epic’ stories like The Ten Commandments, Solomon and Sheba, and Ben Hur. Similarly, music charts saw the likes of Christian-themed singles find their way to the top ten. Religion not only permeated pop culture, but also the politics of the day. Under a law in 1952, the president inaugurated a National Day of Prayer. In 1956, Congress established “In God We Trust” as the official national motto. Andrew Preston argues that “as politics reflected religion, so too did diplomacy.” The country’s visible faith was seen as an antidote to the atheistic and godless evil of communism. Fletcher Bowron, the Mayor of Los Angeles in 1950, openly endorsed Christianity with a press release declaring that “the world face[d] a choice between God and atheistic communism” and therefore “never has the preaching of Christianity been so urgent and the acceptance of the Christian way of life so essential to [America’s] survival as free people in a free world.”

Similarly, Graham’s early sermons were ingrained with the Cold War mentality as he tapped into people’s fear of communism and provided the Christian solution: a need to be a God-fearing nation. Because of the widely accepted notion that America was ‘God’s country,’ the evangelist was able to openly speak on political issues with authority and little criticism.

Furthermore, the atmosphere of public religiosity in the 1950s allowed, and even encouraged, an open relationship between a famous Evangelical figure such as Graham and politicians in power. Front-page editorials and headlines faithfully reported the “private” meetings between the president and Preacher. On 21 March 1956, a special report in the New York Times read, “The Reverend Billy Graham talked religion and world politics with President Eisenhower for 50 minutes today.” Graham and Eisenhower were open with their personal relationship and news reports were happy to disclose that they were ‘old friends [that saw] each other quite frequently.’ Each time Graham visited Eisenhower’s farm, shared a meal with him, or preached a sermon at the White House, journalists were eager to cover the meeting. More than just friends with a Preacher, Eisenhower fashioned himself as a religious man and overtly declared that belief in a supreme being was necessary to the American way of life. Overall, Graham was able to openly support White House foreign policy since the rhetoric of the politicians was very much in sync with the Evangelical anti-communist message. Because of the public religiosity of the fifties, this received neither open criticism nor calls for the separation between church and state. Instead, president and
Preacher formed a tight-knit bond as they together led the “chosen nation of God” together.

Yet, by the 1960s, the pervasive sense of religious fervor in America had begun to die down and had given way to a period of division and confusion amidst the rapid secularization of society. Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman, two leading historians of the decade, claimed “nothing changed so profoundly in the United States during the 1960s as American religion.” They then addressed the trend of growing atheism in the country during that time. The religious confusion of the era is evident from how even Protestants began to subscribe to secular ideas about death and the meaning of life.

In 1961, Christian theologian Gabriel Vahanian published “The Death of God,” in which he argued that the modern world and the scientific view of reality had superseded the need for a supernatural God.

The change in societal climate from the fifties to the sixties was reflected not only in the realm of religious fervor but also in the political mood of the day. The early fifties had mapped onto a strident anti-communist message, beginning when Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy delivered a speech in which he claimed to have a list of names of 205 communists working in the U.S. State Department. The media took this up, and McCarthy effectively galvanized the nation in a four-year campaign to rid the federal government and American institutions of its communist spies. McCarthyism provided Graham with an even larger rhetorical political space for his overheated message against communism. Yet, by the late fifties, similar to the subduing of religious fervor, loud McCarthyite anti-communism had also simmered down.

Likewise, on the issue of U.S. intervention in Vietnam, a single anti-communist, pro-war stance no longer dominated public opinion as in the fifties. In its place were divisive and divergent opinions. Particularly, as the conflict in Vietnam escalated during the mid-sixties, the anti-war movement also started to grow. The American public that had once supported American intervention in WWII, and Korea now found the war in Vietnam morally reprehensible; given absence of a direct threat to American security, it felt that the bombing and devastation of Vietnam was unjustifiable. Because of the failure of expansion of the war to produce any tangible results, in addition to higher taxes required to fund the war and the continual expansion of the military draft, the public grew increasingly disenchanted and frustrated with Vietnam. Polls taken in 1967 indicated that the majority of Americans felt it was a mistake to intervene in Vietnam. Major metropolitan broadsheets shifted from support of the war to opposition, choosing to depict the war in unfavorable terms. Mounting dissatisfaction at the war drew large groups to anti-war rallies as participants became more vocal and daring in their opposition. One of the most striking act of protest took place on October 21, 1967 when nearly 100,000 anti-war demonstrators gathered in Washington and another 35,000 raged at the Pentagon steps. In 1968, an anti-war student demonstration at Columbia University resulted in 1,000 policemen wielding nightsticks to forcefully break up the mass sit-in. As time passed and the war still did not end, the anti-war movement grew in rancor and violence. George Herring argues that “the bloodshed in the streets of night-stick city” indicated that the war in Vietnam was causing “a kind of civil war” in the United States. The general public mood was tired, angry, frustrated, and confused.

It is in light of this change in societal climate that we must understand Graham’s shift in public posture. The Preacher often prided himself on being keenly attuned to the socio-political and cultural trends of the day. In a letter to President Truman, Graham boasted that he knew “something of the mood, thinking and trends in American thought.”

The Preacher was a man who not only knew the times, but was also one who moved along with it. Parallel to the change in political and religious atmosphere, Graham simultaneously shifted from vocal anti-communism to a neutral apolitical stance that maintained a focus on converting individuals to Jesus Christ. The Preacher was aware that the war-weary public would have little patience for yet another loud and clamorous partisan voice. Moreover, an increasingly secularized and cynical society would not have gone easy on a Preacher with a political message, and likely would have criticized him for violating the separation of church and state. In choosing to keep above the fray by avoiding an overtly political message, Graham sought to sustain his popularity among the American public.

Graham’s strategy of turning apolitical and
neutral on the war was wise, particularly when considered alongside the failure of vocal dove and hawk groups to gain mass appeal during this time. Herring argues that public opinion polls found that majority of Americans were disapproving of the anti-war movement, finding its “radical and hippie elements” extremely “obnoxious.” On the other end of the spectrum, the strident pro-war movement was not doing well either. One of its leading voices was the Fundamentalist movement, the hardline older brother of the Neo-Evangelical movement. The group was extremely vocal in reviling and rebuking both America and its leaders for its weak fight against communism. Carl McIntire, one of the movement’s key leaders, was loud and quick to condemn the president for his foreign policy decisions:

You know who is dominating the world right now? The Russians…and the President of the United States is going around and around and around in circles on a secondary level…do you think for one minute that the President of the United States is going to do anything about Russia unloading additional tanks and carrying on all this wonderful, wonderful manifestation of peaceful coexistence with the United States? Do you think the President's going to do anything about that? Of course not. Our hands are being tied by this miserable, abominable satanic philosophy of peacefully coexisting with evil and the works of the devil.  

With such an antagonistic message, it is unsurprising that both American president and public turned away from the Fundamentalists.

To grasp the significance of the failure of the hardliner Fundamentalist movement to the success Billy Graham and the Neo-Evangelicals, we must be reminded of the historical context surrounding the emergence of this new Evangelical coalition in the 1940s. Following the demise of the Fundamentalism out of the public eye of America, a new and young generation of evangelists was eager to re-engage with American mainstream culture in order to start a revival in society. These Neo-Evangelicals were firm in their belief of the need to engage America, and denounced the “negativism” of the old school Fundamentalists that served only to attack and derogate rather than build up. Since the public religiosity of the fifties propelled both moderate and hardline movements, it was the “secular” sixties, the decade in which the socio-political climate of the day had turned against both groups, which proved to be the true test on which camp would be right in its approach.

It was the Neo-Evangelical group that chose to engage and adapt that came out on top. Unlike their militant brother camp that was alienated by society and forced to withdraw back into the shadows, this new group of Evangelicals continued to remain a dominant force even amidst the secularization of society. They had learned from the mistakes of the 1920s in which overtly political talk in a climate of modernization had led to the ousting of the Fundamentalists into the sidelines of American society. Carpenter argues that ever since this alienation, the Evangelicals had yearned for “respect in the public eye” and a “sympathetic hearing.” Now that the fifties had allowed them to win the attention from the media and the prominence in American life that they so craved, the neo-Evangelicals were hard-pressed to protect and guard this newfound stature.

It is likely Graham's shift from political to apolitical could also be explained and informed in part by this historical context surrounding Neo-Evangelicalism and its split from militant Fundamentalism. Graham was a part of, and even a leader of, the new and more accommodating generation of Evangelicals, and he too saw the need to adapt and change to societal currents. Learning from past mistakes, Graham cleverly chose to steer clear of explicitly divisive political issues such as support for the Vietnam War, in order to continue to attract the masses to listen to him. Unlike the Fundamentalist movement that had lost much of its clout because of its overtly political message, Graham's Neo-Evangelical movement continued to amass popular support. A simple and apolitical message focusing on “an Unchanging Gospel for a Changing World" promised and provided stability in the midst of rapid social change and confusion. For example, a Connecticut investment banker explained that he went to Graham's crusades because he saw him as “comforting”:

He’s talking about a part of America that doesn’t exist anymore…but it’s a part of America that people want to relate to…it’s nice to get away from all the problems of the cities and the universities for an hour and listen to someone who sees everything in such simple terms. Instead of smoking pot, you go hear Billy
In a period when church membership was on the overall decline and Protestant Christianity was under attack by secularization, it is astounding that Graham's popularity remained so high. His one-week crusade in New York City in 1969 attracted approximately 234,000 attendants, an increase from a weekly average of 150,000 people during his four-month tour of New York in 1957. Judging by these numbers, Evangelicalism continued to steadily grow and maintain its place in society even if public religiosity continued to wane.

One might conclude that an evangelist such as Graham would naturally do anything within his means to attract crowds to the gospel message. However, this was not the only reason that Graham needed to sustain a significant following; his motivations for the shift were not only spiritual but also political. He needed mass support to keep up his influence in the Oval Office and remain relevant in the eyes of those in power. After all, it was his mass popularity that first gave him inside access into the White House in the 1950s. When President Eisenhower held a news conference on foreign and domestic issues in 1956, a journalist asked him why he chose to spend so much time with Graham. Eisenhower replied, “Because of the very great influence that he continued to hold among the people and, therefore, reminded them of his relevance to the White House.

Graham likely made a conscious decision to shift the tone of his public message. For a man who clearly had strong views on communism and the war, and who possessed a large platform to voice these views, it must have taken much self-control to remain apolitical. Leon Jaworski, a prosecutor who was friend of both Johnson and Nixon, remarked that when it came to speaking on political issues, Graham “kept himself under tremendous…proper, adequate restraint.” The evangelist cautiously and watchfully nurtured and shaped his public image. In a letter written to The Christian Weekly in 1967 responding to criticisms that he had been meddling with national policy, Graham defended that he had been “extremely careful not to be drawn into…the problems of the Vietnam War.” Graham was also shrewdly aware of the distinction between the private and public. In a letter to President Johnson in 1964, he told him about how he wanted to “publicly answer Bishop Pike for his criticisms sweet little Lucy…but thought it might be better to let the matter die [though he] intend[ed] to write him a personal letter and send a copy to [Johnson].” Such a note reveals one who was keenly aware of the presence and impact of his public platform, but consciously chose not to use it, and yet at the same time, he did not forget to privately affirm the president of his support for him and his daughter.

Overall, Graham was able to skillfully negotiate the public and private spheres of power because he was highly cognizant of where he could best assert himself politically. While the societal climate of the 1950s opened space for him to vocally speak on political and religious issues without criticism or censure, the changing zeitgeist of the 1960s meant that his personal political views would be less welcomed by the public. As such, he turned his attention to the private halls of power at the White House. Yet to remain relevant in the private necessitated first remaining relevant in public.
keen political actor who followed societal currents of the time, Graham consciously retreated from airing his political views in public to maintain his mass following and, by extension, his influence in the private halls of power. What remains to be answered is what exactly Graham did or said in private in order to impact the direction of foreign policy in Vietnam.

POLITICKING IN THE PRIVATE: FRIENDSHIP POLITICS IN THE WHITE HOUSE

Graham once acknowledged in a press conference, “Sometimes you can do much more behind the scenes than you can waving out a flag.” The Preacher’s popular mass following may have first gained him access into the White House, but it was really his strategic cultivation of intimate friendships with the presidents that allowed him to maintain and elevate his influence in the White House. Leveraging these friendships, Graham was able to have direct political conversations with decision makers, and he used this platform to voice support for the war.

In an oral history interview, Arthur Krim, an aide to President Johnson, described Billy Graham as a “President Gatherer” who “moved with ease to Nixon and then Ford and then Carter.” However, there is evidence to show that Graham had established a relationship with the White House even before Johnson, starting with President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s. Graham wrote letters at least once a month to the president expressing his admiration and offering prayer and support. In a letter dated December 31, 1957, Graham told Eisenhower that he was “the most remarkable man in history...[and] God’s man of the hour.” In earlier letters, he also affirmed his “complete devotion and personal affection” to Eisenhower and told him that he had urged the 75,000 Americans present at his Crusade to bow their heads in prayer for the president. John Bolten, a companion to Graham in his travels to Asia during this time, noted how Graham would often drop by the Oval Office to see the president and discuss his observations of these places. The letters of correspondence between the Preacher and the White House confirm this—Graham would often request to see the president to update him on the conversations he had with various international heads of states during his travels. Upon returning from the Middle East in March 1956, Graham asked to meet Eisenhower because he felt that he had “vital information” to share with him after his meeting with the heads of the Arab nations. Along with his public diatribes against communism, Graham also attempted to privately urge Eisenhower to fight against the spread of communist ideology. In 1954, amidst news of potential French military defeat in Vietnam, Graham wrote a letter to the president warning him, “Indochina must be held at any cost.” The Preacher then offered to make use of his influence on television and radio to “sell the American public” on the necessity of pushing back against communism in the Far East.

After Eisenhower, Graham continued to foster what seemed to be even closer personal relationships with President Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon. With Eisenhower, a majority of the letters from the president were sent through his secretary or other White House aides. However, with Nixon and Johnson, words of affirmation and support were often directly exchanged between the presidents and the Preacher. Much of the public knew that Graham shared a close personal relationship with Nixon, one that began from the time Nixon ran for president against Kennedy in 1962. In his letters, Graham addressed the president by the informal nickname “Dick”. Records show that between 1962 and 1972, the two would touch base on a nearly weekly basis over calls or meet-ups. Sometimes the two would even correspond more than once a day via telephone. In the telephone conversations between the two, there was a tone of ease and friendliness as their dialogues were often interrupted by chuckles and laughter at comments made. For example, in a twenty-minute conversation on February 21, 1973, the two casually chatted on a diverse range of topics stretching from Graham’s only aunt dying of cancer to commenting that “it was so stupid” of the Israelis to shoot down a Libyan airplane, and to pointing out how embarrassing it was for Israeli President Golda Meir to visit the U.S. at that time. They also enjoyed a private joke about Graham’s letter to Senator Mark Hatfield chiding him on his behavior towards the president. The clear camaraderie and comfort between the two men in their telephone exchanges is striking. The intimacy and rapport between them was also apparent from how Nixon broke down and cried on Graham’s shoulder after he gave the eulogy at his mother’s funeral.
While less known to the public eye, Graham also seemed to have shared an intimate relationship with President Johnson. In a letter dated November 23, 1966, Graham wrote:

I hope you realize that my personal affection for you has nothing to do with you being President...I just happen to love you—because you are you. Whether you are President Johnson or just plain Lyndon Johnson, I have the warmest affection for you as a personal friend.82

The affection seemed mutual—the president often invited Graham to spend time with him at the White House as an overnight guest. In a telephone conversation, Johnson told Graham that he desired him to visit for dinner and affirmed that the Preacher’s presence would make him feel “stronger” for the coming week.83 The relationship was intimate to the point where Graham would be invited to Johnson’s bedroom, where they would give each other massages.84 George Champion, another close friend of both Johnson and Graham, shared how Graham was often asked by the president to come to the White House and “morning, noon, and night... he was there.”85 This is confirmed by the daily diaries of President Johnson, which reveal that Graham met or spoke with Johnson on a monthly and sometimes weekly basis. In addition to holding church services for the president, Graham would often meet with him over a meal, coffee, or sometimes even a movie at the mansion. Their wives, assistants, and even their children would often accompany the two. Records also show that Graham flew with Johnson to various events in his private presidential plane. On one occasion, President Johnson was recorded to have instructed his secretary to send flowers to Graham when he was ill and confined in the hospital.86

The frequency and closeness of the interactions between Preacher and presidents indicate that those in the Oval Office did not seek out the evangelist merely because of his influence among the masses, but potentially also because they shared personal relationships with him. Such friendships could not possibly be a result of simple coincidence, and there is evidence to suggest that Graham carefully nurtured and grew his relationship with the White House. This specific style of ‘friendship politics’ is first played out through Graham’s continual offering of spiritual support and prayers to the presidents. The language and rhetoric used in his letters to both Johnson and Nixon are strikingly similar. To Johnson, he would repeatedly tell him that his “thoughts and prayers are with [him] almost constantly” and that he would “ask God to give [him] strength, grace, courage and wisdom to carry the heaviest responsibility in the world.”87 In the same manner, Graham also told Nixon of how he had “a strange burden on [his] heart to pray for [him] almost constantly.”88 By offering his spiritual support to the presidents, Graham drew legitimacy from his status as a famous Preacher and wooed those in power by suggesting that their friendship with him would allow God to be on their side. For example, on the night before Johnson was due for a surgery, Graham went to the extent of telling the president that God had divinely woken him up in the middle of the night just to pray for his operation.89 In the same manner, he would assure Nixon that he strongly believed that the Lord was supporting him in all of his endeavors.90

In addition to acting as a spiritual advisor, Graham actively pursued friendship with the presidents by offering them his political support. Regardless of their political affinity, Graham never failed to assure his allegiance, suggesting that the nature of his support transcended partisan lines. Following a scandal during the 1964 presidential election campaign, where Graham's daughter was reported to have expressed support for the Republican candidate Barry Goldwater, the Preacher was quick to assure Johnson that he had taken care of this by holding a press conference in which he explicitly rallied Americans to unite behind Johnson. He firmly added, “I want to do anything in this world to help you.”91 On a separate occasion in which a journalist took Graham’s comments and implied that he was criticizing one of Johnson’s decisions, the Preacher responded with a private letter to Johnson clarifying that this was taken out of context and maintained his support for the president.92

Billy Graham’s political support for President Nixon was even more evident and public. During both the 1962 and 1969 presidential elections, Graham openly announced that he would vote for Nixon. In private, he would also sycophantically express his support with words such as “you’re the greatest President that we’ve ever had in the history of America” or “this has become Nixon country down through [South
This essay argues that part of the reason why Graham zealously fostered friendships with those in power was so that he could use this platform to influence policy decisions and outcomes, a position that was useful in a time when his role as a preacher offered him less room for political leverage. The Preacher himself stated that while he would not use his sermons to address political affairs, he would take the opportunity to “privately” speak to the president if necessary. It is noteworthy that Graham seemed to have shared a more intimate relationship with Johnson and Nixon compared to Eisenhower. With the latter, Graham shared that his interactions were “warm and friendly, but…mostly formal.” As Graham turned from political to apolitical in public, his private politicking in the form of pursuing close friendships with the presidents also seemed to have intensified. In navigating between his public and private spheres of power, it is likely that Graham observed the turbulent, war-weary public atmosphere of the 1960s and deemed that the private sphere was now more efficacious for voicing his support for the war, and hence chose to focus his efforts there. Hence, it is unsurprising that a study of Graham’s private correspondence with the president and his aides in the Oval Office reveal a preacher that is not only a spiritual mentor and personal friend, but also a political advisor. While sources show that Graham gave the presidents his opinion on issues of domestic and international relevance, this essay is mainly interested in his advice regarding issues of foreign policy, particularly with regard to the Vietnam War.

First, there is evidence to indicate that Graham met up with the president to discuss issues of foreign policy and the war in Vietnam. In a letter to Johnson, on November 1966, the Preacher requested a visit to the White House after he had returned from Vietnam to preach to the troops, in order to discuss his “thoughts and impressions” from the trip. The president’s daily diary records that Graham did meet up with the President on January 18, 1967, precisely to address that topic. Similarly, a note in Nixon’s Daily Diary on August 10, 1971 records how the president and Reverend Graham attended a foreign policy briefing by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which was arranged by the Preacher. The guest list consisted mainly of well known evangelical leaders and figures such as Bill Bright, the president of Campus Crusade; Pat Zondervan, owner of a successful religious publishing company; and the chairmen of Gordon College and Wheaton College, two established Evangelical universities.

In these discussions, Graham assured Johnson and Nixon that the criticisms regarding their decisions to intervene or act decisively in Vietnam were invalid. For example, in 1964, he told Johnson that the disapproval that he was getting from the press on Vietnam was “unjust” and reminded him that it was the most criticized men in history who would stand out the most. Similarly, a conversation between Nixon and Graham in February 1973 showed the two of them criticizing Senator George McGovern, Senator Mark Hatfield, and Senator Harold Hughes for expressing desire for immediate U.S. withdrawal from North Vietnam regardless of circumstance. Graham then congratulated Nixon for signing the Paris Peace Accords of January 27, 1973, and praised his “determination and perseverance” in the negotiations and achieving peace in such a way that the communists did not have the upper hand. Furthermore, by telling the president that “in a very dark moment in December [he was] right”, Graham seemed to be affirming the U.S. decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972, which Nixon made to show support for South Vietnam and force the North back into peace negotiations.

Not only did Graham fend off criticisms regarding intervention in Vietnam, he also encouraged the presidents to fight the war by emphasizing the importance of their leadership, depicting them to be savior-like figures amidst the chaos. By labeling the communists in Vietnam as evil and expansionary, Graham encouraged President Johnson to see himself as “the man that helped saved Christian civilization.” In the same vein, Graham purportedly told Nixon that amidst degeneration and chaos in the world, the American people would look to him for leadership. After Nixon signed the Peace Treaty in January 1973, Graham assured the president that there was a “whole new respect for [him] on the campuses,” and he had a “groundswell of support” from the people who now saw that Nixon was right in bombing Vietnam in December.

Furthermore, there is evidence that Graham even tried to offer specific advice on military strategy
to the White House. In the Nixon Presidential Library Archives, there is a document labeled “Vietnam Strategy” and signed “BG, January 3, 1969.” At the top right hand corner of the first page, there is a handwritten note which reads “File: Billy Graham, January 5, 1969,” confirming that the evangelist wrote the report. While it is unclear whether President Nixon actually carefully read or considered the document, it is apparent that the Graham did attempt to offer his input on how to act in the war. In this private transcript by Graham on the war, he emphasized the need to make use of the South Vietnamese in fighting the war against the Vietcong. By doing this, he asserted that the U.S. could strengthen the war effort since the South Vietnamese would be able to defeat the enemy with “either ethical or unethical methods...familiar to the Oriental” and hence free the United States of international criticism regarding the means by which the war [was] fought. There is evidence to show that Nixon did consider this particular point in Graham’s proposed “Vietnam Strategy”. In a memorandum written to Kissinger on August 6, 1971, he wrote:

Billy Graham told me of the fine work that _____ was doing with some of the tribes in Laos, Cambodia and the northern part of South Vietnam. Run a check on him and give me a report as to how effective he is. Graham tells me that his missionary friends say that these tribes, of which our own Laotian irregulars are a part, are our main bulwark against Communist influence in that part of the world.

Graham’s document also discouraged a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and urged against recognition of the communist Vietcong as a legitimate government. He also proposed “the calling of China’s bluff” and warned the Chinese privately that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons on them if they intervened in Vietnam. Overall, he urged the need for “a tough non-nonsense policy” noting that the prolonged war had already cost the United States its standing and prestige in Asia. He argued that a hardline policy would have a psychological impact on the communists and push them to the negotiating table.

Finally, Graham also tried to fight the Vietnam War privately on the home front by working behind the scenes to influence Evangelical groups to support the Vietnam War effort. He told President Nixon in a conversation, “Just as you have changed the political picture, we hope to change the religious picture.” He informed Nixon of the formation of a pro-war Evangelical alternative to the World Council of Churches, a body of mainline Protestants groups that fervently opposed the Vietnam War. The Preacher condemned the Council for “say[ing] nothing against the Communists, ever” and even went so far as to comment that “their stuff seems to be written on that side of the world [in Moscow].” Graham then informed the president of his plan to win over different Protestant groups to his side. In response, Nixon told Graham about how Jesuit priest John McLaughlin had also become a “convert to our side,” coming in as an “all-out peacenik” but then returned from a visit to Vietnam with a different perspective.

Graham may have had an apolitical public image, but in private, he was actively pursuing a form of friendship politics, in which he leveraged upon relationships which he had built with those in power and used these connections to assert influence on U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam. The striking similarity in Graham’s interactions with both Johnson and Nixon suggest that Graham was an adept political actor who rose above partisan lines and was able to win the friendship of both a Democrat and a Republican. With both presidents, he formed a relationship, offered prayers and God’s favor, and promoted a tough stance in Vietnam.

Yet, Graham was not merely an individual dabbling in politics, but was a representative of a greater Evangelical movement that supported war against the communists. The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA) was formed in 1950 with the purpose of organizing Graham’s outreach efforts, which had started to increase in capacity and audience over time. By the seventies, the BGEA grew into a megacomplex worth 40 million dollars. It came to consist of a myriad of ancillary agencies, ranging from a radio station, two in-house magazines, a film production company, and a publishing house. It received an average of 2.5 million letters per year and sent out an average of 100 million. The BGEA also had its own public relations, financial operations, and press release office, which often assisted Graham with communication with the White House, scheduling the Preacher’s meeting times with the president.
Sources also reveal that various members and offices of the BGEA communicated with several politicians on matters concerning Vietnam. For example, Sherwood Wirt, the editor of the BGEA’s Decision Magazine sent two congressmen and a senator copies of his correspondence with a Canadian subscriber regarding the morality of the Vietnam War. In the letters, the editor firmly defended the justice of the war in light of the evil of communism and rejected the subscriber’s arguments for peace.\(^{109}\)

The purpose behind sending these politicians the letters could be to privately assure them that Graham and the Evangelical movement were supportive of the government’s decision to intervene in Vietnam. All three politicians thanked Wirt for making the correspondence available for their consideration and affirmed that they shared identical views on the necessity of the war.\(^{110}\)

Evangelicals also tried to use Graham as a channel for influence on the president. A group of ministers from Los Angeles, for example, sent Graham a song entitled “The Prayer of our Nation” and asked him to forward it to the president. They wrote, “Because you and he are close friends… perhaps you will feel led out of God… to directly contact Mr. Nixon concerning this matter.”\(^{111}\)

Graham also wrote a letter to Nixon telling him that he had been inundated with letters, calls, and telegrams with ideas and feedback that they desired the Preacher to tell the president given their known relationship. The president apparently took this somewhat seriously and would often pass on these letters to his aides and counselors for their consideration.\(^{112}\)

In particular, Evangelical missionaries in Vietnam used Graham as a channel by which they could share their opinions on the war with the president. This is evidenced from two separate missionary reports on Vietnam that Graham submitted to Henry Kissinger for his examination. In both cases, Graham paraphrased the missionary’s reports instead of presenting them verbatim. This is likely because Nixon and Kissinger would have been less inclined to pay attention to the report had it been presented word for word. This indicates the importance of Graham as a bridge to the politicians in power, and Graham’s ability to use his personal connections to gain Evangelicals access into the White House. In the first report, labeled “Confidential Missionary Plan for Ending the Vietnam War” and dated April 15, 1969, Graham reported that the missionaries strongly discouraged forming a coalition government between North and South, for fear that the communists would eventually take control. Graham elevated the credibility of the report by portraying these missionaries as the hands and feet of the U.S. government in Vietnam, highlighting their ability to give a unique perspective on the situation and sentiment in South Vietnam because of their personal ties to the locals and their leaders. The report also gave tangible suggestions on how to “Vietnamize” the war. This included psychological warfare strategies such as propaganda television programs as well as specific military strategies such as affirming the use of guerilla warfare and overwhelming air power. They strongly pushed for an offensive in the North rather than containment in the South, and even went to the extent of suggesting that the U.S. could specifically afford to withdraw 100,000 troops by the end of the year.\(^{113}\)

Two years later, in 1971, Graham submitted another missionary report that evaluated the success of the Vietnamization strategy. The missionaries warned that an immediate U.S. withdrawal would be a ‘disaster’ because the South Vietnamese were not motivated or ready to fight for themselves. They also argued that the Montagnard tribal highlanders were essential for the success of the Vietnamization program. They concluded by affirming that they were prepared to assist the Executive Office in liaising with the locals to help the American war effort.\(^{114}\) These missionaries were in part motivated by their fear of a communist takeover and in part motivated by their personal love for and commitment towards the locals. Upon reading the report, Kissinger thanked Graham for the “first hand knowledge… [which he] found quite useful.”\(^{115}\)

The apparent involvement of the missionaries, the BGEA and other church leaders demonstrate that Graham was not alone in trying to encourage the president to continue intervention in Vietnam against the communists. Instead, Graham often had the partnership and assistance of other Evangelical voices. The Preacher then leveraged upon his friendship with politicians in power to further the Evangelical pro-war agenda, and effectively served as a bridge between the movement and the White House.
WITHIN BLURRED LINES: A NEGOTIATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PLATFORMS OF POWER

So far, this essay has demonstrated a noticeable distinction between Graham’s apolitical image in the public and his political actions in the private. Yet, the line between these two spheres was not always as clearly separated or defined in reality. Graham’s well-known relationship with presidents often made it difficult for him to maintain an apolitical public image. Moreover, his involvement in apparently political events, such as a Christmas visit to U.S. troops in Vietnam in 1966, as well as President Nixon’s visit to Graham’s evangelistic crusade in Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1970, naturally raised doubts on his supposed neutrality. In other words, Graham’s political style often created tensions for his Evangelical mission. However, Graham never once succumbed to admitting a private political agenda, but instead, shrewdly navigated past criticisms by employing different strategies that would preserve his non-partisan public image.

First, Graham was careful to portray his relationship with the presidents as merely a friendship and nothing more. When questioned about his role in the Oval Office, he denied any influence or any desire to have influence in politics and claimed that he was not a regular at the White House. Even when he admitted to meeting with the presidents, he argued that the bond he shared with these men was “not political or intellectual [but] personal and spiritual.” On the few occasions that Graham acknowledged an advisory role in the White House, he would admit only to being a spiritual mentor. He openly stated in a television interview that the president’s position of leadership was a solitary one and Graham was happy to provide him with all the prayers necessary. However, while he acknowledged the spiritual dimensions of his relationship with the presidents, Graham’s preferred public representation of his relationship with the president still remained that of friendship.

For critics unconvinced that Graham held a purely apolitical friendship with the White House, Graham would allow a slightly more satisfactory answer. He admitted that at times, he would discuss political issues with the presidents, but only as a friend and confidante, and as such, the content of these conversations should remain confidential.

Through this strategy of remaining silent, Graham was able to somewhat appease his detractors without stirring up any unnecessary controversy or negative publicity. In an open statement in 1973 defining his position on the Vietnam War, Graham stressed that “any discussion [he had] with a President [was] private.” In a separate interview, Graham made a similarly styled statement, “It is an unwritten law that when you visit a head of state, you do not reveal what you discussed.” In his autobiography, the Preacher claimed that when he discussed politics with Nixon, it was always in an informal and unofficial capacity. He admitted that Nixon saw him as a “trusted friend without a personal agenda” who could act as a “sounding board” for his ideas, and listened to his private thoughts without leaking them to the public.

It is in concrete events that we are best able to witness the tensions that Graham faced in trying to maintain an apolitical public image while still making political maneuvers in the private. The line between public and private, apolitical and political became blurred in these events: Graham was asked by the president to participate in public events that could easily be construed as political in nature. Agreeing to get involved would potentially tarnish the apolitical public representation he had nurtured; on the other hand, rejecting the president’s request might mean losing political influence in the private. Therefore, Graham was often made to negotiate between private demands and public implications. Most of the time, the Preacher weighed the former to be more important and thus had to find a way to maneuver past criticisms and maintain his appearance of neutrality.

In December 1966, Billy Graham took an eight-day public Christmas visit to Vietnam at the request of President Johnson. Here, we witness the Preacher’s observed apolitical-political style played out in a particular event. When questioned by the media, Graham claimed that General William C. Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, was the man who had invited him to speak in Vietnam. The stated purpose of the trip was to preach the gospel to the military and the locals, as well as to encourage missionaries and chaplains in Vietnam. He clearly stated that he was “not going to get involved in politics” but only wanted to “preach a Christian message.” However, in
private, sources show that Graham's visit was in fact a political maneuver, requested by President Johnson himself. Following the Preacher’s return, the BGEA created and circulated a television program titled “Billy Graham on Vietnam.” The program discussed his trip to Saigon and aimed to shed light on the ‘spiritual impact’ of the war on the American troops and the Vietnamese. While its content and subject was seemingly apolitical in focus, the purpose of the program was clearly political. This is strongly indicated by how the BGEA sent a tape and transcript of the program to the White House as well as a letter that wrote,

It is our intention to place this program on as many television stations as possible. We feel it contains the type of information people should know and we are particularly delighted, concerning Dr. Graham's remarks about the President...... If I can be of any help to...the President, concerning this tape, please do not hesitate to let me know at once. Also, I would appreciate hearing the reaction of the President after his viewing of this tape.123

However, because of the nature of the event, it was difficult for Graham to mask his private political agenda and sustain an apolitical front. Given the fierce public debate on the American home front regarding the justice of the Vietnam War, his publicized visit to Vietnam received a fair share of criticism and raised doubts on his neutrality. In January 1967, an editorial in The Christian Century, a liberal-leaning anti-war Christian magazine, condemned Graham for endorsing the war, condoning its violence, and “meddling with national policy...[through] leap[ing] with both feet into the political arena.”124 Another editorial criticized Graham for his “duplicitry” and demanded that he “drop the image of holy transcendence.”125 Moreover, in deciding to visit Vietnam, Graham had to answer several reporters’ eager questions regarding his opinion on the justice and morality of American intervention in Vietnam.

Yet, in negotiating the benefits of accepting the president’ request (that is, maintaining his friendship and influence at the White House) and its potential cost on his public image, Graham was willing to risk the latter. After all, by firmly and squarely maintaining his neutrality instead of publicly revealing his pro-war stance, the Preacher could still avert media spotlight and overly harsh criticisms. When asked to comment on the justice of the war, Graham deferred his remarks to the end of his Vietnam tour. When questioned again after his trip, he still declined an answer by saying that the situation was “very confusing and frustrating” and “outside [his] jurisdiction.”126 He proposed that he was neither a hawk nor a dove, but instead likened himself to an ambiguous biblical symbol of a lamb ready for sacrifice.127

Graham also carefully crafted his apolitical image by ensuring that none of his actual activities during the Vietnam visit could be construed or reported as remotely political by his critics. He did exactly what he said he would do – preach the gospel. Reports of Graham’s visit showed him touring hospitals, missionaries, and churches, and singing Christmas carols with the American troops while telling the Christmas story. One newspaper report painted for readers a beautiful image of his Christmas Eve prayer meeting at the base camp of the U.S. 1st Calvary airmobile division in An Khe, where 10,000 candles were lit as searchlights were temporarily turned off.128 Another report told the touching story of Graham holding the hand of a badly wounded soldier and praying over him as doctors treated the man’s bleeding arm.129

Overall, his publicly apolitical strategy seemed to be effective in staving off criticism, particularly when compared to the explicit political overtures of Cardinal Francis Spellman, another influential figure invited by President Johnson to Vietnam. The Cardinal was outspoken in his support for the war, asserting that anything short of a complete victory for the United States was unacceptable.130 In his Christmas sermon to the troops, he likened the U.S. forces to “soldiers of Jesus Christ” fighting “a war for civilization.”131 Critics immediately denounced Spellman; metropolitan dailies across the US carried reports of how 75 lay Catholics staged a protest in front of the Cardinal’s residence in response to his pro-war statements. They also told of an Episcopal Bishop from California openly expressing outrage, and of several national and international Roman Catholic magazines condemning Spellman for going against the Pope.132 In comparison, Graham came out of his visit to Vietnam relatively unscathed. Notably, most of Graham’s criticisms were found in Christian magazine editorials, whereas stories
of Spellman’s public denouncement were widely
carried by the mainstream media. Not only does this
demonstrate the effectiveness of Graham’s “apolitical”
public strategy, but it also reveals how the Preacher
was able to successfully negotiate the demands and
consequences of his actions in the private and public
sphere.

Moreover, the episode in Vietnam also reveals
that Graham did not always strictly act politically
in the private sphere, and apolitically in the public
sphere. The shrewdness of Graham’s politically
apolitical strategy lied in the ability for even an
apolitical image to make a political impact. On first
.glance, Graham’s television program appeared to be
apolitical in focus. However, a deeper examination
of its content reveals Graham’s tacit support of U.S.
intervention and confirms the program’s hidden
agenda of subtly manipulating its viewers to support
the war.

First, rather than give a depressing report on
war, Graham painted a positive and encouraging
picture. Vietnam has often been known as the first
“television war,” given that the television allowed
for daily exposure to violent and horrific images of
the conflict, intensifying the atmosphere of war-
weariness among the American public.\textsuperscript{133} Perhaps
Graham’s television program was created to counter
the negativity and turn around the anti-war public
mood. Instead of focusing on gory images of death,
bombing and maiming in the jungles, the Preacher
chose to emphasize the “sheer beauty…and wealth of
the country.” He described the French city of Saigon
as “lovely” and “beautiful.”\textsuperscript{134} Instead of reporting
the alarming death rate of American troops, Graham
paid tribute to the patriotism and motivation of the
military men. He compared them to the soldiers in
the Korean War and praised them for being more
committed, better equipped and educated, and more
motivated.\textsuperscript{135}

Second, Graham implicitly suggested to
viewers that U.S. intervention was advantageous to
the Vietnamese people. He argued that Americans
should be proud of the military men in Vietnam
because they were not only sent to bring war but also
peace to the nation. He described how these army
personnel were “engaged in tremendous pacification”
as they “[taught] these people how to work out their
lives.”\textsuperscript{136} This sentiment corroborates with a later
statement by Graham in a press conference in 1968
where he called the public to remember how “there
[were] millions of little people in Asia that are scared
to death that [the U.S. was] going to withdraw.”\textsuperscript{137}
By highlighting the dependency of Asia on America,
Graham tacitly gave his stamp of approval to the
American intervention.

Finally, in order to subtly encourage Evangelical
viewers to support the war, the program chose to
highlight the fruitful conditions of Evangelical
ministry in Vietnam, claiming that it was a
“misunderstood dimension” of the war. The program
opened with a story from a U.S. Marine Captain
stationed in Denang, Vietnam testifying to how
200 men accepted Christ at the Christmas service
that Graham had conducted. The Preacher then
affirmed that the troops were extremely responsive
to the gospel message, more so than any other
audience he has had in the world. He also praised
the military chaplains for conducting strong
evangelistic follow-up classes and programs. Graham
also highlighted how the war was opening doors
for fruitful Evangelical missions to the Vietnamese
people. He described his meetings with missionaries
as well as local Vietnamese Christian pastors and
even went to the extent of declaring that Vietnam
was en route to becoming the religious leader of
Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{138} It was likely that this seemingly
apolitical message would result in a political impact,
particularly on an Evangelical viewer. After all, an
Evangelical would have probably been significantly
moved by the conversion stories of army personnel
and locals in Vietnam and as a result, subconsciously
start to take on a more supportive stance on the
war. On a separate occasion, a missionary requested
Decision Magazine to run an article publicizing the
Evangelicals’ abundant ministry in Vietnam. While
he argued that such a move should “in no way be
political,” he also acknowledged that “it could exert a
very profound influence on the reading audience of
the magazine and in turn help to counteract so much
of what is being said in the press.”\textsuperscript{139} While this is
admittedly a different incident, it does suggest that
Graham, Reverend Haden, and the team at the BGEA
were likely cognizant and encouraging of the political
impact that “Billy Graham in Vietnam” would have
on its Evangelical viewers.

Two years after a second visit to the Vietnam
troops in 1968, Graham got involved in yet another
apparently apolitical event, which he once again used
for political signaling. On May 28, 1970, Richard Nixon appeared at Billy Graham's evangelistic crusade at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, and was given an opportunity to address the crowd. This marked the first time the BGEA had allowed a president to speak at a crusade. Similar to Graham's visit to Vietnam, the Preacher's political-apolitical style of politics is clearly manifested in this event. In the lead-up to the event, Graham assured the media that "there would not be anything political...in his visit."140 Unsurprisingly similar to the Vietnam tour, the program at the crusade appeared non-partisan and non-political in both style and content. The program flowed as per normal: a time of worship and song, a choir performance, a sermon by Graham, and a final alter call to participants to accept Christ. The remarks made by Nixon were short in length and neutral in content, centering on praise for the Preacher and admiration for America's "dedicated" youth.141

While there is no concrete evidence to prove that it was the president who initiated his own appearance, understanding the context surrounding the event strongly indicates that it was a strategic political maneuver. Nearly one month prior to the Crusade, news of American invasion of Cambodia had led to violent protests all around the nation, particularly on college campuses. Demonstrations at Kent State University and Jackson State College saw a dramatic clash with the police, resulting in the shocking death of six students. In response to this news, hundreds of university students went on strike, and some campuses even had to be closed down to avert further violence.142 Hence, Nixon's attendance at the Crusade could be read as an attempt to symbolically reclaim support for the president and the war among young people. As a New York Times article accurately put it, Nixon was anxious to "create a new image of communication with youth."143 Rather than a naïve party, Graham seemed to be fully cognizant of and involved in the plan. He shared in an interview that he had invited Nixon to the crusade because he identified that "the problem [was] with the university students right now" and "this would give [Nixon] an opportunity [to be] the president of all people."144

However, as in his visit to Vietnam, the president's appearance at the Knoxville event was hard for Graham to defend as purely apolitical. Moreover, in a time when antiwar opinion in the wake of the invasion of Cambodia was reaching new heights, Graham received more criticism for his apparent violation of separation between church and state. Even if the Preacher had claimed that Nixon's appearance was non-partisan in purpose, a politically charged university landscape naturally led to a political interpretation of the event. Nearly 320 protestors showed up at the event, angered by the war in Vietnam and frustrated at Nixon's appearance. At the start of the event, a small group of protestors marched into the stadium imitating a funeral procession, carrying a casket and holding signs and banners that read, "Thou shalt not kill" or "God giveth life and Nixon taketh away." Throughout the Crusade, they filled up pockets of silence with anti-war chants like "1,2,3,4 we don't want Nixon's fucking war."145

Never before had Graham had received such loud and vehement criticism, but rather than caving into admitting a political agenda, the Preacher once again attempted to fend off criticism by firmly maintaining his apolitical stance. In an interview with the New York Times a month after the crusade, he was quick to dismiss suggestions that the president had made use of the crusade for political purposes. Graham portrayed himself as the initiator and Nixon as following his lead. He insisted that he was the one who had requested Nixon's attendance and that in response, the president was initially uncertain about accepting the invitation because he was afraid that it would "look political."146 In portraying Nixon's reply as hesitant and casual, Graham attempted to quell claims that the event was carefully planned with a political purpose.

Hence, the Knoxville event is another clear example of how Graham sometimes felt a pull of tension between meeting a private political demand and its potential cost on his public image. In negotiating costs and benefits, Graham made a gamble and allowed the president to speak at his crusade. Since the majority of the crusade audience already supported Nixon and the war effort, it was unlikely that the Preacher was motivated by a desire to rally support for Vietnam.147 Instead, it is possible that the Preacher took the risk because he was keen on using the event to prove to Nixon that the Evangelical population was a solid coalition in his "great silent majority".148 Desiring for greater
Evangelical policy influence, Graham had repeatedly tried to convince the president of the importance of Evangelicals as an electoral group. For example, he wrote a letter to Nixon telling him about an “emerging Evangelical strength in the country that [was] going to have a strong bearing on social and political matters” in the coming years. Later on in 1972, Graham strongly recommended Nixon to include a “spiritual note” in his presidential acceptance speech because “many of [his] hard core supporters [had] a strong belief in God.”

The Knoxville Crusade itself seemed to prove Graham’s point. A majority of the audience had responded enthusiastically when the president first entered the stadium. The crowd voiced its disapproval of protestors’ cries of “Peace, peace” by retorting with shouts of “Commie, commie.” A student who was passing out anti-war literature shared how many crusade participants rejected him, and one even went so far as to tell him to “stick it up [his] ass.” President Nixon also seemed to be aware that the crowd was in his favor, as revealed by the note he made in his speech on how he was “glad that there seem[ed] to be a rather solid majority on one side rather than the other side tonight,” and this majority “[did] not approve of violence.”

So, we can see that, rather than a flat caricature of an individual who solely acted apolitical in the public and political in the private, we can see that Graham was a three-dimensional political actor who shrewdly and appropriately navigated the private and public space. Miller argued that Graham was an adept politician, one with “seeming authenticity” and one who was able to masterfully “avoid specifics about more controversial subjects.” Both events highlighted how the Preacher was able to stave off a lot of censure by consistently maintaining his apolitical position even in the face of opposition.

The episode in Vietnam particularly demonstrated the artfulness of Graham’s apolitical front, in that a seemingly apolitical program could be used to make a political impact and subtly garner support for the war. On the other hand, the event at Knoxville showed how Graham was sometimes willing to risk his apolitical image for the sake of a greater cause (in this case, convincing Nixon of an Evangelical silent majority). In fact, both cases highlight the natural tension that Graham felt in associating himself so closely with the president. To do so meant putting himself at risk of considerable criticism for the perceived violation of church and state, and yet, in negotiating the costs and benefits of such a move, “the disadvantages were far outweighed by the opportunity.” Moreover, as a Christianity Today article wrote, there were “ample biblical precedents” found in the stories of Esther, Joseph and Daniel that demonstrated that one could do the work of God through private relationships with those in government. All in all, our examination of the complexities of real life political events that the Preacher had to navigate provides greater depth to our vision of Graham as a political actor.

**THE PRESIDENT AND THE PREACHER: A TWO-WAY RELATIONSHIP**

A greater degree of nuance can be added when we consider things from the perspective of those in political power. While it is not this essay’s purpose to prove that the presidents actually heeded Graham’s advice on the Vietnam War, it should be noted that the relationship between the Preacher and the Oval Office was a two-way rather than one-sided one. Although there is evidence indicating that Johnson and Nixon had some level of genuine admiration and respect for the Preacher, sources also reveal how White House aides carefully strategized the president’s relationship with the Preacher and made use of this relationship to achieve the administrations’ own political purposes.

The dynamic relationship between preacher and president is demonstrated by how both Johnson and Nixon often took the initiative to write letters, make phone calls, and arrange meetings with Graham. Rather than only waiting for Graham to contact them, the presidents often made time to seek the Preacher’s assistance and advice on matters related to policy. In a telephone conversation with Graham on 16 January 1967, Johnson applauded him for his performance in his visit to Vietnam and then invited him to the White House to give impressions of his experience in Vietnam. Two days later, the president’s daily diary records that the meeting between both men actually materialized, and Graham was said to have reported that the morale of American troops in Vietnam was very high. Yet, another record in Johnson’s Daily Diary documents how on June 14, 1967, Graham was invited to a Cabinet meeting in which he witnessed a briefing
on the UN and Middle East Situation as well as the problem of refugees in the United States. Under Nixon's office, the presidential daily diaries reveal that the president would sometimes contact the Preacher for his own needs. On one occasion, Nixon called Graham three consecutive times without Graham picking up, and when Nixon finally got through to him, the president ironically complained about how difficult it was to get a hold of the Preacher when he needed him.

Rather than a single explanation, it is more likely that there were a variety of reasons that account for why the presidents were motivated to actively pursue a relationship with Graham, rather than simply respond or react to the man. For one, there is strong evidence to indicate that the presidents possessed a significant degree of genuine affection and respect for the Preacher. The telephone conversations and letters of correspondence between these men reveal a tone of friendliness and sincere concern. One particular conversation recorded Johnson and Graham casually grumbling on the perils of aging and exchanging advice on what type of pills to take. On another occasion, Johnson wrote a letter to Graham thanking him for his Christmas gift of “pretty cufflinks” and of “popcorn [that would] be devoured with much eagerness.” In writing to Reverend Pollock, Graham's biographer, Johnson sincerely affirmed that he would “never forget what it [was] like to have his companionship and his compassion, and to be better because of it.”

Nixon was known to have an even closer relationship with Graham than Johnson. ‘Dick’ wrote frequent letters to ‘Billy’ praising him for being an inspiration, and blessing and thanking him for “incisive and timely observations”. He constantly assured him that he was a “great source of strength for [him]” and gave him many “affectionate regards and warm wishes.” Moreover, it seems like the president took a genuine interest in Graham's opinion on political matters. In a White House memorandum, an aide reminded Harry R. Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff, that in addition to men like Nelson Rockefeller, Ronald Reagan, and John Connally, the president had also instructed him to contact Billy Graham on a weekly basis to update him on political situations and receive his opinions on these matters. The series of “talking points briefing papers” which the aides prepared for Haldeman saw him asking the Preacher for his impressions on how various groups in the country were reacting to specific events, such as Kissinger's secret negotiation with North Vietnam or the invasion and bombing of Cambodia. The Preacher was also asked to comment on how he thought Nixon would fare in California in the presidential election of 1972, as well as give feedback on how the president could strengthen his position and maintain local support. While there is nothing to prove that Nixon actually listened to Graham's advice, the fact that he instructed his aides to meet with Graham weekly indicate that the president saw the Preacher's viewpoints as respectable and worthy of consideration.

Subsequent personal oral history interviews with the presidents' assistants and friends confirm that Nixon and Johnson had some degree of genuine liking and respect for the Preacher. Arthur Krim, advisor to Johnson, admitted that the president was “obviously a fan of Billy’s” even if he was not a “fan of evangelism.” He revealed that Graham was often invited to visit Johnson's ranch in Texas and the two “seemed [to] like each other.” Such a sentiment can be corroborated by Lady Bird's interview in which she shared that Graham was a necessary feature of the Johnsons’ lives and Bird was grateful for the friendship that she and President Johnson shared with Billy Graham and his wife. In the case of Nixon, his assistant Charles Colson acknowledged that Nixon saw Graham as a “guy to talk over ideas and ask for opinions and reactions” and admitted that the president would “sound him out on things.” Moreover, Nixon and Johnson's letters of correspondence with Graham did not stop after these men stepped down from their office in the White House, but continued on for many years in frequency and intimacy, indicating that the presidents saw their friendship with Graham as more than just functional.

Yet, as demonstrated by Graham's 'friendship politics,' one observes that in reality, genuine friendships can coexist with hidden political agendas. Just because the presidents earnestly admired Graham and enjoyed his company does not negate the fact that they also saw the expediency of publicly associating themselves with him. Rather than allowing a purely organic relationship to form, the presidents carefully nurtured their relationship with Graham. This is strongly suggested by the entourage
of White House aides that strategized and fashioned the president’s public relationship with the Preacher. Soon after Johnson became president, his assistant Bill Moyers rejected an appeal from a minister who had requested that he utilize his personal friendship with Graham to encourage him to hold a crusade in Texas, a location that the minister felt was of crucial political importance.\(^{169}\) Moyers was hesitant to approach Graham because ‘the president and [himself had] gotten fairly close to Billy in the last 3 months … [and they] try to avoid anything that even appears to be using this relationship for a purpose other than the friendship and fellowship it brings.’\(^{170}\) The sense of caution in Moyer’s reply suggests a sense of strategy in the way in which Johnson groomed his relationship with Graham. Charles Colson, special counsel to President Nixon, admitted in an oral history interview that they “tried in many ways to use Billy Graham [and they were] in the business of manipulating religious leaders.” They attempted to make use of his mailing lists and also used him to assemble Evangelical leaders for a meeting in the White House so that they could “give them a real snow job.”\(^{171}\) Some of the president’s aides evidently did not share the President’s affection for the Preacher, and sometimes even went to the extent of mocking Graham. Haldeman once left a memo for Ehrlichman that wrote:

Billy Graham raised with the President today the point that postal rates for religious publications are being increased 400% while postal rates for pornography are only being increased 25%. Needless to say, the President was horrified to learn of this state of affairs and wants to know what we are doing about it.\(^{172}\)

Upon cultivating a friendship with the Preacher, the presidents attempted to exploit the relationship for various political ends. By 1973, Graham had become a world-famous evangelist who had reached more than 5 million people in 38 different countries.\(^{173}\) In the Gallup poll’s list of “Top 10 Most Admired Men in the World”, Graham has finished in the top ten 48 times since 1955, more than any other man since the poll started in 1948.\(^{174}\) Time Magazine even dubbed him the “Pope of Protestant America” between 1950-1990.\(^{175}\) The White House was aware of Graham’s widespread popularity and frequently attempted to make use of its friendship with Graham to shore up political support for the president among the Preacher’s adherents. A memo from State Senator John Colan to Richard Nixon, dated July 2, 1968, was labeled “Project Billy Graham” and had the stated goal “utiliz[ing] and develop[ing] in the most positive manner an endorsement of Richard Nixon by Billy Graham, the Christian Statesman.”\(^{176}\) The plan was to use Nixon’s friendship with Graham to garner votes for Nixon in the upcoming presidential election. “Project Billy Graham” was detailed, well thought through, and was conceived in four main stages. First, Graham would give the invocation at the Republican National Convention. Then, Nixon would then appear at Graham’s Pittsburgh Crusade and make a publicized house visit to Graham in North Carolina. Third, Decision Magazine was to cover a personal interview with Nixon, specifically in September 1968. Finally, Graham was to write a personal letter to everyone on his mailing lists requesting them to vote for Nixon if “God so leads.”\(^{177}\) Johnson also tried to make use of his friendship with Graham to gain political support, albeit in a less formal way. He would often ask Graham to accompany him to various events as a sign of symbolic support. For example, at the Convention of American Association of School Administrators, Johnson publicly remarked to the audience that he “brought Dr. Billy Graham along with [him] to do the praying.”\(^{178}\)

Moreover, the fact that every president since Eisenhower was known to have met up with Graham set a precedent for future presidents to desire to cultivate some form of public relationship with the Preacher. The Preacher himself constantly declared in his White House sermons that the presidents were given a “mandate higher than the ballot box.”\(^{179}\) In the inauguration prayer for Nixon in 1969, Graham proclaimed that it was God’s sovereignty that “permitted Richard Nixon to lead [America] at this momentous hour of history.”\(^{180}\) Hence, in gaining the friendship and endorsement of Graham, the president could legitimize his office as one that was a divine appointment by God. The fashioning of such an image was important to the president and his aides. In a note to Graham regarding his National Prayer Breakfast sermon in January 1973, Nixon’s aides requested that the Preacher specifically discuss the significance of a leader that was led by God.\(^{181}\)

Particularly with regard to U.S. intervention
in Vietnam, the presidents made use of their friendship with Graham to both garner support for the war among Evangelicals and to counter swelling opposition. As described in the previous section, Johnson had personally invited Graham to visit the troops in Vietnam in December 1966. This was clearly a political move considering that three months earlier, John Wesley White, another BGEA evangelist, had put in a request to preach to the army men in Vietnam but was rejected. White had been told that there was “sufficient chaplain strength in Vietnam,” and there was no need for an outside evangelist – and yet, three months later, Graham was asked by the White House to visit the troops. An increasingly war-weary public had begun to criticize the Johnson administration for prolonging the war. Recognizing this, the president mounted a public relations propaganda campaign to rally mass support for the war. This plan included making arrangements for influential American icons to visit Vietnam, as a symbolic gesture of support for the president and the war effort. Hence, Graham’s personal invitation to Vietnam was not unique; several other famous personalities, such as Cardinal Spellman and Bob Hope, had also been given the invite. After their visit, it was not the president but his aides that were tasked with writing “thank you” telegrams to those men, although these were signed off under Johnson’s name. Charles Maguire, an assistant to Johnson, wrote a tongue-in-cheek comment to Jim Jones saying, “Per your unchristian new year’s commands, here follows a host of ecumenical presidential telegrams.” President Nixon’s aides were also known to have done backroom strategizing on how to utilize Graham to garner support for the president’s Vietnam policies. In brainstorming ideas for Nixon’s Inauguration Day program in 1968, a White House aide proposed that Nixon visit wounded servicemen in the company of Billy Graham so that families of men in Vietnam would not feel neglected by the president.

Yet, the presidents were not necessarily always about exploiting Graham and his popularity. Graham’s noticeable influence on the world stage among people and politicians alike caused the Nixon administration to see the value in openly engaging him as a goodwill ambassador that could further the cause of American diplomacy. After all, the Preacher had long promoted to the presidents that he was willing to make use of his international crusades to ‘build a little goodwill for America.’ Graham also notably enjoyed easy access to government leaders around the world. When he flew around the world on his crusades, he would also often be invited to meet up with the ambassadors, admirals, generals, and heads of states of these countries. In September 1969, Graham informed the White House that Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had invited him to a private chat during her visit to Los Angeles. Henry Kissinger immediately instructed him to discuss the reaction of the American people to the Middle East situation and advised her on the “impossibility of [Nixon] standing by and watching the Middle East slip towards almost certain war without trying to help provide a political alternative.” In November 1971, Kissinger wrote to Haldeman revealing that Billy Graham had been asked by Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and the Generalissimo to go to Taipei to talk to them about a situation in China. The couple affirmed that “Billy Graham [was] the one person from [America] that they [would] listen to and would like to meet.” Hence, Nixon instructed Kissinger to give Graham a thorough briefing on U.S.-China policy and prepare talking points that he might use in his discussion with the Taiwanese president.

The relationship shared by Graham and the presidents was a multi-layered and dynamic one. The White House saw the benefit of a public friendship with the Preacher in shoring up domestic political support for the president. It also took advantage of Graham’s international prestige to secure the goodwill of foreign leaders. Hence, more often than not, interaction took place not just between two individuals, Preacher and president, but rather two institutions, Evangelicalism and the White House. Similar to how the Preacher had a whole organization and movement supporting him in his endeavors, the president had the backing and advice of the White House aides, counsels, and special assistants.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of that weekend, Reverend Graham planted a mustard seed in my soul, a seed that grew over the next year...It was the beginning of a new walk where I would recommit my heart to Jesus Christ” – George W. Bush, 1999

On September 14, 2001, three days after the
terrorists’ attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, a National Day of Prayer was called for the victims of the attacks. In this time of grief and mourning, President George W. Bush gave words of comfort from scripture, assuring the nation that “neither death nor life nor angels nor principalities, nor powers nor things present nor things to come nor height nor depth [could] separate [America] from God’s love.” America then went on to fulfill her God-mandated war on terrorism by invading Afghanistan and later Iraq. President Bush proudly defended that “the Liberty we prize [was] not America’s gift to the world, [but was] God’s gift to humanity.” Supporting this crusade of justice against Islamic terrorism, Reverend Ogilvie, chaplain of the U.S. Senate, prayed for the “consistency and constancy of God’s presence to help [America] battle the forces of evil manifested in…cowardly acts of terrorism.”

President Bush’s term in the White House seemed to mark the dawning of a new era where religion and politics seemed to consort confidently and unabashedly. Journalists and scholars alike were quick to pick up on this phenomenon. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. commented that Bush was the “most aggressively religious president Americans have ever had” and that “the religious right [had] become a potent force in national politics.” An article in the New York Times declared that Bush’s “faith-based” approach to his presidential office blurred the line between religion and politics more so than ever before. However, this essay takes the view that Bush’s religiosity was not a radical break from American diplomatic tradition. One look into America’s geopolitical history reveals quite the opposite; one only needs to replace “terrorists” with “communists” and “Global War on Terror” with “Cold War”. The enemy may have changed, but God had always been on America’s side, at least in the eyes of the Evangelicals and in the rhetoric of the politicians with whom they partnered.

While popular portraits of Graham in recent times may have depoliticized the man and turned him into a transcendent icon, the Preacher was very much a political actor in the heyday of his ministry in the fifties, sixties, and seventies. There was more to the man than met the eye, and he was one who shrewdly navigated and negotiated public and private spheres of power in order to steer the United States in what he deemed to be the right course. Unlike the overt and brusque style of the later Evangelical leaders, Graham’s particular brand of politics moving into the sixties was masterfully subtle. His strategy was that of ‘friendship politics’ whereby he cultivated a level of intimacy with Johnson and Nixon unmatched by any other religious leader at that time, and often leveraged upon this connection to gently nudge policymakers towards the Calvary.

Moreover, Graham’s foray into friendship politics did not simply remain in his partnership with Presidents who professed Christianity; he even went to the extent of pursuing a friendship with John F. Kennedy, America’s first Catholic president. Rather than completely disregard Kennedy solely on the basis of his Catholicism, Graham was a flexible political actor who was willing and swift to adapt to a new circumstance in order to gain access to Presidential power. Given the strained start to their relationship, Graham could have easily closed off all channels of communication with Kennedy once he came into office. Yet, in recognizing the need to sustain a relationship with the White House in order to maintain his political influence, the Preacher persisted in pursuing a friendship with Kennedy. He was quick to make public amends to his relationship with Kennedy. Shortly after the presidential election, Graham met up with Kennedy for lunch and a round of golf at Palm Beach. At a press conference that night, rather than continuing to warn against a Catholic president as he did before the election, Graham now praised Kennedy for easing Evangelical fears about having a Catholic in the White House.

Graham’s methods of interaction with Kennedy were also reminiscent of the same style of ‘friendship politics’ observed with Nixon and Johnson, albeit less intimate. When Kennedy’s father suffered a massive stroke on December 20, 1961, Graham immediately sent a telegram consoling the president and assuring him of God’s guidance in this time. He also requested on several occasions to meet the president at the White House. Graham even invited Kennedy to attend his crusade in Chicago in June 1962, a generous and conciliatory gesture in light of how hesitant Graham and the Evangelical community had been of Kennedy in the 1960 election. There is no evidence to show that Graham gave his opinion on Vietnam to Kennedy. However, this could be explained in part by the fact...
that there was little public knowledge or concern on the escalating war in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{200}

Graham’s relationship with Kennedy serves both as a qualifier and confirmation of this essay’s arguments. On one hand, it adds nuance by suggesting that religion is likely more influential in the White House if the president shares the same faith. On the other hand, it also confirms the case for Graham’s “friendship” style of politics. Although less intimate, Graham’s method of cultivating a relationship with Kennedy was very much similar to his approach towards Johnson and Nixon. Given that the Preacher was willing and ready to foster a friendship with a Catholic president, originally an opponent, and one known to be somewhat of a womanizer, it indicates that Graham probably also did not seek friendship with the latter two Presidents purely out of affection, or similarity in faith or personality, but rather in all three cases, Graham viewed ‘friendship’ as a strategic political move to build a power base in the White House. After all, following Kennedy’s assassination, and when Johnson and Nixon came into office and had trouble ending the Vietnam War, Graham was quite ready to put the blame for the war on Kennedy when questioned in public. In both a press conference in 1968 and a television interview in 1972, the President stated that it was President Kennedy that first committed to Vietnam and defended that Johnson had inherited a war that he could not pull out of.\textsuperscript{201} In a private conversation with Nixon in April 1971, Graham assured the President that he had a written an editorial for the New York Times in which he “put all the blame for the whole thing on Kennedy [since] he sent the first 16,000 combat people” to Vietnam.\textsuperscript{202}

All in all, this essay has attempted to tell both a religious and political history, and conceptualize a world in which faith and politics collide, overlap and intersect, and where the line between sacred and secular is often blurred. Political historians often neglect to take the religious perspective seriously, treating it as a sideshow unworthy of scholarly attention. On the other end of the spectrum, historians of religion have often shied away from politics, at most only focusing on how religion passively responded to the evolution of larger political culture. Through examining the political maneuvers of a key religious actor, this essay has showed that religion not only reacted to political trends but also actively sought to shape them.

This is not an essay about religion and politics in general, but specifically on the interplay of religion and matters of foreign policy. Graham’s political maneuvers and actions in this particular essay were studied in the context of the Vietnam War, and this was by no means a coincidence. If the narrative of Neo-Evangelicalism in American history is of a movement that had been shamed in U.S. public life and was now trying to reclaim its prominence in society, then the arena of war and diplomacy was the perfect space for the religious group to express and assert itself. The Evangelical brand of theology and eschatology encouraged a pro-war stance, a view that sometimes sat well with a nationalistic public and a perspective that was convenient for political figures who want to rhetorically justify the decision to go to war.\textsuperscript{203} History shows that in the United States, one does not only rally around the flag, but also around God’s flag. After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, foreign policy temporarily went out public consciousness, only to resurface with Reagan’s call for America to once again wage a relentless struggle against the Communist “evil empire”. He declared that it was “better to die in a nuclear war, still believing in God, than to live under atheistic communism.”\textsuperscript{204} This appeal to religious rhetoric was very much reminiscent to the jeremiads of the immediate post-war decade, and also the clarion calls of Bush’s war against Islamic terrorism.

Moreover, by demonstrating the attempts of Billy Graham and the Evangelical movement to voice support for the Vietnam War, this essay has also sought to chart a fresh direction in the study of the origins of America’s longest and most divisive war, a war which cannot be solely explained by conventional balance-of-power or realist explanations. It was not the ambition of this study to measure if religion had an actual impact or consequence on foreign policy decision in Vietnam, but perhaps this paper could be a stepping stone for future scholars to explore the topic.

Interestingly enough, it was the Reverend Billy Graham who was asked to give the sermon at the Prayer Service held in the aftermath of September 11. It may seem as if age had finally caught up with the man. Now an octogenarian, his wavy blond hair turned into a full crown of white and his deep-set blue eyes were now hidden behind prescription
glasses for farsightedness. But although the vigor and
electrifying voice of a once itinerant Preacher was no
more, Billy Graham spoke with the same measure of
stature and authority, and with the same conviction
that “God can be trusted even life is at its darkest.”

While he reviled the evil of the terrorist attack, his
chosen focus was on the nation's spiritual need for
renewal. The Preacher seemed an appropriate choice
for the event, for America had come to see Graham
as one above the fray of culture wars, partisan
debates, and the very “beacon of stability and
graciousness.”

According to some, “Billy Graham
has lasted so long because he seems to be true...he’s a
soft spoken man. In days when everything is so loud
and biased, he talks to people in a loving way.”

Yet, there has always been more to the man than meets
the eye. After all, the Preacher who had “planted a
mustard seed” in the soul of the man who eventually
led the United States to a God-guided war against
terrorism had long been sowing seeds in the heart
of a generation of politicians, carefully watering and
growing the friendships he had cultivated within the
White House, and patiently praying for the day that
fruit would come.

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12. Ibid, p. 27.


15. Billy Graham on Merv Griffin Show Interview Transcript (October 12, 1972), in Folder 10, Box 2, Collection 24, BGEA: Records of News Conferences, Archives of the Billy Graham Centre, Wheaton, Illinois.


20. Toft, Philpott and Shah, God’s Century, p. 45


23. Reflecting on the 1950s in his autobiography, Graham wrote, “I couldn’t preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ without clashing head-on with the various philosophies and ideologies that were vehemently opposed to Christianity – especially Communism” Billy Graham, Just As I am (New York, NY: HarperCollins Worldwide, 1997), p. 382.

24. Ibid, p. 381.


27. Billy Graham, Just As I Am, xvi.


30. Billy Graham News Conference in Columbus, Ohio (July 7, 1964) Archives of the Billy Graham Centre.

31. Ibid.

32. Sydney Crusade Press Conference (April 1, 1968), in Folder 9, Box 1, Collection 24, BGEA: Records of News Conferences, Archives of the Billy Graham Centre, Wheaton, Illinois.

33. Ibid.

34. Specifically, Graham wrote, “President Rhee made one statement that I will never forget. He said, “when you go back to America, tell the Americans not to have “peace at any price” as a slogan but make it “moral justice at any price.” Make that their slogan.” Graham, I saw your sons at war, p. 54.


40. Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith, pp. 440-441.

41. Ibid, p. 441.


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51. Ibid, p. 216.

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In July 2011, Pope Benedict XVI publicly condemned the ordination of Father Paul Lei Shiyin as Bishop, an appointment the Vatican had not previously approved. The conflict between Beijing and the Holy See over the appointment of Chinese bishops dates back to 1951, when China and Vatican broke diplomatic relations. This paper questions why the Vatican and the People’s Republic of China failed to establish normal relations between 1949 and 1989.

The literature on the diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Holy See is sparse. Beatrice Leung’s monograph *Sino-Vatican Relations: Problems in Conflicting Authority 1976-1986* is the most authoritative account of Sino-Vatican relations after 1949. Leung analyzes the major developments of Beijing-Vatican relations in terms of a clash of authority between the Pope and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).¹

Gerald Chan, a professor of International Relations at the University of Auckland, follows the same line of argument, pinpointing two specific issues of conflicting authorities: the Taiwan question and the problem of appointment of Chinese bishops.² Eric O. Hanson, a leading expert on Vatican diplomacy in Asia, among other authors, agrees with this position. However, he observes a gradual PRC-Vatican rapprochement in the 1980s.³ Likewise, Chinese academics focus on the conflicts of authority between China and the Vatican, often with a marked Sino-centric perspective.⁴ Although both Western and Chinese scholars have unearthed a wealth of factual information, their works devoted little attention to the Cold War context that the PRC grappled with after 1949.

Contrastingly, there is a wealth of literature on the history of both the Chinese Catholic Church and the missionary orders in China. Kim-Kwon Chan has written extensively on the peculiar theological situation of the Chinese Catholic Church. Jean Paul Wiest provided a detailed account of the Maryknoll Society’s activity in China during the first years of the PRC in *Maryknoll in China*.⁵ The late Lazlo Ladany, a Hungarian-born Jesuit and Sinologist based in Hong Kong, wrote an especially scathing account of the Communist Party’s harsh treatment of the Chinese Catholic Church.⁶ However, most authors writing on the Chinese Catholic Church tend to create a narrative of martyrdom. This position distracts from serious reflections on issues pertaining to the links between Sino-Vatican relations, Chinese religious policies, and the beginning and end of the Cold War for the PRC.

This paper will employ a different approach. Rather than focusing on bilateral problems between China and the Holy See, I will attempt to situate Sino-Vatican relations within the major shifts of PRC ideology and strategy during the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. This paper will argue that, although China’s exit from the Cold War expanded its strategy from unambiguous confrontation to gradual rapprochement towards the Vatican between 1949 and 1989, Beijing deliberately blocked any possibility of normalized relations. During China’s Cold War era (1949-1976), Mao’s ideological considerations largely influenced the dynamics of Sino-Vatican relations and restricted the PRC to a position of uncompromising hostility toward the Holy See. However, with Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the normalization of Sino-American relations and 1979 and the trial of the Gang of Four in 1981, China was no longer trapped in the ideological conflicts of the Cold War. With the end of the Chinese involvement in the Cold War, the PRC adopted a variety of courses of action throughout the 1980s, alternating between friendly and hostile policies toward the Vatican to pursue its strategic goals of modernizing the economy and safeguarding its sovereignty.
This essay is centered on an analysis of both English and Chinese primary sources pertaining to PRC-Holy See relations. The English-language primary sources include newspapers from Western media as well as published Vatican official documents. The Chinese-language primary sources comprise newspapers from the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), a major Party mouthpiece, as well as recently published collections of Party documents. This analysis is complemented by valuable factual information drawn from secondary literature. Important milestones from China’s Cold War history, such as the Korean War, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, will serve as the primary guides for analysis of primary and secondary sources. However, an exclusive focus on the Chinese Communist Party’s decisions is insufficient in achieving a full understanding of the major developments in Sino-Vatican relations between 1949 and 1989. Such understanding will require crucial, contextual information regarding the Vatican’s policies toward communist states in general and the history of the Chinese Catholic Church. Finally, the analysis of this paper relies heavily on public pronouncements of the Vatican, the CCP and the Chinese Catholic Church. Therefore, special attention is given to the language in these pronouncements. Following the tradition of “kremlinology,” I perform a close reading of official pronouncements with the assumption that specific formulations, or the lack of thereof, reveal crucial information about the implicit intentions of both Chinese and Vatican policy-makers.

A preliminary clarification of terminology is in order. First, this paper does not define “ideology” as fabricated rhetoric that historical agents can espouse or discard at will to further and hide their “true” intentions. Recent Cold War scholarship by Chen Jian and Lorenz Lüthi have amply demonstrated that ideology played a crucial role in shaping the decisions of the Chinese leaders during the Maoist era. That is why this paper defines “ideology” as a worldview that allows historical agents to make sense of their world and shapes and constrains their decisions. Furthermore, by the terms “Chinese Catholic Church” or “Chinese National Church,” this paper designates the Chinese Church as a whole. By “Chinese Patriotic Church” this paper means the portion of the Chinese Catholic Church that is subservient to the CCP, and by “underground Church,” this paper specifically refers to the part of the Chinese Church that resists the CCP by proclaiming their loyalty to the Pope. Little is known about this resistance underground Church, and any discussion on the topic exceeds the scope of this paper. Finally, this paper uses the term “Universal Church” to identify the worldwide organization of the Catholic Church as a whole. This term opposes the term “Chinese Catholic Church,” which merely designates the National Church in China. It is important not to confuse the “Universal Church” with “Vatican” and “The Holy See,” since the two latter terms are used to refer to the Vatican as a strictly political entity capable of entering diplomatic relations with other political entities.

VATICAN AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC (1945-1989)

Under Pope Pius XII (1939-1958), the Vatican’s foreign policy was firmly entrenched in an anti-Communist orientation. As post-war Eastern Europe gradually became Sovietized, Pope Pius XII exhorted Catholic believers under Communist rule to stick to their faith and attacked those who chose collaboration. In 1946, Pius XII encouraged imprisoned Ukrainian bishops to “proclaim and preach Christ” despite “being in bonds.” The Pope forcefully asserted that “it was absolutely unlawful, even merely exteriorly or verbally, to abandon Christ and his Church.” He threatened Catholic collaborators with the punishment of excommunication. Furthermore, Pius XII ordered several secret consecrations of bishops as a pre-emptive measure, in case existing bishops in Communist countries were put in jail. For example, the Pope had the American Bishop Gerald Patrick O’Hara secretly consecrate Joseph Schubert as Bishop for the Romanian Church in June 1950. Schubert was arrested shortly afterwards in February 1951. Pius XII’s intransigence placed the Catholic clergy in a difficult position causing Communists to feel less restrained in carrying out their anti-religious campaigns. Due to his anti-Fascist credentials, Czech Communists did not dare touch Archbishop Joseph Beran for a long time. Suddenly, the Archbishop found himself placed under house arrest in 1949 and interned in village cloisters for fourteen years. Despite the problematic situations

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\[1\] This essay cites the Renmin Ribao extensively for two reasons. First, the content of Renmin Ribao articles should not be dismissed as mere propaganda: as the official newspaper of the CCP, the Renmin Ribao directly revealed information about the policies and positions of the Party leadership. Second, Renmin Ribao was the only Chinese-language newspaper whose database the author could access using the resources of McGill University.
of the clergy in Communist countries, the Holy See failed to provide concrete assistance to the Churches under attack.\textsuperscript{10}

Pope Pius XII died on October 9, 1958. His successor, John XXIII (1958-1963), took drastic steps in improving the Vatican's relations with Communist countries. In initiating the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Pope laid the groundwork for an eventual détente with the Communist powers, which brought substantial doctrinal revisions aimed at modernizing the Church. As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, John XXIII promoted peace and offered to mediate the conflict.\textsuperscript{11} The Pope engaged Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev directly. In March 7, 1963, the Pope received Khrushchev's daughter and son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, during a papal audience and in private.\textsuperscript{12} Although the Pope evaded Adzhubei's question of whether the Holy See wanted diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, he concluded the meeting on a pleasant note by personally blessing the couple's children. John XXIII was able to secure the release of the Ukrainian Metropolitan Josef Slipyj and several other imprisoned bishops as well by directly improving relations with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{13}

With the death of John XXIII, Pope Paul VI (1963-1978) continued his predecessor's approach of engaging dialogue with Communist powers. Having inherited the "spirit of the Vatican II," Paul VI now pursued a consistent policy of Ostpolitik based on the following principles: 1) the goal of negotiations was not to increase prestige of the Holy See, but rather to create conditions that make pastoral life possible, and 2) partial temporary solutions are always better than Concordats by virtue of their flexibility. Ostpolitik under Paul VI's tenure yielded varying degrees of success for different countries. In the case of Yugoslavia, the Vatican was able to sign a "protocol" in 1966, which guaranteed the National Church's jurisdiction over religious and spiritual questions in exchange for a de-politicization of the Church itself.\textsuperscript{14} Relations with Yugoslavia were later normalized in 1970. The Hungarian Church fared far worse. Both Vatican diplomats and the Hungarian Communist leaders were frustrated with Cardinal Mindszenty's stubborn and confrontational attitude. Negotiations did not yield an improvement of the pastoral life in Hungary.\textsuperscript{15} Paul VI's Ostpolitik was not restricted to Europe. He also attempted, without much success, to set himself up as a peace mediator in the conflict between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the United States. Though the Americans reacted favorably to his role of mediator, the Vietnamese rebuked his appeals.\textsuperscript{16}

After the death of Paul VI in 1978, Vatican policy toward Communist States became more assertive and confrontational under Pope John Paul II (1978-2005). The new Pope publicly condemned the "state totalitarianism of this century" as a "threat to mankind" in March 1979.\textsuperscript{17} When John Paul II visited his native Poland in June 1979, he exhorted the Polish Catholics to "not [be] afraid." His message generated widespread euphoria among the Polish population and embarrassed the Communist rulers of the country.\textsuperscript{19} The Pope actively lent his support to Lech Walesa's Solidarity Labor organization, which emerged from the 1980 strikes of the Gdansk shipyard. Nonetheless, John Paul II did not completely return to the confrontational policies of Pius XII. That he named Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the architect of Paul VI's Ostpolitik, his Secretary of State in 1979 indicated that he did not wish to rule out negotiation.\textsuperscript{20} Although John Paul II was committed to his predecessor's Ostpolitik, he also encouraged resistance within the Eastern European Catholic Churches by adopting new, morally assertive rhetoric. John Paul II's policies of resistance encouragement would not have been possible without the negotiated settlements under Paul VI that ensured the Catholic Church's survival in Eastern European communist countries.

**ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH**

The history of Sino-Vatican relations was full of complex interactions. China's first significant contacts with Catholic missionaries occurred in the sixteenth century, just as the Spanish and Portuguese sailed the seas and expanded their colonial empires. Jesuit Missionary Matteo Ricci, having been granted an audience with the Ming Emperor Wanli, traveled to Beijing in 1601. Ricci, like most Jesuit missionaries of his time, wanted to spread the Gospel in China through the conversion of ruling elites. Ricci soon established himself in a favorable position within the Beijing imperial court. His knowledge of the modern sciences and technologies and his successful conversion of powerful mandarins such as Xu Guangqi was valuable to the dynasty. Ricci studied the Confucian classics extensively, advocating that Christian teachings were
compatible and complementary to Confucius’s ideas.21

Even when the Qing dynasty took over China in 1644, the Jesuit missionaries did not lose their influence among the ruling classes. Jesuit Adam Schall von Bell became director of the Astronomical Bureau at the imperial court of Emperor Shunzhi. Under the Emperor Kangxi, this post was given to Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest. However, the good fortunes of the Jesuits and the Catholic Church would soon come to an end with the controversy surrounding the Confucian Rites.22

When Charles Maigrot, the Vicar Apostolic in Fujian, issued a decree forbidding Chinese Christians to practice the Confucian rites of ancestral worships in March 1693, Emperor Kangxi called for missionaries to adhere to Ricci’s policies of accommodation. The Jesuits advocated for conciliation, while the Dominicans, Franciscans, and other missionaries took a hardline against the Confucian rites. Pope Clement XIV suppressed the Jesuits in 1773.23

The persecutions severely crippled the ecclesiastical leadership of the Chinese Catholic Church. The lay communities took active measures to ensure the survival of their faith. Catholic communities became tightly organized around clans, with clan leaders managing the affairs of the local churches.24 Women known as “Virgins” dedicated their lives to the service of the Chinese Church by caring for chapels, leading prayers at mass, and charging themselves with the religious instruction of Catholic children.25 The Chinese Catholics preserved a regular rhythm of pastoral life through the creation of a lay leadership.

With the Qing defeat at the hands of Western imperialist powers during the Opium Wars and the signature of “unequal treaties” by the mid-19th century missionary work resumed in China. The new Catholic missionaries, having made their way into China by riding the tidal wave of Western imperialism, clashed with the indigenous lay leadership of the Catholic communities. They quickly imposed their own authority. Wrestling the leadership from the hands of Catholic clan leaders and “Virgins,” the Chinese Catholic Church once more became a foreign church as the new missionaries established themselves as its leaders. Nonetheless, the presence of foreign missionaries guaranteed the safety and growth of the Chinese Church.

With the increasingly visible presence of the foreign missionaries, Christianity acquired the stigma of imperialist encroachment in the eyes of the Chinese population. The Confucian literati-gentry viewed the Christian doctrine as a threat against their traditions. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 targeted both foreign and Chinese Christians, and the superstitious rebels equated Christianity with evil. The overall negative picture of Christianity would remain in the hearts and minds of the Chinese long after the departure of Western imperialists.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the Vatican pushed for indigenization of the clergy of the Chinese Catholic Church. Pope Benedict XV (1914-1922) and Pope Pius XI (1922-1939), in 1919 and 1926, respectively, called for foreign missionaries to cede their posts to Chinese priests. Their efforts yielded few results; the foreign missionaries seemed reluctant to relinquish their positions of leadership. The normalization of Sino-Vatican relations in 1939 did not improve the situation. Only in 1946 did the Chinese Catholic Church officially become a national church; even by then, foreigners still dominated its ecclesiastical leadership.26

RELIGION AND THE UNITED FRONT

Anti-imperialist ideology guided the CCP’s United Front tactics during the first decade of PRC history. In September 1949, as the Communist takeover of the country neared its completion, the People’s Political Consultative Conference (PCC) adopted a statement containing a set of guidelines for the future of the PRC called the Common Program. Article 13 of the Common Program stipulated that the PCC was to be organized along the lines of a “Popular Democratic United Front.” This included representatives from the working class, the intellectuals, the ethnic minorities, and other “patriotic elements.”27 Article 7 called for the suppression of “counterrevolutionary imperialist activities” in China.28 The purpose of the CCP’s United Front tactics was, in the words of United Front Work
Department Director Li Weihan, the simultaneous “creation of alliances and carrying out of struggles.”

It was necessary to ally with “patriotic elements” from all social strata in order to “isolate the lingering imperialist influences.”

The CCP’s United Front tactics harkened back to Mao’s “mass line.” The Party had to ally itself with the patriotic masses in order to purge the country of imperialist influence.

The nature of the United Front Work Department activities was contingent upon the major ideological developments in China. Both Li Weihan and Premier Zhou Enlai identified two dominant types of relationships that were important to the CCP’s United Front tactics: the relationship between classes and the one between Party and non-Party elements, which included religious groups, minority parties, and ethnic minorities.

United Front tactics amounted to a dual policy of “alliances and struggles” toward both the non-proletarian classes and the non-Party elements. Major ideological upheavals, such as the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Campaign of 1950-1951, the Hungarian Crisis in 1956, the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957, and the Great Leap Forward of 1958 exerted considerable strain on United Front activities. During those events, intellectuals and religious leaders critical to the Party were purged under the guise of anti-imperialist struggle. Pro-CC non-Party elements were exalted for their “patriotism.” In 1960, at the end of the Great Leap Forward, Li Weihan urged non-Party elements to “stick very close to the CCP as socialist transformations reached a new height.”

Despite the ideological strains, class relationships and party-to-non-party dealings still formed two separate dimensions of United Front policies up to the mid-1960s. Anti-imperialism did not specifically entail struggle against non-proletarian and peasant classes. Cooperation with the CCP was the sole criterion for “patriotism.” However, when class struggle displaced the mass line as the central component of Mao’s ideological discourse, the United Front Work Department was shut down altogether. The Party’s dealings with non-Party elements no longer appeared necessary now that class struggle propelled to the ideological foreground.

The United Front Work Department was reopened in 1975, yet it would only acquire a new orientation in the post-Mao era. Under Deng Xiaoping, class struggle gradually phased out from official rhetoric, with “economic modernization” replacing it as the watchword of the day. Party to non-Party relations was now the only remaining dimension of the United Front policies. The scope of the Party’s United Front work would expand considerably internationally as the Chinese leadership sought the cooperation of the Guomindang for a peaceful reunification with Taiwan.

The religious policies of the CCP were closely connected to United Front work, that is, to the management of Party to non-Party relations. The “alliance and struggle” tactic was a recurring theme in the relations between the CCP and the Chinese Catholic Church. The concrete application of this tactic changed in accordance with the fluctuations of Mao’s ideology, which in turn impacted the dynamics of the CCP’s relations with both the Vatican and the Chinese Catholic Church. Therefore, Sino-Vatican relations should be analyzed in terms of relations between states and interactions between the Party and non-Party elements.

1949-1952: IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION

Between 1949 and 1952, the Chinese Communist Party’s policies toward Vatican and the Chinese Catholic Church showed an ideological commitment to the principle of anti-imperialism. Since foreigners dominated the ecclesiastical leadership of the Chinese National Church, the CCP perceived it was waging an actual battle against imperialist encroachments within the country. This perception heightened as the Korean War broke out, and the resulting tension fueled the domestic mobilization of both the Party and the Chinese Catholics against the foreign leadership of the Chinese Church. Consequently, the Korean War limited the strategic options of China toward Vatican to unequivocal confrontation.

As the Chinese Communist Party consolidated its foothold in mainland China, it deployed its United Front tactics against all religious groups within the country, including the Chinese Catholic Church. The CCP supported potential pro-Communist sympathizers and collaborators within the Chinese Catholic Church to attack its foreign, “imperialist” leadership. In May 1950, during a series of four meetings with Chinese Protestant leaders, Premier Zhou Enlai called for all religious groups to maintain their “anti-imperialist resolve” and to “cut off their ties with American imperialism.” Upon concluding these meetings, Zhou, together with Protestant leaders, produced a Manifesto that called for all religious
groups to cleanse themselves of “imperialist influence by adhering to following principles of autonomy: “self-governance”, “self-financing” and “self-propagation.”

The manifest outlined the core principles of what would be later known as the “Three-Self Movement.”37

On August 19, 1950, the Central Committee of the CCP issued a document that identified Chinese Catholic and Protestant Churches as potential loci of imperialist spying operations. The document explicitly endorsed the Three-Self Movement, citing the necessity to rally “patriotic” elements among Chinese Catholics and emphasized the need to implement “appropriate programs of political education” within education establishments under the Chinese Catholic Church’s control.38 Beijing simultaneously launched sporadic propaganda attacks against the Vatican. Various newspaper articles that appeared in the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) referred to “Vatican-headed Catholic Church reactionary groups” as agents of the U.S.-lead imperialist camp.39 However, the anti-imperialist rhetoric in the CCP’s articulation of its religious policies did not seem to elicit any immediate response from the Chinese Catholic Church.

Archbishop Antonio Riberi, the Vatican’s nuncio40 to China, showed no willingness to placate the sensibilities of the CCP. Closely adhering to Pope Pius XII’s anti-Communist stance, Riberi encouraged resistance within the Chinese Catholic Church. Appointed nuncio to China in 1946, Riberi decided to stay in Nanjing in 1949 and defiantly presented his credentials to the newly established Communist government. Prior to the CCP victory in 1949, Riberi already began to sponsor the growth of the Legion of Mary in China, an international Catholic organization engaged in spiritual work centered on devotion to the Holy Virgin founded in Ireland in the 1920s.40 The organization had a quasi-military structure. It was divided in small groups, each active in recruiting young Catholic women in parishes and high schools and universities. The Legion held weekly sessions of catechism study, during which they prayed, studied theology, and engaged in doctrinal refutation of Marxist theory.41 Though the organization purported to be apolitical, Riberi no doubt saw its potential as a grassroots resistance movement against the CCP.

The Party was deeply wary of the Legion of Mary, especially as it became involved in the subsequent Shanghai resistance movement organized around Bishop Ignatius Gong Pinmei. Riberi’s patronage of the Legion would eventually provide ammunition for the CCP’s subsequent denunciations of his “imperialist” activities.

The advent of the Korean War drastically changed PRC-Holy See relations, as well as the relations between the CCP and the Chinese Catholic Church. The Xinhua News Agency, in a Renmin Ribao article of November 12, 1950, accused the Vatican and the United States of employing “Catholic reactionary groups” for joint espionage in China and Korea.42 In the face of the intensifying political pressure from the CCP, certain Catholics priests and lay leaders of the Guangyuan County in Sichuan province issued a Manifesto toward the end of November 1950, proclaiming that the Catholic Church of Guangyuan would embark on a “Movement of Autonomy and Self-Renewal.” The Guangyuan Manifesto, while “resolutely stating that the Guangyuan Catholic Church would sever its ties with U.S.-Imperialists,” also exhorted Catholics to adhere to the “Three-Self Movement” and to “Resist America, aid Korea through concrete actions.”43 The Guangyuan Manifesto was the first public declaration in which leaders from the Catholic clergy and laity adopted the CCP’s anti-U.S. imperialism rhetoric. Nonetheless, for all their staunch defense of their “patriotic” credentials, the authors of the Manifesto did not explicitly voice their support of the Party, nor did they openly and unambiguously associate the Vatican with U.S. imperialism.43

In 1951, the intervention of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army drove the armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula to a military stalemate. The Chinese Catholic Church felt the intensifying pressures of the CCP’s efforts of domestic ideological mobilization. On January 23, 1951, a group of patriotic priests from the diocese of Nanchong in Sichuan Province issued a Manifesto that, for the first time, publically called for the “severance of economic and communicative ties with the Vatican.”44 According to official press reports, Catholic and Protestant believers actively participated in the demonstrations of the “Resist America, Aid Korea” campaign, “enthusiastically shouting patriotic

ii An Apostolic nuncio, or papal nuncio, is a diplomatic representative of the Holy See that is equivalent to the rank of an ambassador or plenipotentiary. The nuncio is appointed by the Holy See and acts as its envoy or permanent representative to a state or international organization. The nuncio is the head of the Apostolic Nunciature, a diplomatic mission of the Holy See equivalent to an embassy.

iii The motives of the collaborators is difficult to assess: some probably sought to curry favor with the CCP to rise to a prominent positions within the Church, while others only cooperated out of fear. Some priests possibly even supported the anti-imperialist initiatives of the CCP.
The Sichuan Catholics were not the only “patriotic” collaborators that rallied to the Communist United Front. On March 31, the Nanjing Vicar General Li Weiguang issued a public statement proclaiming the Nanjing Catholic community’s “severance of its political and economic ties with the Curia” and adherence to the “Three-Self Movement.” The statement accused American imperialists of “using the [Catholic] Church to conduct activities detrimental to the people” and promised that Catholics will “show no less patriotic enthusiasm in participating in the Resist America Aid Korea enterprise.” Shortly after the publication of this manifesto, Riberi denounced it in a pastoral letter and urged bishops to remain loyal to Rome.

As the CCP rallied “patriotic” Chinese Catholic leaders to its United Front, it also moved against foreign missionaries within the Chinese Church. A document of the Central Committee, issued on March 5, recommended the active isolation of “foreign reactionary elements” within the Chinese Catholic Church to separate them from the “patriotic masses.” The CCP resorted, among other tactics, to the staging of public accusations. “Patriotic” Catholic leaders would often publicly accuse foreign missionaries of maintaining espionage networks for American imperialists. Between March 24 and March 26, during an accusation meeting organized at the Catholic Huayang high school in Kaifeng, Li Maode, a sainarian, denounced Bishop Gaetano Pollio and Reverend Amelio Crotti for allegedly spreading “counterrevolutionary teachings” in order to sabotage the Three-Self Movement. In a Renmin Ribao article, “Patriotic” Catholic priests from the Tianjin diocese leveled charges of embezzlement against Bishop Jean de Vienne on May 28, 1951, the CCP wanted to use the confessions in its propaganda campaigns against the “imperialist agents of the Catholic Church.” Incarcerated priests who refused to sign confessions were subjected to psychological torture, consisting of verbal abuse during interrogations, Marxist discussion groups, and harassment by prison guards.

Ultimately, most foreign missionaries, after a period of incarceration, were expelled from China. A few of them, like Bishop James Walsh, would remain behind bars until 1970. In 1948, there were 5500 missionaries in China; however, by 1952, two-thirds had been expelled. As with the denunciations and the arrests, the CCP also conducted the expulsions of foreign missionaries with much publicity. For example, five months after the expulsion of Bishop Jean de Vienne on May 28, 1951, the Renmin Ribao published “additional incriminating evidence,” namely a written note to Father Alfred Bonningue containing
“counterrevolutionary instructions.” By increasing the publicity of the expulsions of foreign missionaries, the CCP sought to heighten the perceived tangibility of the internal threats it professed to combat, thus reinforcing its campaign of domestic mobilization within the context of the Korean War.

The CCP handled the expulsion of nuncio Archbishop Riberi in an especially dramatic manner. Prior to Riberi’s expulsion, on May 24, 1951, the official press accused the Archbishop of encouraging “opposition the patriotic movement among the Chinese Catholics.” Other inflammatory articles followed suit, publicly denouncing the activities of the Catholic Central Bureau (CCB), an agency under the direct control of the Archbishop and calling for his expulsion. Through such media attacks, the CCP sought to convey that the demand to expel Riberi came from within the Catholic community. Beijing expelled Riberi in early September, fulfilling this “demand.”

The expulsion of Riberi was hailed as a major victory in the struggle against “imperialist efforts to use the Catholic Church to infiltrate China.” According to the Xinhua News Agency, Riberi was guilty of “partaking in the counterrevolutionary activities of Jiang-bandit [Chiang Kai-shek], sponsoring the operations of American spies such as Antonio Riva and Tarcisio Martina” and “creating the counterrevolutionary Legion of Mary.”

By conjuring a sustained storm of media attacks surrounding the expulsion of Riberi, the CCP sought to maximize the propaganda effect of the affair, which would fuel its Resist-America-Aid-Korea campaign of ideological mobilization. The Riberi affair was also the culmination of a direct diplomatic conflict between China and the Vatican. The CCP took active steps to escalate this conflict since the advent of the Korean War. The expulsion of the nuncio swept away all hopes and illusions for the establishment of normal relations between Vatican and the PRC.

1956-1958:IDEOLOGICAL RADICALIZATION AND QUASI-SCHISM

In the wake of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, as well as the subsequent Hungarian Crisis of October-November 1956, the CCP began radicalizing its ideology. Internationally, Mao felt that the center of world revolution was shifting from Moscow to Beijing. Domestically, in order to avoid a Hungarian style revolt, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign, hoping to relieve the oppositional pressure of the CCP. However, he only received a bloody nose as criticism of the CCP became more widespread. The Hundred Flower Campaign was then transformed into the Anti-Rightist Campaign; the CCP sought to silence its critics and crack down on opposition among the intellectuals. It was within this context that the CCP’s new campaign of ideological mobilization forced the Chinese Catholic Church into a quasi-schismatic position.

As the Anti-Rightist Campaign gained momentum in 1957, anti-Vatican invectives, which had lessened by 1953, reappeared in the official press. Chinese Catholics who did not adhere to the “Patriotic” movement were dubbed “[r]ightists who sought to promote the reactionary agenda of the Vatican.” The spotlight of the media attacks fell not only on the Vatican, but also on the Chinese Catholics who refused to cooperate with the CCP’s design to set up a rival Catholic Church with little economic or political ties with the Vatican. Newspaper articles often featured “outraged Patriotic Catholics” condemning the “counterrevolutionary Gong Pinmei group” for carrying out “seditious” schemes of the Vatican.

Even though Gong and other core leaders of the Shanghai Catholic resistance movement were already arrested in 1955, they remained perfect targets for the CCP’s anti-Vatican propaganda, not able to escape subsequent media scrutiny.

In the middle of the Anti-Rightist campaign, the CCP established the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), an organization that would become the instrument through which the CCP consolidated its United Front with the Catholic Church by implementing policies of control and mobilization. The CPA comprised “Patriotic” pro-CCP leaders among the Catholic laity and clergy. Its explicit goal was to set up an “autonomous self-governed Church” that opposed the “undue interference of Vatican in China’s internal politics.” In establishing the CPA, patriotic Catholics also proclaimed their “unwavering resolve to follow the socialist road.” However, despite all their inflammatory utterances, the “Patriotic Catholics” refrained from proclaiming a spiritual break with the Vatican. Lin Ziding, the Vicar-General of Fujian, was quoted saying that under “acceptable circumstances that did not infringe on the interests of the Motherland, it was possible to maintain purely
religious ties with the Vatican.”70 “Patriotic” Catholics also vehemently protested against the charge that they were pushing for a schism. Rather, they insisted that the Pope erred in excommunicating patriotic priest Li Weiguang.71

In 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, a series of radical economic policies of socialist transformation. Ultimately, these radical changes brought intense famines that claimed millions of lives. Between 1958 and 1960, as ideological radicalization reached new heights, the CCP intensified its United Front tactics toward the Chinese Catholic Church. On February 5, 1958, the authorities arrested Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming, Apostolic administrator of the Guangdong (Canton) diocese.72 Deng’s crimes were enumerated at length in the official press: accused of carrying out the counterrevolutionary instructions of the Vatican, sponsoring spying networks throughout China, and sabotaging the anti-imperialist patriotic movement of the Chinese Catholic Church. In March, the Chinese Catholic Church organized conferences across China during which patriotic leaders publicly endorsed socialism and the Chinese Communist Party, while condemning “rightists elements within the Church who did the bidding of American imperialists.”73 The heightened zeal of the “patriotic” leadership, in conjunction with the arrest Bishop Deng, a highly respected leader within the Catholic clergy, were indications of the ideological radicalization underpinning the CCP’s United Front tactics toward the Chinese Catholic Church.

The most controversial development occurred in April 1958, when the Patriotic leadership, for the first time, consecrated bishops without the approval of Rome. On April 13, Bishop Li Daonan presided over the consecration ceremony of Dong Guangqing and Yuan Wenhua. The Xinhua News agency described the consecration as “a path breaking move for the Catholic Patriotic movement.”74 Since bishops, according to Canon law, could not be consecrated without papal approval, the move of the CPA was blatantly schismatic. Nonetheless, Pope Pius XII spoke ambiguously about the consecrations in the Encyclical Ad Apostolorum Principis: the consecrations were “valid” because they were performed by legitimate bishops, but remained “illicit” without the prior consent of the Holy See.75

On April 26, the Propaganda Fide issued a document in the Osservatore Romano threatening Father Dong and Father Yuan of excommunication were they to proceed with their ordination.76 Nonetheless, the Pope refrained from carrying out the excommunication because such a move would have amounted to an explicit recognition of a schism in the Chinese Catholic Church.

Thus, at the height of the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 and the Great Leap Forward of 1958, the CCP further heightened its tensions with the Vatican. As Pius XII continued uttering his anti-communist quips, China brought its national Catholic Church to a quasi-schismatic situation by creating the CPA and by consecrating its own bishops without the approval of Rome. Although pro-Communist associations of Catholics similar to the CPA existed in Eastern European communist regimes, the Chinese went further than the Eastern Europeans by appointing their own bishops. During the Great Leap Forward, the radical ideology environment was such that deliberate confrontation against the Holy See was the only logical choice for the Chinese leaders.


Between 1958 and 1976, the Vatican had continuously made appeals for dialogue. However, Beijing remained “ideologically deaf.” Since Mao viewed China’s grand strategy in terms of world revolution and class struggle, the choices of Vatican were also understood through those ideological lenses. First, the increasingly close interactions between Vatican and the Soviet Union reinforced the Chinese perception of Vatican as an enemy because Beijing’s ideological conflict with the Soviet Union escalated during the 1960s. Second, Paul VI’s attempts at mediation in the Second Indochina War also gave significant ammunition for the propaganda of Chinese newspapers, since Mao sought to use the international tensions surrounding the Vietnam conflict for the purpose of domestic mobilization. The ideological commitment of the Chinese leaders to anti-revisionism and the Vietnam conflict subsequently locked Beijing in a stance of hostility toward the Vatican. Even as China reoriented its strategy toward rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s, it still remained unwilling to improve relations with Vatican.

While John XXIII made significant strides in lowering tensions with the Soviet Union, he vacillated on the question of China. The ordinations of Bishop Dong and Bishop Yuan without Papal approval posed
not only a political problem but also a doctrinal difficulty. Pius XII died before taking a clear position on the issue. In a 1958 encyclical, John XXIII deposed the weakness and fear of illicit bishops for driving China toward a schism.77 The Pope also accused the CCP for pursuing “a plan to force Our Children to obey false pastors.”78 However, in November 1962, after consulting with his China experts, the Pope promised not to use the word “schism” to describe the Church in China. Furthermore, twenty bishops who had worked in China signed a declaration stipulating that the Chinese Church was not schismatic.79 In banning the use of the word “schism” from Vatican’s subsequent discussion of China, the Pope avoided a de jure severance of spiritual ties with the Chinese National Church, hoping to open a window for further dialogue with the CCP and reconciliation with the Chinese Church.

The CCP, in the midst of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward, remained indifferent to the shift of Vatican’s attitude toward Communism. The ideologically charged invectives against Vatican persisted in official press throughout the whole duration the newly elected liberal Pope’s tenure. In 1959, at the Second National People’s Congress, Catholic delegates Li Weiguang and Hu Wenyao accused the Vatican of “mixing politics with religion” for the purpose of serving reactionary imperialists.80 The CCP did not neglect to portray the Vatican as a reactionary servant of the “imperialist United States”: the Xinhua News Agency identified the Vatican and the Peace Corps as President Kennedy’s “tools of invasion” that were meant to “support his projects of armed invasion.”81 Furthermore, the Xinhua News Agency never failed to stress that the Vatican was “resolutely opposed” to Marxist ideology.82 The sustained ideologically charged media attacks against the Vatican throughout the tenure of John XXIII suggested that the CCP had no intention to either de-escalate the PRC’s tensions with the Holy See or mitigate its aggressive United Front tactics toward the Chinese Catholic Church.

Paul VI, unlike his predecessors, directly appealed to the CCP leaders for dialogue. Shortly after his election in 1963, Paul VI sent a message to CCP leaders stressing the compatibility of the Catholic faith and patriotism toward China.83 In 1967, he renewed his direct appeals for peace to China.84 Paul VI’s overtures were largely built on John XXIII’s groundwork of purging the word “schism” from the Vatican’s discussions on China. During a speech at the United Nations in 1965, he called for universal membership at the UN, hinting that the PRC should be admitted in the organization.85 In attempting rapprochement with the PRC, Paul VI distanced himself from Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in Taiwan. During a visit to Hong Kong in 1970, when meeting a Taiwanese delegation, Paul VI did not make any commitment toward anti-Communism that would have reassured the Taiwanese; he instead focused on general questions of spirituality.86

The 1960s saw the escalation of two major Cold War conflicts: the ideological split between China and the Soviet Union, and the military confrontation that pitted North Vietnamese (Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or DRV) Communist forces against the armies of South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam, or RVN) and the United States. The roots of the Sino-Soviet ideological split could be traced as far back as the CCP’s inner party conflicts between Mao and the Comintern-backed Chinese cadres in the 1930s. However, recent scholarship identified the following crucial turning points that heralded the ideological split: Khruschev’s Secret Speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 and his unpleasant exchanges with Mao in 1958 regarding the creation of a Sino-Soviet joint fleet stationed in the PRC’s coastal area.87 As for the Vietnam War, the United States provided limited military and financial aid to the South Vietnamese regime beginning in the 1950s. However, it was only after the Tonkin incident in August 1964 that the Johnson administration began escalating an undeclared war against Indochinese Communist forces. The PRC, on its part, pledged significant military and material assistance to the DRV. Strangely enough, the Holy See had an uncanny ability to involve itself in the PRC’s important ideological conflicts. Consequently, Beijing’s perception of Vatican drastically changed as its ideological rifts with the Soviet Union deepened.

Although the Chinese Communists were dismayed with Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin, they did not immediately proclaim a public break with the Soviet Union. Prior to 1958, the Vatican was still considered an “anti-Soviet”, imperialist foe.88 However, as the ideological disagreements between China and the Soviet Union came to the fore, the CCP gradually began to portray the Vatican as an ally of Soviet revisionism. The gradual Soviet-Vatican
rapprochement that resulted from the Holy See’s Ostpolitik in the 1960s provided ample ammunition for the Party polemists of the state-controlled media. On October 28, 1963, the Renmin Ribao released an Albanian editorial that denounced the “Khrushchevite clique” for “raising the banner of betrayal and split” and for seeking rapprochement with “the enemies of socialism and peace,” which included the Vatican.89

During the Cultural Revolution, the ideological fulminations of the official press painted a colorful picture of the “Soviet-Vatican connivance.”90 A Renmin Ribao article in April 1967 denounced the “hypocrisy of Paul VI’s criticisms of colonialism” and the “dishonesty of Soviet Revisionists for praising the Pope’s so-called anti-capitalist and anti-colonialist credentials.”91 On May 8, 1967, the Xinhua News Agency released excerpts of an Albanian editorial, which argued that “the Vatican, the American Imperialists and the Soviet Revisionists advocated for ‘European détente’ in order to strategically position world counterrevolutionary forces against the center of world revolution – the People’s Republic of China.”92 Toward the end of October 1967, official Chinese media released a rumor that Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was nominated as a potential candidate for the 1967 Nobel Peace Prize, alongside UN Secretary General U Thant and Pope Paul VI.93 This rumor was entirely unsubstantiated. Nobel Peace Prize candidates were nominated in secret, and no similar rumors appeared in Western newspapers. A series of editorials in 1969 attacked the “Soviet Revisionist Clique” for its sycophancy toward the Vatican, the “Soviet Revisionist traitors” were said to “overindulge in opiate” by seeking points of convergence between socialism and Christianity.94

Thus, Beijing’s portrayal of the Vatican was highly influenced by its ideological split with the Soviet Union. Since Beijing always described the Vatican as “a bastion of reaction,” it was logical for the PRC to associate the Holy See with the Soviet Union, which, in the eyes of the Chinese leaders, gradually replaced the United States as the primary reactionary force in the world.95 Because of its radicalizing ideological assumptions, China became deaf to Vatican’s appeals for dialogue and limited its strategic options to confrontation against the Holy See. The CCP’s ideological perception of Vatican would fuel its inflammatory propaganda rhetoric against the Holy See. Because Paul VI was unaware of the domestic political development in the PRC, he unwittingly entangled himself in the Sino-Soviet split through his Ostpolitik.

The PRC’s involvement in the Second Indochina War also strengthened the CCP’s perception of the Vatican as an ideological enemy, thus contributing to the deafness to its dialogue appeals. Recent scholarship by Chen Jian and Zhai Qiang have shown that the Vietnam conflict became a core ideological component of Mao’s revolutionary vision.96 Mao sought to exploit the conflict in order to increase international tensions and fuel his domestic revolutionary designs, especially within the context of the Cultural Revolution. My own research on PRC-Holy See relations and on CCP-Chinese Catholic Church interactions has allowed me to unearth evidence supporting the conclusions of Chen Jian and Zhai Qiang. The Chinese leaders attacked Pope Paul VI’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict to escalate the tensions between China and Vatican, and subsequently prompt domestic ideological mobilization.

Paul VI’s appeals for a negotiated peace in Vietnam, as well as his attempts at mediation between the U.S., the RVN and the DRV became subjects of CCP ideological diatribes as the PRC stepped up its military and financial supports of North Vietnam after 1965. The Renmin Ribao editorials attacked the Holy See for “aiding the peace swindle of the U.S. Imperialists.”97 In light of the continuous increase of the number of American combat forces in Indochina, the Xinhua News Agency concluded that Paul VI was an accomplice of the U.S. “peace scheme, which in fact masked actual American escalation of the war.”98 Since Mao needed to increase the international tensions arising from the Vietnam conflict to pursue his domestic revolutionary goals, he decided to dismiss Vatican’s peace appeals as artifices intended to masquerade the American escalation of the war.

The Vietnam War further reinforced Paul VI’s unwitting entanglement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Having deposed Khrushchev the year before, the new Soviet leadership committed substantial military and material assistance to the DRV in 1965, thus reversing the earlier Soviet policy of non-interference in Indochina. Yet, unlike the PRC, the Soviet Union wanted the DRV to end the conflict through a negotiated settlement. Vietnam now became an arena of competition between Beijing and Moscow for leadership of world revolution. Beijing, in the official
press, insisted that Moscow and Washington were “aligned” in their views on Vietnam, and that they conspired together with the Vatican to put forward a “peace swindle.” The Chinese saw the Pope’s meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on April 27, 1966, and with U.S. Ambassador to RVN Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. on May 3, 1966 as signs that the Pope was “weaving threads between American Imperialists and Soviet Revisionists on the Vietnam Question.” The purpose of the Pope’s meeting with Gromyko was to confer about pastoral questions within the Soviet Union, and there is no conclusive evidence indicating that the Pope discussed Vietnam at length with Gromyko as he had with Lodge a few days later. Nonetheless, the Chinese still judged necessary to view the successive meetings of the Pope with Gromyko and Lodge as a sure sign of Soviet-American-Vatican conspiracy. Given the radicalizing ideological framework of the Cultural Revolution, this was, for the Chinese, the most plausible conclusion to be drawn. The CCP deemed necessary to zealously “expose” the Vatican-Soviet-American “peace swindle” to both publicly demonstrate their solidarity with the Vietnamese people and affirm their own central position in the world movement of communist revolution.

In a similar vein, Beijing viewed the meeting between the Pope and the Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny as another instance of Soviet Revisionists “forming a joint-venture company,” with the Vatican and the American imperialists bringing forward the “peace swindle.” Podgorny’s meeting with the Pope in January 1967 spurred a wave of angry Renmin Ribao editorials that did not subside until March 1968. The Xinhua News Agency even threw in a few anti-Soviet-revisionism tirades of the loyal Albanian comrades. However, the Chinese aid to the DRV began to wane from 1968 onwards, as China reoriented its foreign policy toward rapprochement with the United States. Domestically, Chinese society was on the verge of collapse as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Within this context, the anti-Vatican accusations related to the Vietnam situation began to disappear from the official press.

The Vietnam conflict also permeated the relations between the CCP and the Chinese Catholic Church toward the mid-1960s. In the only 1965 issue of the Courier Pigeon (信鸽), the official journal of the Patriotic Church, out of total number of eleven articles, five were public declarations of solidarity to the struggle DRV from various Party and government organs. None of the eleven articles discussed pastoral matters. In 1965, the United Front Work Department, the agency responsible for the Party’s relations with non-Party elements, including the Catholic Church, operated within an increasingly radicalized ideological environment. Beijing’s Vietnam policies thus became ideologically relevant to the CCP’s United Front tactics toward the Chinese Catholic Church. That the Vietnam question figured prominently within the CCP-Chinese Catholic Church relations supports Chen Jian’s conclusion that the tension related to the Vietnam conflict promoted Mao’s domestic revolutionary goals. In the late 1960s, Mao did not wish for a peace in Vietnam, since he needed the conflict to promote his domestic campaigns of ideological mobilization. It is thus not surprising that Mao’s Vietnam propaganda figured prominently in the CCP’s dealings with the Catholic Church.

In 1969, China was caught in a precarious situation. Abroad, Mao’s commitment to world revolution placed China in opposition against both the United States and the Soviet Union, in addition to alienating third world powers that were sympathetic to Beijing in the 1950s. At home, both the CCP and the Chinese society were in shambles. The United Front had collapsed under the weight of ideological radicalization, and the Red Guard youths that Mao unleashed upon the Party became intractable. The ideological conflict with the Soviet Union still raged on, and it could escalate into a full-blown war anytime. With this situation in mind, Mao and the Chinese leaders began reorienting China’s grand strategy by steering toward rapprochement with the United States. The strategic reorientation of Beijing toward Washington appeared to have reduced the tensions between China and Vatican, since the Chinese leaders sent signals that Vatican immediately took for indications of a willingness to engage dialogue.

Toward the end of 1969, the usual ideological invectives in Chinese media against Vatican faded into an ominous silence. Then, at the beginning of July 1970, the Chinese Communists suddenly decided to release Bishop James Edward Walsh, an American Maryknoll missionary imprisoned since 1954 for alleged charges of espionage. Paul VI received the news of Walsh’s release with much enthusiasm. The
Pope made explicit his expectations of “better days to come in Continental China” during a public address at the St. Peter’s Square on July 12, 1970.\textsuperscript{107} Bishop Walsh, after a brief period of health recovery in Hong Kong, went to the Vatican to visit the Pope on August 25.\textsuperscript{108} Paul VI probably interpreted Walsh’s release as a signal that the Chinese want to improve relations with the Vatican. This was probably why, in October 1971, Paul VI decided to leave vacant the post of apostolic nuncio to the Republic of China (ROC)/Taiwan after recalling Archbishop Cassidy, the last nuncio to the ROC.\textsuperscript{109} Many others shared Paul VI’s optimism. Reportedly, the Father Louis Wei Tsing-sing, a Chinese priest living in Paris, came to Rome on his own accord in 1971 to talk to Secretary of State Jean Villot about the possibility of normalization with the PRC.\textsuperscript{110} However, China rebuked Vatican’s gestures of good will: Father Wang Ki-ting, a priest from Beijing, told the Italian press that the Chinese Catholic Church was autonomous from Vatican and only in “spiritual communion with the Pope”\textsuperscript{111}

A second sign, which also seemed to announce a softening of the PRC’s attitude toward the Chinese Catholic Church, occurred in 1971. Churches were reopened in Beijing for the first time since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. In November 1971, a mass was celebrated for foreigners in a church.\textsuperscript{112} In 1972, two churches began holding regular services in Beijing once more.\textsuperscript{113} Once again, these positive developments boosted the Vatican’s optimism. Paul renewed his appeals for dialogue in April 1973, averring that the thoughts of Mao “reflected Christian values.”\textsuperscript{114} Nonetheless, Vatican hopes proved to be unwarranted. The opening of churches in Beijing was not followed by a general change of religious policy. Because of the PRC’s unchanging intransigence toward religions, the Vatican could not hope to re-establish its severed ties with the Chinese Catholic Church. Furthermore, the “Criticize Confucius Criticize Lin Campaign,” which Mao launched in the aftermath of Lin Biao’s fall from grace, brought a new wave of ideological criticism against all religions. Under such circumstances, the Vatican could not earn limited freedom for the Chinese Catholic Church, as it had done for the Eastern European National Churches through its Ostpolitik.

The release of Bishop Walsh and the opening of churches in Beijing did not signal China’s intention to pursue dialogue with the Vatican. Rather, they were indicative of Beijing’s overall strategic shift toward rapprochement with the United States. Since Bishop Walsh was an American citizen, the Chinese leaders sought to use his release to signal their intention to improve relations. The churches in Beijing were only opened for the purpose of performing religious services for the foreign diplomats. This was also aimed at paving the way for an eventual rapprochement with the United States. Paul VI, eager to establish dialogue with the Chinese leaders, and having no knowledge of the strategic considerations of the Chinese leaders, misinterpreted the Chinese signals. His subsequent calls for improved relations only elicited cold reactions from the Chinese. Thus, though the reorientation of the Chinese foreign policy toward the United States led to an apparent thaw in Sino-Vatican relations, the domestic ideological environment constrained the Chinese into a position of mitigated hostility toward the Vatican.

\textbf{1976-1981: TRANSITIONAL TIMES}

The sudden developments of 1976 completely took China by surprise. The death of the PRC’s two senior leaders, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, the devastating earthquake in Tangshan, and the dramatic downfall of the Gang of Four signaled a new period of political turmoil that would not end until 1981. After coming to power in 1978 and outmaneuvering his political rivals, Deng Xiaoping began to set China on the path of his Four Modernizations, which slowly displaced revolution and class struggle as the Party’s ideological focus. Nonetheless, the political turmoil would not calm down until the end of the trial of the Gang of Four in 1981, as the CCP grappled with the problem of the posthumous assessment of Mao. As China transitioned toward a post Cold-War era, Beijing’s grand strategy was no longer constrained to strict orientations of unmitigated hostility toward either the United States or the Soviet Union as was the case before Mao’s death. Beijing now freely shifted between conciliatory and hostile courses of action in order to accomplish its twin aims of promoting the Four Modernizations and of safeguarding its sovereignty over domestic religious activities.

Despite the waning of the Maoist ideological discourse, the improvement of the PRC-Holy See relations still appeared remote toward the end of the 1970s. In August 1979, during a press conference, a Vatican spokesperson said that the July 25 election of
the new Bishop of Beijing, Michael Fu Tieshan, was illegitimate because the Pope John Paul II had not approved of it. However, mitigating his stance, the spokesperson added that the Holy See expressed "love toward our brothers in faith, particularly those who live in the Chinese continent." Later in 1979, on October 7, Premier Hua Guofeng told a group of European journalists that he would not visit the Pope during his impending visit to Italy, since the Vatican and Taiwan maintained normal diplomatic relations. Hua did not pay visit to the John Paul II, even when the latter made known his eagerness to meet the former. Even with John Paul II's repeated overtures and with the new ideological climate in China, the question of the appointment of bishops remained serious areas of dispute between Beijing and Vatican, or more precisely, between the CCP and the Holy See.

Hopes for the improvement in Sino-Vatican relations appeared more tangible when the PRC received the visit from two high-ranking prelates of the Universal Catholic Church at the beginning of 1980. On February 27, 1980, the Archbishop of Marseilles, Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, landed in Beijing for a two-week visit. He was the first high-ranking prelate to visit China since the expulsion of Archbishop Riberi in 1951. The Archbishop of Marseilles met with both religious leaders and high-ranked Party cadres for informal talks. In a conference with prominent leaders from many religious groups, Cardinal Etchegaray was asked to discuss the theological innovations linked to the Second Vatican Council: his audience expressed puzzlement regarding "the lack of regard of European Catholics for religious rites." On March 1, Etchegaray met with Ulanfu, then vice-president of the People's Consultative Conference and Director of the United Front Work Department. Ulanfu remarked that, although there were diplomatic questions that divided Beijing and Vatican, a solution to those problems could be achieved through efforts from both parties.

On the same day, Etchegaray met with Xiao Xianfa, the head of the Bureau of Religious Affairs. Xiao was considerably more blunt than Ulanfu, asserting that "Beijing would look over past mistakes of Rome." On more than one occasion, Cardinal Etchegaray inadvertently broached the unpleasant topic of the underground Catholic Church in China. Nonetheless, his Chinese hosts remained courteous throughout his stay in China. Etchegaray's account of his encounter with Chinese leaders was sketchy at best. He devoted far greater attention to touristic details of his trip in his memoirs.

Concomitant to Cardinal Etchegaray's visit, the Chinese separately received another important prelate, Cardinal Franz König, Archbishop of Vienna. Like Etchegaray, König was invited privately via the intermediary of a Chinese Ambassador. König landed in Beijing on March 8, and met with Ulanfu and Xiao Xianfa just as Etchegaray did. In his article My Journey to China, he provides an especially detailed account of his encounters with Xiao. Although Xiao assured König that, ever since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the government had secured the freedom of religious belief, he insisted that the Catholic Patriotic Church strove for total independence and that union with Rome would be declined. In a tone reminiscent of Emperor Qianlong's condescending treatment of the British delegate George Macartney in 1792, Xiao dismissed König's suggestion of establishing unofficial contacts with the Vatican, seeing no need for such contacts. However, when König pointed out the de facto schismatic status of the Patriotic Church, Xiao gave a conciliatory response by assuring the prelate that China did not wish for schism, and that the Chinese Church would respect the religious tradition of the Universal Church. Xiao wanted to demonstrate that, with China's new religious policies, the National Catholic Church could be rebuilt with or without the contribution of Vatican. Nevertheless, China would gracefully grant the Vatican the favor of refraining from pushing for schism between the Chinese National Church and the Universal Church.

Furthermore, König noticed that no one discussed with him the question of Taiwan, which tempered his hope for further progress in Sino-Vatican relations. König seemed to have reached the conclusion that the Chinese were not ready to discuss the issue of establishing diplomatic relations. It is doubtful whether the Chinese viewed the Holy See as a potential partner of equal diplomatic relations in 1981 or if the Chinese ever held such views at all. After all, relations between China and Vatican could not be founded on a basis of equality, since the CCP

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iv In 1792, George Macartney, led a British Mission to Emperor Qianlong's court with the purpose of establishing full diplomatic relations with the Qing empire and negotiating the opening of trade of Chinese ports for British Merchants. Qianlong refused all the requests of the British; the Emperor contended that the Qing Empire had everything, therefore had no need for whatever merchandise the British had to offer.
could tolerate with difficulty competing sovereignties over domestic non-Party elements.

Finally, in his account of his encounters with CCP cadres, König left out his discussions with Ulanfu. Likely, he believed Ulanfu to be not as important as Xiao Xianfa in the implementation of religious policies. König was mistaken. Although the Bureau of Religious Affairs dealt with the day-to-day implementation of religious policies, it always worked together with the United Front Work Department and never operated independently. As a result, Xiao, as head of the Bureau of Religious affairs, probably deferred to Ulanfu, the head of the United Front Work Department, when making important decisions.

The visits of Etchegaray and König have shown that, although China was willing to pursue contacts with the Vatican, relations between the two would occur on an unequal basis, with China expecting the Vatican to be the party making more concessions. China clearly did not see normalization of relations with the Vatican as a vital goal. Rather, the PRC, guarding jealously its sovereignty over the Chinese Catholic Church, was reluctant to engage the Holy See. The CCP would only accept an arrangement in which the Vatican renounced fully or partially its claim over the right to appoint bishops and other prelates. For Beijing, bishops who were consecrated without Chinese consent as an important precondition to Deng’s appointment. Unlike his predecessors Paul VI and John Paul II, ordered his Secretary of State Cardinal Agostino Casaroli to meet Deng Yiming in Hong Kong as his own trip to Asia came to a close. When Casaroli arrived in Hong Kong on February 28, he held a joint press conference with Deng Yiming, in which he stated that there were many ways to solve the Taiwan question, and that the CPA, despite being illegal, could become a legal organization; for that purpose, Bishop Deng had to act as a “bridge” between Rome and the Chinese Church. Before leaving Hong Kong, Casaroli told Deng that the Pope wanted to see him. Two months after Casaroli's departure, Bishop Deng travelled to Rome and met the Pope on April 30. Deng stayed in Rome for over a month; he learned that the Pope appointed him Archbishop of Guangdong on June 4, 1980. The appointment was announced on Vatican Radio on June 5, and the Pope performed the ceremony on June 6.

The Chinese angrily protested against Deng’s appointment. On June 11, Bishop Yang Gaojian, the chairman of the CPA, issued a statement “staunchly opposing the Roman Curia’s decision to appoint Deng Yiming as Archbishop of Guangzhou.” Four days later, on June 15, the Bureau of Religious Affairs released a public statement endorsing Yang Gaojian’s opposition to the appointment. On June 24, the local Guangzhou chapter of the CPA removed his functions of vice-chairman of the Guangzhou CPA and of Bishop of the Guangzhou diocese. The CPA organized more accusation meetings against both Deng and the Vatican for the rest of 1981.

The sudden setback in the Deng Yiming affair in 1981 has puzzled scholars of Sino-Vatican relations. The Chinese vitriolic reaction was not unexpected; however, it is difficult to assess the motives behind Vatican’s decision of appointing Deng as Archbishop of Guangzhou. Many scholars who study the Chinese Catholic Church agree that the appointment was Vatican’s blunder. Beatrice Leung wrote that the Vatican diplomats misread prior Chinese conciliatory gestures as signs of real rapprochement, while Kim-Kwong Chan contends that the Vatican mistakenly believed they had obtained Chinese consent of Deng’s appointment. However, the “Vatican misunderstanding” explanation probably rests on the flimsy assumption that Pope John Paul II, in 1981, saw Chinese consent as an important precondition to Deng’s appointment. Unlike his predecessors Paul VI and John
XXIII, John Paul II was not shy about confrontation; his policies of propping up a resistance Church in Poland more than convincingly demonstrated his occasionally confrontational verve. Furthermore, by 1980 the Vatican had accumulated a considerably rich experience in dealing with Communist states through its Ostpolitik. The nomination of new Bishops in Eastern European States often required a complex negotiation process. In light of this experience, it would be simply ridiculous for a conciliatory Holy See to nominate a new Chinese Archbishop on the basis of unconfirmed Chinese acquiescence. The argument that John Paul II’s move was confrontational would be more plausible. The Pope probably wanted to test Beijing’s intentions toward Vatican. Thus, through the nomination of Deng as Archbishop, John Paul II broke with his earlier conciliatory approach toward China.

Bishop Deng certainly expected immediate improvements of relations between Beijing and the Vatican: he expected to successfully fulfill his role as a “bridge” between the Holy See and the Patriotic Church. Many indications from the behavior of the Chinese led him to entertain such illusions. Prior to his departure for Hong Kong, a CCP cadre asked Bishop Deng whether he was going to visit the Pope Upon finding out Deng’s resolve to go to Rome if the Pope asked him to do so, the cadre expressed no further opposition. When Bishop Deng asked whether he could establish relations with the Vatican, the cadre did not express explicit disapproval, saying that “it is up to our higher leaders to decide this, we cannot answer this question.” However, further evidence indicates that the Chinese probably did not wish for immediate substantive improvement in the relations with the Vatican in the years between 1980 and 1981. The Chinese media stressed the unofficial character of Cardinal Roger Etchegaray’s trip, labeling it as “a visit from a friend of France.” There was no mention of his ties with the Vatican. Meanwhile, König’s visit was not cited in the press at all, likely because the Chinese wished to avoid the kind of media storm that would falsely convey the impression that China sought closer relations with Vatican. Furthermore, two months after the visits by Etchegaray and König, Xiao Xianfa, in a speech at the Third Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) Conference of Representatives of May 1980, dismissed the Vatican’s calls for dialogue as a means to reassert their control over the Chinese Church. He urged Catholic believers to be wary of Vatican activities.

Deng, who was still behind bars at the time of Xiao’s speech, was unaware of the full extent of China’s reticence at improving relations with Vatican. Deng’s release and his subsequent promotions were probably part of the CCP’s attempt to bolster the legitimacy of the CPA, as Deng was a widely respected priest within the Catholic community. This was consistent with the Chinese general post-1976 tactic of enlisting non-CPA priests to rally the Catholic community to the CPA. The bold move of the Pope likely took the Chinese by surprise. The Chinese did not oppose Deng’s desire to travel to Rome. Therefore, they did not expect any sudden developments once Deng met the Pope. Deng’s appointment as Archbishop was announced on the June 5, 1981, yet the CPA only released a public statement voicing its opposition on June 11.

It is unclear whether the Chinese had contingencies for dealing with any unilateral moves from the Pope. The delay with which the Chinese issued their response suggests that Beijing spent much time either coming up with new contingencies or simply drafting the response. While there is no evidence supporting this hypothesis, it is possible to observe, through a close reading, that Yang Gaojian’s statement of opposition was very carefully worded. The first half of the statement attacks the “Roman Curia’s” lack of regard for the “sovereignty of the [Chinese] Catholic Church”, while the second half accuses Deng Yiming of “harming the self-respect of the Chinese Clergy and People” in accepting the appointment at the Roman Curia. The diatribe against Deng Yiming indirectly challenged the “bridge” role the Vatican conferred upon the Bishop. Since Vatican presented Deng Yiming as a bridge, it was logical for China to “burn this bridge.”

However, the statement avoided direct attacks on the person of the Pope. The Vatican was always referred to as “Roman Curia” instead of “Holy See” to emphasize the political character of the statement and gloss over its implications concerning spiritual questions. The Bureau of Religious Affairs, a few days later, endorsed the CPA’s statement, directly condemning, with the same careful wording, the Vatican’s “interference in China’s internal matters.” In December 1981, at a tea conference for religious leaders organized by the United Front Work Department, Zhang Zhi, the vice-chairman of the UFWD, congratulated the CPA leaders for their anti-Vatican stance in the Deng Yiming
Affair. Beijing, taken off guard by John Paul's bold move, seemed to lose the control over the dynamics of Sino-Vatican relations. It also saw Deng Yiming’s appointment as a direct challenge to the integrity of its United Front with the Chinese Catholic Church. To correct this situation, the CCP carefully took the time to plan and coordinate responses between the CPA and the State and Party bureaucracies in order to raise the level of tension in its relations with the Vatican.

Thus, between 1976 and 1981, as China moved away from the Cold War conflicts that plagued the world, its possibilities toward the Holy See were no longer bound to its ideologically-determined grand strategy of opposition against either superpower. As a result, Beijing pursued contradictory policies toward the Vatican. The visits by Cardinals Etchegaray and König to China indicated China’s willingness to improve relations in the post-Mao era. However, the botched appointment of Bishop Deng Yiming demonstrated that China was unwilling to compromise on matters of sovereignty over religious life within the Chinese Church. Moreover, it showed that the shadows of foreign encroachment still haunted it. Pope John Paul II’s confrontational approach clearly did not work for China as it had for Eastern Europe. China alternated between hostility and conciliation toward the Vatican because it needed to make friends abroad to improve its international standing and to carry out its Four Modernizations, but it also felt compelled to jealously guard its sovereignty.

1981-1989: STAGNATION OF PRC-VATICAN RELATIONS

The end of the trial of the Gang of Four in 1981 gave way to a new era of political stability in which reform and opening displaced revolution and class struggle as the watchwords of the day. The establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations in 1978 heralded a friendlier international environment in which China could pursue its Four Modernizations with the help of foreign capital. Nevertheless, though China had mostly shed its Cold Warrior skin in the 1980s, Sino-Vatican relations still seemed to stagnate. China continued to pursue its contradictory policy of conciliation and confrontation, for its twin aims of economic modernization and defense of sovereignty did not change. China's post-Cold War diplomacy greatly resembled its United Front policy of “alliance and struggle.” This is no coincidence, as the scope of CCP United Front activities expanded to an international horizon in the Deng era.

After the death of Mao, the Communist Chinese leadership readily acknowledged that religions would have a long-term presence in China despite the prophesies of Communist ideologues regarding its imminent disappearance. In March 1982, the Central Committee issued a Party document calling for the co-optation of religious groups. Furthermore, the Constitution explicitly guaranteed religious freedom. However, the Party made a distinction between legitimate religious beliefs and subversive ideas, which it deemed as “spiritual pollution.” It also warned against “infiltration” on the part of foreign religious organizations.

This double standard led to contradictory measures regarding the Party’s relationship with the Chinese Catholic Church. The Party sought to co-opt the Catholic community by placing formerly incarcerated respected priests, such as Alyosius Jin Luxian and Dominic Deng Yiming, in prominent positions within the Catholic Patriotic Association. Yet the CCP also briefly incarcerated a few Jesuits in 1983 for allegedly subversive activities. This, however, does not change the fact that in the 1980s, the Party considered religion to be a permanent feature in China’s social and cultural landscape. Moreover, Bishop Gong Pinmei was released in 1986; with world revolution no longer the primary ideological watchword of the day, the dissident Bishop was no longer useful for China’s propaganda campaigns.

Sino-Vatican relations reached their low point at the beginning of 1982. On January 6, Pope John Paul II, in an open “Letter to the Bishops of the World,” invited bishops to “pray for the Church of China.” In March 21, the Pope celebrated a mass for the Church of China, during which he “renewed his expression of his affection and esteem for the people.” Prior to the celebration of the Mass, on March 19, Bishop Yang Gaojian of the CPA released a public statement apparently preemptively condemning the Pope for “slanderously claiming that the Chinese Catholics were suffering.” The wording of Yang’s statement was certainly curious, for it anticipated precise formulations on “the suffering of Chinese Catholics,” which were not present in the Pope’s statement at the mass on March 21. Yang’s statement was probably meant to rebuke the Pope’s January “Letter to the Bishop's of the World,” in which John Paul II made...
explicit reference to “difficult and prolonged trials in the span of these years.” Although the Pope made this claim in describing the state of affairs of the Chinese Church over a span of 30 years, the Chinese misconstrued this claim as a description of present affairs, which the Chinese then vehemently refuted. When discussing present state of affairs, the Pope actually praised the new religious freedoms that were granted in China. Thus, the Chinese deliberately misconstrued the Pope’s statement on the “difficult trials” of Chinese Catholics and refuted a claim the Pope did not even make.

At first sight, this maneuver seems absurd. However, a closer examination of the Pope’s “Letter to Bishops of the World” reveals another problematic statement: “How consoling it is to receive the news of the constant and courageous loyalty of Catholics in China to the faith of their fathers and their filial attachment to Peter’s See.” Although this passage made no mention of the divide between the Patriotic and the Underground Churches, it still appeals to traditional Confucian values of loyalty and filial piety in a forcefully subversive fashion. John Paul II, glossing over the schismatic questions that plagued the Chinese Church, bluntly averred that all Catholics in China remained loyal to the Holy See. It is difficult to conclude beyond doubt that the Pope intended to engage in subtle polemics, but the CCP certainly interpreted the passage as a direct challenge to their authority over the Chinese Catholic Church. To affirm that Chinese Catholics were loyal to the “Peter’s See” out of filial piety was tantamount to challenging the integrity of the CCP’s United Front with the Chinese Catholic Church. The CPA did not issue a direct rebuttal the Pope’s subversive passage; to do so would have amounted to schism, which neither the CPA nor the CCP wanted. Nonetheless, Yang Gaojian’s statement was the first instance, since the Cultural Revolution, of CPA churchmen explicitly attacking the person of the Pope in the official press. If the CPA could not challenge the Pope’s subversive passage, then at least it could directly accuse the Pope in order to make explicit the widening distance between the Chinese Catholic Church and the Holy See.

Undaunted by the setback in PRC-Holy See relations, the Vatican continued exploring new ways to improve its relations with the PRC. In 1982, Casaroli toyed with the idea of a “Chinese Rite,” which is the creation of a new rite in China that would allow the Chinese Catholic Church to remain in communion with the Universal Catholic Church while retaining a relative administrative autonomy. A “Chinese Rite” church would have been modeled on the Uniate Catholic Churches in Greece and Ukraine. Casaroli’s proposition possibly entailed radical theological innovations, such as terminating the existing Latin Rite liturgies (pre-Vatican II), which was in use by the Chinese Catholic Church at that time. Casaroli probably believed this was the best solution to the schismatic situation in China. The National Catholic Church officially committed its schismatic act when, in 1958, it ordained its first Bishop without prior papal approval. Since then, the Patriotic Church had ordained new bishops on its own. Although the Holy See had not been in contact with the Chinese Church from the late 1950s until the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Church miraculously survived. However, the lack of communion with the Holy See effectively meant that the Chinese Church bore a schismatic character, even if the Vatican refrained from declaring that a schism had occurred. Casaroli thus hoped that a “Chinese Rite” would allow the Holy See to reconcile with an estranged Chinese Church without disrupting its current administrative autonomy, which would placate the CCP. Nonetheless, the “Chinese Rite” proposition had to be abandoned. As Beatrice Leung points out, there was no specialist in China who would be suited for this task; all experts in theology and liturgy belonged to the Latin Rite Church.

John Paul II, seeing that direct diplomacy, whether conciliatory or confrontational, yielded no positive results, shifted his policies toward indirect reconciliation by encouraging ties between the mainland church and the local churches of Hong Kong and Taiwan. In February 1984, during a meeting with Taiwanese bishops, the Pope invited the Taiwanese Catholic Church and all other overseas Chinese Catholics to act as a bridge between the Chinese Catholic Church and the Universal Church. In doing so, the Pope hoped that, by encouraging closer interactions between the Chinese Church and the Hong Kong and Taiwan Churches, he could open the path for an improvement of the relations between China and the Holy See. John Paul II’s approach yielded mixed results. The two visits of Bishop John Baptist Wu of Hong Kong in 1984 and 1986, despite their lack of substantial progress, still contributed to
the gradual defusing of the tensions between China and Vatican from 1982.\textsuperscript{164}

Paralleling John Paul II’s policy of indirect inter-Church engagement, the CCP, after 1983, also encouraged the “patriotic” priests of the CPA to cultivate contacts abroad. In March 1984, a delegation from the Canadian Catholic Church was invited to China for a friendly visit.\textsuperscript{165} In October 1987, the CPA sent a delegation to Austria, where the delegates met with Cardinal König in an informal setting.\textsuperscript{166} The CCP encouraged interactions between the Chinese Catholic Church and foreign Churches because they were consistent with Deng’s general policy of opening up the country and modernizing its economy. Such interactions could also be beneficial for his Four Modernizations. Enlisting the aid of foreign friends was also part of the United Front tactics of the CCP.

Though the Chinese leaders allowed informal contacts of the Chinese Catholic Church to proliferate, their resistance to the idea of normalization of relations with the Vatican remained strong. In 1984, United Front Work Department Director Yang Jingren warned against the subversive activities of the Vatican.\textsuperscript{167} The Foreign Ministry reiterated in 1987 and 1988 that, in order to have normal relations with China, the Vatican must break off relations with Taiwan and refrain from interfering with China’s internal affairs, including the appointment of bishops.\textsuperscript{168} Nonetheless, relations between China and the Vatican were significantly less tense than they were in 1982. The meetings of the Cardinal of Manila, Jaime Sin, with former diplomat Huang Hua in 1984 and Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1987, indicated a friendlier relationship between the China and the Holy See despite their largely symbolic nature.\textsuperscript{169}

Between 1981 and 1989, China’s Vatican diplomacy stabilized into a contradictory pattern of conciliation and confrontation. Through its vitriolic reaction toward the controversial sections of John Paul II’s “Letter to the bishops of the world,” Beijing sought to assert its sovereignty over religious life in China, especially over the appointment of bishops. However, in encouraging the friendly visits at the level of national churches, China sought to make friends abroad to improve its international image and to indirectly attract foreign investment and talents to China for the Four Modernizations.

CONCLUSION

Between 1949 and 1989, China deliberately impeded any prospects of normalization of Sino-Vatican relations by increasing tensions with the Holy See. The PRC’s Cold War entanglements under Mao Zedong restricted China to an unambiguous stance of hostility toward the Vatican. Only with the death of Mao and the China’s gradual exit from the Cold War under Deng Xiaoping did courses of action other than uncompromising opposition toward the Holy See become available to China.

The outbreak of the Korean War spurred ideological domestic mobilization for the campaign of Resist America Aid Korea. Given the ideological considerations of the Chinese leaders, escalating tensions with the Vatican through an anti-imperialist struggle was China’s only logical option. The Hungarian Crisis of 1956, the Anti-Rightist Campaigns of 1957, and the Great Leap forward of 1958-1961, plunged the Sino-Vatican relations to a low point by bringing forth a new wave of ideological radicalization. Though Popes John XXIII and Paul VI attempted to establish dialogue with China, the CCP remained ideologically deaf to their appeals. Since John XXIII and Paul VI initiated an overall conciliatory policy toward all communist powers at the time when China was engaged in an ideological spat with the Soviet Union, they inevitably became the enemies in the eyes of the Chinese leaders. Paul VI’s attempts at mediating peace between the United States and the DRV only confirmed the Chinese leaders’ perceptions that the Vatican was working with American imperialists and Soviet revisionists, especially at a time when Mao sought to exploit the Vietnam conflict for the purpose of domestic mobilization. The PRC’s general shift toward rapprochement with the United States yielded positive development in Sino-Vatican relations. However, the ideologically radical environment of the Cultural Revolution kept contributing to the Chinese leaders’ deafness to Vatican’s pleas until Mao’s death.

As China transitioned into the post-Cold War era between 1976 and 1981, minor dialogues with the Vatican became possible. Yet, the relaxed ideological environment of the post-Cold War era by no means indicated the inevitability of improved relations between China and the Holy See. China still escalated tensions on purpose if relations with Vatican grew too close. The Chinese leaders were still reluctant to discuss the issue of appointment of bishops, and they
would not compromise their position that no foreign powers should interfere in the domestic religious affairs of China. Rapprochement with Vatican could only be pursued on China's terms. Thus, China's post-Cold War environment of 1989 still presented more possibilities in its dealings with the Vatican, yet its commitment to its sovereignty over domestic religious matters presented other limitations to its strategy toward the Vatican.

In 1991, it was revealed that Pope John Paul II had secretly elevated Bishop Ignatius Gong Pinmei to the rank of cardinal in 1979. The Chinese leaders were furious. The incidents surrounding the Falun Gong in the 1990s further hardened the CCP's attitude toward organized religions. Nonetheless, contacts between the PRC and the Holy See were maintained; United Front representatives engage in either formal or informal talks with Vatican diplomats. In December 2014, Pope Francis I made the shocking choice to not receive the Dalai Lama when the latter was in Rome to receive the Dalai Lama when the latter was in Rome to receive the Dalai Lama when the latter was in Rome for a Nobel laureate conference. The Chinese Foreign Ministry praised Francis I's conciliatory gesture, while reiterating China's interest in further dialogues. This sudden development appears to herald a possible breakthrough in Sino-Vatican relations. However, the problems and legacies of the Cold War confrontations between China and the Vatican have not disappeared, and they can be only overcome through sustained efforts of negotiation from both parties.

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ABSTRACT
Sexual violence during the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Rwandan genocide (1994) has been analyzed thoroughly, but limited attention has been paid to how sexual violence differed in these two conflicts and why. This will be investigated by doing a comparative analysis. Kirby's modes of feminist analysis will be used as framework, and attention will be paid to the relationship between the construction of ethnic and gender identities and particular forms of sexual violence. It will be demonstrated that forced impregnation characterized Bosnian sexual violence, whilst mutilation of female body parts and murder after rape were prominent in Rwanda. I argue that this can be explained by looking at how these forms of sexual violence were the result of mythology and shared beliefs and were being used by ethnic leaders to re-construct ethnic and gender identities to serve their own political objectives. Because these myths, identity constructions and leader objectives were different in Bosnia and Rwanda, the forms of sexual violence were as well.

INTRODUCTION
Sexual violence in conflicts has gone from being considered an unchallenged by-product of war to being thoroughly scrutinized from a range of perspectives. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (henceforth referred to as Bosnia) from 1992 to 1995 was the first conflict in which sexual violence was given massive attention at the time it was happening. After Bosnia, sexual violence in conflicts has been studied in Rwanda, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Uganda, and Indonesia. Significant progress has been made in understanding the motivations for sexual violence. However, it is only quite recently that the considerable differences in what sexual violence looks like in various conflicts have been highlighted. Important variations in frequency, form, and motivation have been overlooked, and sexual violence has been analyzed as one phenomenon at the expense of a more detailed understanding of the varieties it consists of. The conflict-specific processes of sexual violence, and its variation in aims and methods, must be examined to refine our knowledge of this phenomenon.

This dissertation is a comparative study of two of the most important case studies in the research on sexual violence in conflict: the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) and the Rwandan genocide (1994). These two cases followed a similar pattern of leaders of ethnic groups targeting women's bodies, and as a result, the women experienced very high rates of sexual violence. They were both ethnic conflicts in which sexual violence was deployed as a strategy of war. However, the types of sexual violence that was reported from the two conflicts differed substantially, and explaining this will be the aim of my thesis.

These differences will be studied from a feminist perspective, incorporating research on the construction of ethnic identities. Based on a review of the current state of the literature, two approaches to sexual violence in Rwanda and Bosnia are identified as particularly pertinent: first, mythology and cosmology and second, the motives of leaders. In his classification of the feminist literature on sexual violence in conflict, Kirby calls these two approaches mythology and instrumentality. The perspective of the construction of ethnic identities is included to complement his feminist framework. This aims to enhance the understanding of how the interaction of ethnic and gender identities shaped the sexual violence, and how ethnic leaders used mythology to legitimize it.

The following research questions will guide this investigation:

1. How did sexual violence during the Bosnian
conflict differ from that during the Rwandan conflict?

2. What role did myths and shared beliefs within each society play in shaping sexual violence?

3. How did the construction of ethnic and gender identities influence the types of sexual violence?

4. How did ethnic leaders affect the forms of sexual violence?

I believe this dissertation will address a gap in the feminist literature on sexual violence in conflict. In past years, scholars have theorized on the varying prevalence rates of warfare rape, but the research on why sexual violence takes on particular forms in given conflicts is limited. Studies on this topic are often based on one case study only, but by doing a comparative study, it is easier to identify contrasts. This dissertation will create a juncture between the research on sexual violence, the construction of ethnic identities, and the ethnographic study of violence. The latter concept is here defined as “how cultural forms and cosmologies shape and inform violence.”

I will argue that a key difference between the sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda was the presence of forced impregnation in Bosnia, and of sexual mutilation and the intent to kill by, or directly after, rape in Rwanda. The explanation for this is three-fold. First, beliefs shared within a common culture, such as mythology and cosmology, created frameworks for the perpetration of a particular form of violence within the country. Second, mythology was manipulated to help construct gender and ethnic identities that suited the purposes of the ethnic leaders. Lastly, because leadership motives were somewhat different between Bosnia and Rwanda, these identities were constructed in different ways to legitimize particular forms of sexual violence that suited the leadership’s objectives.

The main contribution of this investigation will be to expand the feminist understanding of sexual violence, and highlight how it consists of a variety of violent practices that are dependent on context-specific circumstances. The processes behind forced impregnation are, for example, not the same as those behind sexual mutilation. There are several reasons for why it is important to study the meaning of violence. For example, it can assist the identification of perpetrators to ensure that they are prosecuted, as types of violence may say something about who performed it. Furthermore, Fujii argues that not studying the dynamics of a given form of violence could cloud our understanding of the atrocity and hamper the rebuilding of societies.

8 This is particularly true for sexual violence, which is often laden with meaning. For example, communities having experienced forced impregnation would be likely to face other challenges than people who have been subject to mutilation and killing. By demonstrating and explaining the differences between Rwanda and Bosnia, the aim is to create an awareness of the situation specific characteristics of sexual violence and to promote a less generalized approach to the study of this issue.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The subsequent section is the literary review, in which I will look at feminist approaches to the study of sexual violence and explain my choice of framework. After that is a brief section reviewing the available data on sexual violence from the Bosnian war and the Rwandan genocide. The three consecutive chapters make up my analysis. I first look at how myths and cultural beliefs created a guiding framework for sexual violence. Then, I address how the construction by political leaders of ethnic and gender identities was used to justify and contextualize certain kinds of sexual violence. Lastly, I look at the role of leadership motives.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE

This section will establish the state of the literature on the topic of sexual violence and define the scope of my research. I have chosen to approach sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda through the feminist international relations perspective, first and foremost because this has been dominant in shaping the international community’s view on rape. Feminist scholars have also written extensively on Bosnia, albeit less on Rwanda. There is not only one feminist approach to sexual violence. Rather, there are plenty of approaches and while some are coherent with one another, others are less so. The fundamental element that unites them is that sexual violence is an expression of male domination over women. By combining this framework with theory on ethnic identity construction and a close comparison of Rwanda and Bosnia, I aim to expand on the feminist understanding of sexual violence in conflicts.

The feminist literature on sexual violence is situated within the feminist international relations theory. This theory emphasizes the impact of gender on decision-making processes, power distribution, and conflicts and everyday life. It argues that women and
men face challenges in politics, war, and quotidian life that are contingent on their gender, and that women are often disadvantaged in these situations.\textsuperscript{10} The first major feminist work on rape is that of Susan Brownmiller.\textsuperscript{11} She argued that rape was an expression of the patriarchal power structures in the society, a way for men to dominate women, and that rape had been used throughout history to ensure this domination. This was a crucial contribution to the development of a feminist approach to wartime rape, written in a time when it had not yet been acknowledged as anything more than an unpleasant by-product of war. It was the extensive sexual violence in Bosnia in the early 1990s that urged feminists to change this perception. The most important contribution of feminist scholars to this topic was to present the theory of sexual violence as a strategic weapon of warfare, meaning that rape is employed intentionally to promote the war effort. Today, this is the most widely acknowledged theory of rape in conflicts, and sexual violence is understood as a public and not a private matter.\textsuperscript{12} This has been crucial in convincing major international players, such as the UN Security Council, to consider it a security issue and hence an issue for them to address.\textsuperscript{13} 

Rape in Bosnia was interpreted to be strategic, aiming at the destruction of the enemy group by attacking their women, spreading terror and prompting them to leave their homes, feminizing the enemy men, and proving them incapable of protecting their women.\textsuperscript{14} Although it has been less investigated in comparison to Bosnia, rape in Rwanda has also largely been deemed strategic.\textsuperscript{15} An example of this is the case against the mayor Akayesu, who was convicted of encouraging rape of Tutsi women.\textsuperscript{16} As mentioned above, feminist literature is both diverse and at times contradictory.\textsuperscript{17} Internal disagreement existed particularly around the question of whether this violence was a result of misogynistic attitudes in peacetime and translated into extreme violence when societal inhibitions disappeared during war, or whether it was an orchestrated strategy on behalf of the political leaders designed to target particular groups of women. In the Bosnian and Rwandan societies, women were symbols of the honor of their family and their ethnic group. Hence, rape could be defined as part of ethnic cleansing or genocide.\textsuperscript{18} I argue that it was less the misogynistic attitudes and rather the construction of combined ethnic and gender identities in peacetime that prepared for the sexual violence during these conflicts, along with its promotion by political leaders. This will be further illustrated later on.

The differences within the feminist literature can be organized in a number of ways. Henry, Ward, and Hirshberg divide motivations for rape into three main sections: individual, sociocultural and situational factors.\textsuperscript{19} Skjeldsbaek arranges it according to who can be considered a victim of sexual violence: all women, a targeted group of women, or a targeted group including both women and men.\textsuperscript{20} However, these frameworks are better suited to explain why rape happens, but less able to account for why certain forms of violence take place. This dissertation does not aim to explain why violence starts in the first place, but rather why when it does, its structure is not random. Kirby proposes a more useful model in which he divides the feminist literature on sexual violence into a three-branched system of modes of analysis.\textsuperscript{21} Instead of structuring it according to potential motives or victims, he argues that all feminist analyses fit into one out of three lenses that determine how we understand various aspects of sexual violence in conflict. He calls these instrumentality, unreason, and mythology.\textsuperscript{22}

“Instrumentality” refers to the literature dealing with sexual violence as an instrument of war, i.e. strategic sexual violence. “Unreason” summarizes the approaches arguing that desire and male bonding drive sexual violence. The third lens, “mythology”, focuses on the effect of imagery, symbols, beliefs, and myths. The lens that is most relevant to employ depends on the case studies in question. In Rwanda and Bosnia, instrumentality and mythology are the most relevant modes of analysis. There are close ties between the first and third lens in both conflicts, and myths, symbols, and stereotypes were often used and abused by authorities to create common grievances and self-serving interpretations of the other ethnic group, the conflict, and what to believe or not believe.\textsuperscript{23} It is often the case that more than one mode is needed to explain the pattern of sexual violence in conflict; hence the crux is to identify the most relevant modes of explanation. The problem with using unreason in the cases investigated here is that it focuses primarily on the individual or small groups.\textsuperscript{24} It attempts to address the illogical, pathological and deviant, and its ideal type is the “soldier-sadist.”\textsuperscript{25} Independent of how horrific the sexual violence perpetrated in Rwanda and Bosnia was, it did follow logic, albeit a sick logic, and it was not deviant. It was ordered or condoned by political
and military leaders. Instrumentality and mythology addresses the behavior of collectives, such as military units, political elites, national communities, military discourse, and cultural institutions. Together, “mythology and instrumentality recognize the functional and collective aspects of violence.” Due to the aim of this inquiry, to better understand the effect of cultural, societal, and elite constructions of ethnic identities on sexual violence, it was deemed that unreason was less relevant as an analytical lens when reviewing Bosnia and Rwanda, and it will not be considered here.

Feminist analysis has been criticized for failing to address other identities than that of gender, and for explaining the reasons for sexual violence in war as largely identical, based on global male domination over women. However, particularly in the case of Bosnia, it was argued earlier that the intersection of ethnic and gender identities determined which groups were targeted. What has been less researched is how the construction of ethnic and gender identities affect the particular forms of sexual violence that were employed. To better illuminate this, I will look at how the construction of ethnic identities was related to sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda. To do this, the theory of instrumentalism from the study of ethnic conflicts will be incorporated. This and feminist international relations theory on sexual violence are essentially similar in that they both attempt to explain the relationship between violence and the construction of ethnic and gender identities respectively. By devoting two chapters to the feminist framework, mythology, and instrumentality, and one combining research on the construction of ethnic and gender identities, the origins of particular types of violence will be clearer than if I just employed a gendered perspective.

Instrumentalism in the study of ethnic conflict and instrumentality as a mode of analysis of sexual violence are two different, albeit related concepts. Ethnic conflict studies define instrumentalism as the shaping and changing of ethnic identities according to circumstances, often manipulated by leaders to serve their political aims, such as mobilizing and re-interpreting well-known myths. For the purpose of this analysis, which takes a constructivist approach, identity is defined as a social category with particular membership rules and criteria for qualification, including Tutsi, Bosniak and woman. These are not fixed but constructed, and so are the boundaries between different identities. Cultural discourse and ethnic identities are dependent on the construction and mobilization by elites to produce violence. Leaders may manipulate ethnic identities to promote strategic sexual violence, which was the case in Bosnia and Rwanda. However, this does not have to be the case whenever strategic sexual violence takes place.

The Current Perception of Sexual Violence in Feminist Literature

The understanding of sexual violence in conflict has expanded rapidly given that it first received broad attention only two decades ago. First of all, the literature has moved away from the one dimensional female victim—male perpetrator dichotomy. Although policy makers still fail to address male victims on the same terms as female ones, the literature is increasingly acknowledging the presence of male victims. Data on sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Civil War suggests that groups including female members perpetrated one in four incidents of reported gang rape. Similar data exists for the Democratic Republic of Congo where, in 2010, 41 percent of female victims and 10 percent of male victims of sexual violence report to have been victimized by female perpetrators. Addressing gendered assumptions is important, not only because the experiences of male victims should be a part of the official story of sexual abuse, but also to end the perception that sexual violence is a women’s issue. Feminist literature is increasingly deploying a gendered lens that includes men as well as women.

When sexual violence started to be addressed in the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda, the main concern was to establish the presence and prevalence of it, and not what shape it took. The fact that the type of violence could say something about who perpetrated it and for what reasons was not prioritized, except for the case of forced impregnation in Bosnia. Considerable variations in both rates and types of sexual violence in different conflicts have been noted in more recent studies. These discrepancies seem to be independent of whether the conflicts fall within the same category, such as that of ethnic conflict.

Furthermore, the literature has moved through stages where the general understanding of the motivation behind wartime rape has been explained in different ways. Initially, sexual violence during wartime was captured by the concept loot-pillage-and-rape, meaning that it was considered an inevitable by-product of war. The atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda were the
key catalysts that changed this perception. In this next stage, a general agreement developed in academia and the media in which it was deemed a strategic choice of political and military leaders. This was an important step towards an increased understanding of wartime rape, and was particularly apt to describe the sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda. Today, the literature is attempting to move beyond the equation rape equals weapon of war through broadening the scope of understanding by acknowledging that it is not always ordered as a strategic measure by leaders. Sexual violence occurs both in conflicts where soldiers disregard their leaders’ orders, and where they comply with them. The more relevant consideration is whether leaders forbid, condone, or encourage it. To address sexual violence accordingly in current conflicts, it is crucial not to be blinded by the experiences of Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s where sexual violence indeed was strategic.

Scope of Investigation

In a comparative analysis, it is important to identify where the case studies are similar and where they differ, to be able to determine if there are other important factors that can explain the phenomenon in question. Rwanda and Bosnia are in many ways very different countries, but in the context of this dissertation, this is not a hindrance. Taking into account the wide variety of case studies on sexual violence, they share fundamental similarities that make them suitable for comparison. Both cases were ethnic conflicts where one group was targeted disproportionately and where the rates of sexual violence were incredibly high. Both places showed evidence of strategic sexual violence and a fierce renegotiation over how ethnic and gender identities should be constructed. Political and military leaders played an important role in inciting and directing the violence. They were both societies in which women were defined by their relationships with men, and where political leaders determined the female national identity. These similarities make it possible to analyze both cases using mythology and instrumentality as modes of analysis. Still, as will be shown in the subsequent chapter, the violence perpetrated in Bosnia and Rwanda differed from each other in crucial aspects.

By choosing the lenses with which a phenomenon is investigated, one also determines some possible answers. This dissertation prioritizes identity politics over— for example, economic and pragmatic explanations for violence such as using rape to create group cohesion or participating in violence to gain economic and social advancement. Furthermore, it will deal with Tutsi and Bosnian Muslim female victims, despite the fact that there also were female perpetrators and male and female Hutu, Serb, and Croatian victims. Sexual violence against men has in later years received much needed attention, but this was not the case during the investigations of sexual violence in the 1990s. There are a number of reasons for why male victims of sexual violence are not addressed in this article. One major reason is the accessibility of trustworthy data. If data on the different forms of sexual violence against women is limited in the two chosen case studies, it is almost nonexistent with regards to male victims. Documentation is made particularly difficult given that few men admitted to having been sexually assaulted. However, some research has established that it happened; for example, Oosterhoff, Zwanikken, and Ketting argue that, based on data from local medical centers, it is clear that sexual violence against men was a regular feature of the war in Croatia. There are also indications that violence targeting the male reproductive capacity was used during the Bosnian war, for example castration and genital beatings. This might be evidence that the rationale of ethnic cleansing aiming to reduce the Bosniak ability to reproduce affected both men and women. It is known that men were victims of sexual violence in Rwanda as well, but no official numbers exist, and not a single case of male rape victims was addressed in the Gacaca courts. Another factor making comparisons of female and male victims difficult is the discrepancy in how sexual violence against men and women is reported. Sexual violence against men is very often reported as torture, whilst it is reported as sexual violence when the victims are female. For example, it is often the case that castration is registered as mutilation and rape as torture. Sexual violence is in many cases torture, but torture is not necessarily sexual violence. Hence, I wished to avoid conflating and potentially confusing data on sexual violence versus data on torture. It is by no means the intention of this article to diminish the experience of male victims of sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda. It is rather a cautionary measure to avoid drawing conclusions based on almost nonexistent evidence.

For the purposes of this paper, some key defini-
tions should be established. Sexual violence in conflicts is by the UN defined as “rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity against women, men, girls or boys.” This fails to refer to sexual mutilation specifically (except for enforced sterilization), but recent scholarship includes sexual mutilation in its definition of sexual violence, and so will this thesis. It will also include killing by means of rape or in direct succession of rape because it was a striking feature of violence against Tutsi women in Rwanda, but this will only be addressed under the instrumentality lens.

The forms of sexual violence that will be examined in this analysis are forced impregnation, sexual mutilation, and killing in the context of rape. I use the terms forced impregnation and forced pregnancy interchangeably to mean “the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population.” This is a restrictive definition, and its focus on intent makes it difficult to prosecute this crime. However, it is important to avoid the mistake made by Carpenter to judge pregnancies as a result of mass rape to be forced impregnation, leading her to argue that Rwanda experienced this violence as well. It is inevitable that mass rape leads to cases of pregnancy, but considering this forced impregnation confounds the motivations behind the practice, which will be elaborated on later. Sexual mutilation and mutilation of female body parts will both be used to refer to violence targeting breasts, genitalia, and abdomen as a site of reproduction. This excludes non-gendered violence, which is also common in relation with rape, such as beatings, cigarette burns and kicks. This is to focus the investigation on violence that aims at more than the infliction of pain. Killing in the context of rape is either rape aiming to kill, the deliberate spread of HIV, or murder after rape.

These three forms of violence were chosen because they are the most characteristic of sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda, and because they are explicable within the modes of analysis that I employ. Forced impregnation has come to be understood as the defining feature of sexual violence in the Bosnian war. In Rwanda, female body mutilation and murder in association with rape were particularly characteristic of violence against women. One type of violence that was prevalent in both Rwanda and Bosnia, which I will not have opportunity to address here, is gang rape. I mention this because recent literature considers gang rape as a defining feature of conflicts with high levels of sexual violence, and that this is used for bonding purposes in groups with low social cohesion. Gang rape was an important form of sexual violence, but it is poorly explained within the analytical framework of mythology and instrumentality. To understand gang rape, it is better to look at it from the perspective of unreason, focusing on group dynamics of shared guilt. There were obviously also cases of opportunistic sexual violence and sexual slavery as a reward for the men who were fighting, which also fits within the framework of unreason. I acknowledge these, and that my analysis will not address all factors that determined the type of sexual violence in my case studies.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ETHNIC GROUPS PRIOR TO CONFLICT

This section will give a brief introduction to the ethnic relations in Bosnia and Rwanda prior to the outbreak of violence, and outline the beginnings of the conflicts. The topic is vast and multifaceted, and this section does not pretend to do it justice. It is, however, important to have a basic understanding of the greater contexts of the conflicts and ethnic tensions, as many of the reasons for the outbreak and targeting of Tutsis and Bosniaks had a crucial effect on the perpetration of sexual violence.

The origins of ethnic conflicts are prone to be condensed into an idea of ethnic hatred that reaches its limits and boils over, known as primordialism. The Rwandan genocide was initially a victim of this academic strand, which has lost much of its momentum. Today, an ethnic community is generally understood as a loosely pre-existing group with some common denominators such as language, religion or physical attributes, which has been cemented into an ethnic identity by the artificial classification of political leaders, academics, and administrators. This division is often used as a tool for “the unequal distribution of the economic, educational and other benefits of modernization.” Hence, when referring to ethnic tension, it does not signify a biologically programmed hatred between Hutus and Tutsis or Serbs and Bosniaks, but rather a conflict that has been constructed with ethnicity as the parameter.

In Rwanda, the ethnic division of its people into three groups—Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa—was mainly so-
cioeconomic. This was based on the responsibilities each group had traditionally held in the country. The Tutsis were traditionally cattle herders, the Hutus were peasants, and the Twa (1 percent or less of the population) were hunter-gatherers.\textsuperscript{62} Cultural differences were close to nonexistent, and they shared language, religion and culture. Except for the socioeconomic variety, the main contrast was physical, although this was a stereotype with many exceptions.\textsuperscript{1} European observers, who during the end of the nineteenth century were obsessive about the concept of race, vastly exacerbated the differences between the groups.\textsuperscript{63} The Europeans thought the Tutsis were more intelligent than the other groups, and the German and later Belgian colonial powers determined the position of Hutus and Tutsis in the political and social hierarchy.\textsuperscript{64} Tutsis were given political power and privileges, which they maintained until Rwanda became independent in 1962 and the Hutus claimed political power. This history created grievances and socioeconomic tensions between the Tutsis and Hutus, and these intensified in the years prior to the genocide. Rwanda was under the authoritarian rule of President Habyarimana from 1973 to 1994, during which he targeted the Tutsi minority.\textsuperscript{65} Rwanda was experiencing a civil war from 1990 to 1994 between the government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), mainly formed up by exiled Tutsis, and in 1993, the country was hit by economic crisis due to failing exports.\textsuperscript{66} The genocide started after the President’s plane was shot down on the April 6, 1994, an act the RPF was accused of, although it was never proven. Hence, the tension between Hutus and Tutsis was not primarily due to fundamental ethnic differences, but a result of a struggle to access political and economic resources. The existing stereotypes of the ethnic groups were, however, used to exacerbate animosity and justify the targeting of Tutsis, which in turn affected what type of violence was considered “legitimate” to inflict upon them.

In the case of Bosnia, there is one identity factor that made distinction between groups within the population easy—religion. Croats, Serbs, and Muslims spoke the same language, but were Catholics, Orthodox and Muslim respectively.\textsuperscript{67} Bosnia was one of the most heterogeneous regions in Yugoslavia, and interethnic marriages were common in urban areas. Whilst it was less so in rural parts, it was the region with the highest interethnic marriage rates in the Former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{68} The relationship between the groups in Bosnia was good prior to the war, and this neighbor-turned-enemy dichotomy has been a major focus of the analyses of this conflict.\textsuperscript{69}

Again, political and economic grievances cast in a nationalistic discourse helps explain the abrupt animosity. Yugoslavia experienced an economic and political crisis after the communist downfall and the country’s breakup in the late 80s and early 90s, and nationalism became the new legitimatizing force for political power. Political and religious leaders actively used ethnic discourse to redraw “boundaries of exclusion/inclusion” that determined access to resources and territory.\textsuperscript{70} Furthermore, ethnic identification had been important in Tito’s regime, where political representation was divided along ethnic lines to ensure proportional representation.\textsuperscript{71} Nationalist leaders used the fear of becoming an ethnic minority in a new state to gain power and justify their claims to resources. It was also true that, “Fear and war help to coalesce populations into clearly defined nations,” as failure to be fully included into an ethnic group, when resources and protection is contingent upon ethnic belonging, left one vulnerable.\textsuperscript{72} Milosevic and other Serb nationalist leaders used the Serb fear of being a minority in Bosnia actively to justify his aim of creating a Greater Serbia.\textsuperscript{73} The war started shortly after Bosnia declared independence in 1992, when Bosnian Serbs began the siege of Sarajevo, taking over for the Yugoslav People’s Army.\textsuperscript{74} By the end of 1992, the Serbian forces had ethnically cleansed and controlled 70 percent of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{75}

EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN RWANDA AND BOSNIA

This section will review data on the sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda, and provide evidence for how it was different. Both Rwanda and Bosnia are infamous for the brutal and extensive sexual violence that took place during the conflicts, and it should be noted that these are not representative cases of wartime sexual abuse.\textsuperscript{76} Sexual violence is very difficult to document, and quantitative data on the number of people who have experienced particular forms of violence is close to nonexistent. At most, an estimate of the number of rapes and pregnancies during the conflict can be made. Without this quantitative data, it may seem like this investigation has little evidence

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\item[1]Read more about these physical stereotypes on p.65.
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to refer to. However, in the literature on sexual violence, it is very common to give priority to qualitative sources of information such as interviews, and roughly estimate how common or uncommon a certain practice was based on how many victims refer to similar atrocities and how widespread the victims state that the practice was. Key reports on the sexual violence in Rwanda and Bosnia—such as Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (1996), Rwanda: Broken Bodies, Torn Spirits; Living with Genocide, Rape and HIV/AIDS (2004), Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces (1993), and the report by the UN Commission of Experts (1994)—use testimonies from survivors and witnesses as their main evidence. Hence, I consider it legitimate that I use the same information. Still, the lack of quantitative data should make one cautious of being too assertive in drawing conclusions about how frequent certain practices were in Bosnia compared to Rwanda.

Sexual Violence in Rwanda

The extent of the sexual violence in Rwanda by far exceeded that of Bosnia. Based on the reported pregnancies as a result of rape, it is estimated that somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped. However, this method is problematic since many women were killed after being raped, and many pregnancies were ended or not reported. Bijleveld et al. arrive at a lower boundary of 354,440 rape victims, the vast majority being Tutsi women, and calculate that 294,440 of these were murdered. This is based on an estimate of how many Tutsi women were killed and an estimated ratio of 80 percent of murdered females having been raped. Bains and African Rights support the claim that a majority of the rape victims were murdered.

In Rwanda, the forms of violence that are frequently mentioned in testimonies are rape, gang rape, mutilation of sexual organs and breasts, murder after rape, sexual slavery, and deliberate transmission of HIV. Examples of mutilation of female body parts are violence towards the vagina, the cutting off of breasts, and impalement through the vagina. The perpetrators were Hutu militias (Interahamwe), the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and civilians. The fact that some forms of violence have not been reported, such as forced pregnancies, is not evidence of it not having taken place. However, without having found a single reference to forced impregnation in these reports, it is legitimate to argue that it was not a frequent occurrence. This is interesting in comparison with Bosnia, where the issue of forced pregnancies dominates the literature.

Sexual Violence in Bosnia

The number of rape victims is equally contest ed in Bosnia, where the estimate is between 20,000 to 50,000. The number of Muslim civilian women who were killed in direct relation to the Bosnian war is judged to be between 5,019 and 5,894, but there is no data as to whether they had been victims of rape before being killed. However, given that the number of rape victims is so much higher than that of women who have been killed, it can be concluded that a majority of rape victims were not murdered. Sexual violence in Bosnia was either explicitly ordered or at least condoned as a part of the war strategy, shown by its occurrences in different places throughout the country and following similar patterns of violence. The most direct evidence of this is the RAM plan of the Serbian military that proposed the raping of women and children as an effective weapon to break the enemy resistance. However, its existence has only been reported and not proven.

The sexual violence in Bosnia was defined by the forced impregnation that took place, and it is one of the most important examples of this type of sexual violence. The strategic use of forced impregnation as a tactic of war has been thoroughly documented, and the evidence is abundant. Rape camps were established where women were raped with the explicit aim of making them pregnant. Those who got pregnant were held until an abortion was no longer possible. There were gynecologists in the camps to examine the women, and those who did not get pregnant were punished. Many testimonies state that the Serbian soldiers told the Bosniak women that they were to carry Serbian babies. Sexual violence in Bosnia was almost always perpetrated by someone of a different ethnic group, with Bosnian Serb perpetrators and Bosnian Muslim victims being the most common pattern, particularly in the rape camps.

Many of the rapes were gang rapes, and some reports mention mutilation of female body parts. However, two of these three sources citing sexual mutilation do so on the basis of the reports by one Croatian journalist, Ines Sabalici, and it is difficult to find
any other backing for her claim. Although rapes were often brutal, involving kicking, beating, and cutting, there is little reliable evidence of the same deliberate targeting of female body parts as that which took place in Rwanda. Women were not only detained for the purpose of impregnation, but also to be of sexual service to the soldiers.

Sexual violence in Rwanda and Bosnia shared some common characteristics, such as a high frequency of rape, rape targeting a given ethnic group, and gang rape. However, they are clearly different in some aspects, the most evident being forced impregnation, mutilation of female body parts, and whether or not sexual violence ended in murder.

THE MYTHOLOGICAL LENS

Mythology, cosmology, and shared cultural beliefs are not actors in and by themselves. However, they play an important role in how we understand the world, which in turn shapes our actions. This first part of the analysis will address how shared beliefs within Bosnian and Rwandan societies created a framework for forced impregnation in Bosnia and for sexual mutilation in Rwanda. This does not suggest that Bosnian and Rwandan cultures were particularly prone to violence, but rather that some forms of violence were more likely to occur in one place than in the other. In this regard, it is important to understand how people make sense of violence in culture-specific ways. Investigating the mythological aspect of rape demonstrates how “it obeys the internal requirements and limits set by a particular socio-symbolic order.” Rejali argues that, “Unlike many kinds of violence, rape is shot through with symbolic significance and must be contextually analyzed.” Sexual violence in wartime must be understood through sociocultural practices in peacetime. Hence, given that sociocultural contexts differ between places, it is legitimate to assume that the forms of sexual violence do too.

Feminists have paid particular attention to the forced impregnation that took place in Bosnia, and the following analysis takes this as a starting point. However, it is in comparison with Rwandan mythology and cosmology that the very specific underpinnings of the forced impregnation in Bosnia are clearly demonstrated. It is interesting that only Bosnia experienced forced impregnation, although both societies had an official practice of patrilineal heritage—that is the idea that identity is passed on to future generations based on the father’s identity. This outcome depended partially on how well-established patrilineal heritage was in traditional beliefs. Forced impregnation is not a given consequence of ethnic conflicts with high levels of sexual violence, as the prominent feminist analysis of the Bosnian case seems to suggest at times.

**Forced Impregnation**

Forced impregnation in Bosnia has, in feminist research, been interpreted both as genocide and ethnic cleansing. By occupying Bosniak wombs, the Bosniak population became victim of “measures intended to prevent births within the group.” Furthermore, the impregnation was considered to increase the Serbian population, as the babies were fathered by Serbs, and to contaminate the Bosniak community biologically and psychologically. This interpretation assumes that patrilineal heritage allowed for women to be reduced to “a biological box.” All the ethnic groups in Bosnia, including Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, shared the belief in patrilineal heritage. This belief made it possible for Serbian soldiers to tell Bosnian Muslim women who had been raped that they were carrying Serbian babies, and for that to be believed by both the perpetrator and the victim. This was an incredibly powerful image of Serbian intrusion, beyond the very intrusive act of rape, particularly because all parties shared the tradition of patrilineal heritage.

Patrilineal heritage is not unique to Bosnia, however. It existed in Rwanda, as well, as a legacy of the Belgian colonial rule. However, it was traditionally believed that although men brought the most important contribution to the fetus through their semen—the “gift of self”—the female also contributed to the creation of the fetus. Furthermore, in pre-colonial and early colonial times, Hutu men could marry Tutsi women as a form of social advancement, and their children would then be considered Tutsi. Hence, officially, the father’s identity determined the children’s ethnic membership in Rwanda. However, patrilineal heritage was less well rooted there compared to Bosnia. When ethnic relations were stable, people of mixed parentage were considered to fully belong to the group of their father, but in times of tension, the dominant ethno-political group determined ethnic belonging. Prior to the genocide, the toleration of mixed identities decreased rapidly. Therefore, the intrusion of the ethnic boundaries by the impregnation of women of the other group was not considered
evidence of the perpetrating group's victory and potency. Rather, children of mixed ethnic identity were perceived by the Hutu extremist leaders to be a threat to the boundaries between the ethnic groups. Hence, forced impregnation would not have had the same destructive potency in Rwanda as it did in Bosnia, which made it less relevant as a strategy of sexual violence.

Another commonly shared belief and concern in the Bosnian society contributed to making the reproductive capacity of Bosnian women a target. Due to the lack of physical differences between the ethnic groups, there has traditionally been a strong fear of the possibility of nurturing a baby who is the result of a woman having been secretly impregnated by a man from another ethnic group. An expression of this concern with illegitimate pregnancies is a marriage ritual that was still in practice in the 1990s. Before the wedding, a woman (not the bride) was supposed to accuse the groom of having fathered her (nonexistent) child. This contrasts to the case of Rwanda, where people perceived that there were significant differences in appearances between the ethnic groups. A Tutsi was typically considered tall, with a long nose and long fingers. Although people in reality frequently did not fit into the stereotypical looks of their ethnic group, the belief in the importance of these categories made them real to Rwandans. The fear of impregnation by a man of another ethnicity was not common in Rwanda, again making forced impregnation less likely to be perpetrated there.

Cosmology and Sexual Mutilation

The inscription of meaning on the body through violence has been investigated particularly in literature on torture, and Taussig claims that “far from being spontaneous, sui generis, and an abandonment of what are often called ‘the values of civilization’ such rites have a deep history deriving power and meaning from those values.” Sexual mutilation is also a form of torture, and the two are often conflated in research on male victims, as this type of violence is much more likely to be recorded as torture for men and sexual violence for women. In Rwanda, it is clear that the bodily violence that took place, especially the extensive violence against female, male, and stereotypically Tutsi body parts, had significance beyond the immediate physical damage. In her famous study of Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Liisa Malkki argued that “necrographic maps” are used to shape violence. Necrographic maps are cognitive representations that inform the destruction of the body of the ethnic other, based on myths and stereotypes of that ethnic group. These collectively held cognitive representations are generalized understandings of how the body of the ethnic other is differentiated from the physical body of the ethnic self. By mapping out these physical differences, given violent practices are reserved for specific groups of people and targets are identified based on deviances from the physical stereotype of one's own ethnic group. According to Malkki, these maps “help construct and imagine ethnic difference” and “through violence, bodies of individual persons become metamorphosed into specimens of the ethnic category for which they are supposed to stand.” Actors do not necessarily have to be fully aware of the connection between their beliefs and actions, but the presence of such maps make certain forms of violence particularly meaningful.

Rwandan cosmology has been studied in relation to the genocidal violence mainly by anthropologist Christopher Taylor, whose work is invaluable in that he studied Rwanda both before and after the genocide. In his 1988 study, he found that traditional cosmology still had relevance for how people explained events in their lives and within the state. Cosmology is a system for understanding the world that “entails evaluations and moral premises and emotional attitudes translated into taboos, preferences, prescriptions and proscriptions.” The Rwandan cosmology emphasized the importance of good flow—both in the body and society—of liquids such as blood, breast milk, menstrual blood, semen, and water. Blockages were understood to be very harmful, and this translated into perceiving women who did not menstruate or had small breasts (as a sign of inability to lactate) as abominations. They were dangerous to the whole community, and it was considered the king's responsibility to eliminate them. Taylor has argued that the genocidal violence in Rwanda, sexual violence and mutilation included, bore evidence of being shaped by Rwandan cosmology’s preoccupation with the concept of flow and blockage. He explained the prevalence of breast oblation, impalement, and disembowelment of pregnant women as an expression of this flow and blockage dichotomy. These practices targeted typical female sites of the flow of bodily fluids, and by blocking these, Tutsi women became abominations.
within the Hutu state. Making roadblocks the sites of massive killing and throwing dead bodies into the rivers have also been mentioned as examples of this cosmology on a macro level.\(^{127}\)

Using the mythological lens on Rwanda and Bosnia in a comparative study shows how certain forms of sexual violence were underpinned by given beliefs, myths, and cosmology particular to each of the two countries. It is not sufficient to simply employ the feminist idea of the social construction of women as symbols of the nation and of their families’ and communities’ honor. One must understand how the identities of particular groups of women are constructed based on a set of beliefs in a given place, which creates a framework for sexual violence. However, there are some obvious critiques to understanding nation-wide violence from a cultural perspective. If we accept the argument that culture and myths shared on the national level can influence violent actions, we also have to take into account that the cultures of smaller subnational units can result in variations of violent practices within the nation. National culture could be internally inconsistent, and some belief systems may only be present in certain groups, within a specific region, rural community or religion.\(^{128}\) It is also more difficult to prove the connection between a certain violent practice and a belief system than for example proving the instrumental use of sexual violence, which depends on establishing intent. We run the risk of trying to make sense of violence after the fact, and enhance its symbolic meaning by reinterpreting myths and beliefs to suit the events we try to explain.\(^{129}\) Examining how beliefs and identities were reconstructed before violence broke out reduces these limitations, and this is the aim of the subsequent chapter.

**Instrumentalism: The Construction of Ethnic and Gender Identities**

This section will focus on the topic of manipulation of ethnic and gender identities by ethnic elites and leaders, and argue that this encouraged the perpetration of mutilation of Tutsi women and the forced impregnation of Bosnian Muslim women. In Rwanda and Bosnia, the reformulation of ethnic and gender identities before and during the conflicts was very active, but they were reformulated differently. Fearon and Laitin argue that there is a close relationship between the strategic construction of ethnic identities and violence, and this claim will be supported here.\(^{130}\)

**Forced Impregnation**

The way Tutsi and Bosniak women’s identities were constructed in the public sphere determined what kinds of sexual violence were perceived as relevant to the perpetrators. Hinton argues, using the Nazis and the Khmer Rouge as examples, that both “sought to expunge the impure, but they constructed the impure in different ways.”\(^{131}\) The way a group’s identity is perceived determines how we consider it legitimate to treat its members.\(^{132}\) A major contrast in how Bosniac Muslim and Tutsi women were constructed prior to the genocide was that Muslim women were portrayed as baby producers, while Tutsi women were reduced to sexual objects.

As part of a general pattern of nationalism taking over for communism in Bosnia and Serbia, women’s roles in the society were redefined according to the needs of the political elites. Instead of the communist ideal of the independent female comrade, women were, in the nationalist discourse, constructed as mothers and producers of the ethnic group.\(^{133}\) This approach to motherhood was highly hypocritical. Bosniak and Albanian women were scorned and considered uneducated for having many children, in contrast to the modern and educated Serbian women. At the same time, Serbian women were considered too independent and insufficiently preoccupied with their motherhood due to their low birth rates, and a woman who chose to have an abortion was, in national discourse, considered to be a “traitor” of the nation.\(^{134}\) Given that the defining, most threatening characteristic of Muslim women was constructed as their motherhood, forced impregnation targeted the core of their identity.

In 1993, the extremist Hutu magazine Kangura stated about Tutsis that “a cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly. A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach.”\(^{135}\) This illustrated that shortly before the genocide, Hutu extremists perceived Tutsi women as incapable of having Hutu children. Hence, the construction of Bosniak women’s identities assisted in making forced impregnation a logical instrument for Serb leaders, while these conditions were not present in Rwanda.

**The Construction of Tutsi Women as Sexual Objects**

The Hutu extremist propaganda was very concerned with Tutsi women prior to the genocide. In Rwanda, like in Bosnia, women were primarily valued
for their motherhood. However, prior to the genocide, Tutsi women were sexualized by extremist Hutu propaganda, which strongly contrasted the stereotype of the devoted Hutu mother and wife with the beautiful, seductive Tutsi mistress. This propaganda radicalized the social construction of bodily difference between Hutus and Tutsis that stemmed from the Hamitic myth of the colonial period in Rwanda. This myth told the tale of how the Tutsis were the superior race originating from Ethiopia, and how they were much more European both mentally and physically compared to the typically African Hutus. The Hamitic myth was internalized by Rwandan leaders long before the genocide, and it was used by Tutsi leaders to try to legitimize their continued high social status post-independence, and by Hutu leaders to construct Tutsis as a foreign, imposing group unworthy of ruling Rwanda.

The Hamitic myth did not only construct differences between Hutus and Tutsis, but also developed gender-specific characteristics. Tutsi women were constructed as more beautiful than Hutu women, and this beauty was seen as a powerful tool with which a Tutsi woman could trick a hard-working Hutu man into marrying her, to later become her family’s servant. This fascination with the female Tutsi body is illustrated by the fact that many Hutu extremists had Tutsi mistresses and continued to take Tutsi mistresses even after May 1994, when orders had gone out that Hutu men with Tutsi wives and children should kill their families. Baines argues: “In the private sphere, male internalization of Tutsi beauty and unavailability fed a desire to possess and control Tutsi women. Double-edged, the same beauty of Tutsi women posed a threat to the Hutu nation.” Hence, as a part of the genocide, it was important to destroy the attraction of the Tutsi woman.

The explanation behind the incitement to violence in the Rwandan genocide has been explained as driven by elites, particularly by using media outlets, such as the radio and magazines to build up ethnic hatred. However, this top-bottom instrumentalist approach has struggled to explain how elite propaganda translated into active involvement of a large number of perpetrators, and has failed to account for the personal, economic, and local reasons to participate in the killing. These explanations are, however, concerned with why violence broke out, and not so much with the varying types of violence that were perpetrated. To understand why Tutsi women were raped and mutilated when they, in most cases, were ultimately killed, one must pay attention to how the image shaped by extremist propaganda legitimized forms of violence that targeted them based on their ethno-gendered identity. Although local leaders participated in directing and encouraging the sexual violence, I argue that this was primarily done within the framework of Tutsi women constructed as sexual objects by Hutu extremist propaganda on the national level, as sexual mutilation took place on a nationwide scale.

An example of how Hutu extremist discourse targeted Tutsi women by manipulating the image of their ethnic and gender identity is found in the three first commandments of the infamous Hutu Ten Commandments, published in Kangura in 1990. These dealt explicitly with the unsuitability of having a Tutsi wife, of her traitorous and seductive capabilities, and of how superior Hutu women were as mothers and wives. Cartoons were also frequently used to illustrate Tutsi women having sexual relationships with the UN forces, luring them to support the Tutsis, and challenging the Rwandan sexual norm by depicting oral and anal sex, depriving them of their status as respectable women. This gendered propaganda did not only construct Tutsi women as sexual objects, but created different categories that judged which Rwandan women belonged to the state, and thus were worthy of protection. According to this discourse, Tutsi women were non-citizens, and the only holders of full citizenship rights were Hutu women loyal to Hutu power. The construction of Tutsi women as sexual beings before the genocide “foreshadowed the sadism perpetrated by extremists on the bodies of their victims” and created necrographic maps to guide the violation of their bodies.

Sexual mutilation of Tutsi women was a means of revenge not only against their community through their function as ethnic boundary makers, which feminist analysis tends to emphasize. It was also a punishment of Tutsi women, arising from the constructed image of them as enemies worthy of targeting and further strengthened by the stereotype of the beautiful, socially superior Tutsi woman whom Hutu men did not deserve. Adding to the already complex tensions of gender and ethnicity was the low social status of Hutu militiamen, the majority of which were poor and unprivileged. This status had been exacerbated by poor economic conditions in the years leading up
to 1994. Sexual violence and mutilation of female bodily beauty was a powerful means of revenge and establishing dominance. A survivor of sexual violence reported how she had heard the perpetrator say “You Tutsi women, you have no respect for Hutu men,” and searched for the women with higher social status in order to violate those they would be least likely to attract under normal conditions. Fujii recounts an episode that demonstrates the powerful symbolism of extra-lethal violence, which is violence performed face-to-face that transgress shared norms of how to treat people, such as sexual mutilation. A mayor in central Rwanda had two Tutsi women confined in his house where they were raped and later murdered, and after they were killed, they were displayed naked in the village for all to see. This violence targeted the stereotypical Tutsi female identity because “it made a mockery of the norms of modesty that most young women followed and played upon the racist trope of Tutsi beauty by displaying the bodies in the most degrading position possible.”

Because of this pre-genocidal concern with the physical body of Tutsi women in Rwanda, and not the female body primarily as a symbol of the nation such it was in the Bosnian war, it is not surprising that mutilation of female body parts was prevalent in Rwanda. However, although the reports of sexual mutilation based on constructed characteristics of ethnic and gender identities are much less frequent in the case of Bosnia, there are examples that illustrate how stereotypical appearances informed violence. Olujic interviewed a young woman who had been told by Serb soldiers that she could not possibly be a Muslim woman because she had not shaved her pubic hair (stereotypically a Muslim tradition in Bosnia), so before they raped her, they brutally shaved her.

This section has shown how elites built on ethnic stereotypes and myths to crystalize images of the ethnic other. By doing this, violence was legitimized and incited against a group to target the characteristics of that identity; motherhood in the case of Bosniak women, and beauty and sexuality in the case of Tutsi women. This instrumentalist analysis is included to bridge the gap between Kirby’s mythology and instrumentality modes of analysis by illustrating how myths became a tool for reshaping identities in times of tension, and how this identity construction was used to justify violence grounded in the leaders’ aims and objectives. How leaders’ fundamental motives in the overarching conflict affected sexual violence will be the concern of the last chapter.

THE INSTRUMENTALITY LENS

According to Arendt, violence is defined by being a means to an end, and “violence requires an objective by which to define and guide its function.” Sexual violence is no different, and the objectives of the political leaders in Rwanda and Bosnia shaped the violence that was perpetrated. The concerns of the extremist Hutu leaders and the Serb political leadership shared some commonalities, but were also different in important aspects. Both wished to express their domination over the Tutsis and the Bosniaks to ensure their own position in power, but this was based on different preoccupations and political conditions. In this chapter, murder in connection to rape will also be addressed, in addition to forced impregnation and sexual mutilation.

The Serbian President Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic and Mladic were worried, or at least legitimated, their rise to power within a nationalistic discourse of concern, that the Bosnian Muslim population would become too large in relation to the Bosnian Serb population due to the high Bosniak birth rate. In Rwanda, the Tutsis were by far the minority, but they had traditionally held a privileged position in Rwandan society, which had created an inferiority complex in some Hutus. Given the civil war between President Habyarimana and the Tutsi refugee rebel group Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ending with a power sharing agreement, the Arusha Accords, Hutu power dominance was challenged.

Forced Impregnation as an Instrument of Demographic Manipulation

As mentioned above, one important concern amongst the Serb leaders was to decrease the Muslim birth rate and increase the Serbian population. The leader of the Serbian Orthodox Church called the low Serbian birth rate “the white plague”, and together with several Serbian political parties, the church published a document called “Warning”, promoting births in Serbian areas and discouraging births in Albanian and Muslim areas. By a policy of forced impregnation, both motives could be achieved.

Impregnating enemy women occupied their wombs temporarily and potentially permanently. On the other hand, the wombs were occupied temporarily, since the Bosniak women who became pregnant by
Serb soldiers were carrying what was considered a Serb baby. Hence, they could not conceive with men of their own ethnic origin for the duration of their pregnancy. On the other hand, the womb were occupied permanently because raped women often were ostracized by their families, rejected by their husbands, or had limited possibilities of getting married. Bosnians warned against feminist analysis accepting the incorrect perception of the baby’s identity being determined by the father, and argues that this is to continue treating women as baby containers. Though the concern is understandable, it is only by employing this illogic that we can see how the demographic concerns of the Serb leaders could translate into a strategy of forced impregnation. It should also be taken into consideration that both perpetrators and victims often considered the baby to be Serb. Although the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats shared the tradition of patrilineal belief, this had to be actively promoted by the Serbian leaders and was not automatically accepted, particularly in urban areas with a long tradition of mixed marriages.

Forced impregnation was also a means of helping to populate the Serbian nation. The fetus was not only an enemy because it belonged to its father’s ethnic group, but also because it was referred to as a future soldier that would fight on the Serbian side. Most reports on forced impregnation in Bosnia mention testimonies from rape victims explaining how Serbian soldiers told them that they had been inseminated with Serbian babies who would become soldiers that would kill them. Forced impregnation would be an unlikely strategy in Rwanda, given that the Hutus were by far a demographic majority and that the extremists did not aim at halting the Tutsi birth rate, but instead at extinguishing the already living members of the group. Weitsman summarizes this well:

Instead of using rape as a mechanism to propagate more Hutus, it used rape as a mechanism to try to take life […] This differentiates the mass rape in Rwanda from that in Serbia. In Rwanda, rape was a tool used to destroy Tutsi women; it was not undertaken with the express purpose of impregnating them.

Rape and Murder

The Hutu extremists had a clear agenda of exterminating the Tutsis by murder. The genocide was preceded by huge amounts of propaganda encouraging the killing of “tall trees” and the extermination of “the cockroaches.” Except for the genocide in Srebrenica, the violence against Bosnian Muslims is classified as ethnic cleansing. The Serbian leaders were more concerned with expelling the Muslims from their homes than with killing them (although many were indeed also killed, the vast majority being men). This is a simplified version of two complex conflicts, but this was the fundamental difference in the aims of Serbian leaders and Hutu extremists. The majority of Tutsi women who were raped were murdered afterwards, whereas Bosniak women were less likely to be killed in comparison. To explain why so many women were killed after having been raped in Rwanda and not in Bosnia, it is crucial to consider that Rwanda experienced a genocide and Bosnia experienced ethnic cleansing.

The Hutu extremists in Rwanda had no need to increase the Hutu population, as it was already a majority constituting 85 percent of the population. They did, however, wish to eliminate the Tutsi population. This included the unborn, and extremist radio programs encouraged the disembowelment of pregnant women. Malkki also recorded this in her study on Burundian Hutu refugees after the genocide against the Hutus in 1972, and one interviewee explains this atrocity as an attempt to destroy not only the future of that child, but also the future of the entire ethnic group. Some testimonies also argue that the deliberate transmission of HIV was used to inflict a slow death upon the victim and to spread HIV amongst the Tutsis. In Bosnia, it was not necessary to kill rape victims to achieve the political aims of the Serbs. The aim to ethnically cleanse the Bosniak population was achieved by using sexual violence to terrorize the population into fleeing their homes.

This section has aimed to illustrate how forced impregnation and murder in association with rape were used to achieve the strategic plans of leaders in Bosnia and Rwanda. Leaders were pivotal in shaping the form of sexual violence both because they used it to achieve their given political aspirations, and by promoting their self-serving construction of Tutsi and Bosniak women’s identities in the national discourse.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has aimed to shed light on how sexual violence in Bosnia was different from sexual violence in Rwanda, and to use this as an example of how the feminist perspective on sexual violence
must widen its scope to account for variations in the forms of sexual violence. Sexual violence should be understood as a continuum of political, societal, and conflict dynamics within the country where it is perpetrated. Feminist literature provides a good framework for doing this, but it has to be combined with an analysis of other relevant elements in addition to gender relations. In Bosnia and Rwanda, one of the most important dynamics interacting with gender identity was ethnic identity.

The most pertinent variation in the forms of sexual violence was that forced impregnation was virtually nonexistent in Rwanda, while it was an important form of sexual violence in Bosnia. Also, mutilation of female body parts in Bosnia seems to have been rare in comparison to Rwanda. This posed the question about why two ethnic conflicts experiencing strategic sexual violence on a massive scale produced very distinct ways of targeting women with sexual violence.

Three factors have been identified as crucial, and they all essentially deal with how groups of people were targeted for violence based on how the perpetrators constructed their identity. These are mythology, the use of myths, and common beliefs by leaders to construct ethnic and gender identity, and the motivation for this being leadership objectives in the conflict. Bosniak women were constructed as a threat based on their reproductive capacities, and this was a result of Serbian leaders’ concern over the high Bosniak birth rate and situated within the traditional belief in a patrilineal heritage. My analysis does not comprehensively explain why people participated in violence in the first place. However, it does illuminate why, when sexual violence did break out, it did so in the form of forced impregnation.

The same framework of myths, identity construction, and leadership motives explains sexual violence in Rwanda, but because Rwandan myths, identities and motives were different from those in Bosnia, other types of sexual violence took place there. Rwandan women were constructed as sexual objects that were a danger to the Hutu ethnic group based on their ability to charm Hutu men whilst working for their own ethnic community. This was used to legitimize violence against Tutsi women as a part of the aim to annihilate the Tutsis, and it was situated within myths of Tutsi women’s beauty and superiority to Hutu men, and a cosmology that considered people with blockages in the flow of bodily fluids abominations. Therefore, sexual violence in Rwanda was characterized by mutilation of female body parts to destroy the seductive power of Tutsi women over Hutu men, and by killing them after rape to eliminate the Tutsis completely.

Further study on variations in forms of sexual violence should attempt to address how the construction of identity is translated into violent action more clearly. So far, both feminist analysis and theories of ethnic conflict struggle to do so. This comparison of sexual violence in Bosnia and Rwanda, which from afar might seem rather similar, illustrates that close attention must be paid to the conflict-specific processes in each particular case study if feminist scholars desire to give a credible account of the diversity of wartime sexual violence across conflicts.

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INTRODUCTION

Michael Dawson’s *Behind the Mule*, published in 1994, examines the group dynamics and identity of African Americans in politics. Dawson gives blacks a collective consciousness rooted in a history of slavery and subsequent economic and social subjugation, and further argues that African Americans function as a unit because of their unique shared past. Dawson uses data from the 1988 National Black Election Panel Survey to analyze linked fate—the belief that what happens to others in a person’s racial group affects them as individual members of the racial group—and group consciousness among blacks in the political sphere, and then examines the effects of black group identity on voter choice and political leanings.

Dawson’s work is pertinent today in the years of the first African-American president, and even more so as African Americans become wealthier and more integrated into white America. Integration has bearings on the black group: group ties may become weaker, specifically in the political realm. As African Americans enter into the middle and upper classes, do they still identify with roots in slavery, segregation, and economic suppression? Are these roots abandoned for newly elevated class ties? Will most present-day African Americans side with the candidate who looks like them, but doesn’t necessarily protect their personal economic interests?

Dawson’s work piqued my interest, especially in an age in which some academics argue that the ideological gap between black and white Americans is shrinking. I want to expand on Dawson’s work and see if his idea is still applicable today. I have previously conducted case studies of four townships in the state of New Jersey that represent cross sections of race and class. I categorized Carteret, New Jersey as majority white and lower class; Morristown, New Jersey as majority white and middle class; Willingboro, New Jersey as majority black and middle class; and Orange, New Jersey as majority black and lower class. I analyzed the results of the 2008 presidential election in each of the four townships, and found that both majority black towns supported Obama at rates of over 90 percent. The majority white towns still supported Obama at high rates, but not as high as in the majority black towns. I was not surprised by these results, as they were in line with what Dawson had predicted about black group politics. However, I was unable to find more precise data than that found at the precinct level, so my results could not be specified to particular individuals.

The ecological inference problem piqued my interest in obtaining individual data to apply my findings at the personal level. This issue with ecological inference is that it assumes that individual-level analysis of results can be understood based upon aggregate or group results. The aggregate data from my prior study was only useful at the township level. I wanted to view linked fate and candidate choice on a person-by-person basis. I felt this relationship would present a more accurate and complete picture of each group’s voting decisions. Though the majority vote in each township went for Obama, I wanted to explore what subsets of the African-American group were likely voting for Obama, and which might be more inclined to vote for the Republican candidate. To do this, I decided to conduct a survey asking African-American voters about their adherence to linked fate and political leanings. In addition, I was interested in testing whether, in an electoral contest where candidate race is set against socioeconomic status, an African-American voter would be more likely to base his or her vote upon the candidate’s race or class. I proposed an embedded experiment in my survey that would establish a hypothetical election between four different potential candidates of varying race and economic-policy leanings. This would force the respondent to choose...
in race and fiscal policy crossed pair-ups whether a
candidate's race or socioeconomic status would trump
the other.

These different race and class pairings are tell-
ing because of the unique class and economic status
typically attributed to African Americans as a group.
Because of the history of slavery as well as the so-
cial, economic, and legal barriers placed on African
Americans throughout U.S. history, African Ameri-
cans have been dealt a less opportune political status.
Lack of economic diversity aided in the formation of a
black political group, as fiscal interests were generally
the same. However, I argue that the economic inter-
ests of the black group have begun to vary. Increasing
economic diversity has the potential to separate the
group, and could render Dawson's findings of the late
twentieth century less applicable now, twenty years
later.

I also revisited the four townships I studied to
find out the precinct-level results for the 2012 elec-
tion, and whether these results are in line with my in-
dividual-level survey results. I conducted case studies
of the four townships for the more recent election in
order to see if group consciousness has strengthened
or weakened. This may corroborate or contradict my
survey results. Revisiting these townships was neces-
sary to make insightful comparisons with the newer
individual-level results.

I have discussed Claudine Gay's work on the ef-
effects of neighborhood status, quality, and segregation
on feelings of linked fate, political group conscious-
ness, and the black vote. I am interested in looking
at how living in close proximity to other blacks af-
facts the strength of group unity, and if this unity is
lessered by living in more integrated or mostly white
neighborhoods.

In conclusion, I find this research to be comp-
pelling due to its implications for understanding the
black political community in the United States. I be-
lieve the study will contribute to a further comprehen-
sion of the factors affecting political integration and
the status of blacks today. There may be further im-
lications for the study of affirmative action, neigh-
borhood integration, and more recently, the political
effects of racially biased police brutality and mass
incarceration. I hope that this study will shed light
on the uniqueness of the African-American political
group, both in the past and today.

Literature Review and Expectations

Dawson's *Behind the Mule* considers race and
socioeconomic status among African Americans as
factors for political choice. Dawson describes a cer-
tain "New Black Politics… characterized by the trans-
formation of protest politics into electoral politics
with high levels of black political unity… an image of
profound political unity that transcends class." This
"new" form of black politics defined by Dawson in
1994 places an emphasis on the group consciousness
that accompanies African Americans in the political
arena and at the polls. Dawson discusses this black
political unity in terms of what he calls a "black utility
heuristic":

> It is quite clear that, until the mid-1960s, race was
> the decisive factor in determining the opportuni-
ties and life chances available to virtually all Af-
> ricans, regardless of their own or their family's social and economic status. Consequently,
> it was much more effective for African Americans
to determine what was good for the racial group
> than to determine what was good for themselves
> individually. It was more efficient for them to use
> the status of the group, both relative and absolute,
as a proxy for individual utility.

This black utility heuristic historically assisted
African Americans in choosing which ideologies and
political values fit them best as a group. Because Af-
rican Americans have a unique history with roots in
slavery, segregation, and economic subjugation, vot-
ing as a group has meant more political power and
typically has made sense for most black individuals
struggling with similar fiscal, social, and political is-
ues. By working as a group, blacks could advance fur-
ther. Therefore, they would be communally furthering
the interests of the entire group.

However, I argue that in the years since Dawson's
book was published, perhaps a newer black political
functioning has emerged. Where race used to trump
socioeconomic status, class status is now gaining in-
creasing importance for African Americans in the po-
litical realm. In 1994, Dawson wrote:

Economic polarization among African Americans
has indeed been increasing over the past twenty
years. Both the middle class and the group of eco-
nomically marginalized African Americans have
grown… In the future, the new black middle class
may not identify as strongly with the black com-
unity, the Democratic Party, or liberal causes…
Many would argue that economic polarization
within the black community will continue to in-

81
crease throughout the 1990s and will bring in its
wake increasing political polarization.20

I plan to investigate whether economic stratification in the black community has strained the historic political unanimity of African Americans. Dawson calls on the “black utility heuristic,” the strength and unity of the black network, and individually linked fate as reasons for sustained black political accord.21 However, I suggest that in recent years, political efficacy, ties to the black network, and the sense of common identity among blacks have all begun to dissipate. Furthermore, residential separation within the black community has become a more frequent occurrence. Taken together, these two factors may suggest that black political unity has begun to weaken.22

The black middle class is distinct from the larger black community in the United States. Middle-class African Americans have separated themselves both from the lower class and the distant upper class. This has led to a ‘pulling away’ of the African American class structure at both ends as the top becomes a mainstream bourgeoisie and the bottom is condemned to “ever-widen[ing] poverty.”23 The middle class is forced either into isolation in the middle or forced to draw closer to the upper or lower class. Dawson writes that the black middle class tends to mirror the black lower class economically in some ways, as the government largely employs the middle class. On the other hand, he cites Kilson (1983), who argues that the black middle class has begun a process of “status deracialization.”24 Middle-class blacks have joined the ranks of higher-class workers, and, as such, the characteristic historical racial identity of economic subjugation becomes convoluted with higher-class economic interests.25 Still, Dawson notes, “[t]he contradictory forces working in the black middle class have led to what Kilson (1983) has referred to as the ‘insider/outside’ syndrome. He documents that over 80% of this class still feel racial obligations.”26 Though the middle has separated itself economically from the African Americans as a group, overall it still feels a sense of loyalty to black political unity.

Linked fate is tied together with black group consciousness as well as with the black utility heuristic. This concept of linked fate causes African Americans feel their “fate,” or outcome, is impacted by and tied into that of the African American community as a whole.27 Through my survey and the rest of my study, I seek to find how strong this sense of linked fate is and whether it exists in different levels of intensity between different socioeconomic class levels. Dawson, in his later book (2001), Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, writes, “the great majority of blacks continue, my previous and current work shows, to see their fate linked to that of the race, but how that linkage gets interpreted is based partly on social position but also partly on ideological orientation.”28 My study questions whether this notion still holds true today.

A Pew Research Center report from 2007, “Blacks See Growing Values Gap Between Poor and Middle Class,” argues that blacks are now more segregated because of widening class differences within the racial group:29 “African Americans see a widening gulf between the values of middle class and poor blacks, and nearly four-in-ten say that because of the diversity within their community, blacks can no longer be thought of as a single race.”30 This claim implies that members of the black community may perceive themselves as less of a cohesive group due to differences in class ideals. This is especially significant for black political unity. If values are divergent among economic classes, this separates the black vote both ideologically and economically. Not only might this affect black economic choices, but political choices as well. In addition, the Pew study found that, “blacks and whites concur that there has been a convergence in the values held by blacks and whites.”31 If ideologies between the races are becoming similar, this may imply a political integration as well, or at least a lessening of diversity along racial lines. Within the past twenty years, blacks have also begun to less fervently support black leaders in politics, religion, and the NAACP less fervently.32 In the past, these figures have been unifying individuals, but more recently, they have arguably lost some power in the black community.

The Pew study also cites an interesting contrast to Dawson’s work, which may imply that this change is generational:

A 54% majority of African Americans say that blacks who don’t get ahead are mainly responsible for their situation, while just three-in-ten say discrimination is mainly to blame. As recently as the mid 1990s, when Dawson’s book was published, black opinion on this question tilted in the opposite direction, with a majority of African Americans arguing that discrimination is the main reason for a lack of black progress.33
Views on this feeling of linked fate seemed to change around the time Dawson's book was published in 1994. This could imply that Dawson's thesis is, in present years, not as salient due to the diffusion of the black group. But why would this potential switch occur in the mid-1990s? What changed within this time frame?

In Clemetson's 2003 article, “Younger Blacks tell Democrats to take Notice,” the author takes notice of this same decline in strength of linked fate among blacks in recent years. Clemetson points to the age bracket of eighteen- to thirty-five-year olds that were not alive during the 1960s Civil Rights Movement. This is significant in illuminating the pertinence, or lack thereof, of Dawson's work today. If eighteen- to thirty-five-year olds, the younger population of voting-age blacks, make up almost half of the total eligible black voter population—about 40%—then this age range is extremely important to the black vote as a whole. In 1988, when the Black National Election Panel survey was taken, we find that a person aged twenty-seven, the median age for the eighteen to thirty-five cohort, would have been born in 1961. This means that this individual would have grown up during the Civil Rights Era. Further, his or her parents may have been active or instilled civil rights values in their children during this time of powerful black solidarity. However, a person that is twenty-seven in 2003, when Clemetson's article was written, was born in the late 1970s. They missed growing up in the Civil Rights Movement by a few years. This younger generation may have been further removed from the Movement, and may not have the same strength of black group unity as those of the previous generation.

Because the Civil Rights Movement roughly lasted from 1955 to 1968, any children born after this time frame may not have experienced a sense of the magnitude of the Movement. Black National Election Panel survey, which surveyed many who had grown up in this time period, reveals strong black unity and linked fate among African Americans. If the following generation was more likely to take the gains made during the Civil Rights Movement for granted, then it is also possible that unity began to decline after this year. Perhaps African Americans are more satisfied with where they are today. As the time gap from the 1960s struggle increases and as African Americans perform better economically and socially, they may feel that there is less need for a new civil rights Movement or strategic unity. I will analyze questions on linked fate, as well as hypothetical election results, by age range in order to see whether age makes a difference in strength of linked fate.

In Wypijewski's 2004 article “Black and Bruised,” the changing political loyalties of African Americans are further corroborated. An interviewee in Wypijewski's article argued that “Many blacks stay home for the election because they feel that neither party is attending to their needs… [The] divide in America ain't black and white; it's the have and the have-nots, and that's the truth, darling.” Some African Americans perceive this divide along class lines as being even stronger than that along racial lines. In addition, neither party always satisfies the entirety of African American voters. Still, one of the women interviewed in the article states, “No one I met in the 18-to-35-year-old cohort said, as did James Sulton, at eighty the lion of one of Orangeburgs' grand families, 'I'd vote for the Devil if he was a Democrat.' This level of commitment to the Democratic Party is arguably strongest among the older members of black America, as these members grew up through the Civil Rights Movement and saw what the Republican Party failed to do at that time. Today, it may seem that “the only thing anyone knows for sure about 'the black vote' is that it's not monolithic.”

What once used to be a seamless, stable voter group may now be more divided among different classes, identities, and values.

In their 2010 article, “Is Racial Linked Fate Unique? Comparing Race, Ethnicity Class, Gender, and Religion,” Claudine Gay and Jennifer Hochschild discuss the weakening of this group feeling of linked futures. Their article states, “In seven surveys from 1984 through 2008, the proportion of Blacks who perceive racial commonality ranged between 65 and 83 percent, trending downwards in the 2000s compared with earlier decades.” The fact that linked fate has weakened in the 2000s points again toward the idea that the Civil Rights Movement may have had strong linked-fate effects for those born during that time. As a result, in more recent years, these effects have waned and have resulted in a collectively weaker sense of linked fate. In addition, the authors write that the strength of linked fate may increase and lessen based on social class. I agree that group consciousness and shared fate among African Americans may be lessened because of differences in economic preferences and demands. This will be tested in the survey as well.
Gay and Hochschild acknowledge that for blacks, “cultivating or recognizing the fact that one’s own life chances are likely to rise and fall as Blacks gain or lose political and social standing enables one to use a few strong cues to make sense of the complex American racial arena. Perhaps ironically, linked fate in this logic is as much a matter of self-interest as of group well-being.” The article demonstrates that perhaps linked fate is decreasing among the African American population. The authors also found that lower-class blacks do not necessarily show stronger linked fate than upper-class blacks. The authors conclude with an interesting inquiry: is linked fate “primarily a heuristic or primarily an identity?” Asking whether black linked fate functions solely as an agent for the black community, or whether it also defines such community brings us closer to understanding how this characteristic affects the political arena. The authors claim that “linked fate perceptions are neither consistently nor highly politicized,” but I disagree. Especially in the past, linked fate has arguably had a strong impact on African-American voters, even though this impact could potentially be decreasing.

Claudine Gay, in her article “Putting Race in Context: Identifying the Environmental Determinants of Black Racial Attitudes,” discusses the effects of racial segregation in neighborhoods on black political unity. She argues that segregation might have significant effects on the perpetuation of these feelings of linked fate and group consciousness. Because different levels of socioeconomic status typically experience differing degrees of neighborhood quality, neighborhood quality may have an effect on how African Americans view themselves in relation to the larger group. For example, even middle-class African Americans will, on average, live in worse conditions than white people of similar income levels: “For African Americans…the inability to secure favorable residential circumstances may encourage the belief that race still defines and limits the prospects for socioeconomic attainment.” On the other hand, African Americans of high-income and class status are less likely to be surrounded by poor living conditions. In turn, they may be less inclined to think that being black means suffering injustice. This could potentially lead to a decline in linked fate among high-income blacks. Therefore I have included a section in my survey asking respondents about neighborhood quality, and I analyze these questions by income brackets.

From the previous literature on African Americans and linked fate, there are many different camps that attempt to describe African-American political behavior and linked fate. Through my experimental survey, I will attempt to discern which of these claims are correct and which are unsupported. I hypothesize that linked fate has decreased to a degree, especially among younger African Americans, and to some degree among middle- and upper class African Americans. By analyzing vote choice, linked fate ascriptions, and neighborhood quality, I will test levels of linked fate among different groups of the African American community today. I plan to find whether race or socioeconomic status is more politically salient for African Americans.

**JUNIOR PAPER: REPLICATION OF RESULTS**

My junior independent work analyzed whether race or socioeconomic status is more salient for African American voters. To approach this question, I analyzed the 2008 presidential election results within four townships of New Jersey. The aggregate results showed very high levels of linked fate among blacks. The results of my junior paper aligned with Dawson’s 1994 results; however, I believe that looking at individual level data may show that social class ties have begun to trump race after all, at least in some black socioeconomic groups.

**Results: 2008 Election**

In my junior case study, I analyzed four New Jersey townships that crossed different majorities of race and socioeconomic status in order to discern if one was more important for black voters than the other. I looked at Orange, Carteret, Willingboro, and Morris- town. The townships were all comparable in population size, and each had similar numbers of blacks and whites as a majority, respectively. The socioeconomically similar townships were similar in income level as well. Morristown and Carteret were majority white townships, and Willingboro and Orange were majority black. I categorized Morristown and Willingboro as middle class, and Orange and Carteret as lower class. By crossing both race and class, I could compare African American group voting habits to white voting habits, and middle class to lower class group choices.
My hypothesis was that, due to black group consciousness, feelings of linked fate, and ascribing to the black utility heuristic, the African American townships would vote for Obama at similar, very high rates. The lower class white township, Carteret, would probably vote along socioeconomic lines. The upper class white township, Morristown, would do so as well, and as a result, they would split Obama and McCain, respectively.\textsuperscript{51}

For my results, I used precinct-level data taken from an ArcGIS map created by Stanford University in 2008. The precinct-level results are in the table below.\textsuperscript{52}

### Election Summary Tables (2008)

#### Carteret (Lower class, majority white)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>McCain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Orange (Lower class, majority black)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>McCain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Willingboro (Middle class, majority black)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>McCain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Morristown (Middle class, majority white)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>McCain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As expected, Orange was extremely supportive of Obama at over 95 percent. Willingboro was a bit lower around 90 percent, perhaps due to the middle-class fiscal values of many voters fervently clashing with Obama’s liberal economic policies. The results of Morristown and Carteret were both a bit surprising. I assumed that Morristown would vote along racial as well as economic lines. However, Morristown turned out at majority rates for Obama. Carteret, which I assumed would turn out for Obama at high rates due to liberal economic ties, was less supportive of him than the wealthier Morristown.\textsuperscript{53}

### Replication of Results: 2012 Election

I chose to extend the results of my junior paper by replicating it for the 2012 election. I found the 2012 general presidential election results for each of the above four townships and analyzed this data for any trends. I then compared it to the 2008 results. The data found for the recent 2012 election was taken from the county clerk’s records for each county of each township at the precinct level. The results were as follows.

#### Election Summary Tables (2008 and 2012)

##### Morristown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obama</th>
<th>Republican Opponent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td>31.47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

##### Carteret

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obama</th>
<th>Republican Opponent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>73.81%</td>
<td>24.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

##### Willingboro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obama</th>
<th>Republican Opponent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>91.24%</td>
<td>7.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

##### Orange

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Obama</th>
<th>Republican Opponent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>96.07%</td>
<td>2.84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the 2008 data to the 2012 data, the following trends were apparent. First, in Morristown, support for Obama and the Republican opponent each year (John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012) remained about the same. In the Carteret elections, support for Obama increased about 7 percentage points, and support for the Republican opponent decreased by about 8 percentage points. In Willingboro, there was not much change; the support for Obama only increased by about half of 1 percentage point, and the support for the Republican decreased by about 1.5 percentage points. And in Orange, the support for Obama and the Republican stayed about the same. This data tells us that there was not much change in support for Obama or the Republican opponent outside of Carteret. Still, the fact that there was not much change in support for Obama in the majority black towns of Orange and Willingboro is not conclusive evidence for either an increase or decrease in linked fate at the individual level.

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\textsuperscript{51} Replication of Results: 2012 Election
EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY EXPLANATION

The survey portion of this study provides the individual results required to combat the ecological inference problem. There were 940 completed surveys in total. The survey was internet-based and was sent out to African Americans of voting age across the United States by the distributor Survey Sampling International (SSI). The survey asked simple demographic questions concerning linked fate, neighborhood quality, and the hypothetical election. Most of the survey questions were taken from the 1988 National Black Election Panel Survey, the same survey used as Dawson’s dataset for his 1994 book. The survey shed light on African-American feelings of linked fate, the quality of their neighborhoods, and whom they would vote for in a hypothetical election. I chose to analyze the questions among brackets of income and age to see if different age and income brackets feel differently about their connection to the black group or their feelings about their neighborhood.

Demographic Information

The survey begins by asking demographic information of the respondents in order to create a profile of each individual answering the survey. The highlighted questions in this section are income, social class, race, zip code, and political party. These questions reveal some of the targeted information I am looking for from individual respondents.

Questions on Linked Fate

The linked fate questions of the survey ask whether respondents ascribe to the idea of African American group consciousness and common destiny. These questions are taken from Jackson’s 1988 National Black Election Panel Study, used in Dawson’s 1994 book, which asks whether African Americans have a sense of racial identity that applies to political unity and consciousness. The respondent will answer most of the linked fate questions by ranking how much they agree with a certain statement.

Questions on Neighborhood Quality

The neighborhood questions included in the survey are linked to Claudine Gay’s work on neighborhood quality and racial composition as it affects group consciousness, specifically among African Americans. The questions from this part of the survey are also taken from Jackson’s 1988 National Black Election Panel Survey. I hypothesize that neighborhood racial dynamics may have varying influences on different classes of African Americans.

Experimental Design

The experimental portion of the survey helps uncover the main purpose of this study. I wanted to find out whether Dawson’s work on African Americans and political linked fate still holds true today. The experiment is set up as a hypothetical presidential election in which the candidates vary by race and economic ideology.

There are six experimental conditions that arise from crossing race and economic ideology variables. In the experiment, the race manipulation is simple. Each condition varies a name indicating the race of the candidate as black (Kiara Jackson/Imani Williams) or white (Katherine Miller/Molly Harris) along with economic ideology (liberal/conservative). I chose these names based on reports of the most common first and last names given to Caucasians and African Americans in the United States. The economic ideology will vary between liberals (Imani Williams/Molly Harris) and conservatives (Kiara Jackson/Katherine Miller). A fiscally liberal candidate is described as solving the budget deficit by raising taxes on the wealthy. The conservative candidate supports solving the budget deficit by reducing wasteful spending on big government programs. The survey asks respondents which of two hypothetical candidates they would more likely vote for. The names of the candidates and listings of the pair-ups are shown in the tables below.

Candidate Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
<th>Perceived Race</th>
<th>Ideological leaning</th>
<th>Fiscal policy</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Reduce government spending</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Increase taxes</td>
<td>BL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Reduce government spending</td>
<td>BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Increase taxes</td>
<td>WL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Candidate Matchups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Imani Williams</th>
<th>Katherine Miller</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal leaning</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Imani Williams</th>
<th>Kiara Jackson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal leaning</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Kiara Jackson</th>
<th>Katherine Miller</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal leaning</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Katherine Miller</th>
<th>Molly Harris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal leaning</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

I chose to analyze the data by separating them into three income brackets: high, middle, and low-income. These three brackets result in fairly equal sample sizes and represent three differing levels of income to analyze for linked fate and for the hypothetical election questions. The range of incomes collected within my study was between $0 and $100,000. By breaking down the income brackets into thirds, I came up with a rough definition of the three income brackets for my study. Low-income status is defined as earning an annual income of $0 to $29,999; middle-income status is defined as having a yearly income of $30,000 to $59,000; and high-income status is defined as earning an annual salary of $60,000 to $100,000 or more.

I created age brackets as well for the three designated age ranges. The oldest bracket includes birthdays from 1900 to 1962. The middle bracket includes birth dates from 1963 to 1980, and the last range is those 1981 to 1994. The last and youngest bracket is around the eighteen-to thirty-five year old range of “young” African Americans who were born after the Civil Rights Movement. This group is composed of those who did not grow up during or in the immediate aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement. These respondents have been fairly removed temporally from the Civil Rights Movement. The middle and older ranges both include those born during the Movement. These age groups were chosen because they each made up about one third of the total respondents’ ages, making the samples about equal, and because each represents a different relation to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.

Experimental Results

I created tables that cross each hypothetical candidate with her three opponents. The tables show how well each candidate fared in the election compared to her three opponents and if varying the identity of the opponent affected the respondent’s vote in the election involving that fixed candidate. The null hypothesis is that the identity of the opponent has no relationship to the candidate that is held fixed. To test the null hypothesis, I conducted chi-squared tests on each race for all the candidate-opponent tables to check for independence. The results are as follows. Note also that each table repeats one of the elections.

By Income

Imani Williams (BL) Elections

I analyzed the elections by low, middle, and high-income brackets for each candidate table. For the Imani Williams (BL) table, among low-income respondents, Imani Williams won against all three opponents. The margin was about 20 percent between Imani Williams (BL) and Katherine Miller (WC) (as expected among low-income voters), and the margin between Imani Williams (BL) and Kiara Jackson (BC) was smaller, at about 10 percent. There was a significant difference between Imani Williams (BL) and Molly Harris (WL), with Imani Williams winning 64 percent of the vote, and Molly Harris just winning 36 percent.

For the middle-income category of respondents in the Imani Williams (BL) elections, Imani Williams beat all of her candidates, and the only significant margin was between Imani Williams and Kiara Jackson. This race yielded a significant p-value, as Imani Williams won about 66 percent of votes, and Kiara Jackson (BC) won about 34 percent. For the high-income respondents in the Imani Williams elections, Imani Williams again won all of the elections, but not by a high enough margin to be significant in any of the three elections. The results for each income group in the Imani Williams elections are shown in the tables below.
Support for Imani Williams (Black liberal)
All income levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Imani Williams</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.01771**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.02146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0.001855***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Imani Williams</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0.1088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>0.5151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0.03565**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Middle-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Imani Williams</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0.3363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>0.01109**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0.1025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Imani Williams</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0.1235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0.5164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0.1317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Percent values approximated to nearest whole number.

Kiara Jackson (BC) Elections

Next, I analyze the Kiara Jackson (BC) elections for each income bracket. For the low-income category, Kiara Jackson took 45.8 percent of the votes, and her opponent, Imani Williams (BL), took 54.2 percent of the vote. Low-income respondents who were given the Kiara Jackson and Katherine Miller (WC) matchup voted 62.3 percent for Kiara Jackson and 37.7 percent for her opponent. In the low-income category, for the race between Kiara Jackson and Molly Harris (WL), Kiara Jackson received 27.9 percent of the vote, while Molly Harris received 72.1 percent. In addition, the significance for this test showed a p-value of 0.001091, meaning these results were significant at the 0.01 level. Only the election between Molly Harris and Kiara Jackson was significant at the 0.01 level.

In the middle-income category, for the Kiara Jackson (BC) contests, respondents ranged from making $30,000 to $59,999 annually. In the race between Kiara Jackson and Imani Williams (BL), Kiara Jackson took 33.9 percent, while Imani Williams took 66.1 percent. In the race between Kiara Jackson and Katherine Miller (WC), Kiara Jackson took 56.0 percent and Katherine Miller took 44.0 percent. And in the race between Molly Harris (WL) and Kiara Jackson, Kiara Jackson took 30.2 percent of the vote, and Molly Harris took 69.8 percent. There was statistical significance for the margin between Imani Williams (BL) and Kiara Jackson, and well as for the Molly Harris (WL) and Kiara Jackson election.

The results for the middle-income respondents for the Kiara Jackson elections show that middle-class blacks prefer liberal over conservative candidates. Kiara Jackson lost to Imani Williams, with Imani Williams (BL) taking two-thirds of the vote. The results were not so different between Kiara Jackson (BC) and Katherine Miller (WC), although Kiara Jackson (BC) still took the majority. And in the Molly Harris (WL) versus Kiara Jackson contest results among middle-class respondents, Kiara Jackson took 30.2 percent and Molly Harris took 69.8 percent. These numbers were about the same rates that Kiara Jackson and Molly Harris took in the low-income bracket.

For the high-income category, respondents voted for Kiara Jackson (BC) 44.7 percent over Imani Williams’ (BL) 55.3 percent of the vote. In the same income range, the race between Kiara Jackson and Katherine Miller (WC) came out to be 60 percent for Kiara Jackson and 40.0 percent for Katherine Miller. And for the race between Kiara Jackson and Molly Harris (WL), Kiara Jackson received 43.5 percent of the vote, and Molly Harris received 56.5 percent. The chi-squared test for the high-income table, among all three races, was insignificant. The tables for each income group in the Kiara Jackson elections are found below.
Support for Kiara Jackson (Black conservative)
All income levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Kiara Jackson</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0.02146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0.00001963***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Kiara Jackson</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0.5151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0.07415*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>0.0005462***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Middle-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Kiara Jackson</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>0.01109**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>0.3961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>0.003919***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Kiara Jackson</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>0.5164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>0.3765</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.

Molly Harris (WL) Elections

The next set of tables I chose to analyze among different income levels were those pertaining to the elections involving Molly Harris (WL) as a candidate. For respondents who were low-income, 36.2 percent voted for Molly Harris in the race between Molly Harris and Imani Williams (BL), and 63.8 percent voted for her opponent. In the Molly Harris versus Katherine Miller (WC) contest, Molly Harris took 67.8 percent of the vote, while Katherine Miller took 32.2 percent. And in the third election between Molly Harris and Kiara Jackson (BC), Molly Harris took 72.1 percent, and Kiara Jackson took 27.9 percent of the vote. The results for all of the low-income tests on Molly Harris elections were statistically significant.

In the middle-income division, Molly Harris took 38.9 percent of the vote, and her opponent Imani Williams took 61.1 percent. In the race between Molly Harris and Katherine Miller (WC), Molly Harris took 59.6 percent of the vote, and Katherine Miller took 40.4 percent. And in the race between Kiara Jackson (BC) and Molly Harris, Molly Harris took 69.8 percent, and Kiara Jackson took 30.2 percent. The p-value for the Molly Harris versus Kiara Jackson election was 0.0039, rendering the results for the race significant. The other two races were statistically insignificant. In this class division, Molly Harris took around the same numbers as in the lower income bracket, and Imani Williams (BL) did the same; however, the votes were a few percentage points higher for Molly Harris (WL) and a few lower for Imani Williams. In the election between Molly Harris and Katherine Miller (WC), Molly Harris took only around 60 percent of the votes, compared to her 72 percent in the lower income elections. Katherine Miller, among middle-class respondents, took around 40 percent of the votes, but for lower class voters, she won only a little over 30 percent of the votes.

For the high-income respondents who voted in elections in which Molly Harris (WL) was a candidate, the race between Imani Williams (BL) and Molly Harris turned out 38.6 percent for Molly Harris and 61.4 percent for Imani Williams. In the race between Molly Harris and Katherine Miller (WC), Molly Harris took 58.3 percent of the vote, and Katherine Miller took 41.7 percent. And in the election between Molly Harris and Kiara Jackson (BC), Molly Harris took 56.5 percent of the vote, and Kiara Jackson took 43.5 percent. The p-values for the high-income respondents in the Molly Harris races were not statistically significant. These results showed that high-income respondents preferred Imani Williams (BL) to Molly Harris at about the same rate as the lower two income groups. The tables below show the results for the Molly Harris elections.
Support for Molly Harris (White liberal)

### All income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Molly Harris</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>0.00185***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller  (WC)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0.002663***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson     (BC)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.00001963***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Low-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Molly Harris</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>0.03565**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller  (WC)</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0.006258***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson     (BC)</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>0.0005462***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Middle-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Molly Harris</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0.1025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller  (WC)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson     (BC)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0.003919***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### High-income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Molly Harris</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0.1317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller  (WC)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0.2482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson     (BC)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0.3763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

Katherine Miller (WC) Elections

Finally, the results for the Katherine Miller (WC) elections among income brackets are as follows. For the low-income bracket, Katherine Miller’s opponents beat her in each race. The most significant margin was between Molly Harris (WL) and Katherine Miller. This margin was 32 percent for Katherine Miller and 68 percent for Molly Harris, which is not very surprising among low-income candidates. Katherine Miller still lost to each of her opponents. And for the high-income bracket, Katherine Miller still lost handily, but no p-value showed significance in any race. The tables for the Katherine Miller elections are shown below.

Support for Katherine Miller (White conservative)
tically significant.

For the middle age group, Imani Williams still won each race but by lesser margins, and the margins were not great enough to be more than minimally significant in any of the races. For the youngest age group, Imani Williams won each race handily. The races between Katherine Miller (WC) and Imani Williams and Molly Harris (WL) and Imani Williams were both significant. The race between Kiara Jackson (WC) and Imani Williams was not statistically significant. Imani Williams won almost 73 percent of the vote over Molly Harris (WL), and 67 percent over Katherine Miller (WC).

Support for Imani Williams (Black Liberal)
All ages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Imani Williams</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.01771**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.02146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0.001855***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1900-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Imani Williams</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0.5465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>0.05084*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.1213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1963-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Imani Williams</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>0.5994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>0.6803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>0.4561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1981-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Imani Williams</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.01041**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0.1495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>0.00319***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.

Kiara Jackson (BC) Elections

For the Kiara Jackson (BC) races, the oldest age group only preferred Kiara Jackson over Katherine Miller, the white conservative, but only by a margin of four percentage points. Kiara Jackson lost the rest of the races. Older respondents strongly preferred Molly Harris (WL) to Kiara Jackson, voting for Molly Harris at a rate of 75 percent to 25 percent. Similarly, they preferred Imani Williams (BL), the economically liberal candidate, to Kiara Jackson.

For the middle age group in the Kiara Jackson (BC) races, Kiara Jackson won the race only against Katherine Miller (WC), by 63 percent. Kiara Jackson lost to Imani Williams, but only by a slim margin of 53 percent to 47 percent. Similarly, Kiara Jackson lost 61 percent to 39 percent to Molly Harris, the white liberal. The older respondents preferred Molly Harris to Kiara Jackson at a rate of 75 percent to 25 percent.

The youngest age group in the Kiara Jackson elections chose Kiara Jackson over Katherine Miller (WC) at a rate of 66 percent, and this margin was significant. When Kiara Jackson was against Imani Williams (BL), respondents chose Imani Williams at a rate of 62 percent to 38 percent. In the election of Kiara Jackson against white liberal Molly Harris, respondents chose Molly Harris 61 percent to 39 percent. Below are the results tables for the Kiara Jackson elections.

Support for Kiara Jackson (Black conservative)
All ages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Kiara Jackson</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0.02146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0.00001963***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1900-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Kiara Jackson</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>0.05084*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>0.7098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0.000464***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Molly Harris (WL) Elections

In the oldest age bracket, those born between 1900 and 1962, white Liberal Molly Harris only lost to black Liberal Imani Williams, with 60 percent of the votes. Molly Harris won over both white conservative Katherine Miller and black conservative Kiara Jackson by 72 percent and 75 percent, respectively. Both of these margins showed the significance of opponent economic identity, meaning that older middle-class blacks may value a specific liberal economic ideology over the candidate's race.

For the middle age group in the elections involving Molly Harris, Molly Harris still won against white conservative Katherine Miller and black conservative Kiara Jackson, but not quite as handily. Molly Harris took 61 percent of the vote against Kiara Jackson, and 67 percent of the vote against Katherine Miller. The margin between Katherine Miller and Molly Harris was statistically significant. The race between Molly Harris and black Liberal Imani Williams was fairly close, around 45 percent to 55 percent.

In the youngest age group, Molly Harris lost to black liberal Imani Williams. Imani Williams won 72 percent to 28 percent, making this race results statistically significant. Molly Harris and white conservative Katherine Miller tied exactly, and Molly Harris won against black Conservative Kiara Jackson, gaining 60 percent of the vote. In comparison, for the two older age groups, Molly Harris won in a landslide. The tables for the Molly Harris elections crossed with age bracket are below.

Support for Molly Harris (White liberal)

All ages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Molly Harris</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>0.00185***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0.002663***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.00001963***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1900-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Molly Harris</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0.1213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>0.00319***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0.000464***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1963-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Molly Harris</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>0.4561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.01041**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0.1235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1981-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Molly Harris</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>0.00319***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Miller (WC)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>0.1235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.

Katherine Miller (WC) Elections

Finally, white conservative Katherine Miller’s election results are as follows, as analyzed by age range. Among the oldest age range of respondents, Katherine Miller lost each election. The greatest margin was between her and white liberal Molly Harris, where Katherine Miller took 28 percent of the vote and Molly Harris took 72 percent of the vote. This margin was significant. Black liberal Imani Williams and black conservative Kiara Jackson won over Katherine Miller by very slight margins.

Among the middle age group of respondents, Katherine Miller still did not win any of the races. Between white conservative Katherine Miller and white
liberal Molly Harris was the largest margin of defeat, where Molly Harris took 67 percent of votes and Katherine took 33 percent. This margin of difference was statistically significant. Similar to the oldest age group, black liberal Imani Williams took only about 53 percent of the vote over Katherine Miller, who took 47 percent. Black conservative Kiara Jackson took about 63 percent of the vote against Katherine Miller’s 37 percent.

Finally, among the youngest age group in the contests with Katherine Miller, Katherine Miller lost the elections between black liberal Imani Williams and black conservative Kiara Jackson, but there was a draw between Katherine Miller and white liberal Molly Harris. Imani Williams won by a fairly large margin, enough to render the difference significant. And Kiara Jackson also won handily against Katherine Miller, with 66 percent of the vote, and the results were also significant. Both Katherine Miller and Molly Harris received 50 percent of the vote from the youngest group of respondents. The results for the Katherine Miller elections analyzed by age are shown below.

Support for Katherine Miller (White Conservative) All ages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Katherine Miller</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0.01771**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>0.002663**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1900-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Katherine Miller</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>0.5465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>0.7098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>0.00319***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Born 1963-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opponent name</th>
<th>Vote for Katherine Miller</th>
<th>Vote for opponent</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imani Williams (BL)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>0.5994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiara Jackson (BC)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>0.07684*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molly Harris (WL)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0.01041**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.

LINKED FATE AND NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITY RESULTS

Neighborhood Quality Questions By Income

The eight questions that I chose to analyze regarding neighborhood demographics and quality in the survey were taken from the National Black Election Panel Survey from 1988. The choice of questions was inspired by Claudine Gay’s 2004 article “Putting Race in Context: Identifying the Environmental Determinants of Black Racial Attitudes,” which concerns the relation between neighborhood quality and make-up to linked fate. The questions were each analyzed across income groups by high, middle and low-income respondents. The first question asked was a question about the racial makeup of the respondent’s neighborhood. The answers to this question were “all black,” “mostly black,” “half black,” and “less than half black.” For the high-income group, about 53 percent of respondents said that they lived in neighborhoods that were half or more black, while about 47 percent said they live in neighborhoods that are less than half black. In the middle-income group, 64 percent of respondents live in half or more black neighborhoods, while 36.25 percent of middle-class respondents live in neighborhoods with less than half blacks. The percentages for “mostly black” and “less than half black” 30 and 36 percent respectively, are similar in the case of middle-income respondents. The next question will show what perceived “class” of neighborhood each respondent lives in. The lower-income respondents answered that 67 percent live in half or more black neighborhoods, and 33 percent live in less than half black neighborhoods. The low-income group has the highest percentage of respondents that live in both all black and mostly black neighborhoods, but not by a very large margin. For the low-income blacks, the percentage of those who live with less than
half blacks is surprisingly not much lower than that percentage for the middle class.

**Neighborhood racial make-up**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>All black</th>
<th>Mostly black</th>
<th>Half black</th>
<th>Less than half black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The second question in the neighborhood section asks about the socioeconomic status of a respondent’s neighborhood. The answers to this question include “poor,” “working class,” “middle-class,” “upper middle-class,” “upper class,” and “I don’t know.” The results across all incomes are as follows. Respondents from poor neighborhoods made up 4.19 percent of the total respondents. Those from the working class totaled 33.68 percent. In turn, 30.68 percent responded that they were middle class, and 8.46 percent said that they were upper middle class. Upper-class neighborhood respondents made up 0.94 percent of the total respondents, and those who didn’t know their neighborhood’s social class responded 19.32 percent of the time. The analysis for those of high-income showed that about 31 percent lived in lower class neighborhoods, 46.26 percent lived in a middle-class neighborhood, and about 21 percent lived in upper class neighborhoods. In sum, high-income respondents said that they lived in middle-class neighborhoods more than any type of neighborhood. For the middle class, almost 50 percent said they live in lower-class neighborhoods, and 39.50 percent responded that they lived in a middle-class neighborhood. About 10 percent lived in upper-class neighborhoods. 1.88 percent of respondents said they did not know what class of neighborhood they lived in. In conclusion, most middle-income respondents said they live in lower class neighborhoods.

For low-income respondents, almost 60 percent said they live in lower-class neighborhoods, whereas 30 percent said they live in a middle-class neighborhood, and about 6 percent said they live in more upper-class neighborhoods. 5.8 percent of respondents did not know what kind of neighborhood they live in.

**Neighborhood class status makeup**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Working class</th>
<th>Middle class</th>
<th>Upper middle class</th>
<th>Upper class</th>
<th>I don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next set of neighborhood questions asked about the quality of different resources and institutions in the respondent’s neighborhood. This set included questions about police protection, road maintenance, parks and playgrounds, public schools, and garbage collection. The first question asked about the quality of the police protection in each respondent’s neighborhood. The answer choices were “very dissatisfied,” “somewhat dissatisfied,” “somewhat satisfied,” and “very satisfied.” The high-income respondents were, on the whole, happier with their neighborhood’s police protection than low-income respondents.

**Satisfaction with neighborhood police protection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next question regarding neighborhood quality dealt with residents’ satisfaction with neighborhood parks and playgrounds. The answer choices were the same as above. In terms of the highest income voters, about 18 percent were unhappy with the park and playground quality in their neighborhoods, while about 82 percent were satisfied with their neighborhood parks. Overall, the high-income respondents were very pleased with the status and quality of their local parks and playgrounds. For the middle-income respondents, about 32 percent were unhappy with the state of their parks. About 68 percent were happy with their neighborhood’s park and playground quality. And as for the low-income respondents, about 31 percent were dissatisfied, and about 69 percent were happy with park quality. The middle- and lower-class respondent answers were similar, and if anything, the middle class was more satisfied. The upper-class respondents were almost 15
percentage points happier with their neighborhood parks and playgrounds.

Satisfaction with neighborhood parks and playgrounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next question regarding neighborhoods asked about respondent satisfaction with neighborhood public schools. The answer choices were the same as the about neighborhood quality questions. For the high-income bracket, around 28 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with their public schools, and 72 percent were satisfied. For the middle-income bracket, the figures were fairly similar, 29 percent and 71 percent, respectively. And among the low-income respondents, the satisfaction was about the same: 30 percent were dissatisfied, whereas 70 percent disagreed.

Satisfaction with neighborhood public schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

For the next question, which gauged satisfaction with respondent neighborhood health clinics and hospitals, the answers were the same as the above. For high-income respondents, 15 percent were dissatisfied with health clinics and hospitals in their neighborhoods, and 85 percent were satisfied. For the middle-income respondents, these numbers were 18% dissatisfied and 81 percent satisfied. And lastly, for low-income respondents, 23 percent were unhappy with their local healthcare, and 76 percent were satisfied. There is a small jump from low-income to high-income dissatisfaction, from 15 percent to 23 percent. This reveals that the quality of healthcare in low-income black neighborhoods may be slightly lower than in high-income neighborhoods.

Satisfaction with neighborhood health clinics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The last neighborhood quality question in the survey was about respondent satisfaction with neighborhood garbage collection. Again, the answer choices are the same as above, and the overall percentages for all income levels are as follows. Overall dissatisfaction with garbage collection is 16 percent, whereas general satisfaction is 83 percent. In the high-income bracket, the dissatisfaction is around 10 percent, and the satisfaction is around 90 percent. For the middle-income respondents, the dissatisfaction is around 17 percent, and the satisfaction is near 83 percent. And among low-income respondents, the overall dissatisfaction is around 23 percent, and the satisfaction is around percent. Not surprisingly, the low-income respondents have the lowest-quality garbage collection services, and the high-income respondents have the highest quality.

Satisfaction with neighborhood garbage collection service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Very dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat dissatisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat satisfied</th>
<th>Very satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

Overall, we see that the low-income respondents have the lowest-quality resources available in their neighborhoods, while higher-income respondents have access to higher-quality resources and are on average more satisfied with their neighborhood quality. This satisfaction, or lack thereof, has implications for strength of linked fate among each socioeconomic class.

Linked Fate Questions

By Income

The questions on linked fate come from the 1988 Black National Election Panel Survey. These questions ask about the extent to which black respondents ascribe to Dawson’s notion of linked fate.
and African American group consciousness. I chose eight questions to analyze by both income and age. The three income groups are those used previously. The age brackets are the same brackets described above as well. First, I will analyze the linked fate-themed questions by income bracket. The first question asks black respondents if they think that what happens to blacks in the United States affects them. The answers are “yes, a lot,” “yes, some,” “yes, not very much,” and “no, not at all.” I first looked at the answers for all the respondents. For the high-income bracket, those that agree with this description of linked fate and whose answers were “yes, a lot” or “yes, some”, make up 73 percent of the total high-income bracket. For the middle-income group, those who agree that what happens to other blacks affects them, make up 70% of the bracket, and those who don’t really agree make up 30%. And among low-income voters, 73% have a sense of linked fate, and 27% do not.

Do you think that what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens to your life?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Yes, a lot</th>
<th>Yes, some</th>
<th>Yes, not very much</th>
<th>No, not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The second linked fate question asks respondents to answer whether they think that if black people don’t do well in life it is because of their race. The answer choices for this question were “agree strongly,” “agree somewhat,” “disagree somewhat,” “disagree strongly,” and “neither agree nor disagree.” For the high-income section, 56 percent agree that blacks are kept back by their race, 39 percent disagree, and 4.3 percent neither agree nor disagree. The middle-income section answered that 48 percent agree, 42 percent disagree, and 9.6 percent did not agree or disagree. Interestingly, the middle class seems to ascribe less to this notion of linked fate than does the upper class, by 8 percentage points. Among the low-income voters, 53 percent agree, 38 percent disagree, and 9 percent are neutral. So, the high-income respondents show the highest degree of linked fate for this question, then low-income respondents, and the middle-income voters show the lowest degree.

Do you think that what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens to your life?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The third question asks if blacks as a whole are getting along well, and to what degree. The answer choices for this question are “very well,” “fairly well,” “not too well,” and “not well at all.” Again, I group the two “well” choices together and the “not well” choices together to get a more comprehensible depiction of respondent answers. For those in the high-income group, 60 percent believe that blacks are getting along well, and 40 percent believe the opposite. For middle-income blacks, 62 percent believe that blacks are getting along well, and 38 percent believe that they are not. And among low-income voters, 63 percent believe that blacks are getting along well, and 37 percent believe that they are not.

Would you say that blacks as a group are getting along well, fairly well, not too well or not well at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Not too well</th>
<th>Not well at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The fourth question asks if respondents think that blacks as a group are getting along economically. The answer choices are the same as above. Among the high-income respondents, 43 percent said that blacks are getting along well, and 57 percent said that blacks are not getting along well. The middle-income group responded 43 percent of the time that blacks are getting along well, and 57 percent said that they are not. The low-income respondents answered that 49 percent think blacks are doing well, and 51 percent answered that they are not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Not too well</th>
<th>Not well at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.
Would you say that blacks as a group are getting along economically very well, fairly well, not too well or not well at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Not too well</th>
<th>Not well at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The fifth question asks again about the economic position of blacks, but in comparison with that of whites. The five choices for this question were: “much better,” “somewhat better,” “about the same,” “somewhat worse,” and “much worse.” Overall, 19 percent of respondents think the economic position of blacks is better than whites, 21 percent said the position is the same, and 59 percent said that blacks are worse off economically than whites. For high-income respondents, 18 percent said that the black position is better, 17 percent said that the black position is the same, and 65 percent said that the black position is worse than whites economically. Among the middle-income respondents, 20 percent said that the black position is better, 20 percent said it is the same, and 60 percent said that blacks are worse off than whites in the fiscal realm. And for low-income respondents, 20 percent said the black position is better than whites, 26 said the position of blacks is the same as whites, and 54 percent say that the black financial position is worse than whites.

On the whole, would you say that the economic position of blacks is better, about the same, or worse than whites?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Somewhat better</th>
<th>About the same</th>
<th>Somewhat worse</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next question asks if respondents feel close to other blacks, and if so, how close they feel. The answers are “very close,” “fairly close,” “not too close,” and “not close at all.” Overall, 20 percent of respondents answered that they would choose the black candidates. The question asks what characteristic of one candidate would make the respondent vote for that candidate over their opponent. The options were: “qualification/experience,” “stand on issues,” “honesty/integrity,” “cares for all people/whole city,” “cares for black people first,” “competence/leadership,” “personality/charisma,” “Democrat,” “supports equal opportunity/no discrimination,” “cares for poor/homeless,” and “other (please specify).” High-income respondents answered that they would choose the candidate based on their stand on issues 18 percent of the time, and 17 percent of the time they would exactly the same. And for low-income respondents, 72 percent of respondents believe that the black Movement affected them, while 27 percent believe that the Movement did not affect them.

Do you think that the Movement for black rights has affected you personally, and if so, how much?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Not very much</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next question asks what characteristic of one candidate would make the respondent vote for that candidate over their opponent. The options were: “qualification/experience,” “stand on issues,” “honesty/integrity,” “cares for all people/whole city,” “cares for black people first,” “competence/leadership,” “personality/charisma,” “Democrat,” “supports equal opportunity/no discrimination,” “cares for poor/homeless,” and “other (please specify).” High-income respondents answered that they would choose the candidate based on their stand on issues 18 percent of the time, and 17 percent of the time they would...
vote for the candidate who shows honesty/integrity. Sixteen percent of the time high-income respondents would vote for the candidate who cares for the whole city, and only 0.7 percent of the time would high-income respondents vote for the candidate who puts black concerns first. Eleven percent of high-income respondents would vote for the Democratic candidate. Middle-income respondents had very much the same ages for the above listed vote-choices. For low-income respondents, the percentages also did not vary much. However, 2% of respondents of low-income would vote for the candidate who cares about black people first, but 18% would vote for those who care most for the people's and the city's welfare.

By Age

For the first question on linked fate, asking about how much respondents feel that what happens to other blacks will affect them, 48 percent of older respondents ascribed to this sense of linked fate, while 52 percent did not really identify with it. For the middle-income group, 47 percent of respondents said that they believed in this kind of linked fate, while 53 percent did not really feel it too much. And for the youngest group, 43 percent of respondents said that they feel linked to other blacks, while 57 percent said that they do not feel this type of linked fate. It is interesting to note that around 40 percent of respondents in all age groups answered that they felt “some” linked fate. However, about a third of the oldest bracket of respondents said that they felt “a lot” of linked fate, compared to 30 percent and 28 percent of middle age and lower age bracket respondents, respectively.

Do you think that what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens to your life?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Qualification/ experience</th>
<th>Stand on issues</th>
<th>Honesty/ integrity</th>
<th>Cares for all people/ whole city</th>
<th>Cares for black people first</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competence/ Leadership</th>
<th>Person-ality/ Charisma</th>
<th>Democrat opportunity/No discrimination</th>
<th>Cares for poor/ Homeless</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

For the question: “In the United States, if black people don’t do well in life it is because they are kept back because of their race”, respondents were asked how strongly they agree with this statement. Analyzing for age groups, the oldest age group responded that 54% agree with this definition of linked fate, 39 percent of them did not agree, and 7 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. In the middle age group, 52 percent agreed, 38 percent disagreed, and 10 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. And for the youngest age group, 51 percent agreed that if blacks don’t do well, it is because of race, and 42 percent did not agree with this statement. Seven percent neither agreed nor disagreed. Although these numbers are fairly similar, the oldest group, born before and during the Civil Rights Movement, has the highest degree of linked fate, though only by 3 percentage points.

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: In the United States, if black people don’t do well in life it is because they are kept back because of their race.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
<th>Neither agree not disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The question that asks if blacks as a group are getting along well yielded the following results in the test across age brackets. For the oldest bracket, respondents said 45% of the time that blacks are doing well, and 55 percent of the time that blacks are not doing well. For the middle age group, 41 percent of respondents said that blacks as a group are getting along well, and 59 percent said that blacks are not getting along well. And for the youngest group, 49 percent of respondents said they feel that blacks
are getting along well in the United States, while 51 percent said that blacks are not getting along as well.

Would you say that blacks as a group are getting along very well, fairly well, not too well or not at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Not too well</th>
<th>Not well at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next question is similar to the one above, but asks if respondents think blacks are economically doing well. For those born between 1900 and 1962, 45 percent said that blacks are getting along well economically, and 55 percent said that blacks are not getting along well in the financial realm. Those in the middle age realm say 41 percent of the time that blacks are getting along well economically, and 59 percent of the time that black and not getting along so well economically. And in the young age group, those born between 1981 and 1994, 49 percent of respondents say that blacks are fine fiscally, while 51 percent do not feel this way about the economic situation of the black group.

Would you say that blacks as a group are getting along economically very well, fairly well, not too well or not well at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Not too well</th>
<th>Not well at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next question concerns a similar topic, but asks if this economic position is worse, better, or the same as whites. In the oldest age range, 16 percent of respondents feel that the economic position of blacks is better than whites, 20 percent feel that the position is about the same, and 64 percent believe that economically, blacks are worse off than whites. For the middle age group, 20 percent of respondents believe that blacks are better off than whites, 20 percent believe they are about the same, and 60 percent believe that blacks are worse off than whites economically. In the youngest age bracket, 22 percent feel that blacks are better off economically, 24 percent feel they are about the same, and 60 percent feel that blacks are worse off. Again, these numbers are not too different, although the older group agrees by 4 percent more than younger age groups that blacks are financially worse off than whites.

On the whole, would you say that the economic position of blacks is better, about the same, or worse than whites?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Somewhat better</th>
<th>About the same</th>
<th>Somewhat worse</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next question is very salient for whether and how much each age group feels that the black rights Movement affected them personally. The existing would suggest that the older group to respond that they were more affected by the Movement than the younger respondents. The oldest group responded that 72 percent felt affected by the Movement, and 28 percent did not feel as affected by it. Among the middle age respondents, 70 percent said they felt affected by the Movement, and 30 percent did not feel very affected by the Movement for black rights. And for the lowest age group, 79 percent said that they felt affected by the Movement, and 21 percent did not feel affected by the Movement.

Do you think that the Movement for black rights has affected you personally, and if so, how much?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Not much very</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The next question asks respondents how close they feel to other blacks in the country. For the oldest age group, 85 percent say that they feel close to other blacks, and 15 percent say they do not feel as close to other blacks. For the middle age group, 82 percent said they feel close to other blacks, and 18 percent said they do not feel as close to other blacks. Conversely, 79 percent of young blacks say that they feel close to other people of their race, and 21 percent do not feel as close. The oldest age group seems to feel more of a
connection to other blacks than do other age groups of African Americans.

Do you feel very close, fairly close, not too close, or not close at all to black people in this country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Very close</th>
<th>Fairly close</th>
<th>Not too close</th>
<th>Not close at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

The final linked fate question about the hypothetical election between the two black candidates was analyzed in age brackets. The results are as follows. For the eldest age group, those respondents born between 1900 and 1962, just 0.3 percent answered that they would vote for the candidate who puts black people first, while 18 percent said that they would vote for the candidate who cares about the whole city. Thirteen percent said they would vote for the Democratic candidate. For the age group born between 1962 and 1980, 1 percent said that they would vote for the candidate who prioritizes black issues, while 16 percent said they would choose the candidate who takes the whole city’s needs into consideration. Twelve percent of the middle age group said they would vote for the Democrat. In the youngest age bracket, 3.6 percent said they would vote for the candidate who takes on black needs first, and 17 percent said that they would choose the one who looks at the needs of the whole city. Eleven percent said they would vote for the Democratic candidate.

If there were only two black candidates running against each other for mayor in your city or town, what would be the most important factor that would make you vote for one over the other?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Qualification/experience</th>
<th>Stand on issues</th>
<th>Honesty/integrity</th>
<th>Cares for all people/whole city</th>
<th>Cares for black people first</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values approximated to nearest whole number.

DISCUSSION

By Income

What can be concluded about different income and age groups of African Americans? For the low-income group, overall, it seemed that economic policy was more important than just the perceived race of the candidate. Among these low-income respondents, Molly Harris, the white liberal, won handily over Kiara Jackson, the black conservative. Under the idea of racial linked fate, these results would not hold. Nevertheless, economic linked fate seems to be tying together the lower class of African Americans. However, in accordance with Dawson’s explanation of the “new Black Politics” as emerging from the roots of slavery and economic oppression, the black community has historically experienced a lower economic status. Thus, that African Americans of low-income voted for a white candidate with a liberal fiscal policy is perhaps not so surprising. It would most likely go against the majority of the black group to vote for a fiscally conservative candidate as Kiara Jackson, even though she is black. Voting for the liberal candidate, no matter what the race, seems to still be aligned with the black political community.

Low-income respondents are generally more likely to view the black position as slightly better than both the middle and high-income groups view it. The level of linked fate among low-income blacks could result from both being around only African Americans and thus not feeling like an out-group, in addition to low-income neighborhoods being less socially and politically active and thus potentially less united in these areas.

About two-thirds of low-income respondents live in half or more black neighborhoods, about 60 percent say they live in lower or working class neighborhoods, and 30 percent say they live in middle-class neighborhoods. In terms of satisfaction with neighborhood amenities, low-income blacks are happy enough with their police protection, parks and playgrounds, neighborhood schools, healthcare, and
garbage collection. Though the average satisfaction rate was a bit lower than that of middle-income respondents, the lowest percentage of satisfaction was 69 percent. Gay writes that, “In lower-status neighborhoods, where the absence of economically stable and secure families may erode a community’s organizational strength, the dearth of informal and formal institutions leaves residents largely disconnected from the ‘networks of communication and community learning’ (Cohen and Dawson 1993, 290) so critical to the development and diffusion of African Americans.”

Lower income respondents thus may have a lower degree of black group unity, but above discussed is the high economic unity stressed by low-income African Americans. Indeed, though, the low-income respondents do not seem to display as strong of a racial group consciousness. This may also be because they live around mostly other African Americans, and so don’t feel as singled out as a higher status blacks might.

Middle-income voters are in a unique position within the African American community. Because they are on an economic rise, voting for fiscally liberal policies may not always benefit or suit them. However, being African-American may make middle-class black voters more adherent to liberal fiscal policies. The middle class voted more strongly in favor of Imani Williams over Kiara Jackson than did both the lower and upper classes. In addition, in the race between Kiara Jackson and Molly Harris, middle-class respondents voted for Molly Harris nearly as strongly as did the lower class. However, the split between the votes for Katherine Miller versus Kiara Jackson among the middle class was low—Kiara Jackson won by just 55 percent. The middle class still preferred the black conservative over the white conservative, but not by much. And in the race between the white conservative and white liberal, the results were 60 percent to 40 percent for the white liberal, but these were around the same%ages as the high-income respondents. In the first two races, the middle class respondents seemed to have the highest sense of linked fate of all the income groups, but in the second two cases, it seems like the middle class shows less concern for the black group as a whole. The middle class takes on both characteristics of the upper class and the lower class. Perhaps depending on where a middle-class respondent lives, their sense of linked fate may depend on where they work, or where on the income spectrum they lie.

Middle-income respondents said that 64 percent of them live in neighborhoods that are half or more black. Almost half said that they lived in lower class or working class neighborhoods, while about 40 percent said they lived in a middle-class neighborhood. Middle-income respondents are generally satisfied with their neighborhood police protection, public schools, hospitals and health clinics, and garbage collection services, with the lowest rate of satisfaction being 68 percent. Again, the middle class finds itself in the middle of black ideologies. They are generally satisfied with the available resources, but they live in mostly lower-class neighborhoods around other blacks. Thus, they may keep company with both middle- and low-income blacks, which most likely increases a sense of shared fate. However, Gay writes that, “African Americans who enjoy access to the resources and opportunities available in better neighborhoods may identify only weakly with the history of racial suffering that underlies notions of shared fate and predisposes blacks to view race as the defining interest in their lives.” As a result of these two contrasting environmental factors, it is difficult to predict how middle-class blacks will act politically.

For middle-income respondents, it seems that linked fate is not quite as strong. For the first few linked fate questions, middle-income respondents ascribed to the lowest degree of linked fate of both low and high-income respondents. In addition, they feel the least close to other blacks of all three income groups. Still, middle-income respondents feel as connected to the black group as do high-income respondents, and agree in a couple more areas with the high-income respondents. It is difficult thus to pin down middle-income blacks, because of the countering forces of environmental factors. The sample of middle-class blacks in my study seemed to be more on the lower-middle-class end of the spectrum but were fairly satisfied with the quality of their neighborhoods. In addition, they lived mostly among other blacks. However, there was a fairly broad spectrum of incomes included in this subset, and there was a substantial portion of middle-class blacks that lived among a minority of blacks. Perhaps these two ends of the middle-class spectrum had differing levels of linked fate, and thus cancelled each other out on some of the survey questions. The fact that most middle-class
respondents live amongst other blacks may increase sense of linked fate, but the fact that middle-class neighborhood resources are acceptable would negate this sense of linked fate. This is somewhat seen in the ambiguity of middle-class results, though there still exists a fairly strong sense of linked fate among middle-class respondents overall; it is just not as consistently shown as either the upper or lower classes.

Among the high-income respondents, trends included a seemingly high sense of linked fate. High-income respondents voted for Imani Williams over Kiara Jackson at about the same rate as did low-income respondents. This seems economically counterintuitive for high-income respondents, but perhaps this group still identifies strongly, in racial terms, with the black group. Otherwise, perhaps these economic policies might be helpful for the part of the spectrum that makes closer to $60,000, rather than the end that makes $100,000. In addition, the high-income respondents chose Molly Harris (WL) over Kiara Jackson (BC), even if only by a statistically insignificant margin. The high-income respondents also preferred Imani Williams over Katherine Miller, by a 61 percent margin, demonstrating again that race may be more important to high-income black voters than economic policy.

On the whole, high-income respondents were almost split on the number of blacks in their neighborhood, although just over half said that they were in mostly black neighborhoods. High-income respondents also reported that almost 50 percent of them lived in middle-class neighborhoods. High-income respondents were happy with the police protection, parks and playgrounds, public schools, health clinics, and garbage collection services at rates of 72 percent or higher. Claudine Gay writes that since this sector of the black community has access to such good neighborhood resources, they should share a weaker sense of linked fate with the rest of the black community. Gay posits, “African Americans in neighborhoods with few amenities are more likely than African Americans in high-quality neighborhoods to view race as the defining interest in their lives.” This aspect of Gay’s hypothesis suggests that high-income African Americans will show a weaker sense of shared fate with other blacks. But, there are reasons to believe that high-income African Americans show a strong sense of shared destiny with African Americans.

High-income respondents tend to have about as strong a sense of linked fate as do low-income respondents. These respondents also have the highest tendency to believe that the black group as a whole is not doing well. High-income respondents also believe that blacks as a whole are worse off economically, over ten percentage points more so than do low-income respondents. Those of high-income also say they feel the closest to other blacks, closer than do both middle and low-income respondents.

In conclusion, linked fate seems to be a salient factor among black voters of all incomes, but seems highest among high-income voters. This could confirm Claudine Gay’s hypothesis that, “African Americans in neighborhoods with high-status black residents are more likely than African Americans in low-status neighborhoods to view race as the defining interest in their lives.” Thus, those high-income African Americans who live amongst other high status blacks are likely to have a stronger sense of linked fate. This is because these higher status neighborhoods often have more group activities that unite the community and foster the sharing of ideas, and lower income neighborhoods are less likely to have these institutions. However, the reason for strong linked fate among high-income blacks may be due to discrimination faced by inhabiting mostly white areas and frequently interacting with whites. High status blacks may be more willing to ascribe to the black group because they feel a stronger sense of group consciousness and unity with other blacks than among whites. These explanations involve the environmental reasons for linked fate, which are discussed further below in the neighborhood demographics and quality section of the analysis.

By Age
For the oldest age group, around half of respondents said they did ascribe to linked fate, and over half said that blacks are not getting along well economically. The oldest age group is also the most likely to believe that blacks are worse off economically than whites. Interestingly enough, the youngest age group expressed that the Movement for black rights affected them personally, more so than did the oldest age group. I had hypothesized that older blacks would have felt more moved by the rights Movement. Nevertheless, my survey questions did not specify which particular Movement for black rights was referred to. If the question had specified the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960s, perhaps responses may have been different. Still, those born between 1900 and 1962 demonstrate high levels of linked fate in general, and perhaps some of this could be linked to the fact that these respondents grew up before and during the Civil Rights Movement.

The middle age group had high linked fate, but did not take a clear side on whether it thought the black group is getting along well. This group also felt the least affected by the Movement for black rights, even though most in the age bracket were born during or right after the Movement. Overall, the middle age group had high levels of linked fate, though the oldest group was slightly higher.

The youngest age group showed slightly lower levels of linked fate and connectedness to the black group overall, but, as mentioned above, those in the eighteen to twenty-five age bracket said they felt most moved by the Movement for black rights. In addition, 3.5 percent of young respondents said they would vote for the black candidate who cares for black people first, while the other age group chose this option less than 1 percent. Perhaps younger black voters are more likely to ascribe to a black candidate, but do not really feel as close to other blacks as do older blacks.

Concluding from the results of the hypothetical elections as analyzed by age, the older two age groups showed more economic linked fate, while the youngest group in fact showed more racial linked fate. This was interesting, as I had expected that the groups born before and during the Civil Rights Movement would have had more racial linked fate, meaning that they would have voted for the candidate who was black. However, instead, these two groups voted at high rates for the candidates who exhibited the liberal fiscal policy, with the oldest group voting at even higher rates than the middle group. The youngest group was the most adamant about voting for the black candidate, and voted for Kiara Jackson and Imani Williams at higher rates than both the other groups. For the oldest group, it didn’t matter as much whether the liberal candidate was black or white, though the black liberal still won by a 20 percent margin. What seemed to have mattered most was that the candidate was economically liberal. Like the lowest income group analyzed above, it seems that economic policy was more important in the elections than just the candidate’s race, likely because of Dawson’s explanation of the black group as one which comes from a background of economic subjugation. Thus, African Americans of the older age groups may be more in tune with the liberal economic policy.

Still, it is interesting that the younger group of voters had such strong racially linked fate. However, the Clemetson article referred to above discusses the race of a black Republican, Michael Steele, winning 30 percent of the black vote in Baltimore by making radio ads on the Baltimore hip-hop stations. This black political leader’s appeal to young blacks is somewhat similar to what is seen in the younger contingency of survey respondents in the hypothetical elections, as they voted at fairly high rates for the black candidate no matter what fiscal policy they supported.

CONCLUSION

It can still be argued that because there was not an overwhelming amount of significant difference overall in strength of linked fate between incomes or age groups among the black community, black politicians can still appeal to a fairly unified black political group. All of the age and income groups ascribed to high levels of linked fate, and demonstrated that being African American is still more important than one’s economic status when choosing a political candidate. Still, emphasizing economic liberality seems to be an important facet of the black vote, regardless of race. We saw that the high-income respondents still strongly preferred a white liberal candidate to a black conservative candidate, one who in fact matches along both racial and fiscal lines. All things considered, the black group seems to be a solidly unified and unique political unit with a tendency toward economic liberality.

Some parts to further the scope of this project would be to analyze survey questions across education level as well as neighborhood quality. Claudine Gay analyzed the neighborhood makeup via education level in her 2004 article, and Gay also wrote about the effects of neighborhood quality and resources on one’s sense of linked fate. I hinted at the potential that neighborhood quality might have on linked fate, but did not run a cross-tabulation with my own data to test this hypothesis. There are several other cross-tabulations that would bring more light to the question of the salience of race versus socioeconomic status, such as crosses with perceived social class, and zip code. In addition, visiting the four New Jersey townships directly and conducting an in-person,
qualitative study on resources and conditions of each town would inform the neighborhood/linked fate correlation as well. With the dataset, there is much more that can be learned about African Americans, linked fate, and politics.

In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether the monolithic black group will ever break up. It has in some ways, but the core of the African American political group remains strong. Dawson writes in his 2001 book, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies:

On issues of taxes, partisanship, the role of government, fiscal policy, and the like, blacks remain on the left and unified—more unified across class than whites, but on issues of strategy, tactics, and norms of the black quest for social justice, large cleavages can be detected even using the crude instrument of the public opinion survey.26

Arguably, some of the “institutions and networks within the black community that reinforce racial schema,” which Dawson discusses in his 2001 book, could include recent police brutality as well as mass incarceration. Both the extreme overrepresentation of blacks in the criminal justice system, and the “Black Lives Matter” Movement in response to recent police brutality, exemplify the way that blacks still face racial distinction. These two phenomena demonstrate an existing racial structure, which arguably contributes heavily to the monolithic nature of the black political group. With distinctly racially biased events still occurring, it makes sense that African Americans would continue to stick together politically on terms of race.

By better understanding the black community, its history, and its politics, we can know more about how such a politically bonded group exists. This can inform political leaders, activists, and group members about how to further engage black politics. Race is still pertinent in American politics, as much, if not more so than economic ideology, and this is something worth paying attention to. Ultimately, we cannot truly know or understand American politics without furthering our knowledge of black politics.

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I. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

This study will explore how newspapers circulated in Scotland and the UK treated the divisive issue of oil in the lead-up to the Scottish independence referendum of 2014, aiming to provide an answer to the following two questions: Did newspapers in Scotland and the greater UK wield the issue of oil as a means of shaping the discourse on national (and supranational) identity? How did the presentation of oil differ between Scottish and UK newspapers? I hypothesized that Scottish newspapers would incorporate oil into discursive strategies of identity construction more often than the UK papers, while the UK papers would employ oil more often in factual contexts of economics and finances unrelated to national identity. This study will analyze a body of text drawn from Scottish and UK newspapers, combining methods from corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis to answer the preceding questions. The search for a decisive response to this inquiry will contribute to the literature on the role of energy in the construction of national identity and to the wider field of news media discourse and national identity.

II. BACKGROUND TO SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE

Since Scotland’s union with the British Crown in 1707, some Scots have desired a return to Scottish self-determination.¹ Two relatively recent developments in Scottish politics are of particular importance to understanding the context of the 2014 independence referendum: devolution in 1997, and the Scottish National Party’s gradual rise to prominence in Scottish politics. In 1970, the same year that significant reserves of oil were discovered in the North Sea, the Scottish National Party (SNP) garnered national attention with the rallying cry, “It’s Scotland’s Oil,” and the party gained seats in parliament throughout the following decade while calling for greater Scottish political autonomy, culminating in an independence referendum in 1979.² While the 1979 referendum was a handy defeat for the independence movement, the years that followed saw more concessions from the UK parliament to the Scottish nationalist cause, eventually resulting in a 1997 referendum that created a separate Scottish parliament endowed with all powers not explicitly reserved for Westminster.³ In 2007, the SNP gained a majority in Scottish parliament, and since its election, the party’s core policy has been political independence for Scotland. The Referendum Bill, which called for a referendum on independence, was passed in 2013, and the referendum took place on September 18, 2014. The...
result was a UK-record-breaking voter turnout of 84.5 percent of Scots—any resident of Scotland over 16 was allowed to vote in the referendum—and a 55.3 percent victory for the “No” side.

North Sea oil figured prominently into the recent debate on independence. An independent Scotland, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, would be entitled to roughly 90 percent of remaining North Sea oil, though estimates differ widely on how much oil actually remains.4

III. LITERATURE REVIEW
I. Energy and Identity

The literature exploring links between natural resources and national identity is sparse but growing. Geographers and political scientists generally agree that territory is a strong component of national identity, though literature on resources as an element of territorial identity is less developed.5 More directly related to the present study is the extensive body of work studying separatist conflict in states with large resource endowments, though these studies typically take place in the developing world and involve violent secession rather than peaceful independence movements.6 However, Aspinall concludes that these conflicts are often borne of the entanglement of ethnic or national identity and resource exploitation, demonstrating how natural resources tied to a territory can be a powerful contributor to the construction of identity.7 Other studies have examined the effects of energy infrastructure projects on consolidating nationalist sentiments and ideology.8 The work most relevant to the present study is that of Bouzarovski and Bassin, who have studied discourse coalitions constituted by state-level actors in present-day Russia to examine the relationship between energy infrastructure and national identity, determining that energy and identity can be co-produced at multiple scales.9 However, the thrust of their research essentially highlights the dearth of scholarship around the intersection of energy and identity, which makes the present research all the more valuable. Finally, there has been some study of how independence movements leverage energy resources to further their cause, specifically in Scotland;10 this study points to the ideological incongruence of Scotland’s ambitious renewable energy portfolio with the SNP’s emphatic declaration of Scotland’s rights to North Sea oil reserves, suggesting that the Scottish independence movement wields energy opportunistically to support the case for independence. The present study seeks to expand the literature on the relationship between energy resources and the construction of national identity by examining the Scottish case as it is represented in newspaper discourse.

2. Nationalism and News Media

A significant portion of the literature on the role of news media in national identity construction builds on Michael Billig’s concept of banal nationalism, whereby everyday practices and representations of the nation build an “imagined community” among a people. However, more recent research contends that media influence on national identity is taken as an a priori assumption in Billig’s work, and because most studies that build on Billig’s banal nationalism theory simply follow his framework, there is a distinct lack of empirical study regarding the media’s role in national identity discourse.11 Rosie et al.’s 2004 study was one such attempt to substantiate the assertion that news media plays a central role in the discursive construction of national identity. The study demonstrated, through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, that after the 1999 devolution of powers to Scotland, a distinct “Scottish press” sphere migrated north along with the political entity; the study also confirmed the more intuitive assertion that Scottish papers covered more Scottish events while English papers did not and vice versa (Rosie et al., 2004). These findings were corroborated and expanded upon by Higgins, who compared election coverage of the same event (1999 devolution) between Scottish and UK-wide papers. Higgins found that Scottish coverage was more heavily weighted towards pre-election coverage, implying a stronger obligation (or desire) among Scottish papers to inform and/or influence opinion among voters.12 As Higgins notes, “the home nation is likely to perform discursive roles within news text.”13 This observation neatly summarizes the theoretical underpinnings of this study’s research question. The present study will add to the literature on news media and identity by comparing how national (Scottish) vs. supranational (UK) newspapers treat the same specific issue within a discourse.
3. Establishing a “Scottish Identity”

Building on the idea of a nation as a socially constructed “imagined community” linking people together through a common culture, shared history, territory, and other factors, modern identity scholars assert that “national identity” is discursively produced and reproduced at different levels of communication. Therefore, rather than existing as a monolithic concept, Scottish identity is “claimed” by individuals, who construct their own identity from a number of generally agreed-upon concepts. As is consistent with the discourse-historical approach to studying national identity (expanded upon in IV. Methods and Methodology), it was necessary to conduct research across a wide array of disciplines, including history, sociology, anthropology, and political science, to establish the major components of Scottish identity. My research indicated that Scots profess to have a distinctive national culture characterized by egalitarianism, but also partially rooted in ancient highlands “kinship” culture as well as institutions established by the Reformed Church in medieval Scotland. Scottish national identity is also founded on a shared political history, much of which is characterized by a bitter struggle with England (and in more modern times, Britain) for self-determination. Scotland, like most nations, also has an extensive “origin story” of how it came to be a nation, as well as pervasive national myths about its founders that contribute to a shared national identity. Furthermore, as evidenced by social surveys and contemporary Scottish politics, Scots share in the vision of a political present and future, the imaginations of which are heavily influenced by the themes of egalitarian culture and characterizations of a “fair society.” These elements of Scottish national identity provided the thematic categories into which the discursive strategies of identity construction found in the text were grouped.

4. Attitudes towards Independence

Since devolution, numerous social attitude surveys concerning devolution’s implications for both Scottish and British identity have been conducted and analyzed; there have also been social attitude surveys concerning attitudes towards independence. Some studies have also investigated the Scottish political press since devolution, finding the existence of a distinct “political sphere” within the Scottish press. Studies of social attitude surveys, which utilize primarily qualitative interview methods and some quantitative analysis of survey results, by and large conclude that levels of support for Scottish independence are closely linked to nationalist ideology, and identify that, among Scots, Scottish national identity is substantially stronger than British identity. These studies also indicate that Scots express a growing resentment towards UK rule. A more recent study on Scottish national identity discourse in online independence forums largely corroborated the findings of these social attitude surveys, but also found an absence of strategies seeking to dismantle British identity, indicating that at the “bottom-up” (individual) level of discourse, Scots do not see “Britishness” as a barrier to independence. The present study will add to the literature by analyzing the “top-down” (elite or media) discourse on Scottish identity in the context of independence, and specifically with regard to the issue of oil. Given that the 2014 referendum is such a recent development, this study is possibly the first to analyze the role of newspapers in the discourse on national identity in the lead-up to the referendum, and almost certainly the first to analyze the role of oil in these discursive processes. The next section will explicate the methods used to carry out this study.

IV. METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

1. Overview

To provide a brief summary of the methods and intent of the present study:

I compared two separate bodies of newspaper text, one Scottish and one British (each assembled using the same temporal and content criteria explicated below in IV.3. Text Selection), using statistical and lexical analysis to identify and tabulate the prevalence of identity-forming tactics that related to oil in each work. I then contextualized these identity-forming strategies within the literature on Scottish independence and national identity. To accomplish this, I used a combination of methods from the separate but related disciplines of Corpus Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis...
(CDA) to examine exactly how oil intersected with national identity in the sample of newspapers from the months leading up to the independence referendum. The synergy created by combining these methods is well documented. In this section, I outline the analytical framework used—a discourse-historical approach to CDA, adapted from Ruth Wodak’s study of national identity and its linguistic constructions in Austria—and then explain how CL methods facilitated the analysis.

2. Profile of CDA

Numerous studies have investigated national identities and ideologies using CDA methods; many of these studies adopt a discourse-historical approach. A simplified summary of this approach is as follows: 1) Identify the themes of a given discourse; 2) Investigate the strategies used in relation to the themes; and 3) Explore the linguistic means used to realize these strategies. The researcher can then discuss how these themes contribute to particular power relationships, ideologies, or identities. The discourse-historical approach emphasizes historical, political and social context as integral to the understanding of text as it is written or spoken, meaning that extensive research into the background on Scottish independence, social attitudes, and historical and political themes was necessary to establish themes of the discourse. Because CDA is concerned not just with what linguistic elements exist in a body of text, but why they appear as they do and what the intentions and consequences are of certain grammatical and lexical choices versus others, my analysis considers what the absence as well as presence of specific strategies and linguistic means in the texts. Wodak (2009) provides a strong framework for classifying strategies and their arguments in identity discourse, which Prentice (2010) has already adapted to the construction of Scottish national identity in the context of independence. This study drew heavily on these frameworks to establish themes of the discourse and identify their strategies and linguistic realizations.

3. Corpus Linguistics and CDA

Corpus linguistics methods address two main criticisms to CDA: text selection and narrowness of scope. By enabling the researcher to analyze huge volumes of text with perfect accuracy, CL methods overcome both the issue of subjective text selection, which might skew an analysis if a researcher selects texts they believe to be representative but instead serve only to prove their point, and also the issue of scope by providing the researcher direct access to all occurrences of the lexical items they wish to investigate. CL methods were selected for this particular analysis because the power held by mass media in influencing discourse lies in its repetitive framing of issues, and therefore a smaller textual analysis of selected newspaper articles would not necessarily explicate the dominant recurring frames of the issues being investigated.

Corpus linguistics allows for the large-scale mapping of patterns in text. This is achieved through three techniques: keyness, collocation, and concordance.

Keyness. Keyness is defined as “the statistically significantly higher frequency of a word or clusters in the corpus under analysis in comparison with another corpus.” Keyness is calculated through a comparison of relative frequencies of words in each corpus, followed by a chi-squared or log likelihood test to determine whether a word’s relative presence or absence in one corpus as compared to another is statistically significant. Particularly with larger bodies of text, researchers typically only accept significance below a 0.0001 p-value, simply because a standard social science alpha of 0.05 might return an unmanageable amount of words determined statistically to be “key.” This measure was useful for the present study because I investigated not just how discourses on identity are realized, but also how they differ between Scottish and UK corpora.

Collocates. Collocation is defined by Baker as “the above-chance frequent co-occurrence of two words within a pre-determined span.” There are multiple methods of determining what is “above chance.” Some methods assign high values to very low frequency words, while others focus more on lexical versus grammatical items. Because it provides a balance between frequency and saliency, I used the log likelihood measure to determine the significance of a collocation, setting the critical value at LL = 15.13, or p < 0.0001. I also looked at specific mutual information scores, which assign significance to lower-frequency, rarer words, and T-Scores, which take frequency into account when measuring significance, to achieve a balanced
analysis.37 For the same reason noted above, high statistical standards are necessary in collocation analysis as well. As Baker notes, “language is not random,” and an alpha of 0.05 would return far more relationships than are actually significant.38 This measure allows for statistical confirmation of relationships between words that suggest a discourse, a phenomenon known as discourse prosody.

Collocational analysis was integral to determining the statistical significance of strategies and their realizations in the texts. Concordance. Also known as “keyword in context,” this tool searches for a word, a word family, or a combination of words, and outputs every occurrence of that search term as it appears in its original context, usually restricted to about 5 to 10 words on either side. This tool is the backbone of corpus-assisted discourse analysis, as it provides researchers with a digestible and perfectly accurate readout of words related to the phenomena they wish to investigate and the context in which they appear meaning that they can determine the ways in which particular topics and arguments are presented in the text.

4. Text Selection

I assembled a corpus of newspaper articles from a total of seven papers, three of which are published in Scotland, and the remaining four in London. The papers were selected on the basis of readership/circulation and publication type. I chose two “quality” Scottish papers (The Herald and The Scotsman) and one “tabloid” (The Daily Record), and two “quality” UK papers (The Guardian and The Times) and two “tabloid” (The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror) as to provide a balanced sample of discourses present in different classes of news media.39 The articles were selected based on temporal and content criteria: every article in the corpus was printed between July 17, 2014 and September 17, 2014, representing a two-month window in the run-up to the referendum, and every article contained (in heading or body) the words “independent” AND “oil.” The corpus totaled 517,251 words and 520 articles (323 Scottish, 297 UK), which constituted a sample size big enough to reliably identify lexical patterns.40 The articles were converted to text format and cleaned of non-essential data (i.e. metadata like author, publication date/city) and separated into two corpora: one containing all Scottish articles and one containing all UK articles for the purpose of analysis.

5. Application of Methods

To summarize my approach, I used Wodak’s discourse-historical framework to identify and group discursive strategies of identity formation and their linguistic realizations in the corpora, employing CL methods to locate and tabulate the occurrences of these strategies, and more specifically, to isolate the contexts in which “oil” was implemented in them. These strategies were also grouped by the thematic elements of Scottish identity to which they related (identified in the literature review and expanded upon in section IV.2 Discursive Strategies below). CL methods were also essential to proving statistical relationships and the relative prevalence of words and phrases that indicated a discourse. To investigate the corpus, I used the lexical analysis software WordSmith 6.0, which is capable of performing all of the CL analysis methods described above, and is highly recommended by discourse analysts who employ CL methods.41 While the methods used do not fully escape the criticism of researcher bias in coding the data and identifying which themes to search for, the narrow focus of this project necessitated a combination of deductive and inductive methods to explicate the specific instances in which identity-forming strategies intersected with “oil.” Therefore, a more comprehensive approach to identifying themes of the discourse, as in Prentice’s 2010 study, was neither feasible nor applicable for the present study. This multi-method process is explained further in IV.2 Discursive Strategies section under Identifying Themes.

IV. ANALYSIS

While this study is focused primarily on how “oil” was utilized in discursive strategies of identity construction, obviously not every instance of the word “oil” in the text was part of such a strategy. Therefore, the next section provides a brief analysis of the contexts in which “oil” appears in order to situate the findings specifically related to identity construction, which are discussed at length in the section Discursive Strategies, within the entire body of analyzed texts.
I. Distribution of “Oil” in the Corpora

I adapted a discourse-theoretical framework from Wendler to code instances of the word “oil” according to its contextual appearance in both corpora.\(^1\) I analyzed a random sample of concordance outputs produced by the WordSmith function “random selection,” which does what its name implies. The sample totaled roughly one third of the total occurrences of “oil” in each corpus (31.4 percent UK, 32.9 percent Scottish), meaning that the distribution findings summarized below can be extrapolated to the full dataset with a 95 percent confidence interval of +/- 4.05 percent.\(^2\) Drawing on Wendler, I distinguished between Economic/Factual contexts, Political contexts, and Identity/Argumentative contexts, with the latter category encompassing all identity-forming strategies and arguments explicated in the next section. (Note: this coding was conducted after the strategies had been identified.) I felt the need to go beyond the binary distinction of “identity forming” and “not identity forming” because my pilot analyses of the data revealed an overwhelming occurrence in both corpora of explicitly political contexts as opposed to strictly economic, making it necessary to distinguish between the two contexts in order to address the portion of my hypothesis concerning UK papers’ treatment of “oil.” Table 1 is a frequency breakdown of the categories with descriptions and sample concordance lines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>% Scot</th>
<th>% Brit</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Sample Concordances (British followed by Scottish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic/ Factual</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>Projections/figures, oil industry/company quotes/news, absence of debate context</td>
<td>...adjusted for inflation, oil prices have never...(^4) (Projections/figures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>...executive highlighted the oil products business...(^5) (Company quotes/news)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>References debates or campaigns, actor credibility, “winning/losing”</td>
<td>...use last week’s intervention by oil billionaire Sir Ian Wood as his trump card...(^6) (winning/losing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>...campaign did not play the oil card at a time when...(^7) (Campaign reference, winning/losing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity/ Argumentative</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>Possession, normative statements about “use,” fantasy, country comparison, abuse</td>
<td>...socialist utopia where oil will flow forever. On...(^8) (Fantasy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>...unaware of how Scotland’s oil wealth was kept secret...(^9) (Abuse)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
themes took a two-layered approach: first, themes were established using a discourse-historical review of literature on Scottish national identity (see III.3 Establishing a “Scottish Identity”); second, the corpus was queried using linguistic tools in order to determine which themes remained relevant when the focus was narrowed to mentions of “oil.” While this is the first study (to my knowledge) that seeks to explicate the occurrence of a singular theme not intuitively related to the overall discourse using a combination of CL/DA methods, the approach used is not entirely novel; Baker suggests that the ideal synergies of combining CL and DA methods are created via an iterative process much like the one used here, whereby one establishes themes through contextual research on the one hand, and “maps the text” using keywords, collocations and concordances (keeping the established themes in mind) to locate areas of interest in the text on the other. The thematic elements established through contextual research and cross-checked through pilot analyses of the data are:

1. The narration of a common political past
2. The linguistic construction of a national culture
3. The linguistic construction of a political present and future

**Argumentative Strategies**

Wodak defines a strategy as “a more or less intentional plan of practices…adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal.” The strategies were quantified by calculating the relative frequencies of linguistic means of realization between corpora, and by identifying statistically significant word pairings that suggest identity discourse. Strategies and linguistic means were then examined using concordance analysis and a wider investigation of context where relevant, in order to relate them back to the relevant themes of the discourse and to the socio-political and theoretical context established through the literature review.

**I. Constructive/Perpetuation Strategies**

Constructive strategies are thought to be the most comprehensive and widespread strategies in national identity discourse, and they attempt to “construct and establish a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity.” Perpetuation strategies instead seek to preserve a threatened identity.

**Topos of Possession**

The first clue to the existence of an argumentation scheme based on notions of possession within the national identity discourse came from an analysis of Keywords in the Scottish corpus as compared to the British corpus. (“Keywords” are here defined as words that appear in one corpus and not the other at a statistically significant level.) Two of the strongest keywords in the Scottish corpus were the first-person plural pronouns “OUR” (Frequency: 771, keyness score 113.11) and “WE” (Frequency: 1441, keyness score 120.58). The prevalence of these pronouns in the Scottish corpus relative to the UK corpus suggests the existence of topoi of similarity and assimilation in Scottish newspapers, which are typically articulated through inclusive pronouns. This finding can possibly be explained by the hypothesis that Scottish newspapers feature comparatively more editorial pieces written from the first person, a notion supported by the theory that the home nation plays discursive roles in news text. To determine if the topic of oil was integrated into this argumentation scheme, I performed collocational analysis on “oil” and related terms (resource[s], energy) to look for personal pronouns, as well as extensive concordance analysis of the possessive pronoun “our” in the context of “oil” and related terms. I found that while “oil” does not collocate in the Scottish corpora with any personal pronouns, “resource[s]” collocates strongly with “our” (log likelihood 16.73), suggesting a discourse prosody of a national community bound by its common possessions.

Additionally, occurrences of the clusters “our oil,” “our resources,” and “Scotland’s oil,” while not statistically significant within the Scottish corpus, showed relatively higher frequencies across the board in the Scottish corpus as compared to the UK corpus (calculated by a simple ratio). Results are summarized in Table 2.

**2. Topos of Possession in the Scottish Corpus**

These selected concordances corroborate
the finding that the Scottish press employed the topos of possession to a greater extent than the UK press. However, while the dominant identity discourse in these sample concordances is clearly the consolidation of a Scottish identity via the shared ownership of natural resources, the fourth concordance example hints at an entirely different discourse, albeit a less prominent one. This alternate discourse is related to the preservation of a supranational identity, and the benefits conferred by UK-wide shared ownership of oil and gas resources. A wider concordance analysis of “shared,” “pooled,” and “resources” indicates a strategy of perpetuation, present in both corpora (but not significantly or relatively more so in either), that seeks to resist the perceived threat posed by Scottish nationalist impulses towards North Sea oil resources. This finding is noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that the same argumentative strategies may serve to advance different and even opposing discourses present in the corpora with regards to oil. Secondly, it demonstrates the benefits of using corpus linguistics techniques to conduct discourse analysis, as such small- frequency clusters would almost certainly have been overlooked in a manual analysis.

II. TRANSFORMATIVE STRATEGIES

Transformation strategies seek to “transform a relatively well-established national identity the contours of which the speaker has already identified.” In the context of the present study, transformative argumentation schemes present oil as a means to changing Scotland for the better. Insofar as these strategies are present in the corpora, they appeal to the thematic categories of “linguistic construction of a shared political present and future” as well as “linguistic construction of a shared national culture.”

Topoi of Comparison

While geographic reference has typically been classified as the realization of a constructive rather than transformative strategy in other studies, some references to foreign countries present in the corpora

| Table 3: Topos of Comparison in the Scottish Corpus |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Linguistic Means</th>
<th>Sample Concordances (Scottish Corpus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparison than 70%...</td>
<td>“such as,” “similar to,”...more prosperous than the UK (Norway by more</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(geographic) stands...</td>
<td>“look...[at/to],” “than,”...looks enviously to Norway whose oil fund now</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strong...</td>
<td>“would replicate”...oil assets such as Qatar or Norway, or having a very</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>makers in...</td>
<td>...replicate the arrangement in Norway, where policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
indicate an implication of what an independent Scotland could be, thereby encouraging the categorization of these strategies as transformative.\textsuperscript{70} The impetus for investigating Norway as a potential site of interest in the corpora came from both the background literature, in which SNP politicians repeatedly reference the Nordic country as a model for an independent Scotland by virtue of its prudent investment of oil proceeds (see SNP White Paper, statements from FM Alex Salmond), as well as from inductive CL research; the word “Norwegian” appears as a statistically significant collocate of “oil” in the Scottish corpus (using the measure of specific mutual information, meaning it may not have been a high-frequency collocation). A collocational and concordance analysis of Norw* (the asterisk indicates a “wildcard,” which instructs the software to return all words that begin with NORW) returned “oil” as the most significant collocate (log likelihood 17.14), prompting a closer concordance analysis of the instances in which “oil” and “Norw*” appear in the Scottish corpus. (Note: the UK corpus, by contrast, frames references to Norway in a largely disparaging manner elaborated upon in the next section, IV.2.iii. Destructive Strategies.)

Table 3: Topos of Comparison in the Scottish Corpus

The selected concordances exemplify the aspirational Scottish comparison to its Nordic neighbor on the basis of its huge sovereign wealth fund, which is largely the accumulation of oil revenues. This argumentation scheme linguistically constructs a common political future by suggesting a comparative model and implying that a transformation could be achieved. By comparing itself to a bounded geographical entity like Norway, Scotland (by way of the politicians and citizens who make the comparison) constructs a possible future in which its position relative to other countries is largely derived from the production of oil. This imagination of a national identity contingent on energy is similar to what Bouzarovski and Bassin identified in Russia—a “hydrocarbon landscape with discursive and material aspects that are simultaneously parts of an infrastructurally-grounded vision of national identity.”\textsuperscript{71} A wider examination of the concordances of Norw* in the Scottish corpus illustrates that the comparison extends beyond simply imagining an independent Scotland as an energy-producing dynamo. Numerous examples take the comparison further to explicate the use of oil proceeds to finance an egalitarian society:

1. “We can create an oil fund by saving some of the tax- Norway, a country the same size as Scotland, has accumulated an oil fund of $500 billion to be used for pensions, healthcare and investment in the future.”\textsuperscript{72}

2. The Nordic countries are all more prosperous than the UK (Norway by more than 70 percent), all enjoy much greater levels of equality and none feels the need for the safety net of being tied to a larger country.\textsuperscript{73}

These comparisons explicated the need for further investigation into how oil is tied to a Scottish vision of a more “egalitarian” society, and how these links contributed to the construction of a common national culture.

Topoi of Fairness

To assess the links between oil and the linguistic construction of a particularly “Scottish” culture, I chose a different “entry point” into the discourse,\textsuperscript{74} opting to first locate manifestations of the theme of “common national culture” and then search among the resultant discursive strategies for links to oil. Scotland has historically constructed itself as “egalitarian,” as evidenced by social surveys, ethnographic work, and historical analysis.\textsuperscript{75} In the Scottish corpus, “social” was found to collocate strongly with “justice” (log likelihood 18.34) as well as “fairer” with “society” (26.67). While “fair” appeared a roughly equal number of times in both texts (18 in UK, 21 in Scottish), “fairer” appeared 58 times in the Scottish corpus versus just 14 times in the UK corpus. The addition of the comparative –er to the adjective suggests a transformative strategy that seeks to modify (or amplify) this central tenet of Scottish identity (fairness), a strategy which is significantly more present in the Scottish corpus versus the UK corpus.\textsuperscript{76} This is corroborated by a closer analysis of “fairer” in context in the Scottish corpus:
1. “The best way, the only way, to build a wealthier Scotland, a fairer Scotland, a more confident Scotland, is full powers of independence.”

2. “Make it Yes because there is so much at stake; a fairer, democratic Scotland which we all want.”

3. “…because they believed an independent Scotland would be a fairer society in which endemic problems of poverty and poor health could be tackled more effectively and with greater will.”

Clearly, a discourse prosody exists between “fairer” and “society.” The deployment of a vague phrase, exemplified here by the minimal reference to what “fairer” would actually mean (with some exceptions, as in Example 3) is a typical linguistic realization of transformative strategies. Hence, we can conclude that the use of “fairer” constitutes the realization of a discursive strategy of identity transformation. However, an explicit link between “fairness” or “social justice” and “oil” is virtually nonexistent. At best, we can establish an admittedly weak “secondary relationship” between “social” and “resource” by way of mutual collocations: “social” à “economic” (log likelihood 14.53), “economic” à “resource” (log likelihood 10.93). So, what does this lack of a relationship mean for how “oil” and its related topics help to construct a common Scottish national culture? I tentatively suggest that this distance between “oil” and the linguistic realizations of national culture in the Scottish corpus is indicative of the opportunistic use of oil by Scots in discursive strategies of identity construction. In the context of cultural factors that contribute to Scottish national identity, it appears that “oil” is at best a temporary means to achieving societal goals of “fairness,” and not intrinsically a component of Scottish cultural identity. Interestingly, as the next section will demonstrate, the link between the vision of a fairer independent Scotland and oil was actually made more explicit in the UK corpus, though the link was used to dismantle a vision of a political future, rather than construct one.

III. DESTRUCTIVE STRATEGIES

This final category of argumentation strategies exists to “[dismantle] or [disparage] parts of an existing identity construct.” These strategies, while found to be less common in online Scottish pro-independence debate forums, are strikingly present in both corpora, and they relate primarily to the thematic element of “narratives of a shared political past.”

Topoi of Fantasy

The UK corpus features similar raw and relative frequencies of the term “Norw*,” and also collocates strongly with “oil” (log likelihood 16.73). However, an analysis of the concordances of “Norw*” in the UK corpus reveals a strikingly different discourse. “Norw*” in the UK corpus collocates strongly with “fabulous” (log likelihood 16.78), and a concordance analysis reveals that this is largely due to the recurrence of a quote from Scottish author J.K. Rowling, who was a vocal “No” supporter, printed 5 separate times across the four UK papers:

“That’s not true for everyone who’s being sold the idea that we’ll be a fabulous hybrid between Norway and Saudi Arabia…”

It is interesting to note that J.K. Rowling, who is Scottish, invokes the personal pronoun “we,” which is typically employed in constructive strategies. However, because she uses “we” in the context of an imagined future via the future-tense structure “[w]ill be,” and subsequently mocks the vision as “fabulous” and an “idea being sold,” this argumentation scheme can be classified as destructive. This quote did not appear at all in the Scottish corpus, prompting a closer investigation into other scenarios in which the imagined future of an independent Scotland was derided as fantastical, unrealistic, or childish in the UK corpus. Through collocation and concordance analyses, I found that this argument was present in contexts well beyond the country comparison with Norway, and applied to multiple contexts involving oil. I chose to term this argumentation scheme the topos of fantasy, because it employs belittling and patronizing linguistic realizations to dismantle the imagined identity of a prosperous, independent Scotland.
dependent on oil revenues. It can be understood relative to the *topos of reality*, paraphrased here from Wodak as “because reality is as it is, a specific course of action should follow.” The *topos of fantasy* argues that “because reality is not as it seems (or has been presented), a course of action should (or should not) follow.”

The linguistic realizations in the table below all appear within a 10-word span of “oil” or “Norway;” n/a signifies a term that did not occur at all in the Scottish corpus.

Table 4: Topos of Fantasy in the UK Corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Linguistic Realizations (Relative Freq UK/Scot)</th>
<th>Sample Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fantasy</td>
<td>“fantasy (2.2),” “dream (1.6),”</td>
<td>...nationalists hope to emulate the Norwegian dream, with plans to...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“fabulous (n/a);” “utopia (n/a);”</td>
<td>...their country into a Nordic idyll, or to say how much...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“heaven (n/a);” “paradise (n/a);”</td>
<td>...fund his promised socialist paradise. An avowed statist, he...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“idyll (n/a);”</td>
<td>...equally flawed. His socialist heaven of tax and spend, floating on a lake of oil...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SALMOND’S GREAT OIL WEALTH FANTASY. Alex Salmond’s biggest lie...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Topoi of Abuse*

*Topoi of Abuse* are classified by Prentice as an “abuse of authority.” These topoi were located and examined by first searching for the linguistic constructions of authority in the discourse, and subsequently analyzing how they are characterized and referred to by either press. Wodak points to *metonymy*, which “replaces the name of a referent by the name of an entity which is closely associated with it,” as a common linguistic realization of discursive strategies in national identity construction (or destruction). A common metonymy in political discourse is *place as seat of an institution for the representatives of the institution*, i.e. saying ‘The White House issued a memorandum’ to mean that the President and/or American executive office issued a memorandum. Scottish and British parliaments are referred to as Holyrood and Westminster respectively, as a reference to the cities in which they are housed; these terms represent constructions of authority in the discourse. A collocational and relative frequency analysis on both metonymies in both corpora returned nothing of interest, except for the characterization of “Westminster” within the Scottish corpora. Some of the highest collocates of “Westminster” in the Scottish corpora were “cruel” (log likelihood 22.14); “elite” (log likelihood 20.96); “threat” (log likelihood 19.06); and “lie” (log likelihood 13.14), suggesting a discourse of distrust and ill will towards British parliament that is congruent with the wider discourse on a common Scottish political past in the context of British rule.

An examination of the instances in which “Westminster” collocated with “oil” was even more revealing (the following examples were selected based on their representation of specific topoi):

1. “So our plea today to pensioners in Scotland is this: if you lived through the
energy and national identity in newspaper coverage of scottish independence

Thatcher years, you lived through the waste of opportunity, you lived through the squandering of Scotland’s oil wealth- don’t let Westminster repeat the mistakes of the past.¹⁹⁸ (mismanagement)
2. “Instead, successive Westminster governments used oil revenue for their own immediate political priorities.”⁹⁹ (mismanagement)
3. “This lends weight to the Investors’ Chronicle view that Westminster is seeking to downplay the value of oil to the Scottish economy before the referendum.”¹⁰⁰ (treachery)

These examples are indicative of two separate but related argumentative strategies: a topos of mismanagement and a topos of treachery.

Topos of Mismanagement
The first quotation invokes a political past of hardship at the hands of Westminster, consolidating a Scottish identity through reference to a shared resource that has been “squandered” by Westminster. The second example references “successive” Westminster governments, again constructing a narrativization of a shared political past, this time through temporal reference.¹⁰¹ “Successive” actually collocates significantly with “Westminster” in the Scottish corpus, and subsequent concordances of “successive” confirm that the “shared political past” narrative is indeed tied to oil in certain contexts. Concordance analyses on “squander,” “oil fund” (deemed to be a related term through concordances), and “successive” reveal a topos of mismanagement realized by references to Westminster’s chronically poor governance of oil resources. (The linguistic realizations below all appeared within a 10-word span of “Westminster.”)

Table 5: Topos of Mismanagement in the Scottish Corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Linguistic Realizations (Relative Freq Scot/UK)</th>
<th>Sample Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mismanagement wealth...¹⁰²</td>
<td>“squander”(2); “steward”*(1.4) failed to set up a fund and squandered our oil...</td>
<td>...also accused successive Westminster squandering the resource...¹⁰³ ...Fergus Ewing said: “poor stewardship of frequent changes...¹⁰⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Topos of Treachery
Example 3 above indicates the presence of another sub-topos of abuse present in the discourse related to Westminster’s strategic withholding of information about the extent of Scottish oil wealth. Whether these accusations are true or not, their appearance in the corpus is statistically significant: in the Scottish corpus, “secret” collocates strongly with “oil” (log likelihood 19.00) and “kept” (log likelihood 25.08), and a closer concordance analysis of this theme reveals the related linguistic means.
Table 6: Topos of Treachery in the Scottish Corpus
The third concordance makes reference to a report conducted by a Scottish economist in the 1970s detailing how an independent Scotland would be made “richer than Switzerland” by oil revenues, which was suppressed by UK governments for fear of inciting Scottish appeals to independence.\(^{109}\) Also referenced in the Scottish corpus was an online poll conducted by a popular entertainment-content website that asked Scots if they believed that the UK government was “keeping oil finds secret” to weaken the case for independence, to which 42 percent responded “probably true,” and an equal proportion responded “probably untrue.”\(^{110}\) This argumentation scheme, like the topos of mismanagement, supports social attitude survey findings that Scots harbor distrust for the UK government.\(^{111}\) The “topos of treachery” seeks to dismantle the UK identity by attacking its credibility as a unified community; by identifying specific scenarios in which the UK government willingly acted against the interest of [Scots, who are presumably] its own people, this strategy deconstructs the notion of a supranational British identity through differentiation from the abused party.\(^{112}\) However, it is interesting to note that the topos of abuse represent oil as a depleted resource (“squandered”), in contrast with the topos of comparison above, which bases its construction of a political future on plentiful oil reserves; this discrepancy is indicative of the opportunistic use of oil in identity-forming strategies in the Scottish corpus, because the two strategies employ entirely different visions of Scotland’s oil wealth in order to further their identity claims.

CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
Overall, the findings here both support and build on the literature of Scottish identity as well as the more nascent body of work on the discursive relationship between energy and identity. The destructive strategies present in the Scottish corpus corroborated the findings of recent Scottish social attitude surveys, which identify a Scottish distrust of UK government, while the constructive and transformative strategies, particularly the geographic comparison to other oil-producing countries, support Bouzarovski and Bassin’s conclusions that energy and identity are linked in material and imagined ways.\(^{113}\) However, the total distribution of the contexts in which “oil” appears in both corpora indicates that overall, oil as an issue in the Scottish independence debate was primarily a matter of politics rather than identity. The issue of oil was raised most frequently in the context of political debates and campaign politics, in which it was essentially “backgrounded” as a tool used by actors for political gain (39.6 percent Scottish, 41.1 percent British). Additionally, the fact that both corpora demonstrated similar frequencies of oil mentions in the context of identity discourse indicate that oil as it relates to national identity was not a significantly more important argument for either side of the debate.

Despite the relative similarity in the volume of identity-forming strategies between the corpora, this study revealed a comparative distinction between corpora in the types of strategies used, which in turn gives clues to how exactly oil figures into Scottish identity: the Scottish corpus employed oil in constructive, transformative, and even destructive strategies of identity formation, while the UK corpus utilized oil in primarily destructive strategies. Destructive strategies in both corpora served the similar function of deriding or deflating the opposing identity in order to implicitly promote one’s own, and thus suggest an inherently mutual tension between a Scottish and British national identity. But a closer examination of the UK’s destructive strategies suggest

Table 6: Topos of Treachery in the Scottish Corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Linguistic Realizations/ (Relative Freq Scot/UK)</th>
<th>Sample Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treachery</td>
<td>“secret”(2.7); “downplayed”(2)</td>
<td>...Scotland’s oil wealth was kept secret for years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before the...</td>
<td></td>
<td>...admitted the value of oil was downplayed by Labour and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives...</td>
<td></td>
<td>...was classified and kept secret by Labour and Tory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that they should be viewed as largely reactive to Scottish discursive strategies of construction and transformation, evidenced by the relatively frequent targeting of a particular Scottish imagination of a political future dependent on oil reserves (topos of fantasy). Therefore, this study seems to indicate that the link between a British identity and “oil” is weak, and was only employed as a defensive response to Scottish identity claims involving oil.

The most important finding of this study is the discovery of Scottish destructive strategies aimed at dismantling the supranational British identity through the “narrativization of a shared past,” because this finding is in direct contrast with the conclusions of Prentice, who noticed a distinct lack of destructive strategies in Scottish online independence forums. Taken broadly, this contradictory finding suggests that different strategies exist at different levels of discourse, and that the “top-down” Scottish newspaper discourse may have presented “Britishness” as more of a barrier to independence than did the “bottom-up” discourse in online forums (terms borrowed from Prentice 2010).

Finally, the present study finds Scottish newspapers’ use of oil in discursive strategies to be largely opportunistic; in other words, oil was framed both as a depleted and a plentiful resource, depending on what theme the strategy was trying to realize (narrativization of a common political past or construction of a political future). Destructive strategies referred to the oil as having been “squandered” (topos of mismanagement), while transformative strategies either explicitly (topos of comparison) or implicitly (topos of fairness) referenced plentiful oil as a means to realizing the vision of a political future. The reactive British strategies of identity destruction were a response to the latter series of strategies, and sought to dismantle the construction of an independent Scotland dependent on oil to fund its vision.

Further Research

Future research could expand the scope of the study and examine a corpus spanning several years, perhaps even to a period before the SNP came to power in Scotland, to observe the diachronic development of strategies that employ oil in the construction or destruction of identity in the Scottish press; the temporal comparison would no doubt prove very interesting. Additionally, it could be interesting to conduct a wider comparative analysis of the discourses present in Scottish independence forums versus those in Scottish newspapers to investigate the discrepancy between my findings and Prentice’s (2010) regarding destructive strategies; such a study would additionally have the societal merit of revealing how representative Scottish newspapers are of the Scottish people. Finally, further research could use the same or a similar corpus as this study to examine the distinction between “quality” and “tabloid” papers to see if there exists a relative prevalence of identity-forming strategies in either type of publication.

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117 Bechhofer and MccRone, “Talking the Talk”; Bouzarovski and Bassin, “Energy and Identity”
I. INTRODUCTION

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once railed against the United States’ addiction to foreign oil: “We have to do something about the energy problem. I can tell you that nothing has really taken me aback more… than the way that the politics of energy is… ‘warping’ diplomacy around the world.”1 Such statements are nothing new. Indeed, every president since Richard Nixon has labeled America’s overreliance on foreign oil as a strategic liability and promised to put America on the path towards energy independence. Unfortunately, the history of presidential energy security policy is riddled with failure. Despite several presidential initiatives, American imports of crude oil rose steadily from 1.93 billion barrels in 1970 to a peak of 3.69 billion in 2005.2 A 2011 CBS News story summarized the trend with the damning headline: “Fuelish Dreams: Every President Tries to Break U.S. Oil Addiction; Every President Fails.”3

Today, however, the headlines read differently. The United States is in the midst of a “Shale Revolution” in which domestic sources of shale oil and natural gas are rapidly transforming the nation’s energy outlook. Soaring U.S. shale oil and gas production is sharply curbing U.S.’s net energy exports to the point that America will be a net energy exporter by 2050. Suddenly, the U.S.’s energy security seems to be on rather sound footing.

While the Shale Revolution has already begun to reshape the energy landscape, its geopolitical consequences are still unclear. A key area of interest is determining what impact the Shale Revolution will have on the United States’ strategy and military posture in the Persian Gulf, an area produces 30 percent of the world’s crude oil.4 Indeed, as Barry Posen notes, the United States has long protected the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf with “a full panoply of air, sea, and land forces, a goal that consumes at least 15 percent of the U.S. defense budget.”5 To some supporters like Admiral Dennis Blair and General Michael Hagee, the Shale Revolution provides the United States the strategic flexibility to significantly reshape and reduce its footprint in the Middle East.6

This paper examines that broad proposition with a critical lens. Our research question is simple: How will the Shale Revolution affect U.S. strategy towards the Middle East, specifically in the Persian Gulf? We first examine whether increased production from the Shale Revolution will continue and arrive at the conclusion that it will endure. Next, we review the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East since 1971, a story of threats and responses that gradually deepened U.S. commitments in the region. This history reveals a multiplicity of interests that motivates U.S. engagement. Next, we turn to a comparative study that draws lessons from Britain’s experiences with energy revolutions. Our comparative study of the British experience demonstrates that hegemonic powers retain a broad array of interests that are worth securing with global forces. We show that Britain acted as a balancing power in the Middle East and secured oil resources to hedge against the rise of a regional rival. We contend the United States must do the same today.

Our study of the past points to a clear policy recommendation: continued engagement in the Middle East. For a public that wants to disengage from the region, this proposal may be unsatisfying.
Though the Shale Revolution promises an era of domestic energy abundance, it will not upend U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Both its energy and its non-energy interests will endure well into the future. Moreover, U.S. allies will continue to depend on Persian Gulf oil supplies, and the United States has an interest in their economic well-being. Lastly, related interests such as preventing the rise of a hostile hegemon like China, protecting regional partners like Saudi Arabia, and countering unconventional threats like terrorism will persist in the Middle East even if the United States becomes a net energy exporter.

II. WHAT IS THE SHALE REVOLUTION? – A NEW AGE OF ENERGY ABUNDANCE

[It now looks as though the first few decades of the twenty-first century will see an extension of the trend that has persisted for the past few millennia: the availability of plentiful energy at ever-lower cost and with greater efficiency, enabling major advances in global economic growth.]

— Edward Morse, Citigroup commodity research director

Only five years ago, the United States confronted what seemed to be a depressing future dominated by peaking global oil supplies, falling conventional production, and rising imports of foreign oil and natural gas. The U.S.’s energy outlook was grim. However, those predictions proved to be “spectacularly wrong.” The United States is now in the midst of a “Shale Revolution” in which domestic sources of shale oil and natural gas promise decades of energy abundance. Instead of peak oil production, analysts now forecast increasing rates of global production.

The Shale Revolution represents a massive shift in the U.S. energy outlook. Two factors catalyzed the revolution. First, new drilling techniques including hydraulic fracturing (or “fracking”) and horizontal drilling allow American companies to extract natural gas and “tight” crude oil from shale rock formations across the country. Until recently, extracting these unconventional energy resources was not considered economically viable. New drilling techniques made recovery of those reserves feasible. Recent estimates now put the quantity of technically recoverable North American shale gas at 1,930 tcf—roughly fifty times greater than estimates in 2003. Proven U.S. crude oil reserves increased for the “fifth year in a row in 2013, and exceeded 36 billion barrels for the first time since 1975.” Tight oil discoveries in North Dakota and Texas accounted for 90 percent of that increase.

The combination of high oil prices and falling operational costs created a favorable environment for unconventional drilling. With oil prices hovering above $100 per barrel for much of the past decade, energy companies were willing to make large up-front investments in shale drilling technology. The prospect of high profit margins, supported by relatively high crude oil and gas prices, drew thousands of drillers into the industry. Thus, while improvements in drilling techniques made production of shale gas technologically feasible, underlying economic conditions made the United States’ Shale Revolution possible.

I. Will the Shale Revolution Continue?

The Shale Revolution has produced dramatic gains in domestic production of oil and natural gas. However, skeptics caution that these gains might be short-lived. In particular, they point to two potential pitfalls: declining production rates and unfavorable drilling economics. We argue that each of these concerns is overblown.

Skeptics like David Hughes, a geologist and president of Global Sustainability Research, point out that fracking yields uneven production because wells deplete quickly. While the rate of depletion for conventional oil wells averages around 5 percent per year, some shale oil wells deplete at a much faster rate—44 percent per year, for example, in the Bakken shale plays of North Dakota. Higher well depletion rates could indicate that production gains are illusory. Just because a shale well spurts out a significant supply of oil today does not mean it will continue
to do so in the near future. Recent technological innovations, however, are changing this pattern. New seismic technologies have enabled drillers to find and tap wells with slower depletion rates and long tails of production. According to veteran oil analyst Ed Morse, there are now a sufficient number of these wells to ensure that the flows will continue over time. At the very least, these high-quality wells virtually eliminate the possibility of a sudden plunge in shale oil and gas production.

Skeptics also assert that falling global oil prices could upend many shale companies that operate on razor-thin margins. The Economist notes that most major companies “assume an oil price of $80 when making plans.” Bernstein Research concurs, but also notes that a third of U.S. shale oil production is uneconomical at that price. The recent plunge in oil prices, which bottomed out at $44 in January 2015, has already had this effect. Industry analysts at Baker Hughes note that the number of U.S. oil rigs dropped 24 percent from the all-time high in October 2014. This, the skeptics contend, presages a drop in U.S. shale oil production.

A drop in oil prices may pinch producers, but it does not spell the end of the Shale Revolution. Traders already expect the price of oil to rise again. Indeed, December 2017 Brent crude futures were trading above $73 in early February. Moreover, a study by energy consultancy IHS, Inc. found that 47 percent of new U.S. oil producers could break even at a price below $61 per barrel. Technological innovation and better management practices will only drive this price lower through efficiency gains. A recent report by Accenture found that drillers could cut costs up to 40 percent through better planning, contracting, and purchasing. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) reports that the quantity of shale gas produced per rig has increased more than 300 percent over the past four years due to technological innovations. Morse points out that these efficiency gains are already having an impact; he expects them to drive break-even points to $40 per barrel within a few years. In a sense, the same technological innovation that sparked the Shale Revolution helps ensure its enduring strength.

2. Does the Shale Revolution Shift U.S. Interests?
Our brief examination of the Shale Revolution indicates that it will dramatically alter the United States’ energy outlook. Can we expect a similar shift in geopolitics, particularly U.S. involvement in the Middle East? There are prima facie reasons to expect so. A United States that no longer relies on Persian Gulf oil would theoretically have the flexibility to withdraw from a region that has consumed American blood and treasure for much of the last decade. In the following sections, we interrogate this claim and pose a question of our own: how will the Shale Revolution affect U.S. strategy in the Middle East? Studying the history of U.S. strategy in the area offers a worthy point of departure. Thus, we seek to understand, firstly, the key interests that have historically driven U.S. engagement and, secondly, whether the need to secure U.S. access to oil has ever been the sole or overriding interest justifying American strategy in the region.

III. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

“No Blood for Oil!”—anti-war protesters have employed this slogan since at least 1991, when college students used it to support their opposition to the Gulf War. Rutgers professor Toby C. Jones wrote in a 2012 article about a U.S. “obsession” with oil that has motivated its “militarism” in the oil-rich Arab states. “Having crafted a set of relationships with oil and unstable oil producers and having linked the fate of those relationships to American national security,” Jones asserts, “virtually ensures that while the United States is wrapping up the most recent oil war, its military and political strategists are already preparing for the next one.” Critics in academia, like Dr. Michael Klare in his article “Oil Wars Transforming the American Military into a Global Oil-Protection Service,” and the general public have long been skeptical of the motives for American involvement in the Middle East. For example, some charged that the American military was being deployed solely to protect the nation’s oil supply. Unfortunately for slogan-chanters, the situation is much more complex. A history of U.S. policy in the Middle East since the 1970s shows that the United States has long expressed and defended a multitude of interests in the region. Secure access to oil for the United States, its allies, and the global economy has been a consistent priority, but far from the only motive for involvement. The enduring principles of U.S. Middle
East strategy also include:

1) Prevent the rise of a hostile regional hegemon: Since the 1970s, the United States has increased its presence in the Middle East to counter the threat of another dominant force that could cut off oil supplies to the Western world. From the 1970s to the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union posed the dominant challenge. Iran and Iraq have similarly threatened to greatly expand their influence at times.

2) Support allies and partners in the Persian Gulf: The United States fundamentally values its allies' security, adding Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to a list of partners. Supporting U.S. allies boosts credibility, thereby enhancing America's role as a hegemonic guarantor of stability.

3) Maintain a stabilizing presence in the region: The prosperity of the United States and its allies depends on uninterrupted trade in an increasingly interdependent world economy. Instability in the Middle East threatens the global economy.

4) Counter unconventional threats: These threats include rogue states, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. They primarily arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and concerns intensified after September 11, 2001.

1. A History of Threats and Responses

Before 1971, the West enjoyed negotiating power with regional producers and could weather Middle Eastern oil-supply disruptions. Post-World War II Britain remained influential with the Gulf States and guaranteed the security of the small emirates. Yet three factors make 1971 a turning point in the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East and a useful starting point for a “modern” history of U.S. goals in the region. First, the United States lost its twenty-year oil surplus capacity. The domestic combination of surging demand and falling discovery rates pushed U.S. companies to “all-out production” of its few producing wells. This change meant the end of the “security margin” of production that had insulated the West from disruptions and crises in the Middle East. Second, in February 1971, Western oil companies surrendered power to OPEC. The Tehran Agreement ended the fifty-fifty division of oil revenue that had been a “hallowed” principle for two decades; producer countries now had the upper hand in dividing revenues and setting prices. As Shell's chairman said at the time, “the buyer's market for oil is over.” Third, a regional power vacuum opened.

Following through on Britain's 1968 renunciation of its security commitments east of Suez, British forces withdrew from the region in November. Renowned energy historian Daniel Yergin writes that the withdrawal “marked the most fundamental change in the Gulf since World War II and meant the end of the security system that had operated in the area for over a century.” The Soviets reacted quickly and filled the void, sending a naval task force to the Indian Ocean and negotiating for permanent bases on the Gulf as one part of the nation's long search for warm-water ports.

After 1971, the United States faced a new era of economic and military volatility in the Middle East. Rather than sending U.S. forces to replace the British, President Richard M. Nixon relied on the pro-Western Iranian Shah to keep order in the Middle East. Exhausted by Vietnam, the United States delegated security to regional “policemen” under the Nixon Doctrine. The history of U.S. involvement since then has been a story of threats and responses: threats to vital strategic interests and U.S. responses that deepened U.S. military involvement.

2. The Yom Kippur War and the OPEC Embargo

The first major threat to U.S. interests came in 1973 with the surprise Yom Kippur offensive against Israel. The United States' response showed that its commitment to an ally mattered more than its access to oil. Before the Arab states invaded the Israeli-occupied Suez Peninsula, “U.S. oil companies in the region [had] pressed the administration to adopt a less pro-Israeli position.” President Nixon refused, standing by the official policy of support for Israel. When the Israelis appeared vulnerable to defeat at the hands of the Soviet-supplied Arabs, the U.S. military resupplied their ally, but was unable to keep the effort secret. Arab oil producers led OPEC to impose a total oil embargo within the week. By supporting Israel at the expense of the United States' oil supply, Nixon showed that oil was among several interests guiding U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

U.S. leaders responded to the economic threat of the embargo with limited measures. Nixon's first reaction was domestic: a speech that encouraged oil conservation and grandiosely announced Project Independence, an effort “in the spirit of Apollo [and] with the determination of the Manhattan Project.” In 1974, the United States formed the International
Energy Agency (IEA) with other importing nations, which led to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and similar reserves in other IEA countries.\textsuperscript{42} When Gerald Ford became president, he also focused on domestic measures: fuel standards, the massive Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and a plan for 200 nuclear power plants. These responses showed that although the United States worried about energy security, the country would not take aggressive military action to restore Middle Eastern oil supplies or the low prices it enjoyed before 1971.

3. The Origins of U.S. Central Command

In the 1970s, the United States arbitrarily divided the Gulf between European and Pacific Commands. Soon after President Jimmy Carter took office, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski ordered a broad interagency review of “how we are doing in the world versus the Soviet Union.” The review proposed a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for the Gulf. In August 1977, Carter created the RDF by presidential directive.\textsuperscript{43}

As Brzezinski’s military assistant Gen. William E. Odom later wrote, the impetus for the RDF was not securing oil supplies, but rather countering growing Soviet military power that threatened the region.\textsuperscript{44} A March 1979 Brzezinski memo to Carter emphasized that Soviet power in the Middle East was concerning because Europe and Japan depended heavily on its oil. Yet, actual implementation had barely progressed by December 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Even after that, inter-service rivalry stymied progress.\textsuperscript{45} U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was finally established in January 1983. Odom’s account shows that increased military focus on the Middle East was not driven solely or even primarily by U.S. demand for oil. Soviet aggression, regional instability, and allies’ oil interests were the major concerns.

4. Double Trouble: Iran and Afghanistan

In 1979, the United States faced threats in both Afghanistan and Iran. Until then, U.S. strategists relied on Nixon’s “Two Pillars” strategy of regional policemen that relied on Iran and Saudi Arabia for stability in the post-British power vacuum.\textsuperscript{46} The Iranian Revolution that year ended the strategy’s viability, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan worried U.S. policymakers. U.S. leaders feared that, “the Soviets hoped to capitalize on the American-Iranian crisis to secure a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean and to gain control of Arabian Gulf oil resources.”\textsuperscript{47} Americans perceived the invasion of Afghanistan to be more threatening than previous Soviet interventions. “[H]aving demonstrated its willingness to directly employ combat troops outside the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, as opposed to its normal practice of providing military aid, advisers, and logistical support,” one political scientist writes, U.S. policymakers thought, “Moscow would next turn its focus to the Persian Gulf.”\textsuperscript{48} The concern was two-fold. First, the Soviets seemed to be embarking on a program of aggressive expansion. Second, this expansion might endanger Western access to oil, devastating import-reliant allies.

While Carter’s rhetorical response was strong, it was neither politically popular nor militarily feasible. In his 1980 State of the Union, he declared, “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military force.”\textsuperscript{49} The Carter Doctrine was an election-year attempt to demonstrate U.S. strength to both the Soviets and the electorate. However, the doctrine was unpopular with allies and militarily unrealistic without forces like CENTCOM and the Fifth Fleet. In January 1980, the U.S. military lacked the ability to launch a major war in the area. According to Dr. Jeffery Michaels of King’s College London, “not only did the U.S. military not have hundreds of thousands of troops available to be rapidly deployed to the region, it also did not have the means of getting them there or the means of sustaining such a force once it arrived.”\textsuperscript{50} Although the Carter Doctrine may have appeared to deter further Soviet aggression, evidence from Soviet archives shows that the Politburo actually invaded Afghanistan with defensive intentions; Moscow had no plans to invade the Gulf.\textsuperscript{51} However untenable it was, the doctrine does reveal U.S. goals in the region. Rather than simply protecting the oil supply, Carter aimed to contain Soviet expansion and prevent a hostile hegemon from dominating the Gulf. These were two grand strategic goals beyond the flow of oil.

5. Balancing During the Reagan Administration

Mere months after his inauguration, President
Reagan issued a corollary to the Carter Doctrine that clearly identified U.S. strategy: “There is no way… that we could stand by and see [Saudi Arabia] taken over by anyone that would shut off the oil.” Now, the United States had committed itself to not only repel an invasion by a foreign power—namely the Soviet Union—but also intra-regional threats. While Reagan’s corollary explicitly guaranteed the oil supply, the reasons for that guarantee are not explained as simply by the United States’ thirst for Middle Eastern oil. As Blackwill and O’Sullivan make clear, our allies’ economies depend more on that oil than the U.S. economy does. In addition, guaranteeing the flow of oil is part of the job description for the global hegemon; as the British ensured freedom of the seas, the Americans need to ensure freedom of supplies.

Reagan made the corollary more realistic than Carter’s doctrine by formally consolidating CENTCOM. However, one contemporary critic, Dr. Coral Bell, charged that he largely stood by during the Iran-Iraq War despite threats to oil tankers from missiles and mines. Likely unaware of ongoing covert efforts, the critic wrote in 1984, “Present U.S. policy looks uncommonly like a tacit acquiescence in the Nixon Doctrine—that local powers must learn to fend for themselves.” Though the United States appeared to passively stand by, the Reagan administration covertly used the Iran-Iraq War by “seeking to create a balance of military power between these two large Gulf powers in order to prolong the war, weaken them, and prevent an anti-Western local actor from dominating the region.”

The effort to play the two powers against each other represents an instance of the U.S. grand strategic pillar of halting the rise of a hostile local hegemon. Reagan also expanded covert aid to the Afghan mujahideen that Carter had initiated. U.S. leaders were taking some action to support their rhetoric, covertly expanding U.S. military involvement in the region.

The United States intervened in the Iran-Iraq conflict from 1987 to 1988 in an episode known as the Tanker War. Iraq began attacking Iranian oil production and shipping; according to a U.S. Navy historian, “Iraq hoped to weaken Iran’s economy by reducing its oil-export capacity… and bring[ing] Iran to the negotiating table.” When Saddam Hussein accelerated the attacks on refineries and tankers in 1984, Iran retaliated against merchant ships that were buying oil from Iraq. Tanker insurance rates skyrocketed, and the conflict threatened to paralyze oil transport. (It is important to note that the United States itself only imported 10 percent of its oil from the Gulf, while Europe and Japan relied on the region for 30 percent and 60 percent of their respective supplies.) Here, allies’ interests influenced U.S. action.

Kuwait sought U.S. permission to “reflag” its tankers, sailing under U.S. flags. Reagan agreed because he feared the Kuwaitis might otherwise turn to the Soviets, who could then win support in the region. U.S. naval forces cleared mines, escorted tankers, and occasionally engaged in skirmishes with Iranian ships. The Tanker War illustrates the intertwined nature of U.S. interests: allies’ energy security, a “Hamiltonian” demand for freedom of the seas, and preventing Soviet expansion.

6. The Persian Gulf War

When Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, President George H.W. Bush refused an adviser’s suggestion that he “get used to a Kuwait-less world.” Allowing Hussein to violate Kuwaiti sovereignty would undermine the grand strategy of maintaining stability and countering aggression. It also threatened energy security, since Iraq would have unacceptable price-setting power if it also controlled Kuwaiti production. Thus, President Bush assembled an international coalition to evict Iraq from Kuwait. The United States acted as a sole superpower countering the rise of an aggressive local power in accordance with its hegemonic responsibilities. Yet again, oil was connected to but distinct from other interests that deepened U.S. involvement.

Bush’s speech to Congress on September 11, 1990 identified the multiple U.S. interests threatened by Saddam’s invasion: countering aggression, energy security, and strategic credibility. The primary reason, supported by the U.N. and a wide coalition, was to counter aggression; this relates to the broader strategic goal of preventing a hostile regional hegemon. “Vital economic interests are at risk as well,” Bush said, acknowledging motives beyond simply countering aggression. Bush also stated, “We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless.” Finally, the President said it was
important that “no one doubt American credibility.”

Before the Gulf War, the U.S. military in the area had largely stayed “over the horizon” to maintain a low profile in these countries through utilizing offshore on aircraft carriers or at distant bases. After 1991, U.S. involvement increased dramatically, especially in comparison with sharp reductions in Europe and Asia. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia accepted the U.S. security guarantee and hosted permanent U.S. bases. As deployments in Europe shrank drastically and those in Asia diminished somewhat, the Middle East was the only region with a growing U.S. military presence (see chart).

In 1995, the Navy reestablished the Fifth Fleet to create a centralized command over naval forces around the Gulf. Along with new bases and forward positioning in the region, the United States maintained the no-fly zone in Iraq, acting as a regional policeman. After the Gulf War, the United States made deeper commitments to protect allies and friends in the region. Though oil lies at the root of relationships with Gulf allies, U.S. credibility illustrates the importance of protecting allies beyond energy security. As with Britain in prior centuries, the United States found that its “unipolar moment” as the sole superpower brought great responsibilities.

7. The 21st Century: Old Interests, New Threats

After the Gulf War, the United States once again turned its attention to energy resources. A massive energy shortage in California accompanied by price spikes drew election-year attention in 2000. Once in office, President George W. Bush delegated the energy concern issue to Vice President Dick Cheney, a former energy industry executive. The Cheney Task Force identified a central policy problem: a “fundamental imbalance between supply and demand.” It recommended new drilling, natural gas pipelines, and hundreds of new power plants, both conventional and nuclear.

President Bush stressed the importance of increasing domestic production and reducing consumption. “If we fail to act,” he warned, “our country will become more reliant on crude oil, putting our national energy security into the hands of foreign nations, some of whom do not share our interests.” After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Bush tied energy security to the global war on terror. In his 2007 State of the Union, he said U.S. reliance on foreign oil made the nation, “vulnerable to hostile regimes, and to terrorists who could cause huge disruptions of oil shipments, and raise the price of oil, and do great harm to our economy.”

Military leadership agreed that energy security was critical. Political leaders and policy experts alike predicted the imminence of “peak oil”: a maximum global oil output followed by decreasing production, shortages, recessions, and conflict.

In 2005, an energy analyst writing for The Guardian told the public to “kiss your lifestyle goodbye.”

While the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks pushed the Bush administration to make terrorism its primary concern in the Middle East, the younger Bush was not the first president to focus on non-state actors in the region. In 1983, Reagan faced two Islamic Jihad attacks in Lebanon. Two years later, Hezbollah held hostage a passenger plane. In 1986, Reagan launched a

This table shows the multiplicity of interests identified in official U.S. strategy documents. U.S. access to oil is always acknowledged, but it has never been the sole motivator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>STATEMENT OF INTERESTS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (NSS)</td>
<td>“[M]aintaining regional stability, containing and reducing Soviet influence, preserving the security of Israel and our other friends in the area, retaining access to oil on reasonable terms for ourselves and our allies, and curbing state-sponsored terrorism.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>National Security Directive (NSD-26)</td>
<td>“Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (NSS)</td>
<td>“[P]romoting stability and the security of our friends, maintaining a free flow of oil, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, discouraging destabilizing conventional arms sales, countering terrorism and encouraging a peace process [consistent] with our enduring commitment to Israel’s security.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Draft Defense Planning Guidance for FY 1994-99</td>
<td>“[O]ur overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region.”</td>
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realtor, and a Berlin nightclub bombing. The first attack on U.S. soil came with al-Qaeda's 1993 attempted bombing of the World Trade Center, followed by the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia. Clinton responded to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings with cruise missile strikes on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Then, just days before the 2000 election, al-Qaeda bombed the U.S.S. Cole. Islamic terrorism has been a persistent threat across administrations, with frequent but minor responses. The response to September 11, 2001 was exponentially larger: the invasion of Afghanistan. U.S. focus on counterterrorism in the Middle East dates to the 1980s, but September 11, 2001 elevated this goal to the core of strategy for the region.

U.S. military presence in the Middle East reached an unprecedented level when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. The administration justified leading the nation to war by describing Saddam Hussein as a dictator who seemed to pose a serious threat and had previously invaded Kuwait. Hussein's history of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production and use appeared to jeopardize regional stability. The justification behind the invasion of Iraq touted the need to ensure stability in the region, preemptively prevent WMD proliferation, and promote democracy. The multiple rationales for the invasion reflect the multiplicity of U.S. interests in the region.

8. The Choice Today

As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wound down, most U.S. troops were withdrawn. In contrast to the 201,414 deployed troops in the Middle East in 2003, as of late 2013, the United States only had 35,000 air, ground, and naval personnel there. The United States now faces a decision: what is the future of U.S. presence in the Middle East? The United States can learn from Great Britain's example when it, too, had to choose between retrenchment and engagement.

IV. COMPARATIVE STUDY: BRITISH POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1900-1920

_I do not care under what system we keep the oil, but I am quite clear it is all-important for us that this oil should be available._

— British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, August 1918

As a global hegemon with far-flung economic interests and broad defensive commitments, the early twentieth century British Empire faced many of the same challenges that the United States confronts today. Strategically, Britain hoped to prevent the rise of a rival that could challenge its hegemony. Britain found it necessary to adjust its grand strategy to energy revolutions during the early twentieth century. British policies in the Middle East during this period show that Britain often asserted control over oil interests in the region to prevent other powers from gaining valuable resources and strategic areas at Britain's expense. Whitehall's promotion of British companies in the region and the renegotiation of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement to secure better terms matches our argument that the United States must remain in the Middle East to prevent the dominance of oil resources by other nations.

The comparison of Britain and the United States rests on the belief that thwarting the rise of a rival hegemonic power in the twenty-first century has been a basic principle of American grand strategy since the fall of the Soviet Union. Because early twentieth-century Britain similarly sought to thwart the ascent of France, Germany, and Russia, the comparison is particularly apt. During the early twentieth century, the British government repeatedly asserted its power in the Middle East through diplomacy, military action, and collaboration with oil companies. The desire to deny resources and strategic positioning to other great powers often motivated British moves. While oil became more important during World War I, British actions throughout that period showed that a hegemonic power must commit itself to vital regions and secure oil reserves to block the rise of a rival hegemon. The United States today confronts a similar situation as Britain did in the period surrounding World War I.

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia engaged in the “Great Game” for control of Persia and the modern-day Middle East. Russia's desire for warm water ports and the British need to protect trade routes to India drove the competition. Oil added another dimension to the Great Game. British collaboration with oil interests began in earnest when the Foreign Office supported William Knox D'Arcy's efforts to purchase an oil concession in Persia in 1901. Whitehall saw a
British oil company in Persia as a means of asserting British influence while separating a weak Persia from Russia.\textsuperscript{77} Persian oil grew still more important when First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill shifted Britain's battleships from coal to oil fueling in 1913. Accordingly, Churchill persuaded Parliament to purchase for the Admiralty a majority stake in the fledgling Anglo-Persian Oil Company, founded by D'Arcy.\textsuperscript{78} With the financial and diplomatic support of the British state, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company grew into the corporation that is today BP.

In parallel to Persia, the British government sought an oil concession in the Mesopotamian region of the Ottoman Empire, although no company had yet drilled for oil there. Britain was initially drawn to Mesopotamia to protect its approaches to India and maintain the balance of power. In this period, Germany was negotiating the construction of the Baghdad Railway, and the German concession included mineral rights. Britain thus saw the attempts of D'Arcy and others to win another oil concession in Mesopotamia as strong projections of British interests.\textsuperscript{79} Companies' holdings allowed Britain to compete with other powers in a region where it had heretofore lacked a strong presence. In 1914, the British and German governments negotiated the combination of their various holdings in the Ottoman Empire under the Turkish Petroleum Company.\textsuperscript{80} The willingness to collaborate with rival Germany in an international corporation shows that Britain was motivated by the pragmatic need for a foothold in a region under heavy German influence, rather than an ideological craving for territorial control. In the current post-colonial age, such flexible tactics are all the more applicable to the United States and its presence in the Middle East.

The mechanized warfare of World War I demonstrated the importance of oil reserves. Between 1915 and 1917, the Admiralty's consumption of oil increased from 80,500 tons to 190,000 tons. The number of trucks in the newly mechanized army grew from one hundred to 60,000 by the war's end. Explosives required the chemical toluol, which was derived from crude oil.\textsuperscript{81} Before the oil shortages of 1917, the British had granted France postwar control over the Mosul region in Mesopotamia, then considered likely to be oil-rich, in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Foreign Office's hope to satiate Russian and French demands for power in the region led it to ignore the Admiralty's recommendation to retain Mosul. The result was that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was unfavorable in oil terms, as it surrendered Mosul and its surrounding reserves to France.\textsuperscript{82}

As in Persia, access to oil and the denial of French dominance became more important than formal territorial control of the region. In August 1918, Secretary to the War Cabinet Maurice Hankey led the government to reconsider its strategic interests and renegotiate the Sykes-Picot Agreement to gain access to Mesopotamian reserves.\textsuperscript{83} The wartime oil shortage and subsequent Bolshevik Revolution, which removed the need for a buffer between the Middle East and Russia, altered the strategic calculus.\textsuperscript{84} After the armistice with the Ottoman Empire, the British army seized Mosul by force to improve Whitehall's negotiating position.\textsuperscript{85} Despite repeated breaks in high-level negotiations, in 1920, British and French officials finalized the San Remo Agreement, under which Britain won Mosul and the Mesopotamian mandate in exchange for backing a French mandate in Syria. France would receive 25 percent of British Mesopotamian oil and pipeline rights.\textsuperscript{86}

Studying British strategy in the Middle East demonstrates the importance of global balance of power dynamics in resource-rich regions. Like Britain, the United States is a global hegemon and large-scale oil consumer that could face competition from a rival power with increasing energy demands, most likely China. However, the United States could improve on the British precedent by avoiding unfavorable treaties like Sykes-Picot and taking a tougher stance akin to the position Britain adopted to achieve the more advantageous San Remo Agreement. Just as the British presence in the Middle East fulfilled the dual goals of securing energy resources and thwarting the rise of a rival, so too would keeping American forces in the Middle East increase leverage over potential rivals. As we will discuss later in this paper, China's growing demand for oil and its investments in the Middle East render it the most threatening rival in the region. Distant powers like France threatened British hegemony in the Middle East in the early twentieth century, and the United States accordingly cannot discount the Chinese threat to the far-flung Middle East, especially in today's more globalized world. Great powers seek
the resources they need, and those areas become the locations of strategic competition.

British strategy in both the pre-war and post-war periods gave Britain leverage in the diplomacy of resource allocation in the Middle East. In neither case did Britain hoard Middle Eastern resources through territorial annexation. Rather, Britain sought to increase its sway over rival powers. Through the Turkish Petroleum Company, Britain gained a foothold in a region of burgeoning German influence that could have proved valuable in tempering German power had World War I not broken out. Likewise, Britain did not seek to entirely exclude France when renegotiating the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Under the San Remo Agreement, France retained pipeline rights and control of twenty-five percent of oil. Yet, Britain held the leverage to cut off France's oil flows and affect the regional supply through its dominant presence. As we discuss at length in our proposal section, the United States should ensure that it remains the strongest outside power in the Middle East.

The case of Britain shows that remaining the hegemonic power in a region does not necessarily require a massive force presence or the complete exclusion of other powers. While the mandate system for the Middle East was partly a response to emerging Wilsonian ideals of self-determination, it also suited the British interest in steering the course of events in the Middle East without costly annexation. Britain used its influence to reach an agreement with France that guaranteed the British supply of oil and prevented France or any other country from becoming too powerful in the region. The United States can draw lessons from the British experience in leveraging economic power and force presence to prevent rivals from threatening Middle Eastern oil resources. To apply British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's famous historical analogy, the British case should serve as the “Greek” example for our present day “Rome.”

V. OUR PROPOSAL

In spite of the Shale Revolution, the United States retains three key interests in a continued presence in the Persian Gulf. In order to advance these goals, America requires a continued military presence in the region. In his book, *The Next Decade*, George Friedman lists three primary reasons for U.S. involvement in the Middle East: “to maintain the regional balance of power; to make certain that the flow of oil is not interrupted; and to defeat Islamist groups centered there that threaten the United States.” Friedman illustrates that a multitude of interests, not just oil, keep the United States involved in the Persian Gulf. These interests require action. As Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh write, “Ignoring the region’s problems will not make them go away.”

We argue that the presence of America’s Fifth Fleet and current troop levels in the region are necessary, especially in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. Then, we examine the three priorities Friedman illustrates—the global nature of the energy market, our Asian and Middle Eastern allies, and the need to prevent another power’s dominance—to demonstrate why America’s presence will be necessary even after the Shale Revolution.

**Strategic Force Posture**

What would an ongoing strategic presence in the Middle East look like? As we have shown, there is a strong need for a U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Our previous historical review demonstrates that the United States maintained a sizable presence prior to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces increased dramatically in the region, even outside the direct combat area. We argue that the U.S. should maintain the current U.S. posture in the Gulf, including the newly established bases and continued operations of the Fifth Fleet.

Maintaining the Fifth Fleet presence is crucial for ensuring access to the global oil market. The United States and its allies rely on access to oil through the Persian Gulf. By patrolling the Persian Gulf, the Fifth Fleet allows the United States to ensure open seas and global commerce. Twenty percent of all oil traded worldwide passes through the Straits of Hormuz. Oil trade through these straits includes twenty-seven countries and 7.5 million square miles, in addition to choke points such as the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb in Yemen. If another power such as Iran or China were to be able to gain control of these waters, it could upset the global energy supply and extract concessions from U.S. allies.

The U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, which oversees the Fifth Fleet, advances “the interests of the United States and the security and prosperity of the region” according to their mission statement. Through its mission of promoting security and
prosperity across these major shipping lanes, the Fifth Fleet acts as both a deterrent and protective force. In order to achieve its goals and protect U.S. and Allied interests, the Fifth Fleet requires a sizable presence of 7,179 military personnel stationed at Naval Support Activity Bahrain, seven naval bases, and two aircraft carriers that operate on a rotational basis. While minor adjustments could be made in coming years, a large naval force is necessary to protect U.S. strategic interests in the region.

Besides a strong naval presence, the United States must also maintain robust air and ground capabilities in order to support peace and stability in the region and prevent the rise of another power. Air bases give the United States an organized, forward-deployed presence, allowing it to secure the Gulf. For example, U.S. Central Command Headquarters at Al Udeid represents the strategic foundation of the United States military force in the Middle East and provides "mission-essential combat power, aeromedical evacuation and intelligence support for three theaters of operations." Al Udeid fields crucial capabilities with over ninety different types of aircraft, including the KC-10 Extenders and KC-135 Stratotankers. These two aircraft extend the reach of fighters and bombers, allowing the United States to project its power throughout the region. Maintaining the Al Udeid Airbase and U.S. air presence deters would-be rivals.

Reductions in troop levels would put these strategic goals at risk. The long-range aerial refueling and transport capabilities of the aircraft stationed at Al Udeid airbase, not to mention its use as a command base, make for a robust military relationship with Qatar and other Gulf partners of the United States. In December 2013, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel noted that there are more than 10,000 forward-deployed soldiers in the Gulf area. We argue that the Shale Revolution does not change the rationale behind keeping 10,000 troops and the Fifth Fleet stationed in the Gulf region. These bases, ships, and troops are required due to the global nature of energy markets, our allies’ interests, and the need to deter a potential competitor.


The global and interconnected nature of energy markets requires the United States to reexamine its goal of energy independence and recognize its larger interests in the Middle East. Because of interconnected nature of the global energy market, the United States will have a lasting interest in the stability of the Gulf States and their oil reserves. Though the Shale Revolution has reduced U.S. imports of Middle Eastern oil, it does not eliminate the need to support valuable regional partners. If it continues, the decrease in oil prices brought about by the Shale Revolution will pose a serious threat to the fiscal health of the Gulf states and their leaders’ ability to purchase popular legitimacy. While the United States may welcome long-term pressures for democratic reform, the strain may cause instability that threatens Gulf regimes over the next ten years—and by extension, the stability of the global oil markets they supply. An enduring and credible U.S. military presence would hedge against this dangerous prospect.

Despite the rhetoric over attaining complete
“energy independence,” the United States will continued to be subject to global prices as both an importer and potential exporter. As J. Robinson West and Raad Alkadiri write, “[C]rude oil is a global, price fungible commodity… so] the U.S. economy will remain vulnerable to any events there [the Middle East] that disrupt supplies from the region.”

Even if the United States had more fuel than it could consume, it still would be connected to the Middle East under the global pricing system. Oil is a globally traded commodity; therefore, the price of oil is dependent on global supply and demand, not on local supply and demand. Moreover, the United States will continue to import specific grades of oil, even if the United States becomes a net oil exporter, because refineries are built specifically for certain grades of crude oil. Finally, U.S. supply is still significantly less than future demand. “Bullish” estimates predict fifteen million barrels per day of U.S. liquefied oil production by 2020. By comparison, the United States consumed approximately nineteen million barrels of oil-based liquefied fuels per day in 2009. While the Shale Revolution may reduce U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern supplies, it will not entirely eliminate the influence of Middle Eastern oil.

The Shale Revolution seems unlikely to radically upend the major oil-producing states in the Gulf in the immediate future. GCC states still produce a quarter of the world’s oil. Although the United States has been importing less OPEC oil, global demand remains robust. As recently as July 2014, OPEC anticipated “needing to raise its production to meet demand for [its] oil.” Indeed, until the sliding prices of recent months, which analysts attribute more to falling Asian economic growth than U.S. unconventional production, oil prices remained relatively high compared to historical levels at prices between ninety dollars and 120 dollars (nominal) per barrel from 2009-2013. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report expects Asian demand for oil, though temporarily faltering, to recover. CSIS concludes that the Shale Revolution is “unlikely to transform the Gulf directly” or pose major geopolitical or economic threats to the region’s largest producers.

Yet, the Shale Revolution’s downward pressure on oil and gas prices pose two daunting challenges to Gulf stability. The first is diminished OPEC influence. Since 1971, the cartel’s Gulf producers have wielded control of global oil markets and commanded prices that sit well above production costs. The Shale Revolution puts OPEC’s long-term future in jeopardy, especially if increased supplies decrease prices. This event, Blackwill and O’Sullivan argue, would severely test OPEC cohesion. Individual producers would likely refuse to curb production and scramble for the largest piece of a shrinking pie. Citigroup oil analyst Ed Morse agrees, and predicts that the Shale Revolution will lead to the “prevalence of market forces in international energy pricing, putting an end to OPEC’s forty-year dominance.”

Falling prices could produce budget shortfalls in Arab states. Already, oil prices have fallen below the break-even points necessary for Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia to balance their budgets. Oil revenues are important to Gulf stability because of the domestic and military programs they fund. Leaders in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia use oil revenues to provide citizens with expensive cradle-to-grave welfare systems and energy subsidies. These “gifts” are designed to pacify citizens and insulate autocratic regimes from popular discontent. In 2014, Bahrain spent a whopping 12.5 percent of GDP on energy subsidies alone. Kuwait subsidized domestic energy at the cost of seventeen billion dollars, or roughly 25 percent of all government spending. Kuwaiti consumers enjoy one of the lowest gas prices in the world: ninety-one cents per gallon. Pressures for expanded subsidy programs have grown ever since the onset of the Arab Spring. For example, in 2011, former Saudi King Abdullah unveiled a domestic benefits package worth $130 billion. Rising domestic expenditures have pushed Saudi Arabia’s oil price budgetary break-even point up from over seventy-eight dollars in 2011 to ninety-eight dollars in 2014. Iran requires prices above 131 dollars, up from eighty-four dollars just three years ago.

At least for the moment, most of the Gulf States have sufficient reserves to weather a temporary fall in oil prices. Saudi Arabia, for example, has sufficient foreign reserves to self-finance decades of deficits. It sat on 737 billion dollars in reserves as of August 2014 (almost three times current annual spending). However, if the Shale Revolution and concurrent developments keep prices within the seventy to ninety dollars range over the next decade
or two, as Morse predicts it will, countries with high break-even points and smaller cash reserves may face serious trouble.\textsuperscript{117}

Any decision to cut domestic spending, whether out of necessity or inclination, could invite domestic backlash or provoke unrest. However, previous periods of suppressed oil revenues suggest that major spending cuts are unlikely. In the 1980s and 1990s, Qatar, the U.A.E., and Saudi Arabia all covered their fiscal needs by taking on large debts rather than making politically sensitive cuts.\textsuperscript{118} Middle East analyst Carol Barnett expects that they would pursue the same measures, although doing so would not eliminate the possibility of turmoil. In fact, a continued focus on subsidies could hamstring these regimes’ ability to make investments that are necessary to diversify their economies and spur future economic growth.\textsuperscript{119} If Gulf nations fail to provide meaningful employment to their young, growing populations, expanded subsidy packages alone will not alone be able to mitigate unrest from domestic unemployment. The possibility that festering internal conflicts in countries like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia could boil over in the face of rising unemployment rates, low oil prices, and sectarian divides could “pose a danger to the stability of Saudi Arabia and thus to the United States.”\textsuperscript{120}

\section*{2. Fueling American Allies}

An ongoing U.S. presence in the Middle East is critical to U.S. allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East itself. Critics such as political scientist Barry Posen argue that protecting allies’ access to energy is not the United States’ responsibility, encourages free riding, and constitutes a “moral hazard.”\textsuperscript{121} Nonetheless, U.S. forces must remain in order to preserve the world order that the United States enjoys as a superpower.

\subsection*{a. Asian Allies’ Interests in the Middle East}

The perceived choice between pursuing the Asia Pivot and remaining in the Middle East ignores the fact that the United States’ Asian allies have crucial energy interests in the Middle East and rely upon the U.S. to protect such interests. In 2012, 97 percent of oil exports from the U.A.E. went to Asia. The Saudis exported 54 percent of their oil to Asia. Indeed, with 85 percent of the oil shipped through the Straits of Hormuz destined for Asia in 2014, East Asian countries have an overwhelming interest in the stability in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{122} Asia’s reliance on Middle Eastern energy requires the protection of the sea lanes by the Fifth Fleet to maintain reliable trade.

For an in-depth example, oil accounted for 45 percent of Japan’s total primary energy supplies in 2011. In 2012, 83 percent of Japan’s crude oil came from the Middle East.\textsuperscript{123} Japan’s use of oil and gas is only going to grow as its nuclear power capabilities decline due to the Fukushima nuclear accident of March 2011. In a National Bureau of Asian Research special report, Tsutomu Toichi argues that, if the United States retrenched, Japan would need to provide economic and humanitarian assistance to the Middle East in order to stabilize its source of oil. Japan is dependent on free navigation of the high seas to transport these energy supplies.\textsuperscript{124} Japan would suffer if instability or an aggressive China interrupted oil production or transportation.

The South Korean economy also requires Middle Eastern oil. Roughly 80 percent of Korean crude oil imports originated in the Middle East in 2010, with 70 percent of the imports a part of long-term contracts.\textsuperscript{125} Amidst concerns about the stability of the Middle East, Korea has sought to diversify its energy sources by offering a tax rebate for fuel sold from non-Middle East areas. Korea also began receiving oil imports from Alaska in October 2014, signed a free-trade agreement with Canada, and reached out to Russia about the possibility of a natural gas arrangement.\textsuperscript{126} However, these policies have not drastically curtailed Korean dependence on the Middle East oil. According to U.S. Naval War College Professor Terence Roehrig et al., “[a]ny political and economic turmoil from the Middle East may endanger a stable energy supply.”\textsuperscript{127} South Korean companies have built oil refineries and energy infrastructure throughout the Middle East.\textsuperscript{128} Desperate for a secure energy supply, South Korea relies on the U.S. presence in the Middle East.

\subsection*{b. European Allies – The Qatar Connection}

The effects of the U.S. Shale Revolution resonate throughout energy markets across the globe. The Shale Revolution presents new opportunities to open energy supplies to our allies in Europe. These allies have traditionally relied upon regional sources of natural gas and oil, especially Russia. New sources of natural gas exports from nations in the Middle
East provide an opportunity for Europe to diversify its energy supply. However, this change will only be possible if the United States continues to ensure a stable Middle East.

Qatar has been a major player in the increased liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments to Europe.\textsuperscript{129} LNG exports from Qatar to Europe are estimated to increase by 33 percent in 2014, which would boost the natural gas supply in Europe by 6.64 million metric tons.\textsuperscript{130} Qatar’s significant LNG export capacity has “undercut the price of oil-indexed gas from Russia and Norway and brought new liquidity to northern European gas markets.”\textsuperscript{131} These new supplies account for the increase in the amount of natural gas in Europe traded on the spot market from 15 percent in 2008 to over 50 percent in 2014.\textsuperscript{132} The increase in supply from Qatari LNG imports decreases the spot price of natural gas in the short term. Over the long term, this development provides an opportunity for Europe to reduce its energy reliance on Russia and improve its bargaining position with state-owned monopoly Gazprom.

These European imports are only available as a result of the Shale Revolution in the United States and the continued ability of Qatar to safely export LNG. The explosive growth of domestic natural gas production from shale reserves in the United States has greatly reduced our demand for natural gas imports from abroad. In 2005, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasted that the United States would import 29 percent of its natural gas in 2013, or about 9.4 billion cubic feet per day. As a result of the Shale Revolution, actual imports in 2013 accounted for only 5 percent of domestic consumption.\textsuperscript{133} This difference means that most of the 9.4 billion cubic feet per day of imports the United States would otherwise have purchased from foreign suppliers is now available to other consumers, including European countries. A stable Middle East is a prerequisite to these supplies reaching the international market.

In keeping with its close relationship with the United States, Qatar has joined other countries in calling for a U.S. force presence in the region. Osman Antwi-Boateng, assistant professor of political science at U.A.E. University, explains that the Qatari government enjoys greater military capabilities and influence as a result of its relationship with the United States.\textsuperscript{134} Given an especially weak Qatari military, the Arab nation relies on its relationship with the United States for its protection.\textsuperscript{135} For the reasons listed above, that security is vital to European natural gas supplies.

As with Qatar, the United States enjoys strong military relationships with its other Arab partners, including Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait.\textsuperscript{136} During the Gulf War, these ties were built on the Arab consensus that “a dominant and strong country in the region is necessary in order to prevent regional instability and crisis.”\textsuperscript{137} A relationship with the U.S. military allows Arab countries to secure themselves against their regional rival, Iran. The security relationship between the United States and its Arab partners therefore remains a crucial factor both in the region and in opening alternate sources of fuel for European allies.

3. Preventing Another Power from Dominating the Middle East

These alternative sources of fuel would be threatened if a rival power came to dominate the oil supplies. The threat of another hegemon dominating Middle Eastern oil supplies and the necessity of balancing against that rival is the subject of great debate. While those in favor of retrenchment argue that there is no great power in the Middle East, they neglect to consider China’s interests. China will likely import three quarters of its oil from the Middle East by 2030.\textsuperscript{138} In its current force posture, the United States protects China’s oil supply. The Fifth Fleet monitors the Persian Gulf, and the United States promotes regional stability through measures such as airstrikes against the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL).\textsuperscript{139} China has attempted to offset its reliance on Middle Eastern oil and U.S. protection of the Persian Gulf by importing natural gas from Russia, exploring the South China Sea, investing in Africa, and strengthening ties with Iran. However, China consumes 10.28 million barrels per day, second only to the United States as of 2012.\textsuperscript{140} China’s robust appetite for oil suggests that it may seek more control in the Middle East, especially if the United States were to retrench.

China has a strategic interest in securing Middle Eastern oil, but it also will likely expand its role in the Middle East in the absence of United States protection of the region.\textsuperscript{141} “Securing” the area would not necessarily entail a large military presence,
but could involve increased economic control and diplomatic influence. China views the Middle East as being “integral to Asia's power politics.” It has already increased its presence internationally in the energy domain as it focuses on “ownership” and “physical controls of barrels along with future access.” Such measures are part of China’s “go-out strategy,” according to the National Bureau of Asian Research Energy Security Program’s Research Director Michael Herberg. With Xi Jinping increasing China’s international role, the country is poised to deepen its relations with the Middle East and seek “physical controls.” Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal has observed that, “China is very eager to fill any vacuum that the United States may create.”

Chinese actions have reinforced the validity this reasoning. In 2013, it was China, not the United States, which gained most from the Iraqi oil boom. China funded airports near Iraq’s border with Iran to ferry Chinese workers to and from Iraqi oil fields. Although China has not joined in strikes against ISIL, Chinese strategic interests indicate that it may expand its involvement in the region in the absence of U.S. forces. If China becomes an influential power in the Middle East, the United States would face a great power challenge worthy of a regional presence. It would be ironic if the United States succeeded in limiting China’s influence in Asia with the Asia Pivot, but failed to contain China’s growing role in the Middle East.

Even if China expands its presence in the Middle East in order to secure its energy interests, why should the United States care? First, in its current posture, the United States maintains considerable leverage over China and other great powers. China currently lacks a large enough blue water navy to secure the major sea lanes in the Persian Gulf. By controlling China’s access to part of the energy market, the United States gains strategic leverage. Beijing believes the United States may be maintaining control of major shipping lanes in order to “exploit China’s energy weakness.” While that is not the main reason for U.S. control of shipping lanes, it does strengthen the United States vis-à-vis China.

Chinese involvement could upset the regional balance. In conjunction with considerations about low oil prices destabilizing OPEC countries, a Chinese economic presence would further escalate conflict. Harvard Weatherhead Center fellow Colonel Christopher Sage warns that a “localized arms race could develop as the U.S. and China flood weaponry, both seaborne and otherwise, into the region. Such a scenario, combined with mistrust and miscalculation, could spark a conflict no one desires.” Sage’s prediction gains legitimacy with an examination of the historical precedent of China’s role in the Darfur Crisis. In 2007, Sudan accounted for 6 percent of China’s oil imports while China accounted for 40 percent of Sudan’s oil exports. From 2003 to 2006, China sold the Sudanese government fifty-five million dollars of small arms in addition to aircraft and large weaponry. Human rights groups and news outlets blamed China for backing the Sudanese government and fueling the crisis in the interest of oil. In the case of Sudan, China showed a willingness to escalate regional conflicts in order to protect its oil interests. Similar involvement in a volatile Middle East would further harm the region and destabilize U.S. allies.

Burden-sharing with China in the Middle East is not necessarily problematic. In fact, Chatham House scholar John V. Mitchell and others support burden sharing. Our comparative case showed that great powers can negotiate power-sharing deals, as Britain did with Germany and France. However, a rapid decline in the United States’ presence in the Middle East could cause long-term strategic conflict between the United States and China that would destabilize the region, and perhaps the world. Arguments against a continued presence in the Middle East suggest there is no possible great power in the region. In contrast, a U.S. drawdown from the region has the potential to increase Chinese involvement. As our case study shows, when energy supplies are at stake, great powers are likely to seek regional control. In order to mitigate possible competition in the Middle East and promote peace and stability, the United States should avoid retrenchment and retain a strategic presence in the region.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Shale Revolution should not encourage the United States to withdraw from the Middle East. A review of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East since the 1970s shows that the United States has historically held broad strategic interests in the region. Those strategic interests will endure beyond specific crises and require a long-term U.S.
commitment. In comparison, Britain's policies in the Middle East resonate with the need for the United States to remain in the region, lest a rival attempt to assert control. Maintaining an active U.S. troop presence through the air, land, and sea bases in Gulf-allied nations will be necessary for the United States to pursue its four traditional goals: promote a regional balance of power, stabilize global energy markets, protect allies' energy supplies, and deter potential rivals. The dominance of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf checks the rise of a challenge for regional hegemony, while U.S. bases in the region shore up the security concerns for Gulf partner states in combating threats like terrorism and WMD proliferation. In a world of interconnected energy markets in which the United States’ European and Asian allies continue to rely on the Middle East for energy imports, the United States cannot afford to abandon the region.

The U.S. Shale Revolution undoubtedly changes the way the United States looks at its energy needs. Nonetheless, the United States cannot afford to risk its strategic priorities in the Middle East. When faced with the question of whether to go or to stay in the Middle East, the United States must not pull back in retreat, but instead accept its continuing role as the world's sole superpower.

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