

## DISTORTED GOVERNMENTALITY: THE EMBEDDED BIOPOLITICS OF DAM RESETTLEMENT

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On July 20, 2002, as rainfall swelled the approaching floodwaters forming the reservoir of the Man dam, some 400 police officers forcefully evicted the villagers of Khedi-Balwari in Madhya Pradesh, India. The dam's construction, part of the greater Narmada Dam Project in northwest India, called for the resettling of millions of people. According to *Narmada Bachao Andolan* (Friends of River Narmada), an activist network pressing for adequate compensation for the resettled, "the police, without any warning, started pulling and dragging the people [of Khedi-Balwari] into the vans. The people were severely beaten and the male police dragged and manhandled the [village] women" (Agarwal).

This scene is a dramatic reminder of the potential for violent dislocations caused by hydroelectric dam construction, the severe costs of which are disproportionately borne by local and usually rural communities. Indeed, the local community is often forced to bear all the costs of the relocation, cultural displacement, and environmental damage, and rarely do the benefits of the dam accrue to them for their own socio-economic development. Furthermore, real or perceived benefits to the nation are often used as a pretext for trampling on the cultural and social rights of the relocated, who in this Indian case and in other examples continue to practice a traditional way of life. Reconciling the demands for energy for industrial production for urban dwellers with the rights of the affected local community to continue its way of life is a contentious issue in development, and has been the focus of much action by non-government organization (NGO) networks, development agencies, and dam financiers.

In June 1994, a coalition of civil society groups signed the Manibeli Declaration, which called for an independent review of World Bank-funded large dam projects. The World Bank eventually complied, joining with major civil engineering multinationals such as ABB (Sweden/Switzerland), Hydro Québec (Canada), and Siemens (Germany) and several countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, China, South Africa, and Sweden to establish the World Commission on Dams (WCD). The WCD was an

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independent body that sought to accomplish a review of the developmental effectiveness of the 500 large dams in 92 countries that have been financed by the World Bank since the 1950s (“Outline of the WCD”). These dams resulted in the displacement of over 10 million people.

While the WCD made a number of critical observations regarding the negative environmental and social aspects of dam construction and the impact of poor engineering planning, it nevertheless affirmed the contributions of hydroelectric dam projects to economic development. The final report also made a number of recommendations concerning social responsibility, urging the inclusion of participatory mechanisms for consultation with the local population during the construction process, more studies aimed at assessing environmental damage, and increased attention to improving hydroelectric output efficiency.

This paper seeks to call attention to the cultural rights of minority groups displaced by large dam construction in the discourse generated by the WCD and activist NGOs. While much has been written on the adverse environmental, economic, and social consequences of dam construction and resettlement, the cultural ramifications have received much less attention in the relevant literature. Large hydroelectric dams are unique among infrastructure projects in their massive scale, in the large amount of capital and engineering expertise they require, as well as in their displacement of often rural minority groups to make way for the resulting reservoir. Furthermore, the electricity generated by the dam is usually transported to distant urban centers to support industrial production and to provide power to homes or it is exported to neighboring countries with energy deficits. Finally, both the large amount of capitalization required for these construction projects and the fact that profits are only realized in the long-term, dissuades the private sector from taking the initiative, leaving dam construction to the technocratic planning of the developmentalist state. The developmentalist state is a model that held currency from the 1950s-1980s, in which the state acts as the chief capital accumulator and allocator, directing the process of economic development through government programs, subsidies, and tariff regimes while spurring industrial growth by building large infrastructure projects, such as dams.

Drawing on Michel Foucault’s formulations, I intend to investigate the embedded biopolitical agenda that is advanced in tandem with dam construction and resettlement programs by the technocratic apparatus of the developmentalist state. Resettlement is not merely a managerial process, involving population relocation, but is also a politicized (and often racialized) transformative act with intended people-forming consequences. That is to say, it is a state practice that seeks to alter the culture and way of

life of people who are thought to hinder economic growth and integration with the world economy (Dunn 2).

For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on two case studies of dam construction projects located in Manantali, Mali and in Ilisu, Turkey. I will begin my discussion with the concept of biopolitics and then move on to pinpoint how changes in the developmentalist paradigm have altered the rationale for dam construction and their financing. My first case study of Mali will help illustrate the shift from policies of developmentalist financing by multilateral financial institutions (e.g. Bretton Woods) to the current neo-liberal model in which dam financing is covered by export credit agencies in cooperation with multinational industry consortia. Indeed, in the case of Mali, a dam project rejected by the World Bank on environmental and social grounds went forward with ECA financing with adverse consequences for the displaced Malinké people. The second case study of Turkey will document the alarming potential for lack of accountability and transparency, as well as the negative externalities for the displaced minority group typical of current dam finance. In other words, the shift from the state-centered and autarkic model influenced by the import-substituting industrialization (ISI) school of thought to a model of development finance that stresses private sector participation and market-conforming mechanisms (i.e. export-oriented) has allowed distorted governmentality to be deployed. By distorted governmentality I refer to the use of scientific and technical knowledge to transform and subjugate minority groups in an authoritarian way, rather than in the manner in which Foucault described governmentality, detailed below.

#### **BIOPOLITICS: MANAGERIAL GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE POSTCOLONIAL WORLD**

Michel Foucault first introduced the concept of neo-liberal biopolitics in his 1979 lecture “The Birth of Biopolitics” at the Collège de France, Paris. In this lecture, he describes how neo-liberal governments, such as those of Thatcher and Reagan, engaged in a transformation wherein the body-politic—society in its social, cultural, economic, and political dimensions as well as the physical biomass of the society’s constituents—becomes the primary object of intervention. In this way, biopolitics becomes a form of governmentality that is “premised on the active consent and subjugation of subjects, rather than their oppression, domination or external control” (Clegg et al. 320). Thus, “neo-liberal forms of government feature not only direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically develop indirect techniques for leading

and controlling individuals without at the same time being responsible for them” (Lemke 202).

Foucault described the deployment of governmentality in the West whereas I will be discussing it as applied in the developing world. In the global South, a fundamentally different set of principles have influenced the manner in which political elites used governmentality, altering and de-contextualizing it into a form of statecraft, in which control and transformative people-forming became the primary intent. Thus, while some have spoken of the “congruence [governmentality] endeavours to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational actor” (Lemke 205), I believe the people-forming intent in the global South was distinct. In these countries, specific forms of acquired scientific and technical knowledge were deployed with an aim of securing the nation-state through either bringing peripheral minority groups into the national fold or by transforming them into manageable subjects requiring technical supervision. By examining this process of what I call “distorted governmentality,” premised on the subjugation and transformative management of minority ethnic groups by a bureaucratic-technocratic elite, this paper will illustrate the results of the shift from ISI-centered policies to a neo-liberal financing paradigm.

## THE CHANGING DEVELOPMENTALIST PARADIGM

The 1950s-1970s witnessed a building boom of dam construction around the world. The World Bank and aid agencies of state members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) extensively funded hydroelectric dams projects. During this 20-year period, the “take-off” theory prevailed, according to which the construction of gigantic infrastructure such as dams were integral to ISI because massive amounts of cheap energy were required for supposedly inevitable growth. It was believed that World Bank loans would compensate for feeble capital accumulation in Third World countries, a notion which informed the rationale for financing highways, railways, ports, and dams. Due to the Cold-War climate, such aid was heavily politicized. At that time, neither the Bretton Woods Institutions nor OECD aid agencies had “democracy clauses” requiring transparency and participation in infrastructure projects. The West competed bitterly with the Soviet Union for influence, market access, and prestige in the developing world in particular, as exemplified by the case of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt and Sudan, which was eventually completed with Soviet funds. Dams in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Churchill Falls Dam in Labrador, Canada, were built with an eye for

the grandiose, reflecting a fetishization of dams as artifacts of modernity as well as the Soviet-influenced fascination with economies of scale (Aditjon-dro and Kowalewski 383).

In the 1980s, a new neo-liberal paradigm was promoted by Thatcher's Great Britain and Reagan's United States. This model envisioned the rollback of the state and a greater promotion of private sector and market-directed development. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of the state-centric model, the World Bank gradually began to adopt the same pro-private sector thinking popularized by the US and UK governments. However, a different set of processes was unfolding in the developing world which saw not only the rollback of the state but also its increasing subversion. As the Cold War ended and the West no longer had to compete with generous Soviet aid offers, the so-called Third World state's territorial and regulatory powers eroded. This erosion of the state's importance was furthered by the increasing penetration of multinational corporations and by a dramatic drop in overseas development assistance (ODA) from both the capitalist and Soviet blocs. So dramatic has been the scaling down of ODA flows that "since the 1970s, the flows of grants and soft loans have shrunk by more than a quarter relative to the gross national income (GNI) of high income OECD countries," depriving developing countries of money crucial to discretionary spending and maintaining hegemonic power in the face of encroachment by insurgent groups and organized crime (Hartford et. al 6).

A series of actors soon emerged to fill this vacuum, including a robust civil society that made demands on state power, multinational corporations, and non-state actors (i.e. militant or rebel groups). In order to access aid and to preempt social movements in the West that would enforce boycotts and embargos against governments with deplorable human rights records, regimes of the global South heretofore dependent on aid flows in order to maintain political stability, began to democratize. In 1950, nearly 40 percent of the world's population lived in full-fledged or partial democracies, while the remaining 60 percent lived under dictatorships or in non-self governing regions (such as colonies or protectorates) ("Democracy's Century"). According to the NGO known as Freedom House, by 1990 these figures had reversed themselves, with nearly 60 percent of the world's population living in full or partial democracies and 40 percent residing in countries within the "not free" category ("Democracy's Century"). It is important to note that while the "free" state category remained relatively constant, at 33 percent in 1950 compared to 39 percent in 1990, the "partially free" state category doubled from 10 percent in 1950 to 22 percent in 1990 ("Democracy's Century"). This denotes a general rise in the number of democratic

institutions, yet the commitment of political actors to those institutions and the ability of institutional mechanisms to resist cooption are unclear.

Democracy has introduced a new set of political and economic problems, most notably in the narrowing of the time horizon. Because democratic governments have limited terms, many elected officials realize that they will not be in power long enough to have to legislate for the adverse affects of the dams they build. This shortened time horizon may mean that the immediate governmental gains of the construction phase, such as job creation, may be given more weight than long-term benefits (Wiehen). Equally problematic is the revenue earned from electricity generated by the dams, which is then transferred to power grids sold abroad; the use and size of such capital inflows is relatively easy to obscure and could make the government in question less accountable to parliaments and local civil society. Thus the government may hope to accomplish its biopolitical agenda, either directly through the managerial process of construction and resettlement, or with the monies earned from electricity exports. Finally, the government can shield itself from criticism, as activist networks target instead the foreign civil engineering multinational (such as ABB or Bechtel) that is perceived to be encroaching upon the state in question.

Though the autarkic model of developmentalism had been discredited with the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the debt crises in key ISI states of Latin America, dam construction proceeds unrelentingly. Hydroelectric projects that had originally awaited consideration in bureaucratic channels have been promoted by civil servants, politicians, and technocrats under a new neo-liberal rationale, this time one that emphasizes export-led growth. Instead of generating power for a locality and for indigenous industrial complexes, dams were associated with windfall profits in that they could generate electricity to be linked with power grids in order to supply existing engines of growth, both nationally and internationally. As the World Bank began to shun these projects because of their social and environmental controversiality, export credit agencies (ECAs) such as the US Export-Import Bank, the German *Hermesbergeschaft*, and the Japanese Export-Import Bank stepped in to fill the void.

The reconstruction of Europe and Japan in the post-World War II period stimulated the growth and consolidation of large European, North American, and Japanese civil engineering concerns specializing in large infrastructure projects such as dams, water management, sanitation plants, and complex irrigation systems. These large firms lobby their respective export credit agencies to extend credits and loans to developing countries in order to finance further dam construction. Hence, dam construction continues unabated, and, though democracy has expanded its presence in

the global South, this does not necessarily mean the state's commitment to transparency and participation has increased. The amount of money involved and the lucrative nature of sovereign-backed debt (which is difficult to default on) has made ECAs and multinationals compete fiercely for opportunities to finance dams on one hand. On the other hand, bureaucracies of the developing world have an interest in obtaining rents earned from energy exports. In a sense, the Southern states have now become proxies for these powerful pressures of Western industry and politicized capital. ECAs hold roughly 56 percent of all developing country sovereign debt and "are the single largest public financiers of large-scale infrastructure projects in the developing world" (Moore 1). Their intimate involvement in financing and close cooperation with leading firms from their respective home countries is an issue of concern, for—according to the WCD—"it is not clear for the dams in which ECAs are supporting private investments what the consideration is for development goals, financial and economic risk, and environmental and social risk" (Moore 3). In other words, ECAs have quickly emerged as key players in development finance, a fact that has generated little public debate.

Officially, the World Bank formulated its policy regarding resettlement on the eight-point risk mitigation model developed by its in-house anthropologist, Michael Cernea. The risks included: (1) landlessness, (2) joblessness, (3) homelessness, (4) marginalization, (5) increased morbidity, (6) food insecurity, (7) loss of access to common property, and (8) community disarticulation (Cernea 8). According to Cernea, "the flames of resistance are often ignited not intrinsically by displacement's hardship itself, but because the policy vacuums and legal vacuums leave few alternatives to political struggle" (Cernea 13).

Cernea has been criticized for making a number of broad and unsubstantiated assumptions, for example assuming marginalization to be a possible adverse effect of resettlement, rather than a precondition that leads to displacement (Dwivedi 46). He does not explicitly mention cultural rights, though his eighth point, "community disarticulation," does mention the societal impact of dispersal, stating that:

Informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self-organized mutual help are disrupted. This is a net loss of valuable 'social capital' that compounds the loss of natural, physical, and human capital. The social capital lost through social disarticulation is typically unperceived and uncompensated. (Cernea 18)

The risk-mitigation model does not demonstrate an adequate understand-

ing of bureaucratic politics as well as the risks generated to the displaced people by the lack of information disseminated to vulnerable groups in society. As a scholar studying the case of the Narmada dam in India, “affected people spend a considerable period under conditions of ‘uncertainty’ without adequate information on the nature of impact and the resettlement entitlements, if any. (Dwivedi 46) Finally, Cernea’s model assumes homogeneity among the displaced, though different age groups and genders may view resettlement in diametrically opposed fashions.

### THE MANANTALI DAM: MODERNITY AS AN END IN ITSELF

Sugata Bose observed a striking continuity of policy in the colonial and postcolonial development apparatuses of India, due mostly to the assumption by native elites of the leadership roles vacated by departing European colonists (Bose). A similar process took place in former French West Africa, where colonial governments had already begun imagining a series of infrastructure projects that would generate hydroelectricity, allow the passage of vessels further upstream on the Senegal River, and irrigate the dry Sahel regions surrounding the riverbed. In 1972, the *Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal* (OMVS, Senegal River Basin Authority) was formed between Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania (Guinea was invited to join but opted not to). One of the chief projects of the OMVS was the Manantali dam in northwest Mali. Financing for the US \$500 million project was provided by a number of development agencies, including the Saudi Fund for Development, the Kuwait Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, the OPEC Fund for International Development, Islamic Development Bank, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GmbH* (German Organization for Technical Cooperation, GTZ), the *Agence Française pour le Développement* (French Agency for Development), the European Commission (EC), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (“Le barrage de Manantali”). The World Bank had ceased all financial support for OMVS in 1979, citing environmental concerns, corruption of authorities, and a lack of proper documentation of adverse health effects on the local population.

Though the dam was completed in 1988, further construction was required to bring the power station online, and thus the dam sat idle for roughly ten years, until 1998. In this second phase of the project, which cost US \$433 million, financing was provided by a number of development institutions, including the African, Nordic, West African, and Islamic Development Banks, the World Bank, the CIDA, the European Community

and European Investment Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the German *KfW Bankengruppe* (an ECA), and the *Caisse Française de Développement* (French Development Agency, also an ECA) (“Le barrage de Manantali”).

Typical of other dam works was an embedded biopolitical agenda, in this case the re-engineering of the local farmers from backward to modern political beings. Prior to government intervention, the people of the region had lived in relative political and administrative isolation from the body politic of Mali. They resided in villages that hugged the banks of the river, where water was yearly available, and irrigated their crops by drawing water from the river with buckets. They also established hamlets further away in the drier bush fields where they grew grain, peanuts, and occasionally cash crops such as tobacco (Koenig and Diarra 23-52). Approximately 20,000 ethnic Malinké were resettled from the immediate vicinity of the Bafing River between 1986 and 1987 to make way for the reservoir created by the dam. A further 12,000 were displaced in the second phase of construction. According to the OMVS, the objectives of the dam included: “The irrigation of 255,000 hectares of land in the valley; the year-round navigability of the Senegal River from St. Louis to Ambidédi; the annual production of 800 Gwh of electrical energy guaranteed nine years out of ten” (“Le barrage de Manantali”).

By drawing Malinké villagers out of isolation and into the national fold, resettlement is transformative, turning people from peripheral non-state beings into manageable subjects. Because the government of Mali was not democratic at the time, the OMVS solicited no input from the local people; the transformation was not intended to create participatory political actors, but rather subjects susceptible to state managerial-technocratic control. The switch from rain-fed agriculture to irrigation from the Bafing River also signaled a shunning of the traditional and a move toward the use of modern technology. Sorghum and other cereals grown using traditional rain-fed agricultural methods required the land to lie fallow for some six months during the dry season, allowing the soil’s nutrients to replenish. Yields were typically 400 kilograms per hectare (Rasmussen et. al 62).

These assumptions, as we shall repeatedly see, rested on a normative judgement that pathologized indigenous knowledge and modes of coexisting with ecosystems, instead championing Western scientific knowledge and standardized industrial modes of production, even in agriculture. It is significant that the resettlement program involved not only the physical movement of the Malinké population downstream, but also their historical movement into modernity through the provision of technological implements for mechanized agriculture, the introduction of a new staple crop

despite the cultural importance of sorghum, and the end of the Malinké practice of seasonal relocation to different climate zones for cultivation of diverse foodstuffs and cash crops (a way of mitigating risks inherent to rain fed agriculture). The OMVS plan was, therefore, more than population management; at its core was a biopolitical agenda which sought to transform the Malinké and to compel them to interact with technical and managerial agents of the state on an everyday basis.

However, due to the political instability and lack of coordination among the executing agencies, as well as to disagreements among member states, the Manantali dam project did not reach its stated objectives. Villagers were moved downstream, yet few benefits accruing from the dam manifested themselves in the new village of Bamafele. Much of the irrigation that resulted in the dam's construction was directed towards other areas further downstream. Thus, resettled villagers complained of infertile lands and lack of public services such as health posts or electricity. "The very first beneficiaries of the dam should have been the local people who sacrificed their fertile land, their homes, and their ancestors' sacred burial sites. Instead we are the last," bemoaned a local school director (qtd. in Baxter). Furthermore:

Peasant farmers could not afford the inputs required for irrigation farming. Traditional sorghum crops were replaced with rice, which proved less productive than expected and cost more than the imported product [rice]. (Annex 5)

Rice cultivation is dependent on the input of mineral fertilizers, the haphazard use of which produces wide fluctuations from between one and six tons per hectare, the higher figure having been recorded only in areas with continually functioning irrigation systems (Rasmussen et. al 63). As a result, many of the resettled farmers who were encouraged to plant rice have emerged indebted and dependent on government subsidies to run their irrigation networks. Also, environmental disruption has led to a growing epidemic of schistosomiasis among villagers, especially among children; to a drastic reduction in fish stocks, which has lowered protein intake; and to deforestation caused by changing the natural flow of the river (Southgate et. al 77; Black and Sessay 37). The Manantali displacement experience essentially destroyed the autonomy, economic well-being, and public health of thousands of Malinké, transforming them into passive subject-recipients of aid by donor agencies and of handouts provided by OMVS. As Michael Watts from the University of California at Berkeley wrote, "what was key for Foucault was not the displacement of one form of power by another,

nor the historical substitution of feudal by modern governmentality, but the complex triangulation involved in sustaining many forms of power put to the purpose of security and regulation” (Watts 14). In the case of Manantali, such governmentality was deployed to the end of subjugating a peripheral population through their transfer and through the provision of irrigation equipment requiring technical oversight.

#### THE ILISU DAM: FROM KURDS TO “PERIPHERAL TURKS”

The same refracted process of governmentality seen in Manantali reached new heights in Turkey with the proposed project of the Ilisu Dam, built to hold back the Tigris River in Southeastern Anatolia. This dam, if completed, will submerge the ancient city of Hasankeyf and displace 20,000 people, 90 percent of whom are Kurds. The aims of the dam’s construction are, first and foremost, power generation, and, secondly, irrigation and water management. True to the new paradigm of large-scale infrastructure projects, Ilisu, with a project cost of US \$1.5 billion, would be two-thirds financed by export credit agencies of OECD countries. The Ilisu dam is only one of the 22 dams Turkey has already built or seeks to build in the region as part of the \$32 billion dollar program Southeast Anatolia Development Project, known by its Turkish acronym of GAP. Due to intense competition among large multinational engineering concerns and the massive amounts of export earnings that a dam contract would yield to a given country, plus earnings from interest, ECAs hungrily covet financing opportunities. Hence, as civil society and activist networks begin to mobilize against the perceived negative environmental, political, and socio-cultural effects of the project, and as companies have withdrawn from of the consortium, other ECAs have shown themselves willing to provide the backing.

In 2001, UK-based Balfour Beatty withdrew from the consortium, abandoning a £200 million subcontract in a move that effectively pre-empted the British Export Credit Guarantee Department’s widely anticipated decision to bankroll the project. Sweden’s Skanska withdrew in 2000, and Italy’s Impregilo withdrew the same year as Balfour. However, Austria’s VA Tech, Switzerland’s ABB, and Sulzer Hydro remain committed to the project with the financial banking of a number of European ECAs led by the Swiss ECA *Exportrisikogarantie*. This timeline of changing financiers illustrates the problem of differing regulations and norms among ECAs. The implications are that a project one ECA declines to finance is fair game for others seeking to support their countries’ multinational corporations and to earn rents in interest payments.

Much like the Bafing River area in Mali, southeast Turkey is an isolated area home to a minority group, the Kurds. The Kurds are an ethnically distinct Sunni Muslim group who speak a language loosely related to Persian (Farsi). They inhabit a vaguely defined, rugged, and mountainous area known unofficially as “Kurdistan,” which encompasses parts of Armenia, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Approximately eight million ethnic Kurds live within the Republic of Turkey, and some seven to twelve million more are scattered in neighboring countries. The Turkish government, however, recognizes only three minorities within its borders: the Jewish, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian Orthodox communities, whose rights to practice their respective religions and to operate schools in their ancestral/liturgical languages are guaranteed by the 1924 Treaty of Lausanne, and are carefully scrutinized by their respective nation-states of Israel, Greece, and (since 1990) Armenia. The Kurdish people enjoy no such protection. Their status as a distinct ethno-linguistic group is not recognized by the Turkish state; they have successively been referred to in official parlance as “Mountain Turks” in the 1930s and 1940s and as “Eastern Turks,” or *dogulu*, in the 1980 census, a fact which seems to position the Kurds as backward relatives of “lowland” or “Western” Turks who might transit to modernity with government intervention (“Who are the Kurds?”). Towards this end, Turkey has actively supported policies that would encourage the migration of Kurds to urban centers, a policy that could result in the dilution of the Kurdish population in the southeastern border areas, perhaps fundamentally altering its culture in Istanbul’s milieu. From 1984 to 1999, the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) has initiated an armed insurrection in Turkey’s restless southeastern provinces that has led to the displacement of some 100,000 people from the area, the majority of whom are Kurds.

A climate conducive to the deployment of capital and technical knowledge by the state towards “solving” the Kurdish question in southeastern Turkey has been created and includes: (1) the neo-liberal advice of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to engage the private sector and to tap into its financing capability and expertise; (2) the fact that the area remains under a declared “regional state of emergency governance,” hence removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; and (3) the fact that many Kurdish civil society groups and militant organizations are concentrating their efforts on exercising the few rights they have won as concessions to the European Union (such as freedom to instruct and to broadcast in the Kurdish language). In this atmosphere, the resettlement policies of the State Hydraulic Works (known by its Turkish acronym, DSI) authority are directed towards subverting Kurdish identity and proletarianizing and disbursing Kurds throughout the country.

Preliminary proposals based on experiences from previous GAP resettlement schemes, that relocated some 200,000, systematically excluded many residents from sufficient compensation offers or strongly discouraged them from participating. DSI has decided to recognize only Ottoman-era land titles, known as the institution of the *aga*. The *agas* are tribal landlords who were granted large fiefdoms by the Ottoman Turks as a means of buying their loyalty and were employed to such an extent that today, in some areas of the Southeast, 2.37 percent of households own 40 percent of the land (Morvaridi, "Methodological" 10). The *agas* still hold the land titles, though in principle other landless Kurds may have informally bought property, entered into sharecropping agreements, or made use of the land as a common right among the Kurdish clans (Morvaridi, "Contentious Development Issues" 14). Thus, DSI resettlement policies reward disproportionately the cadre of *agas* who have long constituted a co-opted leadership that has perpetuated the subjugation and control over Kurds in their mountain villages. Poorer residents lacking firm titles to land that they farm are thus given little choice but to accept urban resettlement, perhaps to Diyarbakir, a city with a large Kurdish population but also one housing a significant Turkish military presence. This manipulation of incentives had previously produced dubious results in other dam resettlement schemes of GAP that have not been sufficiently questioned and analyzed. In villages in the Diyarbakir province, 1078 families out of 1582 opted for urban resettlement, and furthermore, in Atatürk and Batman regions, 95 percent and 85 percent, respectfully, of some 60,000 families opted for "self resettlement" with minimal compensation (Morvaridi, "Stakeholder's Report" 19).

The DSI and its private sector partners have compounded their failings by inadequately surveying the area's stakeholders. Of the 184 villages slated to be flooded, 85 were found to be empty after cursory helicopter surveys, presumably a result of the security situation in the Southeast. The DSI has not bothered to adequately seek out displaced residents of these "empty" villages for inclusion in the resettlement and compensation program, and it has been in their interest to assume that these residents had permanently abandoned the Ilisu environs and found suitable accommodation elsewhere (Morvaridi, "Methodological" 8). Dr. Behrooz Morvaridi, Senior Lecturer at the Centre for International Development at the University of Bradford, UK has analyzed the Ilisu dam project as part of his PhD dissertation and as a consultant for a British ECA. He asserts that "although the [Resettlement Action Plan (RAP)] details various valid mitigation initiatives related to income restoral, it does not detail any specific strategies for resolving issues of social tension, ethnicity, and conflict that will challenge risk mitigation measures" (Morvaridi, "Methodological" 10).

The Ilisu RAP systematically ignores key issues such as customary rights to land and the effects on vulnerable groups such as women, youth, pensioners, internally displaced individuals, and the very poor. Despite the lifting of the ban on the Kurdish language, no DSI documents including the RAP are available in Kurdish. Hence, “much of the circulating information on the Ilisu dam and displacement/resettlement is by word of mouth (60%) or [nascent Kurdish-language] journalistic media (20%), rather than from government institutions (<5%)” (Morvaridi, “Methodological” 14). This chronic lack of credible information from reputable and official sources has exacerbated a climate of uncertainty in the area that most likely has affected and continues to affect local investment patterns and that may lead to landlords evicting their tenants in hopes of claiming more compensation for themselves. As one frustrated villager commented, contrasting his situation to that of his local *aga*, “There is no life for us. Only those who have lands in the villages are going to benefit from this dam. One family [the *aga*] has cultivated thousands of trees so that they can get more compensation from the government. Those are the ones who will benefit—not us who have nothing” (Morvaridi, “Stakeholder’s” 46).

The deliberateness of this distorted form of governmentality becomes even more perceptible when one examines the situation of the historic city of Hasankeyf (population: 6,000). Hasankeyf has been continuously inhabited for over a millennium and was first registered by the Turkish government as a “first degree protected archeological site” in 1981. It holds special significance for the Kurdish people, who comprise 60 percent of the town’s population (the remaining 40 percent are Arabs). Several man-made caves have been carved out of cliff sides outside the town where three important religious figures are thought to be buried. Hasankeyf is a center of Kurdish culture and pilgrimage, and historically served as the capital of an independent Kurdish emirate. Thus, in submerging Hasankeyf (which could be saved if the Ilisu dam specifications were altered) in spite of its protected status, Turkish authorities are literally drowning an icon of Kurdish autonomy and self-determination.

In this Turkish example, the biopolitics is found in the unleashing of the state’s violence of governmentality upon the Kurdish population. That is to say, following the effects of the security forces and martial law in the country’s southeast, which has displaced almost a million people, the GAP project will at once drown an important ethno-political symbol of Kurdish separatism and ethnic identity and will effectively engineer the “voluntary” relocation of thousands of Kurds to urban areas, where the state can effectively watch over them. Furthermore, it will perhaps dilute their Kurdish roots and erode their way of life, which includes subsistence farming and

sharecropping agreements which exist outside of Turkey's growing market economy. Ironically, despite the drive of modern science and information gathering that the DSI perpetuates with the reports it commissions, by creating and propagating a climate of misinformation and uncertainty through its failing to inform the Kurdish population of its resettlement plan, it has shown a selective application of this knowledge that can only be explained by the biopolitics behind the GAP. In this fashion, a key agency of the Turkish state in the southeast has shown an unwillingness to engage the local community in its home region, preferring instead to affect a population transfer of said people to an area where the state infrastructure and security apparatus is already in place. In this way, the displacement of the Kurdish people resembles what has been called 'authoritarian governmentality' or "an articulation of generalized uses of the instruments of repression with biopolitics" (Watts 15). This negative biopolitics, therefore, does not seek to internalize into its subjects methods of state control but rather to contain, subvert, and literally dislocate them.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As has been demonstrated with these two case studies, both the literature generated by the World Commission of Dams and by the World Bank, as well as the demands of protest movements in the developed world, have shown a lack of attention to the cultural rights of ethnic minority groups or indigenous peoples who are threatened by dam construction with displacement. Furthermore, "states are not simply functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production that are themselves always culturally represented and understood in particular ways" (Ferguson and Gupta 981). Therefore, managerial population transfers also help accomplish embedded biopolitical agendas completing the construction of the nation-state as the governing elite sees fit. The international community that has widely accepted a state-centric paradigm often does not recognize that states represent artificial and incomplete socio-political constructs, and that all democracies are not necessarily inclusive and equitable systems. In the case studies illuminated above, technical and scientific knowledge influenced by Western methods of investigation and statecraft have been put to use to the end of widening the circle of nationhood, not by free association and local elite imagination, but rather through the violence of displacement and cultural disarticulation.

Furthermore, the new neo-liberal paradigm has turned hydroelectric dam finance away from multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and into a gray area covered by export credit agencies (ECAs) and by

major European, American, and Japanese engineering firms. The World Bank has showed a willingness to improve its environmental and transparency standards through consultation with stakeholders such as NGOs, the private sector, and governments within the WCD context. The World Bank, despite its flaws, still has a structure in which developing countries are represented on the board of governors; the composition of staff has a much larger percentage than previously from developing countries and the organization consults with several NGO and civil society pressure groups. However, the model developed by the World Bank's in-house anthropologist, Michael Cernea, does not directly address cultural concerns, nor does it factor in a lack of credible information as an adverse consequence. ECAs, on the other hand, have made no contractual commitments to sustainable development, nor even paid lip service to it. Instead, they are oriented towards increasing competitiveness for their country's multinational corporations and towards making profits on interest earnings from loans to developing nations.

While public pressure did compel Balfour Beatty and the British ECA to withdraw support for the Ilisu dam project in Turkey, the mobilizing structures were mostly centered around perceived environmental damage and political concerns over water management within the wider Middle East. It is thus unclear whether the cultural rights of the Kurdish people could provide a galvanizing force in Austria and Switzerland, where the financing ECAs are based. The fierce competition among ECAs for loans and subcontracts for their companies has meant that there are no clear standards for evaluating prospective projects and for weighing their adverse environmental and social effects. Given that they are partially funded with taxes by ordinary citizens, ECAs should in theory be held accountable for their practices by taxpayers in rich OECD countries. Yet activist networks are more attuned to the perceived transgressions of the World Bank and the IMF; the obscurity and opacity of ECAs and their ability to deflect attention onto multinational corporations make them unlikely targets for popular or NGO pressure.

In the absence of a credible commitment to sustainable and equitable development goals on the part of ECAs, the question remains as to whether taxpayers in the OECD countries are informed that their tax dollars, euro, and pounds bankroll partially undemocratic governments seeking to reify their own conceptions of the nation-state. A follow-up question could be posed as to whether citizens in the OECD countries could be motivated to press for accountability on the part of their ECAs. The ability of ECAs to work in tandem with their respective corporations raises another question as to whether these firms constitute true multinational corporations, or

whether—at least in the engineering sector—they have become rent-seeking and parasitic entities searching for business by supporting questionable projects, unsustainable practices, and undemocratic regimes. Finally, my research on dam finance indicates that, despite the continued and accelerated subversion of the state in the global South by the increasing penetration of multinational corporations, by a robust civil society, and by Bretton Woods Institutions, states are still capable of mobilizing significant technical apparatuses to conduct resettlement operations with clear substantive, people-forming goals in mind. This is a potentially disturbing ramification, as distorted governmentality such as this could lead to a loss of cultural diversity as well as the forced homogenization and proletarianization of minority groups.

Now that the Ilisu dam project appears to be moving forward, it is prudent to make a number of policy recommendations for the DSI and for the ECAs still involved in the finance. The ECAs of Switzerland and Austria should compel the DSI to release its resettlement plan both to the affected people in southeastern Turkey and to civil society groups. The fact that many of the people that are to be displaced have not received information from credible sources is alarming and illustrates the need for public disclosure in Turkish society. Unfortunately, given the lack of judicial review in the area and the tense security situation, checks and balances in the developing Turkish democracy cannot be entirely trusted. The Turkish government appears willing to loosen some of its control on the Kurds only in order to extract concessions from the European Union upon accession to that political body. Turkey must be similarly pressured by the European Union to go beyond token gestures and to allow substantive participation by the Kurds and Kurdish civil society. If it sees the sacred minarets of Hasankeyf disappearing under rising waters, the PKK may bow to popular resentment and recommence its armed uprising. The program of distorted governmentality may backfire, the consequences of which for the Turkish state and the volatile Middle East region might well be disastrous. The ECAs may lose their investments as well as their public credibility. Ultimately, there are important lessons to be learned from the overall displacement of some 10 million people due to dam construction and its attendant distorted biopolitical governmentality. Alternative energy sources must be developed, and proper accounting for the social externalities of dam resettlement must be performed in order to avoid repeating the same tragedies of the past.

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